USSOCOM Lessons Learned
On the Go in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa
By Mr. T. Secor

Draining the Swamp:
The Role of Operational Knowledge in Fighting the Persistent Conflict
By Mr. P. Fortuna & Ms. J. Sweezy

Proposed Precepts for Irregular Warfare
By Col. L. Caporicci
**Report Documentation Page**

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Horizons

Horizons is a semi-annual U.S. Special Operations Center for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF) publication. Contents are not necessarily the official views of, or endorsed, by the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or USSOCOM. The content is edited, prepared and provided by SOKF, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, Florida, 33621. The editor of Horizons reserves the right to edit all articles, photos, artwork, and letters presented for publication.

MG Steve Hashem, USA
Director
SOKF

SGM Jack Stanford, USA
Senior Enlisted Advisor
SOKF

Col Andy Hamilton, USAF
Deputy Director
SOKF

CAPT David Jones, USN
Director
J7

Col Lou Caporicci, USAF
Director
J9

COL Jeffrey Goble, USA
Director
J10

For further information about SOKF, contact us at:
Commercial – (813) 826-5710
DSN – (813) 299-5710

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER FOR KNOWLEDGE & FUTURES

The Center for Knowledge and Futures was established on May 1, 2004, at the direction of General Bryan D. Brown, Commander, USSOCOM. Originally consisting of two directorates, the J7 and J9, SOKF now includes the J10, Irregular Warfare Directorate, which was added in September 2007. The Center’s mission is to develop and prepare fully capable Special Operations Forces for the present and into the future, ready to conduct military operations, build partner capacity and promote security engagement, through doctrine, education, and training; future concepts, wargaming, and capabilities integration; and institutionalizing irregular warfare across the joint force. As specified in the USSOCOM Organization and Functions manual, the Title X responsibilities of the Center are:

- Developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics
- Recommending programs and proposing budgets
- Controlling expenditures
- Educating and training SOF
- Conducting specialized courses
- Prioritizing requirements
- Validating requirements
- Ensuring interoperability of equipment and forces
- Ensuring combat readiness of SOF
- Preparing SOF to carry out assigned missions

COL Joe Osborne, CAPT David Jones, SGM Jack Stanford, MG Steve Hashem, Col Andy Hamilton, Col Lou Caporicci, Not Pictured COL Jeffrey Goble.
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Dear Reader,

Welcome to the third edition of the SOKF magazine, Horizons. I’ve been fortunate enough to have been extended by ADM Olson as Director of the Center for Knowledge and Futures for another year. I’m excited by this prospect, both because of the amazing accomplishments of the personnel of this Center and because of the opportunity to oversee further maturing of the processes and programs of SOKF.

The personnel of SOKF have continued to contribute to the efforts of this Command to fully prepare the SOF warrior for all the challenges the world of today and tomorrow will offer. Among other accomplishments, our Joint Interagency Training Specialists led representatives from all staff sections in an overhaul of the Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) of this Headquarters. The list was streamlined and all staff sections fully understand their part in helping accomplish the JMETLs. Our Standardization Branch continues to work to accomplish ADM Olson’s wish to have common and consistent joint standards of performance for tasks, such as military freefall and combat dive. They are beginning work on common standards for other sets of tasks; if your staff have not heard from them yet, you soon will. Our Lessons Learned Branch has sent active collection teams to CJSOTF-A, CJTF-HOA, and CJSOTF-AP to improve the gathering of lessons learned in those regions. They’ve also ramped up their dissemination efforts with bulletins and multiple types of reports. Our J9 personnel have helped put the finishing touches on the Defeating Terrorist Networks Joint Integrating Concept. That concept has subsequently been approved by the Joint Capabilities Board and was forwarded to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for approval. Also in J9, our Wargaming and Experimentation folks have partnered with this Headquarters’ Science and Technology Office, Component Commands, and TSOCs to develop a process for satisfying emergent warfighter requirements in a more responsive manner. They have, in fact, tested and refined an area monitoring and detection system that holds promise as a potent force protection tool. Please contact J9 if you have similar requirements you’d like explored. J10 continues its work to institutionalize Irregular Warfare (IW) throughout DoD. They’ve made progress in getting IW documented in DoD and CJCS instructions and have a list of publications on their website on the USSOCOM portal.

I hope you find that the information in this magazine increases your knowledge of SOKF. If you have thoughts or suggestions you’d like to send to us, please send them to horizons@socom.mil or call (813) 826-5710. We will ensure your thoughts are passed along to the right person.

Enjoy reading this magazine and continue to keep the SOF warrior as the best trained and equipped, most capable warrior in the world.

Steven J. Hashem
Major General, U.S. Army
Center Director
The Center for Knowledge and Futures recently engaged in a series of strategic workshops to review and update its mission and vision, and establish strategic goals and objectives. The updated mission, vision, goals, and objectives provide overarching strategic guidance for the Center, in support of the USSOCOM mission, and provide direction for the Center’s functions, products, and services in support of our Special Operations Forces.

**SOKF Vision**

The recognized expert in Special Operations Forces knowledge, institutionalizing irregular warfare, and developing and integrating future concepts and capabilities

**SOKF Mission**

Develop and prepare fully capable Special Operations Forces for the present and into the future, ready to conduct military operations, build partner capacity and promote security engagement, through doctrine, education, and training; future concepts, wargaming, and capabilities integration; and institutionalizing irregular warfare across the joint force
USSOCOM’s Lessons Learned: On the Go in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa

By Mr. Troy Secor

“Active collection consists of activities designed to gather vital information from SOF operations, contingencies, exercises, wargames, and training events in order to archive, analyze, resolve, and disseminate observations, insights and lessons learned (OIL) that can assist the efforts of the SOF warfighter and USSOCOM doctrine, operations, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) processes.”

— USSOCOM Directive 11-3

USSOCOM Lessons Learned Active Collection Teams (LLAT) first became operational in February 2008. Composed of former SOF operators, the teams were designed to collect OIL from specific real-world operations, training events, exercises, or experiments. After initially completing a variety of collection efforts supporting HQ USSOCOM and its Component Commands, the teams prepared to deploy to the CENTCOM and AFRICOM Areas of Operation to collect OIL emerging from ongoing activities in those theaters.

In December 2008, and at the request of SOCCENT and SOCAFRICA, LLATs deployed to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), and the Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA).

The objectives of the LLAT are:

♦ Provide immediate feedback to the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), Components, and other organizations as appropriate, to improve joint warfighting operations and provide information for efforts to transform the force

♦ Serve as an advocate for resolution of issues that require significant levels of coordination and support outside the Geographic Commander’s area of responsibility (AOR)

♦ Serve as a resource to TSOC personnel when access to USSOCOM areas of expertise or other elements of support are requested or required

♦ Identify joint lessons learned that provide the opportunity for immediate impact on the ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations and feed them back into the education and training systems

“Active collection methods include: collecting direct observations, conducting interviews, and surveying event-focused observations to provide initial analysis and immediate feedback.”

— USSOCOM Directive 11-3
Location is Everything

In order to meet these objectives, the LLATs need to be located in the environment that affords them the greatest access to both current operations and key leaders. By attending mission planning activities, observing operations during execution, and actively participating in the after-action process, the LLATs can more easily and more effectively identify those issues that need to be recorded and highlighted for resolution. Quality lessons learned data requires detailed situational awareness. Second only to this is the support of key leaders. Without regular engagement with decision-makers at all levels of command, lessons do not get learned and institutionalized.

Rules of Engagement

When dispatched to support a Subunified Command or TSOC, collected observations, insights and lessons learned are not released until they have been vetted by the originating Command. This ensures the OIL are accurately reflected and leverage the expertise of the staff. Interviews are also vetted with the interviewee to validate context. The goal of the vetting process is to pass valid OIL quickly through the SOF, conventional, and inter-agency communities.

“An active request by a Combatant Command for OIL should be in the form of augmentation support for internal command active collection activities, or as a full package, externally generated, active collection lessons learned activity.”

– CJCS 3150.25D

Samples of Success

LLATs have collected on a variety of topics. This information is typically disseminated through a variety of publications such as Lessons Learned Newsletters, Lessons Learned Bulletins, and Senior SOF Leader Executive Summaries, and via the Joint Lessons Learned Information System – Special Operations Forces (JLLIS-SOF). JLLIS-SOF is accessible through the Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) at: http://www.jllis.smil.mil/ussocom. A sampling of recent collections follows.

Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Systems

At the request of Naval Special Warfare Support Activity One and the CJSOTF-A and CJSOTF-AP staffs, the LLATs collected OIL on the operational use of the Scan Eagle (SE) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) in support of SOF operations. They focused on issues pertaining to SE training, personnel, equipment and sustainment, tactical achievements and innovations, and logistics challenges and best practices. The LLATs collected 53 OIL, conducted 49 interviews, and secured more than 200 supporting documents. The OIL pointed to deficiencies in training, operator qualification, and logistics support. These OIL were shared with the Center for Special Operations Acquisition Logistics Fixed Wing Unmanned Aerial System Office who worked with the SE contractor and SOCCENT to begin corrective actions. In parallel, the OIL also highlighted tactical innovation on the part of SE operators, leveraging the strengths of the system, and mitigating its weaknesses. These tactical innovations were shared with the broader SE community so they did not reside solely at one operating site.

Mr. David Hilliard, a Boeing mechanic operator, retrieves a Boeing Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from a skyhook, a small suspended rope that catches the UAV out of mid-air, during the training exercise Desert Talon 2-06 aboard Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., June 16, 2006. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Guadalupe M. Deanda III)
Biometrics

There are currently three primary biometrics systems in use across Iraq and Afghanistan. One system is considered to have outlived its useful life, and the other two systems, by all appearances, have significant capability gaps. The first generation Special Operations Identification System (SOIDS), with the MV-5 wand, is antiquated and cumbersome in most field situations compared to newer equipment. The Cogent Fusion and Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK) systems, although smaller and more rugged, do not appear to have been fully field-tested prior to employment. Operators cited numerous shortcomings of both pieces of equipment. This information was passed to the SCSO-J24 Identity Superiority Program at USSOCOM and many of the suggestions made for improvement were addressed and will be implemented before the next model is issued to the force.

Operation Good Heart

A 5-year-old Iraqi girl, Tiba, was identified as suffering from a severe congenital heart defect that would have been fatal if not treated. She required specialized heart surgery that hospitals in Iraq were not capable of performing. Through the efforts of several 1st Special Forces Group Soldiers, Tiba was granted full medical treatment at Maine Medical Center in Portland, Maine. The success or failure of this operation from an Irregular Warfare (IW) standpoint depended upon how and when the public was informed. “A very detailed plan was developed that took into consideration every possibility that could turn the operation into a negative message, including cultural and religious concerns,” said a 1SFG soldier. It was critical that every aspect of the story incorporated an Iraqi face, such as Tiba’s, to communicate and emphasize Tiba’s hope and our service to help in her time of need. LLATs were there to collect every aspect of the process and ultimately wrote 19 separate observations, insights and lessons learned.

“Pre-deployment experience and training levels vary significantly between the SE UAS sites. SE-specific training is insufficient. Although personnel were able to draw upon aviation and UAS experience, this experience was ad-hoc as opposed to resulting from formal training. Many contractor field service representatives (FSRs) at the SE UAS sites do not even have related backgrounds, nor familiarity with current theater operations,” said a Scan Eagle operator, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Mr. Troy Secor is the Branch Manager for Lessons Learned Collection and Analysis. A retired Combat Controller, Mr. Secor has been working in the Directorate of Joint SOF Knowledge (J7) Lessons Learned for almost three years.

Mr. Troy Secor
The 2008 Quadrennial Roles & Missions review established Irregular Warfare (IW) as a core mission area for the Department of Defense (DoD). On 1 December 2008, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance for institutionalizing IW across the Department in the form of DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.07.

DoDD 3000.07 articulates Department policy for IW, assigns specific responsibilities for DoD offices and military components, and prioritizes twelve actions or activities to enable “operationalizing IW.” This term is defined by the DoD Dictionary as: “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.”

IW is people-oriented, population-centric, and takes place in the presence of an enemy. DoDD 3000.07 articulates five primary and seven secondary IW activities – which are well-understood, practiced and developed civil-military approaches for addressing the complex socio-political dimensions of conflict. These activities provide

**Definition of Irregular Warfare:**

“A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.”

— DoD Dictionary
coherent operational approaches for developing popular support for U.S. and Partner State strategic objectives, bridging the gap between desired strategic outcomes and the systems and application sequences of tactics, techniques and procedures required to realize them. By executing the five primary IW activities in the presence of an enemy, Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) operationalize IW by building legitimacy with and influence over relevant populations, and eroding the legitimacy of and popular support for the enemy.

Referred to as the “Big Five,” the five primary operationalizing activities for IW are: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counterterrorism (CT) and Stability Operations (StabOps). The seven secondary activities, supporting the “Big Five,” are: Strategic Communications, Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Intelligence Operations, Counterintelligence Operations and Support to Law Enforcement.

The graphic below illustrates IW’s “Big Five” pillars and the seven supporting activities that link national strategies and objectives to gain or erode support in order to achieve a desired end state - friendly political authority and influence over populations.
These “Big Five” are listed below, along with their definitions, to highlight the key elements of each military capability that enables influence.

FID is defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” FID strengthens the ability of Partner states to resist opposing internal forces by developing their security capabilities and capacities. Enhanced security forces are better able to exercise the writ of government and degrade opposing elements. This increases the stability and security of the population by removing threats to its well-being, consequently enhancing the government’s legitimacy and influence.

UW is defined as “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.” UW directly erodes the influence and legitimacy of hostile state and non-state forces by attacking and de-legitimatizing them by calling into question their ability to secure their own territory and populations against attack.

For our purposes, an insurgency is defined as “a political ‘party’ that rebels against established leadership.” COIN is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” COIN works to enhance the influence and legitimacy of Partner State governments by demonstrating their ability to secure their population, while eroding the same for the insurgents and their cause.

Terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. CT is defined as “operations that include the defensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” CT erodes the influence and legitimacy of terrorist elements by neutralizing the actual terrorists and their organizations and builds the influence and legitimacy of the Partner State government by demonstrating its competence and ability to protect its population while defeating hostile elements.

StabOps is defined as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” StabOps enhances the legitimacy and influence of the Partner State government by demonstrating the superior ability and desire of the state to care for its people compared to opposing forces.

The five IW pillars, FID, UW, COIN, CT and StabOps, each operationalize IW. Each IW activity provides complementary capabilities to translate friendly force tactical actions into desired strategic objectives by simultaneously building popular support for friendly Partner State institutions and degrading that of the opposition. Properly executed, the final effect is to realize “friendly political authority and influence over a relevant population,” the desired enduring strategic end state of Irregular Warfare.

Major David Blankenship is the Chief of Plans & Integration in the Irregular Warfare Directorate (J10). As USSOCOM’s proponent for IW, the J10 is the conduit for irregular warfare collaboration within the Command, and with DoD, the Inter-Agency, and Partner Nations.

Maj. David Blankenship
Irregular Warfare Implementation Progress – Part II

By Mr. John Spotts

In our last issue of Horizons, Winter 2008, SOKF J-10 outlined the USSOCOM’s progress in implementing Irregular Warfare (IW), not only to the Command, but throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). Our significant progress is reported in this issue.

Global Synchronization Conference 7 (GSC 7)

The Global Synchronization Conference is USSOCOM’s vehicle to institutionalize new concepts and coordinate activities, as related to the DoD mission in global efforts against terrorist organizations. GSC 7 was held 20-24 October 2008.

During GSC 7, at the request of U.S. Army III Corps, SOKF J9 and J10 held a four-day working group to examine and quantify potential capability gaps between GPF and SOF forces, in preparation for a battle handoff on the expected drawdown in the Iraqi theater of operations. This drawdown moves from a GPF-heavy force to a SOF-heavy deployment to maintain the current Stability Operations environment.

Partnered with the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), a Distributed Operations Planning Guide outlined planning considerations for the Enabling, Support, Sustainment (ESS) requirements in conducting distributed operations, thus enhancing mutual SOF-GPF
enablers. This planning guide presents planning factors, shortfalls, and possible mitigating factors for common military tasks and provides planners with a tool to facilitate their operational planning. The planning guide was distributed to multi-national forces (MNF), U.S. Army III Corps, and other organizations.

Global Synchronization Conference 8 (GSC 8)

The GSC 8, held 20-24 April 2009, allowed for the IW Working Group to return to the policymaking sphere. Since the IW DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.07 was signed in December 2008, the next policy implementation document is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI).

The CJCSI is the Chairman’s vehicle for implementing IW policy in the Services, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. Again, USSOCOM, in partnership with JFCOM, devoted its GSC Working Group to developing a strawman CJCSI with regards to implementing IW. This document, nested with the IW DODD, will enhance the operationalization and institutionalization of IW within DoD. This CJCSI is now being circulated at the Joint Staff for comment and approval.

