MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:
The Gap that Will Not Close: Civil-Military Relations and the All-Volunteer Force

AUTHOR:
Major Linn K. Desaulniers

AY 08-09

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Bradford Wineman, Associate Professor of Military History

Approved: [Signature]
Date: 4 May 09

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Mark Jacobsen, Professor of History

Approved: Mark Jacobsen
Date: 4 May 2009
**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Gap that Will Not Close: Civil-Military Relations and the All-Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Title: The Gap that Will Not Close: Civil-Military Relations and the All-Volunteer Force

Author: Major Linn Desaulniers, United States Army

Thesis: Did the creation in 1973 of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) cause a gap to develop between the military and society separating them in contradiction to Morris Janowitz’s theory on civil-military relations?

Discussion: The historical basis of citizen-soldier in the United States is one of a call to duty during times of conflict with a quick and almost total demobilization afterwards. A distrust of a standing military, bearing origins in European history and solidified during the American Revolution shaped how the United States would balance egalitarianism and liberalism. This pattern held through World War Two, followed by the first break in tradition with the large standing Army of the Cold War Era. The Vietnam War saw the next break in the tradition with a conscription system that went beyond historical norms and ruined the egalitarian aspects of military service to the country. The coup-de-gras was the creation of the All-Volunteer Force and the distinct separation that resulted between the citizens and the soldiers; no longer one in the same. This separation, or gap, has seen concrete consequences manifest in civil-military relations and consequences that have yet to develop.

Conclusion: There is not a current crisis caused by a civil-military gap that would result in a military coup, however, the conditions may be more prevalent than ever for significant influence by the military on politics or for the political system to usurp the military as an imperial force. While significant inferences can be made based on historical data and writings, there must be a new data set complied in the frame of the wide ranging survey like the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies survey in order to take into account post 9/11 and the “War on Terror” to verify this supposition.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Tables

Page

Table 1. Selected TISS Survey Questions and Responses ............................................. 18
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HISTORICAL CONTEXT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Control of the Military</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War Two</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post World War Two</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Backlash</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Gulf War</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CURRENT CONTEXT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Decline</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments for a Distinct Military Culture</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RECOMMENDATIONS</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUSIONS</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

The issue of the Civil-Military Gap has been a major topic among Political Scientists since the publication of *The Soldier and The State*. It is a topic that has the ability to produce new sub-topics and arguments with the shift of political power and world events. This is what has fascinated me about the subject matter, especially in the post September 11th world. In writing this paper I wanted to see if there is a gap that exists between the military and society caused by the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973. This becomes critical in today’s world where the United States Military is called upon to do everything from full-scale combat to humanitarian relief. With these situations come the possible impacts that the deterioration of civilian control manifesting itself as increased political decision making by the military. I wanted to look at this impact and the importance as it related to the values of our country. While writing, it became clear to me that this was a topic with many grey areas that many very intelligent people have written extensively on. I found myself overwhelmed at the number of issues and current events that deal with this topic.

While in the research for this paper I found much to be proud of our countries liberal values, however, there are still some very pessimistic patterns. My hope is that the message of this paper will permeate somewhat within the military to show the benefits of interaction with the civil society, but more important that the responsibility is a joint one, civilians and military. Both have, because of the AVF, drifted from the concept of citizen-soldier, and it will take their collective effort to help mend the gap before it becomes too wide.
Introduction

It could be argued that with the rise of the professional military in the United States there was also a distinct gap that developed, over time, between the professional soldier and the citizen who for generations had been called upon to fill the role of soldier. This gap, according to Morris Janowitz, should become smaller as the military becomes a more civilianized organization. This paper will argue that this diminishing gap is not occurring in the way Janowitz predicted mostly due to the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and the turmoil it causes in the civilian-military relationship. While the connection between civilian society and the military has not been severed completely – i.e. conscription being used much in recent history – it has continued to grow apart even while Janowitz argued that it should be growing closer. It is this paper’s intent to look at this gap in civil-military relations and to discuss its growth in the past 50 years and how the AVF has shifted the paradigm. This paper will frame this problem by addressing the AVF, attitudes toward the military, and the declining propensity to serve showing how this affects the civilian elites who govern. It will also attempt to explore some of the root causes of the attitudes and feelings toward the military including the effect of the media and the lack of civilian knowledge of the military. It is also important to address whether the right questions are being asked in order to determine the existence of a gap or how large it may be. In order to place this situation in context and frame the issue, this paper will refer as much as possible to the situation during the decade post World War II and the beginning of the Cold War as to what may be considered the best example of an “ideal” relationship between the military and the people.

With the current “Global War on Terror” entering its eighth year, and the other worldwide issues from fighting piracy off the African Coast to the military growth of China, the
United States military will continue to be called on to do more on a consistent basis. This resulting persistent presence will find the military interacting on an increasing basis with the civilian population. With “Homeland Defense” a priority, moving past the stage of coastal fortifications and fallout shelters to include the use of the military in domestic disaster relief, it is important to understand the dynamic between the society that is protected but no longer collectively contributing and the organization and culture that is increasingly isolated that protects it, and the effect of a gap on this dynamic to include its impact on civilian control of the military.

