The Care and Feeding of Warlords

A Monograph
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The purpose of this monograph is to recommend the inclusion of "warlords" into United States military doctrine by defining the nature of a warlord, and by applying historical insights into a conceptual framework through which military leaders may better manage warlord interactions. As an influential actor today and throughout history, warlords require a unique approach by military leaders in order to achieve success in their interactions. In addition to identifying general warlord characteristics, it is also important to realize that each warlord acts based on unique motivations, particularly in their relationship to United States' objectives, and that each warlord will have a unique ability to influence the United States' desired outcome in a particular situation. From this information, a warlord typology emerges - the "good", the "bad" and the "ugly" - that affords leaders a structure from which they may begin to consider future planning and operations. Leaders may then frame their interactions based on four general lines of effort - recognition, legitimacy, force application and incentives - in order to compel, control, influence or support a warlord to best reach the leader's objective. Using this typology and these four lines of effort, the monograph introduces a Warlord Interaction Model.

**Subject Terms**
Warlords, counterinsurgency, intervention, leadership approaches.
Title of Monograph: The Care and Feeding of Warlords

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Abstract

The Care and Feeding of Warlords by MAJ Derek O. Zitko, USA, 53 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to recommend the inclusion of “warlords” into United States military doctrine by defining the nature of a warlord, and by applying historical insights into a conceptual framework through which military leaders may better manage warlord interactions. As an influential actor today and throughout history, warlords require a unique approach by military leaders in order to achieve success in their interactions. Currently, United States military doctrine does not address this topic, neither in identifying warlords nor in recommending procedures for handling warlords. However, contemporary literature assists in providing a useful definition of the term “warlord”, and historical studies of warlord interactions present techniques and procedures which may assist contemporary leaders in their interactions with warlords. In addition to identifying general warlord characteristics, it is also important to realize that each warlord acts based on unique motivations, particularly in their relationship to United States’ objectives, and that each warlord will have a unique ability to influence the United States’ desired outcome in a particular situation. From this information, a warlord typology emerges – the “good”, the “bad” and the “ugly” - that affords leaders a structure from which they may begin to consider future planning and operations. Leaders may then frame their interactions based on four general lines of effort - recognition, legitimacy, force application and incentives - in order to compel, control, influence or support a warlord to best reach the leader’s objective. Using this typology and these four lines of effort, the monograph introduces a Warlord Interaction Model. This model seeks to better prepare the United States military to succeed in future warlord interactions; undoubtedly, the nation will be involved in the “care and feeding” of these actors in support of national security interests in the near and distant future.
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INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, Ahmad Shah Massoud led the organized armed resistance that drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s, Mohamed Farrah Aidid led the organized armed resistance that forced the United States to abandon its humanitarian mission in Somalia. The title commonly applied to both of these men by United States civilian and military leaders is “warlord.” Today’s media frequently applies the term “warlord” to describe a variety of anti-government leaders of armed factions in locations around the world. In fact, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 9, 2009, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal stated that warlords were a key element in securing victory in Afghanistan.

However, despite their important role in international affairs and the attention provided to them by leaders worldwide, United States’ military doctrine is nearly void of guidance related to warlords. Based on the Army’s current operational concept of full spectrum operations, should the United States Army introduce doctrine concerning “warlords?” The purpose of this monograph is to introduce the warlord into military doctrine by defining the nature of a warlord and by applying historical insights into a conceptual framework, the Warlord Interaction Model, through which military leaders may better manage warlord situations.

Surprisingly, in spite of its recurrent usage and important application, United States Army or joint doctrine does not mention, let alone define, the term “warlord.” The first function of this monograph is to produce a recommended definition for the extra-governmental actor known as “warlord” for implementation into United States Army doctrine. In addition to the lack of a definition, the absence in military doctrine of any discussion of this significant extra-government

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1 One can located the term “warlord” in numerous publications or in a simple Google search as referring to a variety of strongmen in a variety of geographic locations. For example, a Foreign Policy article from August 31, 2009 refers not only to a current warlord in Afghanistan, but refers to Massoud as a warlord. (www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/31/the_warlord_winner_of_afghanistans_election)

2 Congress confirmed LTG McChrystal as the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in June 2009.
player logically leads to the absence of any methods or techniques which may support United States military strategy involving this type of actor. With military thinkers primarily focused on concerns for doctrine related to other aspects of the Cold War or Desert Storm or to the ideological concerns of the Global War on Terrorism, there is a gap in doctrine concerning warlords. Though certainly not comprehensive of all aspects of warlord activity, a study of historical cases in which warlords were compelled, controlled, influenced or supported may assist in the creation of general methods or techniques to be introduced into United States military doctrine in order to facilitate beneficial interactions with current and future warlords. Thus, the second function of this monograph is to introduce a conceptual framework, based on historical considerations, for compelling, controlling, influencing or supporting warlords for implementation into United States Army doctrine in the future.

**Methodology**

This monograph seeks to answer the research question, “In light of the security environment of the 21st century, should the United States Army develop doctrine concerning ‘warlords’? Further, can a conceptual framework based on historical evidence be constructed for future interactions with warlords?”

The paper’s first section discusses the production of a formal definition of “warlord.” Initially, the monograph reviews Army doctrine in order to locate terms or discussion related to the topic. Next, the monograph discusses outside sources, to include governmental and non-governmental academic studies and foreign military doctrine, in order to obtain an alternative perspective on warlords. Finally, the monograph presents a definition of warlord by synthesizing some aspects of current military doctrine and published academic discussions on this topic.

The second section of the monograph will analyze commonalities of warlord interactions by reviewing four temporally-varied historical case studies involving warlords: Afghanistan in the 1890s, China in the early 20th century, Afghanistan in the 1980s and Somalia in the early
1990s. These case studies draw from varied eras and locations in order to produce depth and breadth in the study. The monograph analyzes the positive and negative interactions between the warlords and the applicable governments during these periods in order to extract methods and techniques used to compel, control, influence or support the warlords in those situations. The final aspect of this section will be a review of the analysis of the four case studies, the synthesis of those lessons learned and the evaluation of their potential use by the United States military in current and future interactions with warlords.

The monograph’s final section will propose a warlord typology and “warlord lines of effort” that may be used as a conceptual framework by military leaders and planners in future operations. The proposed theory categorizes warlords as either “good”, “bad” or “ugly” before applying actions upon them along lines of effort that loosely coincide with the four elements of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic or DIME): diplomatic recognition or isolation, informational legitimacy or criminality, military suppression or cooperation and economic incentives or exclusion. This section seeks to provide a tool from which military leaders may frame their interactions with warlords.
THE DEFINITION OF “WARLORD”

Prior to determining methods through which interactions with warlords should occur, one must define the term “warlord”. As generically characterized, warlords have been powerful figures in history since the beginning of recorded time. Particularly in areas of weak official governance, men who could maintain the loyalty of an armed force could control land and power as they saw fit with little interference. In the past century, warlords have shown to be a tipping point in conflicts around the world, either by supporting a nation’s governmental structure or working to defeat it. Whether considering the current fight in Afghanistan, the world’s renewed interest in an unstable Africa or the growing economic hardship in fragile democracies around the world, the United States military will undoubtedly deal with warlords on current and future battlefields. But what, exactly, does a leader in the United States Army mean when he or she uses the term “warlord?” Despite the attention given them and their key role in determining the outcome of today’s conflicts, Army doctrine remains surprisingly silent about “the care and feeding” of warlords.

While a word-for-word reading of all Army and joint doctrine was not completed, a detailed review of the relevant manuals revealed that current doctrine provides no definitions or discussion of warlords. Further, the related definitions that doctrine provides apply more to an ideological insurgency with national or supranational ends, not to a localized leader involved in informal government whose ends are power and wealth in his region. FM 2-0, Intelligence, and FM 3-13/JP 3-13, Information Operations, mention only generic aspects of insurgents and “guerrilla entities.” FM 3-05.137, Special Operations Foreign Internal Defense, refers to “internal defense threats (IDTs)” that may be insurgents or “separatists,” and that they may be “willing to use violence to secure their goals”; however, no further pertinent discussion occurs. FM 3-07 and JP 3-07, Stability Operations, also offer nothing to the topic, though FM 3-07 mentions the word “warlords” in a vignette but with no definition or discussion. FM 3-0, Operations, provides a broad discussion of counterinsurgency that primarily focuses on
nationalist movements without including aspects of motivation and execution. The military
document that should best address interaction with warlords is FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,
published in December 2006. While ground-breaking for the Army in its topic, this manual does
not address the role of warlords in insurgencies, neither in a historical sense nor in the potential
for interaction in the future. The manual is heavily weighted towards dealing with insurgencies
that seek to overthrow a national government. The manual uses the JP 1-02 definition of
insurgency: “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through
the use of subversion and armed conflict.”3 Warlords, however, most often do not seek the
overthrow of the government; frequently, the opportunity to obtain, or maintain, power in their
region provides motivation for warlords. Additionally, they may not even seek the overthrow of
the government in their region – manipulation or coercion of governmental elements in their
proximity may suffice in allowing them to maintain power and self-interest. Further, FM 3-24
leans significantly on the ideological factors involved in an insurgency. A warlord’s motivation,
however, is generally not a “cause” – their objectives are most often self-serving, seeking only to
increase their own power and wealth. One should, however, consider certain aspects of FM 3-24
in application to warlord interactions. The use of illegal activities for resources, aspects of
leadership, base of followers, vulnerabilities and indicators of legitimacy as outlined for
insurgents by FM 3-24 should also be considerations for warlord interactions.4 The Department
of Defense also published *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0* in
September of 2007. This manual defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.”5 Though this doctrine
does not mention warlords, like FM 3-24, it considers aspects of adversarial interaction, including

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3 FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.
5 *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, 6.
its definition of irregular warfare, which would be useful in countering or co-opting the influence of warlords. Finally, there is an ongoing effort to publish a joint counterinsurgency publication (JP 3-24); currently in its draft form, this literature also makes no reference to “warlords” or other similar actors.