Irregular Warfare Education

As noted in last issue’s IW Implementation Progress Update, Professional Military Education (PME) plays a key role in effectively implementing IW. To that end, in April 2009, USSOCOM conducted its bi-annual Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) review for IW subject matter inclusion. USSOCOM submitted over 50 changes to course curriculums, from pre-Commissioning

Department of Defense Irregular Warfare Directive

The signing of DoD Directive Number 3000.07, on December 1, 2008, marked a significant event. This placed the Secretary of Defense’s formal institutionalization order into effect for the concept of IW throughout all of DoD.

Many of the IW missions and activities are inherent within USSOCOM’s missions, so USSOCOM has a head start in implementing IW.

The signing of this Directive also puts USSOCOM and Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in a leadership role for developing complementary IW concepts; USSOCOM for Special Operations Forces (SOF); and USJFCOM for General Purpose Forces (GPF).
to General Officer-level courses, recommending IW as a primary doctrinal educational topic of instruction. Of these submissions, 100% of the recommended changes were accepted by Joint Staff for inclusion. With the approved OPMEP, institutional schools must develop IW periods of instructions in order to “educate the force” on IW. This type of IW instruction will develop a more comprehensive leader to meet today’s complex combat environment.

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept

The September 2007 IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is currently being revised to reflect a regular transformation of current education, experiences, and lessons learned, with regard to IW. With SOKF J9 as the lead editor, the revision is under its 1.4 version.

Department of Defense Steady-State Exercise

The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) is conducting a steady state exercise with an African scenario that will test how IW threats can be met in an increasing tempo (surge) environment. USSOCOM is providing players to this OSD-John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory partnered exercise to contribute SOF capabilities and gain further experience in IW situations.

The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) report identified IW as an emerging threat to U.S. national security and as an enduring mission for DoD to add to its “specific areas of emphasis” for transformation of the Force in preparation for future conflict. This conflict is much more complex than traditional warfare and the objectives are to win the support of the relevant populations through indirect means, a mission in which SOF has historical, traditional, and inherent expertise. USSOCOM has made significant strides in revitalizing IW within SOF and through its outreach liaison across DoD.

Mr. John Spotts is an L-3 contractor for the Irregular Warfare Directorate (J10). A former Army Psychological Operations officer, Mr. Spotts has worked for J10 since 2008. He holds a master’s degree in National Security Studies.
Irregular Warfare (IW) is presently characterized as a violent struggle. This term is certainly struggling to find its place in the Babel of milspeak.

Is it a form of warfare? Does it represent a unique battle space? Is it offensive or defensive? Is it a legal form of warfare? Are IW subordinate activities (e.g., unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and stability operations) exhaustive, truncated, or just flat wrong?

It is clear that U.S. military forces (and perhaps other countries) have had a difficult time countering the Taliban, Al Qaeda (AQ), AQ affiliates, ‘foreign fighters,’ maritime pirates, and a variety of highly enabled rogue surrogates with our Cold War-sharpened instrument of war.

These challenges have proved so vexing that the Department of Defense (DoD) pointedly addresses this new “not-major-combat-operations” conundrum in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Irregular Warfare (IW) Road Map, subsequent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM), Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) - Version 1.0, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) Guidance for the Development of the Force Study, and many other studies and projects.

As indicated in many of his recent speeches, Secretary of Defense Gates is not optimistic that the DoD and Services’ can transform to be effective in addressing these challenges, while maintaining our...
nation’s conventional dominance. To that end, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) have partnered to write the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0: Countering Irregular Threats.

The intent of this Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is to answer a question that Secretary Gates feels we have not resolved, “How do we utilize our current and future force to, on order, prevent, deter, disrupt, defeat, and/or destroy state and non-state adversaries who adopt irregular methods?,” as stated in his 9 July, 2008 testimony to Congress.

In the end, it is necessary to identify the gaps and key capabilities that will allow this joint force to be effective, without the need for overly specialized or separate forces. Economically, a flexible homogeneous force is eminently desirable. The JOC will distill as many doctrine, organization, training and education, materiel, leadership and personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) policy change requests, as needed, in order to affect the required changes.

To facilitate answers to these challenges, JOC stakeholders have developed 14 IW Precepts. Though the term, “precepts” typically has religious and military roots and may be perceived as authoritative, the Latin derivation, “precepts” is a term that refers to teaching points used to advise and guide.

The precepts listed are not exhaustive, nor authoritative; the IW JOC writing team found them to be constructive in development of the concept. These 14 IW Precepts guidelines are detailed below:

1: Analyze Each Irregular Threat Uniquely

The political, social, cultural, economic, and military situation will manifest itself differently where irregular threats appear. Decision-makers must spend the effort to examine the factors as a social science problem, as much as a military issue. They must gather as many subject matter experts on all aspects of the problem, as time allows. Appreciation of this
complexity needs to extend to the lowest echelons of command. Operations to illuminate the details of the complexity must drive campaign design.

2: Tactical Victory in Military Engagements Will Not Determine Success

The beliefs, acceptance, and actions of the population in the host country will determine when campaign goals are achieved. Campaign planners and Commanders must focus their measures of effectiveness on how well the population supports the host nation government or irregular threat actors. Actions by military units must be calculated to support all other efforts to reinforce the legitimacy of the host nation government in the eyes of the population.

3: Engage Sovereign Partners as Equals

Campaign planners must design operations to maximize partner strengths accepting short-term risks and inefficiencies. Building partner capacity for legitimate governance takes patience and understanding of the social, political and institutional culture of their nation. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions through the combined efforts of U.S., allied, and non-governmental agencies. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions. Eventually, all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers. One does not have to look further than Alexander’s, the Soviet Union’s, the British Empire’s, and the current United States’ experiences in Afghanistan, as a stark example. The sooner the main effort can transition to host nation institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.

4: Allow Intelligence to Drive Operations

Timely, specific, and reliable intelligence gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the Force helps shape effective operations. Wide-spread dispersed operations make individual combatant’s actions a key generator of intelligence. Intelligence assessment includes gathering information from all possible sources, classified and open-source; both military and non-military in origin. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and associated civilian agencies, are often greater in importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets.

5: Make Legitimacy the Main Objective

The primary objective is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate local government. The U.S. government achieves this objective by the balanced application of both military and non-military means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Success in the form of a sustainable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instruments of national power.

6: Place Unity of Effort at the Center of Operations

Unity of effort is critical in order to subordinate independent uncoordinated action to central leadership, thus minimizing vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single leader has authority over all government agencies involved in operations. Usually, however, military Commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of non-military agencies. The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior host nation representatives, must be key players in higher-level planning; and similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command.

14 Proposed Precepts for Irregular Warfare

1. Analyze each irregular threat uniquely
2. Tactical victory in military engagements will not determine success
3. Engage sovereign partners as equals
4. Allow intelligence to drive operations
5. Make legitimacy the main objective
6. Place unity of effort at the center of operations
7. Attack the root causes of the problem to achieve longer lasting solutions
8. Establish security under the rule of law
9. Prepare for a long term commitment
10. Manage information and expectations
11. Use the appropriate level of force
12. Empower at the lowest levels
13. Employ the appropriate mix of direct and indirect approaches
14. Work with and through a diverse range of partners
7: Attack the Root Causes of the Problem to Achieve Longer Lasting Solutions

Stakeholders’ frustrated needs and grievances often fuel the sources and root causes for support to irregular actors. Full understanding of these factors may require detailed analysis of regional history, ethnicity, culture, politics and religion. Improved governance will usually bring about marginalization of irregular actors to a point where they are destroyed, co-opted or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability. U.S. military intervention may cease when success is assured, but before it is actually achieved.

8: Establish Security Under the Rule of Law

Without a secure environment, implementing permanent reforms is problematic and can lead to spreading disorder. To establish legitimacy, Commanders seek to transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement, as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in-line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals, enhances the host nation government’s legitimacy. The violence level must be reduced enough for police forces to maintain order prior to any transition; otherwise, counterinsurgency (COIN) forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the legitimacy gained by the transition.