AVF

The AVF transformed a concept that the United States had embraced since its creation; that of a citizen-soldier; called on when needed and returned to a civilian life when the conflict was complete. At the concept’s root is the debate that plays out between liberalism, the desire to minimize enforced service, and egalitarianism, the desire to spread the responsibility evenly throughout the citizenry. While conscription is not liberal in nature, it may be the most egalitarian of the possible choices. This disparity has historically been offset by the quick drawdown and release from service. The Cold War broke this paradigm by maintaining a large standing army, but still spread the burden evenly. The AVF changed this in 1973. No longer would the country rely on many segments and demographics of the population to serve but rather take the ultimate liberal approach. This significantly narrowed the band of “who serves, when not all serve.” Some arguments against the AVF as outlined by Eliot Cohen include its lack of representativeness of the country, inability to maintain an exceedingly large force (as compared to the World Wars), deficiencies in quality and in general war efficiency.¹ Thirty-six years into
the AVF most of these have been refuted. Quality remains high, and while the definition of
efficiency can be debated, the military is always ready to conduct its mission. While the force is
not at World War levels, the force has proven it can maintain what it needs, even during times of
conflict. The missing piece is representativeness. As a self-selecting force, the AVF has had fits
and starts about who serves. It overcame racial and gender issues, but still lacks certain
demographics. The impact of this disparity on the United States and the relationships between
its government and its people is at the heart of the issue. On the periphery is an additional
argument that the AVF has shifted from a concept of "service" to one of merely a "job," and
with it a societal shift in morals and values that seem out of place in the "professional" military
and have caused a divide on the side of the military as a new "elite" out of touch and above the
population they serve.

**Civilian Control of the Military**

There are two major schools of thought dealing with civilian control of the military,
Huntington and Janowitz. Huntington outlined two forms of civilian control, subjective control
and objective control. Subjective control in the simplest terms maximizes civilian power over
the military, while objective control seeks to maximize military professionalism as the method to
check military influence. As Huntington states, "the antithesis of objective civilian control is
military participation in politics." It is within this framework that the struggle to maintain a free
and open society while still having a military free to operate and carry out its assigned duties
manifests itself. Janowitz takes a more liberal view arguing that societal integration with the
military will maintain control because the military will never be able to move far from the will of
the people. These concepts are integral to the argument about an impending or existing gap
because control of the military immediately places military in the category of “other” and presents a constant struggle between integration and control and the professionalism that is required in today’s All-Volunteer Force. It is within this context that the gap between civilians and the military will play an important role when other factors are discussed later.

This struggle has been going on since the birth of the nation, born from the European experience and the philosophical debates of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The American public after the Revolutionary War had great distrust for a standing army, a result of the British and its army of occupation. After the war and after several incidents involving the Continental Army and its threat of using force against the government, Congress disbanded the standing army completely in 1784. It was with the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the government ensured control of the military would be secure using checks and balances enumerated in the Second Amendment. It is from this point, until after World War II, that the United States would maintain only a small standing army, grown explicitly during times of war with a call for “citizen soldiers” through a draft, to be immediately contracted at the cessation of hostilities.

World War II

World War II had a profound effect on the citizenry of the United States as well as the collective mindset. This “total war” saw everyone, from the draftees who fought, to the wives who riveted the tanks, to the children who participated in “buy war bonds” campaigns, providing some service and sacrifice. During the conflict, largely due to the implementation of the draft, sixteen million Americans out of an available population of forty million men over the age of twenty-one, or forty percent of the available population, served in uniform. This in itself does not mean everything as most of these men were something other than professional soldiers and
found the authoritarianism and structure of the military to their dislike. The argument here is not that a militarization of the population will close the gap with society, but instead that the outcome of sixteen million men, and their families, experiencing some contact with military life and its customs and culture helped to keep the notion of the military as "other" to a minimum by infusing familiarity and spreading the burden throughout the populace. It allowed for a collective experience, born of service to nation and the egalitarian principles of the country. The large veteran population would soon increase as the Korean War once again mobilized the population for military service, and that number is multiplied to include families that had someone serve. This civilian base had participated or experienced the military and was comfortable because all had been a part one way or another. This shared understanding of culture and the collective nature of sacrifice formed a solid base to aid the military to civilianize as claimed by Janowitz in that "the armed forces are a creature of the larger social structure, and the extent which they serve the economic and political needs of the civilian population." 

World War II infused large numbers of veterans into the population who went on to become the doctors, lawyers and politicians, the representatives of the American public. They were able to say that they had served. Their experience helped, not necessarily on shaping domestic and foreign policy, but by providing a connection with the professional military. That connected segment, the one that is supposed to represent the American public, is dwindling. In 1960 there were 324 members of Congress that had military service. Today, in the 111th Congress, there are only 121 veterans. Starting in the late 1990's, the percentage of veterans in Congress no longer reflected the number in American society. The elected representatives of the people no longer act as a tie between the military and the people, feeling no corporateness and allowing the sense that it is "other" who serves to build cyclically. This leads to one of the
dangers that will be discussed later of a growing propensity to use the military as this experiencebase wanes.

**Post World War II**

As the furor of World War II subsided, as per the American historical tradition, the military downsized as quickly as it could and looked to end the draft. It found itself, however, facing the occupation of two countries, Germany and Japan, half a world apart and the menace of a new kind of "cold war" looming on the horizon. There was a call to reinstate the draft, and to avoid the previous shortcomings in readiness of both World Wars, President Truman called for Universal Military Training (UMT).

