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From the Editor

In this issue, Military Review focuses on three themes: United We Stand, Global Threats, and Emerging Doctrine.

United We Stand contains articles about the ongoing war against terrorism and homeland defense. Retired General Gordon Sullivan and retired Lieutenant General Frederic Brown examine America’s Army as it continues to prosecute the war against terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Flynn considers countermeasures installations can take against the threats of terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel John Trippon explains anthrax, how it works, and what steps to take against it.

Global Terrorism reports on the potential terrorist threat in South America. During an interview with Military Review, General Mora, commander, Colombian Army, answers questions about terrorism in Colombia and the Colombian Army’s operations against it. Fort Leavenworth’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) provides an in-depth look at insurgency and its connection with global terrorism. Graham Turbiville, FMSO’s director, reviews the history of Islamic revolution in the Philippines and its bloody engagement with the U.S. Army in the early part of the 20th century. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest reveals how insurgents use safe havens to facilitate their agendas. Retired Colonel William Mendel investigates Paraguay’s emerging role in terrorist operations. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Kipp analyzes Russia’s role in the war against terrorism.

In Emerging Doctrine, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, presents a series of articles that shows there is more to Army Transformation than mere equipment. The authors provide a glimpse of how Transformation is changing warfighting doctrine as well as an overview of the Army’s new field manual (FM) numbering system. Retired Major Douglas Darling argues the Army’s need for a manual devoted solely to warfighting at the tactical level. Retired Lieutenant Colonel William Connor looks at emerging command and control doctrine. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Burke provides an in-depth look at the new FM 3-0, Operations. Major Joseph McLamb wonders whether the Army should abandon its ponderous military decisionmaking process.

In Insights, Adrienne Brooks looks back at the U.S. Army’s 1991 involvement in integrating women into the Emirati military. In Almanac, Timothy Gusinov relates his experiences with Spetsnaz during the Russian Army’s war in Afghanistan. This month’s Review Essay is Lewis Bernstein’s review of The Two World Wars That Shaped the 20th Century.

Military Review seeks to bring the best in current military writing and thinking to the military professional. To learn how to subscribe to the journal, turn to the inside back cover. Not only will you find subscription information, you will also find a list of upcoming themes for the remaining issues of 2002. Good reading!
America’s Army

General Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army, Retired, and
Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired

The Army’s fundamental ethos is winning in close combat and enduring under great stress—as at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, during the Civil War—but then prevailing. It also includes stationing in Korea since June 1950, especially the deterrence cycle, and in central Europe since 1944, especially the heavy fighting during the initial stages and the deterrence-to-victory cycle. America’s Army is not postmodern.

The U.S. Army is unique as a military service in this country as well as being unique in relation to all other nations’ contemporary armies. Thus, the Army shares fully no responsibilities or requirements with other military forces, foreign or domestic. This uniqueness must be reinforced during the transformation process. A broader understanding of the nature of America’s Army will minimize frequent policy errors of aggregation such as mandating dysfunctional uniformity within the Department of Defense (DOD) or with the military forces of other nations. The U.S. Army is neither better nor worse than the other U.S. armed services, but it is substantially different and may require unique policies and programs.

Strengths of America’s Army

Landpower—the U.S. Army—must reflect the unique characteristics of the United States of America as a democracy, as a nation, as a federal republic, as a state, and as a continent. These characteristics are the practical sources of the nature and capabilities of America’s Army, literally a citizen’s army. Singly, and in combination, these characteristics interact to mold a unique landpower force. Because of its fundamental importance, each
The Army has become a national leader in developing soldiers regardless of race, ethnic origin, religion, or (unless proscribed by law) gender. It and the other armed services lead in assimilating diverse nationalities into the national melting pot. As a citizen’s army, America’s Army can be no less than the national model for executing important national social programs as well as a model for supporting domestic defense.

strength must be considered in detail, both how it influences the Army’s nature and how it frames its responses to current and future challenges.

**Democracy.** Landpower exists with the consent of the governed. The institution reflects the will of the people. The Army provides a particular public service—providing a citizen’s army governed entirely by civilian institutions. The Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win our nation’s wars with unlimited liability of those in service to state. Service to nation, including death, sets the military aside as a profession and in the nature of its service to the people it serves. It is the custodian of the nation’s youth as it prepares them to go in harm’s way. Officers, sergeants, and soldiers are equally at risk in attaining U.S. military objectives; all ranks serve in harm’s way.

The Army must be wholly sensitive to generational change and the need for public esteem if it is to attract quality volunteers in an open, competitive market. Seeking “a few good” potential soldiers is not a viable alternative. An individual’s culture—the individual striving to excel as a member of a disciplined team performing under great stress—prevails. “Be All You Can Be” and “An Army of One” must be more than recruiting ploys. They are fundamental expressions of the desire to excel in a meritocracy that are characteristic of soldiers at all grades today and are a vital expectation of America’s youth. Be All You Can Be emphasizes the importance of a competent, confident individual; “Proud to be an American,” by his or her disciplined competence, becoming a role model for others. Individual soldiers are an important deployable strategic resource, as has been demonstrated in the Partnership for Peace Program. Soldiers serve and excel, however, as members of cohesive teams—the individual soldier “of one” in a team accomplishes the task or mission to standard, not letting his or her team members down. Individuals join; teams fight and win. The Army comprises teams of winners—an all-American team!

The Army is expected to support—to confirm the merit of, if not to lead—national social programs within the framework of national landpower military readiness requirements. After what many thought was a slow start, the Army has become a national leader in developing soldiers regardless of race, ethnic origin, religion, or (unless proscribed by law) gender. It and the other armed services lead in assimilating diverse nationalities into the national melting pot. As a citizen’s army, America’s Army can be no less than the national model for executing important national social programs as well as a model for supporting domestic defense. It sets the standard.

The Army must be an apolitical institution led by politically sensitive leaders prepared to express the requirements of the profession while remaining attentive to local concerns. It must be proactively open to media at all echelons to better inform the citizenry.

**Nation.** Landpower reflects shared basic values that are born in national diversity. Competence-basing—rewarding competent performance—is practiced across boundaries of race, ethnic origin, gender, and religion. Landpower must represent the national population at all grades. The United States’ various national and ethnic elements as “a nation of nations” are absolutely represented in the Army. Leaders should be developed from all backgrounds and regions in representative proportions.

Landpower presence commits the nation more than that of any other military service because the Army is directly associated with people in its political milieu. Once committed, these popular associations across economic and social strata, both within the United States and in the region of commitment, are not easily withdrawn.

**State.** The power of the state confers legitimate use of landpower, seapower, and airpower to win conflicts. The citizenry expects highly credible, disciplined basic mission proficiency to fight and win as the national civil leadership expects across a broad spectrum of potential conflict.

New threats mandate new capabilities: military, political, economic, and social expertise. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are new “old” threats. Homeland defense becomes an important landpower responsibility, not greatly different from the Army’s practice during westward expansion in the 1800s. An abiding responsibility of
Each landpower component complements the others by creating one Army of Active component and Reserve component, military, and civilian members. All rely on performance-based excellence to uniform standard, which ensures common levels of proficiency to common tasks. RC soldiers—citizen-soldiers—maintain landpower links with the citizenry.

America's Army is to look forward, to anticipate new threats, and to be ready when called upon. This responsibility has been reaffirmed since the aftermath of terrorism in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The possibility of rapidly emerging, unpredictable threats mandates that the Army sustain its mobilization capability to win against any combination of potential landpower threats while providing necessary support to U.S. seapower and airpower.

Federal republic. The checks and balances of the Constitution—executive, legislative, and judicial—are reflected beneficially in reinforcing military jurisdictions: federal versus state, national versus regional, and individual versus unit as represented in Active and Reserve forces.

Each landpower component complements the others by creating one Army of Active component (AC) and Reserve component (RC), military, and civilian members. All rely on performance-based excellence to uniform standard, which ensures common levels of proficiency to common tasks. RC soldiers—citizen-soldiers—maintain landpower links with the citizenry. An example of these vital links could be emerging national political leaders from among citizen-soldiers such as Desert Storm veterans. Some characteristics of each landpower component follow:

- Active Army: federal and national—individuals and units charged to sustain immediate readiness across the range of landpower capability.
- Army National Guard (ARNG): state and regional units—the governors' militia armies that stay prepared to respond to state emergencies and home defense, mobilize to support Active forces, and generate local political understanding and support for America's Army.
- U.S. Army Reserve (USAR): federal and regional individuals and units. USAR Individual Mobilization Augmentees are the source of superbly qualified individuals drawn from a national sample. The USAR creates units composed of personnel across metroplexes such as the Chicago, New York City, and national capitol region multistate metropolitan areas. The ARNG is limited to separate state jurisdictions.

The strength of the U.S. Army is in the aggregate capabilities of the entire force—AC and RC—
The United States must preserve and nurture the enduring willingness of Americans to serve in uniform. It must not simply cast aside the federal-state, national-regional, individual-unit strengths of any of the three components to resolve some transitory contemporary budget or homeland defense challenge. Rather, the interlocking, carefully balanced capabilities of all three should be reinforced at times of national trial.

drawn upon fully to reinforce strengths and minimize weaknesses such as citizen-soldiers’ lack of time or the active Army’s shortage of focused, highly technical, civilian-related expertise.

Appreciating the unique and truly American institutions—the ARNG and USAR—is important in understanding the power of America’s Army. Each component is different, but transcendentally, all three unite in a common bond—the Army’s men and women who selflessly serve their nation. The United States must preserve and nurture the enduring willingness of Americans to serve in uniform. It must not simply cast aside the federal-state, national-regional, individual-unit strengths of any of the three components to resolve some transitory contemporary budget or homeland defense challenge. Rather, the interlocking, carefully balanced capabilities of all three should be reinforced at times of national trial.

If the U.S. Army did not already have all three components, it would have to create them because they represent the diversity of governance that is the United States. Their inherent competition for resources is healthy. Moreover, the lowest common denominator of best landpower practice for the future is not necessarily the Active unit, justifiably dominant as the model for landpower during the cold war. New threats, including defeating international terrorism, cyberwarfare, and WMD, mandate that each component provide capabilities that magnify unique strengths. The whole of the landpower capability is much greater than the sum of its individual component parts.

Continent. The essential global capability and perspective now present within the Army derived, in great measure, from the intensity of commitment overseas during the 1990s. Leaders at all grades possess an extraordinary range of individual service experience. The Army must be prepared for both inter- and intracontinental force projections under all circumstances of distance, terrain, climate, and population.

Implications

As a unique institution, America’s Army provides the United States with abiding strengths and vulnerabilities rarely shared with either of the other services or armies of other nations.

The necessary. The necessary need continuing support—

- Diverse America’s Army—quality, nationally representative (race, gender, and ethnicity) youth volunteers—will produce thousands of individual soldier role models who support individual and unit excellence to standard while serving under great stress. That diversity of highly capable individuals from all components who manifest the vision of America ensures international landpower preeminence.

- AC-generated landpower, Title 10, U.S. Code, capabilities for AC and RC forces as well as for other services. Complementary products are required to respond to diverse requirements.

- National support of qualitative personnel and equipment requirements for ready landpower and mobilization forces. Adjust and expand, if appropriate, ARNG and USAR regional or local capabilities that are essential to effective homeland defense and to support overseas campaigns.

- Supporting national social and economic expectations of our nation’s youth but not to the detriment of basic warfighting capabilities as determined by national political leaders. Examples include unlimited liability requiring separate but comparable military due process appropriate to preserving good order and discipline, and support for clearly beneficial national projects. Improving a soldier’s education and training to produce a more competent soldier, then a more productive civilian, must be a major Army program.

- Preparing joint and combined leaders and team members is vital to landpower capabilities. Every soldier becomes a leader as his or her responsibility to perform complex tasks to standard migrates to lower echelons, but all perform, both vertically and horizontally, as team members. Increasingly, these teams are joint, multinational, and both civilian and military. The preparation focus should
Force protection is clearly important, but mission accomplishment governs all. If allies and potential enemies perceive that force protection degrades the deterrent, a highly capable Army’s warfighting value becomes dysfunctional. National leaders must explain to the citizens the importance of prevailing in harm’s way. American citizens have always accepted casualties when they understood the cause and accepted its importance, as has happened as the United States is responding to international terrorism.

be on creating and sustaining proficient teams at all echelons.

The dysfunctional. The dysfunctional need correcting if America’s Army is to continue to prevail in its service to the nation.

- Continuing the grinding intensity of commitment despite “resource anemia.” “Consuming the seed corn” as the Army reconfigures impairs necessary introspection and could limit innovation. Because of the universality of task, condition, and standard, no Army has ever known in such detail what is required to be excellent and what is actually occurring. A mismatch between the rhetoric of excellence and the reality of average corrodes the creative energies that are essential in transformation. There will never be a timeout. Should the Army’s drawdown continue or the current resource anemia that compromises the integrity of excellence to standard continue, the impact will become more apparent as the sinews of a professional force erode. An increased focus on national defense stimulated by counterterrorism operations should generate support to better match resources with commitments. If not, many of the best will leave as their talents are drawn to other important national purposes.

- National and service expectations of zero casualties. Force protection is clearly important, but mission accomplishment governs all. If allies and potential enemies perceive that force protection degrades the deterrent, a highly capable Army’s warfighting value becomes dysfunctional. National leaders must explain to the citizens the importance of prevailing in harm’s way. American citizens have always accepted casualties when they understood the cause and accepted its importance, as has happened as the United States is responding to international terrorism. Many policemen and firemen perished in executing their duties at the World Trade Center. There is no such thing as bloodless war.

- Constabulary orientation as force-generation capability. Diverse global challenges ensure the preservation of a credible constabulary capability. The Army’s fundamental ethos is winning in close combat and enduring under great stress—as at
transformation. There will never be a timeout. Actionary—response to social change. An essentially conservative—progressive, not re-

of unlimited liability in service to nation mandate must be exploited, particularly as homeland secu-

rity is addressed post-11 September 2001.

Leading-edge change in national social change is deemed inimical to the good order and discipline professional military leaders require to fight and win. The unique professional requirements of unlimited liability in service to nation mandate an essentially conservative—progressive, not re-

actionary—response to social change.

Common personnel policies with other services

unless clearly appropriate to landpower warfighting readiness requirements. Uniform military policies should be the exception, not the rule. Sergeants lead and fight in landpower; this is not the case in other services. There is exceptional task migration down echelon occurring in close combat forces such as Land Warrior and Joint Special Operations Command Delta Force operatives. Similarly, personnel policies need not be common across components, given the ARNG’s diverse state responsibilities and highly specialized USAR units. Why should there be common retirement ages, promotion incentives, or service benefits?

- Comparing U.S. Army policies and programs with other nations’ armies. Because of U.S. landpower’s unique characteristics, there is no lowest common denominator comparison between U.S. forces and any other nation’s forces. Other than the shared unlimited liability of service to state, other national landpower forces cannot be compared to U.S. forces. Many are appropriately postmodern. Perhaps this is because the U.S. Army performs to a higher standard; certainly it is because America’s Army is the product of unique formational circumstances in our democracy, nation, federal republic, state, and continent.

The U.S. Army is a great Army that has become even better in recent years because of the extraordinary quality and diversity of its volunteers. It is developing highly competent leaders using independently assessed performance to standard at all grades, from private to corps commander, with national civilian leaders’ encouragement. America’s Army is a unique organization. As national leaders move toward essential post-cold war transformation and respond to homeland security requirements, uniqueness should be used to advantage, not suppressed for short-term financial or bureaucratic reasons. MR

NOTES

1. This is not to denigrate in any way the important contributions of airpower and seapower. Operations in Afghanistan fully demonstrate their abiding importance.
2. Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, establishes Department of the Army’s responsibilities to access, train, and equip Army units to support regional joint forces commanders in chief requirements.
3. Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). "Five major organizational changes characterize the postmodern military: the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally; the diminution of differences within the armed ser-

vices based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles; a change in the military’s purpose from fighting wars to missions that traditionally would not be considered military; that military forces are used more in international missions authorized, or at least legitimated, by entities beyond the nation state; and internationalizing military forces. Here, we have in mind the emergence of the Eurocorps, and multinational and binational divisions in NATO countries." For a more compelling discussion of the groundsprings of America’s Army today, see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence (New York: Knopf, 2001). He describes the Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian schools of U.S. foreign policy.

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Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., is the longest serving chief of armor and cavalry since World War II. He is coauthor of The Army in Transition (1973) and author of The Army in Transition II (1993).
Installation Antiterrorism Force-Protection Planning

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Flynn, U.S. Army

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century concluded in a September 1999 report that America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack at home and that Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers. This is a sobering assessment of the era that we expect will last some number of years. If these attacks occur, terrorists will most likely carry them out.1

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Eric K. Shinseki issued this warning as part of his foreword to the March 2000 Antiterrorism & Force-Protection Installation Commanders' Guide.2 Just a year and a half later, terrorists attacked both the World Trade Center complex and the Pentagon, turning this sobering warning into grim reality. While terrorism was once generally regarded as a problem outside the continental United States (CONUS), the past 10 years have shown that the American homeland is not immune to terrorism. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 domestic terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City, and the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon have claimed thousands of lives and caused billions of dollars in damage. Additionally, the lethality of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens at home and abroad has increased dramatically. The U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia caused significant loss of life and destruction.

Military installations are particularly high-value targets for terrorists. They are, in fact, small cities that provide homes for service members, their families, and critical tenant organizations. Military installations are important to the country’s defense, and the psychological and political impact an attack on an installation would create makes them prime targets for terrorist attacks. The object of protecting an installation and all of its resources from terrorism is to stop it before it transpires or to respond quickly to mitigate its effects. This objective places installation antiterrorism force protection (AT/FP) into an operational context. The military decisionmaking process (MDMP), a tactical planning tool, can also help installation commanders and their staffs develop comprehensive, synchronized AT/FP plans. This article overviews installation AT/FP and considers the MDMP from an installation AT/FP perspective.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead agency for combating terrorism; however, every commander, regardless of echelon of command or branch of service, is inherently responsible for planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing AT/FP measures to secure the command. Combatant commands, services, major Army commands (MACOMs), installations, and tenant units all have unique roles and responsibilities in installation AT/FP. The U.S. Army’s AT/FP program is a collective effort that reduces the likelihood that Army-affiliated personnel, their families, facilities, and materiel will be subject to a terrorist attack and to prepare to respond to the consequences of such attacks should they occur. It is imperative that installation commanders and their key staff officers thoroughly understand how installation AT/FP fits into Army and DOD antiterrorism programs. Joint
Combating terrorism involves actions that include antiterrorism, counterterrorism, consequence management, and intelligence support taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Where counterterrorism is offensive, antiterrorism is defensive. Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. The Army’s AT/FP program is part of a broader national program of combating terrorism that is governed by Army Regulation (AR) 525-13, Antiterrorism Force Protection: Security of Personnel, Information, and Critical Resources.

The Installation AT/FP Program

Each installation is a unique mix of threats, vulnerabilities, and acceptable levels of risk based on the factors mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). An effective installation AT/FP program must synchronize intelligence, risk management, and existing security programs to ensure a holistic approach to countering the spectrum of security threats. While each installation’s AT/FP program will vary, an underlying installation AT/FP program concept serves as a guide as depicted in Figure 1.

The AT/FP program concept has two phases—a proactive phase and a reactive phase. The proactive phase encompasses the planning, resourcing, preventive measures, preparation, awareness, and education and training that takes place before a terrorist incident. During this phase, consideration is given to information and intelligence gathering to develop a threat assessment. The threat assessment includes both threat analysis and the command’s assessment of installation vulnerabilities ranked by criticality, or criticality and vulnerability assessment. Both elements together determine the risk and any steps necessary to correct or reduce identified vulnerabilities, or risk management.

The threat assessment is an integral part of the planning process and serves as the basis for developing a long-term AT/FP strategy. Because of limited resources, it takes time to achieve a fully prepared posture. The AT/FP strategy provides that long-term direction to guide the installation in a coordinated series of steps to realize that goal. The actual length of time the strategy considers is based on available resources and other installation missions. Generally, 5 years is a reasonable planning figure. Finally, the approved strategy must be translated into an effective AT/FP program.
The prevention aspects of the proactive phase are based on synchronizing four separate but related security programs: operations security, personal security, physical security, and information security. Additionally, the DOD force-protection conditions (FPCON) system, formerly known as threat conditions, is also a prevention mechanism by which an installation operationally increases or decreases protective measures. The FPCON system consists of five conditions, ranging from normal through delta. Each FPCON describes progressive levels of security measures for implementing responses to threats to DOD personnel, information, and critical resources. Selecting the appropriate response to terrorist threats remains the responsibility of the commander having jurisdiction or control over the threatened facilities or personnel. Training and awareness are critical to an effective AT/FP program. Army and DOD instructions regulate individual, leader, and specialty training.

An installation AT/FP program’s reactive phase involves those actions the installation takes to operationally increase FPCON protective measures in response to terrorists alerts, and the initial response and consequence-management actions it takes to contain and mitigate an actual terrorist incident. Where the focus of the proactive phase is on planning and prevention, the reactive phase is centered on decision-making during execution. Key considerations during the AT/FP reactive phase include:

- Identifying first-response forces and the concept of their commitment.
- Performing command and control (C2), including authority and jurisdiction.
- Committing special response forces such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), host nation security, and hazardous materials teams.
- Evacuating casualties.
- Conducting postincident procedures.

Postincident procedures consist of actions that protect evidence, handle captured personnel, identify and process hostages, document action to use during any prosecution, conduct public affairs operations, and identify changes required to the existing AT/FP plan.

C2. AR 525-13 requires that commanders establish committees and working groups to assist in developing, integrating, and managing the installation AT/FP program. The force-protection committee (FPC) and its subordinate working groups consider the installation from the AT/FP perspective to assess the threat, integrate the installation’s physical security features with its security capabilities, develop plans to compensate for weaknesses, and recommend enhancements to reduce installation vulnerabilities. The FPC meets at least semiannually—more frequently during increased threats—and is chaired by the installation commander or chief of staff. The FPC membership is based on the installation’s size and staff structure. At a minimum, staff principals from the following staff sections form the FPC: provost marshal; security, plans, and operations; budget; staff judge advocate; information management; engineer; medical; public affairs; chemical; and criminal investigation. Other personnel to consider are supporting intelligence and counterintelligence commanders, tenant unit commanders, Reserve component forces, and other DOD and Department of the Army (DA) activities.

The FPC has a broad range of duties and may establish subordinate working groups to address specialized aspects of the program. For instance, a threat working group, sometimes called an intelligence fusion cell, should be established to coordinate the production and dissemination of threat assessments and to ensure intelligence threat information and operational information are effectively and continuously integrated. Other working groups could include planning groups or vulnerability assessment teams. Ideally, the command’s school-trained AT/FP officer supervises each group’s operation.

Each installation must have a designated C2 center to plan and coordinate the command’s AT/FP efforts during training and actual crises. Often referred to the emergency operations center (EOC), this C2 node must be readily available and functional on very short notice. The EOC functions by predetermined standing operating procedures (SOPs). As these SOPs dictate, predetermined and adequate communications systems must be made available at the location. The crisis-management
The FPC has a broad range of duties and may establish subordinate working groups to address specialized aspects of the program. For instance, a threat working group, sometimes called an intelligence fusion cell, should be established to coordinate the production and dissemination of threat assessments and to ensure intelligence threat information and operational information are effectively and continuously integrated.

predesignated, train together, and be prepared to perform individual and collective C2 tasks under the installation commander's or his designated representative's control.

Intelligence and counterintelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence are the first line of defense in an AT/FP program. Commanders, however, must operate as laws and regulations require when conducting intelligence activities against domestic threats. Laws affecting intelligence-collection activities vary between CONUS-based and overseas installations. AR 381-10, Intelligence Activities, outlines the authorities and restrictions in intelligence activities. A variety of information sources are available to assist commanders in determining terrorist threats to installations. Defense Intelligence Agency threat assessments and State Department travel warnings provide useful information. The Army Anti-terrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell publishes daily and weekly intelligence updates and products and distributes them worldwide to Army installations. MACOMs also frequently publish threat assessments and updates. Local threat information may also be available from local, state, federal, and host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Open-source information is publicly available and can be collected, retained, and stored without special authorization. News media, government hearings, and FBI and Central Intelligence Agency publications are examples of open-source information. Because terrorist acts are criminal acts, criminal records are a major source of terrorist intelligence. Commanders must work through established law enforcement liaison channels because collecting, retaining, and disseminating criminal records must be regulated. The installation's supporting U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command detachment is an excellent source of assistance in determining the local terrorist and criminal threat.

Training and exercises. Key to an effective AT/FP program is elevating and sustaining terrorism awareness. Standards require that all personnel on an installation be trained to note and report suspicious activity. Individual awareness is especially important at installations with few security resources and high levels of risk. Response plans must also be exercised. A robust Random Antiterrorism Measures Program tests individual FPCON and other physical security measures, but it is equally important to regularly exercise the installation's ability to effectively transition between FPCONs. While there are no minimum time standards for FPCON transitions, commanders must know how long these transitions will take to establish a measure of confidence in any FPCON and threat environment. Lessons learned from training and exercises must be reflected in the annual review of the AT plan.

AT/FP Planning

To develop an effective and comprehensive installation AT/FP plan, the commander and staff must conduct a thorough estimate of the situation and synchronize numerous agencies, functions, and resources to a common goal—protecting the installation from terrorism. Although designed for tactical planning, the MDMP provides the process to use to accomplish installation AT/FP planning. It is an established, proven analytical process that helps organize the thought processes of a commander and his staff to examine specific situations and reach logical conclusions. It helps them to apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge in reaching decisions to develop effective plans.

For many years, tactical commanders have used the MDMP to determine a plan of action for a particular situation. The MDMP's seven steps are the same for an installation protecting itself from a terrorist attack as for a tactical formation defending itself against an enemy offensive in combat. Using this principle with the same logical sequence and skillfully applied available information and experience will ensure an effective installation AT/FP plan:

- Receive mission.
- Conduct mission analysis.
- Develop courses of action (COAs).
Analyze COAs.

Compare COAs.

Approve COAs.

Produce operation order (OPORD).

The MDMP establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and wargaming COAs against the threat, comparing friendly COAs against criteria and each other, selecting a COA, and preparing an operation plan or OPORD for execution. The MDMP steps allow the installation commander and his staff to organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. Interactions among various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that maintains flexibility, efficiently uses available time, and facilitates continuous information sharing. Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, provides a detailed discussion of the planning process and prescribes formats for staff estimates and orders.13

While the basic seven-step planning process is the same for all types of planning, there are unique considerations when developing installation AT/FP plans. FM 101-5 is written from a tactical staff’s perspective. Some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures described in FM 101-5 may not apply to installation AT/FP planning. Targeting is one example. However, threat analysis, criticality, and vulnerability assessments, which are critical to AT/FP planning, are not addressed in FM 101-5. Additionally, there are some unusual challenges not often found in a tactical unit.

An installation is formed of units and functions that support the various administrative purposes of its residents and tenant units. It is not, as a rule, formed for combat operations. Installation staffs vary widely in size and capability. Some installations are assigned a staff officer for every conceivable function while others have only a few that cover multiple functions, among which is planning. Finally, installation planners are often less experienced...
The commander's role in planning.

The commander is solely responsible for decisions, plans, and supervision, and his personal involvement in installation AT/FP planning is critical. The commander disciplines the planning process so that it is sensitive to time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail. He also disciplines the product to ensure the output is relevant to the situation. To drive the planning process, commanders visualize, describe, and direct operations.

Visualization begins in mission analysis as the commander understands the situation and develops how he wants the installation to move from its current state to the end state, which represents a concept of operations and mission accomplishment. Installation commanders visualize arranging activities simultaneously and sequentially to achieve desired effects. The commander begins to describe his visualization when participating in the MDMP. As he receives information during mission analysis, the commander focuses on developing COAs through the restated mission, his initial commander’s intent, planning guidance, and the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). The commander’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIR all guide and focus the staff throughout the planning process.

Receiving the mission. The MDMP begins with receiving or anticipating a new mission. A directive from a higher headquarters, a change in FPCON, or a scheduled annual AT/FP plan review may initiate planning. Timely notification of an impending planning session facilitates the planning staff’s preparedness. Critical activities outside of the installation staff, such as local, state, federal, and host nation organizations, should also be notified and invited to participate in the planning process. Upon notification of an impending planning session, staff officers prepare by updating estimates and other critical information relating to installation AT/FP. Planners must gather the necessary planning tools that will be used during mission analysis and COA development. These tools include—

- Copies of higher headquarters order and plans.
- Current and supporting installation plans such
as mass casualty evacuation plans and physical security plans.
- Installation maps and other available terrain products.
- Higher headquarters regulations, including applicable DA and DOD regulations and instructions.
- Installation SOPs.
- Appropriate FMs, pamphlets, and guides.
- Current staff estimates.

**Mission analysis.** Mission analysis is the crucial step in determining the mission and developing situational understanding. It consists of 17 tasks, not necessarily sequential, and results in a restated mission, commander’s intent, and planning guidance to the staff for COA development. A thorough mission analysis enables the commander to better understand friendly forces and capabilities, the threat, and the environment. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) begins during mission analysis. It integrates terrorist tactics, facts, assumptions, terrain, and weather to determine likely threat COAs. Installation staff officers should review FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, for intelligence products that can be modified for installation AT/FP planning. One of the results of IPB is the initial threat analysis. A threat analysis should be written according to the factors in Figure 2.

The threat analysis combined with the vulnerability assessment form the threat assessment. The threat assessment is not discussed in FM 101-5 and is unique to AT/FP planning. The staff must examine the terrorist threat, including likely tactics, to determine what installation facilities, systems, and functions are vulnerable to attack. An elementary school, hospital, central mailroom, power-generation plant, commanding general’s residence, water treatment facility, or the installation’s information systems may all be vulnerable to terrorist attack. The staff then ranks each vulnerability according to its criticality to the installation’s mission.

For example, if force projection were a primary installation mission, the installation’s airfield would rank high as a critical vulnerability. Because installations protect people, schools, commissaries, and housing areas may rank high on the criticality list. The prioritized list of facilities, systems, and functions, with their vulnerabilities, allows the commander to focus on each critical vulnerability in priority order. Finally, the staff must identify actions or tasks to mitigate each vulnerability. This analysis will identify required resources—money, troops, and special equipment—and resource shortfalls and will serve as a basis for COA development.

Mission analysis includes determining specified tasks, mostly from higher authorities, and implied tasks the installation planners determine. The mission-essential tasks are derived from the list of specified and implied tasks that form the basis of the mission statement. Most specified tasks for installation AT/FP are found in AR 525-13. An analysis of those specified tasks will result in implied tasks. Implied tasks will primarily result from the installation’s unique circumstances such as its location, associated tenant units, or its possible role as a force-projection platform.

Another part of mission analysis is determining limitations and assumptions. AR 525-13 and various legal documents provide many of the limitations imposed upon an installation regarding intelligence collection and the authority and jurisdiction of a terrorist incident. Commanders must operate as bound by law and regulations when executing AT/FP programs. Often things related to the installation and the adjacent community might impose a limitation on how the installation can operate in an AT/FP environment, including restricting mutual aid agreements. Limitations are important to the process because they prescribe boundaries that the command must anticipate.

Installation staffs work hard to gather every relevant fact to AT/FP. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to begin an operation with all desired information. Assumptions fill in the gaps where certain information is not available and provide the necessary details to continue the planning process. They must be constantly reviewed for validity. There is always a danger of assuming away problems, particularly threat potential. Because of the dynamic and opportunistic nature of the threat, it is best to include all terrorist possibilities. The greater the time between planning and execution, the greater the probability that facts will replace most assumptions.
Central to the MDMP, and particularly important for installation AT/FP, are CCIR and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). The commander needs accurate, timely information to conduct his visualization, to make decisions, and to direct action. CCIR drive and prioritize the information-collection plan, subsequent allocations of collection resources, and analysis efforts. The two elements of CCIR are priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly force information requirements (FFIR). Although not part of CCIR, EEFI are disseminated with CCIR and reflect things the command wants to protect. During mission analysis, the staff develops and nominates information requirements to the commander for his consideration as CCIR and EEFI.

Most CCIR are directly linked to decision points. Thus, answers to CCIR enable the commander to anticipate required decisions and make them quickly. Commanders and their staffs continuously review CCIR throughout the planning process and as the situation changes during execution, particularly when the threat is ill defined, hidden, and changes drastically.

PIR focus on information about the enemy, terrain, and weather. During planning, installation AT/FP PIR focuses on building the threat assessment. During times of normal activity, they are broadly stated and address a variety of possible threats. Collection against PIR for installation AT/FP relies much more on civilian agencies and less on organic assets than does collection during combat. There are numerous restrictions on Army forces collecting information on domestic threats, thus the restrictions severely hamper collection against PIR for installation AT/FP. The commander must focus on a cooperative relationship with domestic security organizations to be able to fully understand the threat. The results will forecast terrorist operations and then determine a working estimate of potential terrorist target values.

Realistic PIR for installation AT/FP focus on understanding what the enemy is attempting to do and reverse engineer that into determining what friendly forces can do about it. Some PIR are also developed to support decisionmaking during execution. For example, examining the indicators that terrorists will use wheeled vehicles as weapons of mass destruction against the installation could lead to a decision to increase vehicle inspection criteria at installation access points or to restrict the route of all heavy commercial vehicles on the installation.

FFIR are those critical information requirements the commander and staff need to know about friendly forces and their capabilities as they relate to the mission. An example FFIR could read, “Inability to secure a stated mission-essential vulnerable area (MEVA).” If an AT/FP plan relies on a tenant infantry brigade to secure installation MEVAs during FPCON Charlie, deploying the infantry brigade would significantly impact mission accomplishment. The answer to this FFIR may lead the installation commander to several decisions, including requesting support from higher headquarters.

EEFI are critical aspects of friendly forces that if known by the enemy would compromise, lead to failure, or limit friendly forces’ success. Operations security is the process commanders follow to protect EEFI. The location and accessibility of selected critical infrastructure, such as a cable communication hub, or installation security vulnerabilities are examples of AT/FP EEFI.

COA development. COA development is the next step in the MDMP. After receiving the commander’s planning guidance, the staff develops COAs to analyze and compare. For installation AT/FP, COA development is organizing installation assets to reduce friendly vulnerabilities from a terrorist threat. In tactical planning, planners begin COA development by analyzing friendly and enemy forces’ combat power. They use historical minimum-planning ratios to gain insight on possible missions. In installation AT/FP planning, this step should consist of a troop-to-task analysis to enable planners to determine resource requirements and shortfalls. For example, matching generic units, functions, and assets against FPCON Charlie’s 40 preventive measures will produce the installation’s resource requirements. The troop-to-task analysis will help planners develop multiple COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

Initially conceptualizing a COA may start by developing a concept to defend the installation’s most
critical vulnerabilities, then working out to the installation’s perimeter security. A series of inner, middle, and outer security rings are matched against assets, programs, and functions to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Another way to begin conceptualizing may be to start with a worst-case scenario such as a high-explosive vehicle bomb detonated at a unit headquarters. In this instance, the planner first develops the COA from the reactive perspective, then develops a concept of prevention.

COAs are presented to the commander for his consideration in the form of a concept statement and sketch. The concept may be phased—preincident, incident, and postincident—or proactive, reactive. It should describe the objective and the main effort of each phase. The main effort could be by unit or, more likely, by function.

**COA analysis, comparison, and decision.** Steps four, five, and six of the MDMP are similar between tactical and installation AT/FP planning. The detailed COA analysis allows the staff to refine and synthesize each COA. The procedures for conducting a wargame are found in FM 101-5 and can be modified to fit AT/FP planning. COA comparison begins with each staff officer analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. The staff then collectively compares each COA to identify the one that has the highest probability of success.

There are several techniques that help the staff determine the best recommendation. The most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess each COA’s effectiveness and efficiency. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies the preferred COA and recommends it to the commander. After the COA decision brief, the commander selects the COA he believes will best accomplish the mission and issues any additional guidance on priorities, preparing orders, rehearsing, and preparing for mission execution.

**Producing orders.** The final step in the MDMP is to complete the plan and publish the order. The AT/FP plan follows the same five-paragraph OPORD format described in FM 101-5. There are some specific annotated AT/FP plan formats available to planners. The Joint Staff J34 section, for example, publishes an installation planning template. Additionally, the J34’s June 2001 publication of *The Guardian*, a quarterly AT/FP newsletter, provides an example of an annotated AT/FP plan.
The Anthrax Scare: Tips for Leaders

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Trippe, U.S. Army

The recent anthrax scares have provided something of a crash-course education in biological warfare. Soldiers who have trained for the traditional battlefield use of biological weapons now find themselves on unfamiliar ground due to the asymmetric and extremely low-technology nature of recent anthrax use. Meanwhile, the media have deluged the public with information and misinformation, much of it promulgated by self-appointed experts. This article addresses some of the more common concerns about using anthrax as a bioterror agent; specifically how key leaders can mitigate the risks of bioterror against soldiers, their families, and Department of the Army civilians.

Although this article specifically addresses anthrax in a garrison environment, many of these principles can apply to other bioterror threats. This article uses only open-source, unclassified data in nontechnical terms to the extent possible.

Defining the Problem

The vegetative (active) form of the bacteria *Bacillus anthracis* causes anthrax. Anthrax occurs naturally in only a few isolated portions of the United States but is endemic in many developing nations. When not actually living inside an organism, anthrax exists in a dormant form called a spore. A tough protective coat allows these spores to survive in the soil for decades—one study found viable spores that were 200 years old. These anthrax spores are processed for use in biological weapons.

Anthrax is not a communicable disease, and it cannot be transmitted from person to person in its active state. Anthrax spores can enter the body in one of three ways: by inhaling it into the lungs, by ingesting it into the digestive tract, or by contact with the skin, or cutaneous exposure. Inhalation is the preferred portal of entry for biowarfare and bioterrorism, as it is the most lethal and the most difficult to detect and treat. Anthrax ingested from contaminated objects or meat can be just as lethal but is much more easily defeated through sanitation and properly cooking food. Cutaneous anthrax is the least lethal of the three types of transmission—less than 5 percent of infections are fatal, given proper diagnosis and treatment, and only 20 percent are fatal even if untreated. Cutaneous anthrax infections occur when anthrax spores contact an open wound, typically when working with the hides or byproducts of infected animals or, in terms of biowarfare, by contact with contaminated objects or surfaces. Cutaneous anthrax theoretically can take place by direct blood-to-blood contact with infected persons, but this would be extremely rare and is preventable by practicing good hygiene. Studies suggesting transmission by contact with biting flies in sub-Saharan Africa remain inconclusive.

It is useful to make three assumptions: that the terrorists’ supply of anthrax spores is finite; that their lack of access to sophisticated battlefield dispersal methods means that anthrax dissemination will continue to occur through low-technology, surreptitious means; and that because of these constraints, the terrorists’ objectives are limited to disrupting operations rather than causing mass casualties.

