ARMY FORCE GENERATION FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS—GETTING ONE SIZE TO FIT ALL

BY

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This paper examines the execution of the Army's Force Generations efforts as they pertain to Combat Service Support (CSS) units, more specifically Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) Sustainment units. Current plan is to restore a balance to the force by 2011 by means of the four imperatives expressed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA): sustain, prepare, reset and transform. The process the Army will employ to reach this balance is the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. The current ARFORGEN model is working relatively well for maneuver units, but is severely inadequate for addressing the needs of EAB Sustainment units. ARFORGEN for EAB Sustainment units is not a single process as it is for maneuver brigade combat teams (BCTs), but it rather is a continuous set of processes executed simultaneously. EAB Sustainment units are in dire need of reorganization. This paper examines issues associated with the ARFORGEN process and offers recommendations that will help to restore balance to EAB sustainment units.
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ARMY FORCE GENERATION FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS—GETTING ONE SIZE TO FIT ALL

Introduction

At a time when protracted conflict has become the norm, during which we will repeatedly deploy and employ major portions of our Army,… units will need to achieve and sustain a level of readiness,… The effects we seek are board: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their Families.¹

This civilian research paper will examine the execution of the Army’s Force Generations as it pertains to Combat Service Support Units, more specifically Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) Sustainment units. The Army’s current plan is to restore a balance to the force by 2011 by means of the four imperatives—Sustain, Prepare, Reset and Transform—expressed by General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The process the Army will employ, in part, in reaching this balance is the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. The current ARFORGEN model is working relatively well for maneuver units, but is severely inadequate for addressing the requirements of EAB Sustainment units. ARFORGEN for EAB Sustainment units is not a single process as it is for maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)—it is a continuous set of processes executed simultaneously—as EAB Sustainment units do not deploy in brigade or battalion sets.

This paper examines that process, AFORGEN, using a series of case studies/events that occur from June 2005 through today in the 13th Sustainment Command Expeditionary (ESC)—formally known as the 13th Corps Support Command. The process of using multiple level brigade and battalion commands to command and control the many company and below units left without proper command structure, and the impact the flip flopping of command structures has on the units as a whole. A list of those challenges, although not all inclusive, are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. EAB sustainment unit ARFORGEN challenges.

An average of 35% of the 13th ESC subordinate units—brigades, battalions, companies, and detachments—have been deployed at any given time since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) began—this is commensurate with other ESCs and Sustainment brigades across the Army. In all cases related with 13th ESC units, they did not deploy as organic brigade and battalion units, instead they deployed piecemeal based on the ARFORGEN flow process provided and used by Forces Command.

Since June 2005, the 13th ESC has relied on an ad-hoc system to implement the ARFORGEN process and fulfill requirements in garrison and contingency operations such as OIF, OEF, and homeland contingency operations like Hurricane Katrina. The impact of this system has been on the fundamentals the Army culture uses to remain relevant as world class power such as training, unity of command, Well-Being program taking care a families, and leadership. This paper will focus the remaining portions on those areas mentioned and the impact they have on meeting the CSA initiative of restoring balance to the force using the ARFORGEN process.

We will explore their importance and impact in the upcoming chapters. This paper uses actual events to illustrate the challenges with implementing the current
parameters of the ARFORGEN as it relates to the task organization of EAB combat service support (CSS) units. The bottom line is that EAB CSS units are not organized like maneuver BCTs and therefore do not fit neatly into the ARFORGEN process. Therefore, the time is now to reorganize the EAB CSS units into battalion and brigade formations in order for the ARFORGEN to work effectively and to restore the balance to the entire force.

Army Force Generation Process—What It’s Supposed to Be

While “what” the Army does for the Nation is enduring, “how” we do it must adapt to meet the changing world security environment. We are in an era of persistent conflict which, when combined with our on-going global engagements, requires us to rebalance our capabilities. We do this remembering that Soldiers and the Families, who support them, are the strength and centerpiece of the Army.²

As it became increasingly evident that the Army would need to deploy large numbers of soldiers over a protracted period of time to Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq, the Service found itself transforming in the wake of events, rather than in anticipation of them. The Army has responded by restructuring from a division- to a brigade-based force, the so-called modular force, and by establishing a brigade rotational base through use of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).³

The Army leadership made a decision in early July 2005 to bring on line the decision forum/process called ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN entails a sequential approach to readiness that synchronizes unit’s capabilities and readiness reporting with equipping and resourcing strategies.⁴