UMT would provide a year of military training to eligible men, then send them back into civilian life with the knowledge that if the country needed to quickly mobilize it had a pool of "basic" trained personnel to call on. The public support for this idea was extremely high: in 1948 it was seventy-seven percent and in 1949 it was seventy-three percent. In fact support for UMT between 1940 and 1967 never fell below sixty percent. Much of this can be attributed to the years of the Cold War and the "Soviet menace" equating to the collective response for the draft during both World Wars. While support did decline over three decades, the fact that an overwhelming majority of young men and their families were willing to allow for a year of training demonstrated that during this time period the military was not "other" or a segregated part of society. A national sense of collective responsibility in response to what Lori Bogle describes as the "civil-military religion" was part of the social network during this time. This time could be construed as the best relationship between the military and the people. The nature
of the Cold War, the collective contributions to the cause and a willingness to continue to support as evidenced by the UMT numbers, all point to a strong connection with the military.

The government re-instated the draft in 1949 as a pre-emptive measure for future United Nations commitments and lingering Middle Eastern issues; however, less than ten thousand were inducted in the following year. Even with the strong public support Congress never passed the UMT legislation and the outbreak of the Korean War solidified conscription as the system of choice. Once the need for a standing army was decided upon, the lack of a pressing need for UMT led to continued conscription as being the most equitable and successful. The Officer Corps, as well, was still being given socio and economically diverse personnel through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at universities across the country.

These universities included elite schools like Princeton and Harvard, as well as many of the state institutions, like the University of Wisconsin and the University of Minnesota, that were established as land grant universities. In 1956 Princeton saw 400 of a graduating class of 750 enter the service as either an officer or enlistee. This in theory would continue the pattern of a collective pool of veterans re-entering society with some connection, or as Jerome Kerwin of the University of Chicago stated in 1948: “An unprecedented number of veterans in our civilian community, and particularly their organized spokesmen, produce a military consciousness in spite of temporary reactions against military life upon their return to civilian occupations.” It would be very unlikely to find a faculty member of the University of Chicago making a statement like that today, or to find a graduate of Princeton entering the military as there were only nine from the class of 2004. Yale’s ROTC population in 2007 was 2 out of 5,300 undergraduates. While Princeton still has a program, Yale’s Cadets must get their Military Science Classes at a neighboring college because Yale stopped offering academic credit for
ROTC in 1969, forcing it off campus, just as Dartmouth, Harvard, NYU, and Stanford had done in the wake of Vietnam. What at one time prestigious private institutions had sought after was now made a pariah due to anti-military and anti-war sentiment. Just as the AVF has isolated the enlisted force from civilian society, there has been a parallel with this lack of “elite” ROTC programs shutting the officer corps from the total of civilian society. In many ways this was a precursor of the decision to develop the AVF; a signaling that society no longer wanted to collectively participate and the beginning of the separation of a demographic that the AVF would continue to facilitate.

It would seem counter intuitive for a country that distrusts a standing military to say it wants its officer corps to rely more heavily on military academies, but by marginalizing ROTC that is what was, and to some extent is still happening. Also there is a definite difference between the two types of commissioning programs of the United States Military Academy (USMA) and ROTC. Volker Franke in 1997 studied West Point cadets and found that they lacked in patriotism and global outlook as compared to ROTC cadets. While a generalization, West Point is known more as an engineering school and there is indeed much “hard science” in the curriculum. Cadets do receive Social Science type courses, but one would not find an elective like “French and Italian Jewish Writers of the 20th Century” in the course work. This leads to a much more specialized and narrow-minded officer. Add this to the fact that ROTC cadets have normal jobs, must work their weekend plans and other student activities and entertainment around their ROTC schedules, and in general are part of the normal student body from day to day; they arguably are the more linked to society than the cloistered USMA cadets.

As Karen Guttieri stated when describing the reasoning behind the 1862 Land-Grant Act, “a nation that was only reluctantly supplanting a citizen-based militia with a permanent professional
force found a way to foster and sustain cultural links between society and the officer corps."  

The same holds true today. The decline in participation by “elite” universities in ROTC is yet one more place that the gap grows as “educated” members of society are not integrated which reinforces the concept of “someone else does that.”

Vietnam Backlash: Setting the Stage for the AVF Gap

This next section will address what contributed to the trend reversing support of UMT and pushing ROTC out of many college campuses. Evidence will show that the Vietnam War in the context of the “60’s,” may have had one of the largest detrimental impacts on the civil-military gap. Andrew Bacevich provides some context when he described the pre-Vietnam situation:

The terms of the broader liberal democratic compact that FDR had forged between the nation as a whole and its military remained into the 1960s largely intact. Americans continued to find the terms of that arrangement agreeable: hence, their unquestioning deference to Washington on matters of national security, their willing support-evident even on the campuses of the nation’s best universities—for a large, far flung military establishment, and their acquiescence in a peacetime draft that had become an acceptable part of the postwar landscape.  

The draft, which had been in place since 1949 with support from the American populace, now turned into a system of “have” and “have nots.” The problem began with the large number available for conscription far exceeding the number needed, immediately creating a situation
where some would go and some would not. Additionally, the draft boards were seen as un-representative of the communities they “served,” leading to questions about bias against the lower income levels and racial bias. The third issue was the deferments. This program originally designed to guide college students into much needed professions turned into an unfair system that favored the rich and upper class. This was in comparison to the types of deferments used during World War II, where 2.1 million farm workers (47 percent) were deferred compared to 1.5 million for all other industries. These were politically driven decisions that the government placed on the system, eventually leading to a political decision for the AVF. This system helped to brake down the concept of a “civil-military religion” and because of the way it was carried out, while still more representative than an AVF, enlarged the wedge that societal changes of the time had already created and in some ways set the stage for the gap the AFV would continue to cause.