The body’s immune system starts attacking anthrax spores once they enter the body; however, some spores may survive and migrate to the tracheobronchial lymph nodes. Thereafter follows an incubation period that varies from 1 to 60 days, depending on the number of spores involved and the route of entry into the body. Relatively high concentrations of aerosolized agent exposure from bioterror attacks may shorten this incubation time to 1 to 7 days, with symptoms present within 48 hours of exposure.
After the incubation period, the spores assume the active bacterial form, multiply, and start producing toxins. These toxins actually cause the bleeding and destruction of internal organs located in the middle of the chest—hemorrhagic necrotizing mediastinitis—that are associated with the disease. This underscores why early detection and treatment are so critical in combating anthrax; antibiotics can kill the bacteria producing the toxins, but they do not remove the toxins.

There is a huge difference between anthrax exposure (contact with the spores) and anthrax infection (actually having the disease), although this distinction is often blurred during nontechnical discussions. In layman’s terms, a useful analogy is comparing the anthrax spore and anthrax disease relationship with that of a single seed and a mature forest. Only in unusual circumstances would planting a single seed result in a mature forest, and likewise, only in an exceptional situation could a wayward inhaled spore produce the actual disease. The anthrax spore is similar to that ungerminated seed; even if it did become active in a suitable host, it generally takes many spores to produce a significant impact.

The exact number of spores needed to effect exposure and progress into an infection depends on many factors that remain a topic of debate. This is partially due to the rarity of naturally occurring inhalation anthrax. The general trend is that if you are in good health, your personal resistance may exceed the lethal inhaled dose. In fact, one study found that nonimmunized workers in animal hair-processing mills routinely inhaled 600 to 1,300 spores during an 8-hour shift without contracting the disease. On the other hand, a few unlucky victims have died from much lower exposure. If you are not in good health or if your immune system is already weakened, you are much more likely to contract the disease at a lower total exposure. There are also indications that people over 25 and those with preexisting lung damage, including heavy smoking, may be more susceptible, but the jury is still out on establishing a threshold dose.

Recent events have caused scientists to examine the possibility that a chain of very low-probability events could result in inhalation anthrax infections by as few as 1 to 3 spores, but these, by definition, would be extremely rare instances. It is important to remember that the mere presence of a few anthrax spores in the area is not itself cause for alarm and that being treated with antibiotics following confirmed exposure is merely sensible.

Media reports commonly mention that inhaling 8,000 to 10,000 spores is required for infection to occur, but things are not quite that simple. The median inhaled dose is approximately 10,000 spores within a generally accepted range of 8,000 to 50,000 spores. In other words, 10,000 spores of proper size—1 to 5 microns—would theoretically be expected to infect about 50 percent of the members in any given population. Being the median value, it also implies that there are some who will contract the disease with exposure to fewer spores and some whose tolerance to exposure is much higher; in other words, your mileage may vary. This is complicated by the fact that inhaled anthrax spores may remain viable in the lungs for up to...
warfare programs searching for the minimum dose that would reliably produce casualties, not produce incidental or fluke fatalities. Based on extremely rare occurrences, some scientists believe that only 1 to 2 spores could result in infection. It is unclear whether this is due to victim susceptibility, individual spore virulence, random probability, or a combination thereof. However, even this theory places the probability of infection at about .01 percent if the person is exposed at all.

If we assume an average particle size of 3 microns—midway between the extremes of 1 to 5 microns—and a median dose of 10,000 spores, then a single teaspoon of pure anthrax spores theoretically contains about 593,052,048 lethal doses. But that assumes perfect dispersion in equal amounts to each of the 593,052,048 intended victims; real life is never quite that simple. Proper dispersion is critical to producing casualties. For example, anthrax bombs were designed for low-order explosions—enough to disperse the spores without generating sufficient heat to destroy them. Anthrax spray tanks achieve proper particle size by mixing them with larger volumes of carrier material and by using specially designed nozzles that are not the same as those that crop-dusters use. Pure anthrax spores require additives to keep them from clumping together into particles larger than the 5-micron maximum size for effective inhalation; this further decreases the number of theoretical doses in our teaspoon of anthrax example. In practical terms, then, it is not quite so easy to produce widespread casualties. Biowarfare experts assume an efficiency rate of 1 percent or less for a typical terrorist device; the envelope-delivered anthrax technique has thus far been statistically insignificant in producing casualties.

Symptoms of Infection

Complete technical descriptions of symptoms may be found in U.S. Army Field Manual 8-824, Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. In layman’s terms, this is what to look for:

**Inhalation anthrax** symptoms are nonspecific and include fever, malaise, and fatigue. A nonproductive cough and vague chest discomfort may be present. There may be a short period of improvement of up to 3 days, followed by an abrupt onset of severe respiratory distress and possible meningitis. This is when the toxins begin to act; death usually occurs 24 to 36 hours later.

**Ingestion anthrax** may take one of two forms, depending on the location of the infection. Gastrointestinal anthrax has vague initial symptoms, including fever, anorexia, nausea, and vomiting. Abdominal pain, bloody vomiting, bloody diarrhea, and massive abdominal swelling can occur. Septic shock and death may follow. Oropharyngeal anthrax symptoms include a severe sore throat or a local oral or tonsillar ulcer, usually associated with fever, toxicity, and swelling of the neck.

**Cutaneous anthrax** initially looks like an insect bite or pimple that fills with liquid within 1 to 2 days. This vesicle ruptures to develop a painless lesion, approximately 0.5 to 2 inches in diameter, with a black-scabbed center. Because it is much easier to diagnose, it is more successfully treated and is rarely fatal. Note that the vesicle contains anthrax bacteria; avoid contact with its contents.

Assessing Threats

Force-protection and consequence-management planning begin with a threat assessment based on a unit’s vulnerability and its value as a target. Leaders then begin to coordinate with the appropriate installation; the Department of Defense; and local, state, and federal agencies with technical response capabilities while training their personnel on proper reaction techniques.

Although analyzing terrorists’ capabilities and strategic goals is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to make three assumptions: that the terrorists’ supply of anthrax spores is finite; that their lack of access to sophisticated battlefield dispersal methods means that anthrax dissemination will continue to occur through low-technology, surreptitious means; and that because of these constraints, the terrorists’ objectives are limited to disrupting operations rather than causing mass casualties.

Place the threat in perspective by honestly assessing your unit’s value as a target. In general, the likelihood of being targeted will increase with one or more of the following: the target’s criticality because
Inside an Anthrax Attack

The inhaled form of anthrax is rare and extremely deadly. Anthrax spores are dormant forms of the bacteria. When the spores are inhaled into the fertile environment of the lungs, they multiply.

1. If inhaled, large spores lodge in the upper respiratory tract where they are less dangerous.
2. Small spores that are between 1 and 5 microns penetrate the alveoli, the tiny sacks in the lung.
3. The immune system responds by destroying some spores and carrying others to lymph nodes in the chest.
4. In 1 to 60 days the inhaled spores in the lungs germinate and the bacteria multiplies, infecting chest tissue.
5. The bacteria produce toxins that enter the bloodstream, causing hemorrhaging, fluid collection, and tissue decay.

There is a huge difference between anthrax exposure (contact with the spores) and anthrax infection (actually having the disease), although this distinction is often blurred during nontechnical discussions. . . . Only in unusual circumstances would planting a single seed result in a mature forest, and likewise, only in an exceptional situation could a wayward inhaled spore produce the actual disease.

Symptoms

First stage can last from hours to a few days. The symptoms are flu-like: fever, coughing, weakness, and chest pains.

Second stage usually ends in death within several days.

Treatment

Antibiotics only prove helpful at the earliest stages of the disease because they fight the bacteria, not the toxins the bacteria produce.

Leaders can increase the effectiveness of response efforts and reduce false alarms by training troops and civilian personnel how to react to suspected anthrax situations. Following the first cases of anthrax, numerous false alarms strained the capabilities of first responders, law enforcement, and medical personnel. One false alarm occurred when someone reported dust particles in the air, not considering the possibility that the particles might be coming from the construction project going on above them.

If you encounter something suspicious, do not move it! There is a natural tendency to take the suspected item to a trusted peer or supervisor to ask for guidance. This increases the number of people potentially exposed to the suspected substance and thus the number of people who must be tested, decontaminated, and perhaps treated with antibiotics. It also greatly expands the number of rooms, or entire buildings, that require biosurveying and decontamination.

Instead, use a piece of cloth, plastic, or paper to cover the object and call for assistance. Close any
open windows or air ducts, close and mark the room to prevent others from entering, and call the designated first responder. Wash your hands and forearms with soap and hot water to limit the spread of any spores you may have encountered while handling the object. Wash your face, especially around your eyes, nose, and mouth, to ensure you do not inadvertently spread contamination.

Finally, prepare a list of names of everyone who was in the room and may have come in contact with the object; first responders will need this list. Facility managers should consider shutting down heating or air-conditioning systems to limit spreading anthrax spores through air ducts.

Depending on the unique situation at your location, either garrison-level first responders or medical personnel will conduct a field test for presumptive presence or absence of anthrax using various hand-held antibody tests. The test kits resemble a home-pregnancy test kit and are almost as easy to use, but they sometimes yield false positive readings due to nonsite-specific binding to similar bacterial strains. A positive reading from these detector kits should always be followed up with laboratory confirmation.

Only qualified medical personnel can decide to administer antibiotics. Because of anthrax spores’ short incubation period, lab test results may not be available until after a patient’s condition is critical. Therefore, medical personnel generally prescribe an appropriate antibiotic regimen, then either continue or discontinue it based on the conclusive lab results.

Certain high-risk personnel, such as those identified in the force-protection analysis, may require additional protection. These may include first responders—firemen, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handlers, or law enforcement personnel—health care providers, military postal unit personnel, or high-profile individuals. Force protection for these personnel may be through using engineering controls, administrative controls, housekeeping controls, or personal protective equipment (PPE).

Engineering controls ensure that facilities and machinery minimize the aerosolization and spread of contaminants. These include heating ventilation and air-conditioning design and measures to reduce air turbulence near high-speed mail-sorting machinery. Some of these will require long-term fixes. Administrative controls reduce the probability of exposure by limiting the number of personnel permitted into likely exposure sites, especially enclosed rooms. Examples include reducing the number of workers required and eliminating visitors or excess support personnel.

Housekeeping controls limit the physical spread of contamination. Examples are using a high-efficiency particulate air filter-equipped vacuum cleaner or wet sweeping, instead of dry sweeping or dusting, to minimize the number of airborne spores in a high-threat room. PPE may be used for personnel whose normal duties place them at an elevated risk for anthrax spore exposure. For these personnel, leaders might consider implementing wearing long-sleeved clothing, using impermeable gloves with a cotton liner to reduce skin irritation or rash, or issuing Occupational Safety and Health Administration-approved masks and filters. A properly fitted M40-series protective mask provides more than adequate protection against aerosolized anthrax. Washing with soap and water after possible exposure to contaminants is also recommended. HAZMAT personnel should follow established regulations.

Both human and animal remains can pose infection hazards to those who handle them. Using appropriate protective clothing and observing Control of Substances Hazardous to Health regulations will protect against infection hazards. Be aware that organisms that die of anthrax release massive quantities of spores into the soil that can remain for decades before being ingested again. Burying animal carcasses is of little use in disrupting transmission since earthworms can carry spores back to the surface. Those who handle and dispose of biologically contaminated remains must be cognizant of potential secondary transmission hazards. Current evidence indicates that complete incineration is required to sterilize remains contaminated with spore-forming bacteria.

Facts About Anthrax

As has been widely reported in the media, anthrax is considered to be noncontagious; that is, the active bacteria are not passed directly from one infected person to another. Anthrax is transmitted via
inactive anthrax spores that must enter the body and undergo incubation before becoming active bacteria. It is theoretically possible to contract cutaneous anthrax if a person with an open wound comes in contact with contaminated body fluids, but common sanitary measures are effective in preventing this mode of transmission.

The notion that using a steam iron on a suspect envelope will neutralize spores probably started with mentioning that spores could be destroyed by steam sterilization or burning. Although it has been reported that boiling at 100 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes will destroy anthrax spores, using mom’s steam iron does not quite cut it.12

Despite the vernacular use of the term “nuking” some dinner, microwave ovens cook food by exciting, thus heating, water molecules, not by using ionizing radiation. Placing suspicious mail or packages in a microwave oven will not destroy anthrax spores by radiation; on the contrary, it could cause combustion.13 Although the fire might destroy any anthrax present, it would also destroy the letter and possibly the microwave oven—obviously not the best course of action. Research into using ionizing radiation to destroy bacterial spores, using *bacillus pumilus*, a bacteria commonly used for tests, indicates that a 140,000- to 400,000-cGy radiation total dose would be required to destroy 90 percent of the spores present.14 By comparison, unclassified nuclear planning doctrine cites 18,000 cGy to produce 100-percent human incapacitation within 5 minutes and 100-percent fatalities within 15 hours.

The level of radiation needed to destroy anthrax spores would require a small reactor or an accelerator, not a kitchen appliance.

Disinfecting contaminated articles may be accomplished using a 0.05-percent hypochlorite solution, or 1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of water. It is important to note that the bleach method is for use with contaminated articles and surfaces, not on human skin. Use soap and water if skin contamination is suspected.

Using any antibiotic without an identified need is unwise from a medical standpoint. Indiscriminately using limited-availability antibiotics may lead to a critical shortage for those who actually need it. Most modern antibiotics are effective against anthrax, including penicillin, usually administered intravenously; vancomycin; tetracycline; and others.15 There are drawbacks to preemptive penicillin use, regarding the length of treatment.

Recent events have produced a great deal of information and misinformation about anthrax. Leaders can use the information in this article to inform and protect their personnel while continuing their missions. By overcoming fear, conserving critical resources, and focusing on primary missions, leaders will deny their opponents’ victory. Then we can concentrate on collectively contributing to destroying our enemies. 

**Organisms that die of anthrax release massive quantities of spores into the soil that can remain for decades before being ingested again.**

Burying animal carcasses is of little use in disrupting transmission since earthworms can carry spores back to the surface.

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**NOTES**

3. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

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The methods that the military currently uses to train and execute combat operations enable soldiers to kill the enemy, but they leave soldiers liable to postcombat psychological trauma caused by guilt. This is a leadership issue. Combat training should be augmented by explaining to soldiers the moral justification for killing in combat to reduce postcombat guilt. Soldiers deserve to understand whom they can kill morally and why those actions are indeed moral.

Military leaders are charged with two primary tasks—to train and lead units to fight effectively in combat in accordance with the war convention and to care for the soldiers they command. Military professionals generally hold these two tasks to be complementary, accepting Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s statement that the best form of welfare for troops is first-class training.

American military leaders have been very successful in creating combat-effective units. In response to the U.S. War Department’s research indicating that less than half of World War II riflemen fired their weapons at the enemy in combat, the military instituted training techniques. These techniques—fire commands, battle drills, and realistic marksmanship ranges—resulted in much-improved combat firing rates. During the Vietnam war, similar research reveals combat firing rates of 90 percent. Unfortunately, this improved combat effectiveness has come at a cost to soldiers’ welfare. The training techniques leaders have employed to generate the advances in combat firing rates have resulted in increased rates of postcombat psychological trauma among combat veterans.

Training that drills soldiers on how to kill without explaining to them why it is morally permissible to kill is harmful to them, yet that is currently the norm. Modern combat training conditions soldiers to act reflexively to stimuli, such as fire commands, enemy contact, or the sudden appearance of a “target,” that maximizes soldiers’ lethality, but it does so by bypassing their moral autonomy. Soldiers are conditioned to act without considering the moral repercussions of their actions; they kill without making the conscious decision to do so. In and of itself, such training is appropriate and morally permissible. Battles are won by killing the enemy, so military leaders should strive to produce the most efficient killers. The problem, however, is that soldiers who kill reflexively in combat will likely one...
day reconsider their actions reflectively. If they are unable to justify to themselves that they killed another human being, they will likely, and understandably, suffer enormous guilt. This guilt manifests itself as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and it has damaged the lives of thousands of men who performed their duty in combat.3

This article argues that military leaders’ important and legitimate role—transforming civilians into combat soldiers who kill to defend their country—carries with it the obligation to help soldiers cope with the moral repercussions of their actions. If military leaders train soldiers to kill others in combat, they should also educate soldiers to live with themselves in the years after combat. Military leaders should augment current training by morally justifying killing in combat to soldiers.3 This education would improve the U.S. Army’s mission effectiveness.

**Why Soldiers Deserve a Moral Justification for Killing**

Military leaders should be concerned with morally justifying killing in combat; it stems from their duty to care for their troops. Soldiers are human beings who naturally feel it is morally wrong to kill other human beings. As a result, without training that overcomes that moral aversion, most soldiers in combat would choose not to kill the enemy. Military leaders enable soldiers to kill by using training techniques, such as popup marksmanship ranges, fire commands, and battle drills, that emphasize reflexive rather than reflective action. Such techniques create a bypass around an individual’s normal moral decisionmaking process so that soldiers act without deciding to do so. While these techniques have greatly increased combat effectiveness, they have exacted a psychological cost on many soldiers.

Many soldiers who have killed in combat—yet are unable to justify to themselves what they did—suffer from PTSD. Finally, proactive leadership can solve this problem. Military leaders do not need to abandon proven training techniques. What they must do, however, is to prepare their soldiers’ consciences for postbattle reflections. Leaders must help soldiers understand that what they learn to do reflexively would be the same choice they would have made reflectively because it is the morally right choice. They must also enable soldiers to make morally justified decisions in morally ambiguous circumstances. By doing so, military leaders can empower their soldiers to live with clear consciences after they have justifiably killed for their country.

**Most soldiers do not want to kill.** Soldiers are people. People are taught from their earliest days that it is wrong to kill another human being. “Thou shalt not murder” is arguably the closest thing there is to a universally accepted moral norm. Yet, military leaders expect young soldiers to ignore well-learned moral codes and to kill whenever ordered to do so. Leaders should know better. Research conducted on U.S. soldiers in World War II suggests that most infantry soldiers chose not to engage the enemy, primarily for moral reasons.

In *Men Against Fire*, Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, the official historian of the Central Pacific and European theaters of operations, describes the problem: “[The American soldier] is what his home, his religion, his schooling, and the moral code and ideals of his society have made him. The Army cannot unmake him. It must reckon with the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. The teaching and ideals of that civilization are against killing, against taking advantage. The fear of aggression has been expressed to him so strongly and absorbed by him so deeply and pervadingly—that practically with his mother’s milk—that it is part of a normal man’s emotional makeup. This is his great handicap when he enters combat. It stays his finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a constraint upon him.”4

Marshall claims that his extensive postcombat interviews with combat soldiers reveal that most of them were unable to overcome their moral reservations about killing.5 He asserts that less than 25 percent of the riflemen in combat fired their weapons, and “that fear of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure.”6 Many subsequent researchers criticize Marshall’s research methods and dispute his precise claim, yet all serious students of World War II do recognize that a significant number of World War II soldiers were nonfirers.7

In *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath*, the authoritative study of World War II soldiers, Samuel Stouffer and his associates do not directly address firing ratios, but they do make this
understated observation about soldiers’ moral reservations about killing: “Combat required a sharp break with many moral prescriptions of peacetime society. As easy as it seems to be for men to kill when their immediate group sanctions it, and ambivalent as normal people often are about killing, it is still true that to kill another human being requires of most men from our culture an effort to overcome an initial moral repugnance. Under the requirements of the situation, men in combat were careful to hide this feeling, and it was not a subject of much discussion among soldiers. Killing is the business of the combat soldier, and if he is to function at all he must accept its necessity. Yet the acceptance of killing did not prevent the ambivalence revealed by such comments as that of a veteran rifleman who said, ‘I’ll tell you a man sure feels funny about killing. Maybe he doesn’t even realize it, but he is aware that he is killing a human being. He may not act morally right to kill another human being, but shouldn’t we have returned fire when fired upon? Hard to say what went through our minds. I’m not so sure that I would have the courage to fire a round if I knew that it was going to result in the death of another human being. Sure, I can fire on a range and score expert. I can fire a round blindly. Then I can justify to myself that I wasn’t responsible for any deaths that occurred. I would say that long distance killing is easier than facing an enemy face to face. They say that artillery is the King of Battle. No doubt considering that they don’t actually see who they are killing.”

While some may find the idea of military professionals being unwilling to kill during battle a bit embarrassing, we should instead think of it as encouraging. We want soldiers who choose to do what is morally right, who kill enemy combatants yet protect all noncombatants, who reintegrate into civil society after a war. What military leaders have to do, then, is to explain to their soldiers why what they expect them to do is morally right.

Military leaders train soldiers to kill reflexively. Despite this Gulf war platoon’s unwillingness to fire in combat, the military has made great strides in improving its soldiers’ firing rates since World War II. Whether or not Marshall’s research was rigorous, the Army responded to it as if it were. Marshall’s claim about nonfiring rates lifted the taboo surrounding the issue, and the Army took action to increase firing rates. By adopting Marshall’s recommendations and incorporating lessons from psychological research, the American military improved its riflemen’s firing rates to 55 percent during the Korean war and to 90 percent during the Vietnam war.

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Marshall notes that “at the vital moment, [the rifleman] becomes a conscientious objector.” To help soldiers overcome their aversion to killing, Marshall offers several recommendations, two of which are that military leaders give fire commands and that they train on more realistic marksmanship ranges. Marshall also notes that soldiers who otherwise would not fire their weapons did so when their officers were watching them and when they fired crew-served weapons. He therefore recommends that junior leaders give specific firing orders to their troops. Subsequent civilian research on obedience and aggression demonstrates that people are much more capable of aggression when ordered by an authority figure. As the military instituted the doctrinal use of fire commands down to squad level, firing rates increased. In fact, in a 1973 study, Vietnam war combat veterans listed “being told to fire” as the most critical factor in making them fire, even more important than “being fired upon.”

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Marshall further notes that soldiers have great difficulty shooting at another human being, so he recommends that they be trained to fire at locations rather than at persons: “We need to free the rifleman’s mind with respect to the nature of targets. . . . The proper educating of group fire requires constant insistence on the principle of spontaneous action developing out of a fresh and unexpected situation.”

The modern-day transitional (popup-target) marksmanship ranges follow Marshall’s advice. They enable soldiers to overcome their aversion to killing by conditioning them to act spontaneously to conditions that are combat-like, yet morally benign. In his book, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, psychologist Dave Grossman explains the process: “What is being taught in this environment is the ability to shoot reflexively and instantly and a precise mimicry of the act of killing on the modern battlefield. In behavioral terms, the man shape popping up [E-type silhouette] in the soldier’s field of fire is the ‘conditioned stimulus,’ the immediate engaging of the target is the ‘target behavior.’ Positive reinforcement’ is given in the form of immediate feedback when the target drops if it is hit. In the form of ‘token economy’ these hits are then exchanged for marksmanship badges that usually have some form of privilege or reward (praise, public recognition, three-day passes, and so on) associated with them.”

This conditioning, training on popup marksmanship ranges, enables soldiers to kill on the battlefield, and the 1993 battle at Mogadishu provides evidence of that. In that 17-hour fight, a few hundred soldiers from Task Force Ranger and the 10th Mountain Division battled thousands of Somalis in fierce, urban combat. The United States suffered only 19 dead while they killed an estimated 300 to 1,000 Somalis. They achieved this extraordinary casualty ratio by being well trained. Based on extensive interviews with the soldiers involved, journalist Mark Bowden wrote a best-selling account of the battle, *Black Hawk Down*, which states: “[Ranger Sergeant Scott] Galentine just pointed his M16 at someone down the street, aimed at center mass, and squeezed off rounds. The man would drop. Just like target practice, only cooler.”

Bowden continues: “[Specialist John] Waddel shot the man. In books and movies when a soldier shot a man for the first time he went through a moment of soul searching. He didn’t give it a second thought. He just reacted.” During an interview with CNN/Frontline, Ranger Private First Class Jason Moore described his willingness to kill: “I just started picking them out as they were running across the intersection two blocks away, and it was weird because it was so much easier than you would think. You hear all these stories about ‘the first time you kill somebody is very hard.’ And it was so much like basic training, they were just targets out there, and I don’t know if it was the training that we had ingrained in us, but it seemed to me it was just like a moving target range, and you could just hit the target and watch it fall and hit the target and watch it fall, and it wasn’t real. They were far enough away so that you didn’t see, or I didn’t see, all the guts
and the gore and things like that, but you would just see this target running across in your sight picture, you pull the trigger and the target would fall, so it was a lot easier then than it is now, as far as that goes.”

Clearly, modern military leaders are doing half their duty—they are training soldiers to fight effectively on the battlefield. They are doing so using techniques that allow soldiers to fire their weapons at the enemy despite the natural moral reservations they may harbor. By conditioning combat soldiers to reflexively engage targets and giving them leaders who issue fire commands, military leaders greatly reduce moral deliberation for soldiers in combat.

At one level, this training accomplishes both aspects of military leaders’ duty—it accomplishes the mission, and it takes care of soldiers by keeping them alive. At a deeper level, however, this approach is inadequate. It makes soldiers able to kill even if they are not willing to kill. Conditioning soldiers to reflexively engage targets prepares them to deal with the enemy, but it does not prepare them to deal with their own consciences.

**Reflexive killing training may be harmful.**

Training soldiers to kill efficiently is good for them because it helps them survive on the battlefield. However, training soldiers to kill without explaining to them why it is morally permissible to kill in combat is harmful because it can lead to psychological trauma. When soldiers kill reflexively—when military training has effectively undermined their moral autonomy—they morally deliberate their actions only after the fact. If they are unable to justify what they have done, they often suffer guilt and psychological trauma.

Many combat soldiers experience feelings of guilt in the months and years following their wartime actions. The following are reflections from combat veterans who performed their wartime duties as their leaders trained them to do. A young soldier who fought in Somalia shares his experience: “Well, that day, I had absolutely no ethical or moral problems with pulling the trigger and taking out as many people as I could. And being back here, years later, I think that they had wives, children, mothers, sons, just like I have a mother and a dog, and all these things. Our government sent us there to do a mission, and I’m sure somebody was paying him to do a mission. [I just] reali[z ed] that he was another human being, just like I am. And so that’s hard to deal with, but that day it was too easy. That upsets me more than anything else, how easy it was to pull the trigger over and over again. . . . It took a long time to wear off, a real long time, because we were still there for a little while, and then when we came back you were still sort of riding the waves of what happened. And I know for me, the hardest thing to live with is knowing that you took another human life, for no other reason than your government told you to. That’s hard. I mean, I’m sure it’s been said before but here I would have [gone] to jail for exactly what I did over there and got medals for.”

At least one senior enlisted soldier who killed during the Gulf war may have found his actions to be too much to live with. An officer in his unit describes the situation: “Let me give you the results of one person who did kill. We will call him 1SG [First Sergeant] Doe. He was a 12B, combat engineer first sergeant. Known as hard charging and didn’t put up with much bullshit. While in Desert Storm, he was assigned to my unit. He volunteered for a bunker-searching mission. Upon coming to one particular bunker, he heard movement inside. Without bothering to clear the bunker, he yelled at the people inside to come out. When they failed to respond, 1SG Doe fired three rounds from his .45 pistol into the bunker. The noises ceased. They then entered the bunker. 1SG Doe seemed okay with the fact that he had killed two Iraqis at the time. It was a very disturbing experience for everyone else. Note this. He is now [1999] at the psychiatric ward at Walter Reed [Army Medical Center]. The pressures of his actions during Desert Storm and Somalia led him to two suicide attempts in the past few months. He is a great guy and I consider him a good friend. However, I believe that in the heat of battle he did something contrary to his (and possibly human) nature. I don’t believe that there really is a moral justification to killing in combat.”

In *On Killing*, Grossman writes about a soldier who struggles to justify his combat actions. Ray, a veteran of close combat in the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, told [Grossman] of a recurring dream in which he would talk with the young Panamanian soldier he had killed in close combat. “Why did you kill me?” asked the soldier each time. And in his dreams Ray would attempt to explain to his victim, but in reality he was explaining and rationalizing the act of killing to himself: “Well, if you were in my place, wouldn’t you have done the same? . . . It was either you or us.”
These soldiers were good soldiers who effectively killed the enemy when their nation and its leaders asked them to do so, only to later suffer guilt. Their experiences are not exceptional. In fact, one senior noncommissioned officer who fought in the battle at Mogadishu commented that many of the veterans of Mogadishu suffer from PTSD. The senior noncommissioned officer explains, “I have come to terms with what I did. I talked to my priest. I have religious faith and a supportive family. The guys that don’t have these [tools] are pretty torn up.” The psychological toll of the battle fell most heavily on the junior enlisted Rangers. Nearly all of them left the military at the first opportunity, and at least one committed suicide.

This is a leadership issue. It is not surprising that soldiers, such as 1SG Doe, suffer debilitating guilt over killing in combat when even their own leaders believe that their actions were unjustified. Soldiers who perform their duty in combat deserve better from their leaders. If killing in combat was not morally justified, then the military profession would be an evil one. Because, however, at least some killing in war is morally justifiable, military leaders must understand that justification—train soldiers to kill only when justified, and explain to soldiers why it is justified. Military leaders who train soldiers to kill in combat without justifying that killing are treating their soldiers as commodities, not as persons. A values-based Army can and must do better than that.

Soldiers who are morally aware of their actions, after all, may be less willing to respond immediately to orders to kill. Such delay could, in turn, cost them their lives and compromise the mission. . . . Soldiers who are confident that killing in war is justified and that their leaders are morally informed would be more likely to respond quickly to orders and combat stimuli. Akin to religious crusaders, they would fight with the assurance of moral rightness.

Refuting a Concern About Offering a Moral Argument

Teaching soldiers the morality of killing would actually harm them by fostering hesitancy on the battlefield. Soldiers who are morally aware of their actions, after all, may be less willing to respond immediately to orders to kill. Such delay could, in turn, cost them their lives and compromise the mission. In fact, the opposite is more likely true. Soldiers who are confident that killing in war is justified and that their leaders are morally informed would be more likely to respond quickly to orders and combat stimuli. Akin to religious crusaders, they would fight with the assurance of moral rightness. Moreover, warfare is becoming increasingly decentralized and ambiguous, so military leaders must move beyond reflexive training. The U.S. Army requires soldiers to make life-or-death decisions in the absence of fire commands or obvious stimuli. In operations other than war, soldiers must make judgment calls that cannot be trained in the traditional sense. To maximize military effectiveness, leaders must empower soldiers to make morally informed decisions about when and whom to kill.

The words of an infantry battalion commander during Operation Just Cause in Panama should serve as a wakeup call to improve the moral element of combat training. He recognized that the nature of the battlefield—urban, full of civilians, with enemy soldiers of uncertain loyalties—could lead to morally ambiguous situations, and he gave these final
instructions to his combat troops before launching an attack: “Let me tell you the bottom line on our rules of engagement, your conscience . . . your moral conscience is going to carry it. I don’t want you shot; I don’t want your buddies shot . . . you don’t have time to call me to clear fires. Make your best call.” That was an enormous burden to place on soldiers whose “moral consciences” had not been prepared for the moral complexities of combat. Soldiers who cannot morally justify killing would be more likely to hesitate on the modern, low-intensity, make-your-best-call battlefield.

*Justified killing in self-defense.* The moral justification for killing in combat is based on elements that provide legal and moral justification for killing in self-defense in civilian circumstances. This justification presumes a rights-based morality that is consistent with Judeo-Christian and Kantian moral thought.

It is morally permissible to kill another person under certain conditions: that another person has consciously decided to threaten your life or liberty, that that person is imminently executing that threat, and that you have no other reasonable way to avoid the threat. Moreover, it is morally obligatory to use the force necessary to protect an innocent person from such an attacker as long as you have the means to do so, especially when you have volunteered to protect that person. For example, if a person intentionally attacks you with a lethal weapon and you have no reasonable way to escape, you are justified in using lethal force to protect yourself. Likewise, if you are a police officer, you are morally obligated to use force to defend an innocent person’s life against an attacker.

All four of these conditions—a conscious choice, a threat to human life or a comparable value, an imminent threat, and no lifesaving option—must be met to ensure that the killing is morally justified by self-defense. For example, if the attacker were a 2-year-old child or a sleepwalker, then the attacker probably would not have chosen to cause the threat and thus would not be morally responsible for it, so killing the attacker in self-defense would not be justified, although it might be excusable. The “conscious choice” condition would not have been met. If, likewise, the attacker were a robber who only wanted someone’s wallet, the value at stake would not justify killing him. The “value comparable to human life” condition would not have been met. A human being should not be killed to prevent mere monetary inconvenience and loss.

If someone were to threaten to kill you next week, you would not be justified in killing him today; the threat must be imminent. The choice to kill in self-defense must be in response to the attacker’s actions, not merely his intentions. Finally, if the attacker were wielding a knife but confined to a wheelchair and you were fully mobile with access to a staircase, you would not be justified in killing him. Instead, you should simply escape up the stairs. There must be a forced choice between fundamental values. If there is a way to escape the situation without compromising life or liberty, you are obligated to choose that lifesaving option and are prohibited from using lethal force in self-defense.

These conditions also apply to justify killing an attacker’s accomplice. For example, if a gang member were chasing you with a knife intending to kill you and you had to escape from the room but another (unarmed) gang member consciously blocked your escape, you would be justified in using lethal force against your attacker’s unarmed accomplice. In legal terms, that person would be a conspirator to attempted murder. Morally, that accomplice would have chosen to threaten your life, and you would have had no other way to avoid the imminent threat. These conditions are more stringent than those required for legally justified homicide in self-defense, yet they are met when soldiers kill enemy soldiers in combat.

*Justified killing applied to war.* When soldiers kill enemies in war, they meet the conditions of justified killing in self-defense. Enemy soldiers are morally responsible for the threat they pose. At some time, they chose to be soldiers, and they must know they are at war against other people. Fully informed volunteers, of course, are more responsible than poorly informed conscripts, yet even conscripts chose to become soldiers. They had other options, however unpleasant they may have been. Human beings, after all, are not responsible for circumstances beyond their control such as whether their nation goes to war. They are, however, responsible for the choices they make within those circumstances. People who choose to be soldiers in war are morally responsible for the threat they pose to their enemy.

Soldiers fight to defend values that are worth killing and dying for. At least, they hope so. In
a just war, that is the case. Because the moral responsibility for going to war lies with political authorities and because the political authorities’ intentions are often opaque, soldiers should be largely immune from judgments about the just ends of a war. Therefore, unless soldiers have strong reason to believe that war is being fought for values other than defending life and liberty, they can assume they are fighting to defend those fundamental values.

Soldiers do face an imminent threat from the enemy. All enemies are either direct threats or accomplices to direct threats. They all act for the same end—to deny the target any right to life and liberty. Soldiers have no recourse to a higher authority to defend them; they must fight, or they will lose those rights.

Finally, soldiers do not have a nonlethal option. If they flee before the enemy, the enemy will follow them. Again, there is no higher authority to protect them or those who depend on them to defend their lives and freedom. Therefore, not only is it morally permissible for soldiers to kill enemy soldiers in combat, but they are also morally obliged to use the force necessary to defend those who depend on them. Soldiers are the last line of defense for the rights of life and liberty.

Honest reflection on the moral demands of military service should play a part in the Army’s transformation. Soldiers who are empowered to make well-reasoned moral decisions would more likely exercise proper initiative and less likely err by commission or omission. Rules of engagement are by nature static; the battlefields of the future will be fluid. The Army must grow soldiers who can think for themselves.

The Army should include the moral justification for killing in combat in training not only because it would enhance the Army’s effectiveness but also because it is the right thing to do. The profession of arms is a noble calling, and military leaders perform their duties honorably. They devote their lives to preparing soldiers—mentally, physically, and materially—for the rigors of combat. They conduct demanding, realistic training; they keep them physically fit, and they equip them with the best weapons. Unfortunately, they fail to prepare them morally, and in doing so, they fail to care for soldiers’ welfare. They leave soldiers unprepared to deal with their postcombat consciences and unprepared to make morally right decisions about who to kill in morally ambiguous circumstances. This is a leadership problem that is solvable, and it demands military leaders’ attention.

__NOTES__


2. The prevalence and degree of PTSD among combat veterans is a disputed issue. See Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam (New York: Atheneum Publishing, 1994). Shay, Grossman, and others contend that PTSD severely affects hundreds of thousands of veterans. Other researchers, such as B.G. Burkett, Stolen Valor (Bangor, ME: Verity Press Inc., 1 September 1998) and syndicated columnist Michael Kelly, dispute their claims as being exaggerated. All informed parties recognize that combat-induced PTSD does exist to some extent and is a problem worth solving.

3. It goes without saying that military leaders must first understand moral justification theories before they can teach it to others. Therefore, military leaders have a duty to develop their own skills of moral discernment. I owe this good point to Major Tony Pfaff.


5. Many military officers disputed Marshall’s findings, which did not surprise him: “In the course of holding post-combat interviews with approximately four hundred infantry companies in the Central Pacific and European Theaters, [Marshall] did not find one battalion, company, or platoon commander who had made the slightest effort to determine how many of his men had actually engaged the enemy with a weapon.” Marshall discovered that what the military’s leaders had taken for granted—that well-trained soldiers will use their training to kill the enemy with a weapon.” Marshall, 82.


11. Grossman, 35. I have not yet found data on more recent wars.

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Plan Colombia has been a major tool in the war against drugs. This war is international in nature, a matter of supply and demand in which the responsibility must be shared between the countries that produce and those that consume drugs. We have always combated drugs in Colombia. We have destroyed the cartels, and now we have a plan that consolidates our efforts.

Commanding what many refer to as a new, motivated, and efficient organization, General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, commander of the Colombian army, affirms that “every war is fought with victory in mind.” Major Richard Procell, managing editor of the Latin American editions of Military Review, spoke with Mora during his recent visit to Fort Leavenworth. During his visit, Mora was inducted into the International Hall of Fame for international officers who graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and who have attained distinction in their home countries.—Editor

MR: First, we wish to extend our congratulations to you on your induction into the International Officer Hall of Fame. Our focus will be to analyze the war in Colombia and to determine the Colombian Army’s involvement in it. For decades, the threat—the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have been tough, persistent, patient insurgents. Both groups seem even stronger because of their involvement with the drug trade and, apparently, because of their association with other international criminal organizations. What in your opinion are the political objectives and military strategies of these organizations, and what do you think they intend to do to achieve them?

Mora: The guerrilla movements that arose during the 1960s adopted a communist doctrine and ideology. The FARC linked itself to what was known as the Moscow line, while the ELN looked to Cuba. Over the years, both organizations grew considerably in numbers and quality. As the drug problem increased in Colombia, the two movements became more and more involved with the drug trade, which undermined their political base.

Losing political ground, the organizations began attacking those they had vowed to protect—the people who became victims of terrorism. On the other hand, the organizations’ increased involvement in all phases of drug trafficking made them economically powerful. They have the means to acquire all types of weapons through connections in the international black market.

MR: Have the FARC and ELN grown since 1995?

Mora: Growing both in manpower and in means, the FARC now has approximately 16,000 armed men, and it has plans and strategies to eventually take over the government and change the democratic system in Colombia. The ELN includes approximately 4,500 armed men and has its own plans to change the democratic system.

Energy and fuel infrastructures—the destruction of oil pipelines and electric power structures—are the main targets of these organizations. They attack the population, destroying homes, churches, public buildings, banks, and bridges. They are responsible for kidnappings, massacres, arsons, and hijackings. Civilians in rural areas are their primary victims. The organizations do not rely on popular support; in fact, according to national polls, only 2 percent of the Colombian population support them. They terrorize the population with weaponry obtained through the economic power of drug trafficking.