Fighting two wars and world-wide commitments the Army recognized that it has many challenges:

- Meeting Regional Combatant Commanders force requirements
- Restructuring (modularizing) the force
- Equipping, Manning, and Training
- Cross-leveling of units, personnel, and equipment
- Prioritizing and allocating shortages
- Handling unwieldy Alert/Mobilization/Deploy/Demobilization Processes
- Rebalancing Active and Reserve Components
All this and how the future will play out mandated the need for the Army Force Generation approach that synchronizes requirements to reduce uncertainty for available modular force in a logical and systematic process. ARFORGEN processes are supposed to improve predictability for commanders, Soldiers and their Families. It resources priorities based on unit rotation sequences and maneuver idle equipment to needed locations to maximize employment and readiness training.²

The strategic concept for the Army is to adapt and implement ARFORGEN to meet requirements for continuous full-spectrum operations and to preserve the all volunteer force in persistent conflict. The Army must generate large scale rotational forces to create conditions for enduring victory in the long war against terror. Simultaneously, Army forces must defend the homeland, provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), deter conflict in critical regions, remain ready to respond promptly to small-scale contingencies and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat operations. To meet these multiple strategic challenges, the Army will shift from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness to address both rotational and contingency requirements. Fundamentally, ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and readiness process that synchronizes strategic planning, prioritizing and resourcing to generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces tailored to Joint mission requirements.

The intent of ARFORGEN is to provide combatant commanders and civil authorities with trained and ready units, task organized in modular expeditionary forces tailored to Joint mission requirements, with a sustainable campaign capability and depth to conduct continuous full-spectrum operations in persistent conflict. Operational requirements drive ARFORGEN training and readiness, which supports the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to resource, recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive units more effectively and efficiently. At end-state, the Army achieves a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular forces tailored to Joint mission requirements while preserving the capability to defend the homeland, provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, deter conflict in critical regions, surge to conduct major combat operations, and preserve the quality of the All Volunteer Force in persistent conflict.
The concept of ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements. Operational requirements drive ARFORGEN, which in turn supports the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to generate capabilities on a sustained, cyclic basis. The Army gains a holistic view of Army global force requirements and global force availability across six year planning horizons. The Army uses this to focus units against future missions as early as possible in the ARFORGEN process and task organize modular expeditionary forces tailored to Joint mission requirements.

The Army refines expeditionary force packages in the ARFORGEN synchronization process as operational requirements mature over time. Army units flow smoothly through the reset/train, ready and available force pools to meet operational requirements with increased predictability. Mission requirements determine unit resource priorities and readiness reporting (ready for what = resourced for what and when = report against what metrics).

While the focus for the ARFORGEN process has been on BCTs, EAB sustainment units received little or no attention on how the ARFORGEN process worked for them. These units often received the lowest priority in terms of equipping, manning and training unless they were in the final approach for deployment, usually within 90 days of deploying. Because of this, EAB sustainment units developed internal policies in order to meet the needs of their units not supported by the ARFORGEN policies and processes. They did this in order to prioritize and allocate resources in terms of cross-leveling of units, personnel and equipment to meet the deployment criteria set by the supported combatant commander. Typically, this was done without the assistance of the combatant commander or the understanding of the requirements by higher headquarters involved in the deployment process.

In summary, ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and readiness process. To be successful, strategic planning, prioritization and resourcing must all be synchronized to produce fully trained forces on a schedule that meets mission requirements. ARFORGEN
is intended to result in trained and cohesive units, to streamline training and deployment management, and to provide greater stability for Soldiers and their Families.

The benefits of ARFORGEN are widely accepted; however, the proper implementation raises many challenges. At first review, these challenges tend toward logistics concerns, and military subject matter experts describe them in terms of resource availability and planning. As an example, it is critical that training schedules be synchronized to seamlessly supply Soldiers of the needed specialties and experience levels into the Reset/Train pool. Upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that innovations in training and personnel management could perhaps relieve some of the pressure on the planning and logistics pipeline. Such innovations are likely to come with a cost, perhaps to unit cohesion, perhaps in skill retention rates, or some other measure. It is important to fully understand that cost to make good decisions about the benefits of the innovation.

