THE EMERGING AMERICAN STRATEGY: APPLICATION TO SOUTHWEST ASIA

James Digby

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A SERIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

May 1981
In late 1978, The Ford Foundation provided grants to The Rand Corporation and several university centers for research and training in international security and arms control. At Rand, the grant is supporting a diverse program. In the Rand Graduate Institute, which offers a doctorate in policy analysis, the grant is contributing to student fellowships for dissertation preparation, curriculum development, workshops and tutorials, and a series of visiting lecturers. In Rand’s National Security Research Division, the Ford-sponsored projects are designed to extend beyond the immediate needs of government sponsors of research by investigating long-term or emerging problems and by developing and assessing new research methodologies. The grant also is being used to fund the publication of relevant sponsored research that would otherwise not be disseminated to the general public.

All research products are being made available to as wide an audience as possible through publication as unclassified Rand Reports or Notes or in journals. The Rand documents may be obtained directly or may be found in the more than 330 libraries in the United States and 35 other countries which maintain collections of Rand publications.

The present Note is a speculative discussion about U.S. international security strategy, not a report on a completed analysis. Therefore, it is intended not so much to provide firm answers as to stimulate the reader to think hard about the value of a U.S. and Western security strategy for major confrontations very different from past ones, and to consider what types of new forces would be required. The speculation is along two lines. First, the outlines of the strategy seemingly favored by the Reagan Administration are noted and reduced to a brief code.
Second, consideration is given to the usefulness in Southwest Asian confrontations of various elements of the postures implied by the strategy: bases, ships, airplanes, vehicles, missiles, information networks, collaborative programs, and the like. Consequences for Europe are frequently noted, but the present discussion leaves it to later research to develop the application of a new strategy to East Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The elements of security strategy treated here relate primarily to direct confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union and to confrontations through their encouragement of the acts of others or through the overhanging threat of either. They do not cover the important set of problems dealing with internal instability, guerrilla warfare, and unsponsored local conflicts. A new strategy for dealing with these matters—which may threaten important U.S. interests—is much needed, but its outlines have yet to emerge. The author considers no cases of purely political competition, and only certain aspects of economic strategy.

It can be argued more convincingly that the Carter Administration's security strategy is no longer in effect than that a new strategy is in place. This effort to describe the emerging strategy is thus based not only on the few official statements made to date, but also on the views of persons one can expect to be influential. The author has consulted pre-1981 articles by Fred C. Iklé, Francis J. West, Andrew Marshall, John Lehmann, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Burt, David S.C. Chu, and Geoffrey Kemp and public speeches and statements through the spring of 1981 by Alexander Haig, Richard Allen, and Richard Perle. Also, he has profited from working closely with Albert Wohlstetter over the past six years during a time when the latter's speeches and papers were laying an intellectual
groundwork for many of the ideas now being adopted, including many codified in this Note.

But it should be clear that the author has used his own judgment in selecting which elements to include. In addition, he has superposed his own ideas for useful elements of the strategy and for unifying themes. The principle of bringing to bear almost every resource that might be available, some of the points made about the greater use of information systems, and the notion that the emerging strategy is consistent with the classical goals of arms control are largely his own embellishments.

Finally, it should be said that those who have considered the actual moves made in the first part of 1981 by the new administration and observed that these did not seem to be guided by a consistent strategy are justified. It was easier to set down this outline in February, when it was first drafted, than it would have been in May. But another year must pass before we can judge whether the somewhat idealized strategy set forth here predominates over the pressures to continue along familiar paths and the need to compromise.
SUMMARY

This Note deals with a number of elements of a new U.S. international security strategy, especially those where confrontation with the Soviet Union might be involved. It speculates on the strategy that is emerging, basing its outline of that strategy largely on views that have been expressed by leading figures in the new administration.

The new officials are consistent in pointing up the urgency of redressing the imbalances brought about by the buildup of Soviet military power. They note that restraint on the part of the United States has not resulted in reciprocal restraint on the part of the USSR.

The emerging strategy—which might be labeled a "Strategy of Full Recourse"—is likely to include these ten elements: (1) the preparedness to deal with simultaneous challenges in many places (and the abandonment of the "1-1/2-war" strategy), (2) the enhancement of mobility forces, particularly naval forces, (3) the enhancement of information systems requisite to efficient deployments and careful political control, (4) the restoration of a worldwide base system and selective forward basing in newly critical places, (5) collaboration with the leading industrialized democracies, (6) full use of Western industrial strength, both for a buildup of arms and to provide for later defense expansion during crises, (7) arms transfers when they contribute to U.S. security interests, (8) extension of the political use of U.S. nuclear strength while providing for nuclear deterrence and firm means of control, (9) prior arrangements to bring to bear all available resources, minimizing earmarking, and (10) the pursuit of the classical goals of arms control, which can often be consistent with Western security interests, while deemphasizing the virtues of the "process."
These principles can lead to a revised posture that shows much greater promise than the present posture for backing up U.S. interests in Southwest Asia. But it is not without its risks. It deemphasizes the buildup of intercontinental nuclear forces and specialized postures for Central Europe—but the traditional dominance of these goals may prove to have been correct. It makes shifts that may be hard to explain in convincing terms to America's allies. And it envisages making a number of changes in weaponry and deployments over the long term—but the urgent need may come before these can be ready.

On the other hand, these risks can be hedged, and, if the emerging strategy survives to be a dominant force and is administered with skill, it gives the United States some important chances to redress military balances and restore confidence in its leadership.
Malcolm Hoag and Fred Hoffman in reviewing this Note provided many thoughtful insights, warned against glib assumptions, and suggested less optimism about the support that even an excellent new strategy would receive. Each also suggested a number of more lucid phrasings.
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### Glossary

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<td>AMRAAM</td>
<td>Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>Assault Breaker</td>
<td>A developmental antiarmor rocket with guided submunitions</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>A Soviet armored fighting vehicle used by airborne forces</td>
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<td>CX</td>
<td>A very large air transport proposed for development by the U.S. Air Force</td>
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<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTIDS</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (a digital data communication system)</td>
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<td>MSAMS</td>
<td>Mobile Surface-to-Air Missile System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MW-1 (STREBO)</td>
<td>A German-developed downward firing dispenser of air-to-surface submunitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>MX</td>
<td>A large U.S. land-based intercontinental missile system whose form was under review in mid-1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAVE MOVER</td>
<td>An advanced long-range airborne radar now in development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>An advanced Navy air-launched missile</td>
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<td>PLRS</td>
<td>Position Locating and Reporting System</td>
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<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Force</td>
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<td>SINCGARS</td>
<td>Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (planned as the armed forces' standard by the late 1980s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOTAS</td>
<td>Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (an Army heliborne radar with excellent data processing features for ground search)</td>
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<td>USAFE</td>
<td>U.S. Air Forces in Europe</td>
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INTRODUCTION

American security strategy has more similarity to the common law than it does to statutory law or the Code Napoleon. The documents that set forth formal strategies may not have such pervasive effects as decisions about speeches and budgets. Further, even before the process of formal adoption is complete there may be modification by precedent.

Nonetheless, a synthesis of the various aspects of security and foreign policy gathered in one place, with due reflection on their interconnections and explicit statements of unifying themes, is much needed. With a new administration in place, its executives would be well served by the process of drafting and coordinating a new strategy.*

In this Note I set forth some of the guiding principles that are likely to be strong candidates for inclusion in a new strategy. These were put forward and their interconnections considered as some dozen or more of the people later appointed by the Reagan Administration and their intellectual colleagues debated about changes that should be made in the security and foreign policies of the Nixon and Carter Administrations.

The strategy I outline here should be thought of as somewhat idealistic. Proponents of these views will have to face people with different perceptions of uncertain matters. There will be bureaucratic forces resisting change. There will be resource constraints and advocates of both more and less spending on security. The views of

America's allies--many of whom currently propose a less confrontational approach than the United States--will have to be taken into account. Even the particular skills of various proponents in the government will affect the form and timing of a new strategy.

This does not diminish the importance of analyzing the candidate elements taken as a group; this Note is a beginning on such an analysis. To avoid cumbersome language I will not always refer to "candidate elements" or the "emerging strategy" but the term "new strategy" should be considered to include implicitly the qualifiers just discussed.