MR: Could you address the FARC’s international efforts?

Mora: Because of their terrorist actions against civilians, the organizations have established contacts
and exchanges with other terrorist organizations around the world. They have acquired technical combat expertise, especially instruction and training for manufacturing and effectively using explosives and unconventional weapons that can cause great damage and many casualties. The same antipersonnel devices and explosives used in Vietnam and El Salvador are now being used in Colombia. This year, we arrested three Irish Republican Army explosives and arms experts who were teaching their skills and techniques to the FARC.

**MR: How important are psychological warfare, propaganda, and misinformation activities to the FARC?**

**Mora:** When similar movements have popular support and fight in defense of the people, they are fighting a revolutionary war with political ends. This is not so in Colombia because the organizations have lost their political agenda and are attacking, murdering, and kidnapping civilians—the principal victims of terrorist activities. The movements’ actions are designed to instill fear and cause terror by using the weapons in their arsenals. Their use of psychological warfare and propaganda is based on the results of their terrorist acts and demonstrations of force, which naturally produce intimidation.

**MR:** *What actions do you believe the Colombian Government needs to undertake to satisfy leaders of the FARC and to reach a peace agreement?*

**Mora:** I do not believe it is a matter of satisfying the terrorist organization. Rather, the Colombian Government is spearheading a peace process that seeks to end the war that these organizations have declared on the people. Colombians long for peace. With great resolve and persistence within constitutional principles, our president is trying to achieve that peace.

**MR:** Do operations, such as the recent mobilization of 3,000 soldiers within 48 hours, foretell future activities of the Colombian Army?

**Mora:** The Colombian Army began a restructuring process 3 years ago that has resulted in major institutional changes. Our president is committed to the peace process as well as to strengthening and transforming our armed forces.
As a byproduct of the restructuring process, a rapid deployment force was organized. The force consists of three mobile brigades and a special forces brigade, a total of 5,000 soldiers whose deployment is based on military concepts of mass and mobility.

The deployment mentioned was Operation “7th of August” in which we rapidly mobilized nearly 3,000 soldiers against a FARC column, composed of 2,000 FARC combatants, which was trying to accomplish what it called a “campaign.” Our operation was a complete success with excellent results, thus neutralizing the organization’s terrorist plan. The commander was a casualty, and the column totally disbanded.

MR: With respect to staff training at brigade and division levels, comparing the Colombian Army’s current organization with that of 1995 through 1998, it seems that it operates quite differently from how it did at that point. Can you describe the training that staff officers now receive?

Mora: A restructured general staff has given us better leadership in planning operations at that level. Our military schools have also undergone important changes. We emphasize the study and analysis of lessons learned from all actions conducted on the battlefield, especially those related to planning. Similarly, we have worked quite intensely to ensure general staff officers dedicate themselves not only to planning but also to the continuing development, direction, and command of operations. I believe we are achieving this, and I believe that at all levels our general staff officers are dedicated to winning this war.

MR: Will the need for joint planning become greater?

Mora: The war we fight clearly shows us that we need to operate jointly. If each of the armed forces or services performs independently, we cannot guarantee the achievement of our common operational goals. After all these years, we have acquired new strategies. For example, the majority of our air assault operations are nocturnal. For this, we need experience, coordination, and joint planning. Participants include army troops and helicopter transports as well as air force helicopters and planes that provide air support. It is an established fact that planning and execution require participation by all forces.

MR: Operations at division and brigade levels still appear to be short-lived. What resources do you believe will be necessary to maintain such operations on a long-term basis?

Mora: Guerrilla warfare is characterized by the use of small groups that have significant mobility, can attack, then quickly withdraw without sustaining casualties in an engagement. Because of the duration of the conflict and the growth of guerrilla organizations, they have been able to create numerous columns, and their attacks have become commensurately greater. This requires that brigade-level operations employ support on a larger scale. However, by the very characteristics of the war we now fight, in which the enemy cannot hold terrain in the face of the regular army in combat, we have been able to sustain those operations with the resources we have throughout the duration of such operations. Past experience with this level of operations highlights the importance of logistic planning to sustain our force. I believe we should pay particular attention to this aspect of the art of war.

MR: As for the potential of working and operating in decentralized operations, including urban terrorism, how is the Colombian Army preparing to confront this?

Mora: Within a historical framework, we have the examples of Vietnam and El Salvador. The development of those wars included the urbanization of conflict. In other words, war was taken into the cities, followed by offensives against the most important towns, including capitals, after which, supposedly, the war would end.

We have studied and analyzed history, as well as FARC and ELN plans, and have found that their intent is to recreate the events of Vietnam and El Salvador. We are preparing for these phases of warfare. Our hope is that through restructuring, acquiring new capabilities, and receiving the support and backing of our people, the war in Colombia will not evolve to such levels of conflict.

MR: It seems that Plan Colombia has not received the international political and economical support that was expected. To what do you attribute this?

Mora: Plan Colombia has been a major tool in the war against drugs. This war is international in nature, a matter of supply and demand in which the responsibility must be shared between the countries that produce and those that consume drugs.

We have always combated drugs in Colombia. We have destroyed the cartels, and now we have a
plan that consolidates our efforts. This plan, which should lead to positive results, includes a component representing 25 percent of the military. The most important part has to do with social assistance to urban areas, incentives to voluntarily eradicate coca plants, to strengthen the justice system, and to protect the human rights of those individuals involved in the cultivation of coca.

I believe there has been a misunderstanding of the plan by those unaware of the problems that Colombia faces. Some organizations see the plan as a military plan, which is not correct. Nevertheless, Plan Colombia will prevail, and we shall be able to show positive results.

**MR:** In Latin America, particularly in countries that have common borders, there has been concern since the inception of Plan Colombia that not only would guerrillas infiltrate other countries but that the production of cocaine in particular would also spill over the borders. What are your thoughts on this?

**Mora:** I believe this is a general concern. In Colombia, a few years ago, we did not have the coca plantations we now have; nor did we produce cocaine. Over time, the country has become home to some of the largest coca plantations in the world, and it is one of the major producers of cocaine. Neutralizing the problem will take a cooperative effort to eliminate coca plantations anywhere in the world. We have a moral obligation and must be determined to resolve this terrible dilemma with the assistance of the international community.

**MR:** Many self-defense groups, including the Convivir [special protection and private security services], were organized to protect themselves from guerrillas. The government’s responsibility was to legitimize their existence. Could you tell us something about the relationship between the Colombian Army and those organizations?

**Mora:** The self-defense groups existed legitimately for a number of years. They were made up of members of the rural population organized to defend their homes and towns from guerrilla attacks. With the advent of the drug problem and the forming of cartels in Colombia, the cartels began fighting among themselves and the guerrillas for territorial control. The cartels then began to solicit the self-defense groups to join them in confronting the guerrillas. This process corrupted the self-defense groups.

The cartels strengthened the self-defense groups militarily, which caused them to lose their defensive posture and to become criminal organizations that began to take the offensive instead. Faced with this development, the government declared such self-defense groups as lawbreakers, and they became clandestine organizations. Later, the Colombian Government legitimized some groups, known as the Convivir, which were made up of civilians in small towns and cities. Their philosophy was to support the police and army with information and real-time communications concerning illegal acts to help state forces in their preventive or repressive measures. This did not work and was short-lived.

There are now no legitimate self-defense groups. Therefore, the existence of self-defense groups in Colombia might be puzzling. The explanation lies in the tactics of intimidation, threats, destruction, and guerrilla terrorism against the very population the groups purport to defend. Self-defense becomes the populations’ response to the guerrillas’ terrorist nature. The army’s responsibility is to fight the war against the guerrillas and the self-defense groups to protect the people.

**MR:** Does collaboration with the insurgents exist?

**Mora:** These types of internal conflicts can create sympathizers within our ranks. In such cases, where this has been determined, we have taken the appropriate disciplinary or legal measures, and those involved are discharged. The army must be legitimate, and this is obtained through a disciplined institution, one with high moral values, integrated by honest and respectful men who show the people their commitment to the defense of their countrymen.

**MR:** The armed forces, then, are taking action against those members within its ranks who are involved as sympathizers. Do you believe that because some soldiers are involved with paramilitary groups and guerrillas that this justifies denying political and/or economic support to the Colombian Government by the international community?

**Mora:** No. The international community understands that we are fighting a war against drugs and against certain organizations that cause considerable damage to our nation and that Colombia needs support. Colombia is a country that wants to live in peace, but socially and economically there is a lot to be desired.

Our people require important changes, and change is what our president and government pursue. The poorest and most humble people suffer the most because of war. Fortunately, the army has considerable support. Polls taken during the past few years show that the army comes first among all of Colombia’s institutions in prestige and in receiving the people’s trust. This shows the international community that the people love and support their army.

**MR:** Could you address the army’s efforts with social communication?
Mora: In the type of war we are fighting there is a need to keep the public informed about what we are doing and how we are doing it. Because the people are aware of the details of the war being fought, they support their institutions. The army’s communications systems allow the public to be intimately informed about guerrilla and self-defense group activities, the damage these organizations cause, and what the army is doing to defend the public. Because of this we have great support, and this spontaneous and sincere support is instrumental in winning the war.

The army has a network of 23 broadcasting stations that are part of the army’s chain of satellite-connected radio stations. The network broadcasts messages and institutional information throughout the country. This allows us to inform the public, but it also allows us to reach the guerrillas and the self-defense groups with messages admonishing them to desist in their efforts to harm the public.

MR: What about the advances made in your recruitment efforts? I understand you have a human rights officer in each of your battalions.

Mora: The human rights issue is a fundamental one. In a country at war, it is of utmost importance. We know that if we have the heart, support, and backing of the Colombian people, we will win. The way to receive such backing and support is to respect people’s rights. To get to that point, we had to make important changes. Our men have been made conscious of the need for mutual respect.

In every army battalion, there is an officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the office of human rights. We hold seminars, inviting graduates of military schools to participate, and have the support of the International and National Red Cross, who hold conferences for our units. The International Red Cross has an important and considerable presence in Colombia and is quite familiar with how our army operates. Our soldiers are well prepared, know the respect they owe to our people, and are familiar with the regulations pertaining to international humanitarian rights.

In several units, the army has created a human rights area. During training, as soldiers progress through infantry, gymnastics, and other physical training areas, they also pass through a human rights area. The area consists of 10 to 12 stations where soldiers encounter situations in which a decision must be made about an incident that will affect people’s rights and how the decision applies to and will affect international humanitarian rights. Our soldiers learn how to act and how to respond on the battlefield. At all army schools, officers and NCOs receive several hours of instruction concerning this subject. The International Red Cross, the Colombian Red Cross, and public universities oversee the courses. The courses also meet the requirements of our agreements with other countries that support us in training soldiers.

I believe the Colombian Army has made great progress, and that progress is recognized by the international community and by human rights nongovernmental organizations. The greatest show of support and appreciation is that shown by the Colombian people to the soldiers and the army as an institution.

MR: Can the guerrillas be defeated?

Mora: Every war is fought with victory in mind. Our soldiers are clear as to what it means to win this war. Winning does not mean killing all of the guerrillas; that has not been possible anywhere. Neither does it mean destroying our towns and cities. Further, harming our own population by using our resources and the forces against them would by no means represent a victory. To the Colombian soldier, winning this war means finishing off—destroying—the organizations’ will to fight and showing their adherents that they will never rule Colombia. If we are able to achieve this, if our successes make these groups understand that the only solution to the conflict is found within the process of negotiations that favor the Colombian Government, we shall achieve the peace we seek.

MR: In conclusion?

Mora: I have always been a dedicated reader of Military Review. I wish to express through its pages to other militaries of the world that the message of the Colombian people is one of hope and friendship. We are fighting a war against drugs and terrorism. We will be victorious because the Colombian soldier believes in its cause. He feels the backing and definite support of our people and of the international community who regard us with respect and profound admiration for the sacrifices we are making to save a people from this terror and affront. MR
In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. President George W. Bush and his national security leaders articulated objectives for a wide-ranging war against terrorism. Months later, these objectives remain focused on destroying international terrorist centers, dismantling terrorist networks around the world, and punishing states that support terrorist activities. The al-Qaeda terrorist organization—sponsors of the 11 September attacks and earlier terrorist assaults on U.S. people, property, and interests—remains a high priority. As al-Qaeda’s principal bases and leadership cadres in Afghanistan were attritted and its Taliban supporters driven from power, U.S. planners began to direct resources and focus to other al-Qaeda cells and associates operating in dozens of countries around the world. U.S. national leaders emphasized that these groups, and other terrorist organizations, constitute legitimate targets in the global war on terrorism.

Among those targets receiving early attention from U.S leaders was a small, violent Islamic group that, despite origins in the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war, operates in the jungles, hills, towns, and coastal waters of the southern Philippines. This group is Abu Sayyaf, meaning “bearer of the sword” in Arabic. It has become noted for ambushing government forces, kidnappings, piracy, and frequently beheading captives. As this is written, Abu Sayyaf elements remain engaged in sporadic clashes with the Philippine Armed Forces and continue to perpetrate a mixture of political terrorism and banditry throughout the area. Its purported links to al-Qaeda and its asserted devotion to a radical, perverted form of Islam identify the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) as a vector of local terrorism that also has broader regional and international implications. Of particular concern is the prospect of further radicalizing other Muslim insurgent and proindependence groups in the Philippines and serving as a catalyst for analogous developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere.

This article addresses the origin and activities of Abu Sayyaf, the operational environment in which it carries out its activities, and its influence on the Philippines and the region. Before examining Abu Sayyaf specifically, it is instructive to review briefly the historic continuity of Muslim insurgency in the Philippines; the U.S. experience in what was, 100 years ago, a new operational environment; and the current context in which Abu Sayyaf has sought to advance its goals.

**Moros, Insurgency, and the Operational Environment**

Twenty-first century Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, in many respects, is continuing a struggle that began in the 15th and 16th centuries. Islam arrived in the southern Philippines in the 14th century, spread aggressively from the Indonesian Archipelago by seafaring Muslim traders and teachers, and by the 16th century, had spread through the islands of the Sulu Archipelago into Mindanao, pushing farther north. These Islamic communities, constituting the southern Philippines, were based on their own developing concepts of authority, social relationships, and sovereignty.

These communities collided violently with Spanish explorers seeking to establish lucrative colonies in the area based on supposed rich resources, trade...
routes, and a population converted to Catholicism. The Spanish called the Muslim people they found there Moros, or Moors, reflecting their old Muslim enemies in Europe and North Africa. While Islam was pushed southward and constrained by Spain, an armed, effective Moro resistance began immediately. It continued until 1898 when the United States defeated the Spanish in the Spanish-American War. The Moros emerged in 1899 with religious and cultural identities intact and, at the very end, enthusiastically wiped out isolated Spanish garrisons before U.S. forces arrived to take over.

**U.S. Military Meets the Moros**

The Philippines were ceded into the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, sparking resistance immediately in the predominately Christian north and later in the Sunni Muslim south. The 1899-1902 Philippine Insurrection in the north was successfully put down and declared officially ended on 4 July 1902. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt noted in the declaration of termination, however, that “peace has been established in all parts of the archipelago except in the country inhabited by the Moro tribes, to which this proclamation does not apply.” Full-fledged conflict in the south had broken out just 2 months earlier in May, following a series of incidents, rising tensions, and Moro resistance to incorporating Muslim lands into the Philippine state under U.S. control. As Moros saw it, “Catholic Spain had been driven by the spirit of the Inquisition, America was inspired by the unholy doctrines of ‘Manifest Destiny’ to bring the ‘blessings’ of western civilization to these ‘barbarians’ in Southeast Asia. But the Moro ‘barbarians,’ much to the Americans’ surprise, were not easily subdued.”

The latter judgment was clearly an understatement as the U.S. Army and Navy found themselves engaged with an enemy who quickly earned a place as one of the bravest, most dedicated, and resourceful adversaries yet encountered. It also highlighted for the U.S. military the impact of Islamic religious fervor mobilized in pursuit of what many Moros still consider their wholly earned and justified right to independence. Moros were poorly armed compared to U.S. soldiers whose basic weapon was the .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifle—M1892 and M1896 models with a 5-shot magazine—backed up by Gatling and Hotchkiss guns and several models of light cannons. Moros possessed a variety of older weapons, including muzzle-loaders and some primitive brass cannons. It was the Moros’ skill and surprising effectiveness in using edged weapons that generated the greatest respect and fear, however. U.S. troops came to recognize and understand the capabilities of the barung with its 1½-foot leaf-shaped blade; the 3½-foot kampilan long sword, traditional fighting weapon of the Maguindanao and Maranao Moros; and the sword most identified with the Moros, the kris, a superb weapon of varying length that had a distinctive wavy-edged blade that became famous at the time.

Moros were extremely effective at jungle, forest, and swamp ambushes and also fought well from their forts, called cottas, or kutas. Moro attacks on moving columns or sleeping encampments were sudden, often involving bloody hand-to-hand fighting, as kris- and spear-wielding Moros closed quickly with better-armed Americans and used their edged weapons and spears to great effect. As one specialist from the period notes, “American troops had not participated in such fighting since Revolutionary War days.”

Traditional problems associated with counterinsurgency operations appeared early on. For example, distinguishing Moro male combatants from females, who sometimes were combatants as well, was an enduring problem since women were attired in much the same way as male fighters. In an effort to reduce noncombatant casualties, U.S. Army

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Accounts abounded of seemingly peaceful Moros suddenly drawing kris or barung and killing multiple American soldiers or civilians before being killed themselves. Replacing the .38-caliber U.S. Army revolver with the harder-hitting .45-caliber automatic was in part a result of the difficulty in stopping juramentados.

(Top left) A Moro warrior captured by U.S. soldiers.
(Above) Brigadier General John J. Pershing leading the 8th Infantry and Philippine Scouts during the Battle of Bagsak Mountain on Jolo Island, 11-15 June 1913. After the bitter fighting, Pershing wrote the Adjutant General that he did not believe he was entitled to the Medal of Honor for which he was being considered.
(Left) The aftermath of the 4-day Battle of Bagsak Mountain.
orders forbade firing on groups of Filipinos that contained women. This order prompted one derisive soldier rhyme, a la Rudyard Kipling, that captured the way some troops saw the dilemma: “If a lady wearin’ britches is a-hidin’ in the ditches, an’ she itches fer me ears as souvenirs, Must I arsk, afore I twists ‘er, ‘air you miss or air you mister?” How shall a bashful man decide the dears?”

Another phenomenon many U.S. military and other official observers noted was the extraordinary vitality of many Moro fighters and their capacity to continue forward even after being shot multiple times. While attributable in large measure to the character of a brave and determined warrior people, there is another dimension rooted in the Moros’ practice of Islam. In various forms, that practice has resonance today in the suicide attacks, or constructive self-destruction, around the world that Muslim fighters undertake in varying interpretations of Qur’anic imperatives to oppose infidels.10

Juramentado and Jihad

Americans quickly became more familiar with this dimension, which the Spanish earlier had learned well—Spanish soldiers and officials called it juramentado, roughly translated into “oath-taking.” This practice, based on Sulu Moro interpretations of jihad, consisted of elaborate dedication and purification rites conducted with family and religious authorities. Those who went through this dedication swore to kill as many Christians as possible before dying, their reward being ascent into paradise. A lone juramentado would attack an entire group, and the sudden assaults of those “running juramentados” became a constant concern. From the Muslim view, this description was far from adequate. Rather, as contemporary Moro Islamic insurgent spokesmen describe it, “The Bangsamoro mujahideen took it as a personal duty to Allah to continue to fight to the death, even if a Muslim leader surrendered. It became common for a lone Muslim mujahid to attack American soldiers and camps, killing many of them before losing his life. The Spanish and Americans disparagingly called this act juramentado or amok; Muslims refer to this as sabil or prang sabil, from the Arabic jihad fi sabillah.”11

Accounts abounded of seemingly peaceful Moros suddenly drawing kris or barung and killing multiple American soldiers or civilians before being killed themselves. Replacing the .38-caliber U.S. Army revolver with the harder-hitting .45-caliber automatic was in part a result of the difficulty in stopping juramentados. U.S. military officials unable to find other effective countermeasures implemented other practices that reportedly yielded short-term results but likely generated longer-term negative consequences. Governor of Jolo, Colonel Alexander Rodgers, was said to have carried out one such approach. All Moros who ran juramentado were killed and laid out in the marketplace with slaughtered pigs placed above them. The Mohammedan abhors all contact with pork, so the dead juramentados’ contact with the pigs neutralized the beneficial effects of the rite itself. The Moros came to know Rodgers as “The Pig,” and juramentados hurriedly fled to other districts.12

To 21st-century Filipino commentators, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon immediately suggested juramentado. One observer noted: “the decision of the [11 September] hijackers to kill as many people as possible and have themselves killed in the process is reminiscent of the Muslim juramentados in Zamboanga and Jolo in the southern Philippines during the American colonization of the islands in the early 1900s.”13

Continuing Moro Armed Resistance in the 20th Century

Moro engagements with U.S. forces continued periodically from the first pitched battle in 1902 until the official end of military rule in 1913. The interruption of World War I, an interwar period that saw increased local northern Filipino jurisdiction over Moro affairs, and Japan’s occupation of the Philippines in World War II shaped and frustrated Moro aspirations for independence. The Moros fiercely resisted Japanese occupiers, but in the postwar granting of the Philippines’ independence on 4 July 1946, the Moros found themselves incorporated into the Republic of the Philippines. Over the next decades, there was continued Moro resistance to this integration. Government-sponsored migration of Christian Filipinos to traditional Muslim lands in the south and what Philippine Muslims saw as the massive transfer of land titles from Moro peoples fueled this resistance. Current Moro resistance
spokesmen draw a parallel with this influx of Filipinos from the north and the “policies enacted by ‘Israel’ against the Palestinian people.”

The government and the Christian north emphasized threats to the Moros’ Muslim identity.

Moros assert their marginalization by the government in other forms—local investment, education, health care, access to the justice system, and other complaints—were added to traditional aspirations for independence. Violent Christian gangs, in collusion with local constabularies and especially the Jabidah massacre on 18 March 1968, played catalytic roles in growing Moro militancy during Ferdinand Marcos’ presidency. The Philippine Army killed at least 28 Moro recruits on Corregidor Island. These recruits—in the Jabidah Special Forces—were undergoing training in unconventional warfare with the alleged aim of seizing the disputed Malaysian state of Sabah on the island of Borneo under a plan code-named Operation Merdeka. The Moro recruits were allegedly shot for refusing to obey orders and to keep them from revealing details of the operation.

One direct result of this event was the clandestine formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in late 1969. Moro students studying at universities in the Philippines, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East who were dedicated to creating an independent Muslim nation in the south Philippines formed the MNLF. The MNLF gained foreign support from Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and from the governor in Sabah, Malaysia, who supplied arms and other aid from Libya as well as training for Moro youths. Bolstered by foreign arms and supplies, by the mid-1970s, the MNLF had perhaps 30,000 men under arms and had been engaging Philippine Army units and police in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao. Initial successes began to fade by late 1975; however, a leadership change in Sabah state limited resupply and effective government amnesty programs. Nevertheless, a cease-fire in 1976 and the establishment of a provisional autonomous, but not independent, Muslim zone in the south Philippines seemed to signify real gains for the MNLF. Subsequent backing from Iran in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution also bolstered the MNLF’s international support.

In 1979, a short-lived rival group designated the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization was formed under the leadership of expatriate Moros based in Saudi Arabia. In 1977, a leadership split in the MNLF resulted in a breakaway organization that, by 1983, adopted the name of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF, though smaller than its predecessor, also had substantial numbers of armed combatants. For a time, these three Muslim organizations sought primacy as representatives for the Moro people, punctuated by low-level clashes, cease-fires, and discussions among their members and the Philippine Government. This complexity was accompanied by another development far removed geographically—the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan war in December 1979—that would eventually generate another, more radical, Muslim insurgent group in the Philippines—the ASG.

Abu Sayyaf: From Afghanistan to the War on Terrorism

While accounts of the ASG’s formation vary in detail and interpretation, it is roughly agreed that Moro founder and first leader Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani was studying in the Middle East when he fell under the influence of the Wahabi theology espoused by Professor Abdul Rasul Abu Sayyaf. The Afghan, and ethnic Pashtun, professor was a follower of the puritanical Saudi Islamic sect—named for its 18th-century founder Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab—that branded other Muslim sects as heretical. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Abu Sayyaf, said to be a kind of swashbuckling, charismatic figure, formed a mujahideen group in 1986 that operated near Kabul against Soviet forces. Designated the Islamic Union, radical Saudi Arabian Wahabi backers heavily financed the group, and it aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. It became an important part of the centralized effort Jordanian Palestinian Abdullah Azam began in about 1984 to bring in foreign Muslim fighters and support. Financial and other support was often filtered through Muslim charities.

The ASG was reported to have trained some 20,000 foreign mujahideen fighters. Many of them trained at a camp near Peshawar, Pakistan, that prepared fighters from the Middle East, North Africa, and the Philippines. Janjalani himself arrived in Afghanistan in 1986 and reportedly joined Sayyaf’s
Islamic Union. He probably received his training at a Sayyaf camp and appears to have stayed in Afghanistan as a mujahideen until the end of the war. Like thousands of non-Afghan Muslims, including Egyptians, Saudis, Algerians, Chechens, Uzbeks, Kuwaitis, Uighurs from Xinjiang in China, and others, Janjalani was determined to help drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. With that goal achieved in February 1989, most foreign mujahideen veterans scattered to Muslim countries around the world. As is well documented, many of them became part of insurgent and armed opposition groups waging jihad against regimes seen as heretical or as having been too influenced by the West. Support networks and ties established in Afghanistan endured and developed, coming to play roles in attacks on U.S. lives, property, and interests around the world over the next decade.

Between 1989 and 1990, Janjalani appears to have left Afghanistan and returned to his Basilan Island home in the Philippines just across the narrow strait from the Mindanao capital, Zamboanga. He and many other Afghan Moros returned from the Afghan jihad with a view to duplicating Afghanistan’s success—in this case, establishing an independent and assertively Muslim state in the southern Philippines. Some returning Moro mujahideen joined the MNLF, and others joined the MILF. Janjalani, however, believed in a so-called “pure” form of Islam on the Wahabi model. In his Basilan hometown of Tabuk, it was said that there was an old world atmosphere in which the women wore black and the men wore either gray or white. He set about with a few followers to establish a new insurgent group that he dubbed Abu Sayyaf, evidently to be resonant of his Afghan mentor. Dissident elements of the MNLF led by a man with similar views, a religious teacher named Wahab Akbar, joined him in this endeavor. From a group with an initial membership of about 20 and the goal of establishing a pure Islamic state in Mindanao, the ASG grew to at least several hundred members and made its presence felt in Basilan, the Sulu Archipelago, and some parts of Mindanao.

The ASG impressed itself on the public consciousness with its brutal bombings, murders,
assaults, and ambushes as well as robberies, extortion, and kidnappings that have become its trademark. One sizable ASG element being pursued by the Philippine Armed Forces and backed by U.S. material aid and possibly advisers still holds two missionaries from the Wichita, Kansas, area and a Filipino nurse. The ASG also draws on the strong Moro maritime heritage, operating as successful pirates in Philippine coastal waters and sometimes farther from home. Filipino commentators have drawn parallels between legendary Sulu pirate Jikiri of the early 20th century and Abu Sayyaf. After years of successful depredations ostensibly carried out on behalf of Moro rights, Jikiri was killed in a hand-to-hand battle with a U.S. officer on the island of Patian. Today, commercial shipping enterprises fear that the ASG and other groups will turn their attention increasingly to the soft targets that maritime carriers present.

The Philippine Army and police have scored successes against the ASG, including killing its founder, Janjalani, in a December 1998 gun battle and capturing or killing other leaders and members. Khaddafy Janjalani, younger brother of the founder and named for the Libyan leader who has supported Moro causes, now heads the ASG. The reported ties between Osama bin Laden and the ASG date to Afghanistan in the 1980s when bin Laden, like Janjalani, was closely linked to Professor Sayyaf’s Islamic Union and fought with their forces. In the post-Afghan war days, bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization reportedly funneled money and other support to the ASG, although the precise nature of the aid is not known. As early as the mid-1990s, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, a Saudi financier named Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, was alleged to be one of the principal vectors of funding to the ASG and perhaps other Philippine Muslim insurgent groups as well. Through an Islamic charity in the Philippines, some sources have linked Khalifa to a key individual, Ramzi Yusuf, who was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Other funding sources linked to al-Qaeda are alleged as well. Additionally, allegations of mid-1990s plans by Philippine-based radical Islamic groups to blow up 11 U.S. commercial airliners over the Pacific, assassinate Pope John Paul II, bomb U.S. and Israeli Embassies, and assassinate U.S. President William J. Clinton all marked the area as a vector for international terrorism. More recently, the January 2002 arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah militants in Singapore and the Philippines, with ties to al-Qaeda, underscored the existence of continuing direct links and regional ties with international terrorism. The ASG was planning attacks on U.S. and Western Embassies in the region and on the U.S. military.

Substantial training and other ties to Afghanistan evidently endured in the years since the end of the 1979-89 war. In July 2001, a Filipino senator and former Philippine Armed Forces chief indicated that 50 Moro fighters were being trained in Afghanistan. While it was far from clear to which of the three Moro groups the 50 guerrillas belonged, the revelation underscored the robust dimensions of terrorist links and interaction. As the unraveling of the Taliban regime accelerated in mid-November 2001 under the impact of U.S. and Northern Alliance attacks, Moros were reported to be fighting near Kabul with Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. They are evidently sprinkled among the thousands of al-Qaeda prisoners and dead left in the wake of the successful U.S. and allied operations.

Islamic Insurgency and the Region

As 2001 came to an end, concerns about the ASG were fueled by the prospect of renewed militancy from the MNLF and MILF as they pursued Moro independence. Additionally, the prospect for broadening unrest and uncertainty to other states in the region seemed more likely. In late October 2001, MNLF founder Nur Misauri—his leadership challenged by other MNLF representatives and his position as governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao denounced by Manila’s government—quickly indicated his intention to take up arms. According to the government, he met with ASG representatives and with the MILF to gain active allies and orchestrate a general uprising. More than 200 Misauri followers shelled a Philippine Army post on Mindanao with mortars on 19 November, took many dozens of hostages in Zamboanga City, and in resulting clashes with the army, lost some 52 fighters. Some fighters were reported to be former Moro rebels who had been integrated into the army but mutinied over the Philippine
The MNLF gained foreign support from Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and from the governor in Sabah, Malaysia, who supplied arms and other aid from Libya as well as training for Moro youths. Bolstered by foreign arms and supplies, by the mid-1970s, the MNLF had perhaps 30,000 men under arms. . . . [By the mid-1980s,] three Muslim organizations sought primacy as representatives for the Moro people, punctuated by low-level clashes, cease-fires, and discussions among their members and the Philippine Government.

Government’s treatment of former governor Misuari. Many more MNLF fighters were arrested, and large arms and explosives caches were seized.

While the Philippine Army continued into December to try to pacify Misuari’s fighters, Misuari himself fled to Sabah, Malaysia, where it was feared he would use territory and camps there to launch operations against Manila’s government. Malaysian authorities detained him on 24 November, albeit in fairly opulent conditions, and the Kuala Lumpur Government subsequently cleared him of terrorist charges. He was, nevertheless, deported to the Philippines where he is imprisoned. Fears that Misuari’s armed followers, such as the loyal and elite Mutallah force from his days as governor, might try to free him has heightened military and police attention and intelligence-gathering efforts. Misuari supporters also are believed to be planning terrorist strikes in the Philippines as they watch his extradition and deportation proceedings.

The MILF—whose meeting with Misuari took place in Bangkok, Thailand, in October—asserts that it is pleased to see rising tensions with the Philippine Government, having opposed earlier peace efforts. At the same time, the ASG pursues its own enigmatic criminal and radical Islamic agendas. In short, Moro resistance groups’ interaction is complex, as is the impact that all of this has on other states in the region.

At a minimum, the perceived Malaysian backing for Moro independence remains a source of tension between Manila and Kuala Lumpur, but there are more serious impacts. The Philippine Moro insurgent movements have increased arms smuggling and alien smuggling in Malaysia and Indonesia. The January 2002 arrest of al-Qaeda-linked militants in Malaysia, who had ties to the Philippines and Indonesia, indicates that the full extent of radical Islamic networks is not yet apparent. In addition, the ASG’s successes in raising money through kidnapping and extortion are believed to have sparked analogous efforts by pirates and other groups in regional waters. Radicalizing Malaysian Muslims and institutionalizing anti-U.S. and anti-Western
opposition and hostility remain potentials but are limited to the rhetorical and to demonstrations against U.S. strikes on Afghanistan.44

Indonesia, as the fourth largest state in the world and the largest Muslim country, is particularly concerned about radical Islam and terrorism. More than 85 percent of Indonesia’s 210 million people are Muslim; about 5 percent are Christian, and about 1 percent is Buddhist and Hindu. While the East Timor experience is said to have reenergized the Philippine Moros in their secessionist efforts, it is recognized that inspiration flows both ways.45 The presence of al-Qaeda cells in Indonesia was suspected and discussed well before their attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States. Attacks against U.S. interests there sparked U.S. State Department warnings and increased embassy security.46

More recently, Indonesian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Abdullah Hendropriyono charged that al-Qaeda camps and those of other terrorist groups exist on Indonesia’s Sulawesi Island. While Hendropriyono said that camps had remained largely inactive since their establishment, he indicated that al-Qaeda representatives, other foreigners, and local militants were fueling Muslim-Christian conflict there.47 A number of groups in Indonesia have extremist agendas, including the Islamic Defenders’ Front and the militant Laskar Jihad. A former mujahideen veteran of the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war who has sent many local youths to wage war against Christians in the Moluccas and the Central Sulawesi province leads the Laskar Jihad.48 The group reportedly has nearly a dozen commanders with Afghan war experience. While these radical groups deny al-Qaeda ties, their radical activities and continuing involvement in the Sulawesi problems suggest otherwise.

Overall, however, membership in such radical Islamic groups is still relatively small. The extent to which these groups will be able to mobilize new members to undertake regional versions of jihad in today’s environment is the issue that concerns regional governments and the United States.49 Recent revelations about al-Qaeda-linked militants arrested in Singapore—well-known for its strict law enforcement and other controls—were particularly unpleasant. Such revelations suggest to specialists and media commentators alike that the potential for al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups to gain footholds amidst the disarray of Indonesia is a most serious consideration.50

From the late 13th century to the age of the Internet, Moro goals, identity, and coherence as a people have remained largely intact. Now constituting about 5 percent of the Filipino population, their goal of independence—or at least greater autonomy and a more equitable share of opportunity and national resources—remains a powerful imperative. As one sympathetic Filipino commentator put it, the continuing Moro armed struggle is “founded on an historical perception that Manila’s Imperial Government is out on a systematic pattern for the extirpation of Islam in the Philippines.”51 Whatever the merits of this perception, enduring economic marginalization and decades of government policies considered to be hostile by many south Philippine Muslims have fueled an active insurgency.

The Philippine Government’s military efforts to deal with guerrillas have led to charges of human rights abuses and unwarranted militarization.52 As 2002 began, the Philippine Army asserted that it must substantially increase the size of its forces by 40 battalions to deal with the threat of southern Muslim guerrillas and communist insurgents operating in areas farther north. Together, these Muslim and communist guerrillas are estimated to total about 25,000 fighters.53 At the same time, Muslim insurgents are seeking new recruits, funding, and allies, a cycle that suggests the prospect of increased confrontation in the Philippines and possibly provides a catalyst for broader armed conflict in the region.

The new factor in the Philippines, and in the region, is the introduction of a far more radical form of Islam backed by international adherents. While the ASG may now be both a criminal enterprise and an ideologically motivated insurgent group, the message of Islamic extremism in populations seeing little prospect for material improvement could be especially seductive. Traditional Moro independence groups, militants, and armed insurgents may become radicalized. Regional commentators, including those in Indonesia, continue to echo the fear that “radicals might eventually attract the economically dispossessed.”54 Indeed, by late January 2002, there were increasing reports of ties among the ASG, the MNLF, and the MILF. The well-regarded Manila Times cited Philippine military intelligence reports that MNLF and MILF insurgents had “linked up with Abu Sayyaf rebels in Basilan.”55 Should this report prove correct and indicate an enduring relationship, it would mean far more serious problems for Philippine military operations.

U.S. policy in the Philippines recognizes two requirements: to support the Philippine Government’s military effort to deal with the immediate threat of terrorism and to meet the longer-term problem of endemic poverty and marginalization that feeds instability. U.S. military assistance has thus far been confined to materiel support and deploying Special
forces and other advisers, with the possibility of more active U.S. participation having been raised in government-to-government discussions. The likelihood of strong opposition to a more assertive U.S. combat role may limit options in this regard. Presidents Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Bush both agreed that sustainable peace would depend on how well economic and social problems could be addressed, and the United States has pledged to double economic aid for key southern Philippine areas. This assistance will support the integration of former combatants into the economy in an effort to create an “environment that is attractive for investment, job creation and economic progress and providing improved public services.”56 The impact of these longer-term programs—and the scope and scale of military activity—will depend on the dangerous months ahead when leaders and populations in the Philippines determine which paths to take. 

**NOTES**


3. Converts to Islam were from the same racial lineage as those residing in the Christian north.


5. Ibid.

6. Alonto.


9. From the anonymous poem, “If a Lady’s Wearin’ Pantaloons.”


11. Alonto.


15. Ibid.


17. These arrangements were set out in the December 1976 Tripoli Agreement conducted under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).


19. It should be noted that communist insurgencies, largely in the northern Philippines, have been an important security issue for the Philippine Government.

20. The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization eventually dissolved, with organizers holding meetings having little influence as a result.


24. Djalal and McBeth. 25. Alonto.


27. Ibid. Wahab Akbar is now the governor of Basilan Island. This former MNLF official was said to be designated Al Harakatul al Islamiya but became known as Abu Sayyaf.

28. The organization was said to be designated Al Harakatul al Islamiya but became known as Abu Sayyaf.


32. Ibid.


37. Djalal and McBeth.


41. In December, the very influential Indonesian-based OIC announced it would support Misuar’s successor in Mindanao, although Misnar retains international support from Saudi Arabia and elements in Malaysia as well. See Johnna Villawlay and Mirasol Ng-Gadil, “Misuari Fate Hangs in OIC Balance,” The Manila Times, 6 December 2001.


43. “Asian Nations Widen Terrorism Inquiry.”


48. Djalal and McBeth.


53. Some Philippine legislators, including the senate president, are less than convinced. See “Philippines—Manila Must Double Military Strength to Fight Rebels.” AFP, 3 December 2001, at <http://periscope.org>.

54. Djalil and McBeth.


Soon after the entire world expressed solidarity with the United States’ intention to physically defeat terrorism, the predictable waffling about how to define “terrorist” began. Some governments struggled to find a semantic concoction that would appear as shared outrage while helping to distract American attention from their own dubious liaisons and détentes with outlaw groups. In this regard, the importance of organizational identity was nowhere more transcendent than in northern South America where the 11 September 2001 attacks heightened an already keen attentiveness to U.S. foreign policy. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, in a speech to the Venezuelan Congress, asserted that Colombia’s two major armed dissident groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the larger Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), “cannot be considered terrorist because if they were we could not negotiate with them, because one does not talk with terrorism, but rather combats it.”