Unity of Command

You know I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot with stand them. 6

Practice of unity of command requires the placement of all forces operating in a specific theatre to achieve a distinct objective under a single commander. This originated in the Civil War, and reached an apogee with the ascension of General U. S. Grant as General-in-Chief of the US Army; an investiture of supreme command designed to unify all northern military efforts under one brain. 7

By 1914, the idea had become a combat principle, articulated in Field Service Regulations as such: “Unity of command is essential to success. . . . All troops assigned to the execution of a distinct tactical task must be placed under one command.” 8 It took the desperate situation created by the German offensive of March 1918 before allied generals could accept this essential principle. 9

Unity of command is one of the nine principles of war adopted by the US Army. That for every objective ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander. 10 ARFORGEN promotes unity of command for BCTs by organizing soldiers into combat units that would remain intact for a three year cycle. Note that the BCTs are organized, trained and manned at this level and AFORGEN is managed at this level.
However, EAB CSS units are not organized effectively to maximize unity of command. Because of this, 13th Sustainment Command Expeditionary (SEC) units to include Sustainment brigades have experienced multiple changes of command structure since June 2005. These multiple changes in command structure cause challenges in unity of effort in several areas to include training, personnel changes, Family programs, and leadership.

According to FM 22-100, “Bonds of respect, trust, confidence, and understanding take time to develop. When Soldiers or leaders are shifted, bonds are broken, and new ones must be built.”11 Turbulence tears at the fabric of unit cohesion, degrading a unit’s combat effectiveness. Maintaining unit integrity whenever possible creates an environment for sharing experiences and enhancing teamwork.12

It is foolish to believe that a Soldier’s loyalty, trust and commitment belong to his leaders and organization alone. Leaders must be sensitive to the needs of the family. Figures from past reports show about half of the young Soldiers are married and over 82% of both the Noncommissioned Officer Corps and Officer Corps are married. Families, who often feel isolated and lack a sense of belonging, need both a formal (Family Readiness Groups) and informal support structure, especially when the unit is deployed. Likewise Soldiers need to know their families are being taken care of during deployments.13
Changing command structures as often as the units in 13th ESC have experienced can cause cracks or complete failures in the unity of command. Units will see a raise in unlawful actions such as alcohol related incidents, assaults, divorces etc. To understand the severity of the changes in command structures have on unity of command we will examine the command structure of the 13th ESC in June/July 2005 timeframe.

Figure 2 depicts the results of a decision made in April 2005 based on the deployments of the brigade and two battalion headquarters elements, leaving behind 17 companies and 10 rear detachments.

Figure 2. Results of changing command structure.
The 2nd Chemical Battalion grew from 800 Soldiers and their Families to over 2700 Soldiers and Families in the battalion. Doctrine tells us that a battalion headquarters can effectively command and control up to seven companies. The 2nd Chemical Battalion clearly exceeded the limit for unity of command and instead reverted to a unity of effort operations. A chemical battalion was now in charge of a mixture of chemical units and logistic units; clearly two different training programs along with one (logistic units) having a define garrison mission, as well as deployment and redeployment implication.

The administrative burden placed on the battalion was overwhelming for the first six months until processes could be implemented and issues resolved that the brigade and battalion headquarters left behind in order to deploy for OIF. Compounding the issues even further was that fact that the brigade and battalion along with the 13th ESC headquarters had changed leadership during the handoff of companies to the 2nd Chemical Battalion. Thirty days later the one brigade and two battalion headquarters deployed to OIF.

This was the first of many changes to come in the command structures. Further compounding the challenges were other outside influences impacting on this decision; many of the logistics units had supporting missions to the post and support missions to civilian authorities. However, the most decisive influence was the fact that EAB CSS units, especially companies and detachments are not organic to any one battalion or brigade structure. Meaning companies and detachments did not deploy with their battalion or brigade headquarters and can then be moved around without regards to unity of command.

In addition, the Sustainment brigades and battalion headquarters deployed into theater without any of the subordinates units they commanded and controlled in garrison for their train up prior to deployment. They fell in on a “pick-up” team of like subordinate units, but had no prior relationship. Therefore, these brigades and battalions headquarters had to take the time to built unity of command relationships… this is not an ideal task when one is already involved in combat operations.

The 13th ESC is in a constant state of the ARFORGEN process deploying and redeploying Sustainment brigades, battalions, companies, and detachment-size units. This creates the need for creative unity of command organizations. This constant changing of
brigade and battalion headquarters for command and control also means a changing of standards, processes, and personalities, along with impacts on training and deployment preparations. Unless these units, down to the five person causality liaison team, are closely managed and transitioned, they can get lost in the larger scheme of things by BCTs and divisions deploying that get more assistance from installations activities and higher commands.