The new strategy will almost certainly hold out a much better hope than the old for dealing with U.S. security interests in Southwest Asia. The current U.S. inability to protect its interests there--and those of its allies--is much in the minds of the officials who are formulating a new approach. Yet this does not necessarily portend the neglect of other areas. A fundamental tenet of the strategy is that the United States must be prepared to deal with crises as they occur, in places that are hard to predict when postures are being determined. The strategy anticipates that while the United States deals with less demanding confrontations it might concurrently be faced with a major crisis in Europe--and not necessarily by coincidence. Thus, while this Note discusses the effectiveness of new postures for applications in Southwest Asia, it will assume that there is a continuing need to deal with crises in Europe and elsewhere. As Francis J. West put it, "We should replace the 1969 'one and a half war' strategy with a broad concept of [attending to] several military balances and a design of a conventional
essential equivalence which employs our relative war-fighting advantages."

MAIN ASPECTS OF THE EMERGING STRATEGY

National strategies are too complex to be fairly represented by a short label, but brevity often forces the use of a label. Until the new strategy gets an official designation I suggest that it be called the "Strategy of Full Recourse," since a main feature is that it requires that almost every resource available to the United States be capable of being brought to bear on a conflict or confrontation.

Lying behind the strategy are two views that seem to be held by many of the new officials. First, they recognize as urgent the security problems brought about by: the buildup of Soviet forces (and, notably, their power projection forces); the deterioration of the military power of the United States and the West relative to the USSR; and the advantages that the Soviet Union has in its geopolitical position as a central power, able to use interior lines to move into surrounding lands (and, most importantly, into the Southwest Asian crescent) with little need to give advance signals of their planned azimuth of attack. Second, they recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a long-term competition of global scope and that restraint on the part of the United States in the recent past has not resulted in reciprocal restraint on the part of the Soviets.

The main elements of the new strategy are:

(1) A preparedness to deal with simultaneous challenges in many places. Enhanced capabilities will preferably be coupled with contingency plans in order to control escalation with clear information, flexible military means, and impressive forces held in reserve.

(2) The enhancement of force mobility, with increased emphasis upon forces that are inherently flexible and mobile, such as naval forces. More forces should be built up that can be treated as a strategic reserve. Modernization is not regarded as provocative, but should be undertaken when cost-effective.

(3) The enhancement of information gathering and processing systems that can apply the above forces efficiently and under careful political control. Unintended damage will be minimized.

(4) The restoration of a worldwide base system, capitalizing on the possibilities wherever relatively good relations with local powers permit it and on the possibilities of collaboration with the major allies. For both small and large powers there can be implied alliances as well as formal ones. In critical areas some forces and some equipment should be in place so that an enemy could not seize key places before our lift capabilities could bring our forces to bear.

(5) Prior arrangements with the leading industrialized democracies to collaborate on a wide spectrum of security matters of mutual interest.

(6) An effort to capitalize on the superior industrial strength of America and her allies. Building increased quantities of weapons operable by ordinary soldiers instead of
overly sophisticated weapons in small numbers. Contingency plans for much greater buildups of defense assets. The coupling of defense expansion on our part to Soviet aggressive behavior should be made explicit so that our ability to mobilize serves as a deterrent.

(7) Encouragement of arms transfers where they contribute to U.S. security interests. Arms sales will not be treated as being inherently morally reprehensible. They will be used to strengthen the capabilities of friends, enhance important bilateral relationships, support U.S. overseas basing and access requirements, and send signals to friends and adversaries about American determination to act on behalf of its interests.*

(8) Visibility of U.S. nuclear strength, even while making every effort to deter and avoid nuclear war. Such strength should be seen by others as usable if the circumstances demand, although subject to the most careful controls, and capable of being used with precision by well-informed authority. There must be a capability to use it in a measured way that is suited to the purpose at hand. There must be arrangements to make U.S. nuclear strength relevant in local confrontations outside NATO, with exploitation of new technological possibilities that can make some nonnuclear forces nuclear-capable.

* Paraphrased from testimony of Richard Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 23, 1981.
(9) Arrangements to bring to bear almost any resource under U.S. (or Western)* control to deter, deflect, or counter Soviet moves. This means a minimization of forces strictly earmarked for one region together with a concerted effort to make the forces of the several services work together effectively. Similarly, it means making the theaters work smoothly together and planning for combined (multinational) commands. The mobility, flexibility, and increased use of advanced information systems noted above would contribute importantly to this strategy of making everything we possess able to be brought to bear, or otherwise play a useful role, in a crisis.

(10) Pursuit of the classical goals of arms control, through a new path that emphasizes Western actions that increase stability--including the making of the consequences of destabilizing acts very undesirable or unprofitable to the USSR. The past stress on negotiating limitations on numbers--with consequent strains on means of verification--and the past emphasis on atmospherics, in order to "teach" the Soviets how to be civil by Western examples and exhortation, will be de-emphasized. Constraints on arms acquisition and arms use will continue to be sought, in part because the different perceptions of the European allies make them important, but under strict requirements that agreements be to the mutual advantage of the parties, de-emphasizing the virtues of the "process."

*In this Note the term "Western" should be interpreted to include Japan and, often, Australia.
There are tensions between the ten aspects outlined above, and it will take more than discussion and common sense to resolve them. The practicality of the new strategy depends on a substantial increase in Western defense budgets, and, even in the United States there may not be enough money. Support for bigger defense budgets among U.S. allies has been faltering. Consequently, there will still be contention over the allocation of resources among the various objectives just noted. There will be balances to be struck between forward-based forces (Point 4) and the flexibility of having those forces in a strategic reserve (Point 2). Other balances will have to be struck between quickness of response and mass in mobile forces, etc. In consequence, the implementation of the new strategy will profit from a substantial number of new quantitative analyses.

Before going on to discuss the implications of the ten points it is appropriate to note some omissions from this formulation—which were also omissions in some of the syntheses and symposia before the election—and to mention a major difficulty with America's allies. The strategy set forth here needs to be augmented to deal with threatening crises where the Soviet Union is not involved or where it simply capitalizes on opportunities. The Middle East would undoubtedly have its internal uprisings, boundary wars, and struggles for leadership even if the Soviets become totally preoccupied at home. The Arab-Israeli conflict would be a serious international problem even if the Soviets had not been eager to exacerbate it. Guerilla warfare has many precipitating causes. The outline of a strategy for dealing with all these kinds of conflicts, many of them with a high probability of affecting U.S. interests, has yet to become evident.
Many of America's allies do not see these matters as the U.S. government does. European leaders have indicated that U.S. support of Israel has foreclosed certain solutions to the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and that they will go their own way. Quite apart from that, electorates in Northern Europe and Japan are signaling their leaders to go slow on spending for arms and to pressure the United States into arms negotiations that it had planned to de-emphasize.

Thus there is little cause for optimism that the emerging strategy—as initially conceived—can soon be adopted or can come into effect without substantial compromise.

WHY THE OLD POLICIES PROVED INADEQUATE TO UPHOLD U.S. INTERESTS

No one any longer disputes that Southwest Asia—the crescent from Pakistan through Turkey, including Arabia—is of great importance to the United States and the other industrialized democracies.* There is the geopolitical reason: the countries of this region control the access of the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. They can limit or help Soviet expansion into the Islamic world and African continent. There is the direct economic reason: access to Persian Gulf oil. While this oil accounts for only about 20 percent of U.S. oil consumption, Western Europe gets about two-thirds of its oil from the region, and Japan about three-fourths. Economic disaster would be inevitable if this supply were cut for long. And, even more troubling, Soviet control of this supply could be used to meet both its own needs and,

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*Because of the internal organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it excludes Turkey from "Southwest Asia," but includes northeast Africa except for Egypt. The term as used here includes Turkey and does not include northeast Africa, but most of the arguments made are applicable to developments in the latter region.
possibly, to force important political concessions from Japan and the major countries of Europe.

The Carter Administration, which had in 1978 been seriously pursuing the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, attempted a sudden reversal of policies after the events of 1979. This reversal involved a major declaration by President Carter on January 23, 1980, in his State of the Union address:

> Any attempts by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

In practical terms the changes from late 1979 onward included the augmentation of the U.S. Indian Ocean fleet, the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force, and a new emphasis on obtaining facilities and base rights in the area.