Chavez’s logic was impenetrable—governments do not negotiate with terrorist organizations. Colombia’s government had been negotiating with these groups; therefore, the FARC and ELN are not terrorist forces. Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller later made a muddled, but similar, comment. The dissemblance was lost on no one, especially in Colombia. The immediate post-World Trade Center issue of leading Bogota news weekly, Semana, includes a brief, insightful article about what the events meant for Colombia. The article notes President George W. Bush’s early ultimatum about punishing terrorists and whoever protects them, then wondered aloud how the United States would define protection.

In 1998, Colombia’s government bet its success, and maybe the country’s future, on a plan for a negotiated settlement with the FARC and ELN. Together, the two groups annually commit thousands of kidnappings and hundreds of murders, extortions, and bombings, making Colombia one of the most dangerous and violent countries in the world. Their modus operandi is to translate ruthlessness into fear, thereby gaining the kind of respect that springs therefrom. Their explicit objective is to take power.

Nevertheless, to find a way out of what Colombia’s government may have seen as an impasse, President Andres Pastrana agreed to temporarily hand over a piece of Colombian territory to the FARC. Officially called the despeje, or clearing, the area was cleared of all government armed forces, leaving it under complete FARC control. A 10-kilometer-wide no-man’s zone then was added around the outside. Ostensibly, the FARC required this concession as an assurance of security to begin a course of peace negotiations. The results were dubious, the FARC having conceded nothing in more than 2 years of talks.

The FARC actively exploited the natural military advantages of safely occupying such a huge section of geography in the heart of the national sovereignty. Protected interior lines allowed the FARC to greatly increase its effective military presence in areas around the zone, expanding the total amount of territory under its control, at least partially. To the south this provided special strategic advantage, helping to secure the FARC’s southern line of communication out of Colombia into Ecuador and Peru. Within the despeje, the FARC was able to hide and manage its inventory of hostages, step up training, and manufacture bombs and mines. To the northwest, the despeje borders the mountain approaches to Bogota.
Although underrecognized, an earlier *Semana* article provided definitive answers about the nature of the ELN and FARC, and of the government’s peace plan. By 2001, Pastrana was pressing for a similar zone for the smaller ELN. The area chosen lies along the middle reaches of the Magdalena River. Aside from dominating the most strategically important line of communication in the country, the proposed zone includes a major coca crop concentration as well as oil industry infrastructure. The *Semana* interviewer questions Pastrana about ongoing negotiations with local residents who were opposed to the proposed accord.

The interviewer asks, “And if there is no agreement, are you going to continue with the clearance zone in that area?” The frank answer is troublesome, its logic perhaps the first public expression, beyond reciting abstractions, of the President’s reasoning: “The country needs to understand that the ELN is prepared to make peace, but if it doesn’t happen, it is prepared to make war. And it has a great terrorist capability.” In a nutshell, a president is stating that his country must understand that if he does not give an armed outlaw group strategically important land the group will hurt the country. To avoid violent harm, the president advises the country that it must yield its wealth and accept strategic risk. There is no doubt about Pastrana’s use of the term “terrorist” in his explanation or about the simplicity of his appeasement.

Coca cultivation in the FARC despeje increased as U.S.-sponsored Plan Colombia coca eradication activities proceeded outside it. A major goal of the eradication plan has been to reduce the financial blood flow to the FARC and thereby decrease its capacity for violent action. However, because Colombia has a longstanding policy of not negotiating with drug dealers, the Pastrana government long maintained publicly that the FARC was not a drug-trafficking organization. For a time, the United States was deferred to Pastrana’s political expedience regarding classification of the FARC. After all, the Drug Enforcement Administration itself was always slow to accept publicly the idea that the FARC is a drug-trafficking organization. However, since 11 September, when terrorist replaced trafficker as America’s number one enemy identity, it has been too much for the United States to overlook these organizations’ terrorist character and too much for the Colombians to ask the United States to do so.

During the week of 5 September, three Irish Republican Army members were captured in Colombia after having trained FARC members. Even in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, the FARC could not moderate its behavior, murdering a popular government official while holding her captive. The FARC mounted a publicity effort in which it expressed sympathy for victims of the World Trade Center disaster, but Colombian Government security forces revealed a tape recording of a senior FARC leader asserting that the FARC would “combat them [North Americans] wherever they may be, until we get to their own territory, to make them feel the pain which they have inflicted on other peoples.”

A mild paradox in the course of U.S. policy regarding Colombia’s situation makes the despeje question still more interesting. Another of Colombia’s illegal armed organizations, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), recently joined the ELN and the FARC on the U.S. Department of
State’s official list of international terrorist organizations. The AUC’s stated purpose is to eliminate the ELN and the FARC, but like them, it has been implicated in human rights violations and in the drug trade. The AUC may have been put on the State Department’s terrorist list in part because FARC peace negotiators demanded that the Colombian Government demonstrate good will in opposing the AUC. Now it appears that including the AUC on the list will make it harder for some publicists to overlook the terrorist characterization of the FARC and ELN. The AUC is generally labeled right-wing, while the FARC and ELN are known as leftist.

A corollary, we might ask what parts or determinants of our own policies have so discouraged the Colombian Government, or so disabled its ability to apply military power, that a small outlaw army could bully an ally of 40 million people. Perhaps we accepted the notion that the problems in Colombia are essentially political or cultural and the military instrument therefore inappropriate. Popular, plausible theories signaling economic disparities, political inequities, and cultural anachronisms as the root causes of conflict may have distracted us from appropriately defining the more immediate requirement.

As a corollary, we might ask what sorts of disadvantages the subversives enjoyed for more than 2 years: interior lines, rear area security, protected lines of communication, protected financial resource bases, marshaling areas, training areas, and access to strategic corridors. These are not societal failures fueling underlying causes of popular discontent. They are military objectives. In February 2002, the Colombian Army took back the despeje. MR

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4. In an interview with propagandists of Patria Roja, the Communist Party of Peru, FARC commander Raúl Reyes made the standard assertion: “The FARC has risen as a Marxist-Leninist force fed by Bolivarian thinking that struggles for power and does not recognize the State.” He goes on to explain the negotiations with the government. Evidently, for the FARC, the peace negotiations form part of their process for taking power. See <http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/senate/9785stacl10.html>.
5. The propagandistic value cannot be understated, propaganda and operational strategy being at some point linked. The FARC has long made explicit arguments in favor of belligerent status under international law. See, for instance, “Belligerencia,” FARC-EP Documents, at <http://www.farc-ep.org/>.
7. See also Wilson, “Colombian Rebels Use Refuge to Expand Their Power Base FARC Pushes Boundaries of Government-Backed Safe Haven,” The Washington Post Online (3 October 2001), A05, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. “Envisioned as a way to end Colombia’s nearly four-decade civil war, the FARC’s safe haven instead has become the guerrillas’ single biggest military advantage in the widening conflict, according to senior army officers and defense analysts in Colombia.”
13. Some ELN members may have been defecting to the AUC. See, in this regard, the official AUC website, Comuna Libre, at <http://www.colombialibre.net/colombialibre>, which posted an item claiming widespread defections from the ELN to the AUC. The FARC can also be expected to receive members from the ELN if it is, as some analysts contend, crumbling. These possibilities raise questions about the ideological dimension of both the ELN and the AUC. The reported lack of organizational cohesion in the ELN further calls into doubt the Colombian Government’s decision to give it a large internal sanctuary. Changes after 11 September are palpable. Francis Taylor, Coordinator for Terrorism Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, stated in early October to attentive South American audiences that his office was designing an antiterrorist strategy for Colombia that would complement Plan Colombia. See Sergio Gomez Maseri, “E.U. prepara estrategia antiterrorista para Colombia,” El Tiempo [Bogota] (12 October 2001), at <http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/12-10-2001/prp_pf_0.html> and “EE. UU. No descarta interven en Colombia” [United States Does Not Rule Out Intervention in Colombia] (16 October 2001), at <www.clarin.ar>.
14. The ELN describes it, “This complex panorama of the social, political, economic and legal reality and of the opportunities of life denied to the majority of Colombians is what gave rise to and sustains the existence of a guerrilla movement and the inevitability of revolutionary armed struggle. It is not the desire nor the result of individual motives of warrior men, as Colombia’s ruling class would have it.” See <http://www.web.net/eln/ELN/eln.html>. Whatever Colombia’s ruling class would or would not have and whatever social injustices exist, objectively compels one to conclude that, indeed, much of the violence in Colombia is the desire and result of individual motives of warrior men.
Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity

Colonel William W. Mendel, U.S. Army, Retired

PARAGUAY IS landlocked, poor, a long way from everywhere, and seldom appears in the drama of international events but is nevertheless emblematic of our global security challenge. It has suffered crippling wars where governance has always been a challenge and where smuggling and criminal organizing is a tradition. Long disregarded by the great powers’ intelligence and diplomatic services, it is now a place where international crimes like money laundering, gunrunning, migration fraud, and drug trafficking recombine and metastasize. In an age of great sovereign competitors, the United States pays attention to nations according to their development—their ability to mobilize as a nation and to make war as a nation. Now we are entering an age of uncivilized behavior in which we must focus on the lost geographies, the fertile ground for piracy and terror. Ciudad del Este, a boomtown on Paraguay’s eastern border facing Brazil and Argentina, is an appropriate target for new concerns. Regional security scholars have aptly called it a nest of spies and thieves.

Local security specialists assert that Ciudad del Este is not only a den of low-technology criminality but also a haven for international money laundering, with much of the money coming from the Middle East. It is a town of a quarter million inhabitants and an international trading center where the admixture of drug runners, terrorists, and pinstriped bankers trespasses on the sovereignty and safety of democratic countries and their citizens, thereby representing a threat to the United States and the region. There are other examples of ungovernable zones in the Americas that provide cover for terrorist groups, such as the Switzerland-sized area that Colombia granted as an official safe haven to a group on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, but in Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este, all the components of transnational lawlessness seem to converge.

The Larger Context

The turbulent political environment of Paraguay engendered lawlessness in Ciudad del Este. The country has suffered three coup attempts in the past 5 years. Popular army chief, General Lino Oviedo, who mounted a short-lived coup in 1998, was sentenced to 10 years in prison, then ran for president later the same year. While the supreme court declared Oviedo an illegal candidate, his running mate, Raul Cubas Grau, was elected president and quickly pardoned Oviedo. Cubas Grau resigned under pressure after the vice president was assassinated in March 1999, leaving the presidency to Luis Angel Gonzalez Macchi who was next in line as senate president. Adding to the political turbulence, Gonzalez Macchi fired 18 generals and more than 100 other officers who had supported Oviedo. After a May 2000 coup attempt, Gonzalez Macchi terminated another 13 officers. Meanwhile, the party of Oviedo-supported Vice President Julio Cesar Franco maneuvered to impeach Gonzalez Macchi. The political tumult has done little to engender social and economic progress in Paraguay, and only Brazil and Argentina’s influence have kept the

Although it may be unwise to assume that all black-market thieves are terrorists, police authorities believe that the amount of money from smuggling and money laundering going from Paraguay to overseas banks is far more than any presumptive business activity. . . . Brazilian Judge Walter Fanganiello Maierovitch [former National Drug Enforcement Secretary] . . . reports that Osama bin Laden is setting up an al-Qaeda unit near Ciudad del Este under the Arab community’s cover.
According to Paraguayan police, about 70 percent of the 600,000 vehicles on the road in Paraguay are there illegally. Open markets provided by the Common Market of the South membership help import stolen cars from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Brazilian police complain that Paraguayan criminals trade stolen cars for drugs, which are then exported to Europe and the United States.

Located near the junction of the Iguazú and Paraná Rivers, Argentina’s Puerto Iguazú can access the Atlantic Ocean using small freighters. In this photo of the landing at Puerto Iguazú, Argentina is on the left, Brazil is on the right, and Paraguay is center-rear.

democratic government afloat.¹ Needless to say, the government in Asunción has had little time to concentrate on improving the rule of law in Ciudad del Este.

According to Paraguayan police, about 70 percent of the 600,000 vehicles on the road in Paraguay are there illegally. Open markets provided by the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) membership help import stolen cars from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.² Brazilian police complain that Paraguayan criminals trade stolen cars for drugs, which are then exported to Europe and the United States. Recently, González Macchi was exposed in the press as owning a stolen BMW, and his wife was then reported for having a stolen Mercedes. Both cars apparently claimed the same title document, which belonged to a Toyota. Understandably, Paraguay did not attend the American hemisphere forum on auto theft held in Bogota, Colombia, in October 2001.³ One has to wonder whether the government in Asunción can muster the will to improve the rule of law in Ciudad del Este.

Perhaps as much as 85 percent of Paraguay’s rural population lives at or below the poverty level. About 56 percent of Paraguayans live in urban areas, particularly the capital city of Asunción that accounts for 10 percent of the country’s population. Agriculture provides 27 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, but this sector has proven vulnerable to economic conditions in neighboring countries. Paraguay’s gross domestic product has remained essentially flat since 1996, and inflation has lingered at about 10 percent.⁴ Paraguay’s participation in MERCOSUR since 1991 opened the landlocked country to opportunities in foreign markets.

Paraguay’s economic potential is strengthened geographically by its access via the Paraná River to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and the Atlantic Ocean. Brazil created a free port on the Brazilian Atlantic coast at Paranaguá and developed a road linking the port to Paraguay. The project included the Bridge of Friendship that now spans the Paraná River between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu. The bridge carries about 40,000 travelers daily. The valuable economic opening increased the economic importance, legal and illegal, of the triborder area. One result of the various economic factors is the increasing urban population, mostly poor, of Ciudad del Este. In the past 5 years, the population of Ciudad
del Este and the surrounding Paraguayan state of Alto Paraná has increased by 50 percent.

The population in the triborder area is concentrated in three interacting border cities. Ciudad del Este is the largest city, with a population of 240,000. Across the Bridge of Friendship in Brazil, the city of Foz do Iguaçu (population of 190,000) thrives on tourism and provides secure neighborhoods for foreign nationals who commute to Ciudad del Este from Brazil. Argentina’s Puerto Iguazú (population of 28,100) is isolated from Ciudad del Este by the Paraná River but has access to Brazil across the Iguazú River at the Tancredo Neves International Bridge. The Arab community of immigrants that represents a slice of the urban population in the triborder area, mainly Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, is estimated to be nearly 30,000.³

Illegality of Every Kind

In Ciudad de Este, the absence of government control allows smugglers and money launderers to leverage disparity in the levels of law enforcement, import regulations, exchange rates, and tax rates between Paraguay and its neighbors. European-bound illicit drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana, pass through Foz do Iguaçu for transshipment eastward to Puerto Paranaguá on Brazil’s Atlantic coast. Argentina’s aggressive border controls and law enforcement, and the impressive Iguazú waterfalls have nurtured a growing international tourism industry in the Argentine state of Misiones. But Argentina’s high tax rate and expensive peso have made smuggling cigarettes a profitable, low-risk enterprise. Night flights of cigarettes from Paraguay to Argentina bring sizable profits with little risk. A $1 pack of cigarettes in Paraguay gets $2.50 in Argentina. Even agricultural products, such as soybeans and chickens, are involved. Since Brazil and Argentina are magnets for the marijuana grown in Paraguay, most of the illicit drug trafficking in the triborder area involves marijuana, but cocaine from Bolivia and Peru is sometimes seized at triborder checkpoints. Investment money flows from the Middle East, apparently because profits can be made quickly on illegal merchandise, including purloined intellectual property.

A large Chinese community has developed in Ciudad del Este alongside the established Arab population, adding to the international mix. It is interesting to note that over the past 3 years 30 percent of the false immigration documents seized at the Argentine Iguazu checkpoint were carried by Chinese people who were presumed to be heading to Buenos Aires.⁶ In September 2001, the Paraguayan consul in Miami was arrested for allegedly selling more than 300 passports, visas, and shipping documents since June 1999. The consul reportedly sold 16 passports to terrorist suspects from Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon who were planning to move to Ciudad del Este.⁷

Illegal weapons merchandising provides another trading advantage for Paraguay. Taurus- and Rossiproduced Brazilian guns are reexported from Paraguay back into Brazil with no documentation and with great profit to gunrunners. Brazilian investigative news sources assess that most of the Brazilian weapons exported to Paraguay end up in Brazil, but there is a significant flow of weapons into Argentina as well. On the Argentine side of the Tancredo Neves International Bridge at Iguazú, the number of judicial actions taken in cases involving firearms and explosives jumped from 1 in 1999 to 51 in 2000. These cases are considered serious enough and supported by enough evidence to be processed successfully through the Argentine courts. Preliminary numbers for the first half of 2001 indicate that
Gun smuggling continues apace. In contrast to the increase in gunrunning, individuals passing through the Iguazú border checkpoint dropped from 3,413,876 in 1999 to 1,396,733 in 2000 and continued on a similar pace in 2001. Total vehicle passages dropped from 350,751 to 242,669, with the pace seeming to slow more in 2001.

While no one conclusion can be drawn, the dramatic rise in weapon smuggling against a decrease in total cross-border movement at least raises questions concerning regional instability. Likewise, the Ciudad del Este link to Colombia is also important. A guns-for-cocaine connection between Paraguayan gunrunners and the terrorist group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was uncovered, and one FARC operative was arrested.

Interestingly, actionable drug cases from border arrests at Iguazú have diminished in the past 3 years as most drugs are moving from Paraguay into Brazil or into Argentina far south of the triborder area at Posadas and elsewhere.

**Law Enforcement Success**

To better control commerce and the large transient international population, three countries constituted a “tripartite command of the triborder” in 1996 as a multiagency, trination police cooperative. The Paraguayan National Police represents Paraguay. The Gendarmería Nacional (border patrol), Prefectura Naval (coast guard), and federal police units, as well as representatives from the state intelligence secretariat, the Argentine consul’s office in Foz do Iguaçu, the National Aeronautical Police, and the Misiones Provincial Police represent Argentina. Brazilian units include the Brazilian Federal Police, Mountain Infantry Battalion 34, the state intelligence department, plus the Brazilian consul’s office in Ciudad del Este. In 1998, to intensify their fight against terrorism, smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking, the three countries augmented the trinational program with a security agreement. The countries agreed to develop a joint criminal database, operating in Argentina, and co-
operate with banks and financial institutions to stop money laundering. So far, the triborder cooperative effort has not been effective in bringing international crime to heel. Uneven participation and enforcement have failed to counteract the conditions conducive to smuggling, money laundering, and the gamut of international crimes.

Border control of criminal activity is certainly possible, as evidenced by Argentina’s discipline of the Iguazú tourist area in Misiones Province. Argentina took action there by establishing an indepth defense to interdict smugglers as they move southward down the Misiones corridor between Paraguay and Brazil toward Buenos Aries. Seven battalions of the Gendarmería Nacional’s Region II are deployed at section outposts along the frontier and on north-south National Routes 12 and 14. Twenty-nine sections, with 20 to 50 officers, are assigned a zone of responsibility of about 200 kilometers (km) along the frontier. Seven more sections along Route 14 in the center of Misiones are at internal checkpoints. At the spearhead in Puerto Iguazú is the Gendarmería Nacional’s Squadron 13. It has jurisdiction over 2,400 square km, with 50 km of border facing Paraguay and about 200 km facing Brazil. Prefectura Naval units support with checkpoints on

Some of the control success in Argentina’s Misiones state is attributed to terrain. The steep basalt cliffs of the Iguazú River that create the spectacular falls are not as conducive to contraband traffic as are Paraná’s gentler reaches.

Ciudad del Este provides the kind of uncontrolled environment that can sustain criminal organizations—and terrorists. The 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing and the 1994 Argentine-Israeli Community
A large Chinese community has developed in Ciudad del Este alongside the established Arab population . . . [and] over the past 3 years 30 percent of the false immigration documents seized at the Argentine Iguazu checkpoint were carried by Chinese. . . . In September 2001, the Paraguayan consul in Miami was arrested for allegedly selling more than 300 passports, visas, and shipping documents . . . [16 of which were sold] to terrorist suspects from Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon who were planning to move to Ciudad del Este.

Center bombing cast a spotlight on the Arab community in Ciudad del Este that it has since been unable to avoid. In May 2000, International Criminal Police Organization investigators arrested a Paraguayan businessman linked to the center bombing. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 reports that in February, Ali Khalil Mehri, a Lebanese businessman with financial links to the terrorist group Hizballah, was arrested for aiding a criminal enterprise involved in distributing compact discs espousing Hizballah’s extremist ideals. He subsequently escaped from Paraguay before trial. Then, in November 2000, Salah Abdul Karim Yassine, a Palestinian who allegedly threatened to bomb the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Asunción, was arrested and charged with possessing false documents and entering the country illegally.

In October 2001, Paraguayan police alleged that an Arab businessman living in Foz do Iguacu was sending funds to Hizballah, but Brazilian authorities decided not to arrest him. Arab businessmen send large amounts of money abroad to purchase goods for import. Because much of Paraguay’s export business is underground, the situation leaves the Arab community suspect for financially supporting Arab terrorist groups but without clear proof. Although it may be unwise to assume that all black-market thieves are terrorists, police authorities believe that the amount of money from smuggling and money laundering going from Paraguay to overseas banks is far more than any presumptive business activity. It suggests to local police officials that some in the Arab community are supporting radical terrorism with the spoils of illegal trade.

Indeed, the U.S. State Department clearly advises that there are individuals and organizations with ties to extremist groups operating in Ciudad de Este and along the triborder area between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Brazilian Judge Walter Fanganiello Maierovitch, former National Drug Enforcement Secretary and now with the Giovanni Falconi Bra-

zilian Criminal Sciences Institute, reports that Osama bin Laden is setting up an al-Qaeda unit near Ciudad del Este under the Arab community’s cover. The U.S. Government cannot confirm an al-Qaeda presence in the triborder area. However, other radical Islamic extremists use illegal activities, such as drug and arms trafficking, to help fund terrorist activities throughout the world.

To achieve some control, 10 member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) InterAmerican Committee Against Terrorism participated in exercises in the triborder area to highlight solidarity against extremist activities. The United States, Argentina, and experts from other countries are providing training to Paraguayan antiterrorist police and military personnel. The objective is to “maintain a presence in the area and to be able to raid homes of persons suspected of being involved in financing terrorism or of radicalized members of Islam residing in the Tri-Border area.”

The interest seems to be having some results. On 21 September, 16 terrorist suspects from Lebanon, Palestine, and Brazil were arrested in Ciudad del Este for having false documents and being in Paraguay illegally. On 3 October, two Lebanese citizens, Hassam Saleh and Saleh Fayad, were arrested as Hizballah suspects and charged with piracy of commerce and having false documents, including passports that the Paraguayan consulate in Panama issued. Police alleged that they were helping to fund terrorist groups and that they were sending $50,000 a month to “organizations like Hizbollah.” They were found working in a Ciudad del Este store owned by Foz do Iguacu resident Assad Baracat, who antiterrorist agents had been seeking.

On the Brazilian side, the federal police discovered a group of suspects operating a half-dozen clandestine telephone exchanges. The police uncovered this when they identified an account with almost $30,000 worth of telephone calls from Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The account was under a false name, and all calls had been made during June, July, and August. In early September, the occupants of the house that identified with the account escaped. All this could be entirely coincidental since contraband and fraud of every kind goes on in the triborder area, but the case is obviously attractive. Only time will determine if the investigations and arrests reflect good-faith efficiency on the part of Paraguayan lawmen or if it is just a “round up the usual suspects” reaction to placate the immediate outrage of 11 September.

What Can be Done

If we believe that the best defense against terrorism is a good offense, perhaps the Ciudad del Este triborder area requires an active presence. At a recent meeting of the OAS International Committee
The smugglers' haven at Ciudad del Este could find itself at the top of the target list.

Since the 11 September 2001 Arab terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the locus of U.S. counteraction has been Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The stunning attack met a prompt response in those regions, but, as U.S. leaders asserted early on, the United States' and worldwide effort to counter terrorism will be protracted, encompassing all regions of the globe, including areas out of the mainstream.

U.S. security strategists are now open to more carefully scrutinizing peripheral geographies and respecting the dangers that may emanate from them. These are the centers of gravity of the new threat; however, regional states’ strategic interests are most immediately implicated. The social and political anomalies associated with the Taliban government in Afghanistan were felt most strongly in Pakistan, a long-time U.S. ally. After Afghanistan fell under the U.S. military lope, Pakistan’s security and sta-

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In 1998, to intensify their fight against terrorism, smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking the three countries augmented the trinational program with a security agreement. The countries agreed to develop a joint criminal database, operating in Argentina, and cooperate with banks and financial institutions to stop money laundering. So far, the trinborder cooperative effort has not been effective in bringing international crime to heel.

NOTES


5. Paraguay has a large influx of Lebanese and other Middle East nationals about 60 years ago, and it formally accepts a small number of naturalized citizens from Arab countries each year (114 Lebanese were naturalized in 1999), but this does not account for the transient population of Arab and Asian people who blend into the scene to stay for a while. See “Resoluciones Sobre Cartas de Naturalización Dictadas Por Año A Según Nacionalidad. Periodo 1995-1999,” Anuario Estadístico 1999, Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos, Paraguay, at www.dgeic.gov.py/Publicaciones/Anuarios/Anuario99/ ANUA99.htm, accessed 19 October 2001.


12. “Latin American Overview.”

13. Ibid.


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As the U.S. government mobilizes for homeland defense and a protracted war against terrorism, it is evident to the Russian national security elite that fundamental features of the international security landscape are undergoing "tectonic shifts." Such shifts, as described by diplomatic historian John Gaddis, involve the process of globalization, the decline of the power of the nation-state, and emerging nonstate actors with the will and means to challenge the international system’s stability. History did not end with the cold war, but it does assert a new set of fault lines. The current revolution in the international security system cannot be understood in isolation. In the case of U.S.-Russian relations, there have been two seismic shocks in only 2 years. The first, during spring 1999, was associated with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo that ended the post-cold war era and any illusions of a U.S.-Russian partnership. The second occurred in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and the initiation of the war on terrorism. The first shock pushed the United States and Russia apart on key security issues; the second drew them together as allies.

The Postmodern Russian Military: Post-Soviet and Post-Yeltsin

During spring 1999, this author wrote about a dying Russian military whose chronic problems remain numerous and deep. Low morale and the military’s diminished status in society broke the link between the nation and the armed forces. A top-heavy officer corps with too many senior officers and too few junior officers fed stagnation and inertia. A conscript pool based on a small portion of eligible age cohort, drawn from the lower strata of Russian youth, brought health and social problems into the ranks. Barracks life, with its brutal hazing, caused suicides among recruits. Criminalization and corruption throughout the officer corps undermined self-respect and public confidence. Grossly inadequate training reduced the force’s combat effectiveness. A decade of barely procuring new weapons and the problem of looming block obsolescence in the first years of the next century precluded modernizing the force. The officer corps’ open disdain for and distrust of the current government created a dying military.

As an acute observer notes, their inability to deal with their own decline into chaos and disorder has gone hand in hand with a remarkable fact of their marginalization in Russian national politics. Disgruntled officers perceive themselves as sheep going to the slaughter. Each time the sheep complain of starvation, the political shepherds respond with another round of cuts in manpower and wage arrears. One of Boris Yeltsin’s government’s most vocal critics, Colonel Viktor Baranets, uses precisely that language to describe Russia’s “lost army.” During spring 1998, the much-publicized film, “Chistilishche” (“Purgatory”), which was written and directed by nationalist journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov and produced by oligarch Boris Berezovsky, carried the metaphor even further by depicting the Russian Army in Chechnya as a crucified Christ.

The resurrection of the Russian military began during spring 1999. The rebirth involved a combination of international and domestic events, which brought in their aftermath renewed pride and importance for the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s inability to forestall NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis undermined the strategic posture of relying on strategic nuclear weapons to secure Russian political interests. Former Russian Minister of Defense Marshal Igor Sergeev made modernizing those forces and restructuring their command and control the capstone of his military reform program at the expense of Russia’s conventional forces. The NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia served Sergeev’s critics in two ways. First, it underscored the limits of strategic nuclear deterrence in defense of interests that were beyond Russia’s immediate frontiers and...
not perceived to demand capital engagement. Second, the air campaign’s precision strikes raised the prospect of NATO applying a similar intervention strategy against the periphery of Russia.

The Russian public saw the NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia as morally wrong and as an indirect threat to Russia itself. Given the increasing likelihood of renewed hostilities in the Caucasus and NATO’s growing interest in the region as a result of the emerging great game for access to oil and gas, a new military priority emerged: the ability to engage in theater deterrence. To many Russian observers, Kosovo marked the end of the post-cold war era and the beginning of a new period when local conflicts could turn into local wars with a very high risk of external military intervention against Russia.

This article focuses on Russia’s postmodern theater armed forces. Postmodern is used in this case as a military adapted to a postindustrial, informational dominated environment where the force is structured to conduct stability and support operations. Such a force would negate many aspects of conventional mass armed forces even as the force took on a wide range of security functions associated with globalization. Some authors see such changes leading to the marginalization of military power. Other authors have asserted that postmodern militaries will be primarily involved in intrastate conflicts as the probability of interstate warfare continues to decline. This article rejects the term “conventional forces” because it implies continuity and negates any emphasis on the impact of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) on the evolution of the forces of those services not connected to strategic or strategic nuclear forces. This position is quite different from Western RMA theorists who tend to see precision as a substitute for all-arms theater warfare and focus on developing advanced systems for aerospace warfare. Such capabilities will provide the United States with a global military hegemony even against potential peer competitors.

Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelley shares his vision: “In 2025 most major battles among advanced postindustrial societies may not be to capture territory. They may not even occur on the earth’s surface. But if they do, armies and navies will deploy and maneuver with the privilege of air and space power. More than likely, the major battles among these societies will occur in space or cyberspace. Those who can control the flow of knowledge will be advantaged. It is not information itself which is important but the architecture of and infrastructure for its collection, processing, and distribution which will be critical. This is not to say that surface conflicts reminiscent of the slaughter by machetes in Rwanda will not continue in the future. They probably will. But the U.S. need not fight those adversaries in those places with those weapons—even when we must become involved.

“Whether or not there are any major competitors for the U.S., many competitors will be advantaged by time, capability, or circumstance. In the world of 2025, there will be a select few who can compete in some aspects at the highest levels of military technology. Others will have reasonable

In the war against terrorism, a key issue is defining who the terrorists, terrorist organizations, and state sponsors of terrorism are. And that can be a complex political question that lies much in the eye of the beholder, especially when the issue moves from those immediately responsible for a specific attack to a more general terrorist threat. States and societies bring their own prisms to measuring and assessing terrorist threats.
world powers, directed toward the deprivation of Russia’s independence, the undermining of her from within, the terrorism that is connected to this [policy], the heating up of internal and adjacent conflicts from without, and what the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, has called the aspiration of some powers to domination in the world.

“The second and biggest threat is that the final destination of the nuclear weapons of practically all countries who have such weapons is against Russia; the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

“The third threat is the presence of powerful armed groupings across the entire perimeter of borders, their approach to Russia. In particular, as a result of expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east its military potential has increased by 20-25%.”

At the same time, the decline in the Russian economy over the past decade and present demographic trends preclude maintaining a mass, industrial army. The RMA is expected to have the greatest impact on those forces intended to conduct theater warfare. They include ground, air, and naval forces committed to the theater and those strategic nuclear and space forces that would support the conduct of theater war and reduce the prospects for horizontal and vertical escalation.

As Russia’s military and political leaders see the evolving geopolitical situation, such escalation can arise primarily from two strategic directions. One such threat would be from the West and would involve some United States-led coalition of forces, including other NATO members’ armed forces, in some conflict on Russia’s periphery, threatening Russia’s vital interests. Another, in the more distant future, would involve possible military action by the People’s Republic of China against the Russian Far East as a result of domestic weakness or a reorientation of Chinese policy toward creating a sphere of influence in that region.

Under Putin, managing these two threats is a matter of realpolitik such as engaging Europe to lessen American influence while avoiding open confrontation. The current cooperation policy with China gains international leverage against the United States and draws China into a cooperative security system for Central Asia. At the same time, the policy, which involves arms sales that will accelerate the modernization of China’s armed forces, runs a grave risk in the mid to long term in case Russia’s domestic political and economic situations prove unable to modernize Russia’s own forces.

The emphasis in military planning and force structure transformation is on warfare fought in theaters on Russia’s periphery where both the levels and imminence of threats define the exact wars the Russian Government expects to fight over the next 15 years. This approach is postmodern because the composition, structure, and organization of those forces negate the Soviet state’s modern military force paradigm. Its features are closer in spirit and content to recent Western works devoted to conducting combined arms theater warfare. With some precision, one can date the beginning of the postmodern era in Russian national security policy and define the nature of those changes. The core event was NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and the air campaign conducted against Yugoslavia during spring 1999. Up to 1999, one can argue that the dominant opinion within the Russian national security elite stressed a window of security that was expected to exist for the next decade or so.

This window of security would guide Russian military reform with regard to its conventional forces. Over the near term, Russia’s conventional forces could limit their preparations for local conflicts on the southern axis of instability. Over the midterm, which Deputy Chair, Defense Committee of the Duma, Aleksei Arbatov describes as the next 10 to 15 years, those forces should be prepared to deal with larger regional conflicts in the south. In the long term, or in the next 15 to 20 years, those forces should prepare for “regional or large-scale conflicts in the south and/or east.” This view provided the foundation for the Russian National Security Concept issued in 1997 that emphasized internal threats to Russian national security. The events in Kosovo—NATO’s decision to conduct military operations against Russia’s advice and in the absence of a mandate from the United Nations (UN) Security Council—transformed the balance of political power within the Russian national security elite and bolstered the case for decisively using Russian military power on its own periphery, even in the face of possible external intervention by the West. The implications of this development were quite profound for Russian national security policy in Eurasia.

Chief of the Russian General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin warned on 15 November 1999 that Moscow sees the possibility that NATO may be willing to use force on the territory of the former Soviet Union, among other places: “Not only the growing military-political activity in the former Soviet Union but [also] the evident attempts to declare these regions a sphere of NATO security interests are alarming. Kosovo and Iraq were the first examples of NATO’s growing readiness to use armed force, and one may therefore expect that other territories, including former Soviet territories, will be no exception.”

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The experience of the last decade of U.S.-led interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia confirms a desire for what might be called no-contact warfare in support of or in preparation for stability and support operations. The same experience suggests a high risk of miscalculation in applying no-contact warfare and an emerging set of countermeasures that can ameliorate the combat advantages of precision strikes in a protracted campaign.

 Putin and the Utility of Military Force

Putin’s rise to power corresponded with a radical deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations resulting from the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia during spring 1999. At that time, Putin served as Secretary of the Security Council and played a prominent role in the Russian response to that crisis. He oversaw a major recasting of Russian doctrine on nuclear first use. In June, he was one of the civilian leaders kept informed of the dash of Russian paratroopers from their bases with the Stabilization Forces to Pristina. During the same period, the Russian Armed Forces mounted its largest exercise in a decade, Zapad-99. This exercise had a distinctly anti-NATO cast and simulated employing nuclear forces to escalate a conflict using nuclear weapons first.

Putin played a prominent role during the incursion of Chechen rebels into Dagestan. Appointed prime minister as the crisis extended into Chechnya, Putin firmly supported a military solution to the crisis and backed the invasion and assault on Chechnya. In the aftermath of bombings within Russia, Putin spoke forcefully for destroying the Chechen bandits and terrorists. He rode his tough stand on Chechnya to victory for progovernment parties in the December Duma elections and his appointment as Yeltsin’s successor. Putin punctuated his own electoral campaign for president with the armed forces’ successful assault on Grozny.

Putin has been ruthless in his prosecution of the Chechen war as seen from the fiery destruction of Grozny, the continued counterterrorist operations against Chechen villages, and the brutality of the so-called filtration camps. Putin handed primary responsibility for the antiterrorist campaign to the Federal Security Service but still has not found a way to bring peace to Chechnya. Even as the Chechen war continues, he retains his popularity. Putin made it very clear what he saw as Russia’s position in the international order—cultivated relations with China as a counter to Western intervention on Russia’s periphery. Outlining the weakness of the Russian economy and the reduced power of the state, he stressed the need to bring about domestic reforms that would strengthen the Russian state to impose order at home and respect abroad. As Yeltsin’s appointed heir, Putin stressed the continuity of his presidency with the policies of Evgeniy

Russia’s inability to forestall NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis undermined the strategic posture of relying on strategic nuclear weapons to secure Russian political interests. . . . The air campaign’s precision strikes raised the prospect of NATO applying a similar intervention strategy against the periphery of Russia.
Primaakov and Yuri Andropov. Putin takes pride in his connections with the security services and has sought his closest advisers from among those who also served in the former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Putin, in short, has proven to be a state-builder and a risk-taker, calculating how various moves will support Russian state interests against the risks involved in following a particular policy line. Putin practices realpolitik. Restrained by a weak hand but willing to take serious risks when vital interests are at stake, Putin fully understands Russia’s weaknesses and has sought ways to become an effective partner of the Bush administration where national interests coincide. But he is willing to act to protect Russian interests where he sees a serious threat.

Putin faced a serious problem in dealing with the new Bush administration; Washington did not see Moscow as a serious player in the new international system. From the new administration’s perspective, it appeared to be an economic, political, and social basket case. During Putin’s election campaign, U.S. President George W. Bush was highly critical of Russia. He denounced Moscow’s actions in Chechnya as well as corruption in Russia and charged Viktor Chernomyrdin with stealing from Western loans to Russia. Shortly before his inauguration, Bush stated that in contrast to former President William J. Clinton, he would not work to make Russia more democratic. During a New York Times interview, Bush stated: “He has pledged to root out corruption. I think that’s going to be a very important part, but it’s his choice to make. That’s the point I’m trying to make. It’s hard for America to fashion Russia.”

Whether Russia became a democracy was a Russian, not an American, problem. In contrast to the Clinton administration, Bush saw no need for a special relationship with Putin. The focus would be on normal state-to-state relations. The problem, however, was that, as Robert Kaiser pointed out, the administration had no policy toward Russia—we have been “posturing.” Before the summit held in Slovenia on 16 June 2001, it appeared to many observers, including Putin, that the Bush administration was not willing to engage Russia on critical bilateral issues such as NATO enlargement and national missile defense.

In the first half-year of the Bush administration, it appeared that neither side could find common grounds for addressing these issues. The conflict over the Bush administration’s push for developing a national missile defense system and Putin’s opposition to scrapping the Antibalistic Missile (ABM) Treaty did not lead to serious negotiations between the parties. Initial signals from Washington, DC, suggested that the new administration was quite willing to move ahead with its plans if Russia proved unwilling to accept national missile defense as a requirement of a new security environment that included efforts by rogue states to procure weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. In no area was this conflict clearer than in Russia’s policy of assisting Iran in nuclear projects and weapon procurement. The United States repeatedly warned Russia of the risks this policy ran for U.S.-Russian bilateral relations. Russian officials denied any existing threat to the international antiproliferation regime and categorized Iran as a stable partner on regional security issues. In December 1999, Sergeev visited Tehran for talks on further military cooperation and arms sales only a month after Putin renounced a 1995 pledge to sell only defensive armaments.