While much of the anger and resentment was focused at the civilian administration, the military was stuck in the middle receiving much of the same resentment. Partially fueling the resentment were press accounts of the war, with the extensive almost immediately televised footage, showing a bleak picture starting early on but climaxing in 1968. Events like My Lai, and the bombing of civilian cities went beyond the political realm so that Soldiers and Marines were labeled as “baby killers” and partially blamed for the war itself. The ideal of citizen-soldier was dead, ruined by an unfair system. Along with its death would come a generation of “veterans” who had served in an ugly military where drugs and racial issues were carried over from civilian society, in an unpopular war, who would go on to become the new elite. In the 1980’s and 1990’s they would become the leadership of the country, carrying a skewed base of
knowledge reflecting their own personal experiences from what was a politically charged and anti-military, anti-establishment time period.

This gap manifested itself as in the previous example of ROTC being pushed off many campuses, and with a generation of academicians that were “anti-military.” Michael Desch writing in 1999 addresses this point: “…the Vietnam War…manifested itself particularly in the growing trend in history departments not to hire and tenure military and diplomatic historians…given the decreasing size of the U.S. Military, there are few ways for civilians to gain much direct exposure to and knowledge about the military.”

Historically it would seem that civilian uneasiness about the military stems from the lack of understanding of its place in the country and the role it fills, yet the education “profession” whose purpose is to help understanding does not feel the need to address this part of our society.

While Vietnam may have increased the number of veterans, the way in which it did so helped begin the gap between society and the military that had not been present throughout the “ideal” period of the early Cold War: “…a considerable number of Americans experienced Vietnam directly, but the people collectively did not.”

In 1973, the all-volunteer military was born out of the ashes of Vietnam and would spend the next decade recovering, but would place a permanent divide between the military and civilian.

Janowitz and Moskos identify the AVF as a “political decision paralleling the traditional American practice of reducing the military establishment after a period of intense military hostilities.” The fact that the AVF was a policy decision might hold clues as to the connection needed to keep the divide in a state of equilibrium and prevent an imbalance from forming.

Janowitz and Moskos noted that during the first years of the AVF the “military participation ratio” averaged 2.4% and compared this to the time between the two World Wars when it was
Today that number is 0.9%.\textsuperscript{32} In their analysis the United States must maintain 20-25% participation by the new age cohorts to “give meaning and validity to the term citizen soldier.”\textsuperscript{33} Using 2006 statistics for age breakout and an assumption that the new cohort that Moskos and Janowitz talks of is 18-24 year olds, even when counting guard and reserve numbers, the total participation is 1.0%. This shortfall shows how the AVF has become a significantly smaller part of the population and can easily explain that declining numbers of veterans in society.

\textbf{Post Gulf War}

With the quick and relatively bloodless Gulf War, the American public re-embraced the military after a decade of slow acceptance. Some of this has been attributed in writings and discussions to Vietnam “guilt,” but also because the United States was on top again, having won instead of “not losing.” General Colin Powell, a veteran of the Vietnam Era, stated “the American people fell in love again with their armed forces.”\textsuperscript{34} This newfound euphoria over the uniformed services with parades, speeches and aggrandizement did not truly help to close the gap. While Americans watched with awe the precision guided munitions and news reports of desert tank battles, they still did not know who was doing the fighting. It is akin to cheering for the local football team, but not knowing who is the starting quarterback or how the game is played. These Americans in uniform were still unknown to their own society, free agents who played on Sunday for a paycheck; the cultural gap that the AVF introduced still remained.

Six years after the Gulf War, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in remarks to students at Yale said, “…one of the challenges for me is to somehow prevent a chasm from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn’t fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn’t understand why the memories of our citizens
and civilian policy makers are so short or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting.  

This quote by Cohen is used often and in many contexts within literature dealing with the civil-military gap. The argument is not that the military does not understand short memories, or even quick criticism. This separation caused by the AVF leads to cursory support and as Eliot Cohen describes with the British invasion of the Falklands, the civilian population ends up being more accepting of casualties and therefore perhaps quicker to use military force. In some respects one could see the cost of this gap as a manifestation of a loss in hesitancy to use the military. It is best represented with the statement, “they signed up, so they knew what they were getting into.”

**Post Cold War: What Does the Military Do Now?**

The Clinton White House decided that the issue of gays in the military would be one of the first issues with which the administration dealt and set a tone for his administration. This became a divisive point both for the military and for the civilian population. Here the President, acting as “Commander in Chief,” believed that he could provide an executive order similar to the one Truman issued desegregating the military, yet was unable to understand the context of time and place and its impact on civil-military relations. It may be one of the first examples of the AVF, having been set apart from society, showing resistance because of its growing isolation. Moving away from society the AVF was no longer responding to historical patterns of downsizing post conflict. In some aspects this could be seen as a return to the post-Revolutionary War era where there was a distrust of a standing army now that the Cold War threat had dissolved. The situation was not the same, however, and because the United States
was taking a more intervening and anti-isolationist position in the world, it was forced to keep a politically created AVF with arguably no enemy to fight and nothing to do.