Critics, of whom there were many in the election year of 1980, pointed to the lack of teeth behind the brave words. Ex-Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger said:

> [The Carter Administration is] wholly unwilling to put behind such concepts the resources and the planning effort necessary to turn concept into reality. ...The delights of concocting verbal formulas seem far more rewarding than the banality of influencing reality.*

Whether or not one wishes to be as trenchant as Schlesinger in the appraisal, there is good reason to feel that the United States is at a great disadvantage in Southwest Asia by comparison with the Soviet Union. Albert Wohlstetter has pointed this out, noting that the geo-

political situation is favorable for the Soviet Union, which can have the role of a central power with interior lines of communication. It may well have the temperament to initiate, he notes. The Western powers, in contrast, protect a long frontier far from home, and would likely be rather sluggish in responding. While the Soviets can simply change the azimuth at which forces go forth, the West must reorient carrier task forces or redeploy ground forces over many miles. Put in other terms, the Soviets have to fly only 600 to 1200 miles from Georgian or Afghan bases to important Gulf regions. Currently, the actual distance the United States must fly is over 6000 miles from the East Coast and over 7000 miles from many on-load points.*

The contrast between rapidly deployable ground forces is also remarkable. Both sides have airborne forces. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division might begin to deploy lead elements into the region in two days after a decision to do so; however, some planners believe that all available U.S. airlift would be occupied for ten days in getting airbase equipment and fighter squadrons to the region, with the 82nd in place on the fourteenth day, while the Soviets could begin to arrive on the first day.** While the U.S. Airborne Division is about twice as large as the Soviet, there is only one active division. The Soviets have seven or eight, and these have light tanks, tracked assault guns, and an increasing number of 9-ton BMD armored personnel carriers. Moreover, Soviet armor could deploy over land

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to the head of the Gulf in less than a week given either a starting point in Iraq or an impotent Iran.

These imbalances in forces and equipment are part of a larger picture of increasing Soviet advantage over many years. The West has relinquished many base rights while the Soviets have, on balance, gained. The lands that could be overflown by the United States are fewer, while routes have opened for the USSR. These trends were part of a pervasive pattern. In Europe there has been the popular wave of dissociation from colonial policies since 1945, while in the United States post-Vietnam anti-interventionist sentiment grew. These views added to an even longer-standing strategic emphasis in the United States: for many years the design of U.S. forces was dominated by just two tasks: being prepared to fight an intercontinental nuclear war (and, hopefully, to thus deter it) and getting the capability to fight alongside the NATO allies to block a Soviet attack in Central Europe. (The emphasis on Europe prevailed even before President Nixon cut back from a "two-war" strategy in 1969.*) The great penalties of failing in either of these tasks were so demonstrable that the services were able to persuade the Congress to fund the needed forces, while they learned that requests for air transport, fast deployment logistics ships, and the like were complex and had less chance of success. The political factors involved in non-European wars were ever-shifting, little understood, and seemed of less urgency to Americans.

The emphasis on fighting the big war in Central Europe had a great effect on weapons procurement. During the mid-1970s Army procurement requests were dominated by the "Big Five," including the M-1 tank, MIC-V combat vehicle (now the M-2 and M-3), and three other large and expensive

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*For a discussion of this problem in earlier times see Gaddis and Nitze, op. cit., p. 174.
systems best suited for war in Europe. The Navy concentrated on being able to keep the sea lanes to Europe open during a long multi-month buildup, and the Air Force tended to buy for high-intensity combat rather than for a flexible and sustainable capability. Plans require that much of this heavy equipment be moved to Europe by sea or be prepositioned there. While a few compromises were made in tanks and guns to make them fit air transports, there was no adequate joint process whereby ground vehicles and aircraft were designed together. With this view of priorities it was not surprising that U.S. Army leaders were pleased to see the production of the C-5A transport, capable of carrying the M60 tank, which could not otherwise be airlifted. They then gave great emphasis to the production of the even larger M-1 tank and other large systems like the DIVAD air defense system, so that, by the mid-1980s, an even greater need for transports to carry "outsize" cargo will exist. The Air Force then proposed the more advanced CX, still being regarded skeptically in Congress, which could normally carry only a single M-1. There has been no influential process which would, for example, examine the optimum use of $100 billion over 10 years for buying the combination of aircraft and fighting vehicles that would have the greatest military effect when rapid deployment was required. (This is not to say that such choices are simple; tanks can be sealifted or prepositioned and big transport airplanes have many other uses.) Thus the strategy of concentrating on the "canonical war" in Europe had a major effect on the equipping of the forces, and a negative effect on their ability to deal with an emergent crisis in Southwest Asia.*

In addition to such concrete examples in the selection of equipment, the concentration on intercontinental war and

*See West, op. cit., pp. 321-323.
on a major war in Europe has had great consequences for the realism of preparations. A war that was unthinkable did not get thought through. Many of the NATO authorities operated with command facilities using only "authorized" data, and which could be quickly destroyed in war, until, in the mid-1970s, USAFE Commander General John Vogt pressed for a command bunker that would combine information from many sources. The numerous problems posed by having both a forward strategy in Europe and major fractions of the posture unavailable in peace time have been only sporadically addressed. Similar instances of the long avoidance of reality can be pointed to in the years that went by before there was much effort to understand the survivability of communications, the effects of nuclear-weapon-induced electromagnetic pulses, etc.

REDRESSING THE POWER BALANCE IN THE 1980s

With the national mood in the United States now favoring a stronger military posture, and an administration in place that has promised such a strengthening, it remains to discuss the directions that these changes can take. The country is now at one of those junctures that can set patterns for many years; it is a time when a guiding strategy is most important.

For a while it looked as if the changes might be more in magnitude than in direction. Reports on the proposals of the Defense Transition Team indicated a strong emphasis on intercontinental nuclear war and on large and expensive combat vehicles.* However, incoming Defense Secretary Weinberger reportedly rejected the Transition Team recommendations and the themes just noted have not been important in his statements. Instead, the signals from

* Aviation Week, December 8, 1980, pp. 16-21.
Secretary Weinberger, Secretary of State Haig, and their principal subordinates indicate moves to redress the balance on a much wider front, including an active solicitation of greater efforts by America's allies. In the first major statement by a new Defense official, Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci said:

The threat to vital Western interests in key areas, such as the Persian Gulf, can be met only if all concerned share the burden and find new ways to make greater contributions in support of our common interests. Western Europe's stake in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf is enormous and well-recognized. What is perhaps less well understood is the great contribution the Western European members of the Alliance could make to help protect the security of this region so vital to them.*

This is consistent with a strategy that would meet various challenges in Southwest Asia through the ability to project specific countering forces, not just through a generalized and nonspecific deterrent. However, the confrontation need not be confined to Western weak spots. Secretary Weinberger's statement in submitting the revised defense budget to Congress showed an interest in playing a more calculated role:

We must not pursue a defense strategy that anticipates a point-to-point response to [Soviet] actions, but rather one which permits us to take full advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities.**


Simultaneous Challenges and Responding Against Vulnerable Points

The new strategy recognizes that threatening crises may occur simultaneously in various parts of the world and also that a second confrontation may develop because stabilizing forces are preoccupied with the first. There has been a danger that the redressing of years of Western neglect of Southwest Asia will result in an overspecialized posture that cannot be brought to bear in the reinforcement of NATO, the Far East, or elsewhere. It now appears, though, that a more flexible approach will be taken. While postures will be tested for their usefulness in the obviously urgent needs relevant to Southwest Asia, a measure of their value will be how well they will perform in other regions.*

The need for flexibility was emphasized by Secretary Weinberger in an early interview where he again referred to U.S. responses "aimed not at the point of attack but at Soviet weaknesses."** This intent not to exclude lateral escalation clearly makes a careful assessment of alternatives very important and puts a premium on the possession of the reserve force needed to contain a wider conflict.

Some of America's European allies have expressed a concern about the prospect of U.S. reserves being sent to the Persian Gulf, despite the fact that the interests they would be protecting are of greater importance to Europe

* This was treated in a number of talks that Albert Wohlstetters gave to influential audiences warning of the need to prepare for simultaneous threats in many places. He coined the term "virtual war" to note how resources have to be reserved for a confrontation that has not yet gone active. These talks will be summarized in a forthcoming paper tentatively titled "Coping With Lethal Threats in Many Theaters."

than to the United States. In any event U.S. officials have called on NATO governments to act to bolster their own defenses and, second, the strategy calls for the total size of U.S. forces to be increased. A third helpful action, improving the mobility and flexibility of Western forces, will be discussed below.

Trends in military technology facilitate using the same kind of unit for reinforcing Europe as for stopping a tank thrust into Arabia—though missiles or other payloads may be changed.* The same trends make it more feasible to extract forces engaged in Southwest Asia so that they could be redeployed to Europe if the need there became urgent.