The Bush administration’s unilateralist policies and a growing crisis with China in the aftermath of the collision of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter gave Putin considerable room to maneuver. On national missile defense, he sought to adapt Russian policy to the concerns of West European governments, and he pursued closer relations with China in the Shanghai Five, an organization that proclaimed the ideological unity of its members against the threat of U.S. global hegemony, even as they deepened cooperation in the struggle against ethnic unrest and terrorism in Central Asia.

This situation changed, however, during the Bush-Putin summit held on 16 June 2001 in Slovenia. While substantive differences, such as NATO enlargement and national missile defense, remained unresolved, it was clear that the atmospherics between the two countries had improved considerably. Bush and Putin got along well with each other. Putin stated, “We found a good basis to start building on cooperation, counting on a pragmatic relationship between Russia and the United States.” Bush stated, “I am convinced that he and I can build a relationship of mutual respect and candor.” Each man had come to Slovenia at the end of long journeys. Bush had visited Spain, Brussels, Sweden, and Poland where he addressed key issues of European security—NATO enlargement, U.S.-European Union relations, and the United States’ commitment to continuing its engagement in the Balkans. Putin had traveled to China to attend the meeting of the Shanghai Five, which became the Shanghai Six, and address Sino-Russian cooperation on Eurasian security. U.S.-Russian relations appeared to be an important area for both administrations. Sergeev, now serving as a senior defense adviser to Putin, stated, “I consider this meeting as positive, and I
believe that it will have long-term results."

Whether this meeting would eventually lead to substantive improvements in U.S.-Russian relations remained unclear over the following summer. However, it appears that the first steps were positive and that Bush decided that it would be better to engage Putin wherever possible. On 18 June 2001, Putin announced to the U.S. media that a unilateral renunciation of the ABM Treaty could lead the Russian Government to consider acquiring new ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles.

With the Bush administration’s review of defense policy still in progress and the Quadrennial Defense Review still awaiting completion, U.S.-Russian relations remained in political limbo in the key areas of defense and security policy as the summit ended. The Bush administration began to speak of forging a “new strategic framework” that would shape U.S.-Russian relations. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov expressed Russia’s willingness to discuss a new strategic framework on defense but within the context of clarifying U.S. intentions regarding national missile defense.

However, on the eve of the terrorist attacks, the definition of the new strategic framework remained focused on the security legacy of the cold war. Anatol Lieven, a leading commentator on the post-cold war security environment, warned that U.S. strategic thinking, with its focus on the cold war legacy, retained a strong element of Russophobia. Representative Curt Weldon, Republican, Pennsylvania, proposed a radical redefinition of the framework on 6 September 2001. “I want to create the most comprehensive package we can to engage Russia in a new way.” Weldon noted that his proposal would include “sections devoted to the environment, education, business, finance, health care, the economy, agriculture and defense. . . . But defense isn’t going to be the key because we have to convince the Russian people that we really care about being a long-term partner.” Less than a week later, the idea of a long-term partnership suddenly became more appealing to both the United States and Russia, and security policy had reasserted its importance but not in the context of continuing cold war rivalries. There now appeared to be some grounds for identifying a common enemy in international terrorism in its diverse manifestations.

The Bush administration began mobilizing the nation and forming a broad antiterrorist coalition.
Bush spoke of the struggle in his 20 September 2001 address to the joint session of Congress and the people: “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” In the face of what appears to be a protracted struggle with international terrorism, the United States faced the major challenge of turning international sympathy into building blocks of an antiterrorist coalition.

First Response to Terrorist Strikes

The events of mid-September brought into focus critical policy choices that went beyond initial consequence management, rescue, and recovery. As the Bush administration outlined the political goals and objectives of the newly declared war against terrorism, other states responded. Putin was the first head of state to reach Bush and express his condolences to him and the American people. On 12 September 2001, the Russian envoy voted for the UN Security Council’s unanimous resolution, expressing its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks in New York; Washington, DC; and Pennsylvania and any acts of terrorism, which it called “criminal and unjustifiable.”

At the same time, the Russian Government has been assessing the implications of the global situation for Russia. Given the attention of U.S. policy toward Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and Afghanistan, the Russian Government began a series of conversations with the United States and others. At the meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Council on 13 September 2001, Russia joined as NATO condemned terrorism and pledged to act: “NATO and Russia are united in their resolve not to let those responsible for such an inhuman act go unpunished. . . . NATO and Russia call on the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism.”

One week after the attacks, Putin was deep into bilateral consultation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members from Central Asia. A critical theme of Russian conversations with the United States and West European and Central Asian states has been to define Russian national interests and to tailor a response to the current situation to enhance those interests. Facing militant Islam in the form of Wahabbism in its second Chechen war in the Caucasus and Taliban-supported insurrections in Central Asia, Russia was reeling from the assassination of its close ally, the military leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shab Masood. Masood died at the hands of two suicide bombers who claimed to be associated with Arab International News to gain access to the military commander. Exiled Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani said Masood’s assassination was the work of “Pakistan, the Taliban and alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden.”

The Putin government faces difficult choices in responding to the developing global crisis. On 17 September 2001, Putin made an unscheduled trip to Sochi and telephoned the leaders of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan regarding the crisis. Other Russian officials expressed solidarity with the United States but left the issue of joint military operations open and focused their attention on the deteriorating situation in Northern Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spoke of U.S.-Russian solidarity in the struggle against international terrorism. But later that week, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that any joint Russian-NATO operation in Central Asia was purely speculation. S. Ivanov later announced that the Russian Army’s 201st Division located near the Afghan border in Tajikistan was on high alert. The Russian Government began to show concern over imminent U.S. military operations against Afghanistan.

Emerging Debate Within the Russian Elite

The emerging debate reflected a fundamental conflict within the Russian elites’ world view. On one side, the old hands in international relations and security policy viewed the crisis as one within the international system, understood the dynamics of the current crisis, and recognized the need to find some manner in which Russia could respond and protect its interests. Head of the Council of Defense and Foreign Policy Sergei Karaganov spoke of the need to join the coalition of industrial democracies in combating international terrorism. He called attention to the fact that India had already joined the coalition and that Russia faced possible isolation and loss of ability to influence events. Arbatov, an expert on defense policy, noted the diplomatic security situation that was likely to lead Uzbekistan to support deploying U.S. forces to Central Asia. Arbatov went on to suggest that there were divisions in the Russian elite over joining the United States in any airstrikes against terrorists in Afghanistan.

Retired Russian Army General-Colonel Boris Gromov, now Governor of Moscow Oblast, reflected on his long experience fighting in Afghanistan and emphasized the difficulties of conducting a campaign in such rugged terrain with its diverse and complex ethnic landscape. He warned against mounting any attacks against Afghanistan before the Taliban’s implication in the terrorist acts could be established but called for Russian cooperation with the United States in diplomatic efforts and between
In the first half-year of the Bush administration, it appeared that neither side could find common ground. . . . This situation changed, however, during the Bush-Putin summit held on 16 June 2001 in Slovenia. While substantive differences, such as NATO enlargement and national missile defense, remained unresolved, it was clear that the atmospherics between the two countries had improved considerably. . . . Putin stated, “We found a good basis to start building on cooperation, counting on a pragmatic relationship between Russia and the United States.”

intelligence services. Russia would seek to avoid being a politico-military addendum to any military operations in what it considers its own sphere of influence in Central Asia.  

Member of the State Duma and former Secretary of the Security Council Andrei Kokoshin called the terrorist attacks “a threat to civilization” and warned that the world was already in a state of war. He anticipated subsequent military operations leading to a long-term NATO military presence in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders. He recommended calling “a meeting of the heads of state from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as a legitimate agency to tackle issues of such magnitude.”  

Russian public television anchorman Mikhail Leontyev summed up the bottom line among most of the Russian policy elite: “Russia should participate in the American actions proceeding exclusively from its national interest.”

The events of 11 September 2001 made this shift manifest by demonstrating what many had considered impossible—the United States’ vulnerability to major terrorist attacks by an international terrorist network with its base of power not located in a rogue state but in a failing one being torn apart by civil war and collapsing economically. Major changes in threat perceptions, venues for security cooperation, and a new coalition of the willing became evident. Some commentators have seen these events and the ensuing changes as the beginning of “a bleak new world,” an end of American optimism and the beginning of a new cold war. President of the Foreign Policy Research Institute Harvey Sicherman notes the importance of coalition-building in a war that would be global and irregular. Sicherman draws a distinction between rhetorical support and actually committing blood and treasure to the struggle. In the war against terrorism, a key issue is defining who the terrorists, terrorist organizations, and state sponsors of terrorism are. And that can be a complex political question that lies much in the eye of the beholder, especially when the issue moves from those immediately responsible for a specific attack to a more general terrorist threat. States and societies bring their own prisms to measuring and assessing terrorist threats.

**Eurasian Hostility to the United States**

The second view that emerged among the Russian elite can best be described as conspiracy run
Dugin presented this crisis as a serious threat of nuclear war. Pavlovsky, the guru of the Kremlin and a close ally of Dugin’s in the past, spoke of the advent of new weapons of mass destruction, such as hijacked civilian airliners used for kamikaze attacks, and called them “weapons of a completely new type, comparable in their novelty and revolutionary impact with nuclear weapons.” Pavlovsky proposed that Russia join the struggle against terrorism but not against “Islamic terrorism” and recommended that Russia avoid war: “we must not come under the command of Mr. Bush, who has demonstrated, it seems, to the entire world his incompetence.”

Divergent in their interpretations of the events, these Eurasianists advocated not supporting the United States in the present crisis for a variety of motives. Initially, military opinion, as expressed in the official Russian daily newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, warned the United States “not to throw its military might around and seek to intimidate the rest of the world.”

**Putin’s Choices in a New Geostrategic Situation**

Putin has been pragmatic in seeking to enhance Russian national interests. His relationship with Westerners and nationalists/Communists has been ambiguous. He has used both to his own ends without being captured by their programs. In his immediate response to the crisis, he sought to enhance Russian interests and attempted to define the struggle against terrorism in a manner that would allow Russia to deal with those he defined as terrorists in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Putin used the nationalists’/Communists’ opposition as rationale for not directly cooperating with the United States in the theater of operations while he bargained for the political legitimacy of his claims and for military and political support for his own forces. The pace of developments, however, undermined Russia’s ability to organize a diplomatic political response to military options. Putin’s administration found itself responding to rapidly unfolding events.

Within a week of the terrorist attacks, the Russian media was full of reports on the unfolding U.S. military response, Operation Noble Eagle, as the Russian press misidentified the campaign in Afghanistan, was a subject of hot debate. Russian Internet media, Katypusha, reported on 16 September that forward elements of the U.S. Army’s 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions had already deployed to Pakistan and were on their way to Peshawar, their base of operations. The account then described in
The very war on terrorism has transformed alliance politics. Russia is engaged in the ad hoc coalition of the willing in Central Asia. Its arms and assistance to the Northern Alliance were critical to the campaign against the Taliban. Russia recast the politics of European security by joining NATO in invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in circumstances unforeseen in the 1949 treaty—Europeans rallying to the United States’ defense after it was attacked.

some detail the upcoming ground campaign against bin Laden.\(^46\) On 17 September, the “Information Telegraph Agency of Russia, ITAR-TASS,” reported that the operation could begin within 2 days. Krasnaya zvezda provided an extensive exposition of U.S. force deployments under way to support Operation Noble Eagle. On 18 September, Krasnaya zvezda described Operation Noble Eagle as involving mass cruise missile attacks, followed by rocket and bomb attacks on terrorist bases in Afghanistan, and introducing Special Forces units to locate and eliminate bin Laden and his supporters. It speculated that the operation could start as early as 30 September.\(^47\)

As these reports suggest, Russian leaders were confronting another unilateral U.S. military action adjacent to what it considered to be its sphere of influence. The impact of these events on Russian policy depended very much on the status of U.S.-Russian bilateral negotiations for cooperation. Unless terms could be negotiated in advance to keep the first front within acceptable bounds in terms of time, extent, collateral damage, and adverse effects on Russian interests in the region, the United States faced the prospect of Russian unilateralism—dealing with the Taliban on its own terms in Afghanistan. This unilateralism ranged from giving greater Russian support to the Northern Alliance, to attempting to isolate states of former Soviet Central Asia from the conflict, to disengaging and refusing to cooperate in other theaters of the war against terrorism and overt hostility. Just 2 weeks into the crisis, Putin took what one commentator has described as a “bold move.”\(^48\)

On 24 September 2001, in an address to the Russian people, Putin announced Russia’s support for the war against terrorism. Labeling the attacks as being barbaric, Putin offered Russia membership in the antiterrorist coalition.\(^49\) Putin stated that Russia had long called for a unified effort against international terrorism, had been battling it in Chechnya and Central Asia, and was now ready to actively participate in a multilateral coalition against it: “Russia has not changed its stance. Surely, we are willing now, too, to contribute to the anti-terror cause. As we see it, attention must turn primarily to enhancing the role of international institutions established to promote international security—the United Nations and its Security Council.”\(^50\) On specific cooperation in the Afghan theater of military actions, Putin pledged Russia’s cooperation in five areas:

- Intelligence sharing among security services.
- Allowing air passage over Russian territory for humanitarian cargo to support antiterrorist operations.
- Using their good offices to secure access to airfields belonging to Russia’s allies in Central Asia.
- Engaging Russian forces and facilities in...
international search and rescue operations.

- Maintaining closer relations with and providing greater assistance to the Rabbani government and to Northern Alliance forces.

Putin put Minister of Defense S. Ivanov in charge of coordinating the intelligence sharing and practical cooperation with the antiterrorism coalition. Stating Russian support for the antiterrorism coalition, Putin also addressed Chechnya in a manner that tied the two topics directly to one another: “As we see it, Chechen developments ought not to be regarded outside the context of efforts against international terrorism.” This statement was clearly a marker on the table.

Putin noted the historical peculiarities of the Chechen conflict that made it a distinct part of the struggle against terrorism and then appealed for the misguided and misinformed to lay down their arms: “That is why I call all paramilitaries and self-styled political activists urgently to sever whatever contacts with international terrorists and their organizations; and to contact official spokesmen of federal ruling bodies within 72 hours to debate the following: the disarmament procedure of the paramilitary groups and formations, and arrangements to involve them in peacetime developments in Chechnya. On behalf of federal authority, Victor Kazantsev, envoy plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation to federal district South, which incorporates Chechnya, has been authorized to effect such contacts.” Putin went on to make it absolutely clear that Russia was not joining any anti-Islamic campaign and turned the question around, pointing out that he had met with Russia’s Islamic leaders and that they had proposed organizing an international conference on “Islam Against Terror.”

The next day, Putin traveled to Berlin for an official state visit and addressed the Bundestag. Speaking first in German and then in Russian, Putin stressed the need for Europeans to lay aside cold war stereotypes to cooperate more effectively in the current crisis. He presented a vision of Russia as having been integrated into a new, united Europe. He used the events of 11 September to suggest that, as Russia had been proposing, the world was no longer bipolar but complicated. Failure to build a new security system was the primary cause of those events—failing to read the emerging threats and to act collectively against them. Putin asserts: “I think we [politicians] are all to blame for this, in particular we, the politicians, to whom the ordinary citizens of our countries have entrusted their safety. And is it happening primarily because we still have not managed to recognize the changes that have happened in the world over the past 10 years? We continue to live in the old system of values. We speak of a partnership, but, in reality, we still have not yet learned to trust one another. Despite all the sweet talk, we secretly still resist. Sometimes we demand loyalty with NATO, sometimes we quarrel about the purpose of its enlargement. We still cannot agree on the problems of the missile defense system, and so on and so forth.”

Putin called for the adaptation of post-cold war security structures to meet new threats and put the events of 1999 in Dagestan, Russia, and Chechnya in the context of the global struggle against terrorism. Russia had seen that evil and knew what it took to fight it. Addressing the role that Russia and the other CIS countries play in opposing the advance of drugs, crime, and fundamentalism from Central Asia, Putin embraced the campaign against terrorism: “Of course, evil should be punished—I agree with that. However, we must understand that no retaliation can be a substitute for a comprehensive, purposeful, and well-coordinated struggle against terrorism. In this respect, I fully agree with the U.S. President.” Russian spokesmen were quick to point out that Putin’s move toward the West was not surrender to pressure or a case of diplomatic bandwagoning. As Sergei Butin, an adviser on foreign affairs to the State Duma, pointed out: “This is not a question of our president yielding to the West . . . This is our national interest. Both sides face the same enemy, the same threats.”

Putin did not confine his response just to the venues of the war on terrorism. In mid-October, Putin announced the closing of the electronic intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, and withdrawal from the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Coming on the eve of the Shanghai Summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the announcement provided a context of cooperation that included negating cold war verities. While there was less debate over the wisdom of abandoning Cam Ranh Bay, the decision to abandon Lourdes provoked an intense debate in Moscow. Communists and nationalists joined former intelligence experts and soldiers in criticizing the decision to give up Lourdes. Putin’s former military allies, notably retired Russian Army Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, spoke of abandoning the base as a geopolitical disaster for Russia and as a surrender to the United States. Ivashov cast the decision as political opportunism devoid of geostrategic direction: “Unfortunately, in Russia there is a geopolitical doctrine, but there is no discernible pattern of geopolitical conduct.”

Commentators warned that Putin’s pro-Western course ran the risk of mobilizing a Fabian resistance, one that would avoid a direct confrontation but would seek by sabotage, delay, and obfuscation to undermine the president’s policy over time. More
Krasnaya zvezda described Operation Noble Eagle as involving mass cruise missile attacks, followed by rocket and bomb attacks on terrorist bases in Afghanistan, and introducing Special Forces units to locate and eliminate bin Laden and his supporters. It speculated that the operation could start as early as 30 September. As [this suggests], Russian leaders were confronting another unilateral U.S. military action adjacent to what it considered to be its sphere of influence.

recently, Putin’s critics have been more direct in their attacks on his support for the antiterrorism alliance. Ivashov called Putin’s move toward the West in the wake of 11 September and the war on terrorism a means to further expand American global power at Russia’s expense in Central Asia: “Today a pretext for them appeared, and they have come there. And they have come to stay for a long time, if not forever.”

Other Communist-nationalist critics warned of Russia’s geostrategic encirclement in the aftermath of the Afghan campaign. Dugin, whose web pages carried Ivashov’s criticism of the Putin administration, joined Putin’s opponents and criticized the president for abandoning Eurasianism for Atlanticism. In the wake of the Bush-Putin summit in November 2001, Dugin spoke of “the perspective of civil war in Russia” and warned that the internal enemy had captured Putin. “He is absolutely weak. Now the problem of rescuing Russia is the problem of rescuing the president from this irresponsible, pro-Western, atlantist (sic) elite.” He went on to warn Russian patriots to “be prepared for the worst.”

In the face of this criticism, Putin and his administration have remained solid in their antiterrorist orientation. In Russia’s traditional New Year’s Eve address to the nation, Putin underscored the economic gains that Russia had made in 2001 and noted Russia’s enhanced position in the world as a result of its support for the antiterrorist coalition: “The world has come to view Russia with great trust and respect. It became apparent that Russia’s consistent fight against terrorism was predicated not only on our national interests but a global danger.”

More recently, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stressed the positive nature of the U.S.-Russian cooperation against global terrorism. Because the struggle against terrorism is global, strains in U.S.-Russian cooperation can be expected. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly stated, the war on terrorism will involve more terrorist strikes and a protracted struggle across many theaters. In his State of the Union Address in late January 2002, Bush extended the war on terrorism to include an “axis of evil” composed of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, states the administration accused of seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction: “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of
indifference would be catastrophic.”

While the United States has tried to enlist Russia in its campaign to get these states to abandon their programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, Russia has had a radically different approach to all three states. The dispute came to light at the European Security Conference in Munich in early February 2002. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz warned that the United States would hold the states composing Bush’s axis of evil accountable for their support of terrorism. Minister of Defense S. Ivanov responded that Russia did not consider Iran to be connected to terrorism; Russia has its own list of states sponsoring terrorism, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

As the United States and Russia contemplate their distinct roles in the war on terrorism, we may expect a protracted dialogue over the nature of this conflict, the roles particular states may play, and the further direction of our cooperation. It may be advisable to engage in doctrinal discussions regarding the military art that will be employed to defeat terrorism and insurgency in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other potential theaters. Some Russian analysts claim that U.S. military intervention in Central Asia is but a first step to a permanent presence at the expense of Russian interests in association with a revived “great game” over oil, gas, and pipelines in the Caucasus, Caspian, and Central Asia. Such interpretations rest on a basic assumption of a zero-sum game of influence and power in these regions without addressing the fundamental causes of terrorism.

While Putin’s domestic and foreign policies remain popular with Russians, he faces sustained criticism on his foreign and security policies. In this context, it is important to be mindful of the mid- and long-term environments in which he is functioning. His bold move was based on a long-range calculation of Russia’s need for peace and stability to carry out its own recovery. The current economic revival owes much to the sudden rise in energy prices, which may not continue. The actual situations confronting Russia’s economy and society are desperate, interconnected crises that cannot be quickly or easily solved. Some experts saw the collapse of electric power and centralized heating systems in the Far East last winter as a harbinger of a larger infrastructure crisis that could culminate in a nationwide crisis in 2003. Moscow has become a prosperous, cosmopolitan city where 5 percent of Russia’s population produces 30 percent of the gross domestic product. But other regions, especially the far north and Far East, confront infrastructure collapse, declining populations, and increased environmental risks.

Russian public health is in a state of near collapse. Russian demographics for the past decade show a 3.5-million net decline in population to 145 million in July 2001, even with immigration from former Soviet republics. Projections of population decline over the next few decades are even starker, with optimistic estimates and projections calling for a decline to 122 million by 2025 and pessimistic assessments looking to a steeper decline to under 100 million.

Putin’s campaign for internal order, stronger institutions, and restored great power status fits well within the framework of Russian national traditions when confronted by a time of troubles. But it remains to be seen whether these traditional answers will be effective in addressing the long-term crisis within Russia. The most certain guarantee of successful reform within Russia is a stable international environment and mitigating any challenges to Russian vital interests.

Putin’s overture to the United States in the war against terrorism is solidly grounded in several key assumptions. First, Russia and the United States now face common enemies in the initial round of the struggle against terrorism in bin Laden, the al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. Military and political cooperation in these areas is mutually beneficial. Second, in the Caucasus, terrorism and Islamic extremism provide an international legitimacy to Russia’s own war in Chechnya, even as it offers grounds for seeking negotiations with Chechen nationalists such as President Aslan Maskhadov. Finally, the long-term struggle with terrorism justifies Putin’s domestic stance for a strong central state. In this context, several salient international issues appear in a very different light.

The war on terrorism radically reduces the risks of U.S. unilaterism in abruptly abandoning the ABM Treaty. As the Bush and Putin administrations prepare for a bilateral meeting in St. Petersburg during spring 2002, both sides are presenting draft position papers on strategic arms reductions and the fate of the ABM Treaty and national missile defense. Russia and the United States have common reasons to seek to defuse this issue by some diplomatic device. The risk of rogue states acquiring weapons of mass destruction capabilities underscores the need for cooperation on counterproliferation and defensive measures. On NATO expansion, the very war on terrorism has transformed alliance politics. Russia is engaged in the ad hoc coalition of the willing in Central Asia. Its arms and assistance to the Northern Alliance were critical to the campaign against the Taliban. Russia recast the politics of European security by joining NATO in invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in circumstances unforeseen in the 1949 treaty—Europeans rallying to the United States’ defense after it was attacked. Whether this arrangement survives further tectonic shifts in the international environment remains unclear. But for now Russia and the
United States are bound in a common struggle with a global threat. 

Dealing with Putin’s Russia may not have been the core concern of the Bush administration during its first month in office. By summer 2001, it was quite clear that U.S.-Russian discussions on a new strategic framework were important to both sides. After the events of 11 September, the nature of the challenges before both states became quite clear. A perception of common enemies provided a vital context for a new, post-cold war strategic framework.

MR

NOTES


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71. “Remarks by the National Security Advisor Concludeezza Rice to the Conserv
THE 1993 EDITION of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, expanded its focus to address global social, political, and economic changes brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its publication marked the culmination of a 2-year debate during which the Army examined the implications of the post-cold war era. Including operations other than war (OOTW) into the Army’s operational doctrine was a conspicuous change from previous editions of the manual. The 1993 edition also developed operational- and even strategic-level concepts to support joint contingency operations and by doing so represented a profound change with enormous implications for every facet of Army operations. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 codified—and in some cases established—the basis for changing Army organizations, procurement policies, and training.* However, including operational and strategic discussions and OOTW in the 1993 edition left less space for its traditional discussion of the tactical art—a discussion that, in previous editions, had provided keystone definitions of tactical concepts, terminology, and control measures for the Army’s subordinate doctrinal manuals.

The impact of the lack of definitions for keystone tactical terms in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 soon began to appear. Colonel Ed Thurman, then director of the Concepts and Doctrine Directorate (CADD), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and many others observed the proliferation of nonstandard and nondoctrinal terms throughout the Army in the years that followed FM 100-5’s publication. They observed this problem at home station unit training exercises, collective training center rotations, and Battle Command Training Program seminars and warfighters. Commonly accepted terms lacked common definitions, and draft manuals produced by different U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponents began to reflect small differences in terminology.

Solving this problem required more than just a doctrinal solution since it also affected training and leader development programs. Nevertheless, Thurman saw the development of a tactics manual as the first step to correcting such a problem in a doctrine-based Army. The primary audience for this new manual is commanders and staffs from battalion to corps when operating at the tactical level. . . . Such a manual had not existed since the early 1960s when FM 100-5 stopped being an infantry division-level manual with the development of FM 61-100, Infantry Division Operations.

Manual Development Highlights

The 1994 TRADOC reorganization gave Thurman the chance to divert resources from lower-priority missions to produce a manual that would provide the necessary keystone tactical guidance for the entire Army. Such a manual had not existed since the early 1960s when FM 100-5 stopped being an infantry division-level manual with the

Thurman established a three-man writing team and gave it 6 months to research the development of tactical concepts from the 1940s to the present. CARL greatly assisted in this process because the team could review about 150 obsolete manuals from CARL’s collection. The team also checked selected British, German, and Russian tactical concepts and doctrinal publications. The team found remarkable continuity in American tactical thought throughout the 55-year period, with an occasional surprise—like introducing, in the mid-1950s, the mobile defense as a type of defensive operation.

By August 1995, the team had published an author’s draft of FM 100-40, Tactics. March 1996 saw an initial coordinating draft of the tactics manual. That draft incorporated and integrated staffing comments from the Army major command staffs, TRADOC service schools, and Active and Reserve troop units from more than 100 organizations that respond to the staffing of the author’s draft. The writing team disbanded after the publication of the initial draft, leaving a single author to complete the doctrine-development process.

New CADD director Colonel Clint Ancker replaced Thurman in February 1996. He allowed the initial draft to be published in March although he was not totally satisfied with its organization and content. He wanted to expand the scope of the tactics manual to discuss each type and form of operation, including the minimal control measures necessary to execute the operation; organization of forces; and appropriate planning, preparation, and execution considerations. CADD, now called the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, published and staffed Armywide a revised initial draft in June 1997 because of the scope of the changes. Representatives from CADD, the Armor School, and the
Infantry School, who met at Fort Benning, Georgia, in late October 1997, agreed to changes to FM 100-40 resulting from this third staffing.

**Relationship With FM 3-0, Operations**

A close collaboration between the School of Advanced Military Studies’ FM 100-5 writing team and CADD began shortly after the initial draft of FM 100-40 was published. The initial FM 100-5 writing team took advantage of the existence of a supporting draft tactical manual to reduce the scope of material in FM 100-5. Throughout the subsequent development of both manuals, various doctrinal discussions have migrated between the two manuals. Both organizations have frequently reviewed each other’s work to ensure the two manuals are synchronized and integrated. When the focus of FM 100-5 changed in 1997, publication of a final draft of FM 100-40 was postponed to allow the implications at the tactical level to emerge.

Publication of FM 100-40 was again delayed until after FM 100-5’s approval and publication. In May 1999, FM 100-40 was published as a CGSC student text (ST) for Academic Year (AY) 1999-2000 so that emerging doctrine would be available to students attending the next course. ST 100-40 was also provided to battalion and brigade commander selects in the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth. With more than 1,000 CGSC students having used and commented on ST 100-40 during the AY, CADD decided to consider the ST as a final draft of FM 100-40.

The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine’s decision to adopt the joint manual numbering system caused both manuals to be renumbered. FM 100-5 became FM 3-0, and FM 100-40 became FM 3-100.40. The interdependence between the FM 100-5 writing team and CADD increased as other CADD FMs were added to the integration effort supporting FM 3-0. These manuals include FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations; FM 3-13, Information Operations; FM 5-0, Planning; and FM 6-0, Command and Control.

On 30 June 2000, Lieutenant General Mike
Steele, commanding general, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, chaired a TRADOC pre-Doctrine Review and Approval Group (pre-DRAG) video teleconference that concurred with forwarding FM 3-0 to the Army Chief of Staff through the TRADOC commander for final approval and subsequent publication. CADD prepared a revised final draft of FM 3-100.40 immediately after the FM 3-0 DRAG because 2 years had passed since it was last staffed Armywide. Comments from that staffing were the subject of a conference held at Fort Leavenworth in October 2000.

The DRAG edition of FM 3-100.40 incorporated results from the revised final draft staffing. Like the revised final draft edition, the DRAG edition was widely staffed throughout the Army and posted on the CADD web page. The tactics manual received its last numerical redesignation—FM 3-90—when the new manual numbering system was approved.

**What is the Tactics Manual?**

Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the actions a commander takes to arrange units and activities in relation to each other and to the enemy. FM 3-90 provides the organization of forces; minimum-essential control measures; and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of offensive and defensive combat operation. It is the common reference point for all students of the tactical art within the Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common professional language, a purpose, and unity of effort.

FM 3-90 provides keystone-level tactical doctrine. It introduces those basic concepts and control measures associated with tactics as it applies to offensive and defensive operations. Its companion is FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Neither can be read in isolation. Also, to understand this manual, one must understand the operational-level theory of art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0. The commander should understand how the activities described in FM 3-07 influence offensive and defensive operations and vice versa. He should also understand the plan, prepare, and execute cycle described in FM 6-0 and how that cycle relates to the military decisionmaking process described in FM 5-0. These publications provide the framework for understanding FM 3-90.

FM 3-90 focuses on how battalion through corps commanders conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their supporting tactical enabling operations using the word to define itself. Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure terrain, with its populations and production capacity, distinguishes land forces conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations from air forces and sea forces. FM 3-90 is not prescriptive but authoritative, and its tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of new equipment. However, integrating new equipment and organizations usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. This manual provides combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint capabilities that have shown promise during the Army’s advanced warfighting experiments.

A benefit of the tactics manual is that it reduces the need to have the same tactical-level material in multiple manuals by providing a single-source reference. Therefore, this manual does not repeat tactical enabling operations discussed in other manuals such as information operations (FM 3-13), river-crossing operations (FM 3-97.13), and combined arms breaching operations (FM 3-34.2). A family of subordinate manuals addresses the techniques and procedures a specific type of unit uses at a specific echelon.

FM 3-90 follows the doctrinal hierarchy established in FM 3-0. It has 16 chapters grouped into 4 parts and 5 appendixes. It defines 155 tactical terms. It makes three terms—zone, sector, and coordination point—obsolete because of their redundancy. Zone and sector are redundant with area of operations, and coordination points are redundant with contact points. Part I introduces the art and science of tactical operations, and its key points follow:

- Your opponent is always thinking and wants to beat you.
EMERGING DOCTRINE

Doctrine Hierarchy
Types of Military Operations

Offense
Defense
Stability
Support

and Their Subordinate Forms

Types of Offensive Operations
- Movement to contact
  - Search and attack
- Attack
  - Ambush
  - Demonstration
  - Spoiling attack
- Feint
- Raid
- Exploitation
- Pursuit

Types of Defensive Operations
- Area defense
- Mobile defense
- Retrograde
  - Delay
  - Withdrawal
  - Retirement

Types of Stability Operations
- Peace operations
- Foreign internal defense
- Security assistance
- Humanitarian and civic assistance
- Support to civil defense operations
- Combating terrorism
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Arms control
- Show of force

Types of Support Operations
- Domestic support operations
- Foreign humanitarian assistance
- Relief operations
- Support to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction
- Support to civil law enforcement
- Community assistance

Forms of Support Operations

Types of Enabling Operations
Information Operations
Combat Service Support

Types of Tactical Enabling Operations

- Reconnaissance Operations
  - Zone
  - Area
  - Route
  - Reconnaissance in force
- Security Operations
  - Screen
  - Guard
  - Cover
  - Area (includes route and convoy)
  - Local
- Troop Movement
  - Administrative movement
  - Approach march
  - Road march
- Combined Arms Breach Operations
- River-Crossing Operations
- Relief in Place
- Passage of Lines
- Tactical Information Operations
Mastering the art and science of tactics requires study and training.

There are no checklists; doctrine merely provides a set of tools that the tactician must adapt to meet the needs and conditions associated with a specific situation.

FM 3-90 defines tactical concepts and control measures common to both offensive and defensive operations. It formally introduces the doctrinal hierarchy shown in the diagram. The tactician must understand the basic tactical concept and definitions contained in this chapter and used by military professionals. It further provides additional information to that contained in FM 3-0 on contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operation. The concepts and terms specific to a single type or form of operation are discussed in sections on that particular operation.

Parts II, III, and IV discuss the organization of forces and minimum control measures associated with all types and forms of offensive and defensive operations. They also discuss those tactical enabling operations that are not addressed in separate manuals such as riverine operations or mountain operations. They provide general considerations associated with planning, preparing, and executing these operations.

Part II discusses offensive operations, provides the basics of the offense, and further defines those in FM 3-0. It also discusses movement to contact. Attacks are offensive operations that destroy or defeat enemy forces, seize and secure terrain, or both. Attacks must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that the enemy cannot match; the resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. It further discusses exploitation, a type of offensive operation that exploits success rapidly to disorganize the enemy in depth. Finally, pursuit operations leave the enemy trapped, unprepared, unable to defend, and faced with either surrender or complete destruction.

Part III discusses defensive operations. It first discusses the basics of defensive operations—operations designed to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. It provides additional definitions to FM 3-0. It also describes common defensive scenarios such as defending against airborne and air assault attacks or defending a linear obstacle, perimeter, or reverse slope. It discusses the area defense as a type of defensive operation that uses a mix of static and active measures to deny an enemy force access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than to destroy the enemy outright. The area defense focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing the enemy into an interlocked series of positions from which fires can largely destroy him. It also discusses the mobile defense, which concentrates on destroying or defeating the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. Finally, it discusses retrograde operations and addresses two unique retrograde situations: denial operations and stay-behind operations.

Part IV discusses the conduct of those tactical enabling operations that are not part of separate FMs. Commanders do not conduct tactical enabling operations as independent operations. They conduct them to assist in conducting one of the other four types of military operations. Part IV discusses security operations, including screen, guard, and cover. It also addresses area security and local security operations. It reintroduces the concept of combat outposts into tactical doctrine. Next, it discusses reconnaissance operations in its four doctrinal forms—route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force. It then discusses troop movement—moving troops from one place to another by any available means. Methods of troop movement, conducting administrative movements, tactical road marches, movement techniques, and the approach march, are addressed as well. Finally, it covers how to conduct a relief in place and a passage of lines.

The five appendixes discuss Army branches and tactical echelons, tactical mission tasks, airborne and air assault operations, encirclement operations,
EMERGING DOCTRINE

Part II [of FM 3-90] discusses offensive operations, provides the basics of the offense, and further defines those in FM 3-0. It also discusses movement to contact. Attacks are offensive operations that destroy or defeat enemy forces, seize and secure terrain, or both. Attacks must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that the enemy cannot match; the resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals.

Rear area and base security include the closely related areas of route and convoy security. This appendix provides guidance on resolving command authority with an echelon rear area. The discussion defines threat levels, gives considerations for evaluating the utility of different locations within an echelon rear area, and describes political considerations that apply to conducting operations in an echelon rear area. It describes the organization of forces, control measures, and planning considerations that apply to base defense and route and convoy security while providing additional information on defense beyond defensive operations.

The tactics and supporting techniques and procedures described in FM 3-90 are only starting points for tacticians. They must continue studying military history. They must temper this study and evolve their skills through a variety of relevant, practical experiences. The more experience they gain under a variety of circumstances, the greater their mastery of the art of tactics.

FM 3-90 gives the Army a coherent tactical lexicon and a standard set of basic control graphics. FM 3-90’s publication and use can correct the proliferation of nonstandard and nondoctrinal terms throughout the Army only if leaders at all levels personally use doctrinally correct terminology. They must study current doctrine constantly so they do know that correct terminology.

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IN MAY 1863, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, outnumbered more than two to one by the Union Army of the Potomac, defeated the Union Army in the Battle of Chancellorsville. This victory was a victory of command and control (C2) rather than one of superior numbers. The Confederate commander, General Robert E. Lee, first had to understand the situation, then move to overcome his initial disadvantage, and finally use superior C2 to defeat his opponent. His victory also stemmed from the fact that the defeated Union commander, Major General Joseph Hooker, although he had seized the initiative in the campaign, displayed poor C2. This example illustrates the value of C2 in conducting successful military operations. The U.S. Army’s modern operations and doctrine rely on superior C2 for success.

As part of the emerging doctrine to support U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, the U.S. Army will publish C2 doctrine in the new FM 6-0, *Command and Control*. The decision to publish a separate C2 doctrinal FM was made because U.S. Army C2 doctrine has been relatively sparse in its higher doctrinal literature. The 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, discusses C2 under the heading, “Battle Command,” and only amounts to a few pages. More C2 doctrine may be found in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, but this is still only about eight pages out of more than 200. Consequently, subordinate branch and echelon manuals have had to develop their own definitions and details of C2, leading to multiple versions of C2 doctrine. A committee effectively decided the Army’s C2 doctrine because it lacked a C2 FM to provide details for the concepts in FM 100-5.

Joint Publication (JP) 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*, does not provide C2 doctrine explicitly. Other sources of joint C2 doctrine are JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, but there is not a single authoritative source. Moreover, C2 of land forces has unique requirements that joint doctrine does not address.

The decision to publish a separate C2 doctrinal FM was made because [this area] has been relatively sparse in its higher doctrinal literature. . . . Consequently, subordinate branch and echelon manuals have had to develop their own definitions and details of C2, leading to multiple versions of C2 doctrine. In contrast, other services and armies have published C2 doctrinal manuals. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps have all published their C2 doctrine in separate manuals—Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-8, *Command and Control Doctrine*; Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6, *Naval Command and Control*; and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, *Command and Control*. The British Army has published its C2 doctrine in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 2, *Command*, as has the Canadian Armed Forces in Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 300(3), *Command*.

FM 3-0 recognizes information explicitly as an element of combat power and sets guidelines on the meaning. Central to exercising C2, leaders use information to generate understanding and then use that understanding to make decisions that lead to effective actions. FM 6-0 amplifies those concepts in FM 3-0.