In order to illustrate the need to organize EAB CSS units into organic battalions and brigades this paper will discuss a specific case, the 96th Transportation (Trans) Company. The 96th Trans Company is a heavy equipment transfer company that moves heavy equipment and supplies around on the battlefield. The company is now on its sixth deployment in support of OIF operations.

96th Trans Company is a unique unit, being one of two in the active Army inventory. Their mission is to provide heavy lift capabilities in a theater of operations. Therefore the company was routinely deployed to Kuwait for six month rotations in support of OIF operations. However, based on Department of the Army policies regarding deployments the unit was constantly in a pre-deployment, deployment, or re-deployment phase; this status did not lend itself to normal unit functions such as Soldier rotations, refit operations and training.14

Operating in this type of environment for any length of time severely impacts on areas across the company and the battalion/brigade structure you are currently in. The unit experienced a change in five battalion commanders and four brigade commanders in a five year period and this is only in garrison not counting the command and control structure the unit was under while deployed. This caused a huge gap in the habitual relationship with the go to war headquarters in terms of training as you fight, standard operating procedures, multiple changes in Family Readiness Groups, and a complex unity of command. The unit was responding to two command and control structures, one in garrison and one for deployment; not an ideal situation for a young company commander and staff.

The unit experienced a raise in several Army Well-Being areas; divorces, assaults, alcohol related issues along with a shortage of personnel when Soldiers were declared non-deployable based on health issues or other related DA policies. The ad hoc command
structure had to revert to unique solutions in orders to ensure the unit could meet deployment criteria set by higher headquarters that were often oblivious to the exceptional challenges this unit faced.

In one particular case, the unit needed additional 20 88M (motor transport divers) personnel to meet its mandated deployment strength. The battalion command made the decision to train non related military occupation specialties in the fine art of driving a tractor trailer. After completing the training the Soldiers were then assigned to the 96th Trans Company and deployed. On a good note, many of the Soldiers who completed the training elected to change military occupation skills and remain an 88M.

On another deployment schedule the command had to cross-level 88Ms from a newly activated company into the 96th Trans in order for the unit to meet required deployment personnel. The impact of cross-leveling appeared to have less impact on unity of command than the other factors for the 96th Trans. However, it appears to have a greater impact on the donor units of those personnel in terms of their personnel readiness. Personnel readiness in the units receiving those personnel clearly went up but for every unit fixed there were multiple units broken—robbing Peter to pay Paul. A technique too often used within the 13th ESC to maintain deploying units’ strengths. This factor alone has major implications for ARFORGEN and the ability of the Army to build and maintain ready, deployable units.

The policies directed by higher headquarters and Department of the Army were not written with units below the brigade level in mind, but more for the BCTs who deployed and went through the ARFORGEN process as a whole. Policies were not executed equally across the force and created the have and have nots. When the Commanding General of the 13th ESC asked for an exception to the policy to delete the 96th Trans from its fourth straight deployment it was denied by the higher headquarters that created the deficiency. Therefore the ad hoc command and control structures in charge of all these companies within the 13th ESC had to develop policies that cover particular areas that were not addressed adequately for their unique situation.

The 13th ESC is once again creating, yet another, ad hoc organization to compensate for the deploying battalion and brigade headquarters while the other battalion and brigade headquarters are set to redeploy. Figure 3 depicts the current command
structure. Note that some battalions and one brigade headquarters are no longer available due to inactivation. In addition, the 13th SCE gained additional battalions and two brigades, but none of the company level units are organic to these higher headquarters. The companies have changed battalion and brigade headquarters five times thus far.

Solving the challenges associated with EAB CSS task organization units requires renewal of our understanding of the unity of command principle. It requires recognition of its importance and of reaching again an appreciation for the importance of a single purpose, and simplicity that comes with clear chain of command for garrison and contingency operations.

This principle means that all organizational activities must conform to the fact that all assigned will be together and prepared to fight as one. The claim of this principle further implies that the lines of authority be definite, clear-cut, and understood by all. Every Soldier should be indoctrinated with the fundamental concept of one boss at each level.
EAB CSS units that will conduct future contingency and homeland defense operations must take calculated steps to instill in their Soldiers an aggressive will to succeed in full spectrum operations. Like maneuver BCTs, EAB CSS units and their Soldiers win or lose on the battlefield based on the level of unit cohesion developed in garrison. In today’s environment EAB CSS units do not have that ability.