Flexibility, Mobility, and a Central Reserve

For a long time the designers of military weapon systems have tried to make them useful in a variety of climates. But to design a tank gun, for example, that can deal with both infantry and other tanks, costs more in dollars and in weight. To make it reliable in a Norwegian ice storm as well as in the Arabian desert costs even more. Modern weapon technology can help in several ways. In guided weapon systems both warheads and guidance units can be made modular; both can be designed for a given target type. More flexibility can come from treating the vehicle design separately from the payload design; vehicles are likely to become obsolescent more slowly than their payloads.

These prospects for weaponry fit very neatly into the new strategy; it makes the idea of a central or strategic

*This unit might be of brigade or battalion size, composed of modular subunits, and tailored to fit in C-141-size transports. For more discussion see James Digby, Modern Weapons for Non-NATO Contingencies, The Rand Corporation P-6521, December 1980, pp. 9-10.
reserve much more feasible. * Forces can be designed to have a great deal of flexibility as modules are changed or different payloads put on airplanes, ships, or armored vehicles. Moreover, it is no longer necessary to have large tanks to meet large tanks. Weapons like Assault Breaker ** can do the job in various regions and from several kinds of platforms. Elements of the central reserve that are useful in Europe can be made ready for the Persian Gulf region on short notice. The same antitank or antiair weapons can be put in a prepositioned tracked vehicle in Europe, or transported in wheeled vehicles in Arabia.

But in moving toward a central reserve it is necessary to strike an appropriate balance. Detailed considerations of crises in Southwest Asia show the value—both political and military—of having some forces in place, even though in small numbers. This presence can be in the form of base tenancy, U.S. cadres working with host-nation units, bases operated by allies, jointly operated reconnaissance activities, or naval patrols. This would facilitate quick response and also, hopefully, deter moves that might arouse a forceful U.S. response.

Here again, as in the need to prepare for simultaneous challenges in many places, it appears that the needed augmentation will call for a substantially increased U.S. defense budget. Moreover, the practical politics of making major changes in the kinds of weapon systems in the U.S.

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* Where the term "central reserve" is used in this Note it refers to forces that are not firmly committed to a given region. They might be in Europe or in Korea; they need not be in the United States.

** Assault Breaker is a DARPA-originated concept for attacking large formations of armor. A cannister is guided precisely to a point over the formation, then dozens of individually guided submunitions are released. While this system has good prospects for effectiveness, it is complex, and it may be 1985 before its costs and reliability are known with confidence.
posture call for higher budgets. These changes will need new capital at a time when there is great pressure to increase operating budgets, and the urgencies of the situation hardly permit the spreading of these capital improvements over a ten-year period.*

One should question, however, unless the international situation deteriorates very rapidly, the accelerated acquisition of large quantities of the big, expensive, traditional weapon systems: the B-1 bomber, M-1 tank, large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and MX horizontal-shelter missiles.** These are all systems not particularly well-suited for service in Southwest Asia.

Instead, the new strategy—in its ideal form—calls for an increased emphasis on medium-size naval vessels, on light, fast ground forces, and on air units where the aircraft are not required to penetrate the most lethal airspaces. Because of the potency of modern Soviet-style air defenses and the need to cut combat crew losses, cruise missiles are likely to be useful—mounted on ships, on aircraft, and on ground transporters—with many of them capable of carrying either nuclear or nonnuclear warheads. A substantial fraction of this new equipment could go to units that can be treated as a central reserve, capable of being moved quickly from their home base (which might not be in the United States) to the place where they are most needed. Units

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* See, for example, the testimony of General Lew Allen, USAF Chief of Staff, on the decision not to complete a planned buy of A-10 aircraft in order to meet operating and maintenance expenses. "Readiness Drive Spurs Tough Decisions," Aviation Week, February 23, 1981, pp. 22-23.

** Cf. the comments on the Transition Team, p. 13. There are always many pressures in the practical politics of defense that will have to be accommodated, and the increase in quantities of major traditional items is a practical and available way of increasing U.S. strength early on. Moreover, such actions usually have strong institutional support from the services.
already deployed to one part of the Southwest Asian crescent (say, Saudi Arabia) could be quickly moved to a place where the problems proved more serious (say, Pakistan).

Enhanced Information Systems

In the trench warfare of World War I information systems could be fairly simple and foot messengers often adequate. In World War II, Guderian achieved some notable victories by using radio in new ways to control a very fluid armored attack. The new strategy takes this a great deal further by treating U.S. forces as having a global fluidity. Success requires that a large fraction of these forces be in the right place and this means that the United States needs excellent systems for gathering, processing, and distributing information. For example, if a Soviet airborne division stands down, the United States needs to know it within a few hours. If it departs its home base for Kandahar (in Southern Afghanistan), this needs to be known within the hour. If it continues beyond Kandahar, this needs to be known in minutes.

Fortunately, the technology to sense military movements, communicate and process the data, and send out signals to friendly forces will permit highly developed systems. It is one of the decreasing number of technologies in which the United States has a substantial lead over the Soviet Union, though this lead is not necessarily found in deployed equipments. Not only can reconnaissance systems sense the movement of destroyers, battalions, or squadrons, but new and upcoming systems can provide detailed tactical targeting data. The AWACS aircraft, already deployed, can see individual fighters (though AWACS is big and expensive); the SOTAS heliborne radars, in production, can target individual tanks; and the PAVE MOVER systems, due in the mid-1980s, are designed to provide target-quality data from a rather distant aircraft as part of the Assault Breaker system.
Current programs will not bring forth the full potential of Western information technology, however. Integrated circuits and microprocessors call for digital data systems, and much of the programmed equipment still uses analog methods (like the familiar voice-operated mobile radio sets). Even the Army's much needed and long delayed SINCGARS series of radios, due in a few years, will handle some digital data, but is optimized for voice. Once digital systems become more widespread it will be easier to use distributed military data networks that avoid the vulnerability of the concentration points in the present hierarchical networks. Distributed systems for processing and relaying data (of which the Air Force's JTIDS and Army's PLRS are early examples) are well suited to fluid postures, since they have less of the lumpiness of hierarchical systems, where much of the data analysis and processing are done at a few big complex centers—which are relatively hard to move—and most of these are at theater, corps, and division level.

Restoring a Worldwide Western Base System

As already mentioned, there needs to be a balance between reliance on a central reserve and U.S. or Western presence on the spot or nearby. Consider a confrontation stemming from a threatened invasion of Kuwait. It is true that the United States could send the B-52Hs of the new Strategic Projection Force on a refueled mission from Minot Air Force Base to provide some sort of air support. But more sorties and more responsive sorties could be mounted with F-111s from a choice of Eastern Turkish bases or Ras Banas (in Egypt), or from those places with staging through Saudi bases. (Kuwait is about 750 n mi from Ras Banas and 650 n mi from Eastern Turkey.)

Presence in the area is not just a matter of increasing the number of sorties or cutting the time to get a Marine
Amphibious Unit ashore; it also has a substantial political effect. The presence of a 500-man cadre of Western military advisors in a small Persian Gulf country could not only help build up the local military infrastructure, it would signal a Western intent to back that country. (There would be some risks that they would attract, rather than deter, however.) In addition, it would be part of a learning and acclimatization process and would provide a flow of information about the local situation.

Establishing such points of presence is not without risk and expense. The idea of taking such actions on a multilateral basis, which is discussed below, would provide some sharing of risks as well as bringing in partners who have local expertise. It would provide some limited insulation for the United States. (This might help, for example, in the event that the United States felt compelled to aid Israel against the wishes of a local Arab host nation.) Despite the risks, however, it seems clear that the United States will need to enhance greatly its access and local presence in Southwest Asia as a part of improving its capability to bring forces to bear there.

While it will not be treated in this Note, there are important unexplored possibilities for the Western encouragement of the forming of non-Western contingents that could be sent to restore equilibrium. The recruits could be citizens of less wealthy countries whose interests are convergent with U.S. and Western interests. (Pakistan, where the military profession has long been honored, may be a possibility, as the Saudi use of Pakistani troops has demonstrated.) This technique has worked relatively well for the Soviets and their Cuban dependents. While they have had their failures, they have learned from these and arranged that they not be catastrophic: Such forces could have a useful role in restoring internal stability or confronting Soviet-sponsored guerillas.
In most of the cases where the United States or other Western powers make collaborative arrangements with local powers in Southwest Asia the latter would have a variety of incentives. In order to get the most out of each collaboration it will be important for the Western powers to understand all of these incentives. Americans have become accustomed to thinking of offering military or economic aid and asking for base rights. For the Persian Gulf countries the negotiations need to have a much wider scope. Essentially what the United States has to offer is some security from invasion and, perhaps, some stability for the family or group currently in power. For their part, besides bases, the wealthier local countries might offer economic assistance (to Turkey, for example), hire Pakistanis to man military infrastructure units under U.S. cadres, or finance the regional security infrastructure (including warning and information networks).