Having established the lack of reference to warlords in Army and joint doctrine, a review of publications outside the United States military may provide a potential doctrinal definition. First, a review of some foreign military doctrine provided no advancement toward a common definition. The United Kingdom Glossary of Join and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JDP 0-01.1) does not include the term “warlord,” nor are warlords discussed in UK Joint Defense Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation. A review of German military doctrine also revealed no definition or pertinent discussion of warlords.6 While an assessment of only two nations’ publications is certainly not all-encompassing of foreign doctrine, it shows that, though our NATO counterparts commonly use and understand the term “warlord”, they have also not formally considered a definition or techniques for interactions with this common actor.

Though the press and military academic elites also frequently use the term “warlord,” there is surprisingly little research published on this topic. However, there are a few resources from which an appropriate definition may be drawn. At the most basic level, the Oxford Companion to Politics of the World refers to a warlord as “…the warlike ruler or leader of a local region,” also mentioning that warlords often receive support from foreign governments.7 John MacKinlay refers to a warlord as “the leader of an armed band…who can hold territory locally and at the same time act financially and politically in the international system without

6 Assistance in this research and translation was provided by MAJ Guenther Daniels, German Army

interference from the state in which he is based.”

MacKinlay writes further into the requirement for distinguishing between insurgents and warlords, saying

Nor is the warlord to be confused with the insurgent: the former deals with the local population in a rapine and predatory manner, the latter has to use the population as its resource. The insurgent may use some of the trading techniques of the warlord, but if he really is an insurgent with a long-term political agenda, he will return to a political end game in which he will have to submit himself to the electorate.

The Cambridge History of China states that a warlord is one who commands a personal army, controls or seeks to control territory and acts more or less independently. Other authors have defined warlords in terms of legitimacy, power and wealth. Sasha Lezhnev has written that monetary gain is the primary gain for the warlord, facilitating their overall objective of “wealth, power and fame.” William Reno states that “warlord pursuit of commerce has been the critical variable in conflicts [in Africa]. Strongmen have used commerce to consolidate their political power within a coalition of interest among themselves, businesspeople, and local fighters.” Antonio Giustozzi’s research has led to his assertion that a warlord’s subordinates grant the legitimacy to the warlord through his provision of necessary services, to include military leadership and coordination. Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of nationalist China in the early 1900s, said that warlords have five characteristics: the lack of a political principle, the occupation of an area, an insatiable need for money and property, the love of his own skin and the dependence on imperialist support.

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8 MacKinlay, Defining Warlords, 48.
9 Ibid., 60.
10 Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, 284.
11 Lezhnev, Crafting Peace, 3.
12 Giustozzi, The Debate on Warlorism, 14.
From this research, a picture begins to develop of a common warlord that differs in important ways from doctrinal discussions of “insurgents,” thereby requiring a unique definition. First, the warlord is the product of a stateless or “weak-state” environment – his opportunity arises due to the lack of a governmental monopoly on violence. Second, a warlord achieves legitimacy through maintaining control of an armed force – unlike an insurgent, he does not need national public approval to reach his objectives. Third, a warlord exercises control over an area within a nation state that serves as his base of power – unlike an insurgent, he does not seek a “new order” for his country. Fourth, a warlord may conduct illegal activities, and may be supported by external states, in order to obtain financial sustainment – though similar to an insurgent, a warlord can be more ruthless because he will not be seeking electoral or diplomatic approval in the future. Fifth, unlike an insurgent, a warlord is not ideologically driven – the warlord is self-serving, seeking power and wealth. Finally, a warlord gains and enforces his stature through the force of personality – his charismatic and crafty leadership strikes a magnetic hold over his supporters. These characteristics should be included in Army doctrine as the formal definition of a “warlord,” and the case studies used in this monograph will consider these characteristics in viewing the nature of a warlord.
CASE STUDIES

Prior to proposing a conceptual framework through which to view interactions with warlords, it is beneficial to extract insights from warlord interactions throughout history as a basis of consideration. Due to their impact on governments and populations around the world and throughout time, there is no shortage of case studies available to review warlord interactions. The four studies chosen for this monograph vary temporally, geographically and contextually. The first study, Afghanistan in the late 1800s, provides a century-old look at a location in Central Asia that has garnered great contemporary interest. The second study, China in the early to mid-1900s, will review the events in the Far East that occurred during the Warlord Era after the fall of that nation’s final dynasty. These two case studies will primarily follow the narrative of the governmental leader who sought to control the warlords in his country. The third study, Afghanistan in the 1980s, returns to Central Asia in order to determine whether the interactions with warlords may have evolved in the same region. The final study, Somalia in the 1990s, looks at the events that occurred in a failing state on the African continent. Different from the first two studies, the monograph studies the last two cases primarily from the viewpoint of the warlords themselves and from the viewpoint of the external players who interacted with them. Using the variances between the cases in time, space and context, this study seeks to draw general lessons from which the United States military can consider for future operations.

Afghanistan, Late 19th Century

As throughout much of its history, Afghanistan in the 19th century was a pawn in someone else’s game; in this case, it was “the Great Game” between Russia and Great Britain. With Russia seeking a warm-water port to its south and Great Britain seeking to deny that objective by maintaining Indian sovereignty, Afghanistan became Britain’s buffer state against Russian aggression. The Barakzai dynasty ruled Afghanistan during this century, but was not without internal conflict. In 1863, Emir Dost Mohammed chose his third son, Sher Ali, as his
successor, setting off a civil clash between those who supported the succession and those who believed that the eldest son, Afzul Khan, was the rightful leader. This internal conflict established Afzul Khan’s son, Abdur Rahman Khan, as a strong, courageous leader to the Afghan people. Eventually defeated in the civil war, Abdur Rahman lived in exile in Russian Turkistan until Sher Ali’s death in 1880. Coinciding with the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British sought to replace Ali with someone whom they believed could control Afghanistan yet would understand his place in foreign affairs.14 After negotiations with British representatives, Abdur Rahman Khan became the recognized emir of Afghanistan in July of 1880.

Prior to his taking the throne, “every priest, mullah and chief of every tribe and village considered himself to be an independent king, and for about 200 years past, their freedom and independence were never broken by their sovereigns.”15 Assuming the leadership of this loosely connected country, Abdur Rahman first sought to unite Afghanistan’s regional warlords through peaceful means. He made great efforts to reconcile differences between tribal leaders prior to assuming the throne.16 He sent orders to all of the chiefs to “keep the country peaceful and to treat their countrymen kindly” and for this they would be rewarded.17 He sought to inculcate the thinking that, in order to best a rival, you don’t attack him directly; you outperform him in order to receive a promotion or benefit in rank, which reflects obedience and gratitude to the king.18 Additionally, he appointed loyal followers as provincial governors, decentralizing control in the provinces as long as they supported his requirements.19 Seeking to ensure the support of his

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14 Dupree, Afghanistan, 417.
15 Rahman, Volume I, 217.
16 Ibid., 182.
17 Ibid., 191.
18 Edwards, Heroes of the Age, 104.
19 Dupree, Afghanistan, 420.
countrymen, Abdur Rahman deployed “detectives and spies” throughout the country in order to determine which regional leaders were not loyal to him.20

Support from sources external to Afghanistan’s borders played a key role in Rahman’s warlord interactions. The containment of the warlords would not have been possible if Great Britain had not supported him with weapons, cash and other resources.21 The British influence on the creation of a modern state in Afghanistan cannot be understated. Further, Rahman had concerns over the warlords receiving support from external powers, particularly Russia. He found it vital to employ national power and his relationship with the British to deter any external support to the warlords.

Over time, regional warlords sought to undermine his rule, and Rahman frequently resolved this issue with military action. Despite the social changes he would institute in later years, Abdur Rahman’s ultimate source of power was his army.22 In order to promote the national position, Rahman would leave Kabul and personally go to the fight to challenge the warlord in front of the people of the region, his charismatic presence supporting the will of his army.23 His swift deployment against the Ayub’s uprising in Herat in 1881 resulted in the warlord fleeing from the country and the stabilization of governmental rule.24 In defeating Yussif Ali of Shignan in 1883, Rahman freed the people from illegal and repressive illegitimate rule. Most controversially, Rahman, after defeating the warlord army, would relocate the warlord’s base to another part of the country, saying that “the tree whose roots have been cut off cannot stand any longer…”25 The movement of Kilmani and Kafir peoples to other regions of the country in the

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24 Ibid., 215.
late 1880s dissolved their warlords’ potential for future uprisings. After the defeat of a Ghilzai warlord, Rahman moved these Ghilzai to northern Afghanistan, where these Pashtuns constructed villages separate from the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Over time, however, they began to take brides from the Uzbek and Tajik villages, deepening relations which continue to today through an inter-village council in the region. In 1898, Rahman deployed “agents” to the base of warlord Mahomed Ishak in order to win over his followers prior to battle. Perhaps the most encompassing example of how Rahman treated the warlords after defeating them can be found in the Hazara uprising in 1890, where he “killed some, others submitted to his rule, others were treated kindly as prisoners and sent to their homes.” Rahman also bought some warlords, exiled others and undermined still others by appointing their sons as members of his elite guard, which pulled them away from the warlord and into substantial positions in the national army. When these methods failed, Rahman did not fail to execute warlords either; after defeating the warlord Mahomed Hussain Khan, his “leaders were brought to Kabul, and the country was cleared of all these mischief-makers.”