Doctrine must guide the development and use of modern information technologies and their powerful ability to influence the conduct of operations. If not, the technology, or those developing the technology, will require the forces to exercise C2 its way. For example, during development of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), the contractors asked that doctrine be written to label all operation order (OPORD) annexes after F as F1, F2, and F3 because their program did not recognize OPORD annex designations higher than F.
What is in the C2 FM

FM 6-0 provides a common framework for C2 doctrine. This common framework is a common language and defines essential terms to discuss, describe, and develop C2 at schools and centers. It firmly establishes mission command as a C2 concept that best fits the doctrine of full-spectrum operations and uses modern technology to support soldiers. FM 6-0 centers on the commander rather than the staff and focuses on execution rather than planning in the operations process. It further guides schools and centers in their instruction and in their branch and echelon FMs when addressing C2.

FM 6-0 details the concepts from FM 3-0 to make that doctrine useful in application and illuminates how to use information as an element of combat power. It also covers the art of command in some detail and explains that one of the commander’s primary roles is to combine the art and science of C2. FM 6-0 uses the visualize-describe-direct-lead methodology of battle command in FM 3-0 as the commander’s decisionmaking methodology, whether planning in the formal military decisionmaking process (MDMP) or in execution. Finally, FM 6-0 details C2 during the operations process—planning, preparing, and executing operations with assessing throughout.

FM 6-0 synchronizes U.S. Army C2 doctrine with emerging joint and allied C2 doctrine, allowing Army forces to uniquely contribute to joint or multinational operations or campaigns because C2 doctrine now better fits the doctrine of our partners or potential partners. It covers these and other topics in six chapters and six appendixes. The chapters cover command’s nature and art, control’s nature and science, the commander’s role, the C2 system, and how to exercise C2. The appendixes supplement doctrine in the chapters with discussions on the observe-orient-decide-act cycle, information, staff organization and staff officers, staff responsibilities and duties, liaison, and rehearsals.

The New FM 6-0

FM 6-0’s first new concept is mission command. This concept is explicitly new in the Army. We have used mission command a long time without naming it or making it a specific doctrinal concept. Both the Navy and Marine Corps use it, as do the British, the Canadians, the French, the Germans, and others.

FM 3-0 introduces and defines information management (IM) as a contributor to information superiority. FM 6-0 provides doctrine for IM, showing its importance to C2. IM in C2 is one way to use information as an element of combat power. Providing one source of control, FM 6-0 defines IM’s subordinate concepts. A later FM, FM 6-0.6, TTP for CP Operations, will provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for IM.

Army and joint doctrine have not defined control in C2 before, and FM 6-0 now does so. It also identifies the elements of control and gives principles of control to use in applying the elements during operations and when exercising C2. Finally, it discusses forms of control.

Another new part of C2 doctrine is identifying the commander and the C2 system—not command and control—as two separate, distinguishable C2 components. FM 6-0 discusses the commander’s role, emphasizing that he contributes to the art of command, he combines the art and science of C2, and he is the driving force in C2 for all else. It defines the C2 system, shows that it exists to support the commander in achieving effective C2, and shows how its components work together to achieve this support.

FM 6-0 gives doctrinal guidance on digitization’s effects on C2. It discusses digitization and mission command; digitization and IM activities; digitization and exercising C2 during execution; and using digitization to support the art and human sides of C2, thus enabling human potential rather than replacing it. FM 6-0 also provides C2 doctrine during execution. It focuses especially on decisionmaking during execution.

Mission command. Historically, military commanders have employed variations of two basic C2 concepts: mission command and detailed command. Militaries and commanders frequently favored detailed command, but an understanding of the nature of war and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command. FM 6-0 introduces the U.S. Army’s preferred C2 concept as mission command. It defines mission command, gives its components, contrasts it with detailed command, and shows the utility of modern information technologies in applying this concept to operations.

Mission command is conducting military operations through decentralized execution based on
Mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results when subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish their missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Its components are the commander’s intent, subordinates’ initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation.

Mission command provides a commander-centered C2 concept balanced by subordinates’ initiative for decentralized operations. This C2 concept requires the commander to describe his visualization through his intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements so that his subordinates can exercise initiative within his intent. He must also establish an environment of trust and mutual understanding.

IM and information superiority. FM 3-0 introduces information doctrinally as an element of combat power. Through information operations (IO) and IM, FM 3-0 addresses the tasks of directing and coordinating the other elements—maneuver, firepower, and protection. IM contributes to achieving information superiority. This represents a change from the former IO concept, which included the components of IM within IO. While developing FM 6-0, it became evident that information, in general, and IM, in particular, were more appropriately discussed and formulated under C2 doctrine than under IO doctrine.

IM means providing relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form for situational understanding and decisionmaking. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data and information. IM supports the three primary functions of control and the C2 system in supporting the commander. By collecting, processing, and displaying relevant information in the form of a common operational picture (COP), IM helps the decisionmaker achieve situational understanding when he applies his judgment to the COP. With situational understanding and a mission, the decisionmaker can initiate decisionmaking. IM also supports decisionmaking by collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating relevant information.

Finally, FM 6-0 discusses the role IM plays in disseminating the decision using orders and plans to direct actions that implement the decision. Information that does not lead to action through situational understanding and decisions is not relevant; moreover, it may contribute to information overload of the staff or commander.

Digitization and C2. FM 6-0 provides doctrine that guides digitization to facilitate and strengthen mission command. One perception of digitization is that the Army might minimize the art of command by increasing information and providing commanders better, more accurate, and timely information and intelligence, allowing them to rely less on intuition to visualize current and future states. With more accurate information, they would be better able to dictate the terms, location, and tempo of the battle even at lower echelons. This would appear to create tension with mission command.

Digitization does not change the fundamentals of command, and it can increase the effectiveness of decisionmaking and leading. It should allow commanders to devote more time to the art and human sides of command and permit commanders to achieve and use visualization. Modern information systems, such as ABCS, enable mission command. Above all, these systems allow commanders to provide information to subordinates so they can exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. The COP facilitates subordinates’ own situational understanding and conveys their superior commander’s perspective so they can visualize intuitively the effects of their decisions on the higher commander’s operation and accept or mitigate the costs of their decisions. Subordinates have a context within which to assess information they obtain at their level to use to exercise initiative consistent with their superior commander’s intent. As subordinates act on their decisions, information technology allows them to pass information about these decisions to their commander. The commander can monitor the subordinates’ actions and, with his staff, resynchronize operations rapidly with information technology after subordinates exploit the tactical initiative.

FM 6-0 explains how digitization can substantially support the art of command by providing commanders better, more accurate, and timely information. With improved situational understanding, the commander focuses on fewer unknowns, thus allowing him to better visualize the current and fu-
Decisionmaking in execution. FM 6-0 now provides doctrine on decisionmaking during execution using the MDMP methodology and context, but it is influenced by the conditions of execution. As such, it expands on the current doctrine in FM 101-5 that describes the MDMP during planning to produce an order or plan. Many interpreted FM 101-5 as requiring the full MDMP for all decisions regardless of time. FM 6-0 guides commanders during preparation and especially during execution in adapting their operation to emerging conditions rather than attempting to retain a plan that may no longer reflect reality. In other words, fight the enemy, not the plan, a current practice at the combat training centers.

Decisionmaking during execution is often very rapid, even split second, and it may not always follow a formal process. It depends on assessing progress to identify variances in how the commander visualizes the expected progress. If the variances are within acceptable limits, then the operation can continue with branches and sequels and with critical continuing functions of execution discussed in FM 6-0. If variances are too great, the commander must determine if the variances (or their forecast results) present an opportunity for greater success or are a threat to the mission or force. In either case, the commander must adjust his decision.

If the variance presents an opportunity, the decision should take advantage of it by seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. If the variance is a threat, the commander adjusts his decision to bring the operation back in line with expectations. Given the importance of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative in execution-focused operations, FM 6-0 provides doctrine for attaining these goals during stability operations and support operations as well as during offense and defense.

Emphasis on art and humanity. FM 6-0 emphasizes the human and art aspects of C2 as being more important than the material or technological ones. It elaborates on using the visualize-describe-direct-lead methodology of battle command described in FM 3-0. Visualize-describe-direct is the commander’s contribution to decisionmaking in the art of command, and lead is how he brings the leadership element of combat power into operations.
As a result, FM 6-0 replaces the terms “battlefield visualization” and “commander’s estimate” in doctrine with the term “commander’s visualization” to capture how the commander combines the art of C2 with the science represented by the MDMP. The term carries the same definition as “battlefield visualization.” It is the key by which the commander combines the art and science of C2, and it is the core mental process that supports his decisionmaking.

The commander uses it both in planning and during execution.

The emphasis on the human and art aspects of C2 also includes considering leadership, although not repeating the doctrine covered in FM 22-100, Leadership. However, FM 6-0 does emphasize certain aspects of leadership doctrine that apply particularly to command as well as differences between commanders and other leaders in how they apply leadership doctrine.

Control. Neither joint nor Army doctrine has defined control within C2 officially. FM 6-0 now defines it as “the regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Control includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating information for creating the common operational picture (COP) and using information, primarily by the staff, during the operations process.”

Control consists of three elements. The most important is information. The other two are communication and structure. It provides three basic functions in C2. Control helps decisionmakers achieve situational understanding, it supports decisionmaking, and it disseminates decisions as execution information. Principles of control guide how to employ the elements to accomplish the functions of control.

The C2 system is the component of C2 that provides control functions. The commander also provides some control but only for selected, critical purposes, times, and places in which he must collect or disseminate information personally. Because the staff is a primary part of the C2 system, staff doctrine has been included in FM 6-0 from FM 101-5.

Historical vignettes. FM 6-0 uses historical vignettes to illustrate or emphasize essential points in doctrine. Not all of these points are contemporary accounts, but C2 is not new. Doctrine must not only be modern in terms of concepts, materiel, and procedures, but it must also meet the test of time. For example, the manual uses General Ulysses S. Grant’s letter to General William T. Sherman for the campaign of 1864 to illustrate the environment of trust and mutual understanding necessary for command in general and mission command in particular.

The encirclement of the Ruhr expands on another historical vignette in FM 101-5, Field Order 18, VII Corps, which initiated a six-division coordinated attack from the Remagen Bridgehead to encircle the Ruhr. The field order consisted of three typewritten pages, an operations overlay, an intelligence annex, and an artillery annex. These vignettes contrast powerfully with the misuse of modern word-processing capabilities to produce OPORDs of hundreds of pages.

Digitized, analog, and hybrid units. FM 6-0 provides C2 doctrine that supports digitizing and transforming Army forces. However, for the life of the FM, it also provides doctrine for legacy forces and the hybrid forces that have not yet completed digitization. This also provides doctrine for operations with potential coalition partners who may not have achieved the same level of digitization that U.S. Army forces have.

FM 6-0 provides doctrine on C2 for Army operations and full-spectrum operations. It applies across offense, defense, security, and stability and is fully compatible with its associated operational framework of decisive, shaping, and sustainment operations. FM 6-0 provides a common framework to use in developing branch and echelon manuals and TTP for C2. It also incorporates the latest guidance for transforming Army forces to remain relevant for legacy forces, interim forces, and the Objective Force.

NOTES

10. FM 6-0.

FM 1-02/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12A

FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, is being revised based on the publication of FM 1, *The Army*; FM 3-0, *Operations*; other field manuals; and changes to Department of Defense (DOD) Military Standard (MS) 2525, *Common Warfighting Symbolology.* The manual will reflect changes in relevant joint terminology in accordance with the April 2001 revision of Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Since this is a dual-service manual, written with U.S. Marine Corps collaboration, the Marine Corps will also provide new terminology and updated definitions.

The new version no longer constitutes the proponent manual for definitions. Rather, it is a compilation of selected definitions from other manuals, which are the formal proponents for the terms in FM 1-02. Only one manual will be the proponent for any particular term. If a joint definition is applicable to the Army and the Marine Corps, it will be included and noted as a joint term. If, however, an Army or Marine Corps definition differs from an existing joint definition, the joint definition will be cited along with the service definition. Where the Army and Marine Corps definitions differ, both will be included. The definitions included in FM 1-02 are Army- and Marine Corps-specific; if Webster’s dictionary defines a particular term, it will not be included. An updated list of approved acronyms and abbreviations with their explanations will also be included.

As for symbology, the September 1997 FM 101-5-1 reflects the new DOD MS 2525A, based on which affiliation shapes changed for enemy (diamond), expanded to include neutral (square) and unknown (trefoil), but did not change for friendly (rectangle). Modifiers for the symbols are unchanged. Graphics in DOD MS 2525A have remained largely unchanged from the October 1985 FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols.* The current revision will include additional information on building symbols and using graphics. Moreover, a new version of DOD MS 2525B has been approved and includes symbology changes dealing with stability operations and support operations that will be reflected in FM 1-02.

FM 3-06

FM 3-06, now being disseminated to the Doctrinal Review and Approval Group (DRAG) for review, discusses major Army operations in urban environments. It updates and replaces the previous urban operations doctrine, FM 90-10, published 22 years ago. FM 3-06 provides a keystone urban operations doctrine and incorporates changes in joint and Army doctrine and organization since the last edition. It also records changes in the National Security
Information-age developments, coupled with a revolution in military technology, have profoundly influenced the depth, breadth, and height of today’s battlefield. The capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver are maximized by effectively using the electromagnetic spectrum. Exponential improvements of targeting capabilities occur almost daily in the technological age.

late Army input. CADD then staffed the concept paper through U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools and centers to solicit input and comments. The concept paper and comments provided the framework for FM 3-06. Urban environment—complex terrain, concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems—is the operational environment in which Army forces will operate. It may be the predominant future operational environment. FM 3-06 is intended for senior leaders and their staffs at the brigade through corps levels, and it addresses the full spectrum of operations, both violent and nonviolent, that Army units will execute in urban settings.

The organization of FM 3-06 is simple and demonstrates how to apply the doctrinal principles in FM 3-0 to this unique environment. It consists of eight chapters, with the first half providing general doctrine that applies to all urban operations. It provides theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations that serve as a basis for the rest of the manual. Next, it discusses the characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on operations. FM 3-06 also discusses the media’s impact and the nature of the urban threat. It then discusses the potential costs of urban operations and the effects on each of the battlefield operating systems (BOS) that each commander must consider. It also outlines an urban operational concept and specific urban considerations that create the necessary framework for applying operational doctrine in an urban environment.

The second half of FM 3-06 discusses how to conduct urban operations. Urban operations include major offensive and defensive operations in cities, and stability and support operations ranging from peace operations and combating terrorism to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. For each type of operation—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—the purpose, characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed separately. However, commanders must remember that most urban operations will involve some aspect of all four types of operations, although one may dominate for a period, and plan accordingly. Each urban operation will be distinct because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation, and various geopolitical considerations. Commanders must also consider urban operations’ effects on noncombatants more intently.

FM 3-06 provides the analytical tools needed to evaluate an urban operation and determine its necessity for mission success. It also provides the means to understand and determine how the urban environment impacts military operations and provides information on managing, taking advantage of, and mitigating the effects of those impacts.

**FM 3-07**

FM 3-07 is also a keystone doctrinal manual that replaces four previous manuals. It updates FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, and consolidates doctrine found in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*; and FM 90-29, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*. It incorporates terminology and concepts currently contained in FM 3-0, specifically amplifying chapters 9 and 10. FM 3-07 is conceptual, aiming more at a broad understanding than at details of operations. Other joint and Army publications contain details such as TTP. FM 3-07 is being disseminated to the DRAG for review.

Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national security by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operating environment through peacetime cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crises. Stability operations can range from cooperative actions, such as security assistance, to coercive operations such as peace enforcement. The overarching purpose of these operations is to promote and sustain regional and global stability.

Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. During support operations, Army forces provide es-
sentential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. Support operations are designed to meet designated groups’ immediate needs for limited periods of time until civil authorities can function without Army assistance.

**FM 3-16**

FM 3-16 focuses on Army units participating in multinational operations, but much of the material will be generic enough for any nation participating in multinational operations with the U.S. Army to use. It supports the Army as either a multinational headquarters or a multinational member nation.

FM 3-16 is being revised as an initial draft and incorporates material from FM 100-8 and the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook (COH) while eliminating duplication of JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. The ABCA COH was originally written and published for the ABCA Armies' Program. The handbook was developed based on an ABCA Exercise Cascade Peak 1996 tasking that was a Battle Command Training Program warfighter exercise for I Corps. The COH also supported an ABCA lessons learned requirement that NATO was not working on. The Australian Joint Deployable Task Force tested it in November 1998 during ABCA Exercise Rainbow Serpent in Brisbane, Australia, and the Australian Joint Deployable Task Force then used it at the International Force East Timor headquarters during actual operations. The United Kingdom further tested it in May 2000 at the ABCA Seminar Focus 2000 in preparation for revising the COH and publishing a second version.

FM 3-16 will contain general information on important topics that are necessary to conduct multinational operations. Additionally, it will provide questions that multinational headquarters or multinational partners need to ask to improve the multinational force’s efficiency and effectiveness to accomplish its assigned mission. The questions will appear at the end of each chapter following the general information. The information is presented in a format that corresponds to a headquarters staff.

**FM 3-52**

FM 3-52 has been approved, and publication is expected shortly. The manual will update interim Army airspace command and control (A2C2) doctrine from a 14-year-old manual based on joint airspace control doctrine developed since the last FM. It also replaces FMs 100-26, 100-28, and 100-42.

Information-age developments, coupled with a revolution in military technology, have profoundly influenced the depth, breadth, and height of today’s battlefield. The capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver are maximized by effectively using the electromagnetic spectrum. Exponential improvements of targeting capabilities occur almost daily in the technological age. Although extending the area of operations has evolved throughout the history of warfare, space and airborne platforms have improved the commander’s abilities to visualize the battlespace, target the enemy, and process and distribute information beyond any 20th-century expectations. Twenty-first-century technologies have placed increasing demands on using airspace. Airspace has become a crucial resource with
increasing numbers and types of airspace users that the combat commander must manage efficiently. A2C2 provides the necessary command and control (C2) structure to effectively use airspace. FM 3-52 describes the doctrinal principles and fundamentals for organizing, planning, and using airspace.

**The September 1997 FM 101-5-1 reflects the new DOD MS 2525A [symbology], based on which affiliation shapes changed for enemy (diamond), expanded to include neutral (square) and unknown (trefoil), but did not change for friendly (rectangle).**

Beginning with the fundamentals of airspace management at the joint level and working through A2C2 management at each echelon of command, FM 3-52 is both a primer for airspace users and a primary reference for A2C2 staff planners. It provides the guidance to allow planners to identify, integrate, coordinate, and regulate the Army’s use of airspace, focusing on how the Army uses airspace in planning and executing the commander’s intent.

The Army’s requirement to effectively control and exploit airspace validates the fact that airspace is the terrain flight dimension. Coordinating and integrating airspace use is a force multiplier; it ensures that all BOS are available to positively affect the course of the battle. Additionally, effective airspace management and control enhance force-protection measures, minimize the risk of fratricide to airspace users and ground combat units, and increase overall force effectiveness. Within its five chapters and three appendixes, FM 3-52 overviews airspace C2 doctrine, A2C2 fundamentals, functional elements, procedural control measures, and A2C2 connectivity. It covers A2C2 messages, reports, and overlays; A2C2 tasks; and the Tactical Airspace Integration System in the appendixes.

**FM 3-91**

The final draft of FM 3-91 has been completed and released for comment with a target publication date of September 2002. The manual will be the first echelon manual that references doctrine from FM 3-0 and FM 3-90, Tactics. Readers must understand these manuals to effectively understand and use FM 3-91. This draft also combines the TTP from five 71-100 manuals, thereby eliminating the need for the other manuals. The draft still addresses TTP specific to different divisions; however, referencing common doctrine and terms in FM 3-91 omits redundancy.

The manual’s format is consistent with the Army operations process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. The operations process forms the outline for the chapters as well as FM 3-0’s operational framework and battlefield organization. FM 3-91 also includes chapters on C2, fundamentals of division operations, and offensive and defensive operations.

FM 3-91 further discusses what divisions should consider when tasked with conducting full-spectrum operations. Two new chapters discussing stability operations and support operations are included, as are appendixes on Army transformation, interim brigade combat teams, an Army forces division, heavy/light operations, airborne/air assault operations, and force projection and sustainment. FM 3-91 is written for staff officers from any division. By covering all types of divisions with one manual, staff officers will be able to understand and use various units within the division as well as select corps assets.

**FM 5-0**

FM 5-0 is a revision of the May 1997 FM 101-5-1. The initial draft has been distributed to the field for comment and is being revised for final draft. Army planning processes for the next 14 years must meet the needs of all units, from analog to digitized. Because of these requirements, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) will not change drastically. However, this revision will visit TTP that may apply to future digitized units. The revision does not address staff organization as the current version does. Staff organization and responsibilities now appear in the new FM 6-0, Command and Control. FM 6-0 better aligns the staff with the manual for the commander.

There are two additions to the revised FM 5-0. First is a chapter on problemsolving techniques that are no longer taught in the programs of instruction at Army schools. Currently, the U.S. Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the only school that teaches these techniques. The Army does require a reference manual for analytical problemsolving techniques. FM 5-0 will be the standard for routine problem planning and decisionmaking as well as operations and orders production planning.

The second addition is troop-leading procedures (TLPs). Leaders inherently use TLPs in their intuitive decisionmaking and commander’s vision. FM 5-0 establishes an Army standard for TLP on which other doctrine centers can base additional details for TLPs that are specific to their branches and echelons. TLPs are taught to small-unit leaders throughout the Army for decisionmaking at levels where
the commander has no assigned coordinating staff.

FM 5-0 incorporates some of the efficiencies to the MDMP found during Army digitization. In August 2000, the Army received a request for required functionality changes to the MDMP that occurred as a result of digitization. CADD and the Battle Command Battle Lab, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, are working together to compile the results. Enhancing situational understanding through a shared common operational picture is leading this digitized effort. Because of the common operating picture and whiteboard/videoteleconferencing capabilities, collaborative planning among commanders and staffs will speed up the MDMP. Additionally, parallel planning among different levels of staffs will be greatly enhanced.

**FM 7-15**

FM 7-15 is a comprehensive listing of tactical level of war tasks that describe the Army’s contributions to the joint force commander’s capabilities tasks and is being revised into the DRAG edition. It is subordinate to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04B, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).* TRADOC developed the Army universal task list (AUTL) as a comprehensive listing of Army tactical-level tasks and functions in response to a UJTL tasking. The AUTL—

- Provides a standard structure of tasks and functions, including their definitions and reference codes, that Army units and staffs perform at the tactical level.
- Articulates what the Army does to accomplish missions. It does not describe how success occurs. It applies to all four types of military operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support.
- Serves as a reference that commanders at all tactical echelons—company, troop, battery, to corps—can use in developing their unit mission-essential task lists.
- Relies on the UJTL to define tasks and functions Army elements perform when operating at the operational or strategic level.
- Defines the seven BOS prescribed in FM 3-0.
- Provides measures of performance for each task from which standards can be developed given the applicable factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians.

The AUTL provides a doctrinally sound common language and reference system for doctrine, combat, and training developers. It also provides a basis for establishing Army Training and Evaluation Program mission training plans.

The AUTL contains only tactical-level tasks. It does not include tasks Army forces perform as part of joint and multinational forces at the operational and strategic levels. Tactical-level operations involve units, task forces, and staffs as they conduct—plan, prepare, execute, and assess—operations that accomplish tactical military objectives. Each AUTL task is individually numbered to reflect its placement in the structure and appears only once. This provides a standard reference system for addressing and reporting requirements, capabilities, or issues. Tasks within the AUTL can link horizontally to other tasks within one or more BOS. For example, an armored cavalry troop conducting a movement to contact requires the troop to execute tasks from all BOS. These horizontal links synchronize tasks in space and time based on the concept of operations.

Many AUTL tasks have parallel tasks for other levels of war in the UJTL. For example, an airborne battalion conducting the tactical activities associated with preparing for overseas movement is vertically linked to operational-level, force-projection operations. These vertical task links connect tactical, operational, and strategic operations. However, tactical land power’s contributions to joint military power are unique in some cases and do not necessarily link one for one with operational- and strategic-level UJTL tasks.

The format of the AUTL divides the seven BOS into more specific tasks. At the upper levels, the AUTL provides a concise picture of the major activities of a force. At lower levels, it provides increasingly greater detail on what the force must do to accomplish its mission. In all cases, the list of subordinate tasks, if applicable, further elaborates on a task’s definition.

Each task appears only once within the AUTL. Subordinating a task within the AUTL has no relationship to a task’s importance. That importance is always situationally dependent. In like manner, task subordination does not imply either command or
staff oversight. A task appears in the location that depicts its most common relationships if there are multiple locations where a task could doctrinally be placed. While some functions from different BOS resemble one another, their definitions clearly distinguish them.

FM 7-15 has two parts divided into 12 chapters. Part one, with five chapters, addresses tactical actions, missions, and operations. The Army tactical missions abbreviate these tactical actions, missions, and operations. Part one provides a generic hierarchical listing of the tactical missions for each type of Army operation. The tasks and functions associated with these missions apply across branches and proponents. Each type of operation has its own chapter, addressing the offense, the defense, stability operations, and support operations. Tactical mission tasks describe the results, or effects, the commander wants to achieve—the what or why of a mission statement. These tasks have specific military definitions, and tasks are often given to small units as the task or purpose part of their mission statements. All tactical actions, missions, and operations in part one are executed using two or more of the seven BOS defined in part two.

Part two defines the seven BOS and defines and provides measures of performance for the subordinate Army tasks of each BOS. The BOS are the physical means tactical commanders use to execute the operations defined in part one and accomplish the missions superior tactical- and operational-level commanders assign. The BOS group relates tasks according to battlefield use. Each BOS has its own chapter:

- Intelligence.
- Maneuver.
- Fire support.
- Air defense.
- Mobility/countermobility/survivability.
- Combat service support.
- C2.

The six tactical task areas established in the UJTL do not reflect how the Army has traditionally organized its physical means—soldiers, organizations, and equipment—to accomplish tactical missions.

The UJTL defines environmental conditions a force might experience. These environmental conditions may affect task performance. Some conditions describe civil considerations such as host nation support, others describe the military environment such as the United States having air superiority, while still others describe the physical environment. Conditions help frame the differences or similarities between assigned missions when linked to tactical tasks. Because conditions for joint tasks are the same as conditions for Army tasks, the AUJT does not address them. Users should refer to the UJTL for condition statements. MR

NOTES


4. DOD MS 2525.


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On 14 June 2001, the U.S. Army released its new operations manual, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. This edition supersedes the 1993 edition of FM 100-5. It is number 14 in a series of Army field service regulations dating back to 1905 that provide basic operational doctrine for Army forces. FM 3-0 complements and expands on the Army doctrine contained in FM 1, The Army, also released on 14 June 2001. As the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual, FM 3-0 establishes a foundation for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in other Army manuals.

Publishing both of the Army’s top-end doctrinal manuals is not only unusual it is also unique. Typically, the revision and publication of FM 1 and FM 3-0 proceeded independently and out of cycle, as was the case with publishing FM 100-5 in June 1993 and FM 100-1 in June 1994. This time, however, the coincidence of Army transformation, ongoing joint doctrine revision, and the decision to rewrite FM 100-5 precipitated a major doctrinal shift. FM 1 and FM 3-0 herald a top-to-bottom revision of Army doctrine that supports Army transformation. This revision is already well under way with the first of the supporting doctrinal publications, FM 3-90, Tactics, appearing in July 2001. Additional supporting publications, such as FM 6-0, Command and Control, and FM 3-13, Information Operations, are nearing completion. FM 3-06, Urban Operations; FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations; FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; and FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, are in draft for Armywide staffing. Similar efforts are under way to rewrite FM 1-0, Personnel; FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations; FM 4-0, Combat Service Support; and FM 7-0, Training the Force. With this magnitude of doctrinal shift under way, this article places FM 3-0 in context and provides some insights into not only the doctrine contained in FM 3-0 but also why it has changed and the significance of the change. It examines the major conceptual changes in the doctrine.

Whether one fully embraces the changes to Army keystone doctrine or not, comparing the new FM 3-0 with previous editions reveals a major shift in Army doctrine, arguably as significant as adopting AirLand Battle in 1982. Changes in content and context bear this out. This is the first edition of the operations manual to appear under the aegis of a mature and authoritative joint body of doctrine. For the first time, it defines Army mission-essential tasks lists (METLs), the operational expression of the Army core competencies found in FM 1. Additionally, FM 3-0 recognizes a profound shift in the operational environment and examines the increased complexity of modern operations from that perspective. In consonance with Army transformation, FM 3-0 recognizes that Army forces must be strategically responsive, not just deploying faster. To a greater degree than almost any doctrine since the Korean war, this doctrine is offensive, stressing operations that are more nonlinear and simultaneous. It discusses and illustrates operations conducted throughout expanded and noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs).
Army operations are full spectrum, spanning decisive action in major theater war, peacetime military engagement, and domestic support activities. FM 3-0 is commander focused and expands the importance of battle command—the ability to visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess operations. Information technologies powerfully influence how commanders conceptualize the battlespace, how they plan and operate, and how they engage adversaries. The manual retains and restates hard-won lessons from 226 years of Army experience, revising and reapplying them in old and new ways. So, while it represents a significant shift in doctrine, it would be wrong to label the new edition as being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, some question the timing and argue that it may have been better for the Army to wait for the new administration’s defense review results.

It is illuminating to review where the Army has been since FM 100-5 appeared in 1993. Following Operation Desert Storm, force projection and major regional contingencies against conventional threats were paramount strategic planning considerations. Hurricane Andrew relief efforts in south Florida had just ended. The Soviet Union dismembered itself in late 1991 and early 1992, but the extent to which that superpower’s military power would devolve remained unknown. In late 1992, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia had yet to deteriorate. And the Army was in the midst of a massive reduction from its peak cold war strength. While the 1993 version was prescient in its emphasis on force projection and battle command, it could not envision the events in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, central Africa, and other contingencies. Nor could the doctrine authors foresee the astonishing advances in information technology or the degree to which U.S. conventional forces would dominate the military environment following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Clearly, doctrine developed to fight against Soviet forces or surrogates was obsolete at best, completely outdated at worst.

The new operations manual postulates no single threat. Rather, it describes a range of threat characteristics and likely modus operandi. The unifying theme emerging from discussion is that U.S. adversaries are neither stupid nor complacent. They recognize that joint U.S. forces will dominate any conventional engagement unless they can find ways to nullify or bypass our strengths. Thus, FM 3-0 discusses asymmetry, urban operations, the continued threat of weapons of mass destruction, and the two-way street of technology. These ideas will drive the way we present potential adversaries in exercises and training. But there is a larger impetus evident in the manual’s tone. The U.S. Army is now the premier land force in the world; its capabilities present almost insuperable challenges to any opponent. Consequently, this is a fundamentally offensive doctrine, and that is captured immediately in the foreword written by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: “Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few ‘rules of thumb.’ First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend well, but you win on the offense. Next we want to initiate combat on our terms—at a time, in a place, and with a method of our choosing. Third, we want to gain the initiative and retain it—never surrender it if possible. Fourth, we want to build momentum quickly. And finally we want to win—decisively.”

In his study of the process and outcome of the work to revise FM 100-5, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) historian John Romjue characterized the 1993 book as “doctrine for the post-cold war world.” The new FM 3-0 captures the experiential period of the intervening years. It is not cold war doctrine, nor is it even post-cold war doctrine. This is new. This is doctrine for an Army in the midst of transforming to a strategically responsive, full-spectrum force; one that is meeting today’s deterrence, engagement, and support missions; and one that is ready, when necessary, to fight and win—decisively.
proved systems, and some are receiving suites of improved command and control (C2) equipment. But for the most part, they are familiar organizations whose designs and purposes trace back through the cold war to World War II. This force is hardly obsolete; it makes up the Army’s principal striking power and provides the conventional hedge against the outbreak of major theater war.

The second force is much more extensively modernized—the so-called digitized force. These units are just beginning to reach war readiness after years of experimentation. Although still maturing, they already demonstrate capabilities that change the tactical nature of operations. Finally, the interim force appeared in the inventory. This force is entirely new and represents the first Army formations designed for the complex operational environment of the early 21st century. FM 3-0 provides the doctrine that is suited for these forces; even so, it also looks ahead. Even as it captures how we do things now, FM 3-0 pulls the Army toward Objective Force operations.

The latter point is important. Although it is forward looking, FM 3-0 is not doctrine for the Objective Force. The combination of immediate relevancy and forward focus circumscribes its shelf life. It will serve the Army only until its successor addresses advanced operations conducted by objective forces. Today’s edition addresses operations conducted by less modernized forces, modernized and digitally enhanced forces, and interim forces. But it also introduces operational concepts that herald capabilities that only the most modernized Army units may exploit. In so doing, it pulls the entire force toward Objective Force operations—operations that will feature extraordinarily versatile and lethal forces with future combat systems, extremely advanced C2 systems, and a degree of joint integration well beyond that possible today.

Together with FM 1, FM 3-0 initiates a doctrinal numbering system that parallels the joint doctrine numbering convention. Aside from the obvious ease with which joint and Army planners can refer to supporting doctrine, this signifies the Army’s maturing role in joint operations. This edition of the Army operations manual is the first written to support an authoritative and mature body of joint

Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy. During offensive and defensive operations, the certainty of destruction may persuade the enemy to yield. In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions.
doctrine. More important, it is written from the position that Army forces act as part of a joint force, neither more nor less important than the other services’ forces. The manual states: “Army forces may be the supported force for some portions of a joint operation and be the supporting force in others.” FM 3-0 describes Army forces in unified action—the part of the joint forces that often includes mul-

tinational forces and interagency elements. It recognizes that Army forces are an indispensable component of most joint forces and will be the decisive component of sustained land warfare. But it does not, as in the past, proceed from an underlying assumption that Army units are the sole basis of decisions made within a campaign. Implicit in the Army’s maturing as a component of a joint force is that this relationship is mutually complementary. Army forces depend on the other services for enablers necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations just as the other services require Army forces to realize the full potential of joint operations. While FM 3-0 is indisputably about Army operations, it still recognizes and affirms the enduring qualities of land forces. The manual states, “Army forces make permanent the otherwise temporary effect of fires alone.”

The Army METL provides the operational expression of the Army core competencies discussed in FM 1. The Army METL includes shaping the security environment, responding promptly to crises, mobilizing the Army, conducting forcible entry operations, dominating land operations, and providing support to civil authorities. Framing the Army’s fundamental contributions to national security as mission-essential tasks permits FM 3-0 to establish the link from operations to Army force responsiveness and hence to training. For the first time, the operations manual states that units focus their training on warfighting tasks unless a senior commander—three-star or higher—directs otherwise.

A theme initiated in discussing Army METL and carried forward is Army forces’ need to close with and destroy the enemy. FM 3-0 emphasizes the complementary nature of fires and maneuver and reiterates that relationship. It contains an interesting discussion of the element of combat power: “All tactical actions inevitably require seizing or securing terrain as a means to an end or an end in itself. Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy. During offensive and defensive operations, the certainty of destruction may persuade the enemy to yield. In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions. In all cases, the ability of Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a situation.”

FM 3-0 moves beyond war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) to the complex challenges of today’s operating environment. It establishes full-spectrum operations as a flexible means of conceptualizing what the Army does during peace, conflict, and war. Every operation is a combination of the following types of military operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Offensive operations are decisive; they destroy or defeat an enemy. Their purpose is to impose U.S.
will on the enemy and win—decisively. Defensive operations defeat an attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop favorable conditions for offensive operations. Stability operations include such activities as peace operations, noncombatant evacuation, and foreign internal defense. Stability operations also address the vital role that Army forces play in peacetime military engagements to improve international relationships and moderate factors that could explode into crises. Support operations describe how Army forces respond to disaster and domestic requirements, the latter in support of civil authorities.

Examined individually, these types of operations are not new. What is new is recognizing that, increasingly, these operations are interrelated and make up land operations. Versatile, adaptive Army forces combine and transition between and among these operations throughout a campaign, major operation, or other mission.

Offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations are not intended to supplant war and MOOTW at the operational level. Rather, FM 3-0 defines a range of operations that Army forces conduct to support a joint campaign. It captures the requirements of today’s land operations where there is no clear demarcation between war and MOOTW. For Army forces, credibility in peacekeeping operations stems first and foremost from the potential enemy’s certain conviction that the U.S. Army would defeat them if the situation resulted in combat. Conversely, Army forces may conduct a major offensive operation within which designated Army forces support displaced civilians and local populations. In this respect, doctrine reconciles operational experience with the conceptual basis for envisioning and teaching land operations. Consequently, both Army doctrine and transformation plans stress the requirement for Army forces to transition rapidly and effectively between types of operations to maintain the momentum of the campaign.

Army doctrine addresses full-spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict as shown in Figure 1. Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW. For each mission, the joint forces commander (JFC) and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagements (PMEs).

The complex nature of ground operations today requires a more flexible battlefield organization than the cold war construct of close, deep, and rear operations. FM 3-0 provides a purpose-based battlefield organization that uses decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. This permits our view of operations to accommodate increasingly simultaneous and nonlinear operations conducted in greater depth than ever before in noncontiguous AOs.
Army forces. In adapting a purpose-based framework, FM 3-0 retains the older deep, close, and rear organization but assigns them strictly spatial qualities in terms of areas. Deep, close, and rear areas help commanders describe where shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations may occur, particularly in operations characterized by linear action and contiguous AOs.

Strategic responsiveness is a primary theme of FM 3-0. Strategic responsiveness is more than simply deploying faster. It includes generating, training, swiftly deploying, and simultaneously employing the right forces at the time and place the JFC requires them. It is about giving the JFC options in using decisive land power while creating operational dilemmas for the adversary. The message here is both internal and external. Internally, it provides the doctrinal basis for changing the Army’s mind-set toward Army transformation. Externally, it reinf-
erations. Commanders provide the impetus for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Their ability to successfully command land forces depends on how well they master the art and apply the science of war.

Because of this, the battle command concept receives considerable attention. As shown in Figure 3, FM 3-0 retains the emphasis on leadership while offering a new model for battle command—one that requires commanders to visualize operations, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct operations to conclusion. Throughout, commanders lead soldiers and assess the situation. The new model recognizes that in an increasingly simultaneous, noncontiguous environment, the commander must establish and update a mental picture of the battlespace to truly communicate his intent. Perhaps more important, an informed mental vision of the operation permits the commander to be proactive, to fully exploit the power of C2 technology, and act rather than wait to be surprised by events and cursed with missed opportunity.

FM 3-0 concludes with a chapter on combat service support (CSS) that emphasizes the evolving concept of CSS reach operations: “Combat service support reach operations involve the operational positioning and efficient use of all available CSS assets and capabilities, from the industrial base to the soldier in the field.” CSS reach operations focus on logistic efficiencies, not just for their own sake, which is important in terms of responsiveness, but in terms of extending operational reach. Army forces can extend their effectiveness across a greatly expanded area of operations while reducing their logistic footprint.