**Bringing To Bear the Combined Strength of the Industrialized Democracies**

It was noted above that the United States is generally outclassed by the Soviet Union in the capability to project power into Southwest Asia. Redressing this imbalance will be quicker and more practical if the major industrial countries who have mutual interests in the region all make contributions.

Table 1 shows the relative industrial strengths of the Warsaw Pact countries and the larger industrialized democracies.
Table 1

RELATIVE ECONOMIC STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979 GNP ($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>1801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (including U.S.)</td>
<td>5098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO plus Japan and Australia</td>
<td>6307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, at this highly aggregated level, the industrialized democracies greatly outclass the Soviets and their allies, making "Western" political cohesion an important factor even without a more formal military arrangement. But for the protection of their very important mutual interests in Southwest Asia, a more formal arrangement is called for. For one thing, domestic support in the United States for supplying a strong military presence in the area is likely to fade if it becomes obvious that the European countries and Japan, whose dependence on Persian Gulf oil is greater than that of the United States, are not carrying their fair share of the burdens. A second factor is that some degree of formality and commitment is an antidote to Soviet salami tactics; otherwise the Japanese would probably be more concerned with the fate of Kuwait and the French with that of Iraq than either would be with threats to Pakistan. Some degree of organization will help reduce soft spots.

Realistically, it must be admitted that this kind of pulling together seems quite unlikely unless European and Japanese perspectives change drastically. The resources are there; the will to use them is currently lacking.

The new strategy calls for a collaboration without specifying the form of organization. Perforce, it has to admit that securing allied backing may take many years— or may fail. It is also flexible in permitting contributions to be made in the form best suited to the donor. Thus the Japanese, who would find it almost impossible for domestic reasons to send military forces to the Gulf region, might provide economic assistance. The British and French might expand and continue joint naval exercises and send cadres to selected countries. The Germans might step up their economic assistance to Turkey and send industrial development teams to Gulf countries. A number of countries could, overtly or covertly, facilitate overflight and facility rights for military activities in the mutual interest. Some new collaborations on reconnaissance and intelligence could involve a number of countries, even including the Japanese as designers and producers of equipment.

Almost all experienced observers agree that this collaboration should not be handled by formal changes in NATO's charter, giving it out-of-area responsibilities. The North Atlantic Council has faced this possibility several times; it has, each time, only agreed on increased consultation. There are several promising forms of organizing, however. These will be discussed in the last part of this Note.

Using Western Industrial Strength for Security

The new strategy recognizes that much of the strength of the West is in its industrial capability, but that this strength cannot be brought to bear on confrontations if it is locked up by policies. Potentially, the military strength of the West could far outstrip that of the Soviet Union; the prospect that this buildup might actually occur should serve as a major constraint on Soviet expansionism.
Yet, the policy of detente over the past 15 years has observably limited Western military power during a time when the Soviet Union has greatly increased its forces. Thus the advocates of a new strategy should welcome the suggestion of the Franco-German summit of February 1981 that the objective be "stabilization." The new term was interpreted to imply an active attempt to restore a balance, while the implication of detente, which was not stressed, is a "relaxation of tension" and passivity.

The Reagan Administration thus has proposed an increase in the U.S. military budget and its earliest contacts with the allies have proposed that they join in the buildup. Nowhere is the inadequacy of existing Western postures more obvious than it is when confrontations in Southwest Asia are considered. As noted previously, the problem is not just one of size or deployment, but rather that capital expenditures are needed to provide a greatly changed and modernized posture. The construction of this posture


**See, for example, the Carlucci Wehrkunde talk, cited above. NATO, at the verbal level, responded favorably at the Spring meeting of defense ministers. See Robert C. Toth, "NATO Agrees to Boost Military Efforts, Assist U.S. Gulf Force," Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1981, p. 23.

***The Committee on the Present Danger prepared an interesting alternative to the Carter force structure plans of 1980 in its Illustrative Five-Year Defense Budget, undated, but mailed in May 1980. This document proposed increases in almost every category of procurement, including the addition to the Carter plans by FY85 of five active Army divisions, nine active tactical air wings, ten airlift squadrons, replacement of older ICBMs by 300 Minuteman IV missiles, and an increase in the Navy to 650 ships. This was estimated to cost an extra 44 to 53 billions of FY81 dollars in each of the years FY81 through FY85. This plan gave details indicating that it largely involved the procurement of service-supported traditional weapons systems. So far, the Reagan Administration appears to be planning for more modest increases in numbers of units. The Navy may get the largest increase, with 600 submarines and surface ships sought by 1989."
could well use contributions from several countries. It can hardly wait for perfection in this collaboration, though, since the politics of arranging it are even tougher than those in the long sought "rationalization and standardization" in NATO.

A more feasible task has been suggested by U.S. officials late in the Carter Administration and early in the Reagan: that the Europeans and Japanese substantially build up their home defenses to permit the potential release of U.S. forces, stationed or reserve.

During the detente years defense industry in the United States declined greatly in capacity relative to all industry. Even if funds for new ships and aircraft were provided in Spring 1981, the first significant production would probably take several years. In testimony last year General Alton D. Slay deplored the lack of an "adequate and dependable resource base." He said:

The bottom line is that even if we go all out for mobilization of our resources, we won't be able to deliver significantly larger aircraft quantities in the first 24 month period. A chilling example is that after nearly 18 months under surge conditions, we could only expect to get an aggregate of 22 more A-10s and no additional F-15s and F-16s than already exist on the currently contracted delivery schedule. Obviously, with proper funding, we could greatly increase the output of these aircraft, but we would not begin to see significantly larger numbers flying for at least three years or more.

General Slay's testimony was well received by the Defense Industrial Base Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services. Their report said that they found "the defense industrial base unbalanced; while excess production..."

capacity generally exists at the prime contractor level, there are serious deficiencies at the subcontractor levels" and that "the industrial base is not capable of surging production rates in a timely fashion to meet the increased demands that could be brought on by a national emergency...." To mitigate these delays several officials and analysts proposed in 1978 a revived program for planning an expansion of defense industrial capacity.**

Workable plans for an efficient increase and modernization in defense equipment are useful not only in the event of an actual decision to increase defense spending, but also because they make more credible the prospect that Soviet aggressive moves can trigger such an expansion, to their long-term detriment. The new strategy, if backed by an actual expansion of capacity, will make it clear that destabilizing moves in, for example, Pakistan can trigger a redirection of Western industrial production from civilian to military items.

Just as the stocks of equipment may need to be built up rapidly, so may the manpower. Modernization during a buildup could lead to a larger fraction of complex systems, hard to maintain and hard to operate. This would be a great mistake, since training people to perform well in a

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** Notably Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense and Fred C. Iklé, then a private consultant. Peter H. Haas of the Defense Nuclear Agency organized a series of workshops to promote research on defense expansion policies. These organizers decided to use the term "defense expansion" instead of the more ambiguous "mobilization," which has the connotation of a calling up of manpower. See Fred C. Iklé, "Protecting the United States: The Coming Test for American Strategy and Diplomacy," Chapter XV in Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka (eds.), The United States in the 1980s, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1980.
flexible posture is hard enough. Thus, the weapons develop­ment strategy needs to use modernization to ease the job of training men. This is likely to lead to the choice of larger numbers of smaller systems with plug-in modules as opposed to fewer big complex systems.

The Delicate Matter of Getting Value from Nuclear Weapons

The new strategy will continue to regard the deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States as the most basic security requirement; it will call for modernization and improvement.* Nonetheless, by contrast with the old strategy, which treated nuclear weapons either as part of a cataclysmic intercontinental exchange or, in Europe, as a kind of super explosive that would lead to an equally cataclysmic regional exchange, the new strategy may treat nuclear capability in more political terms. It may recognize that the United States has long been committed to the first use of nuclear weapons if things go badly after an attack on NATO, but still try to make the likelihood of their use exceedingly small by raising the nuclear threshold and by acting to deal with destabilizing events before they escalate. It may further seek to forestall nuclear use by discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons.** Should nuclear use have to be threatened, it might make the threat both credible and less likely to cause an expanding war by tailoring the response to the situation.

* See Iklé, op. cit., p. 438.