To combat future conflict with warlords, Abdur Rahman believed it necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule. He believed that attacking the base of the warlords’ support, through both progressive and

26 Ibid., 248/291.
27 Ibid., 250-7.
29 Rahman, Volume I, 278.
30 Ibid., 288.
31 Ibid., 202.
32 Rahman, Volume II, 90.
33 Rahman, Volume I, 283.
fear-instilling means, would best deflate the warlords’ capabilities. He created provincial
governates that did not align with tribal boundaries – this permitted land transactions to occur
outside of the traditional tribal boundaries. These transactions, and other cross-tribal
interactions, weakened the bonds between the warlord and his base. Rahman sought to reduce the
power of the clergy and to limit their wealth, realizing that it limited his power to control the
people. Rahman also sought to invest in the people, placing a high priority on his subjects’
education and forming a national Loya Jirga, in an advisory role, which included warlords,
religious leaders and state secretaries from throughout the country. Rahman placed branches of
the treasury in nearly every town and province in order to support the people. In all these
actions, Rahman sought to exploit the kinship metaphor over the nation in order to soften tribal
ties and portray himself as a father for the country. Rahman’s assessment of his actions led him
to perceive that “many of the tribal chiefs have been transformed from bitter enemies into warm
friends, and I have placed them in high positions and offices under my government.” While
these actions paint Rahman as a progressive leader, he also earned his nickname as the “Iron
Amir.” He made quite vivid public displays of the remains of those who were disloyal to him.
He also required government approval for all Afghans to move within or outside the country.

38 Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 82-3.
Through his words and actions, Abdur Rahman sought to undercut the warlords’ base by both offering modern progress, and threatening violent action, to the people.

Perhaps the great legacy of Rahman’s provincial system was that his son replaced him without bloodshed, an uncommon occurrence in Afghan history. Rahman said, “If my successors follow my example in employing able officials in their service without prejudice against nationality or religion, their country will always prosper.” Rahman believed that Afghanistan could one day again be divided if “the country came under the rule of an inexperienced and weak Amir.” Using a combination of progressive reform and brute force, Rahman succeeded in controlling the warlords in late 19th century Afghanistan. In the end, the fact that “he proved to be one of the few Afghan monarchs who died in bed and in power can be explained not only by his vigilance, but also by the fact that he availed himself of every opportunity to demonstrate the force of his will and the moral imperative of his rule to those around him and to the nation at large.”

**China, Early to Mid-1900s**

The early 20th century was a historic time for the Chinese people. Throwing off thousands of years of dynastic regimes, the Chinese revolution of 1911 pronounced a new hope for the people, who believed it signaled their entrance into a promising future. However, the fall of the Manchu dynasty left a power vacuum that led to a chaotic 12-year period known as the Warlord Era. During this time, the former national army generals commanded their own armies and laid claim to their regions, and sometimes to the capital, through the use of brutal force. Though the national government eventually came together under Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang (KMT)

46 Rahman, *Volume II*, 16.
47 Ibid., 167.
Party in the 1920s, it wasn’t until the ascension of Chiang Kai-shek to Generalissimo of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the National Government that the national leadership sought and obtained the total submission of the warlords. Through both diplomacy and forceful means, Chiang drove the warlords of China into capitulation to the national government.

As in the case of late 19th century Afghanistan, both of the actors in conflict here, the Kuomintang and the warlords, received financial support from external states. During Sun’s rise, the Russians provided manpower and resources to him to promote stability in the country. Chiang received support from both the United States and Germany in the form of arms and cash. Because the Japanese desired an unstable China, they supported the warlords with resources and deployed agents with the purpose of creating conflict. Additionally, both Great Britain and Japan supported the warlords Wu Pei-fu and Tang Chi-yao in order to facilitate the Chiang’s defeat. The Soviet Union supported warlord Feng Yue-hsiang, yet he played both sides and eventually told the Russians to go home, ending Russian involvement in warlord politics. In support of both sides in the conflict, foreign governments ignored the 1919 Arms Embargo Agreement and shipped a multitude of weapons. Again, external actors played a large part in a sovereign nation’s internal warlord interactions.

During the Warlord Era, the conditions in the country consistently deteriorated. Sun claimed that unification had to come through a common belief among the people, not through

49 Schurmann, Republican China, 139.
50 Ibid., 147.
51 Ibid., 149.
52 Pu-yu, A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary Forces, 43.
54 Ibid., 304.
55 Schurmann, Republican China, 31.
arms to which the warlords adhered.\textsuperscript{56} The undisciplined anarchy of the era could only be solved by internal unity and strength\textsuperscript{57} Chiang had grown up during this era, and he understood that there were “few standards of human decency his warlord contemporaries did not violate. They obeyed no law but power, and he outwitted them at their own game.”\textsuperscript{58}

The warlords in China were a diverse and colorful cast. Feng Yuhsiang, the “Christian General,” had an armed cavalry mounted on bicycles; fat general Ma Hung-kuei overindulged himself and was abandoned by his troops; Yen His-shan so deeply entrenched himself into isolation that Chiang could never dislodge him.\textsuperscript{59} Eventually, Chiang chose to provide financial support to Yen and gave him a meaningless government title that only affirmed his isolated position.\textsuperscript{60} Regardless of location or style, “each [warlord] was his own master, and each depended for power on his private army which in turn depended for its survival on what could be taken from the countryside.”\textsuperscript{61} They were primarily interested in power and wealth; they most often determined whether to support or betray the government based where their financial advantage lay.\textsuperscript{62} Further, most of their men joined the warlords for economic reasons, most often resourced through illegal taxes or the opium trade.\textsuperscript{63} Each warlord maintained control through personal relations and asserting the obligation of loyalty to every soldier.\textsuperscript{64} None were eager to actually put their armies into battle because they could lose them and, thus, lose their power

\textsuperscript{56} Pu-yu, \textit{A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army}, 46.
\textsuperscript{57} Schurmann, \textit{Republican China}, 138.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 37/42.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{63} Worthing, \textit{A Military History of Modern China}, 90.
\textsuperscript{64} Fairbank, \textit{The Cambridge History of China}, 287.
As in Afghanistan, “the warlord’s primary goals were personal, the maximization of his power.”

Chiang recruited the best soldiers from around the country to his military school, the Whampoa Academy, gaining their loyalty and removing assets from the warlords. These troops were frequently outnumbered in battle, but their higher quality and discipline provided victory and impressed the populace. Chiang obtained victory through three primary means: his method of defeat in detail, tackling the warlords one by one; his promotion of solidarity, convincing the army of its united purpose; and his promotion of the liberation of the people, who were tired of the warlords’ abuse. Chiang, either diplomatically or through threat of force, influenced many warlords to join him on the Northern Expedition – though they greatly outnumbered the KMT, they would not work together so Chiang defeated them one by one. Three days into the Northern Expedition, six warlords had capitulated and declared allegiance to the central government. Like Abdur Rahman, Chiang Kai-shek led from the front, personally directing operations against the warlords. Warlords who disliked him supported him because “he was recognized by the world as the proper recipient of loans and supplies to China” and could, therefore, fill their coffers. For example, in 1923, Chiang showed his diplomatic and economic

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65 Ibid., 289.
66 Ibid., 303.
67 Schurmann, Republican China, 144.
68 Worthing, A Military History of Modern China, 95.
69 Pu-yu, A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, 48.
70 Worthing, A Military History of Modern China, 97.
71 Pu-yu, A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, 83.
72 Ibid., 51.
73 Schurmann, Republican China, 246-7.
flair when he coordinated with a Cantonese warlord in order to set up and support a local
government, defusing the warlord through progressive means.\textsuperscript{74}

Though victorious in the long run, Chiang’s actions were not always successful. His
offers to the warlords of high positions in the national army provided mixed results – many
accepted the positions, but some later would not obey his orders.\textsuperscript{75} Worse, warlords kidnapped
Chiang and interned him for two weeks until he agreed to stop fighting the Chinese Communists
in order to take the fight to the Japanese.\textsuperscript{76}

The Warlord Era in China was born out of a weak central government that could not
maintain stability within its borders. Chiang Kai-shek showed that a key requirement in
controlling warlords is a strong military force.\textsuperscript{77} However, later years showed that, while warlords
influenced the shape of Chinese nationalism due to the militaristic requirement, the failure of the
KMT demonstrated that military power alone is not enough.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Afghanistan, 1980s}

In the decades following the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan, the Afghan monarchy led the
country peacefully by allowing measures of autonomy in a confederation of regions until charges
of corruption in the national government led to a bloodless coup in 1973. Internal strife followed
for the next five years until the Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) established a socialist state in 1978. From the beginning, the new
government intended to uproot the traditional society in order to “modernize” the country. They
conducted reforms through violent means, causing an organized backlash from militants who

\textsuperscript{74} Schurmann, \textit{Republican China}, 140.
\textsuperscript{75} Worthing, \textit{A Military History of Modern China}, 99.
\textsuperscript{76} Schurmann, \textit{Republican China}, 148.
\textsuperscript{77} Fairbank, \textit{The Cambridge History of China}, 310.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 319.
desired to maintain the country’s traditional semi-autonomous ways. The regionally-based militant leaders, or warlords, maintained armed forces and operated independently in order to obtain their personal objectives. Due to the pressure placed on it by these warlords, the Afghan government requested military support from the Soviet Union, who entered the country in 1979 and departed in defeat nine years later. Afghanistan’s warlords, supported by external actors, were the primary cause of the Soviet departure.

While external support was an important factor of warlord interactions in 19th century Afghanistan and early 20th century China, the intervention of foreign powers in this period of Afghan history was decisive. Despite making little progress in its “Great Game” with Great Britain in the 19th century, Russia continued to maintain interest and influence in Afghanistan, partnering with the Afghan monarch and providing arms and other resources to the government throughout the 20th century. The establishment of the PDPA as the ruling faction in 1978 provided a solid foot-hold for the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the region. Therefore, when this new grip appeared to be slipping, the USSR upped the ante in its support to the Afghan government by deploying its 40th Army to fill the large gaps left by the dissolving Afghan national army. Initially, the combined arms brought to bear on the warlord factions, and their support bases, were devastating; however, due to the determination of the warlords and the external support provided by other nations, the Soviets eventually cut their losses and withdrew their forces from Afghanistan. As for the warlords, the United States and Pakistan provided the external support to their efforts, primarily in a covert manner. The funding and weapons, particularly the Stinger missile, provided by the United States through Pakistan to the warlords were the tipping point of the war.