Perhaps a small overt example of this distrust can be seen in a well-documented incident taking place at the White House emphasizing the civil-military gap. A Clinton staffer responded to a greeting by the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison to the White House, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, by saying “I don’t talk to the military.” Through this, along with Clinton’s previously documented views of “loathing the military,” one can see that the Chief Executive might be influencing entire segments of society to believe that not trusting the military is acceptable and believing they are “other” is the norm. Clinton may ironically be close to the original ideal of a distrust for and desire to shrink the military after a conflict, but because the establishment was so engrained in the political and social system it would prove to no longer be a relevant position. With the political decision to create an AVF, there must also be a political emphasis on balancing the divide it caused between the military and civilian worlds, but in a cyclical puzzle, the political has itself lost touch with the military world.

This attitude was allowed to propagate because of the so-called peace dividend. America as a society no longer saw a need to spend money on warfare because the Cold War had ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Oddly this is in contrast to polls that show that the number of Americans who believed that not enough was being spent on national defense and military purposes increased consistently from 1990-2000. Perhaps this was because of the beginning of the military’s “Missions Other Than War” (MOTW) phase that saw deployments to “assist” rather than defeat become the norm. Bacevich, similar to Cohen, describes a militarization of the country where military intervention is becoming accepted. He uses a quote from former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who asks, “What’s the point of having this superb military
that you’re always talking about, if we can’t use it? The AVF provided a reason for the government and excuse by the electorate to send the military into difficult situations. As Moskos outlines the public’s view of the military has moved from ambivalent to indifferent with the displeasure of wartime casualties linked to the number of elite youths serving.

This time period saw the final development and coming to power of the post-Vietnam generation, a large segment of which had not liked the military and more importantly did not understand it. What they instead saw was an organization that was available for use anywhere, anytime, at any cost. This MOTW mission added to this confusion in America as to what the military really was for and collectively who it was. The resentment that was prevalent in military circles for this new mission did not help bring the military closer to society from a Janowitzian perspective. Theoretically the military should have been linked to the people and pliant in its attitude; however, the AVF placed an obstruction between the two. It has separated the citizen from the soldier, blocked the historical relationship and, as will be discussed later, developed the military into a quasi-caste that sees itself as above the citizenry.

Current State of Decline

Up to this point this paper has relied on mostly anecdotal evidence and literature to present the issue at hand. In the final part, this paper will attempt to use the slim empirical data that exists to discuss these issues. Much of this is centered around the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies (TISS) “Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era.” TISS surveyed three broad groups: the general public, influential civilian leaders, and up and coming military officers. Conducted between Fall, 1997 and Spring, 1999, this survey represents the only
current data of its kind. It has some limitations, however, as its focus was on the officer corps in comparison to civilian society and was specifically targeted for Post Cold War topics.

One of the largest potential influencers on the population is the media. There is a perception that the media is heavily slanted to the political left-of-center and that it depicts a very narrow and poor view of the military. The March 6, 2008 Harris Poll on Americans and the Press shows that forty-three percent of Democrats trust the press as compared with nineteen percent of Republicans.\textsuperscript{45} The press is only a small part of the Media, but is a part that is in the daily cycle of most Americans, either through newspapers or the local nightly news. The Harris Poll is important when placed next to the TISS survey results that show an increasing politicization of the officer corps with 63.9 percent of military leaders identifying themselves as Republican.\textsuperscript{46} This “Republicanization” has been on the rise since the creation of the AVF. While evidence does not suggest that it this is a direct result of the AVF, it could be extrapolated that with self-selection and increased feelings of isolation the AVF has fostered this growth. The idea of the media depicting a narrow and poor view of the military can be refuted by a study by Krista Wiegand in late 1998 that looked at media bias in major newspapers as opposed to military publications. The finding showed that for the most part news stories were very rarely negative, staying positive, neutral or ambiguous, with editorials tending to be more negative.\textsuperscript{47} These findings would be different today, having evolved, as the military is placed in the same category as a disliked administration and unpopular war, similar to the Vietnam Era. If one categorizes the media as coming from part of civilian society, and answering to the people, the same disconnect that the AVF brought between the public and the military could be seen as also effecting the media and the military. When there is no more direct linkage, the assumption is that the military is simply a part of bad policy rather than acting on bad policy. The Walter Reed
Army Hospital story and others like it, while important for pointing out shortcomings are, to use a term from Ms. Wiegand, “gotcha” stories. These stories continue down a road of painting the military in an unfavorable light as a whole, devoid of the traits that society believes to be inherent in the military. One reason behind this is the increased politicization of the military or simply another Vietnam type backlash. Either way, the military’s equation of the media to the public has added a roadblock to the movement of the military toward the civilian. It is not the cause, but compounded with the AVF it has added to the divide on both the military and civilian sides.

While the military has a difficult time rectifying its views of the public vis-à-vis the media, the number of Americans who believe that military officer, as an occupation, holds “very great” prestige remains high. According to the August 1, 2007 Harris Poll, fifty-two percent say “very great” prestige and twenty-nine percent said “considerable” prestige. This number has steadily risen from a low of twenty-two percent in 1982. Conceptually, perhaps, Americans “don’t know, what they don’t know” or as Bacevich states, “the attitude prevailing on the civilian side of the civil-military divide can be summarized briefly: although we don’t know you, rest assured that we admire you–now please go away.” With the AVF gap in place and with it decreasing context, it is not hard to speculate that the average citizen, or for that matter “elite” citizen, does not truly grasp what is being written about. Of course this only takes into account written media, but it could be argued that the “sound bite” culture of television and the Internet only magnifies the confusion when there is not context to fall back on.