** Though this view is well accepted by several leading officials in State and Defense, it has not been stressed by Energy Secretary Edwards. Addressing a meeting at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on May 27, 1981, Assistant Secretary of State James Malone said that a formal policy would be set forth in a few weeks. He indicated that the United States would become a "reliable supplier" of nuclear fuels, including plutonium, but would insist on a high level of safeguards against military use.
Hardly anyone denies that U.S. nuclear capability has played a useful role in organizing the defense of NATO. It has made unequivocal the leadership of the United States, without which the Alliance would likely have come unstuck on many occasions. It has been a stabilizing factor and has greatly decreased the incentives for national nuclear weapons programs (notably in West Germany).

The new strategy would have U.S. nuclear capability play a similar role in other places. This implies quietly and gradually calling attention to nonnuclear forces that also have nuclear capabilities. In turn, this means that several technical changes would have to be made in the arming of U.S. projection forces. The Navy can serve as a useful model in this increased emphasis on dual capability. When the Navy increased its presence in and near the Persian Gulf there was little alarm about nuclear weapons being suddenly injected into a new region, but all concerned knew that the conventional capabilities of the two carrier battle groups were backed up by nuclear capabilities.

The realization that America's leadership in South-west Asia includes a selective nuclear capability could be enhanced by discreet planning discussions with the Turks and with those other NATO allies who might play an active role in Southwest Asia. The views of the Israelis, Egyptians, Saudis, and Pakistanis might be sought. From the outset, it should be clear that the U.S. nuclear role is intended as a stabilizing factor, not an inciting one. To this end, specific attention will have to be paid to controlling escalation and deterring nuclear weapons proliferation. In the Far East, U.S. nuclear capabilities have already served as a disincentive to South Korea, Taiwan, and to those minority elements in several other countries who might advocate a weapons program. It may be too late to keep the Pakistanis from exploding a nuclear device, but it is still possible to reduce their incentives
for spending much on a nuclear force. In any event, an emphasis on raising the threshold and on nonproliferation on the one hand, and a genuine dual capability and thoughtful plans about nuclear contingencies on the other, should lead to the United States deriving a political value from nuclear weapons while making their use even less likely than if they had to be injected suddenly.

Getting the Most Out of U.S. and Western Assets

In discussing several specific activities it was argued above that the new strategy calls for the flexible and wide-ranging use of U.S. and Western assets: in emphasizing a "central reserve," in bringing to bear industrial strength, and in making political use of nuclear capabilities. Here the point is made more generally: the new strategy seeks to make assets wherever they may be located or assigned capable of being brought to bear in important contingencies, even though these may have arisen with little notice. In U.S. relations with the other Western countries this implies the joint exploration of likely scenarios that threaten mutual interests and the working out of contingency plans. It implies a greater synergism between the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. It also implies a rethinking of the relationships between the unified and specified commands and of their geographic boundaries.*

In the case of Southwest Asia there might be a conflict involving naval forces in the Gulf of Oman, air forces which might be based at Riyadh, and land forces just arrived from European command, with headquarters in Stuttgart. In an actual confrontation in that region it

*Some of this rethinking was presumably done as the JCS deliberated over the role and authority of the Rapid Deployment Force.
would be important for the elements from the various services to be mutually supportive. Very little in its training programs would prepare an F-111E squadron for an airfield attack mission from Saudi bases with defense suppression supplied by Navy F-4s and targeting by Strategic Projection Force SR-71s. These are problems that have been around for a long time; military units work best if they have clear-cut loyalties and a vigorous spirit of competition. But almost any scenario of confrontation in Southwest Asia brings up these problems in an acute form. Mitigating them will be an essential part of the new strategy with its emphasis on bringing all useful resources to bear.

The New Strategy and the Classical Goals of Arms Control

While the new strategy deemphasizes many of the most visible arms control activities of the 1970s, its aims are quite consistent with the classical goals of arms control. These are usually put this way: (1) to decrease the likelihood of war, (2) to reduce devastation and human suffering if war should occur, and (3) to lessen the economic burden of preparations for war.* Advocates of the new strategy claim that the emphasis of many prior arms control

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* These are sometimes called the "Schelling criteria" since they were discussed in Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. See also Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, New York, Praeger, 1961. Henry Kissinger treated these points briefly in his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957, pp. 203-233. Some of Kissinger's arguments here run counter to positions he later took. His view is most pessimistic on both the likelihood of the reduction of forces and the value of the rewards. He discusses limited war as a means of mitigating the effects of war, noting that "...it is important to develop a concept of risks and possibilities for settlement of each stage before recourse is had to the next phase of operations." (pp. 225-226).
activities was misplaced: it paid little attention to the most incendiary situations, it led to distortions in posture and extra expense (as in the case of MX), and its questionable equity could lead to a sudden explosion of Western effort that would be more destabilizing than a gradual redressing. Moreover, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) relied on mutual assured destruction, a feature whose ethical and logical basis was questioned. *

The new strategy clearly places much more emphasis on stabilizing situations before they are catastrophic. It allocates more effort to keeping order in turbulent places and it entails a capability for controlled escalation if war should, in fact, occur. It includes policies of preparing for intrawar deterrence at any level of violence. It emphasizes the signal content of military action and the setting of finite military goals; thus, it calls for plans to limit action to military targets where possible, avoiding civil collateral damage (which might cloud the intended limitation). Thus the new strategy is more consistent than the old with the first and second goals noted above. **

Whether it will reduce the economic burdens of war preparations is a more complex question. It calls for more expenditures in the immediate future, but it could be argued that its emphasis on stability will lead to less arms spending over the long term. It could also be argued that its postures call for efficient modern weapons to do

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* See Fred C. Iklé, *Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?* California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, 1973.

** Fred S. Hoffman (of Rand) pointed out to the author that the three classical goals of arms control are suitable goals for a U.S. security posture. One might add a fourth: to have forces that would outperform likely opposing forces. This observation may be useful in deciding how to pursue the "dual track" of arms control and nuclear modernization requested by several of the European allies.
fairly specific jobs, and call less for the biggest and most expensive systems.

Most of all, though, it should be noted that the new strategy pays special attention to dealing with the unexpected, to handling instabilities in a measured way while they are still limited, and to avoiding big surprises. It utilizes, rather than deplores, weapons modernization, since modern weapons can diminish unwanted damage and make the need to resort to nuclear action less likely.

APPLYING THE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTION RELEVANT TO SOUTHWEST ASIA

At a time when the industrialized democracies are faced with an urgent need to design a new set of political relationships to deal with emerging problems, there are increasing divergences in thinking about how these problems should be handled. These divergences have received a great deal of attention in the press and have been important in political campaigns in West Germany, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia, where large centrist blocs are reluctant to approve of policies that acknowledge the failings of detente. American leaders have publicly deplored European passivity in the face of Soviet moves, while Europeans have deplored the readiness of the United States to emphasize military power (as in the formation of the RDF).

Thus it seems quite urgent to speed the processes that would permit a deeper dialogue among the Western powers, and to improve the communication of the main arguments on each side to the various electorates. An improved understanding is really a prerequisite to success in the collaborative moves discussed below. It is not, however, sufficient. One must remain quite pessimistic about a collaboration where there are differences in goals, in value systems, and in how uncertain matters are perceived.
There are special interests that will be pursued and divergent national personalities. In spite of all this, a start needs to be made.

The most important kind of political collaboration that needs initiatives from the United States is to make prior arrangements with other friendly countries to cooperate in protecting mutual interests. The more formal and structured the arrangement, the more automatic the cooperation, and the more it will extend beyond the narrow interests of the contracting countries. But formal structures are hard to agree on.

Given that NATO is possibly the most successful peacetime alliance of modern times, there is a natural tendency on the part of Americans to consider various forms of extending its scope to include Southwest Asia. Such a solution is quickly rejected by most Europeans, who are concerned that it might overly stress military responses to crises, including some that would denude Europe, and would formally couple their region of relative stability to one of instability. A major problem with this arrangement would be the awkwardness it would inject into relations with the local powers in Southwest Asia. But the most conclusive argument seems to be that, for all its successes, NATO is frequently strained to near the breaking point as it is, and this is recognized by a majority of its members.

A second option is to construct an interlocking new or expanded series of bilateral and multilateral alliances centered around the United States.

A third option is to organize a noncommitting forum where the larger NATO countries, Japan, and Australia would meet periodically to review threats to their interests and assess together courses of action. This forum would have a staff, a regular place of business, and its own information channels.
A fourth was recently suggested by a four-nation private review group: the organization of several "groups of principal nations." The inclusion principle would call for these to consist of "only those countries which are able and willing to accept concrete obligations within the troubled area." The principal function would be to make joint assessments and carry out crisis management. The core group envisioned "will usually include the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan." They recommended immediately setting up a principal nations group to deal with developments in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.*

It is likely that some combination of these options will come to be regarded as appropriate by the Western nations with the less structured--that is, the second and third options--being stressed in the early 1980s.