It is important to point out that a misunderstanding of Afghan culture could lead to an objection to labeling these men “warlords” as opposed to *mujahideen* and, therefore, driven by
ideology. While Islam was a part of the Afghan narrative, their warrior nature and the desire for control of their region were the driving factors at this time.\textsuperscript{79} The internal strife and backstabbing among the warlords prevented any unity guided by ideology. As Howard Hart, the CIA’s station chief in Pakistan at the time, said, “…the Afghans are hardly a people, much less a nation. They are a nation of tribes constantly at war with each other. They are very heterogeneous, with an extreme ethnocentricity which makes them not only hate or suspect foreigners but Afghans living two valleys away.”\textsuperscript{80} Thus, by the working definition in this paper, there were many warlords in 1980s Afghanistan. Amin Wardak used his private army to wrest Wardak Province from the communist regime.\textsuperscript{81} Ismatullah Muslim was a warlord who determined in 1984 that he was not receiving enough material support from the United States-Pakistan fund and switched sides, fighting for the communist government in order to receive greater wealth.\textsuperscript{82} Abdul Rashid Dostum was a key general for the Afghan national army until he switched his allegiance to the warlord alliance and contributed to the government’s downfall. Perhaps more well known to the Western world are the warlords Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Haq and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the face of the Afghan resistance in the West during this period. Massoud’s position in the Panjshir Valley, located between the Soviet Union and Kabul, provided him the ideal site for attacking Soviet convoys into Afghanistan. Prior to the war, Massoud used his isolated location to set up military schools, Islamic courts and an extra-governmental tax collection system which, in conjunction with military aid from China, financed his operations. When the war began, Massoud employed hit-and-run tactics to degrade the capabilities of “over 100,000 [Soviet] troops totally dependent on everything from spare parts and ammunition to medicine, vodka and Russian

\textsuperscript{80} Crile, \textit{Charlie Wilson’s War}, 224.
\textsuperscript{81} Kaplan, \textit{Soldiers of God}, 183.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 203.
food.” Massoud was also brilliant in his strategy, three times cutting a deal for a cease-fire with the Soviets in exchange for food and guarantees to leave his villages alone. Massoud, however, became most effective when the United States identified him as the point man in the fight against the Soviets and began to increase resource support to him, particularly with Stinger missiles. Despite their ethnic differences and a shift in funding away from him, the warlord Abdul Haq celebrated Massoud’s accomplishments in the Panjshir. Haq is notable due to his ability to work around distinct tribal loyalties in forming his armed forces. Haq was the first warlord to meet with President Reagan, but the United States determined that he would not be a critical player and, thus, he received minimal resources to conduct his operations. The funding that did not go to Haq went to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, perhaps the most ruthless warlord in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was cunning, maintaining his camp just inside the borders of Afghanistan so that he could say that he had fighters operating in the country, yet preserve them from actual commitments to battle. Pakistan led the United States to believe that Hekmatyar was the principal actor needed to defeat the Soviets, and the U.S. provided him with billions of dollars. However, the evidence shows that Hekmatyar spent more of his resources attacking rival factions than in defeating the Soviets.

The United States’ involvement in warlord interactions achieved mixed results. It worked in conjunction with the British government to achieve effects that it may not have been able to obtain on its own. Gust Avrakotos, CIA agent in charge of the Afghan program, said that Great

86 Ibid., 42.
87 Ibid., 169.
88 Ibid., 110.
89 Ibid., 169.
Britain “had a willingness to do jobs that I couldn’t touch. They basically took care of the ‘How to Kill People Department’.\(^90\) The United States, however, did maintain a separate funding channel from the established British avenue, in order to maintain leverage over Massoud.\(^91\) The provision of Stingers was critical because it provided security to the people, who could return to the fields to work, and legitimacy to the warlords.\(^92\) On the other hand, the United States interaction with Pakistan was not always productive. The Pakistani ISI consistently lied to the United States about the progress of the war and the use of the money given to it.\(^93\) Thus, the United States’ poor understanding of the environment led to the provision of large amounts of money to a savage like Hekmatyar.\(^94\)

A final reflection from this period involves the consideration of the impact of progressive reforms. If the government had given the warlords what they had wanted in the 1970s, there may have been no motivation for war. If Karmal, the more moderate PDPA candidate in 1978, had been the leader of Afghanistan and had granted land reform and maintained traditional society, as expected, the country may have become another Bulgaria, at peace.\(^95\)

**Somalia, 1990s**

With its history of undermining occupiers, the people of Somalia say of foreign governments that “it’s easy to come, but hard to stay.”\(^96\) This certainly proved true of the United Nations’ humanitarian mission to Somalia in the 1990s as the operation, and indeed much of the world, became engulfed in warlord politics. Lyons and Samatar state that Somalia is

\(^90\) Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 201  
\(^91\) Ibid., 201.  
\(^92\) Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 129.  
\(^93\) Ibid., 215.  
\(^94\) Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 212.  
\(^95\) Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 117.  
\(^96\) Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 76.
a decentralized, pastoral society with a culture based on kinship and Islam, which became distorted under colonialism by the penetration of market relations and artificial state structures. Decolonization and the institutions of the early independence years failed to establish effective new ways to connect Somali society to the state. Siad Barre’s regime became increasingly authoritarian over time and in the end relied upon brute force and the manipulation of clan animosities to remain in power.97

After Siad Barre was removed from power, his clan-based faction remained loyal, and he attempted to hold onto Mogadishu, acting as “the first regional warlord in the 1990s.”98 Early in 1992, a great north-south split developed along clan lines with warlords Mahdi and Aidid in command. These rival factions ruled their own areas, facilitating the split of the nation state, yet each sought to gain more power over Somalia.99 Upon recognizing the emerging humanitarian crisis, the United Nations deployed peacekeeping forces with the task of maintaining order and securing the distribution of food and supplies to the Somali people. Due to the determination of Aidid and other warlords, the UN mission, which later included heavy U.S. involvement, suffered a great number of unexpected casualties and culminated short of its objectives.

Again, the actions of external players factored heavily into warlord politics. In the case of Somalia, it was the sin of omission that contributed to instability. The United States and Italy were external patrons to Somalia with leverage over Barre in 1988; their intervention then may have averted a civil war or mediated it quickly. However, once fighting started, the international community acted late, not discussing power sharing until there was already an imbalance between adversaries; UN’s first intervention was more than a year after Barre fell.100 The United Nations and the United States were often at odds on the strategy and prosecution of the mission, from the process of supporting humanitarian assistance to the rules of engagement and the program of

97 Lyons, Somalia, 24.
98 Ibid., 21.
99 Ibid., 23.
100 Ibid., 27.
disarmament of the population.\textsuperscript{101} Lyons and Samatar testify that “international policymakers focused primarily on the ceasefire as a means to facilitate humanitarian operations rather than as the first step in a broader strategy to promote political reconciliation to fill the underlying vacuum of authority.”\textsuperscript{102} By attempting to solve the wrong problem, the interference of the international community only exacerbated the problems in Somalia. As in the case of 1980s Afghanistan, the role of external actors was significant, though this time not decisively positive.

The organizational strength in Somalia is at the level of the clan – a grouping based on kinship and descent. Thus, the post-Barre division appears to have returned Somalia to its propensity - a U.S. Army War College study noted that the “highest level of politics [in 1990s] Somalia is clan politics.”\textsuperscript{103} Because the clashes were factional in nature, it guaranteed that the perception of the peacekeepers in charge of assistance protection tasks would not be neutral – warlord leaders interpreted the peacekeepers’ motivations depending on the dispersion and location of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{104} Further cultural issues facing the UN mission included instituting a policy of weapons gathering when weapons seized in this society were easily replaceable, and maintaining effective rules of engagement when women and children frequently participate in the battles.\textsuperscript{105} For example, Pakistani forces that deployed as a part of the UN contingent in September 1992 had neither the mandate nor the weapons nor the rules of engagement to challenge Aidid; thus, they were restricted to barracks and could not take effective action.\textsuperscript{106} In December of 1992, another ceasefire brought calm between Aidid and Mahdi, and Aidid gave the following advice to US envoy Oakley and to the coalition generals on the ground:

\textsuperscript{101} Lyons, \textit{Somalia}, 41.  
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 31.  
\textsuperscript{103} Clarke, \textit{Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope}, 9.  
\textsuperscript{104} Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 55.  
\textsuperscript{105} Poole, \textit{The Effort to Save Somalia}, 50.  
\textsuperscript{106} Lyons, \textit{Somalia}, 33.
“If the militias and gangs know you are coming, they will get out of the way and won’t cause trouble. And make sure that the first troops arrive with food and medicine to give directly to the people. In this way they won’t see you as just another armed band to be feared but will associate you with good things.”

When UN observers initially deployed, it was under the expectation that they would fall under the protection of Aidid and Mahdi; however, there were so many factions, no group could make such a guarantee. These two primary adversaries had less control over events than they pretended. Further, young Somalis were not desirous of an end to the war – their economic fortunes were such as they had not known before. The arrival of peacekeepers would reduce their fees as security guards or prevent their thievery.