Training and Leader Development

Developing cohesion and the will to fight in individuals and units is a dynamic process. Training and leadership are the two most essential components contributing to unit characteristics.\textsuperscript{17} They enhance and strengthen the bonds of trust and mutual respect between Soldiers and Soldiers and their leaders.\textsuperscript{18} When unit characteristics are out of balance so are training and leader development programs.

With the many changes in command structure within 13\textsuperscript{th} ESC, units have experience a decline in training and leader development from moderate to severe in most of its company size units. In addition, companies have gone years without their primary mission essential equipment in order to conduct their wartime mission. In some cases, battalion commanders and their staffs have lost their focus on training and leader development largely due to the requirements placed on them by higher headquarters and outside influences. Because of the many changes in command structure leader development programs, at all levels, were lacking sufficient utility to meet the needs of leader growth. 13\textsuperscript{th} ESC units, as a whole, were experiencing an imbalance in Army culture.

When Army culture is out of balance there is friction between Army beliefs and practices. Over time, that friction threatens readiness. This friction can be characterize as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises, trying to do too much with available resources, too many non-mission and late taskings, too many directed training events, and senior leader “can do” attitudes that put too much on the plate.\textsuperscript{19}

It creates an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. Training is not done to standard; leader development in operational assignments is limited and does not meet expectations; Soldiers of all ranks and their families elect to leave the service early.\textsuperscript{20}
One of the Army’s seven principles of training is *train as you will fight*. However, EAB CSS units are not organized in this fashion. Company and smaller units are not organic to their battalions or brigades. FM 7-0 outlines that all units down to brigade level will have Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) and that all subordinate units will align their CMETL with the brigades. This CMETL and direct missions provide direction for brigade and below to establish training plans, guidance and contracts.

In a garrison environment this is accomplished by aligning like units together allowing them to establish unity of command and a clear path for maintaining the Army culture. However, when every six months or yearly, you are changing higher headquarters it causes call for alarms in training and leader development. In addition it fragments other programs, such as family readiness groups and the judicial system.

13th ESC units training and leader development programs were impacted by a constant flow of the ARFORGEN model putting its piece of the Army culture at risk. Units were either preparing to deployed, deployed, redeploying or managing all three phases and still running logistics operations on the installation. If a direct mission came from higher headquarters for one of the units it would disrupt the entire training cycle.

Direct missions came in forms of a change of mission for a particular unit primary CMETL. This direct mission was not part of the original mission task for a company or detachment and required a complete change of training priorities. Early in the stages of OIF and OEF, EAB CSS units were often required to provide protection assets for their logistics platforms, which required a different tactical skill then the EAB CSS were used to training. These protection assets formed into what is known today as combat logistics patrol (CLP) teams. Today, CLPs are a command part of the EAB CSS units training plan.

However, when a direct mission occurred it often required resources not in a EAB CSS unit. Because, the unit was not a BCT it routinely when to the bottom of the list to receive priority for equipment to accomplish this directed mission. The EAB CSS units borrowed equipment for a specific amount of time or modified existing equipment in order to simulate the training task being performed. In extreme situations, EAB CSS units trained the task in Kuwait prior to movement into Iraq. This type of training does not lend
itself to train as you fight nor does it instill confidence in Soldiers and Leaders performing the training.

For most EAB CSS company size units and below they meet their wartime battalion and above commanders for the first time in the operational environment; an awkward situation for any commander, especially in a war zone. The unity of command is not inherent and must be established. This takes time and patience for all units involved.

In Iraq the 13th ESC directly managed over 200 companies and below level transitions into theater of operations (Iraq). The tasks associated with such transitions included attempting to know the unit’s training and leader development level as well a tying into the unit’s Family Readiness Groups. Something a battalion or brigade command would know prior to deployment if these units were habitually aligned with their headquarters. But, EAB CSS units are aligned in a manner not conducive to unity of command.

The Army is undertaking a paradigm shift in unit training and leader development, and readiness as it implements ARFORGEN. Unit training and leader development, and the readiness reporting related to that, will move from the band of excellence to one of progressive and increasing capability over time. As the Army moves to this new standard, it must align and integrate EAB CSS units, at a minimum at the battalion level, to fully capitalize on unity of command when it comes to training and leader development and the other issues listed in Figure 1.