A common deficiency of all but the second option is that they may be perceived by the local powers in Southwest Asia as giving insufficient weight to their interests. These countries have such diverse positions on many issues, diverse cultural backgrounds, and disparities in size and wealth, that it will be hard to find unifying principles.

In the heyday of its power dominance, the United States could deal with small local powers by sending in economic and military assistance teams; the largesse which these teams controlled was often enough to give them considerable influence in their host's policies and certainly

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in his military posture. While the Reagan Administration does intend to increase economic and military aid to critical countries, the old modus operandi is hardly applicable now. More attention is going to be needed to identify solid mutual interests.

In a number of countries the combined expertise of several of the industrialized powers may be useful, and a multilateral form of association may seem more palatable to local leaders. For example, the French may work with the United States in Djibouti (and, perhaps, later on in Chad or Iraq). The British know the situation in Oman and North Yemen. The Germans can be even more helpful partners in Turkey than they have been. All of these skills are likely to be put to the test in trying to design a unifying structure of relations among these diverse powers. Nonetheless, these structural actions are important under the new strategy, since it calls for efficiency in moving resources and a minimum of tying them down.

As the political organization proceeds it should become practical to support politico-military collaboration in Southwest Asia along a number of pathways. Some options are touched on briefly below:

1. Arrangements for the joint design of contingency plans, joint exercises, and the joint exchange of information. These arrangements should be in the context that there would be a coherent plan to use economic, political, and military power for the agreed ends.

2. Collaboration in specialized military tasks, especially those that aim for stability (notably, by decreasing vulnerability or surprise). For example, FRG and U.S. aid in improving Turkish air defenses; Japanese-U.S.-British provision of aerial reconnaissance data
to Saudis and Pakistanis; British-U.S. patrols off Oman's coasts.

(3) The organization of combined military units, especially for materiel handling, military construction and repair, port security, and air defense.

(4) Ultimately, some joint planning for nuclear targeting by dual-capable U.S. forces. This would only be done with the greatest of caution and in a most gradual way. It could begin where it represents the least discontinuity: by discussing afresh with Greece and Turkey the role of nuclear guarantees in the defense of those countries.

The chosen politico-military steps would have much better chances of success if fully integrated with a set of collaborative economic actions. Among the most urgent of these are steps to deal with a cutoff of Persian Gulf oil both by advance preparations that would soften the impact (like increased stockpiling) and by advance policy coordination, through IEA or through supplementary arrangements, with respect to oil market behavior during a supply interruption. It is clear that the United States, with its large energy supplies, would be expected by its allies to take the initiative in cooperative efforts to reduce the impacts in such crises.*

The main Western industrial nations will also need to work together on the rules for economic arrangements with the wealthy oil exporting nations. The four-nation private report cited above put it this way:

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*These matters will be treated in a forthcoming Rand report for the Department of Energy by Fred S. Hoffman, et al.
The overall strategy (which has to be shared) ought to include the strengthening of all economic relations, especially trade, with the Arab countries; an increase in economic aid to be distributed to the strategic countries of the area—particularly to Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt; the judicious use of arms sales. The entire West has a major interest in an intensive, cooperative approach to the recycling of Arab oil revenues.*

The preceding implies some exceedingly complex arrangements between nations. It would undoubtedly be necessary to begin with fairly simple exchanges of views; even this would require more of a staff mechanism than currently exists. The private report suggests strengthening the seven-nation summits (as at Venice in Spring 1980) as well as adding the "groups of principal nations" mechanism.

The new strategy suggests some other economic moves relevant to Southwest Asia:

(1) The formalizing of U.S. defense expansion plans for mobility forces and equipment suited for power projection forces. How "hot" these plans would be could be linked to Soviet moves that would destabilize Southwest Asia.

(2) Similarly, options could be explored with the more industrialized allies, with the aim of committing them to a cooperative expansion of defense production. Here too, there could be an overt discussion of linking this expansion to destabilizing moves.

*Kaiser et al., op. cit., p. 39. Italics in original not used here.
APPLYING THE STRATEGY: SOME OPTIONS FOR U.S. POSTURAL CHANGES RELEVANT TO SOUTHWEST ASIA

Recalling that the strategy calls for mobility, flexibility, and the ability to apply a spectrum of force, a fairly obvious early U.S. move is to build up the Navy. Naval units can be present in a region without there having been years of negotiations with local powers. Moreover, the United States and the West have a substantial advantage over the USSR in that they have a much longer tradition of far-flung naval operations and extensive combat experience. Naval units sent to Southwest Asia can provide a variety of capabilities: reconnaissance, amphibious assault, communications, air support and strike, and nuclear attack. Naval vessels make excellent cruise missile platforms. Their crews impinge on local populations only where they take shore leave; their shore bases can be operated satisfactorily while insulated from local people. Finally, the early moves in expanding the Navy can be taken by increasing the procurement of platforms of known designs; their payloads of weapon systems can be decided upon later.

The Reagan Administration has evidently decided to increase naval budgets by a larger percentage than those of the other services, and is asking Congress for funds to add 16 ships more than were previously planned. *(The Navy's choice to use much of these funds to recommission two battleships and start a new large carrier is hardly consistent with the policy of having "hundreds of submarines and surface combatants" recommended by several Reagan advisors, however.)*


** See West, op. cit., p. 332.
An additional option is to decrease the U.S. Navy's emphasis on protecting the sea lines of communication to NATO, reallocating more resources to the northern and southern flanks of NATO and to the Indian Ocean. The choice to do just this has also been announced by the Secretary of the Navy.*

Another major claimant on defense funds is the Rapid Deployment Force; funds could be increased for the sorts of weapon systems useful in power projection. That could include improving mobility—both by air and by sea—and designing land forces and air transports jointly to get from the combination the most effective military power at a remote point. This, in turn, means more emphasis on light armored vehicles which get their effectiveness from modern weapons instead of from sheer size. It also means more attention to air-to-ground weapon systems, since these can usually be gotten to the arena quickly.

An emphasis on the modular design of forces—especially of land forces—will be consistent with the new strategy. The traditional rule in the U.S. Army has been to make the division (about 15,000 men) the smallest self-sufficient unit, but recent additions of complex electronic systems have made the presence of corps-level units more necessary for effective fighting. While the Army has long thought of itself as capable of forming up smaller units using a modular approach, there has not been much actual practice in doing this with all the electronic systems in place. More emphasis on brigade- or battalion-size modules that can go out independently will permit a more rapid combat readiness when projected, and will permit the tailoring of response to need.

But even a very effective and rapid projection force may not be fast enough, and some effort will need to go

*See Hoffman (Associated Press), op. cit.
into increasing in-place Western presence in Southwest Asia. As noted above, this can come, in part, from an increase in the number of operating facilities in the region, and it can also come from military assistance teams and the organization of combined Western-local military units. These in-place activities, if backed by the RDF, could greatly increase the deterrence of Soviet and Soviet-backed incursions. Well handled, they could also increase the political cohesion between the United States and its hosts.

Note, though, that U.S. presence also increases the risks of needing to escalate, and installing small pockets of American forces in various Southwest Asia locations without preparing a response if they are threatened would be dangerous and irresponsible.

One special opportunity for improving U.S. basing in Southwest Asia exists: the improvement and protection of bases in Turkey. This is a matter of politics as well as of construction and deployment.

Forces of all three U.S. services will be needed in Southwest Asia, in place or in reserve, so a major problem for those who execute the new strategy will be to make the various elements mutually supportive. The Air Force needs to prepare better to protect naval vessels with land-based air, and it could give more attention to the surveillance of narrow or coastal waters. The Navy is only beginning to emphasize attacks on land targets and has little training useful in stopping an airborne invasion. Communications and the exchange of intelligence among the services is awkward. The geography and circumstances in Southwest Asia bring home the great need for these synergies.

Similarly, there are special needs in the area for close collaboration between the various U.S. unified and specified commands. Unfortunately, as noted previously,
several of the seams between their geographic assignments run right through likely arenas of confrontation.

Turning to tactics for Southwest Asia, there are a number of situations where occupying and holding strong points are appropriate, since there are long reaches of empty lands in many places. (This is in contrast to holding along a line or solid area.) As it happens, holding a small area or attacking an enemy concentration are just what modern precision missiles do best. These include antitank weapons, antiair weapons, and coastal defense weapons. (Weapons for protection against airborne attack are less well developed.) Thus the changes in posture should emphasize these defensive weapons.