Adding further tension was the greater esteem given to the Aidid and Mahdi factions; the non-Aidid/Mahdi factions felt unrecognized by the UN, and did not get their share of the food aid, so they continued fighting after Aidid/Mahdi had agreed to a stand down/cease fire in March, 1992. For example, the March 1992 UN ceasefire talks only included Aidid and Mahdi, thus marginalizing leaders and clans – like the Murasade and Hawadle – that had remained neutral all along. The UN continued to compound this issue because the fourteen factions represented at the January 1993 talks were chosen haphazardly, with no thought given as to whether they would be the ones to reestablish the Somali state. Aidid acted as an obstructionist to the January 1993 talks, so U.S. Marines attacked one of his camps, capturing weapons and destroying the camp – Aidid chose to participate in the talks thereafter. Later that year, the UN negotiated agreement from the March 27, 1993 conference was usurped by a “warlord-driven conference” on March 30,

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108 Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 35.
109 Ibid., 77.
1993; however, because this new conference did not represent the whole community and its traditional leaders, the conference facilitated no long-term stability. Finally, the timing of troop rotations also inhibited the UN forces’ effectiveness - any momentum gained through the Addis Ababa conference on March 27 was lost due to the military unit transitions that occurred soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{113}

More than any other warlord, Mohamed Farah Aidid became the adversarial face of Somalia. Beyond his previously stated obstructionist acts, he continually vexed those attempting to stabilize Somalia through other actions, to include writing a letter to PM Mulroney of Canada in October of 1992 stating that “the deployment of forces… would promote open conflict in Somalia and thus undermine the peace process we are now engaged in.”\textsuperscript{114} Once the United Nations deployed, Aidid supported the deployment of US troops in December 1992 because he knew he couldn’t resist such a powerful force and because he believed it would forestall further UN intervention in Somali processes.\textsuperscript{115} Once the United States finally learned that negotiations with Aidid would not work, they declared him an international criminal. By mid-May 1993, the man “who once had been courted by the U.S. and UN and treated as a major player in internationally-sanctioned conferences on political reconciliation, was now demonized and made a pariah.”\textsuperscript{116} By June of 1993, the UN decided to include Aidid’s name in a resolution, issuing a warrant and offering a 25,000 dollar reward, which only resulted in his going into hiding and boosted his popular standing among his backers.\textsuperscript{117} In August 1993, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin approved sending a 440-man Special Operations task force to hunt Aidid; after he eluded capture, the U.S. government considered isolating Aidid or even reaching accommodation

\textsuperscript{113} Rutherford, \textit{Humanitarianism Under Fire}, 124.
\textsuperscript{114} Dawson, \textit{“Here is Hell”}, 107.
\textsuperscript{115} Lyons, \textit{Somalia}, 39.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{117} Poole, \textit{The Effort to Save Somalia}, 45.
with him. These accommodations included offering him safe haven in another country or ending his “outlaw status” to achieve reconciliation. As Baumann and Yates state,

Confronting a crisis it had not anticipated, President Bill Clinton’s administration responded in a way that epitomized its conflicted view of using military force. On one hand, it moved quickly to strengthen the US military presence in the region as if to warn recalcitrant Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid that it was prepared to crush any further opposition. On the other hand, it proclaimed within days that US military personnel would be pulling out of Somalia after a decent interval of a few months.

Additionally, commanders received guidance from the White House, the Pentagon or the United Nations that was ignorant of the local situation and imposed unnecessary restrictions. Further complicating the mission was the strife between the State Department and U.S. Central Command; by the State Department limiting the role of the quick reaction force (QRF) to force protection, it led Aidid and others to believe that the international mission was weak. One could argue that, due to the complexity of international interactions, popular support and cultural misunderstanding, U.S. foreign policy has never been more dysfunctional and schizophrenic when dealing with one man. The lack of unity of effort by the international community and the absence of a stable policy and well-defined objective doomed the effort to control warlord politics in Somalia.

One can obtain numerous insights from Somalia about dealing with a warlord situation. First, every input (food, meeting with certain factions, failing to meet with other factions) has ramifications – a leader must weigh the second and third order effects of each input into the environment. For example, despite the UN intention of merely separating warlord factions, the

118 Ibid., 3.
119 Ibid., 53.
121 Ibid., 207.
122 Ibid., 52.
perception might be that an external force is supporting one or the other faction rather than remaining neutral. Next, the external forces did not address other key leaders in society in the reconciliation process: the elders, *Ulema*, modernizers, oracles and poets, women.\(^{123}\) By speaking to these people and supporting their legitimacy, the United States would have promoted peaceful stability to the population. Third, as discussed, the political establishment must be firm in its intent. Issues with this mission included “vague political guidance, the lack of an attainable endstate, mission creep, political considerations overriding military necessity, a multilateral collaboration that conceded to the UN too much influence over American forces, and the subordination of genuine national security interests to idealistic humanitarian impulses.”\(^{124}\) Next, the lack of an underlying political strategy in relation to disarmament attempts reduced the ability of self-defense for Somalis without offering them a police force or other security measure.\(^{125}\) Finally, short-sighted operations designed merely to manage the humanitarian aspects alone were inadequate for providing assistance in a warlord environment.\(^{126}\) Neither the UN, nor the U.S., attempted to solve the right problem, and did not set the conditions for successful operations in Somalia.

Unique in these case studies, Somalia also presents the most difficult warlord situation in which the United States government may decide to act: involving the military with warlords in a sovereign nation’s internal strife in which U.S. national security is not at risk yet at least one actor is blatantly violating human rights. Further, perhaps Lyons and Samatar provide the greatest cautionary tale in warlord politics:

> Those who intervene in places like Somalia must decide in advance whether they are going to accept and work with the local powers that

\(^{123}\) Lyons, *Somalia*, 65.

\(^{124}\) Baumann, “*My Clan Against the World*”, 201.

\(^{125}\) Lyons, *Somalia*, 42.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., 67.
be, even though these people may be the ones responsible for the trouble that triggered the intervention.\textsuperscript{127}

In Somalia, as long as the United States and the United Nations dealt with the warlords and their followers, no effective processes would be established or supported by those societal factions not associated with the warlords.

**Evaluation of Case Studies**

In synthesizing the four case studies, the monograph will divide the lessons learned in reference to interactions with warlords into six categories: diplomatic actions, military actions, leadership and strategy, character and environment, base of support and the role of external actors.

**Diplomatic Actions**

The case studies provided mixed results in the area of diplomacy, displaying insights into the possibility of some short-term and long-term gains. Abdur Rahman sought reconciliation of differences upon taking the throne and built relationships that pacified a number of warlords in Afghanistan during his reign, seeking to establish a system where loyalty and obedience were more profitable than conflict. Both Rahman and Chiang placed warlords in governmental positions in order to invest them in the system and promote the legitimacy of the government to the warlords’ constituents. Additionally, both Rahman and Chiang bought the loyalty of the warlords, displaying the financial benefits of working with, versus against, the government; however, this method worked only as long as the funding lasted. Chiang also took steps in some cases to legitimize the warlord’s local government, in effect solving two problems in one action. This method also worked in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as Massoud and others had autonomy in

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 62.
their regions as long as they worked within the guidelines given by their benefactors. Diplomatic efforts in dealing with Aidid and the Somali warlords were an abject failure; however, this failure magnifies the necessity of having a central government through which to conduct diplomacy. The only exception to this requires a continuous flow of resources from the foreign power to the warlord, as in the case of the U.S. support to Massoud or the Russian and Japanese support to the Chinese warlords. One should consider the following lessons in diplomacy with warlords for application to military doctrine:

- Diplomacy between foreign powers and warlords is unlikely to achieve the desired results; unless backed by a continuous flow of resources or a strong military presence, the warlord will not respect the authority of the foreign power in his region

- Promote the supported government’s leaders’ aggressive pursuit of peaceful reconciliation with warlords

- Promote the supported government’s appointment of warlords to appropriate positions within the government; further, leaders should consider adopting the warlord’s local government, within set guidelines, as a win-win situation for both the leader and the warlord since it provides stable local governance while appeasing the warlord’s desire for power and autonomy

- The provision of funding to manipulate warlords may only prove beneficial in the short-term; benefactors must consider the long-term objective of that funding prior to committing it to the warlord

- If supporting a warlord, ensure warlord’s autonomy is validated; consider promotion of “good” warlords to national power in the absence of a supported government

**Military Actions**

When diplomacy fails, governments may be compelled to take forceful action against warlords. Abdur Rahman deployed trusted government agents throughout the country to observe any disloyal activities and to undermine the influence of the warlords. He also exiled warlords who would not reform and physically relocated people groups in order to avoid future conflict. Above all, the four case studies identify that a primary source of a country’s power is its army.
Both Rahman and Chiang maintained the threat of swift, violent action against those who considered disloyalty and killed those who acted upon it. In contrast to these two strong armies, the Afghan national army dissolved in the 1980s, and the Somali national army was absent; thus, there was no source of power from which to combat the warlords. The military actions as applied from these case studies to warlords are:

- Encourage the supported government’s penetration throughout the country and into the bases of warlord power in order to promote government legitimacy and degrade warlord influence

- Support the supported government’s ability to legally exile or execute warlords; relocation of people groups, however, this is not politically advisable

- Promote the strength and capability of the legitimate government’s armed forces; most warlords only respect the threat of physical force and some must be crushed in order to achieve submission

Leadership and Strategy

Two factors that increased the success of Abdur Rahman and Chiang Kai-shek in their warlord interactions were their strong leadership traits and the strategies they applied to their rule. Where the leaders in 1980s Afghanistan and in Somalia hunkered down in their capitals, Rahman and Chiang deployed their forces into the warlord bases and were personally involved in the battles with the warlords. This not only encouraged their armies, but highlighted the capabilities of the national government to the people in the affected region. Both Rahman and Chiang undermined the leadership capabilities of the warlords: Rahman by appointing warlords’ sons into elite positions in the national army and Chiang by recruiting the best and brightest from throughout the country for the national army school. Further strategies adopted by these two leaders included Rahman’s provincial realignment, which served to divide some of the warlords’ bases, and reduction in the power and wealth of the clergy, which diffused their ideological incitement of the population, and Chiang’s isolation of certain warlords, which gave them the ability to manage their own regions but within Chiang’s guidelines. Additionally, Rahman
advanced a strategic communication plan. By attempting to portray himself as a “loving father” and provider to the country, he sought to endear the population to himself rather than to their local warlord. In 1980s Afghanistan and in Somalia, the warlord filled the absence of any national leadership. In the Somalia case study, Aidid greatly overmatched the international community in both leadership and strategy. The leadership and strategy applications as applied from these case studies to warlords are:

- Persuade the supported government’s leadership to lead from the front against warlords; aggressively eliminate the threat and legitimize the leader’s authority
- Encourage recruitment of the best young men and/or women into the national army, to include political recruitment of warlords’ family members
- Promote the realignment of geographical/political boundaries in order to ethnically divide warlord power bases
- Consider formalized isolation of a warlord base (the provision of semi-autonomy) in cases where the cost of military action is too great
- Conduct information operations that highlight the benefit of the government’s actions over warlord rule
- In the absence of national government, identify a strong “good” leader (i.e. Massoud) and promote his capability as the nation’s leader

Character and Environment

As these case studies have shown, the warlord character and the environment in which he operates will undoubtedly challenge national governments and foreign powers. Thucydides stated that the motives for war are “fear, honor and interest”; warlords must believe that two out of three isn’t bad because trusting in their honor has resulted in many setbacks. Though 1980s Afghanistan showed that one can manipulate through guns and money, it is also true that warlords then, as well as in China and Somalia, could only be trusted within a given framework due to their constant objective of self-interest. Further, Somali warlords frequently overstated their capabilities and authority because there were no ramifications for their bravado. On the other
hand, warlords are generally not dumb; they can use their understanding of the environment to work to their advantage, particularly over a foreign adversary. Both Massoud and Aidid used cease-fire agreements merely as tactical pauses in order to reconsolidate and build for the next opportunity. Additionally, warlords do not always wear uniforms and often use women and children as both warriors and barriers to an opponent’s actions – this created many rules of engagement issues in Somalia. In not understanding the character and the environment, the United States invested a large amount of money and time in both Afghanistan and Somalia in bad choices – they bet on the wrong horse because they didn’t know the field. Particularly in Somalia, the decision to support the legitimacy of only certain warlords alienated not only the warlords who were more reconcilable, but the more productive members of society, too. This action spotlights that every input into a warlord interaction will change the propensity of the system, requiring great governmental foresight prior to every decision. The lessons in the warlord character and environment as applied from these case studies are:

- There is no endstate in warlord interactions - a positive relationship will remain constant only if the benefit to the warlord remains constant; therefore, an exit strategy is vital

- The “warlord USR (unit status report)” will always appear better than it really is; warlords desire to project greater power and capability than they can truly muster, requiring a strong emphasis on intelligence in order to determine their true capabilities

- Do not underestimate the advantage the warlord may have in geography and culture; seek to balance this advantage through a deep understanding of their base of power

- Invest time and resources in understanding the environment in order to ensure that any support given to a warlord will accomplish the United States’ objectives and that support is denied to those warlords who work against the United States’ objectives

**Base of Support**

Just as in an insurgency, a warlord requires a base of support from which to operate and recruit his armed force. In addition to the penetration of warlord bases by the government as
previously discussed, both Abdur Rahman and Chiang Kai-shek sought to lessen the brutality promulgated by the warlords, and Rahman in particular sought to offer progressive reforms that would further endear the population to his government. In fact, the fate of Chiang and the Kuomintang highlight the importance of penetration: they subdued the warlords because they brought progress to those warlords and to the land-owning elite, but Chinese Communists defeated them because the Kuomintang did not bring reforms to the people. Somalia provided a number of lessons in dealing with the base. First, warlord armies do not stop fighting unless there is an alternate source of income – the illegitimate activities of the Somali warlords provided immediate cash to young Somali men. Next, the gathering of weapons in a poor, warrior culture is likely to be fruitless – the warlords easily replace the guns and nonbelligerent civilians will have no way of defending themselves. Finally, it is difficult for a national army, and particularly a foreign army, to intervene in warlord conflict because the population may perceive action against one warlord, regardless of the reason, as support to another warlord. The lessons in interactions with warlord bases of support that may transition to military doctrine are:

- Promote the supported government’s capabilities of providing for the basic needs of the people over the warlord’s capability and ensure provision is made; if the warlord is “good”, recommend considering him to formally continue his leadership in his region

- Seek to recruit capable warlord lieutenants into the national army in order to promote disorganization within warlord bases of support

- Weapons disarmament programs in warrior cultures will likely be unsuccessful; warrior cultures consider arms as a basic need and, thus, disarmament shows a lack consideration for the operating environment

- Consider the ramifications, both perceived and real, prior to involvement in a battle between warlords

- Use social anthropology to determine the warlord’s power base; identify the source of a warlord’s base and focus efforts on disruption and interdiction of the source
The Role of External Actors

In each of the four case studies, actors external to the country’s borders played an important role in warlord interactions. In addition to receiving support from the British, Abdur Rahman used his own capabilities, in addition to leveraging British diplomacy, to deny the Russians from providing resources to the warlords in Afghanistan. Japanese support to warlords degraded Chiang Kai-shek’s ability to defeat them, delaying his goal of uniting the country. 1980s Afghanistan and Somalia showed that relationships between the United States and other external actors frequently lacked a unity of effort. In Afghanistan, the U.S. trusted Pakistan to funnel resources to the “right” warlord who would defeat the Soviets; however, the Pakistanis acted in their best interest and misappropriated billions of American dollars. Eventually, the United States found the warlord who would best accomplish its objective and supported him in abundance. In Somalia, the unclear and dynamic objectives of the mission led to a constant misunderstanding between the United Nations, the United States and other involved nations. The lack of unity, even within the U.S. government itself, undermined the ability of the armed forces to accomplish its mission in a warlord environment. Finally, as Aidid himself stated, any foreign power that enters into a warlord interaction must appear “good different” from the warlords; there must be an immediate positive impact in order to justify their appearance to the people. One may apply the following lessons involving external actors and warlord interactions from these case studies to military doctrine:

- A U.S.-backed government, with international support, must deny external support to warlords

- External governments must have a unity of effort, preferably in support of a legitimate national government, in all warlord interactions; the lack there of increases the legitimacy of the warlord

- The supported government must trust that its partners, both international and host nation, seek the same objectives prior to determining to which warlord resources will be given, if at all
- If committing forces to an internal conflict, ensure the impact of their arrival is immediately felt by the local population with provisions greater than the warlord can provide.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR WARLORD INTERACTIONS

Based on the proper definition of a warlord and the summation of lessons learned from past interactions with warlords, a conceptual framework emerges that facilitates a military leader’s understanding in a warlord environment. A military leader must first determine the type of warlord with whom he is interacting; then, he may use actions along four general lines of effort to compel, control, influence or support a warlord to best reach his objective.

Warlord Typology

In addition to identifying general warlord characteristics, it is also important to realize that each warlord has unique motivations, particularly in their confluence with United States’ objectives. Thus, a “warlord typology” may assist leaders in determining the method with which they desire to deal with a particular warlord. This typology will consider three types of warlords: the “good”, the “bad” and the “ugly.” Before determining a plan of attack for a given warlord, leaders must determine with which type of warlord they are interacting. Despite the pejorative qualities generally attributed to the word, one could consider a warlord “good” when his objectives align with the United States and with whom coercion causes no harm to the United States in international relations. Further, the warlord is able to maintain his base of power through more than raw intimidation. For example, Massoud not only had the parallel desire as the United States of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but he served in the role of “benevolent dictator” to his people, which allowed the United States to escape any public backlash they might have received for working with him. A “bad” warlord is one whose objectives do not align with the desires or values of the United States. Aidid in Somalia is a good example; his endstate would never have matched the coalition’s desired endstate, not even in simple humanitarian aspects. Finally, one must consider the “ugly” warlord. An ugly warlord is one whose actions either are neutral or are even aligned with the United States, but who, due to his nefarious ways, will bring political discredit to the United States should it choose to cooperate with him. For example, the
United States worked with the warlord Dostum in the Northern Alliance in order to defeat the Taliban in 2001, despite his well-known criminal activities and malevolent behavior.

In determining the type of warlord, a leader should consider several factors. The first involves the degree to which the warlord will be useful in achieving U.S. objectives. Regardless of what type of warlord is involved, leaders must determine whether there is a need to inject U.S. influence into a warlord situation in order to achieve the desired result. If the particular warlord is not of strategic or operational importance, or if one believes that internal forces at play will neutralize the warlord’s capabilities, there may be no action required by the United States.

The second factor is the alignment of the warlord to U.S. objectives. Obviously, if a warlord’s endstate is the same as the United States’ endstate, it will be easy to lead him to where he wants to go. Even if the warlord’s objective is neutral to the U.S. objective, as in an “ugly” situation, he will be far easier to coerce than a warlord who is diametrically opposed to U.S. objectives. By identifying these motives, the U.S. may determine the appropriate incentive-versus-force ratio required.

A third factor to consider is the warlord’s relationship to the central government. A “good” or “ugly” warlord is likely to be tacitly supportive of the central government because he sees the potential for the government to provide some autonomy, power and wealth. This support works for U.S. interests since, in most warlord situations, the U.S. would be acting on behalf of the legitimate government. A “bad” warlord will likely not support the central government and will constantly seek methods to undermine it. The only incentive that may work in this instance would be the granting of a level of autonomy that the central government may not be willing to allow. If there is no viable central government, warlords may have an increased motivation to obtain national power. In this case, ensuring the proper typing of a warlord is essential – the United States will seek to support a “good” warlord as a head of state.