FM 3-0 is transformation doctrine for a transforming force. It is a significant shift from its predecessors, although it would be wrong to label it as revolutionary. To use an analogy, FM 3-0 is like the howitzer, ship, or bomber that returns to the factory for a service life extension overhaul. Every piece is disassembled and renewed, or it is replaced with something that is a generation ahead of the old system. What emerges from the factory retains the original’s appearance and basic function; however, the updated platform can perform its mission more effectively in changed operating conditions. FM 3-0 is that kind of doctrine. It contains much that is old and familiar but contains a great deal that is new. It addresses the operating environment of today while anticipating the requirements of tomorrow. It is a stepping-stone to the doctrine that will drive Objective Force operations. FM 3-0 also provides a firm basis that Army forces can use to conduct full-spectrum operations today.

NOTES

5. The FM 3-0 writing team originally intended to follow the release of a new edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. The FM 3-0 authors not only reviewed all JP 3-0 drafts, they also embodied language from those drafts throughout FM 3-0.
8. FM 1-0, Personnel (Washington, DC: GPO, TB); FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, TB); FM 4-0, Combat Service Support (Washington, DC: TB); FM 7-0, Training the Force (Washington, DC: TB).
9. The current edition of JP 3-0 was published in 1995. Before that, joint publications were essentially recapitulations of service procedures. Compounding the problem, joint doctrine was difficult to obtain and doctrine on hand was often out of date. The 1995 version of FM 100-5 influenced the current JP 3-0 heavily. Since 1995, joint doctrine has undergone a revolution, and joint doctrine now establishes the bounds of Army doctrine.
10. FM 3-0, Foreword.
12. FM 3-0, chapter 1, paragraph 1-32.
13. Ibid., chapter 1, paragraph 1-18.
14. FM 1, chapter 3.
15. FM 3-0, chapter 1, paragraph 1-52 and chapter 3, paragraph 3-35.
16. Ibid., chapter 4, paragraph 4-10.
17. Ibid., chapter 1, paragraph 1-47.
18. The 1982 construct of deep, close, and rear operations was intended for division and higher operations. The 1986 FM 100-5 elevated the focus of deep, close, and rear operations to the corps and echelons above corps, although divisions continued to organize their operations accordingly. However, that doctrine did not envision brigades and lower echelons conducting deep operations—lower echelons than divisions conducted close operations. The distinction between deep, close, and rear all related to the existence of a more or less distinguishable forward line of own troops created by the array of forces side by side. This construct breaks down in terms of modern operations where smaller Army forces are conducting more nonlinear and noncontiguous operations as integral components of joint task forces.
19. FM 3-0, chapter 4, paragraph 4-28.
20. Ibid., chapter 11, paragraph 11-87.
21. Ibid., chapter 12, paragraph 12-4.
22. Ibid., chapter 5, paragraph 5-41. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively; it is a tether.
ANY OFFICERS and noncommissioned officers describe the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) with phrases such as “too complex,” “too burdensome,” or simply “too slow.” Frustration with the process is evidenced by late-night monologues delivered by executive officers (XOs) in their tactical operations centers, tools designed to bypass or shorten the MDMP, and arguments for a streamlined process. The debate surfaces occasionally in professional journals and even more frequently in Army e-mail circles.

Is the MDMP a viable method by which to solve today’s staff problems, or is it time to find some other process? What is the MDMP supposed to provide? Why are units having such difficulty with it? What other options have been offered, and are they workable? Answers to these questions can offer insight into the value of the current MDMP.

A Thinking Man’s Game

The smoke of battle was still drifting away as the observer/controller sat with the platoon leader on a fallen log to discuss the platoon’s encounter with the enemy. The conversation ranged over a number of aspects of the firefight but invariably returned to the question of how the leader made his decisions. What information did he have? Was all of it useful? What information did he need? After about 15 minutes of this, the young lieutenant shook his head and pronounced, “You know, combat really is a thinking man’s game.”

That platoon leader made an important discovery. Reduced to its lowest common denominator, combat is about problemsolving. The problems are complex, often difficult to see in their entirety, and always complicated by innumerable factors like terrain, weather, technology, and morale. Regardless of the complexity, however, combat is simply a problem, and the MDMP is a method of deciding how to use available resources to solve the tactical problem at hand. The plans the MDMP generates are valuable only if they actually solve the problem. They gain no inherent value from being doctrinally sound, sufficiently detailed, innovative, daring, or bold.

In considering the value of the MDMP, it is important to recognize this central truth. Military decisionmaking is nothing more than problemsolving. Doctrinal terms and a host of overlays, matrices, and charts sometimes obscure this, but the goal of any MDMP effort is to solve the problem. Any replacement process must solve a broad array of problems, not a particular problem or set of problems. A problemsolving methodology must be general in its applicability, or its value is extremely limited. This is true enough under any circumstances, but it is even more important in an Army in which staffs find themselves in scenarios ranging from humanitarian relief to mid-intensity conflict. The process staffs use to solve problems must function under a limitless number of possible situations.

The MDMP is designed to meet that requirement. Indeed, it is the MDMP’s universal applicability that often generates frustration among those trying to apply it. The MDMP contains no special insights into the problem; it provides only a methodology for
identifying the problem, generating possible solutions, analyzing those solutions, comparing the solutions, and determining the best solution. The commander and staff must do all the requisite brainwork. At the heart of the frustration with the MDMP lies a desire to lighten the burden of mental activity that the staff must bear.

**Defining the Problem**

It is not surprising that battalion and brigade staffs want help. Two major factors cause staffs to experience difficulty with the MDMP: a lack of experience and limited training time on the MDMP. The lack of experience among commanders and staffs is widely recognized as an important problem in the U.S. Army, and the design of its officer management system was influenced, at least in part, by a desire to increase the officers' experience. In the short term, we can expect inexperience to persist at battalion and brigade levels. An infantry functional area assessment, for example, determined that the shortage of infantry captains available for assignment in tactical units remains a major concern for senior leaders.

That shortage, and similar shortages throughout the Army, translate directly into staff inexperience. In many maneuver battalions, two of the four primary staff officers are senior lieutenants waiting for the advanced course. At best, captains who have not yet commanded a company fill the S1, S4, and assistant S3 positions. At brigade level, captains in the S3 section are frequently precommand officers. The same holds true for either the S1 or S4 positions. That these officers, whose primary experience is at the platoon level, find the MDMP burdensome should surprise no one, but the lack of experience is not limited to company grade officers. Most field grade officers have been away from battalion and brigade operations since completing their company commands. Most have not been on a battalion or brigade staff since before they assumed company command. Among field grade officers assigned to maneuver battalions, MDMP experience comes more from the classroom than from field exercises.

The general lack of experience is compounded by the lack of dedicated staff training time. The demands of day-to-day administrative activities, the unpredictability of operational requirements, and the much discussed increase in operating tempo (OPTEMPO) make it difficult for a staff to train on the MDMP using the Army’s doctrinal crawl, walk, run methodology. As new members join the staff, the pace of operations precludes a transitional training period, and even the youngest, least experienced staff officer is expected to function adequately under a training methodology of run, dash, sprint. When untrained staff officers produce unsatisfactory results, options are generally limited to accepting the results or firing the officer; retraining is simply too time-consuming. The frantic pace of operations makes training the staff a requirement that limited resources are rarely able to fulfill.

Taken in combination, the lack of staff experience and the limited available training time make it difficult for staffs to conduct the MDMP quickly and efficiently. True, both factors have always existed in the U.S. Army, but they appear to be more pronounced now than at any time in the recent past. Both factors present a difficult problem for today’s battalion and brigade commanders: how to get an untrained staff through the complex MDMP under the stresses of combat or even less stressful but more frequent combat training center rotation.

**Common Courses of Action**

Three common solutions to the MDMP dilemma are to ignore the problem, ignore the process, and ignore the staff. The most frequently used solution is to ignore the problem altogether. Units that adopt this solution simply refuse to acknowledge that the staff is not trained to perform the MDMP. In such units, the commander generally exercises broad guidance and little involvement, the XO drives the staff to stay within time lines, and staff officers dutifully provide timely products that lack analytic depth. The XO charged with overseeing the process is forever frustrated with the poor quality of staff work but finds himself compelled by time lines to move on to the next MDMP step without waiting for the staff to redo an earlier task.

“The important thing is that we use the process” quickly becomes the standard response to poor analysis, and the staff offers a recommendation to
the commander that is based on faulty assumptions, vague analysis, and wishful thinking. When the commander approves a course of action (COA), the staff finds that its ability to produce an order is now hampered by the many tasks that must be redone to provide detailed guidance to subordinate units. Such orders do little to synchronize a unit’s combat power. The staff learns little from its experience and will repeat the performance during the next decisionmaking cycle unless it undergoes dedicated training. Ignoring the problem does not appear to be the answer.

A second solution is ignoring the doctrinal MDMP in favor of bypassing or replacing the MDMP using fill-in-the-blank operation orders, various synchronization matrixes, or others that have won early acclaim. These tools are discarded when their limitations become apparent. Each such tool has genuine value as a supplement to the MDMP but falls short as a replacement.

An example is the expanded role of the targeting process used to conduct search and attack operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). A doctrinally based process, targeting is a methodology that determines the best use of a battalion’s combat multipliers in a particular operation. Because the process involves filling in a matrix, it is generally deemed a task that can be performed quickly. Some advocates have argued for expanding the goal of the targeting process to include developing the friendly COA for the next day’s operation. The latter determination is more properly answered using the MDMP, but the matrix is far more appealing than the laborious MDMP. By using the targeting matrix to identify enemy targets and apply combat power against them, the staff can take a relatively easy shortcut to a fragmentary order for tomorrow’s operations.

This shortcut avoids several elements that are important to the MDMP. Perhaps the most critical is identifying the decisive point. The decisive point is where the unit will mass the effects of overwhelming combat power to achieve a result and is the first step in generating options during COA development. The targeting process, used as a replacement for the MDMP, replaces identifying the decisive point with selecting one or more high-payoff targets. The targeting process leads to seeing the enemy as a series of targets and to synchronizing the forces assigned to a specific target. Little attention is paid to synchronizing the overall effort against the enemy. Attrition becomes the default solution to the problem posed by the enemy. The targeting process, when used in lieu of the MDMP, tends to cause units to focus on wearing the enemy down rather than knocking him out.

This does not mean that the targeting process has no value or is flawed. Rather, it indicates that the targeting process was designed to work within the MDMP, not in place of the MDMP. Units should use the targeting process in synchronizing their combat multipliers, but to select and develop a COA, the targeting process is out of its league.

The real problem with using targeting to replace the MDMP, however, is the most common shortcoming of all the magic bullets of the past. Although the targeting meeting has become a staple of planning for units in the movement to contact phase of a JRTC rotation, few people have argued a more general applicability. Units that are devoted to the targeting process as the centerpiece of their planning during the movement to contact phase are quick to push the process back to its original purpose when they transition to a deliberate attack or defense. Whatever the value of the targeting process in selecting and developing a COA, it is limited to a relatively small number of operations.

The unavoidable truth is that no matrix, chart, or preformatted slide can sidestep the need for clear, analytic thinking to solve tactical problems. Matrixes and other tools can greatly assist staffs in managing, visualizing, and presenting information, but they cannot solve tactical problems. Only applied brainpower can do that, and shortcuts often cause more problems than they solve. Tactical problem-solving is a thinking man’s game.

A third solution, and one an increasing number of commanders are adopting, is to ignore the staff. While the staff goes through the mental gyrations of the MDMP under the XO’s direction, the com-
mander moves to a quiet place and conducts his own analysis. By the time of the COA decision brief, the commander has formulated his own detailed COA, which he often reveals to the staff only at the completion of the brief. Lamentably, this may cause the staff to clear any work they may have accomplished up to that point from the table and start over. This is a variation of the much discussed "single COA" approach to the MDMP. A number of authors have argued in favor of commanders directing a single COA that the staff then wargames. As most advocates have visualized, this version of the MDMP requires the commander to develop his COA and present it to the staff as guidance immediately following the mission analysis brief. Although this is not as far removed from doctrine as some think, it tends to get twisted during execution. It is unusual for the commander to reveal his COA until very late in the planning phase.

Because battalion and brigade commanders are competent, experienced officers, the COAs they develop are usually tactically sound and feasible. Because the staff becomes aware of the COA only when it is time to produce an order, it has difficulty fleshing out the commander’s concept into a written order and then monitoring its execution. In many cases, the commander is the only one who really understands the plan. The dangers of such an arrangement are fairly obvious and become more so as fatigue and battlefield hazards preclude the commander’s intimate involvement in the battle. The Army’s decision to provide battalion and brigade commanders with staffs is one of necessity—one man simply cannot do it all. Ignoring the staff is not a realistic solution.

A Viable Solution

There are several steps that can relieve much of the staff’s suffering while still allowing it to assist the commander. Doctrine writers envisioned all these steps and included them in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5; unfortunately, units
Several steps that can relieve much of the staff’s suffering while still allowing it to assist the commander... [are included] in FM 101-5; unfortunately, units that implement these steps are rare. FM 101-5... identifies [time-constrained] environments as existing “any time there is too little time for its [the MDMP’s] thorough and comprehensive application.” By this definition, almost all of today’s battalion and brigade staffs’ tactical planning is conducted in a time-constrained environment.

By combining these options, the commander can get a timely staff analysis. Direct personal involvement can go a long way toward compensating for a staff that is energetic and devoted but undertrained. In the short term, this may appear to be micromanagement. Over time, however, the staff will become more confident in its ability to predict the commander’s intent and solve tactical problems. A commander who invests his time teaching subordinates to solve problems will be rewarded by a staff that can provide solutions quickly and effectively.

Time for a Change

The MDMP has not outlived its usefulness; no other process offers the universal ability to solve problems. Although far from perfect, the MDMP remains the best available resource for tactical decisionmaking. Likewise, today’s staffs are also likely to remain harried and undertrained. Staff officers will lack sufficient training; training time for the staff will be a rare and precious commodity.

It is time for a change, however. The commander’s personal involvement in the planning process, mentorship, teaching, and coaching can do much to offset the challenges today’s battalion and brigade staffs face. Increasing the commander’s role in planning does not require any modification to current doctrine; it requires only that commanders exercise the flexibility inherent in doctrine.

The challenge of building an effective staff in today’s maneuver battalions is tremendous. Many staff officers are convinced that the MDMP cannot work. Only those capable commanders who are willing to spend time training their staff officers can teach them that combat is about problem-solving and that problem-solving is a thinking man’s game. MR

NOTES
4. LTC Paul H. Herbert argues, for example, that the battalion commander who “makes his targeting meeting the centerpiece activity for his battle staff every day... has taken a significant step toward effectiveness.” See “Targeting—A Maneuver Concept,” Combat Training Center Quarterly Bulletin, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1995 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned).
7. FM 101-5.

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After the dastardly attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, Americans have had to reexamine their understanding of Islam and the Middle East. Americans generally misunderstand Islam, seeing it as a homogenous culture and religion. However, we are now realizing that there are striking differences in culture, lifestyle, and interpretation of religion, just as there are in other parts of the world.

One particular aspect of this reevaluation has been the role women play in Middle Eastern societies. Not only have the injustices committed against Afghani women been given greater prominence in the press, the contrast of varied lifestyles found among women in other Middle Eastern countries has been highlighted, particularly those in the Persian Gulf region.

**Few Choices for Women**

Most Americans envision women in Persian Gulf countries as swathed in black, not permitted to drive, and having little choice in marriage, lifestyle, education, or work. While true for many Gulf-area women, particularly those in Saudi Arabia, this stereotype is an anachronism when examining a select group of women in the United Arab Emirates—those serving in the military.

Readers interested in military subjects might be aware that women have served for quite some time in such Middle Eastern countries as Jordan and Syria. In fact, Aisha bint Al-Hussein, the sister of King Abdullah of Jordan, graduated from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and presently holds the rank of colonel in the Jordanian army. However, most people are not aware that Emirati women serve as a near-irreplaceable presence in their country’s military.

The school was founded in 1991 in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. In support of the school, the U.S. Army sent a cadre of 10 women, led by Major Janis Karpinski, to the Emirates to establish the training regimen for the school. The U.S. team also trained some of the newly graduated Emirati soldiers to become trainers for future recruits. Since then, other female U.S. Army soldiers have rotated through the Khawla School in advisory roles. Foreign instructors were phased out in 1996, however, but according to current commander Colonel Jumah Rashid Saif Al-Dhaferi, the school continues to produce high-quality female soldiers.

**Female Emiratis an Exception**

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) became an independent nation in December 1971. The UAE constitution guarantees women rights equal to men. Article 14 states, “Equality and social justice, ensuring safety and security and equality of opportunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of the Society.” However, local tradition and culture have generally dictated that women should stay at home in a more traditional female setting.

Sheikha Fatima, the wife of Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahayan, President of the Emirates, has been a great pioneer in changing the traditional roles of women in the UAE. With her husband’s support, she has done much for women by eliminating antiquated cultural barriers and expectations. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, Emirati women began asking why they could not participate in defending their country if it ever came under attack. Sheikha Fatima agreed and helped set up the Khawla bint Al-Azwar Military School, named after a famous woman warrior in Islamic history who fought alongside the prophet Mohammed.

The school was founded in 1991 and is located in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. In support of the school, the U.S. Army sent a cadre of 10 women, led by Major Janis Karpinski, to the Emirates to establish the training regimen for the school. The U.S. team also trained some of the newly graduated Emirati soldiers to become trainers for future recruits. Since then, other female U.S. Army soldiers have rotated through the Khawla School in advisory roles. Foreign instructors were phased out in 1996, however, but according to current commander Colonel Jumah Rashid Saif Al-Dhaferi, the school continues to produce high-quality female soldiers.

**Military Training**

Women who wish to join the UAE military must be citizens between the ages of 18 and 28. They must have at least graduated from a middle school and be willing to serve in the military for a minimum of five years. Recruits must also pass a medical examination as well as an interview by school personnel. Once accepted, the cadets undergo a basic training course that lasts six months.

The course is divided into two parts: basic military training and subsequent administrative training. No passes are granted during the first 40 days of training, but after that trainees are allowed weekend passes during which they may go home to visit their families. The school also provides transportation to all trainees for weekend trips home, even if they live five or six hours away in a remote Emirate. During the six months of initial training, cadets are subject to dismissal if they become pregnant. A surprising number of trainees are already married, and a female soldier may continue to serve in the military if she becomes pregnant after the basic training period.

During the first phase of training, as they are introduced to military life, cadets are instructed in numerous soldiering skills, including the following:

- Physical training.
- Infantry training, including minor tactics.
- Islamic education.
- Light weapons training, namely qualification with the M-16; a 9-millimeter, semiautomatic pistol; hand grenades; machine guns; and Russian rocket-propelled grenades.
In addition to the above courses, trainees can choose one of four levels of English-language courses, which are taught using the material created by the Defense Language Institute English Language Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.10

Once cadets graduate from training, they are assigned to vacant posts throughout the Emirati armed forces. Female Emirati soldiers currently serve in communications and communication engineering, secretarial, computer, and training positions for future recruits. Two graduates of the school, both captains, serve as part of the elite personal protection service to Sheikha Fatima.11 Female Emirati soldiers and their male counterparts also have been assigned peacekeeping duties in Kosovo.

On graduating from the school, military rank is awarded according to the level of education graduates had completed before enlisting. Middle school graduates receive the rank of private. Those who completed their first year in high school become lance corporals. Those with two or more years of high school, or have completed high school, become corporals. Those with one to three years of college-level studies receive the rank of corporal first class. University graduates become warrant officers.12

Military salaries are competitive with those in the private sector. A private earns 5,300 Dirhams a month (approximately $1,450), whereas on reaching first lieutenant, her income increases to 11,000 Dirhams a month (approximately $3,000). Female Emirati soldiers also receive standard military benefits that include housing, medical care, and rations.13 The highest ranking female in the Emirati armed forces is a colonel, who currently heads the dental section in the medical corps.

As time and the cadets march on, the cultures and countries of the Middle East will continue to change. The United Arab Emirates will be no exception. In fact, many believe that this small but strategically significant country has developed and changed more rapidly than any other country in the Persian Gulf area since becoming an independent nation. Women serving alongside men in the Emirati armed forces have certainly contributed to these admirable changes and will continue to do so as their service becomes more and more acceptable to and valued by Emirati society. It is important for Western societies, particularly the United States, to be aware of these changes, and to continue to reexamine beliefs about women and their roles in the Middle East.

**NOTES**


3. See G. Brooks for an excellent description of the initial establishment of the Khawla School and viewpoints of female U.S. Army soldiers sent as part of the initial training team.


5. Khawla bint Al-Azwar Military School pamphlet, Khawla Bent AlAzwer Military School (sic) in lines, no date.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


**Correction:**

On page 49 of Colonel Teddy Bitner’s article “Integrating Space into Training Simulations” (November-December 2001), the model identified as “Descriptive Intermediate Attributed Notation for ADA” should have been listed as DIANA. DIANA is a model specifically developed by the Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab for the Future Command and Control experiment; it is simply a name, not an acronym. Also, the biographical summary on page 50 incorrectly lists Bitner as having a Ph.D. from Trinity Seminary; it should read Doctor of Ministry from Trinity Seminary.
Soviet Special Forces (Spetsnaz): Experience in Afghanistan
Timothy Gusinov

When I read in the newspapers that U.S. Special Forces units had deployed to Afghanistan in the full-scale antiterrorist operation after the Attack on America on 11 September 2001, I could not help but experience déjà vu; I had “been there, done that.”

“They are ready to go,” I said to myself. “Maybe at this exact moment they are jumping into a chopper to take them on their mission. Or possibly, they are already on the ground in Afghanistan.”

I had lived through the dark nights in the mountains of Afghanistan. I had heard the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air. And, I had experienced the deafening bursts of automatic gunfire and the blasts of hand grenades as they exploded in narrow canyons or among packed mud walls of Afghan villages. I lived again the exhausting dash back toward the pick-up area. I saw the faces of my comrades, dead and alive.

Soviet Spetsnaz

The involvement of the Soviet special forces—the Spetsnaz—in Afghanistan began in 1980. The Soviet command soon realized that mechanized infantry units were not effective against Mujahideen guerrilla tactics. The Spetsnaz were called in as the only forces capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. Their mission in the event of a full-scale European theater of war was to hunt and destroy headquarters, command and communications centers, and mobile missile launchers. In Afghanistan they had to learn a lot fast to meet new and unique challenges.

In the paragraphs below, I list some of the challenges and solutions Soviet Spetsnaz teams faced and what they learned.

Deployment Lessons Learned

Helicopter assault tactics. When deploying a Spetsnaz team into enemy territory, helicopters should make several landings, leaving the team at one location only and under cover of darkness. Doing so complicates the enemy’s search and pursuit because they will have to conduct searches in several places, thus dispersing their forces.

The helicopter drop should be from two to three miles behind the target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group would be moving back toward its own base. If the enemy launches a search operation, chances are fewer that they will be searching in the back direction.

Helicopters should use different routes for returning to base after dropping the team. To conceal the team’s deployment, there should be other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes near but not too close to the team’s objective.

Destroying enemy supply convoys. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen developed sophisticated and effective tactics of bringing weapons and ammunition supply convoys into Afghanistan. The tactics the Spetsnaz most often used to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route.

The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is that the closer to the enemy’s base or main camp the convoy is intercepted, the higher the chances the convoy will be in one piece and its security will not be on full alert. After a large convoy arrives at a distribution base or area, representatives of different field commanders and tribes meet it and divide it into smaller groups, which are much harder to detect.

When a long line of camels loaded with weapons and ammunition is attacked, the most depressing thing is the maddening shriek of wounded animals. The wounded from the convoy security detachment screaming too, but they are the enemy; the animals are victims. The most unpleasant thing is when a camel loaded with mines or TNT explodes into bloody pieces, killing everyone nearby.

Local conditions. Even if soldiers speak the local language and dress like the locals, they should not count too much on their ability to pass as locals. The way they walk is different, and there are many tribal dialects. Dress-specific features, even in the way of wearing a headdress, carrying weapons, and so on, can betray someone as not being a native. Depending on the mission, however, it makes sense to dress as much like locals as possible for the particular area of the country in which the mission is to occur. Doing so could fool the enemy for some time and give soldiers a small advantage. Also, soldiers should collect and hide used toilet paper. Most Afghans in rural areas use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.

Tactics Lessons Learned

Air-fuel munitions. The Soviet air force used air-fuel bombs and unguided rockets with air-fuel warheads for the first time in Afghanistan. When used in populated areas, such munitions completely destroy buildings within a distance of 25 to 30 meters from the center of the explosion and partly destroying and damaging structures at a distance of up to 80 meters. The smashing and throwing effect of an air-fuel bomb’s hot explosion wave is effective at a...
distance of up to 200 meters, especially in canyons and narrow valleys. However, thin air in the mountains and wind at ground level can quickly disperse the concentration of aerosol needed for explosion, thereby decreasing the power of such munitions.

These munitions should be used during cold season, at night, or during the early morning, when the air is still cool and thick. If dropped in thin air or during windy conditions, it is best to use a cocktail combination of aerosol munitions and smoke bombs dropped together. The smoke will keep the aerosol from dispersing too quickly.

The number of landing zones in Afghanistan near fortified enemy bases are limited and usually mined. During air-assault missions, air-fuel munitions are effective for cleaning mines from helicopter landing zones before troops land.

Soviet attack aircraft used the following tactics:
- Attacking the target from the sun.
- Performing “star” air strikes, which consist of aircraft attacking a target continuously from different directions, thus preventing the enemy from accurate firing in one direction.
- Using two aircraft or two pair of aircraft on parallel courses coming from opposite directions to attack the target.
- Finishing the attack by steady climbing, then performing a sharp hook turn to either left or right.

Often a flight of aircraft would launch a distracting attack by flying on afterburners to create noise, while the main striking force attacked a strongly fortified enemy base from another direction during a large-scale operation.

Air-strike diplomacy. If a particular tribe, field commander, or village was known to have taken prisoners of war (POWs) or possessed the remains of those killed in action, from two to four aircraft would deliver an impressive air strike as close as possible to the location using heavy bombs and incineration munitions. At the same time, leaflet bombs would be dropped that declared that unless there was immediate negotiation for POWs’ release or for the return of bodies to a specified location, the next air strike would target the area itself.

Air Defenses Lessons Learned

During my service in Afghanistan, the enemy used a variety of portable, shoulder-launched missiles. They included the old (usually Egyptian-made) Strela-1, Strela-2, and Strela-2M (modernized) missiles; American Red Eye and Stinger missiles; and British Blowpipe missiles.

According to information gathered from POWs, Blowpipe performance was disappointing because of its low accuracy, heavy weight, and complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were used en mass during the 1986 assault on Javara south of Khost. I personally witnessed from two to three simultaneously launched Blowpipe missiles missing a single aircraft and exploding in the air.

Twelve 7-millimeter DShK (1, 2, or 4 barrels, mostly of Chinese or Egyptian manufacture) and fourteen, 5-millimeter Zenitnaya Gornaya Ustanovka (ZGU) antiaircraft mountain units, using Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vlavimirova Tankoviy tank-mounted, large-caliber machine guns of Vladimirov design (originally designed for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)), had effective ranges of fire up to 1,500 to 1,800 meters. Even after the introduction of SA missiles, the DshKs and ZGUs caused from 50 to 70 percent of helicopter losses and damage and from 40 to 50 percent of aircraft losses and damage. Also in limited use were Swedish 20-millimeter Eurlicon antiaircraft guns and the Soviet-made mobile 4-barrel automatic gun system known as Shilka, which was used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

For better protection of their fortified bases and strongholds, enemy forces established a local early warning system that consisted of a net of observation posts. Small radio stations were located as far as from 5 to 15 kilometers from each post. This distance does not seem like much when flying in a jet, but it is enough to give advanced warning of approaching helicopters. Also, such posts kept air force bases under observation, reporting every group take off. To counter such a net, striking teams should take a deceptive course, then change it to the correct one once out of the observation area.

Enemy air defense of fortified bases began from distant approaches of from four to six kilometers out from the main base area. Air defenses included heavy antiaircraft machine guns and occasional SA missiles located on high mountain ridges. The concentration of air defenses gradually increased toward the center of main bases and fortified areas. The number of heavy machine guns defending a base varied depending on its size and importance but could range from 60 to 80 pieces in a particular area. Crews are tough. Often, when a gunner was killed or wounded, another trained crewmember immediately replaced him.

Soviet pilots nicknamed antiaircraft machine guns “welding machines,” because from the air the flashes that occurred when they were fired reminded the pilots of welding works in progress. Fortified areas with large numbers of antiaircraft machine guns were called welding workshops.

Special “free-hunting” missile teams usually consisted of from 10 to 20 soldiers; one to two trained missile men; and two to three soldiers to carry additional tubes. Other team members carried infantry weapons for protection and cover. Hunting teams, operating near air bases, and missile teams defending enemy bases, included 4- to 10-member groups whose mission was to kill or capture downed pilots. Pilots’ messes at airbases, such as at Bagram and Kabul, were specific targets for mortar or rocket barrages. Sometimes such teams would climb to incredible heights to attack or engage transportation aircraft that the Soviets thought were flying at safe altitudes.

In 1987, after recovering from being wounded for the second time, I returned to Afghanistan where I worked at the Military Intelligence Department in Kabul. I received information that a Spetsnaz team in the Panjshire area had intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy carrying, in addition to the usual variety of weapons and munitions,
small portable oxygen bottles and masks.

To counter such measures, humanitarian packages should be dropped from higher altitudes. Transportation aircraft should alternate approach directions as often as possible, and they should avoid permanent flight routes.

Mine Warfare Lessons Learned

On many occasions, enemy forces would lay mines in a way that they could be easily detected and disarmed. Other mines in the same area would be much better concealed and laid with much more resourcefulness. For example, a mine having an easily detectable metal casing might be surrounded by mines that had plastic casings, which are much harder to detect. Enemy forces would also combine pressure-detonated mines with remote radio or wire-detonated mines and charges whose power was often increased by putting pieces of cut thick metal around them or laying stones over them.

Despite the fact that many modern weapons, including modern land mines, are used in Afghanistan, many homemade devices are also used. A pile of empty artillery and tank shell cases, as well as cases from unexploded air bombs and other munitions, clearly indicates that the place is used for manufacturing explosive devices. Also, the enemy will collect empty artillery and tank shell cases, fill them with explosives, and use them as anti-vehicle mines. Such refuse should be collected and rendered unusable by running over it with a tank or other heavy-armor vehicle.

Finding large amounts of cheap soap and empty glass bottles indicates the production site of Molotov cocktails. Soap is grated, placed in a bottle, mixed with gasoline, and thrown on a vehicle. When the bottle breaks the burning mixture of soap and gasoline sticks to the surface and burns. MR

Editor’s note: U.S. Armed Forces on the ground in Afghanistan have most likely already encountered all or most of the tactics discussed here. However, it is wise to listen to the voice of experience. The War on Terrorism could last much longer than anyone can predict.

The Two World Wars that Shaped the 20th Century

Lewis Bernstein

The 20th century was shaped by two world wars. The result of World War I was the collapse of the German, Austrian, Turkish, and Russian empires that gave rise to fascism and communism. World War II hastened the end of European colonial empires in Africa and the Far East and brought about the emergence of two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.


The editors remind readers of the wars’ similarities despite a tendency of most analysts to emphasize the differences between them. World War I is usually seen as “bad”; it was an avoidable conflict, directed by incompetents, which resulted in mass slaughter in the trenches on the Western Front. Historians see World War II as being a “good” war; it was an unavoidable conflict against monstrous tyrannies directed by relatively competent generals who used high-tech methods to move across battlefields at relatively small cost. As these volumes remind us, such views are not completely true. Massacre atrocities in World War I foreshadowed those in World War II. The 1914-1918 commanders were about as competent as their 1939-1945 successors.

The British Experience

In the 33 comparative essays in Volume 1, Lightning Strikes Twice, the mostly British scholars write about experiences on the frontlines, in leadership, and of occupation. The topics of individual chapters include the following:

* Relations between major coalition warfare partners, such as Britain and France; Britain and the United States; and Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.
* Comparisons in military and political leadership, in particular that of the principal British generals and England’s prime ministers Lloyd George and Winston Churchill as well as German strategist Erich

- The effects of occupation in Belgium, France, and Poland and of genocide in Armenia in 1915 and Romania in 1942.

**The Peoples’ Experience**

*Volume 2, Who Won? Who Lost? The Peoples’ Experience,* has a broader scope than Volume 1. The first part explores the far-ranging implications of total war and how they affected the societies of Canada, South Africa, the United States, India, New Zealand, Russia, Italy, China, Australia, the Balkans, Japan, India, the Arab world, and the African empires of Britain and France. These chapters also detail how the Netherlands and Sweden fared as neutrals. Many of the chapters are sketchy, attempt to cover too much ground, or are drawn too narrowly. However, each chapter contains useful bibliographical references, casts light on unknown aspects of the wars, or indicates areas for future research.

The second part of this volume concentrates on cultural experiences and is narrowly drawn, limning the ways in which British artists, writers, and the entertainment industry responded to the wars. The reader longs for a similar presentation about the cultural experiences of French, German, Japanese, American, Chinese, and Italian societies, but they are not covered.

The section on moral experiences continues in the Anglocentric vein, but the chapter on ethics and weaponry tries to broaden the scope of inquiry. It does not succeed. The authors never explain how ethical dilemmas or questioning prevented or curtailed the use of aerial bombardments, submarine attacks, or chemical warfare against the general civilian populace.

The essayists never grapple with the implications of total war in the 20th century. One would have expected some attempt to place this warfare in a larger world context or even a larger Western context, but that attempt was not made.

**Old Rules of War Overthrown**

The essayists in both volumes amply demonstrate that the old rules of civilized warfare, invented after the horrors of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, were overthrown by 20th-century mass industrial warfare. As entire societies mobilized to support national aims, warfare reverted to what it has always been—nasty, cruel, and sordid.

After 1945, soldiers and statesmen began to reformulate rules of warfare to include human-rights issues. Dutch pioneer of natural rights and other legal causes, Hugo Grotius, did the same thing after the religious wars of the 17th century, when he began drafting his work on international law. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians wanting to avoid war’s totality have sought to disengage their societies from the war-making apparatus.

**Comparisons**

*Volume 1’s* engaging collection of essays, which combine novel approaches to old questions about the business of warfare in the two world wars, is thought provoking. Although some of its comparisons are far-fetched, such as comparisons between Ludendorff and Tojo and others, such as Churchill and Lloyd George, Brusilov and Zhukov, Foch and Eisenhower, and brief comparisons of genocide give the reader much food for thought. The comparisons between Anglo-French and Anglo-American relations in coalitions are also insightful even though their predominant concern is the British experience. A careless reader would be hard pressed to discover the extent of U.S., French, or Russian involvement in the wars. Nevertheless, the chapters are informative.

In *Volume 2*, the authors successfully sketch the wars’ societal affect. Yet, it fails to deliver on its promise of far-ranging scholarship, especially in the later sections of the book. They were disappointing. However, both volumes are well worth reading. Their varied contents should interest all intellectually curious browsers.

Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, most Westerners thought of Islam as being characterized by strong ideals, religious fervor, and an almost fanatical approach to ideas and cultural issues. After the attacks, most Americans added terrorism and violent conflict to that list. In Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam, Anthony Shadid argues that the West misunderstands Islam and those who practice the religion.

Shadid sets out on what begins as a self-inspired journey, taking his U.S. roots to the Middle East in an attempt to understand his paradoxical feelings of “being an Arab in the United States and an American in the Middle East.” Through a series of interviews with personalities as diverse as Mujihadeen freedom fighters to Cairo entrepreneurs, Shadid examines the emotions that make up the people of Islam.

Shadid begins by providing an introduction to Islam and the Islamic, or Muslim, faith. He sets a course for the book based on the hypothesis that the lack of clarity and direction left as the legacy to the prophet Mohammed’s followers meant that the very nature of the religion would be one of constant change as it proceeded to that list. In Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam, Anthony Shadid argues that the West misunderstands Islam and those who practice the religion.

The evolutionary rather than geographical journey that unfolds in the book ushers the reader through the various changes that have occurred within Islam since its inception. What the West should come to realize is that there are many sects and divisions within Islam, just as there are in the Christian faith. As Westerners, we can gain a better understanding of and tolerance of Muslims through a study of this book.

MAJ Simon J. Hulme, RE, British Army


Two weeks before the end of World War II, a Japanese submarine in the Philippine Sea, about 350 miles East of Leyte, torpedoed the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis. The ship sank in 12 minutes. A brief SOS was improvised by an ingenious radioman despite the wreckage of the equipment. Tragically, those who heard it did not properly record or respond to the message.

Approximately 900 crew members survived the immediate explosion and were able to abandon ship. Of those, only 317—35 percent—survived to be found by chance four days later. The others died of dehydration, hypernatremia (from drinking seawater), hypothermia, and shark attacks.

Public outcry at the Navy’s reporting of inefficiencies that contributed to the enormous loss of life was muted by the euphoria of the ending of the war and the drama of the dropping of nuclear weapons. The Navy quickly carried out courts-martial proceedings, doled out minimal punishments to those involved ashore, and hoped the entire episode would be forgotten.

The ship’s skipper was reprimanded, retired from the Navy, and ultimately committed suicide. The survivors met periodically, and in 1999 the meeting was brought to the attention of author Douglas Stanton. Stanton interviewed 14 of the attendees and used in-depth interviews with the ship’s doctor, a lieutenant commander at the time, and a Marine private for most of the new material included in the book. Most of the material used as the basis for this well-told story came from numerous newspaper and magazine articles written in 1945 and 1946.

Stanton’s account is meant to remind the public of a dramatic story. He is not a sailor or Navy man. The first 63 pages, which provide background to the events leading up to the sinking, are filled with Navy and nautical gaucheries, which could have been avoided if the publishers had bothered to ask any old seagoing Navy man to help with proofreading. Although such errors irritate the professional, they do not detract from the story.

The book’s ending could have been more satisfying if Stanton had included in the epilogue something of lessons learned from this and other stories of survivors of torpedoes during wartime. Navy and Coast Guard physicians have studied such histories and by applying what they have learned they have influenced the redesign of lifeboats, life rafts, life vests, techniques for converting seawater to potability, and methods for identifying a man afloat in a life vest in the open ocean. Most important, after its frightful performance in 1945, the Navy redesigned its system for ship reporting so that, hopefully, such a tragic overlooking of a sinking ship will never recur.

RADM Ben Eiseman, USNR, Retired, Denver, Colorado


James Moody of Sussex County, New Jersey, was one of the most active Loyalists during the Revolutionary War. He was a spy, a recruiter of Loyalists troops, and a staunch supporter of the king.

Susan B. Shenstone’s book, So Obstinately Loyal, follows Moody’s life after he leaves the American
Colonies and resettles in Nova Scotia. There is little information extant about Moody, although much has been attributed to him. Therefore, Shenstone paints his portrait by skillfully filling in the outline with the story of the people and events of the time, which surely formed Moody into the person he became. In Canada, Moody is largely unknown; in New Jersey, he is still looked on as being a rascal. His story is interesting and refreshing.