9: Prepare for a Long Term Commitment

At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for commencing military operations is crucial, however, experience shows that the typical timeframe for political and public support is three to five years. The irregular threat’s primary battle is against the host nation government, not the United States; however, U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. The American public will not actively support the host nation government unless they are convinced that the military’s deployed forces have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win.
10: Manage Information and Expectations

Information and expectations are related; the joint force Commander must manage both. To limit discontent and build support, the host nation government, and any joint forces in assistance, must create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. Information Operations (IO), including psychological operations and the related activities of public affairs and civil-military operations, are key tools to accomplish this. Campaign designers must use operations to create and maintain an appropriate message, thus helping to control expectations of the population.

11: Use the Appropriate Level of Force

It is vital for Commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely so that it accomplishes the mission, without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering.

12: Empower the Lowest Levels

Delegating Command authority down to the lowest level for mission execution is ideally suited to the mosaic nature of countering irregular threats. Local Commanders have the best grasp of their situations. Under mission command, they are given access to, or control of the resources needed to, produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage IO and civil-military operations. Thus, effective operations are decentralized, and higher Commanders push as many capabilities as possible down to their subordinates. Mission command encourages the initiative of subordinates and facilitates that the learning that must occur at every level. The lowest echelons are closest to the population and therefore, must fight, adapt and react, at least as quickly as the irregular threats.

13: Employ the Appropriate Mix of Direct and Indirect Approaches

Campaign planners need to design operations to blend these two approaches in order to best counter irregular threats. Together, they integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt adversaries while impacting the environment in which the irregular threats operate. The direct approach addresses the immediate requirement to pursue the difficult irregular threats, their infrastructure and their resources. It includes actions to kill, capture and interdict violent extremist networks, and deny their access to and use of weapons of mass destruction. The indirect approach focuses on enabling a diverse range of partners. It entails a broader long-term commitment to foster a self-sustaining indigenous capability and capacity to provide security, develop governance, and promote development.

14: Work With and Through a Diverse Range of Partners

Host nation, Geographic Combatant Command, and Country Team strategies define the objectives in combating irregular threats. Planning must coordinate an integrated theater effort that is joint, inter-agency, and multi-national to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy. Inter-agency coordination during joint operations becomes extremely important. This is the best way to ensure that the efforts complement each other and that available resources are used effectively and efficiently. Effective integration is difficult and consists of much more than mere coordination. Ideally, endeavors such as a well-resourced foreign internal defense program will incorporate all instruments in a coordinated and supporting manner that addresses host nation requirements, as well as U.S. national policy and interests.

Are these 14 IW precepts particularly unique? No. They are rather a guiding imperative to devolve our joint force into something that is better, as existed at various times in our past. The joint force of the United States is striving for a force that functions in a distributed manner, is not overly dependent upon technology, can conduct operations when command and control fails at higher levels, leverages the pioneering and risk-taking nature of our forefathers to forge friendships and liaisons to a mutual advantage, and underwrites the mistakes of junior leaders. Similar to the past, times will dictate when the Force must come together to meet formidable challenges. These precepts, if institutionalized and operationalized across the Force, will yield a better force; and one that best represents the values of this country.

Colonel Louis A. Caporicci is the Director of the Futures Directorate (J9). Previously, the Chief of Concepts for J9 and Deputy Commander, SOCPAC. He is an AFSOF rotary wing command pilot with extensive combat and contingency experience.
Aviation Development in Nation-Assistance Strategies:
Are We Overlooking a Critical Asymmetric Advantage?

By Mr. G. Hale Laughlin

Contemporary conditions involving complex national security initiatives have caused transformation in the way that U.S. national security institutions think about war. Driven by analysis of current and predicted conditions, these initiatives have shifted the ways and means employed to secure U.S. interests in a complex international arena. U.S. strategic initiatives have produced concepts that synthesize conflict theory with security strategy and national policy to guide planning for force structure, resources and response options. The result is increased emphasis in categories including Irregular Warfare (IW) and Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, grounded in activities involving nation-assistance agendas. Significantly, the narrative of IW describes the legitimacy of a government as measured in the minds of the governed. The role that aviation resource development plays in assisting nations, challenged by insurgent pressure and other destabilizing conditions warrants specific consideration in this new strategic paradigm.

Recognizing the fundamental principle that integrated activities of all U.S. instruments of national power are the best approach to this agenda, emphasis has been placed on whole-of-government planning and activities. Combined with the nation-assistance strategy currently guiding U.S. policy, economic development of partner nations is a paramount category that must be factored into the equation. Short of a major power conflict, this new strategic security paradigm can be summarized by stating that U.S. security interests will be obtained to the extent that other nations behave responsibly on the international stage. The U.S. will work to obtain this end by employing ways and means to assist other nations to gain and maintain their own security, stability

An Mi-17 helicopter is unloaded from an Antonov AH-124 transport aircraft in Kabul, Afghanistan, Dec. 1, 2008. Three helicopters will be added to the fleet of the Afghan National Army Air Corps. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Keith Brown)
Please reply to
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USSOCOM SOKF Horizons Survey, Fall 2009

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c) Length of articles
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   1  2  3  4  5

e) Appearance of magazine
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and economic development. It goes without saying that the U.S. will also maintain the right and the ability to prevail in conflict if necessary to secure this end, but that employing indirect ways and means that help other nations gain and maintain their own security and stability through nation-assistance agendas are the preferred persistent approach.

Despite a complex policy environment, executive guidance and logic provide that U.S. security is the paramount strategic end. The real transition has taken place in the ways and means, and resources and methods, in which policy makers have chosen to obtain that objective. Each Cabinet department has had to adjust to the new strategic paradigm. Renewed emphasis on inter-agency integration and coordination are diligently being addressed and progress is being made. This presents an imperative for the Department of Defense (DoD) to broaden its focus to include both Major Combat Operations (MCO), as well as the need for all service components to bring their expertise to bear in stability operations and other nation assistance agendas operating under complex, irregular conditions.

At the dawn of the Cold War, the Kennedy administration ushered in an era of nation-building strategies as a way to thwart the domino effect of communist expansion. Having stepped away from large scale nation-building agendas in the post-Vietnam era, the DoD again finds itself with the need to expand its own capability to work through indirect means to assist other nations to obtain and maintain their own security and stability. Unlike the era of 1960’s, when John F. Kennedy’s response was to expand Special Forces as a way to address his nation-building strategy, current efforts require all service component forces to balance capabilities across stability operations, and security assistance agendas that often take place under irregular conditions. Supported by the Secretary of Defense policy for several years, this shift requires service components to expand outside the well-known direct approach to obtaining security objectives and embrace the less comfortable indirect approach of obtaining objectives by working with and through counterparts of other nations.

Each service component is wrestling with their own unique challenges to meet this imperative, while maintaining the ability to defeat great power adversaries in large-scale conflict. Balancing force structure and resources between conventional MCO focus and IW operations, where the ability to advise a partner nation counterpart is as important as employing a particular skill set in MCO, has proven to be a daunting challenge for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and each component. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has also had its own unique path down this complex IW journey.
Responsible for securing U.S. security objectives in air, space and cyberspace domains around the globe, the USAF performs many roles every hour of every day with much of it unseen and largely unheralded, even by those who benefit from the functions. While many of these functions operate with little need for adaptation across the range of warfighting conditions, there are some functions unique to the Air Force that require adaptation to irregular conditions and the new Building Partnerships (BP), Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), and other related nation assistance agendas. Specifically related to U.S. strategic objectives, regarding the need to assist other nations to gain and maintain their own security, stability and economic development within broader nation assistance agendas, the role of partner nation’s aviation resources must be considered.

For many, the term “air power” conjures images of fighter aircraft and bombers converging on targets to deliver massive lethal kinetic effects, and large cargo aircraft delivering thousands of troops and tons of cargo anywhere in the world day or night. Within the context of nation assistance agendas, and considering some inter-agency partners important to integrated plans and activities for achieving those objectives, the term has little meaning and often produces negative responses. In order to help expand the strategic template necessary to address roles that the USAF provides under irregular warfare and nation assistance agendas, it has been useful to shift the narrative. Shifting the narrative in the BP, BPC and nation assistance realm to the term, “aviation resource capacity and capability” has opened up a space for broader dialogue concerning the strategic asymmetric advantage that aviation resources provide a nation – any nation.

The total aviation resource capacity and capability of a nation involves the sum total of all air domain resources including humans, aircraft, processes and infrastructure in both civilian and military-security sectors. Nation-assistance agendas function within a partner nation’s political, military-security, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) development sectors. The question then becomes, “What role does a nation’s total aviation resource capacity and capability provide to the PMESII conditions of a nation to provide increased legitimacy to the government in the minds of the people?”