The fourth factor to consider is the warlord’s source of power. A legitimate warlord, by Western standards, would be one whose “army” is full of willing recruits and who obtains
resources only through lawful standards. However, cultural differences apply varying meanings to the word “lawful” and, therefore, a “good” warlord could also be one who obtains resources through criminal means and who maintains an armed force by leveraging a warrior culture. A “bad” warlord may or may not exploit criminal means to build his power base; ideally, the host nation populace sees his methods as illegitimate. While not as essential in determining the type of warlord, determining the source of a warlord’s power is a key component to compelling, controlling, influencing or supporting him.

The final consideration in the typology of warlords is the sleaze factor - it is this feature that truly separates a “good” warlord from an “ugly” one. The United States may use a “good” warlord to achieve its objective without receiving backlash from the American people or from the international community due to its interactions. However, leaders must consider the ramifications of dealing with an “ugly” warlord. Even if coercion of this type of warlord is attainable in order to support the central government and to work in unison toward the U.S. objective, the second order effects of supporting him may not be worth the investment. An “ugly” warlord may be involved in gross human rights violations or may be engaged in criminal activity on a grand scale. Leaders must then determine if the interaction with this warlord to achieve the U.S. objective in that nation is worth the adverse effects involved.

When considered as a whole, these factors should cause leaders to ask themselves three primary questions about interactions with warlords: Will my injection into this warlord’s activities assist me in achieving my objective? If so, can I lead or coerce this warlord into working with me to achieve my objective? What are the second and third order effects of working with this warlord? What is my desired endstate and exit strategy as it pertains to interactions with this warlord? The answers to these questions will assist leaders in determining whether or not

\[128\] An example of this would be Dostum’s alleged mass murder of nearly 1000 Taliban prisoners of war at Dasht-e Leili in Afghanistan in 2002.
they should involve themselves in a warlord interaction. Determining the type of warlord will
greatly assist a leader in choosing the appropriate methods to apply in a warlord situation.
However, it is important to note that the typing of a warlord is never complete. From the
previously stated definition, warlords by nature are self-serving and will morph according to their
circumstances – therefore, military leaders must also continually reevaluate the motives of the
warlord to ensure that the applied type remains appropriate.

**Warlord Lines of Effort**

Once a leader has determined that a warlord interaction is required to achieve the national
objective, and has determined which type of warlord is involved, the next question is with what
methods do I confront this warlord in order to coerce him to meet my needs? Using the familiar
construct from military doctrine, there are four primary lines of effort (LOEs) to employ in the
management of warlords. Though there would be a variety of nodes along these lines of effort
reflective of the particular operational environment, this monograph will generalize the areas
from which military leaders should draw their nodes and objectives.

The first two lines of effort are part of the “carrot and stick” approach: incentives and
force application. In the incentives line of effort, the United States, in conjunction with the host
nation government as appropriate, would strike at the warlord’s desire for wealth. The most
obvious provision of this LOE would be cash payments or arms shipments to the warlord. As the
case studies showed, warlords may be easily bought, but only for the short-term – a later line of
effort discusses the manner in which this payment becomes legitimate. The second major area in
which to incentivize a warlord involves the provision of resources to his region. Regardless of
whether these provisions come from external powers or the national government, from
governmental sources or non-governmental sources, a warlord understands that he will best
maintain his power base if there is investment in his region. This line of effort likely applies
maximally to “good” warlord and with caution to “ugly” warlords. The incentive line of effort
focuses on the ability of the United States and the host nation government to endow a warlord with both personal and communal wealth.

The force application line of effort, the “stick,” involves the degree to which the U.S. will attack the persona and power base of a warlord. This LOE may range from the complete suppression of a “bad” warlord to full military cooperation with a “good” warlord. The two primary methods used within this LOE are the application of military force and penetrating information operations. If a warlord’s objectives are irreconcilable with the United States’ objectives and the supported government’s objectives, force will be required to achieve a long-term solution. This force may be the threat of military action, arrest, deportation or the use of armed forces against the warlord’s militia. This method requires physical removal of the warlord’s capability to act in conflict with U.S. and/or host nation’s objectives. Used as a precursor or in conjunction with force, aggressive information operations (IO) is another method of suppressing a warlord’s power base. The U.S. should facilitate the supported government’s penetration to the heart of the warlord’s power base in order to discredit the warlord and his ability to provide for the basic needs of the people. The force application line of effort will be the primary LOE in the interaction with “bad” warlords; likely, only the threat of force and the threat of dishonor should apply to “good” and “ugly” warlords. Further, a “good” warlord may receive cooperation from the U.S. along this LOE through partnership and training, the use of enablers or combined operations. Because of its hard-hitting ramifications, one must consider the force application line of effort in terms of second-order effects to ensure that the force applied, whether suppressive or cooperative, will achieve the long-term objective.

The final two lines of effort, much like the wealth involved in the incentives LOE, strike at the heart of a warlord: legitimacy and power. In the legitimacy line of effort, the United States should support the host nation government in using the charisma and capability of the warlord to improve governance in his region. For a “good” warlord and, to a lesser extent, an “ugly” warlord, this would require general agreement in policy between the government and the warlord.
This would facilitate the government’s affirmation of the warlord’s leadership in his region and achieve the warlord’s buy-in to the government. A second step in the legitimacy LOE is positive information operations. The antithesis to the IO used in the force application LOE, this action would reflect positively on the relationship between the warlord and the government and would aid in the national government’s penetration into the region. For a “bad” warlord, the U.S. would assist in delegitimizing the warlord, emphasizing his lack of governing capability and promulgating the negative IO discussed in the force application LOE. In the end, managing the legitimacy of a warlord is a key factor in achieving U.S. objectives in warlord interactions.

Finally, the recognition line of effort strikes at the vanity of these charismatic leaders by providing them position and title in the nation. The host nation government’s amalgamation of a warlord into its power structure, whether actual or ceremonial, provides esteem for the warlord in his region. Nationally, this might mean providing the warlord a seat at the table through a council or ministry position. Regionally, this might mean assigning him command of the army in his region or legitimizing his militia as a “national guard.” Additionally, by providing him position and title in the government, he receives pay appropriately for his work – this allows the legitimization of the “bribe” aspect discussed in the incentives LOE. The power line of effort focuses on the vanity of the warlord, providing him a modicum of control in the government while stroking his ego through position and title.

As stated previously, these lines of effort are general in order to give leaders the flexibility to adapt them to their environment. Particularly in the case of an “ugly” warlord, these lines may even apply in opposition to each other: perhaps by providing military cooperation to a warlord along the force application LOE in the short-term while working to denounce him along the legitimacy LOE in the long-term. By attacking warlord interactions through the lines of incentives, force application, legitimacy and recognition, U.S. leaders will better be able to organize their attempts at controlling warlord interactions. A graphic depiction of the model is located below. It is important to remember that this model is not intended to be prescriptive; it
provides generalizations from which leaders may conduct planning and operations in warlord interactions. A key component of the model is the constant reevaluation of the utility of the warlord interaction and the typology of the warlord. Misreading the usefulness of a warlord (as the United States did with Hekmatyar in the 1980s) or incorrectly typing a warlord (as the United States initially did with Aidid in Somalia) may result in poor resource utilization or, worse, mission failure.
Warlord Interaction Model

LEADER INTERACTION

The actor is a warlord?

The warlord influences the objective?

The model is not applicable

Determine Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition (D)</th>
<th>Legitimacy (I)</th>
<th>Force Application (M)</th>
<th>Incentives (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOOD</td>
<td>Promote as leader in region to the base</td>
<td>Provide military cooperation</td>
<td>Provide military/humanitarian/personal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGLY</td>
<td>Limit recognition, treat as long-term liability</td>
<td>Avoid promotion, seek to discredit in the long-term</td>
<td>Neutrality; short-term cooperation (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAD</td>
<td>Isolate from influence in govt/region</td>
<td>Delegitimize authority to the base; discredit</td>
<td>Suppress warlord through military action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This model is not prescriptive. The interactions between types of warlords and the lines of effort are generalizations from which military leaders may plan their operations.*
Practical Application of the Framework

Typology and lines of effort provide a general conceptual framework through which military leaders may conduct warlord interactions. Then next section applies this framework to both a historical and a contemporary case study in order to facilitate further understanding.

Historical: Arab Revolt of 1914

Though one cannot legitimately apply a new theory to history as if the participants were using the theory, one can view a historical event with respect to the tenets of the theory in order to consider its potential. An examination of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, popularly recounted by T.E. Lawrence, provides one example through which this warlord methodology may be applied. Because of its status as a global power, Great Britain fought World War I on multiple fronts against multiple enemies. Concerned about the actions of the Ottoman Empire on one front, the British saw an opportunity to use internal strife within the Ottoman Empire to decrease Britain’s national requirements - support the Arabs in a revolt against the Turks.

First, one must review the definition of warlord to determine if Emir Faisal, the leader of the Arabs, qualifies as a warlord. Faisal certainly was a strong personality, had control of a significant armed force and enjoyed a considerable base of power. Though not stateless, the Ottoman control of the Levant and Mesopotamia was weak enough to allow Faisal’s organization to arise with little resistance. The characteristic from the definition most difficult to apply to Faisal involves his motivation. Arab pride and the opportunity to throw off Ottoman rule were strong motivations for Faisal and his men. However, as the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, Faisal most certainly enjoyed the power and wealth accredited to him by his position and saw the potential of expanding both outside Ottoman rule. These considerations classify Faisal as a warlord for further consideration.
Next, one must conclude if an interaction with Faisal would contribute to the British strategic objective. As previously discussed, British forces deployed around the globe fighting battles during World War I. Because their main focus would be on the European continent, any assistance which they could obtain that would ease their commitment in other parts of the world, including the Levant and Mesopotamia, would be advantageous. Thus, one would deem that the interaction with Faisal would contribute to the overall British objective.