A second tactic that seems promising in much of the region is to employ disruption techniques. Modern weapons (like Assault Breaker) are well suited to both the disruption of attacking columns and their attrition, and forces equipped with them can be on the scene in a few days, rather than the several weeks needed for forces to hold territory. Land-based disruption forces could sally forth from the strong points noted above.

Both strong-point defense and disruption units would facilitate extracting forces from a region when they can no longer fight effectively.

An element of U.S. posture in the region that has so far been discussed very little in public is nuclear capability. For a number of reasons it would seem counterproductive to announce that U.S. forces were not capable of nuclear action, since the Soviet forces they might face are unlikely to be stripped of their nuclear elements. On the other hand, the sudden introduction of Lance or Pershing battalions might be politically impossible. A better answer is to make the forces that might be used in Southwest Asia dual-capable. In other words, the United States would deploy conventional units, some of which could be equipped
on short notice with a nuclear capability. The control of the warheads, both before and after installation, would have to be just as secure as that of Europe-based forces. In a political sense they would serve many of the same purposes as Europe-based nuclear-capable forces. The introduction of cruise missiles is likely to provide an excellent opportunity for making conventional units nuclear-capable.

Having noted a number of the overall characteristics of a useful posture and some options for tactics, some particularly useful possibilities for weapon systems useful in Southwest Asia can be listed.* (Some of these should be treated as quite tentative suggestions.)

- An interim Assault Breaker system for contingency operations. For those cases where Western forces may face Soviet-style armor in large numbers, weapons using the Assault Breaker concept offer a way of packing great defensive firepower into each ton of weight. But the present configuration includes some components that may take longer and be much harder to get into operation than others. Tests this year should suggest ways to get this very useful concept into operation without waiting for the best solution to all its design problems.

- A relatively cheap carrier missile for Assault Breaker's submunitions; the system will be much more useful if this can be brought in for under $100,000 a copy.

- Similarly—and perhaps with some commonality—a relatively inexpensive 500-km cruise missile for surface-to-surface or surface-to-air use. In

*Adapted from Digby, op. cit.
particular, a sea-launched version for use against land targets seems quite useful.

- A lightweight armored vehicle that would readily fit in a C-141. Its weight might be between 14 tons and 22 tons. It should be capable of mounting antitank missiles or a 75-mm gun. Currently, the Marines favor a configuration at the light end of this range which could be lifted by CH-53 helicopters. The Army is holdout for for a heavier version, to mount a 90-mm gun.* The United States may also need self-propelled guns comparable to those in the Soviet airborne divisions, the ASU-85s.

- Air transportable air defense weapons, including a radar that can fit in a C-141 or C-130. The Marine Corps MSAMS indicates one way to go toward this goal.

- A line of wheeled armored vehicles, capitalizing on both lighter weight and low maintenance possibilities. Armies in sandy countries have long seen some advantages in wheeled vehicles.**

- Improved munition dispensers for air-to-surface use. A number of designs are available and the real problem may be one of accelerating evaluation and production. There are already unpowered

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* While the matter has not been settled as this is written, the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 1981 inserted language in the FY82 Defense authorization which would give the Marine Corps the sole responsibility for development of lightweight combat vehicles.

** See Col. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USAR, "The Rapid Deployment Force--How Much, How Soon?" in Army, July 1980, pp. 18-24. This article has useful characterizations of the good and bad points of various division types.
dispensers including the German-designed MW-1 (STREBO) and projects for propelled guided dispensers.*

- "Smart" submunitions and air-deployed mines. Again the problem is not good technology, but accelerating evaluation, production, and system integration.

- Weapon systems that could interdict air transport near its takeoff point, en route, and as it lands. Much of this function could be taken on by existing types of long-range fighter aircraft and high-performance missiles like Phoenix. But the newer AMRAAM could be fired in volleys, more could be carried on each aircraft, and more could be bought for given funds than of Phoenix. A "harassment drone" version of a cruise missile might also be developed for antitransport attacks.

RISKS OF THE NEW STRATEGY

In world affairs there is always some danger in discontinuity. There are risks in new policies just because they have not been as thoroughly thought through nor debated long by advocates and skeptics. Several aspects of the new strategy that are likely to be called into question include the following:

1. The strategy may be misreading the consequences for the structure and main thrusts in Soviet society of an increased arming of the West. Some have maintained that a kind of golden rule

*The usefulness of these systems was suggested by Donald A. Hicks in "U.S./Alliance Contingencies in the Gulf (Options for Posturing)," prepared for the European-American Workshop held at Elvetham Hall, near London, June 27-29, 1980. Hicks also suggested the two points that follow.
applies to the Soviet government if given time (i.e., by affecting a new generation of leaders) so "if the West is nice to the Russians they will be nice to us." As time has passed, the evidence for this view has seemed less convincing.

(2) The increased allocation of U.S. resources to military programs may not command popular support for a long enough period to construct a consistent new posture. In particular, the build-up of defenses while cutting back on social programs may lead to unrest and a harmed economy, and have to be reversed.

(3) From the opposite wing the concern will be voiced that there is not enough time to make structural changes in posture, and that most resources should go into paying for readiness, and more men and more weapons of familiar types.

(4) Related to the preceding point, there will be arguments against the taking of so many technological risks and views that more experimentation and field trials should precede large purchases of cruise missiles, light armored vehicles, multiple-kill antitank weapons, etc.

(5) There are a number of analysts and technical experts who are concerned that the greatest increases in funding are not going to inter-continental nuclear forces, but to postural elements for fighting in third areas. They feel that this risks a nuclear showdown in which the United States would be forced to back down.

(6) Some will be concerned that a strategy of either meeting aggression with local ripostes or by the lateral escalation strategy announced by Secretary Weinberger* will involve too great a risk

*See Richard Halloran (March 9, 1981), op. cit.
of escalation, and that weaknesses up the line would let that escalation get out of control. They will be particularly disturbed by there being an increased role for nuclear capabilities in forces sent to third areas. Many feel that if a limited nuclear response is threatened, it may have to be executed, and that, once nuclear weapons are used, there is little hope of avoiding large-scale nuclear war.

(7) Finally, there will be some concerns that a sudden shift in U.S. policies will widen the political gaps in the Atlantic Alliance. There are substantial groups in the two ruling coalition parties in West Germany, in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Scandinavia who will vote for leaders who will stress detente and the arms control process. Until a considerable and convincing discourse on the rationale for the new strategy takes place, the disaffection of these European groups will be increased, and the leaders in these countries will, at best, be wavering supporters of American policies.*

There are hedges against these risks, and a good many hedging actions are already evident. (One of the most costly is that a new nuclear-powered carrier is being proposed at the same time that major programs for using cruise missiles are under way.) Finding the correct path between the pure policies of the new strategy and the compromises

*The potency of these European views was brought home early in the new administration when Secretary Weinberger responded to a question as a press conference was breaking up by repeating a campaign position favoring production of neutron weapons. The subsequent uproar in the European press and protests from allies had to be calmed by softening remarks from the State Department.
needed to reduce its risks must be left to the management of the national security establishment. It is beyond the scope of this Note to go more deeply into these compromises, but it can be observed that guidance from objective analyses will be needed more than ever over the next few years.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is too early to say that the new strategy—as described in this Note—is an unmitigated "good thing." It is also too early to say how firm the administration will be in its attempts to implement it. But, if largely implemented, it promises the most far-reaching changes in U.S. security policies since 1961. Its effectiveness will depend not only on the skill with which it is executed and with which the risks just named are hedged, but on the success of the administration's new economic policies.

But if things go moderately well in these respects, the new strategy gives the United States some important opportunities to redress military imbalances and restore confidence in its leadership. It calls for bringing to bear most U.S. resources—economic and military—to support security objectives. It calls for adding to the nation's own resources those of its allies, which thus gives the West a preponderance of power. It deemphasizes the rhetoric of detente, with its implication of passivity, while stressing the maintenance of stability. For all of its increases in military forces and preparations for active intervention, it gives specific attention to reducing the destruction of war and the likelihood of war by proposing that responses be prompt, precise, and matched to the circumstances that threaten stability.

Clearly there are serious risks. Equally clearly, there are some chances for success. It is not unlikely that the strategy will meet its first test in Southwest
Asia. This Note has pointed to a number of ways in which the relative position of the United States and the West would be improved there if the strategy is followed and if allied support is forthcoming and adequate. But many of the changes discussed will take years. It remains to be seen if they will be in time.