Given the global conditions in the early part of the 21st century, objective analysis requires investigation into whether it is possible to have a secure and stable nation in the early 21st century without at least some minimally effective aviation resources to connect the government to the people and the people to each other; to provide commerce critical connections to regional and global markets; to extend the rule of law throughout the country and help to secure borders; and when necessary, to provide part of the security sector necessary to counter criminals and anti-government adversaries. Such analysis might derive the premise that the security, stability and economic development of a nation in the early 21st century may be critically linked to its aviation resource capacity and capability.

Answers to these questions are important to ensure that we do not overlook critical options that may weigh considerably in the balance of effects and influence necessary to achieve U.S. strategic ends. For example, although our earth is 75% water, it is also surrounded by air, yet there are vast segments of the world’s population who live in regions that are not serviced by other transportation infrastructure (e.g., aviation/marine channels). Thus, the lagging development of aviation resources does have an impact on nation-assistance agendas. Therefore, most practitioners argue that ignoring these aviation and maritime resource requirements is not a sustainable course of action. Addressing these needs is critical to developing security, stability and economic development in island nations.

Similarly, we do not have examples from modern history where security has been achieved in counterinsurgent warfare, without the use of aviation resources. While historical examples provide that the use of aviation resources
used to prevail against insurgents have often been supplied by external support interests, the critical factor considering current U.S. strategy, is that building the capacity of other nations to obtain and maintain their own security and stability are paramount. If we apply the lessons of successful counterinsurgency adapted to current U.S. strategies then the implication is that helping those nations to develop their own aviation resources is also critical. The alternatives are either to support U.S. BPC strategy for developing aviation resources in partner nations lacking them, or to program the force structure and resources necessary for the U.S. and coalition partners to uni-laterally or multi-laterally provide the aviation resources necessary to prevail against what are predicted to be increasing magnitudes of insurgent wars and other conflicts.

While the debates and efforts to clarify the current strategic narrative and design the appropriate defense postures necessary to ensure U.S. security continue, consideration of the value that aviation resources provide to a nation threatened by insurgent pressures and stagnated development should receive strong consideration. Historically, policy has not supported development of aviation resources in nations that cannot afford the aircraft that the U.S. has to offer from its advanced inventory. Current strategic conditions indicate that the greatest threats, in terms of ungoverned sanctuaries, combine latent strategic resources for energy (and other minerals that are becoming increasingly scarce and important) within the territories of nations at the lower end of the development scale.2 These nations require specific attention and planning for how to develop their aviation resources.

Developing aviation resources in these nations often involves the need for skill sets and knowledge for how to advise partner nations in the employment of foreign aircraft, as well as the U.S. aircraft that they possess. The gap created by this inattention provided by the aviation development of these nations in past decades has been filled, and continues to be exploited by other powers such as Russia and China. The long-term relationships established by the transfer of aviation equipment and infrastructure warrants close analysis for U.S. industry and policy makers to determine if the ability to compete in this market is important to U.S. security objectives.

The USAF has taken steps to increase its own aviation advising capacity and capability as a way to execute the means to assist aviation development in partner nations. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will further broaden the Air Force’s effectiveness, as lessons learned in those operations are applied to training and development of new generations of advisors. Carrying out the aviation development agendas in support of the broader nation-assistance strategies, and addressing the civilian aspect of aviation development and the security sector, will require policy shifts and other adaptations that allow a whole-of-nation approach, which is necessary to meet the demand. Further analysis may also yield that encroachment on U.S. diplomatic space by the nations of Russia and China in regions like Africa, may warrant pulling from U.S. and other western nation industry to develop aircraft capable of filling the niche market currently occupied by the less expensive, less capable and far more difficult to maintain Russian and Chinese aircraft, yielding a truly whole-of-nation approach to these complex security dynamics.

Draining the Swamp: The Role of Operational Knowledge in Fighting the Persistent Conflict

By Mr. Peter Fortuna and Ms. Jodie Sweezey

To succeed in global operations against terrorist networks, referred to by some as “The Long War,” one must embark upon a deliberate process consisting of reconstruction and nation-building focused on Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Civil Affairs (CA), Security Force Assistance (SFA), and inter-agency participation. According to USSOCOM Commander ADM Olson, this process is “the new normal, not just an aberration.”

What is the future of this new normal and its societal and cultural implications? The National Defense Industrial Association’s (NDIA) 20th Annual Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Symposium and Exhibition focused on this...
subject. Held in Washington, D.C. from 9-12 February 2009, “The Persistent Conflict: The Path Ahead” was elaborated on through white papers, panel discussions, and keynote speakers. This article discusses the subjects covered through the week-long conference, that are currently being addressed by the SOKF J7.

**Addressing The Persistent Conflict**

The symposium panelists and speakers stated that some of what constitutes the “Persistent Conflict” has yet to be defined; but we do know that it is ever-changing and very different from conflicts of the past. As it relates to “Persistent Conflict,” we need to address the application of unconventional warfare (UW), counter-insurgency operations (COIN), and irregular warfare (IW), because the focus is currently on CA, FID, Information Operations (IO), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

As our leadership stated, this new focus will be accomplished by fighting smart to, “drain the swamp, and not just kill all the alligators” and necessitates inter-agency cooperation. This collaborative effort is not just between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) but also between SOF, Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Governmental Agencies (IGA), and multi-national forces.

The SOKF-J7-OD (Operational Knowledge, Doctrine Office) has the DoD lead to develop joint Special Operations (SO) doctrine and ensure its integration into the body of all other Joint doctrine. J7-OD also develops the enduring and fundamental principles, guiding the employment of U.S. forces in coordinated actions toward common objectives. As DoD re-thinks important aspects of its doctrine applicable to persistent conflict, SO doctrine reflects the unique capabilities extant within USSOCOM that have particular application to the “new normal.”

SO doctrine encompasses direct action, special reconnaissance, UW, FID, SFA, COIN, IO, PSYOP, CA operations, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism. Within SO doctrine, there is a focus on the value of the “indirect approach” that requires thinking in terms of synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the activities of military, inter-agency, multi-national and non-governmental entities to achieve a unity of effort. More specifically, SO doctrine is developed for application in both traditional and irregular warfare. It is particularly well suited for the “new normal” where it is applied directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Additionally, as a core task of the Headquarters staff, USSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks which it does in coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies.

**Preparing Our SOF Forces**

Panelists also stated that in the persistent conflict, the individual SOF warrior is the center of gravity. They are more important than the technology they utilize. To succeed, education and training must be both a life-long endeavor, as well as a series of focused occurrences to prepare special operations personnel for their missions. The current growth of SOF places more operators in training with the expectation that graduates will still meet or exceed graduation standards. In addition to maintaining high standards, it is important that training remains relevant, and proactive versus reactive. As discussed during the Symposium sessions, we must train our military to deal with potential uncertainties by teaching them how to think instead of what to think.

The SOKF-J7-OA (Operational Knowledge, Assessments Branch) performs a number of tasks that support SOF training in preparation for deployment. J7-OA tracks and reports education and training readiness of the force, the Component Commander’s top readiness concerns related to education and training, and other issues impacting education and training to CDR USSOCOM. Vehicles for gathering this information include reporting in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), searching for lessons learned within the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), and conducting on-site visits with the Component Commands. The Branch leads the Joint SOF Assessment Team (JSAT) program to ensure SOF-specific training meets the basic SOF standards set forth by USSOCOM in order to facilitate interoperability.

**Embracing Language and Culture Variances**

One of the panels pointed out that the majority of SOF operations are non-kinetic, so our forces require more language and cultural knowledge to facilitate missions and tasks. For example, there are regional variances in places where SOF operates, such as Central Command AOR, Pacific Command AOR, and Southern
Command AOR. Success in these regions requires us to embrace language and culture, not just emphasize it. Finding and recruiting people who already possess these language and cultural skills is difficult.

The SOKF-J7-OC (Operational Knowledge, Culture and Language Office) is at the forefront of initiatives to increase USSOCOM’s capability and capacity. These initiatives include a focus on legislative and policy issues which are designed to broaden recruiting pools in order to include more native speakers, as well as align Service testing and proficiency pay with SOF needs. Additionally, refinements are made to the requirements and readiness processes to better define which capabilities and capacities need to be developed. Finally, we provide better training by assisting component institutional and unit programs, as well as expanding access to joint SOF language training.

Enhancing Current and Future Global SOF Capabilities

Another panel focused on meeting the challenge of “Persistent Conflict” through a proactive approach to education and training. Using Wayne Gretzky as an example, a panelist said “we need to skate to where the puck will be, instead of where it is now.” This foresight, combined with lessons learned from the battlefront, allows us to provide relevant training.