Some questions used by the TISS survey could be used to derive this conclusion. These questions center on military cultural norms, and show a divide between civilians without service and those who have served.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#Percent “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat”</th>
<th>Military leaders</th>
<th>Active reserve leaders</th>
<th>Civilian veteran leaders</th>
<th>Civilian non-veteran leaders</th>
<th>General public veterans</th>
<th>General public non-veterans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Civilian Society would be better of if it adopted more of the military’s values and customs</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Bonds and sense of loyalty that keep a military unit together under the stress of combat are fundamentally different that the bonds and loyalty that organizations try to develop in the business world</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Military leaders care more about the people under their command than leaders in the non-military world care about the people under them</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The new emphasis on joint education, training, and doctrine across branches of the military has improved the effectiveness of the armed forces</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. The American people understand the sacrifices made by people who serve in the U.S. Military</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. I am proud of the men and woman who served in the military</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a series of questions asked about military and civilian culture using certain traits such as honest, loyal, hard working, etc. Ole Holsti described the general results saying, “it is clear that most American leaders view military culture in more favorable terms than civilian culture.” This does not, however, correspond to the data from question A, in Table 1. This is additional proof that civilians do not understand what truly are military values and culture. The gap becomes defined partly as an “understanding gap,” and questions B, C, D and F all help to support this definition.

James Burk addresses the topic of the military’s presence in American society, using what he terms “material presence.” This according to Burk can be analyzed through dollars.
spent on Defense and distribution of military personnel throughout the country (i.e. how are military bases distributed). He believes that “overall, the military remains a formidable material presence in American society...There is no reason to based on this analysis to say that the military is a peripheral or an alienated institution.”52 This is a flawed argument in two ways. First it fails to discuss how the civilian and military integrate and interact. Having regionally distributed military bases does not mean anything in itself, but if the pieces of the puzzle that are the civilian and military populations fail to lock together, the gap will always exist. It is much easier to ensure this happens when they are in close proximity and can be seen in the military communities that surround major military installations. Secondly it fails to take into account the answer to question E, in Table 1. Burk argues that within the four types of “institutional presence,” where there is high materiel salience but low moral integration, it is possible to have illegitimate institutions that are shunned by society but still have influence and must be taken into account. His example is of the Mafia or other large criminal organizations.53 It is an example of a non-alienated institution being wholeheartedly rejected by society because they are not alienated but instead not morally integrated. The gap caused by the AVF, in conjunction with today’s self-centered civilian culture, reinforce the statement “actually serving in the military was now something that other people did,” just as perhaps being in organized crime is “something other people do.”54

It is an interesting exercise to take Burk’s framework and turn it to reflect the views of the organization that is being analyzed. Does the military have a different perspective on its material salience and moral integration? The answer could be viewed as yes. As the presence of the military becomes more confined to isolated bases like Fort Hood, Texas or Fort Drum, New York, through the Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) process, the amount of interaction
between the military and the civilian population will continue to decrease. From the military mindset, every convenience is provided on these installations, from food to post offices. Its own feeling of isolation continues to grow, and with it the feeling or decreased material salience. The view by the military of a lack of moral integration into civilian society has been increasingly written about (Henderson 2007; Ricks 1997; Davis 2001; Roth-Duquet and Schaeffer 2006) including some of the results of the TISS survey data, makes a case that the military does feel alienated.

There were three questions in the TISS survey that dealt with the American civilian interaction with the military. Michael Desch discusses these three questions only briefly in a few sentences. It is the only place in the entire analysis by Feaver and Kohn, et al. that attempts to integrate the lack of interaction between the public and the military as an explanation of the “gap.” If the AVF keeps a perpetual gap between the military and society because of self-selection, a difference in cultural norms and values, or a indifference on the part of the public toward the military, then if there is no or limited interaction this gap can only be exacerbated.

This paper has touched on the current lack of propensity to serve, and many of the reasons discussed contributed to the current situation. Lingering ill-feelings from the Vietnam generation, possible anti-military rhetoric from media (of all types), or the public’s negative views of the war on terror and the Bush Administration have reflected themselves on to the military, as happened with the Vietnam War, may all be factors. Yet all the current polls still show the military as being highly respected. A large factor is the influence of society’s “elites” that are without a frame of reference because of all the reasons mentioned above and so have caused the cycle to repeat itself. Additionally, there is evidence that the percentage of youth who joint the military whose parent(s) is/are serving is increasing to the point where nearly half of all
Army recruits have a parent who has served.\textsuperscript{56} Michael Desch reports a finding by John Farris that sons and daughters of career military are six times more likely to enlist.\textsuperscript{57} While this finding is older, reported from 1981, there is very little to suggest that the trend is reversing itself. This trend was noticed as early as 1978 by Janowitz and Moskos, though it was too early for them to draw any particular conclusions other than to point out it was one of the fears of the AVF.\textsuperscript{58} The military in some ways replicates itself and does not bring in more of the population, as Janowitz predicted would happen when the two continued to merge together. With this self replication comes an “inbred” cadre even more removed from society and as Feaver and Kohn suggest, “the narrowing of personal connections to the military means that recruiters today must persuade doubtful prospects with less help from family and friends who have served themselves.”\textsuperscript{59}