Third, one must assign a type of warlord to Emir Faisal. Because Faisal’s and the Arabs’ goal was to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain’s and Faisal’s objectives were aligned, both desiring conflict with the Ottoman Empire. In this case, because the British desired revolt, allegiance to the central government was undesirable. Combining this factor with the parallel objective, Faisal classifies as a “good” or “ugly” warlord. Because this event occurred prior to the 24-hour news cycle, there was far less concern about “ugly” warlords than there is contemporarily. Nevertheless, Faisal acted for his people within the cultural norms of his nation; therefore, one should consider Faisal as a “good” warlord.

Finally, one should look at how the British acted with respect to the lines of effort in order to manage their warlord interaction with Emir Faisal. First, because Faisal was a “good” warlord, the British acted with far more “carrot” than “stick.” In regards to the force application LOE, the British made it clear to Faisal that they had the capability to crush him, but due to his status as a “good” warlord, preferred to provide military cooperation. Far greater were the activities the British conducted along the incentives LOE. The British provided Faisal and the Arabs with a multitude of resources, to include guns and gold, to assist them in reaching their mutual objective. Further, they supported Faisal along the legitimacy LOE by providing British advisors, further establishing him as the undeniable leader of the Arabs. They also employed information operations to some degree, seeking to gain sympathetic support within Great Britain and from their allies concerning the Arabs struggle for freedom from the oppressive Ottoman Empire. Finally, they also supported activities along the recognition LOE, leaving Faisal in
charge of his military activities, despite their concerns, and forwarding his desires throughout the British chain of command.

As is well-known from Lawrence and from British history, Great Britain’s investment in Faisal and the Arab revolt was a success. The British were able to involve the Ottoman Empire in an internal quagmire that severely limited its ability to affect British efforts elsewhere. Additionally, the British were able to save precious resources, manpower in particular, for use elsewhere in World War I. The British were able to identify a warlord interaction, ascertain its feasibility, determine the quality and type of warlord and apply the appropriate pressures and resources to achieve their objective.

**Contemporary: Afghanistan in 2009**

While hindsight certainly allows one to apply a theory to history, a theory receives a more rigorous test when applied to a contemporary environment. In May of 2009, President Obama instructed Richard Holbrooke, his Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to negotiate with Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Though not known publicly, the assumed objective of this negotiation would have been to persuade Hekmatyar to cease his activities against the Afghan government in exchange for some type of personal or political gain. Hekmatyar’s willingness to accede to this negotiation would strengthen the international coalition’s ability to support stability in Afghanistan.

Using the theoretical framework, one must first determine that Hekmatyar meets the definition of a warlord. As the leader of *Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin* (HIG) in a country with a weak government, Hekmatyar controls a personal army and a large power base, both located in eastern Afghanistan. A charismatic leader, Hekmatyar was the prime minister of the country in 1993 and has continued to maintain control of his base despite focused attacks against him by coalition forces since 2002. Though he labeled by the press as *mujahideen* and claims his actions are to advance Islam, Hekmatyar’s efforts consistently work to maintain or increase his power.
Hekmatyar’s activities in the drug trade and in smuggling efforts provide for his and his party’s gains and, in an interview in August 2009, stated that “he had not spoken to Osama [bin Laden] in years.” Though Hekmatyar has ties to ideology through Islam, it is not a stretch to assume that his primary motivation is personal power. Therefore, Hekmatyar qualifies as a warlord under the recommended definition.

Second, one must determine whether or not interaction with Hekmatyar would be useful to accomplishing the United States’ objectives. As suggested previously, an agreement with Hekmatyar would be highly beneficial. He controls a large portion of the anti-government movement, and the curtailment of his anti-government activities and his promotion of the legitimate government would greatly contribute to the objective of stabilizing Afghanistan.

Next, one must assign a type of warlord to Hekmatyar. Historically, he has been both a good actor, as a Soviet fighter in 1980, and a bad actor, as an adversary during the 2001 United States invasion of Afghanistan. Primarily, Hekmatyar is an opportunist, and therefore labeled, at best, as an “ugly” warlord. First, the United States has identified him as a terrorist – therefore, the U.S. press will perceive any interaction with him as negative. Second, there is great risk in any negotiation with him – the U.S. must realize any expected gain in the short-term. If the U.S., working through the Afghan government, is to benefit from a warlord interaction with Hekmatyar, it must understand that there will be political ramifications for dealing with a terrorist, and it must ensure that it can quickly exploit the gains made before Hekmatyar looks for the next best opportunity.

If the U.S. determines that it can survive the “bad press” of dealing with Hekmatyar and that the risks of dealing with an untrustworthy character are acceptable, it may then act along the warlord lines of effort to achieve its objectives. Militarily, there would likely be a ceasefire between HIG and coalition forces along the force application LOE. While Hekmatyar would

129 Quoted in a Sky News interview with Hekmatyar, August 17, 2009.
certainly not agree to disarmament, the Afghan government could use this ceasefire to grow
Afghan National Police in eastern Afghanistan. They could also employ Hekmatyar’s fighters for
government purposes, further stabilizing the region. In the incentives LOE, a non-Western
approach may be required, where the Afghan government continues to allow some of
Hekmatyar’s illegal financial operations to occur in order to obtain the short-term gain. In the
long-term, the negotiation could be a basis for moving Hekmatyar’s forces into licit operations.
Diplomatically, the recognition LOE would be vital. Hekmatyar would demand a position in the
political process, initially requiring official recognition of his leadership in his region and, further,
the opportunity to run for national leadership in the future. These three LOEs work to the benefit
of the United States and the Afghan government and would be acceptable to Hekmatyar.
However, the legitimacy LOE would likely be the problematic issue. Promoting Hekmatyar as a
legitimate actor in Afghan politics, as one perceived to have ties with radical Islamists, may not
be an acceptable long-term solution for the United States. Therefore, the U.S. would likely need
to take action behind the scenes in order to delegitimize his ascendency.

Based on his track record, any U.S. interaction with the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
would be extremely risky. If the U.S. is prepared to exploit the immediate gain of a ceasefire in
an explosive region, this interaction could lead to meeting the country’s objective. Ironically, it is
legitimacy of another kind, the “occupation” of coalition forces, which would likely prevent the
occurrence of this interaction. Hekmatyar has stated previously that the presence of foreign forces
makes the Afghan government illegitimate; therefore, his willingness to work with the
government is predicated on the withdrawal of all coalition forces. Finding this untenable, the
United States and coalition forces will continue to treat Hekmatyar as a “bad” warlord and will
seek to defeat him through military force application, financial isolation, diplomatic exclusion
and delegitimizing information operations.
CONCLUSION

Warlords are important actors on the military landscape, and they require a unique approach by military leaders to achieve success in their interactions. In addition to the historical and contemporary evidence cited, there are certainly other contemporary examples that support the findings in this monograph. First, the United States worked with warlords in Afghanistan in 2001, achieving success with the Northern Alliance in defeating the Taliban through a unity of effort and a united objective and by providing a “carrot” to the northern warlords via resources. Upon his election thereafter, Afghan President Hamid Karzai placed the warlords in legitimate positions in the government. Much as it did for Abdur Rahman a century earlier, this defused the warlords’ motivation for struggle with the government. Second, in Iraq in 2007, the United States supported the “Awakening” in the Al Anbar province. Finding “good warlords” in Sheik Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi and Ahmed Abu Risha, the U.S. again found a united objective with the Sons of Iraq and provided the resources needed to achieve success against Al Qaeda. Also in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki displayed the leadership qualities of Rahman and Chiang in the Basra offensive in the spring of 2008. By being aggressive and bold in his initiative, he greatly increased the legitimacy of his government and bolstered the nation’s confidence in its armed forces while diffusing a warlord-like threat in his country.

As for the future of warlord interactions, the opportunities appear plentiful. In 2008, Somali pirates took warlordism to the waters through the capture of international ships. In 2009, instability in Mexico, the ill-health of Kim Jong Il in North Korea, and separatist movements in Pakistan are examples of situations where national governments may be threatened by warlords and require United States military intervention. Renewed interest by world powers in the African continent will likely bring confrontation with warlords bent on maintaining control of the natural resources in their region. Perhaps the United States government should even consider Afghanistan in 2009 simply through a “warlord lens,” despite its label as a major ideological struggle. Noted political scientist Fareed Zakaria, in discussing politics in Afghanistan, remarked
that it is less about ideology and more about “a share of the spoils”; while some Taliban are hard-
care fundamentalists, “others are concerned only with gaining a measure of local power, of access
to money and clout.”

To take it a step further, though research would be required beyond this monograph, the United States may also find itself in a scenario where the actor displaying warlord characteristics is not an indigenous strongman, but is instead a multi-national corporation. Currently, a number of African nations have contracts with corporations for the rights to the resources within that nation’s territory. Hiring their own “armies,” these corporations could seek to manage their “rightful territory” by force, essentially displaying the warlord characteristics of having an armed force, seeking control of a region and fighting for their own power and wealth.

The intent of this monograph is to determine if the Army should develop doctrine regarding warlords. In light of the 21st century operational environment, historical evidence supports the development of a conceptual framework which contemporary leaders can apply to warlord interactions. Through its historical and contemporary findings, this monograph recommends introducing the warlord into military doctrine by defining the nature of a warlord and by applying historical lessons into a conceptual framework, the Warlord Interaction Model, through which military leaders may better manage warlord situations. Through this application of new doctrinal concepts, the United States military will be better prepared to succeed in warlord interactions. Regardless of the good, bad or ugly nature of current or future warlords, there is no denying that the United States will be involved in the “care and feeding” of these characters in support of national security interests in the near and distant future.

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130 Zakaria, “A Turnaround Strategy”, 2
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