The SOKF-J7-OL (Operational Knowledge, Lessons Learned Branch) is proactively collecting lessons learned to gain ground truth that is vital to the rapid delivery of capability and best practices to the SOF warrior. The data collected is stored in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System for Special Operation Forces (JLLIS-SOF) and provides a collaborative environment to enhance current and future global SOF capabilities throughout the DoD and its inter-agency partners. J7-OA is working closely with J7-OL to track doctrine, training and education issues/shortfalls, as reported in JLLIS-SOF, for resolution.

Providing Foreign Military Education Opportunities

Other panel discussions at the NDIA symposium discussed the importance of SOF interacting internationally through fellowships and attending foreign schools. Presently, USSOCOM depends heavily upon the Services’ programs to select and send SOF members to foreign schools and programs such as the Olmsted Scholarship, which offers an opportunity to live abroad while attending a foreign university.

The SOKF J7-OE (Operational Knowledge, Education Office) is working with the Services and Service Components on professional development opportunities for SOF, including foreign professional military education. These efforts allow USSOCOM to fill seats in foreign schools and build life-long relations.

Building Relationships with Other Nations

In his keynote speech, ADM Olson spoke of “wisdom” as being what is special about SOF. He noted that SOF can be more successful through relationship building and interacting with additional foreign countries. Using T.E. Lawrence, known throughout the world as Lawrence of Arabia, as an example, he pointed to Lawrence’s continued longevity resulting from his constant interaction with the Arabic culture.

In recent years, relationship building is key to our approach to success by winning the hearts and minds of local populations. Our initiative to expand education and training opportunities abroad will enhance the SOF warrior’s outlook and gain an understanding of priority countries’ cultures. This continuing effort to advance current programs will be vital to our success in “the persistent conflict.”

Ms. Jodie Sweezey is the Lessons Learned trends analyst for the Directorate of Joint SOF Knowledge (J7), a position she has held for one year. Ms. Sweezey is a Marine Corps reservist and holds a master’s degree in history.

Mr. Peter Fortuna is the Deputy Chief for the Operational Knowledge Education Office in the Directorate of Joint SOF Knowledge (J7). His current programs include the Special Operations Legislative Affairs Program (SOLA) and the Professional Development for Special Operations Forces Program.
USSOCOM Wargames

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) participates in a variety of wargames that address warfighter requirements in the future global environment. Wargame events are valuable opportunities for USSOCOM personnel to interact with the joint community, inter-agency community, and coalition partners in order to influence future joint policy, doctrine, and operational capabilities. Within USSOCOM headquarters, the Directorate of Futures (SOKF-J9) has the responsibility of exploring these opportunities and serves as USSOCOM’s clearinghouse for innovative ideas. J9 uses the USSOCOM Vision and Long Range Planning Process to develop Special Operations Forces (SOF) future concepts, which are then wargamed in a realistic future environment. The resulting insights lead to limited objective experiments being conducted on select concepts in order to further refine them. Wargames and follow-on experiments are chosen carefully based on USSOCOM identified needs. Each must have a joint context that allows USSOCOM to explore new SOF concepts, technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with the Commander’s focus and guidance. The venues must have objectives and scenarios that correlate with USSOCOM’s vision, mission, and priorities.

Wargames, Exercises, and Experimentation

What is the difference between a wargame, an exercise, and experimentation? The distinction between these three is not well understood. In fact, many people use the three terms almost interchangeably. A wargame is generally a simulated campaign, designed to test military strategic and operational concepts without maneuvering actual forces. The IAW CJCSI 3010.02B wargame provides an opportunity for members within the joint concept community to compete ideas in the form of an assessment or quantitative analysis. Wargames provide a forum to closely examine the concept, formulate recommendations, and make decisions to generate more viable capabilities and solutions.

On the other hand, an exercise usually involves the use of actual forces to evaluate whether or not a joint or service-centric force can execute operations outlined in OPLANs, CONPLANs, and other mandated campaign plans. Exercises are military maneuvers or simulated wartime operations involving planning, preparation, and execution. They are carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation but may provide insight to potential joint force employment methods. Exercises are also designed as training events for warfighters from the operational-level down to the tactical-level to demonstrate required proficiency levels in military plans and operations. Thus, wargames focus on future capabilities, while exercises focus on current capabilities.

Experimentation is the third term described and usually involves testing technical solutions to address capability gaps, but may also involve non-material solutions as well. Experimentation venues or seminars are usually scoped to evaluate portions of concepts and capabilities that will enhance the joint force in the future. These venues or seminars involve concept and mission-based experimentation events to test new TTPs and/or technical solutions that meet the future challenges of a rapidly changing global environment.

Wargames and experimentation reinforce the fact that critical thinking is necessary to develop capabilities in support of future requirements. Properly planned wargames and their outputs can be used to explore and illuminate, or simulate, some feature or aspect of human behavior that directly bears on the conduct of war. At USSOCOM, a wargame planner seeks to design a game event that helps frame, examine, and refine key aspects or capabilities to conduct special operations both now and in the future.
Integrated Functional Teams

USSOCOM addresses future challenges by identifying capability requirements for SOF utilizing its J9 Concepts, Integration, and Wargame/Experimentation Divisions. While developing concepts are written, they are tested through a wargaming and experimentation process to validate ideas or discover flaws. Integrated Functional Teams (IFTs) consisting of members from all three J9 Divisions work together to integrate their processes necessary to develop, test, and wargame future concepts. The IFTs closely coordinate activities to more quickly identify required future capabilities, capability gaps, and recommended solutions, to drive more expeditious changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P).

Extensive knowledge of joint concepts and the ongoing work of the J9 Integration Division, in concert with the IFTs, are critical to successful wargaming and the outputs they provide. Equally important is the development of a method for data collection and analysis, which is the center of gravity for successful wargaming. Data collection and analysis plans are designed to capture information that supports the development of future concepts and must be directly linked to the capabilities-based assessment (CBA) process. Data collection plans must be focused to address capability gaps. The final reports that are produced provide the joint community and inter-agency organizations a better understanding of special operations and joint force capabilities and how those forces should be employed. The final reports also highlight capability gaps and proposed solutions to address these gaps.

Service Title 10 Wargames

Each of the Services has a responsibility to plan and conduct its own Title 10 wargame, as a venue for analysis of its own future concepts. The J9 staff participates in each of these Service-sponsored wargames and associated planning events. This participation allows USSOCOM to ensure SOF is represented appropriately in the Service event and to familiarize the joint community with SOF TTPs.
Unified Quest 09

USSOCOM co-sponsored the U.S. Army’s Title 10 wargame, Unified Quest 09 (UQ09). The USSOCOM objective for UQ09 was to identify how SOF and GPF should enable, support, and sustain each other in order to achieve strategic agility and identify the capabilities that each requires. This objective was monitored at several venues, but particularly at the USSOCOM event, which was dedicated to that objective. The output was a list of planning considerations for enablers, including recommendations on Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), lift, logistics, and medical capabilities.

Global 09

USSOCOM also supported the U.S. Navy’s Title 10 wargame, Global 09. Global 09 was designed to investigate the rationale and assess the impact of varying capabilities and courses of action (COAs) for assigned forces with regard to their ability to gain and maintain sea control in a challenging anti-access environment. The intent was to develop a better understanding of sea control and its importance to and relationship with the joint fight. The game examined the nexus between potential COAs (ways) and Capabilities (means) in order to gain insights into the “realm of the possible.”

Unified Engagement 08

USSOCOM recently attended Unified Engagement 2008 (UE08), the Air Force’s Title 10 wargame. The USSOCOM analytical team collected data and solicited answers from wargame participants regarding SOF and joint force capabilities.

Through observing operational game play and engaging in active discourse with the air, land, and maritime components, analysts identified strategic, operational, and tactical level challenges that either supported or suggested further study of the ideas in the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC). This method of collection and observation also enabled quality examination of the interaction and interdependency that exists among General Purpose Forces (GPF), SOF, and partner entities. Detailed findings and recommendations were collected and analyzed in the areas of DOTMLPF-P changes that were necessary to effectively employ conventional and unconventional capabilities in support of irregular warfare. The findings were provided to the IW JOC core writing team and the J9 Integration Division to help validate ongoing capabilities based assessments.