The supposition presented by Gronke and Feaver that, “perhaps social distance from the military permits shallow and superficial support” is a strong one.\textsuperscript{60} In this way there is no “requirement” for service as long as there is no direct connection. The AVF allowed “elites” an “out” and society an “invisibility cloak.” Add to these the development of a military caste and the cycle is self-perpetuating. The above suppositions make it very difficult for Janowitz’s concept to continue moving forward. It is a barrier that keeps the military from moving closer to the civilian. While the military has done very well matching the population in certain demographics, such as minorities, part of the barrier is through the continually missing key socio-economic pieces. These include the upper class the so-called “elites,” but also the upper middle class. This is yet another instance of the AVF keeping a gap open.

Janowitz seems to take a pragmatic view of society, but also an idealized one (to be fair, it should be pointed out that Janowitz did not predict or even comprehend the possibility of an AVF when he wrote most of his work). In order to show another gap in his conjecture, the topic
of the dumbing down of America must at least be touched upon and placed in conjunction with the culture of “consumption” that is pervasive today. Rick Shenkman puts forth the topic of how young voters are not as educated on events and important issues in general as may be believed. The Pew poll from April, 2007 identifies only 15% of the 18-29 year-old age bracket as possessing a “high” level of knowledge, this is in stark contrast to the 30-49 bracket which demonstrate 35% and the 50-64 bracket that leads the groups with 47%. Compare this to the a military population that has a higher level of high school graduates and number of mid-grade officers with advanced degrees compared to their equivalents in the civilian population as reported in the TISS survey. The survey sample showed 71 percent of the officers held a graduate degree with at least 93 percent having done graduate work, compared with the civilian sample where only 10.8 percent had study beyond bachelor’s degrees. The military overall is a more educated environment than civilian society. This, arguably, is in direct contrast to what Janowitz wanted to happen. Instead of representative and fusion of the military with civilian society, there is a separate “class” that is forming, keeping the gap from closing. Bacevich touches on this issue writing, “to the extent that the members of the AVF see themselves as professionals-members of a warrior caste adhering to their own distinctive code- they have little interest in nurturing a close relationship with civilian society.” Perceiving itself as more educated and with dedication to service of country, it is easy to understand how the military can see itself as alienated from society, but also of a higher caliber then the people that it is serving.

To address the proposition that a culture of consumerism impacts the AVF, one only has to look at recruiting numbers when there is a downturn in the economy. Recent articles have focused on the military making its recruiting numbers despite having trouble doing so for the past five years. This trend of viewing military service as a job versus profession or required
civic-duty is troubling. Revisiting the AVF as a policy decision, it is not the military’s desire to turn service into a job; however, it has become a necessity to maintain the requisite numbers of the standing forces. This is not a new complaint as Hansen Baldwin, military editor for the *New York Times* in 1948 complained about the “work-less-and-make-more” philosophy of the new generation of youth. As previously pointed out, if there is a self-developed “military class,” then this bi-product of the AVF may hasten its growth.

**Argument for Distinct Military Culture**

There has been much written and debated about what is the right amount of military integration with civilian culture. Samuel Huntington believes that civilian society must provide the bridge by adopting the “conservative” values of the military establishment and argued that armed forces must retain cultural autonomy. Contrasting this is Morris Janowitz who believes the military must adapt itself to the changing cultural norms of society. There are examples of both over the military’s history. The de-segregation of the armed forces or the implementation of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, are examples of changing to meet cultural norms of society. The example of the Huntingtonian converse was the strong military opposition to “gays in the military” that demonstrated cultural autonomy.

Even when the military is forced to shift its norms to that of its society, it must be granted certain freedoms in order to maintain itself as a coherent unit. As long as the United States maintains an all-volunteer military, it must not be brought down to the level of “job” over profession, though it has been moving in this direction since the AVF began. Germany may have a more inherently Janowitzian military due to its universal conscription, but it has been so integrated into the liberal traditions, that military “service” has been ruled a form of employment
and has the same discrimination laws and civilian court jurisdiction as every other member of their society.\textsuperscript{66} This is fine for a conscripted military, perhaps to alleviate some of the fears stemming from liberal traditions within a society, but with an AVF in order to counter some of the criticism addressed earlier, it must keep from moving too far to the Janowitz “management” and continue to deliver the “management of violence” as asked by its country. The nature of the AVF today, as well the nature of warfare, has gone beyond hiring computer techs and pilots and must continue to center around a “warrior culture.”

**Recommendations**

If the AVF does act as a block to Janowitz’s construct of the military and civilian moving closer, how is it possible to bridge the gap that is inherent with an AVF? There are many approaches to help narrow the gap across all the spectrums. A few put forth here have been suggested in previous works, dealing specifically with understanding between the differing cultures, much in the same way that countries interact in the global arena.