Lynn Sims, University of Richmond, Virginia


Collections of letters from Civil War soldiers are not uncommon. What sets this collection apart is that it also contains letters from the soldier’s wife and family. One can only imagine the difficulties a soldier would encounter attempting to save letters while on campaign. Retention of letters would have been extremely difficult given such conditions as adverse weather, limited space in his knapsack, and loss or theft of personal items. Nevertheless, Captain Jacob Ritner was able to save 44 letters from his wife Emeline—letters that provide insight into the trials of the women who had to manage the farms, take care of the children, and pay the bills while their husbands were away.

Jacob’s letters provide ample details of soldier life. He describes food or the lack thereof, marches, equipment shortages, and disgust with paymasters. He gives accounts of winter quarters and the soldiers’ attempts to make their rude dwellings comfortable. He inquires about his children, his wife’s health, the condition of their cows, the weather in Iowa, and he expresses concern about not being able to provide her with his pay.

At times Jacob declares his dissatisfaction with Army leaders, especially his dislike for Northern democrats whom he believes are undermining President Abraham Lincoln’s attempt to win the war. Rarely does he provide his views of Confederates or the Confederacy, although, in his letters beginning the middle of 1864, he takes a more strident tone toward the enemy, referring to them as “liars and drunkards and slave holders and traitors.”

Emeline tells of the children, the cost of items at home, local news, and also expresses her desires for a Union victory. In this regard, her passion for the cause exceeds that stated by Jacob.

Often in 19th-century letters there are few expressions of love. Jacob’s letters do not follow the norm. He writes of his loneliness, his love for Emeline, his desire to return to her and his children, and of his dreams of her. She, on the other hand, tells of her desires for his safety, but in two letters writes plaintively of what life would be like were he not to return.

Although Jacob’s descriptions of the battles in which he fought are limited, they do provide a view of conflict through the eyes of a soldier rather than that of a general who might have a self-serving view of the fight.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


In Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Keith W. Nolan gives a brilliant account of a crucial engagement at Dienbienphu during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. I have corresponded with Nolan for 20 years, ever since he was a teenager so articulate and knowledgeable that I initially doubted his authenticity. Since then, I have observed with admiration the development of his historical and literary skills. Also, I have been a friend, subordinate, colleague, or superior to several key figures in the RIPCORD story. From my observation of these men in other circumstances, I find Nolan to be a keen judge of character and an unsparring, but not gratuitously unkind, appraiser of professional behavior under the horrendous pressures of close combat.

In 1970, a year into America’s withdrawal from the war, the U.S. military decided to buy time for the said-to-be-improving South Vietnamese forces by interdicting a segment of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. The A Shau Valley, running north-south for 50 kilometers just inside the Vietnam border with Laos and dominated by a chain of hills previously occupied by U.S. forces, seemed the logical choice for the engagement. An infantry battalion with supporting artillery occupying a fire base on a supposedly impregnable hilltop could disrupt the southward flow of northern troops and supplies or destroy, by employing massive U.S. firepower, enemy forces sent to dislodge that base.

In Saigon and at U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters, the concept undoubtedly made splendid sense. The 101st “Screaming Eagles” Airborne Division command post appears also to have been staffed by true believers. However, at brigade, battalion, and especially company and platoon levels, where helicopters were available, the war consisted of near-impenetrable jungle, near-unbearable heat and humidity, precipitous and always-one-more-to-climb hillsides, and a near-invisible, tenacious, deeply dug-in enemy. Soldiers exhibited astonishing bravery even as casualties mounted and higher headquarters demanded ever-greater effort in pursuit of unachievable ends.

As a study in leadership and organization, this is an important book. As Nolan says, “[The battle was] a tragic metaphor for the entire Vietnam War.” As literature, this book is a masterpiece—a moving, insightful illumination of the tragedies of the Vietnam War.

COL William L. Hauser, USA, Retired, Manhasset, New York


The political and increasingly universal practice of “declaring victory and coming home” has provided a false and dangerous domestic impression of success for U.S. and U.N. unilateral and multilateral interventions in failing and failed states around the world. The reality of such
irresponsibility is that the root causes and violent consequences of contemporary intranational conflict are left to smolder, perhaps to soon re-ignite. Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home discusses why the international community and individual powers involved in dealing with the chaos of the post-Cold War world must understand that such actions require a long-term, holistic, strategic approach.

Editor Max G. Manwaring is an adjunct professor of political science at Dickinson College and an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. He is also a retired U.S. Army colonel. Editor Anthony James Joes is the chairman of the international relations program at St. Joseph’s University. Both are quick to point out that nations that “declare victory and go home” without having put into place a fundamental infrastructure to provide either the reality or perception of justice or lasting stability are often the same nations that claim to be unable to fathom why problems continue to fester or erupt again.

This book is part of a continuing effort to revitalize strategic thinking as it pertains to “uncomfortable” contemporary conflicts. The essays analyze the global security environment, synthesize the fundamental changes associated with that environment, and project appropriate rules of law to identify essential internal “defensive” conditions that lead to mandated peace and stability. Manwaring and Joes go farther than other paradigms in that they shift from the defensive action of peace enforcement to explore the offensive actions necessary to secure a durable peace.

LTC Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA, Vicenza, Italy


In 1939, Australia went to war. In 1941, the United States joined the fray. The timing and the differences between the armies, leadership, pay, uniforms, post exchanges, life styles, treatment of minorities, and other differences are said to have contributed to a knockdown, drag-out, bottle-breaking brawl between the Diggers and the Yanks in 1942 that became known as the Battle of Brisbane.

Brisbane is a lovely Queensland town, but beneath the town’s beauty and quiet life stirred foreboding of impending threats. In February 1942, the same Japanese aircraft that had bombed Pearl Harbor devastated Darwin, another northern Australian town. The Japanese also came over the famous Kokoda Trail in New Guinea and threatened Port Moresby, the last settlement before the Torres Straits and Queensland. However, the Yanks were coming.

Much to the manpower-short Australians’ relief, a convoy carrying U.S. National Guard, Air Corps, and Army soldiers destined for the Philippines ended short of its goal, landing in Queensland. In time, more U.S. troops arrived until there were enough for General Douglas MacArthur to begin military operations in New Guinea. While the build-up went on, Queenslanders breathed easier.

Australia did not have a draft during World War II. So, the Australian army was made up of two types of soldiers: Australian Imperial Force (AIF) enlistees and volunteers who made up the militia. The militia could not be sent overseas, but they could be used for Australia’s defense. That defense included areas north of Australia—New Guinea and Papua. Still, the militia was ridiculed by the AIF as being “chocolate soldiers” or chocos. U.S. troops also began heaping derision on them because the Americans were draftees serving overseas and in forward areas.

Another factor in “the war” was the difference between the troops and their provost corps or military police. The Aussie Digger had little or no respect for the military police, who were viewed as misfits who had been shunted into a duty no one else wanted. As a rule, Aussie MPs were unarmed. In Brisbane, the MPs were American, armed, and considered arrogant.

In 1942, two things that could set men brawling were women and authority. The American GI had money, a smart-looking uniform, PX privileges, and a multitude of other characteristics that gave him a head start in wooing an Aussie lass. The girls thought the Yanks were something; their own men were something less.

The incident began when a U.S. private was having beers with some Aussie soldiers. When American MPs approached him, demanding to see his pass, words were exchanged. The tensions that had been building over little incidents spilled over, and the MPs found themselves trapped by a mob of taunting soldiers. Rescuers came with a shotgun, and an MP accidentally shot and killed a Digger. Random attacks went on until unit officers restored order.

Journalists Peter A. Thompson and Robert Macklin tell the Battle of Brisbane story well. They cite all of the factors that contributed to the brawl and leave readers with this message: when troops are placed into other countries, even allied countries, leaders need to be sensitive to the indigent population’s feelings and be aware of when the welcome mat might be wearing thin.

Peter Charles Unsinger, San Jose State University, California


The Doughboys: America and the First World War, Gary Mead’s attempt to “redress the balance of history by reinstating the vital importance of the American contribution to the defeat of the Central Powers in November 1918” is an absolute success.

Mead, an English journalist, wanted to prove that the U.S. entry into World War I and the fielding of a U.S. Army in France was essential to the culminating victory of 1918 and, in many ways, set the stage for America’s ongoing engagement as “Europe’s policeman.” Mead’s target audience is in part the covey of French and English academics who dismiss U.S. participation in the Great War as too little and almost too late. Yet, he is far more interested in telling the military history of America’s part in the war than in engaging in a drawn-out historiographical debate.
In 20 tightly written, engaging chapters, Mead recounts America’s entry into war and the chronology of building, fielding, and fighting in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France. Perhaps because of his training as a journalist, Mead skillfully weaves the personal narratives of individual soldiers and generals into the big picture, producing a compelling, broadly focused narrative.

The photographs are well chosen and captioned, and the maps are new and clear, not the tired reproductions of previously published work. Mead’s use of previously unpublished memoirs, narratives, and diaries culled from the holdings of the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks is remarkable, and it is refreshing to see some new first-person accounts about the AEF experience.

In “Falling Apart in Russia,” Mead details the experience of the often forgotten Americans who served in Siberia and North Russia, elements of U.S. participation in the war usually glossed over if not omitted entirely from other accounts. The final chapter, “Aftermath,” which pulls together the threads of his narrative, argues that the U.S. contribution, long overlooked, minimized, and in part forgotten, was nothing less than vital to allied victory.

MAJ Stephen C. McGeorge, USA, Retired, Clackamas, Oregon


In Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Robert A. Divine examines U.S. involvement in 20th-century wars. Although Americans like to think of themselves as peace-loving people and of the United States as a peaceful nation, war is an integral part of U.S. history. Divine explores the historical record to determine if there is a distinctive U.S. motive and style of war. His conclusion is that the United States seeks to use war as a way to create a better, more stable world, only to see its good intentions nullified by unexpected outcomes that seed new hostilities.

Divine wraps his main points up in a discussion of how U.S. leaders bring wars to an end, which he believes reveals the most about America’s national character. Feeling an obvious need to address the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s, Divine tacks on an epilogue that addresses recent U.S. interventions, focusing on the conflict in Kosovo.

Divine’s analysis of each 20th-century war is methodical and succinct, as are his conclusions. Sometimes, however, this results in an oversimplification of an event in order to show a continuous pattern. For example, Divine finds that the U.S. often enters wars by figuratively “drawing a line,” thereby surrendering the initiative to its opponent. This is not true for describing U.S. entry into the Korean and Persian Gulf wars; it is even more of an oversimplification for the Kosovo conflict.

A more detailed analysis might bring out greater distinctions between U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power that do not necessarily fit Divine’s pattern. In war and crises that lead to war, the president often faces the competing demands of domestic concerns and foreign policy. Recognizing this and fully incorporating these factors into the analysis before deciding that every war fits a particular pattern is important.

I am disappointed that Divine does not mention U.S. National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy. Bringing these relatively new documents into any analysis is critical. Despite its flaws, Divine’s book is thought provoking. I recommend that all military professionals, especially military strategists, read his book.

MAJ Joseph E. Whitlock, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


While the American Civil War is one of the most written about conflicts in history, few books deal with issues outside conventional battle histories, biographies of major commanders, or the war’s effect on society. Andrew R.B. Haughton’s Training, Tactics and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee: Seeds of Failure adds an entirely new dimension. Historians and social scientists have attempted for years to answer the question of why soldiers fought in the war. Haughton answers the question of how they fought and why the lack of doctrine and experienced leaders doomed them.

The story follows the Army of Tennessee from its cradle to its grave. Haughton even covers the antebellum period as he refutes the legend of Southern martial prowess. His simple, but ignored, observation is that the “honour, self-will, and recklessness cited so often as evidence of a propensity for military life are qualities that actively militate against the concepts of discipline, absolute obedience, and deliberate fire which were the basis of nineteenth-century tactics.”

Southern soldiers who showed the “proper” Southern virtues were more of a hindrance than a help to any officer attempting to fight by the tactics of the era. Consequently, in a futile attempt to meld the force into an efficient army, discipline was brutal. According to Haughton, and backed by solid evidence, Southern officers knew how to discipline troops but not to train them. As a result, the Army of Tennessee never reached a level of competence that its Union opponents did and paid for its failures with soldiers’ blood.

This book has some weaknesses. For example, Haughton devotes little discussion to cavalry operations, a field in which the Confederates did show some innovation in tactics and organization with the 1862-1863 raiding campaigns of Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan. He also ignores the extensive partisan and guerrilla operations in the region, tactics that used the strengths of Southern horsemanship and independence antithetical to the organized battle lines of the period.

The focus on infantry and artillery operations almost exclusively gives the book a slightly unbalanced feel. Given the book’s length, this single omission is understandable, as is the
lack of discussion on Union innovation. Despite these deficiencies, the book is excellent.

MAJ Robert R. Mackey, US Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Policy analysts and regional experts at the RAND Arroyo Center in Santa Monica, California, have undertaken the daunting task of creating a process model for identifying and predicting so-called ethnic conflicts. They acknowledge that the idea of predicting ethnic conflict has two basic flaws. First, the term that is currently widely used is a poor substitute for the broader term “communitarian intrastate strife” that might or might not have an ethnic dimension. In RAND’s model, ethnicity is one component of conflict causes and accelerators. The second flaw, which the authors freely admit to, is that there are so many subjectively valued variables (they identify 56) in the prediction of conflict that no model can be fully predictive or universally applied.

The model consists of three stages. The first stage uses an ascriptive approach, which is a refined version of social psychologist Ted Gurr’s perceived relative deprivation theory, to identify the potential for strife within a country. The RAND authors contend that Gurr’s theory indicates only the potential for strife, not its likelihood.

The second stage of the model describes the change from potential to likely strife centering on the mobilization of a dissatisfaction group to political action. The authors contend that the simple notion of being excluded or expelled from the process will not compel large groups to action and that several catalytic factors must be present. Such factors might include charismatic leaders, tipping events, access to resources, changes in the balance of power, or foreign influence.

The third stage of the model is the most critical. The model analyzes the state’s capacity to accommodate the desires of a disenfranchised group and the strategic bargaining that must occur to allow peaceful resolution of potential conflict. The theory is that states that can successfully incorporate the political demands of mobilized groups can diffuse any conflict because the movement will not be able to provide members of the group with sufficient cause to act on their frustrations.

After describing the model, the authors apply it to four cases. In the first two cases they apply the model to two conflicts—in Yugoslavia and South Africa—to prove that the model would have given indications of each conflict before its occurrence if it had been used. Relying on perfect hindsight, the authors selectively ascribe importance to events and situations that fit the model. They show the motivations behind the behavior of some key actors that could only have been determined post facto.

In the second two case studies, the authors apply the model to Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. The authors assess the likelihood of future strife and conclude that, while conflict is quite possible, there is no certain way to determine when or if the missing requirements for violent conflict will occur.

The authors have undertaken the difficult task of identifying potential conflicts and attempting to distill information gathered into a manageable list of factors and logical deductions with which to develop policy and strategy. They admit that the science is inexact but contend that the model can be especially useful to the intelligence community. Unfortunately, too many of the factors require in-depth knowledge of attitudes and perceptions of groups and individuals that the current intelligence structure could not reasonably hope to collect.

MAJ J. Matthew Venhaus, US Army, Leavenworth, Kansas


Joseph L. Harsh has become a renowned expert on the Confederate Maryland Campaign of 1862. His two earlier award-winning books, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 1998) and Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 1999), examine the campaign. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862 is a companion to the first two books.

Students of the battle and campaign waged in Maryland during September 1862 will find Sounding the Shallows to be an essential source of information about the movements of the armies and the battles. There are detailed weather reports giving temperatures, winds, and precipitation for every day of the campaign. The Confederate Order of Battle includes summary histories of each unit down to brigade and battalion levels. He presents demographic information on the area of operations to the detail of the number of residents, farms, blacks (both free and slave), livestock and crops, and total railroad mileage. Harsh also analyzes every major event involved in Lee’s invasion and how it contributed to the culmination of the campaign in the bloodiest day in U.S. history.

This important reference book should be used to supplement all examinations of the Maryland Campaign regardless of author. Without this information any study of the campaign is incomplete.

COL James L. Speicher, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In the book Nineteen Eighty-four (Knopf, NY, 1992), George Orwell says, “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.” Can we deny that educators play a key role in shaping the citizens of the future? If they do not, there would be little debate about the role of education in the United States today. Every U.S. politician wants to be known as the “education” governor, congressman,

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senator, or president, but who really controls education, in particular, the study of history? Politicians or teachers? Perhaps it is the writers and editors of textbooks.

Those in power control what is taught, but the textbook certification process controls how students view themselves, their nation, other nations, and key actors of the world. In the movie *The King and I* (Fox, Hollywood, CA, 1956), the King of Siam’s children are horrified when they see a map of the world that their English schoolteacher shows them. They were accustomed to the officially sanctioned map that showed Siam as a large and, by inference, powerful nation. They had great difficulty accepting the actual geographic size of Siam until assured that England was much smaller. To students “truth” is what they are taught.

As the global village shrinks, the way nations present their histories vis-a-vis other nations is becoming a worldwide issue. Japanese textbooks portray World War II quite differently from those of Korea or the United States. German textbooks portray war experiences differently from those of their neighbors. If each nation views the same action differently, what happens to the truth?

The various teachings of history certainly have ramifications for international relationships. For example, as long as Koreans teach their history as being filled with Japanese aggression and paint the Japanese as aggressors, having an international relationship based on mutual trust will be almost impossible. Can Americans be powerful, yet humble, if their history teaches them that they are the world’s protectors and have a “manifest destiny?”

Editors Laura Hein and Mark Selden have selected nine scholarly essays that cover Japanese, German, and U.S. experiences in developing and publishing textbooks. Unfortunately, Hein and Selden’s selections are not balanced. They try too hard to convince the reader that their agenda is “right.” They see patriotism and national pride as being great evils and root causes of war. For example, Japanese historian Fujioka insists that Japanese history be written so Japanese students can develop national pride. Some of the essayists castigate Fujioka and his group for calling themselves “liberal,” as if doing so is an affront to true liberalism and an attempt at false legitimacy. Yet these same writers see nothing wrong with the dictatorial communist regimes of East Germany, North Vietnam, and North Korea using the term “democratic” to describe themselves. Teachers who fight against national pride are called “progressive.” People who want to take pride in their nation are referred to as having “knee-jerk patriotism.”

History has been called society’s memory. The blurring of historical facts is a loss of collective memory, leads to inaccurate decisionmaking, and can destabilize national interaction. In *Censoring History*, Hein and Selden present a clear, accurate assessment of the problems that confront the teaching of history and the importance of protecting truth and accuracy. Their selection of singularly one-sided articles reinforces this requirement and shows that perhaps “we, the people,” should keep a watchful eye on the academics who are trying to reshape U.S. and world history.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC, Retired, Fallbrook, California

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Some of the most enduring images from World War I are photographs of enthusiastic crowds of people surrounding ranks of youthful soldiers as they march off to battle. Standard historical accounts build on such images to suggest that the coming of war was a hugely popular event across most of the world. In Germany, at least, this is not true, so argues Jeffrey Verhey, a research fellow at the Friederich Ebert Foundation in Bonn.

According to Verhey, the excitement captured in film reflects the sentiments of only a fraction of the German people. Nevertheless, such sentiments fed the enduring myth and produced important consequences for German political culture. In *The Spirit of 1914*, Verhey sets himself the task of discovering the true nature of German public opinion at the beginning of the war, how and why the myth of national unity was created, and how the myth was used to advance the agendas of rival factions in a Germany deeply divided along class and party lines.

If the Spirit of 1914 was a myth, on what was it built? Using newspaper account as his primary source, Verhey finds that news of the July crisis, mobilization, and opening battles created enormous interest across Germany. However, the carnivalesque outpourings of nationalist fervor were limited to students and the urban bourgeoisie. These were expressed in train send-offs, a variety of charitable works, and celebration of early victories. The fervor subsided in six weeks.

In working-class districts and in the countryside there was no jubilation—only anxious concern. In fact, in the early stages of the crisis, the Social Democrats (SPD) organized significant antiwar rallies, but these are generally overlooked in accounts of the early stages of the war. In spite of such rallies, when the Kaiser asked for war credits, the SPD voted along with the remainder of the Reichstag to support the war. Wilhelm II expressed his appreciation by repeating his assertion that he no longer recognized parties, but only Germans. Thus was founded the myth of patriotic unity.

As the war dragged on, the myth of German unity was difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, in the last two years of the war, German strategist Erich Ludendorff’s demand for a total national war effort invoked the Spirit of 1914 in order to remobilize Germans for greater exertions. Against an overwhelming Allied superiority in manpower and munitions, Germany would counter with a greater will—the kind of will the German people had exhibited in 1914. Enthusiasm would be replaced by iron resolution. As the tide turned against the Central Powers, the German Army’s heavy-handed efforts to revitalize the myth with a Patriotic Instruction Program failed to overcome the people’s war weariness.

The post-war period pushed the idea of the Spirit of 1914 into the
background of German political life through most of the 1920s. The rise of the National Socialists saw the myth resurrected and coupled with the stab-in-the-back legend to support a fictionalized account of World War I that portrayed a brave and unified Germany betrayed by Jews and communists. The Nazis used the story to great propaganda effect when they came to power in 1933. Yet, significantly, there was no popular euphoria when Hitler led the country to war in 1939.

Verhey’s superbly researched, convincingly argued case study illuminates the Clausewitzian relationship between popular passion, government policymaking, and military capability.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


At a time when the U.S. Army is developing intermediate brigades equipped with light armored vehicles, a history of the U.S. Marine Corps’ experience with armored fighting vehicles is useful and relevant. Marines Under Armor fills the bill, although readers hoping for stories of blood on the track treads will be disappointed.

Kenneth W. Estes, who graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and has a doctorate from the University of Maryland, was a career Marine Corps tanker. In the book’s preface, Estes admits that the book is not a history of combat operations; instead, it is “a study of how the U.S. Marine Corps came to acquire the armored fighting vehicle—why, how, what, from where and when, and what it tried to do with it.”

Estes paints a picture of a Marine Corps only grudgingly interested in the combination of firepower, protection, and mobility that has become the essence of Army heavy forces. In the book, retired Commandant Charles C. Krulak says he “would eliminate the tank fleet found in the Marine Corps today if I could.” Organizations that do not like innovations, even ones that would better allow them to accomplish their missions, tend not to incorporate them fully.

Armor conflicts with the Marine Corps’ vision of itself as America’s 911 Force. This self-image helps to explain the Corps’ absence of doctrine for combined arms operations and its inability to deploy large ground units to the field even during training exercises. After reading Marines Under Armor, it will come as no surprise that the Marines had to depend almost exclusively on the Army for mobile protected firepower during the Persian Gulf War.

This book offers other important lessons to an Army attempting to incorporate light armored firepower to increase 21st-century strategic deployability. Perhaps the most telling is the Marine Corps’ desire for minimal weight at the cost of its essential combat capability. Estes suggests stretching the capability of transportation systems rather than cutting into vehicle capabilities, admittedly an easier task for a seaborne service than for one seeking air-transportability. Still, it is a thought worth contemplating.

Making the U.S. Army’s equipment procurement and doctrine-development processes look like success stories is not easy, but this book succeeds. That alone makes it worth reading.

MAJ John A. Nagl, USA, Fort Riley, Kansas


Donald M. Snow’s When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Force is a thoughtful view of current foreign policy and an insightful vision of what the U.S. could face in the future. Snow addresses current policy, options for engagement in the post-Cold War world, and his vision of dilemmas that might arise from engagement issues.

Several major points, represented by five logically developed chapters, support Snow’s thesis. The first chapter establishes a foundation for current security strategy. Snow poses questions with which to determine if U.S. security strategy adequately addresses national needs and whether it is applicable for any area of the world.

Chapter 2 focuses on how U.S. strategy should be fashioned in the post-Cold War environment. The military instrument of power was used in realist paradigm scenarios up to the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, however, events in Bosnia and Kosovo changed the framework.

The third chapter addresses options for military action. Snow discusses the spectrum of conflict and ways the military can be used in the changed paradigm. He focuses on Kosovo and Bosnia because of recent lessons learned and the tragedy of possibilities for future internal wars.

Snow logically addresses the problems that can arise from U.S. intervention in new internal wars in chapter 4, illustrating how current national security strategy does not adequately address the complexities of engagement. In the last chapter, Snow projects how the United States should proceed and presents guidelines for involvement.

When America Fights is not just for the military strategist; it is an excellent book for officer professional development and should be placed on professional reading list because of its simple concepts and background analysis, coupled with original foresight and insightful ideas for addressing the needs of future U.S. security strategy.

MAJ Paul Michael Paolozzi, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965, is a good book for former military advisers to the U.S. Armed Forces of South Vietnam as well as for readers interested in the nonmilitary advisory and aid effort. The use of the word prelude in the title sets the stage for the surge of military advisers who arrived in Vietnam from 1964 until 1965. The surge gained even more momentum thereafter in the form of increasing commitment of U.S. combat forces.
Editors Harvey Neese and John O’Donnell tell the story of just what “went on” in South Vietnam before the major commitments of U.S. military resources. What went on was the rural-development program designed to counter Viet Cong influence and control in the countryside.

The theme the essayists’ convey is the inability of U.S. policymakers to think of the Viet Cong insurgency in unconventional terms. The authors confess their general lack of confidence in most senior U.S. policy leaders, including those sent to Vietnam to oversee the counterinsurgency effort and those in Washington who had no grasp on the insurgents’ energy, drive, and willingness to go to extreme ends to displace the South Vietnamese government and replace it with a communist regime.

Some readers will regard this short compendium of personal accounts as a revisionist account of the authors’ perception of the situation in South Vietnam in the early 1960s. Others will see it as an effort to say “we told you so” on the coattail of Robert MacNamara’s admission that he and the administration failed to listen to the experts. Perhaps this is so, but most likely not.

COL James D. Blundell, USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia


Russell F. Weigley has a grand legacy of studying, teaching, and writing military history and applying critical assessment to the art and science of military operations. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, does not disappoint.

Historian Bruce Catton once described the American Civil War as “a risky new experiment which involved nothing less than working out the relationships that must exist between a popular government and its soldiers at a time when the popular government is fighting for its existence.” This chronological weaving of political and military events as they unfolded is precisely what makes Weigley’s book a real achievement.

Despite Weigley’s vast knowledge of the subject, a one-volume narrative of this crucial point in the nation’s development is a daunting task. He lists James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford University Press, NY, 1988) as perhaps the best of this genre. As a veritable Civil War bible in its own right, however, Weigley’s book will have no problem sitting next to Battle Cry on most readers’ shelves.

Weigley notes individual unit participation in most actions down to brigade and regimental levels, and he lists general officers and their dates of rank. He also meticulously lists the numbers of killed, wounded, and missing from each engagement. These numbers support one of his central conclusions: that the South, despite numerous victories, could not afford the accumulated losses as the war progressed. The book is also painstakingly footnoted, with nearly one-quarter of the 600 pages devoted to references, providing the reader with a nearly endless list of follow-up sources for additional research.

One of the most interesting threads throughout the book is Weigley’s attention to the evolution of what has become known as operational art, which he describes as “thinking in terms of campaigns to link individual battles to the entire war effort.” He credits the Prussian and German armies as the first to actually develop this idea, but he notes several instances during the war that point to the beginning of this progression. However, it was the lack of true operational thinking that limited the armies of the North and South and prevented them from exploiting situations that had the potential to end the war quickly.

Weigley points to Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s orchestration of General Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 as the first instance of the South’s emerging perception of operational art. Similarly, when Lee maneuvered Jackson’s and General James Longstreet’s forces against Union General John Pope’s army in the Battle of Second Manassas, he showed understanding of operational warfare and came close to achieving a decisive victory over the North as a result. Weigley notes that “Jackson’s flank march to Manassas Junction had been a manœuvre sur les derrières as brilliantly executed as any by Napoleon himself.”

The South did not hold a monopoly on operational thought during the Civil War. Weigley gives several Union examples of planning and execution above the tactical level. Union attempts to understand operational art were imperfect, though, and like those of the Confederacy they led to minimal achievements. Union General George McClellan attempted to maneuver multiple separate forces during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign. However, Lee’s corresponding aggressiveness quickly put an end to this endeavor, as McClellan’s legendary caution overcame his ability to think operationally.

In 1863, Union General Ulysses S. Grant demonstrated a basic understanding of the benefits of operational thinking during his prolonged attempt to capture the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the last remaining impediment to free movement on the Mississippi River. His coordinated movements of distinct elements against a central objective were key to the success of this critical campaign. Unfortunately, Grant would not again demonstrate such enlightened achievement until the end of the war, with his movement of forces around Richmond and Petersburg and the subsequent corning of the Confederate Army at Appomattox.

Weigley remains convinced that despite these flashes of operational brilliance, the ability of military leaders, North and South, to think in operational terms was restricted in part by the failure of politicians to define strategic priorities.

Weigley’s narrative is graceful and eminently readable. He does not introduce any particularly new theories or original insights, but the packaging of information is what makes this volume conspicuous. Weigley’s ability to seamlessly intertwine military battles and campaigns with the political activities in Washington and Richmond enables the reader to gain a unique perspective on all the critical events of the time.
Weigley’s analysis of technological advancements and their effect on warfare, combined with the introduction of operational thinking on the part of a few select generals is extremely enlightening. A few more maps would have been welcome. In the final analysis, however, every Civil War historian would be well served by acquiring this book.

MAJ John A. Tokar, USA, Fort Stewart, Georgia


In February 1945, when asked what General Douglas MacArthur was really like, General Thomas Blamey, commander of the Australian Army in the South Pacific theater, replied, “The best and the worst thing you hear about him are both true.” MacArthur and the American Century is a compilation of first-class essays that document the truth of Blamey’s observation. However, readers searching for the definitive, unequivocal MacArthur should look elsewhere.

Leaders willing to struggle with the many facets—good and bad—of a complex man will be grateful that editor William M. Leary bound these stellar articles into one convenient book. Most of the essays, including one by H. Pat Tomlinson, titled “Inchon: The General’s Decision,” which appeared in Military Review in 1967 (April 1967, pages 28-34), have been printed in academic or Army journals.

Edward Drea and Stephen Taaffe’s essays, printed here for the first time, are shortened versions of previously published monographs on MacArthur’s use of military intelligence and his conduct of operations in New Guinea in 1944. Readers can get the complete picture elsewhere if they have the time to devote to the topic. I, for one, am happy to have a shortened version on hand from the acknowledged expert on the particular subject.


Essayist Robert Textor, a New Dealer who had worked in the Occupation, acknowledges that although Washington might have conceived the general plans to democratize Japan, “it was MacArthur whose leadership succeeded in implementing them. This, alone,” says Textor, “was an achievement of major historical significance.”

Leary’s book covers MacArthur pro and con. Although the book is welcomed, it reminds me of an old adage: “There is a simple answer to every complex question—but it is invariably wrong.”

Michael Pearlman, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR, John G. Stoessinger, Bedford/St. Martin’s, Boston, MA, 2001, 286 pages, $59.95.

Barnes and Noble and Amazon.com classify Why Nations Go to War by John G. Stoessinger as a history textbook. I agree. While Stoessinger attempts to convince readers of the pivotal role leaders play in pushing a nation over the threshold into war, the true value of his book lies in providing a basic understanding of the causes of eight conflicts.

Stoessinger’s thesis is summed up by the following quote. “With regard to the problem of the outbreak of war, the case studies indicate the crucial importance of the personalities of leaders.” I agree that a leader’s personality plays a large part in why nations go to war; I am not convinced that it is of such pivotal importance as Stoessinger would have us believe.

The chapters on India and Pakistan; the Fifty Year War in the Holy Land between Israel and the Arabs; the two wars in the Persian Gulf; and the war over the remains of Yugoslavia are enlightening. Each chapter also includes excellent maps of the areas of conflict.

While Stoessinger is a world-recognized authority, it is readily apparent from this book that he has not served in and does not understand the military. Certainly not when he writes the following when referring to the air campaign against Serbia: “[T]he main architect of NATO’s air campaign was an American [Secretary of State Madeleine Albright] whose childhood had been spent in Serbia during the Holocaust.” Also, “NATO emerged victorious with air power alone and without a single combat casualty. It was a victory without precedent in military history.” It was a victory without precedent in military history.

LTC Kevin D. Jones, USA, Richmond, Virginia


6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them disappoints. One might expect keen insight into foreign policy from a former national security adviser, but for that one still must rely on Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Anthony Lake’s nightmares are real enough, but they are strung together without coherence. The first nightmare is terrorists’ possible use of nuclear weapons and almost certain use of chemical and biological weapons. That is hardly a new idea. Lake begins with a maudlin hypothetical example of a little girl and her father poisoned by a terrorist’s biological agents at a women’s basketball game. The imaginary terrorist even debates with himself before his attack. The story has shock value only for the naive.

Lake considers it possible to deter state-sponsored use of weapons of mass destruction, but he has no solution to the threat posed by individuals or small groups. Instead, he recites possible motivations for terrorism, including hate. The closest he comes to a solution is to suggest increased intelligence at home and abroad. He considers this to be the
best weapon against nonstate terrorists, but he fails to develop the subject in any detail.

Lake then turns to eTerror and eCrime, correctly pointing out the fertile field for hostile manipulation of computer systems to interfere with communications, power supplies, and air traffic control; to gain access to government and private information; and to enhance international criminal conspiracies. He points out that amateur hackers have led the way for professional terrorists and criminals. Again, he recites the threats but comes up short on solutions, returning, instead, to a general consideration of nuclear proliferation and miscellaneous troubles worldwide.

The next specter in Lake’s Dickensian parade is ambiguous warfare, used by several third-rate countries to frustrate the United States. Ambiguous warfare is permanent war as seen by the target. Many forces in the world subscribe to it, recognizing no period of peace. We could find ourselves attacked without knowing by whom or why. Has someone unofficially declared war against us, or is this the work of a madman acting alone? Only tedious intelligence—or detective work—can answer such questions.

In the context of ambiguous warfare, Lake discusses the revolution in military affairs. U.S. Armed Forces have made great strides in intelligence, surveillance, communications, and target acquisition, which enable U.S. forces to “get inside an enemy’s decision cycle” and disrupt his plans before he can put them into effect. In its essential parts, though, this revolution in military affairs is only an improved means to develop targets and deliver ordnance—the traditional objectives of Clausewitzian or conventional war.

Lake seems unaware that the revolution, so defined, is no revolution at all and has no relevance to ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare, another concept that Lake throws quickly into the mix. Greatly improved target acquisition helps not at all in ambiguous warfare wherein we do not know whether we are at war, with whom, or to what end. Neither does it help in asymmetrical warfare in which the enemy employs an entirely different grand strategy from our own.

Lake seems not to understand what happened to us in Vietnam or to the French in Algeria. In these cases, the enemy employed an international strategy of political warfare that made victory in conventional battles irrelevant. We could say of Vietnam that we won every battle. We did, but we lost the war because the battles had no effect on its outcome. The grand strategy of political warfare turned most of the world against U.S. efforts and undermined support for the war at home. We had to withdraw, not for want of battlefield victory, not for want of target acquisition, but for want of political success.

Lake’s prescription of increased military budgets to effectuate the revolution in military affairs will not help in ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare. What is required is a clearly defined grand strategy and a thorough integration of political and military policies. Lake comes closest to this prescription when he recognizes the need for intelligence and makes brief mention of covert action. The latter is probably the best offensive weapon, but Lake discusses only Americans’ distaste for it.

Vulnerability to ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare is more than a bizarre tale of a guerrilla war that took place 30 years ago. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, having tasted defeat in conventional war, seems to have learned the lesson. He has undermined the international coalition that expelled him from Kuwait. The coalition no longer exists, and former members are among the most vocal opponents of continued sanctions and enforcement of no-fly zones. Hussein succeeded in driving out international weapons inspectors by applying political pressure. We can assume that he is continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction. Most important, he is still in power, and he is seen in many quarters of the Middle East as the leader who defied the West. Who else has learned the same lessons?

Lake devotes a chapter to the perils of weakness, discussing the need to maintain conventional military strength. He is correct, as far as he goes, but what country or force is going to oppose “the most powerful nation in the world” in “armor country” when more effective means are available? No potential U.S. adversary can project force far from its own borders. Conventional military threats to the United States are indirect, aimed at friends and allies. Not so the political-military threats of ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare, which can reach us anywhere, anytime.

Lake’s final nightmare is the mess in Washington. That is mine, too. This book offers no solution.

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George Rollie Adams’s biography of General William S. Harney is a delightful work of scholarship on the 19th-century U.S. Army and one of its keys, but lesser known, military leaders. Adams’s well-researched, nicely illustrated, and well-written account of Harney and his times effectively combines Western religious historian Francis Paul Prucha’s approach of stressing the Army’s non-military contributions to national development with historian and writer Edward Coffman’s emphasis on the Old Army’s maturation from the soldier’s perspective. Moreover, Adams highlights the evolution of the officer corps as a profession of arms much the same as does history professor William Skelton. He also includes excellent analyses of tactics, techniques, and procedures the U.S. antebellum military employed, which avid readers of military history will also find in the works of historian Robert Utley. Adams’s ability to combine these aspects into a single biography of Harney is most commendable.

Harney’s military career spanned more than 50 years. From his commissioning in 1818 to his role in the Indian Peace Commission in the late 1860s, Harney participated in several significant events. Through the Black Hawk War, the Seminole Wars, the Mexican-American War, peacekeep-
The future of Turkish-Western relations: Toward a Strategic Plan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, $20.00.

A real estate professional would emphasize any particular region. Examining U.S. interests in a new Turkish-Western strategy centered on four pillars of common interests: ensuring energy security by strengthening ties to the Caspian; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; a need to both contain and engage Russia, coining a new term, “congagement”; and a deeper integration of Turkey into European affairs.

Although those unfamiliar with the region’s politics might be overwhelmed by the many references to Turkish current events, the authors effectively articulate the numerous challenges Turkey faces. With few surprises, the authors concisely and
systematically analyze the merits and potential pitfalls of a fresh, strengthened Turkish relationship with Europe and the United States. Although the book has an unabashed pro-Western bias, it is an excellent primer for students of this pivotal nation’s current events.

**MAJ Greg H. Auld, USAF, Ramstein, Germany**


Frederick W. Mote, an emeritus professor of Chinese history and civilization at Princeton University, has spent more than 50 years teaching and conducting research about China. He is one of the surviving members of the pioneer generation of U.S. Sinologists. He is an accomplished scholar and his research interests and publications have ranged from a bibliography of Japanese puppet governments in China during World War II to the religious and political symbolism expressed in the physical design of 15th-century Chinese cities.


Although long, this book is one of Mote’s most accessible works; it begins with the formation of the Song Dynasty and the gradual emergence of the relatively open-opportunity society of late imperial China.

Mote presents a corrective to many of the false ideas about Chinese society and government between 900 and 1800 A.D. He examines many of his colleagues’ prevailing theories and cherished interpretations and vividly demonstrates that attempts to explore the vast documentary corpus that is Chinese history have been limited. This is not necessarily a criticism of his colleagues; it is an example of just how new the field of Chinese studies is in Western scholarship.

The chapters on the complexity of the relation of the Chinese State with its neighbors are rewarding. Everyone with a professional interest in China should read this book.

**Lewis Bernstein, Senior Historian, SMDC, Huntsville, Alabama**

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