Expeditionary Warrior 08

U.S. Marine Corp’s Title 10 wargame, Expeditionary Warrior, explored the more pressing challenges of the USMC. Because of the closely allied relationship between USSOCOM and the USMC, J9 has been very successful in leveraging this event to explore IW challenges. For the first time in the history of USSOCOM, Expeditionary Warrior included a USSOCOM limited objective experiment to gather information and validate ideas for the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) currently in development.

USSOCOM Seminar Wargame

USSOCOM also hosted its own 2-part seminar wargame 25-27 August and 22-24 September 2009. The purpose of this wargame was to help participants better understand the nature of the future operating environment, as outlined in the Joint Operating Environment (JOE), USSOCOM’s Strategic Appreciation, and presentations from a variety of key note speakers and subject matter experts.

Break-out groups were organized with a cross-section of O-6 level participants from USSOCOM and its Components, TSOCs, the Services, Joint staff, JFCOM, ASD SO/LIC IC, inter-agency representatives, and subject matter experts.
from across academia. The break-out groups discussed global challenges and determined the implications shared by the SOF and joint community. Focused discussions involved looking at global challenges associated with migration, economic trends, crime, and extremism.

SOKF will take the findings and recommendations and integrate them across USSOCOM to inform a variety of processes and products to include: next year’s posture statement and strategic communication plan, concept, strategy, and doctrine development; follow-on experimentation and CBAs; future revisions of the JOE; strategic appreciation; Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO); strategic planning process; warfighter challenges; and USSOCOM’s draft guidance for the development of SOF document (GD-SOF). Results from USSOCOM’s wargame will also influence the development of follow-on wargames and seminar workshops to address the future.

Future Development of Special Operations Forces

Wargames are instrumental in the future development of our SOF, driving DOTMLPF(P) changes and ensuring that the SOF warrior, joint forces, and partners have the required capabilities to meet the future challenges of the global environment. The wargames hosted and co-hosted by USSOCOM allow the command to address critical warfighter challenges and test the sufficiency of developed and developing concepts. These events provide a venue for USSOCOM to educate the joint, inter-agency, and international community on special operations capabilities, requirements, shortfalls, overlaps, and gaps to ensure operational effectiveness and efficiency in a “whole of government” and “populace-centric” approach to operating in the future environment. Wargames have picked up a great deal of momentum since 9/11, and will continue to provide an outstanding venue to test concepts, evaluate capability requirements, and ensure the future force can successfully address its nation’s interests.

**Thoughts or suggestions for future issues of Horizons?**

**Email us! horizons@socom.mil**

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**Mr. Mike Poncin is a Special Operations Futures Analyst in the Futures Directorate (J9).**

**Mr. Poncin is a former First Sergeant in the Army.**

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**Major Bradley Hodges is a Wargaming Branch Plans Officer, SOKF J9. He was previously Chief of the Operations Development & Analysis Branch at The Space Innovation and Development Center and is an Air Force Space Operations Officer.**

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**Maj. Bradley Hodges**
Lessons Learned: Support to Combat Mission Needs Statement and SOF Integration and Development System

By Mr. Rod Crist

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Special Operations Forces Lessons Learned Program (SOFLLP) aided by the Joint Lessons Learned Information System – Special Operations Forces (JLLIS) supports urgent warfighter requirements in one of two ways:

- Observations, insights and lessons learned developed through the implementation of SOFLLP can be used to document a critical capability gap and thus become the genesis of a Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS)

- Analysis of observations, insights and lessons learned resident in the JLLIS-SOF database support the mission needs assessment phase of the CMNS process and may serve to validate a critical capability gap identified through some other means
The USSOCOM CMNS rapid response process is known as Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System – Urgent (SOFCIDS-U), and is described in USSOCOM Directive 71-4. A CMNS “documents a critical capability need or gap that might require a fast track solution which may include rapid system development, acquisition and fielding.” This process is used when a SOF unit identifies an “urgent and compelling new or existing capability gap or requirement during preparation for active SOF combat or contingency operations” that meets one of two criteria of unacceptable risk, mission failure or force protection. These risks must be “substantiated with objective analysis or other quantifiable information.” The observations, insights and lessons learned found in the JLLIS-SOF database and subsequent analysis provided by Lessons Learned Specialists can provide this necessary quantifiable information to support the CMNS process.

When a warfighter identifies a capability gap, it is documented and entered into the JLLIS-SOF database as a lessons learned observation. Then, if an urgent solution is required, the lessons learned observation could become the basis for a CMNS.

In a recent example, the Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component (CJSOAC) Operation Enduring Freedom – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF-OIF) identified a requirement for a classified capability for the AC-130 [JLLIS-SOF Lesson ID 18031]. The lesson learned observation recommended “the creation of a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), or equivalent quick-reaction mechanism” (CMNS, in this case) to develop and field this capability. Almost immediately, the CJSOAC initiated the CMNS process through a message to Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and USSOCOM. Following the procedures outlined in USSOCOM Directive 71-4 Center for Special Operations Resources and Requirements (SORR)-J8-R, the gatekeeper of the CMNS process, convened a Rapid Response Team (RRT) composed of subject matter experts from the headquarters staff. The RRT considered the operational merit of the mission need, assessed the materiel solutions for feasibility and developed a resourcing plan. The RRT’s recommended course of action was approved by the Deputy Commander and sent to SOAL for implementation within 180 days. Thus, a lesson learned observation was used to identify a capability gap, and form the genesis of the CMNS.

In the second case, lessons learned analyses were used to support a CMNS during the mission need assessment phase of the rapid response process. One example of this analysis support is illustrated by a recent SOCCENT CMNS requesting concealable body armor. The SOKF representative to the RRT conducted a JLLIS-SOF search on concealable body armor and the countries in the SOCCENT area of responsibility for threat information. The most applicable observations were made available to the RRT for use in evaluating the mission need (JLLIS-SOF Lesson IDs 140, 3483, 3985, 3995, 4100, 13016). While the details are classified, these lessons learned observations concerned availability of level 4 concealable body armor and the wearing of indigenous clothing and level 4 body armor when traveling to and from the hotel lobby, embassy, and training locations. Level 4 body armor is designed to protect a person from a single armor piercing projectile. The concealable nature helps the teams maintain a lower profile. In addition, the lessons learned analysis supported the J-2 intelligence assessment of the threat. The RRT considered these
observations during deliberations to assess the need for the materiel solution proposed in the CMNS. In the end, the need was validated and approved by the Deputy Commander. Specifically, the Deputy Commander approved the rapid acquisition for SOCCENT and directed the Center for Special Operations to determine the operational needs across the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

In another recent example, Air Force Special Operations Command Lessons Learned Branch (AFSOC/A9L) provided an analysis to support the SOCCENT CMNS for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Remote Weapons System (RWS) upgrades for Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) operations. The JLLIS-SOF database contained numerous observations (JLLIS-SOF Lesson IDs 15341, 16327, 16331, 16556, 17026, 18902) that “reflected the problems encountered by JTACs in regard to the MRAP and recommendations for alleviating the problems.” The AFSOC/A9L analysis point paper was included as part of the official staffing package. Ultimately, the RRT recommended that AFSOC develop a long-term materiel solution for this capability gap using the normal SOFCIDS process.

The USSOCOM Lessons Learned Program has grown consistently over the last two years. With a cadre of over 100 Lessons Learned Specialists located at the headquarters and throughout the Component Commands and TSOCs, the Lessons Learned program is playing an important role in the requirements process. These Lessons Learned Specialists, principally assigned to the O-6 command level throughout USSOCOM, collect observations from ongoing operations, perform analysis for their respective commands, educate the SOF community on the capabilities of SOFLLP, and network with each other to ensure emergent observations are spread broadly across the force. As demonstrated in the CMNS and SOFCIDS-U processes, their analysis directly supports the implementation of material and nonmaterial solutions to identified capability gaps.

Of note, beginning in January 2009, SOKF-J7-OL assigned a full time analyst to SORR-J8-R to lead lessons learned support to the requirements process.
A continual presence and influential actor at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps wargames since 9/11, has been the work of the late U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, the creator of the famous observation, orientation, decision and action (OODA) loop. Colonel Boyd contended that civilian and military organizations that complete the OODA cycle faster than adversaries retain a decisive edge. Due to war’s ongoing process of action-reaction, slower adversaries always have a distorted and time-lapsed picture of reality and are at distinct disadvantage when trying to adapt to conditions on the battlefield. In addition, he encouraged continuous evolution of U.S. thought processes to cope with uncertainty, acknowledging that anyone’s view of reality can only be partially correct and temporary. Ultimately, he concluded that individuals and organizations that can best learn and adapt will thrive in ambiguous environments.