First and foremost there must be a base to build upon. The topic of the military must be added to current curriculum in junior and senior high school as well as through the college level. Some time spent during “civics” or “social studies” class dealing with these topics, in a society that has a “month” for every segment of the population, does not seem as out of place or overly coercive. Some basic themes could include: civilian control of the military as it pertains to the history of the country and why it is important, basic functional awareness i.e. what do the Armed Services provide the nation, and basic cultural awareness i.e. history of the military and how it pertains to the United States. This will help give a foundation for society as the military continues to close the gap per Janowitz. It helps anchor society as the two continue to merge. If
Clausewitz’s trinity hold true, then it is important to describe the interaction of the military in relation to the political, ensuring that they are seen as separate entities.

The concept that the military is part of the civic function may never be solved with an AVF in place. In order to bring back the balance between egalitarianism and liberalism, which has been weighted toward the liberal side since the AVF was introduced, adding a national tax on those who choose not to serve (if fully qualified) similar to Switzerland, may bring more equality to the prescription.67

The military must proactively become engaged with the rest of the civilian world. As of 1949 the military had given “off-the-record talks” during “orientation conferences” to leaders of industry, labor, education, government, press and religion.68 This was not public affairs officers repeating talking points, but included the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps as well as the director of the State Department’s policy planning Staff. This would continue the process of merging the military into civilian society by providing more of a knowledge base for a generation that never had an opportunity to build one, but that is still making policy decisions in a vacuum influencing the future youth. Outreach will build upon the base throughout the strata of society. Current overtures by the Army to incorporate activities like blogging and speaking engagements are excellent examples, but until the fear of the military as preaching propaganda is overcome, these types of programs may have limited effects.

Michael Desch suggests that the military expand its advanced degree programs so that more company and field grade officers have a chance to study at civilian institutions. This is already being tested on a limited basis, and will require a continued culture shift on the part of the military. He also talks about bringing ROTC back into elite universities.69 While the
government would have a hard time mandating this, there could be ways to “influence” the schools, much in the way it influenced states to raise the legal drinking age.

Another suggestion that Thomas Langston puts forth is to lower the payback time for ROTC commitments to 15 months. This would seem to be a cost prohibitive measure. Twenty-four months seems more reasonable, perhaps for the benefit of partial tuition assistance. Comparing what enlistment bonuses have been over the past five years, this reduction in service requirement would not be significant. The entire purpose of this to get some more of society familiarized with the military and maybe on the track of social service.

None of this can be accomplished without a strong push by “elites” or people of influence to make the call for service as it pertains to the overall benefit of the country. One consistently hears politicians and “elites” talk about service by joining grass-roots organizations, the Peace Corps, America Corps or becoming a teacher. The military is never brought into the equation. This is especially true with the 2008 election cycle. The website www.usaservice.org lists all of the above organizations mentioned above, plus the National Park Service, but there is no link to the Department of Defense or to a military service site. If Janowitz viewed the military as becoming more socially integrated, it would hold true that a broader segment of the populace would seek it out as part of national service. The AVF is in some regards “self-selective,” yet being based on political policy decisions, it needs the backing of the policy-makers to ensure that it remains viable as part of a national strategy and help to eliminate some of the self-selection. At this time it would be hard to find a way to help curb the self-section cycle of the military. Military leadership must recognize this propensity to self-select, however, and with it the growing internal view of a military caste perceiving itself as better than society. Discussions and
classes through the professional military education system will help this self-awareness and recognize that it is part of the gap the AVF places between the military and society.

Conclusions

There has been much scholarly research and writing done since Janowitz and Huntington’s works were published and many of the topics dealt with here have been discussed elsewhere to some extent. Conducting the research for this paper has led to several conclusions:

1) The topic of civil-military relations tends to mostly focus on civilian control of the military. The history of the United States bears out that the probability of a military coup overthrowing the government is fundamentally zero. The TISS survey attempted to deal with other “gaps,” but still did not deal in depth with basic civilian-military interaction or the consequences of the AVF and the impact that it has on civil-military relations.

2) The importance of impact of the AVF “gap,” while showing no immediate threat to the subjugation of the military to civilian control, may have an impact over time of increasing politicization of the military to the point where it becomes a “policy decider” rather than a “policy executer.” Another danger is the military becoming so isolated from the government and people that it essentially becomes an “imperial army,” sent to combat with no view of the costs because it has no more links to the society. Both of these are direct results of the balanced triangle of Clauswitzian Theory being skewed by the AVF gap.

3) There has not been, and there needs to be, another study similar to the TISS survey within the context and framework of the “War on Terror” or “Long War” in the post 9/11 timeframe to validate or invalidate some of the findings after a period of prolonged modern conflict. This would need to be a longer-term study, as wide in scope as the Foreign Policy
Leadership Project (FPLP) surveys that follow cohorts with periodic questionnaires in order to find changes in views and trends over time.

4 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 358.
21 This was from personal experience and was a class I took to fulfill an “ethnic studies” requirement for my undergraduate degree from the University of Wisconsin.


Bacevich, “Elusive Bargain,” 239.


Ibid.

Data used from DMDC for January 2009 and Dept. of Labor from February 2009

Janowitz and Moskos Jr., “Five Years of the All Volunteer Force,” 211.


Ibid.


50 TISS survey data
53 Ibid., 250-251.
57 Desch, “Explaining the Gap,” 299.
58 Janowitz and Moskos Jr., “Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force,” 191, 201.
Bibliography


Desch, Michael C. “Huntington’s Hartz: the Clash of Civilizations Between America’s Civilian Liberalism and Military Realism.” Paper prepared for the workshop on “American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years Since The Soldier and the State.” United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.