Boyd also sensed the differences between tactical and strategic application of his theories. The higher the level of the struggle, the more likely confrontation would move more heavily into the cognitive domain, and adaptation would be slower and more indirect, dealing with ideology, psychological, diplomatic, economic, and societal and systemic issues.

Since 9/11, USSOCOM and its Special Operations Forces (SOF) have fought today’s enemies in virtual lockstep with John Boyd’s theories.

In Afghanistan, Theater SOF coupled with Central Intelligence Agency operatives went into Afghanistan with an unconventional war plan similar to the World War II model to build rapport, gain understanding, and discover
opportunities to defeat the Taliban. After precarious infiltrations to link with Afghan indigenous forces in opposition to the Taliban, USSOCOM’s Special Forces A-Teams made friends, appraised Afghan unit readiness, called for supplies, and, as opportunities unfolded, made uncharted, unplanned, and unfettered decisions on-the-fly to fight a campaign that caused the Taliban to collapse and flee, in short order.

The speed of success was unanticipated. WWII unconventional warfare had been coupled with information age communications, unhindered ability to see and fight at night, and precision air support. It was classic Boyd. Once SOF observed and understood, operators were capable of decision and action.

In Iraq, National SOF, adopting a Vietnam era construct to attack Al-Qaeda, explored and experimented with different approaches, rapidly procured new equipment, and streamlined and radically changed inter-agency informational exchange and staffing processes, resulting in an OODA loop that John Boyd would envy. Boyd’s OODA is now SOF’s find, fix, finish, exploit, and assess (3FEA) process. Coupled with information age technology that swirls information and amplifies understanding in increasingly rapid and tighter circles, 3FEA is a marvelous tool to keep adversaries in recoil, disjointed, paranoid, and incapable of little, beyond survival and low-level disruptive and propaganda operations.

General Purpose Forces (GPF) have also greatly improved their capability to adapt. Since 9/11, U.S. Army and Marine forces, as well as SOF, have sped acquisition procedures, rapidly explored historical counter-insurgency doctrine, and found ways to change training, tactics and procedures at virtual light speed due to information age reach-back from Afghanistan and Iraq. Simultaneously, SOF is capturing lessons from less visible operations in Colombia, Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines, and Trans-Sahel Africa.

Since 9/11, Colonel Boyd’s works have been validated and appear to be unassailable; however, the war and information are cause for some reflection on the margins.

Nation-states without a “psychological anchor” may be undermined by ever-faster learning and adaptation. Boyd’s inherent assumption that the U.S. would be free to act unilaterally in the national defense may be at risk. Increasingly adaptive business organizations, striving to compete in the global marketplace, will diminish nation-state ability to react in the national defense. Intertwined economies, with executives and corporations indefinable regarding national origin or loyalty, with global overlapping OODAs, may change the strategic level of war. As the economic impact of war increasingly limits U.S. strategic options, other countries with “manifest destiny-like” solid psychological anchors, will be much more likely to take risk to achieve their national vision. Anchors could include strong racial and language identification, a history of great empire and/or repression, territorial designs on others, and the like.

Slowly grinding, subliminally imbedded strategic OODAs of this nature may envision change in centuries, an arena in which the real-time United States cannot compete.

The levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic) are less and less distinct. Boyd emphasized the differences between operating at the tactical versus strategic level. Due to modern communications, the compression of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict weaves psychological, moral and ideological threads throughout the fabric of conflict. USSOCOM is increasingly realizing that mutually supporting SOF capabilities must range from the tactical to the strategic to ensure optimal situational understanding and appreciation of the operational environment. ADM Olson, USSOCOM Commander, has changed SOF’s strategic focus from direct action to a strategy of both direct and indirect action, acknowledging in Congressional testimony the need to have the world’s best counter-terror force, as well as the world’s best advisors, trainers, and masters of Foreign Internal Defense. An additional realization is that SOF capabilities may operate on significantly different timelines, as
Boyd mentioned, regarding the slower process of change at the strategic level.

When resources are constrained, organizations can use education to sustain an adaptive and learning culture. Prior to 9/11, USSOCOM had spent its first thirteen years fixing the failed raid into Iran to rescue American hostages. Guided by the Holloway Commission’s findings, SOF resolved aviation shortfalls, intelligence gaps, communications support, logistical agility, authorities, inter-agency coordination, and training and equipment shortfalls. The result was the world’s finest counter-terror force.

Conversely, due to the imperative to fix the Iran raid, indirect SOF was used as a bill payer to assist. Aviation assets were taken away, signal intelligence units lessened in size, support units cut, fire support mechanisms eliminated, and the ability to change severely constrained. However, indirect SOF, through the thirteen years, finished the final four years of conflict in El Salvador, maintained a healthy educational and overseas Joint Combined Exercise Training Program, and took advantage of USSOCOM programs at the Naval Postgraduate School and JFK Special Warfare Center and School to train leaders to be comfortable with ambiguity and study counter-insurgency, language and culture, and guerrilla warfare. Innovations included low-cost concepts such as Coalition Support Teams, Special Operations Command and Control Elements, and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces, that are common on the battlefield today. A parallel could be the U.S. Army’s investment in the Army War College, Command and General Staff College and the Infantry School during the 1930s. Even though soldiers were trained to minimal standards, at times with rifles carved of wood, the institution of the Army was professionally educated and intellectually prepared for the challenge of World War II.

Increasing agility and adaptability may endanger the military “sweet spot.” The current climate is ideal for adaptation. The U.S. military has unquestioned superiority in space, air, and at sea. On land, the U.S. has dominance in the times and places it chooses. Congress provides virtually unlimited resources and the defense industry is running hot and ready to react. The enemy has been forced underground and the U.S. has access to almost all of the physical terrain where the enemy operates. These conditions result in counter-mafia style operations and stability operations enabled by modern technology – mostly conducted where the U.S. can operate virtually at-will. As the U.S. adapts and evolves to fight this unique war, it would be dangerous to assume that these conditions will often be repeated.

It is highly unlikely that the United States will again execute a strategy of collapsing governments with no follow-through and blind assumption that all will be well for U.S. policy afterwards. Overreacting by building a 30,000 man advisory corps and other suggested Iraq/Afghanistan specific solutions would be unwise, although tempting, given our current climate of barely bounded resources and adaptability.

The proper approach for SOF and GPF is to find the “sweet spot” (a term used by General Dempsey, Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) for unit design and capability that allows for optimal agility after problems arise. The enabling requirement is to develop institutional capacity to quickly observe and orient on new crises to provide azimuth for adroit unit modification.

Colonel John Boyd would be pleased to see that the U.S. Army is adopting the Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, a measure specifically designed to force research, exploration, observation, orientation, and extensive discourse prior to development of military plans. USSOCOM has already installed a similar process in its J5.

In sum, one can sense that in the upcoming decades globalization, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, increasing effect of Moore’s Law, and yet unknown factors, may someday heavily impact John Boyd’s theories. But for now, Colonel John Boyd still guides us well.
The SOKF coin provides a symbolic representation of the Center’s people and mission. The SOKF coin is presented to those who achieve exceptional levels of performance and enhance not only the Center for Knowledge and Futures and U.S. Special Operations Command, but most importantly, provide for the continued excellence of the special operations warriors at the tip of the spear and reinforce the SOF truths.

The front side of the coin consists of the USSOCOM seal, flanked by the seals of the Component Commands within USSOCOM: United States Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command. The outer ring of purple notifies all who hold the coin that USSOCOM is a joint command, maximizing the synergy created by all Service special operations components working toward a common goal.

The back side of the coin symbolizes the Center, specifically. The focal point is the Eye of Providence or the all-seeing eye, a symbol which represents the enlightened few, separated from the base of the pyramid, representing the rest of human kind. To the left of the eye is a burning oil lamp, a symbol dating back to ancient times used to express knowledge and learning, in this case the Center’s J7. Right of the eye is a futuristic logo for USSOCOM, comprised of an inverted spearhead and pathway to the future. This symbol signifies what is still to come in special operations, led largely by the Center’s J9. Below the pyramid are the stars representing the current rank of the Center Director. The outer ring of green highlighting the Center’s motto, “Knowledge is power, the Future is now,” illustrates the current Service of the Director.

We want to hear from you!
For suggestions & feedback on future issues of Horizons, please fill out our short web survey:
http://tinyurl.com/SOKFsurvey
Helping Shape the Future of SOF

USSOCOM Special Operations Center for Knowledge and Futures