The unity of command principle recognizes the strong relationship between Army culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. Army culture must operate routinely within an acceptable band of tolerance for the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders. Any change that widens the gap between beliefs and practices in the Army culture impacts the Army’s ability to train soldiers and grow leaders. Aligning EAB CSS units in battalions and brigades will allow the Army culture to flourish within the Army’s most precious resource, its Soldiers.
Conclusion and Recommendation

The inherent strengths of command and control, training and leadership proficiency, motivation/morale and Army Well-Being programs are key elements of the principle of war called unity of command. In addition to this, ARFORGEN is seen as the mechanism the CSA will use to restore balance to the force by 2011 by means of the four imperatives—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. ARFORGEN offers an opportunity to formally link the future Army EAB CSS units (the Institutional Army, or generating force) with how future Forces (Operating/Operational Army) are designed, trained, and fully prepared to field the appropriate EAB CSS forces to the combatant commanders.25

General Richard Cody, while serving as the Vice CSA noted to the Army G3 and G4 that “Part of modularity was aimed at fixing the CSS and BNs so we have less of the “split up of CO/DET” in building LTFs – We need to work this better.” This comment was made after GEN Cody received a briefing on the disarray EAB CSS units were encountering after years of deployment in support of OIF and OEF operations regarding task organization and the challenges it causes with unity of command. Basically, GEN Cody was telling the G3 and G4 to align the EAB CSS units more like their BCT counterparts. Ultimately this will allow for maximum effectiveness with a higher degree of efficiency for EAB CSS using the ARFORGEN model.

This paper recommends assigning companies and detachments first with Combat Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSB) and then with specific Sustainment Brigades. Sustainment Brigades currently have only one battalion assigned to them. By assigning EAB CSS company and below size units to CSSBs the Army can capitalize on the unity of command along with quality training and leader development programs. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show current method and solutions for aligning EAB CSS units by capability.
Figure 4. Current sourcing process.

Figure 5. Improved sourcing process.
Organizing this way allows improves EAB CSS sustainment formations and standardizes CSSBs formation. You also improve the manning, training, equipping and resourcing of the units using the ARFORGEN process. It eliminates command and control fragmentation and turbulence, and formalizes habitual support relationships. It also has the capability of adding other modular CSS capabilities. Lastly, it reduces risk associated with training and readiness oversight.

The ARFORGEN process is leading the charge in transformation and replacing antiquated systems as we fight wars on two fronts simultaneously, OIF and OEF, and provide forces for homeland contingency crisis. EAB CSS units are out of balance, not because they are broken—Soldiers and Leaders remain resolved and committed—but due to a marked increase in the breadth, scope and magnitude of current operations and engagements expected of these units over the last five years.

CSA General Casey recently stated referring to the ARFORGEN process “… we are moving forward, and I think we are well on a path to bringing ourselves back into a state of balance. … but for the first time, I’m starting to see daylight, and I see how the plans that we have put in place can move us over the next three years to a position of balance, so that we can continue to prepare for the uncertain future.” However, for EAB CSS units it is hard for them to even get started out of the ARFOREGEN process.

The time is now to begin organizing the EAB CSS units into cohesive units maximizing the principle of warm unity of command. By doing so, the Army will gain greatly in the near, mid, and long terms. In the short term, senior leaders will gain an enterprise view of EAB CSS units in readiness and deployment sequence just like they do for BCTs. The CSA must issue guidance to achieve battalion level cohesion at the battalion level for resourcing.

Furthermore, fix Sustainment brigade fragmentation and adjust the timing of deployments to allow units to conduct a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) and deploy as a cohesive task organization (one deployment date for all units). By doing so, you deploy well-led, trained, and equipped EAB CSS units. In the long term, we need to change two more challenges and they are create Standard Requirement Codes (SRCs) for CSSB and formalize C² relationships and eliminate ad-hoc organizations in our
sustainment doctrine for EAB sustainment units (i.e., assign CSS battalions to Sustainment brigades).

The biggest hurdle for those units to overcome is the way they are tasked organized. The time is now to reorganize the EAB CSS units into habitual battalions and align them with Sustainment Brigades thus taking advantage of the ARFORGEN process and instilling the Army culture to last over the long haul. The next step would be to align the Sustainment brigades with their battalions for training and readiness oversight to expeditionary Sustainment commands, but that is a topic for another paper.
ENDNOTES


4 Information was obtain from the following website: www.atsc.army.mil/ltd/briefings/sym3/ARFORGEN%20abstract%20for%202006%20rtlp.doc

5 Ibid.


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10 Field Manual 1-02 (FM 101-5-1) MCRP 5-12A, Terms and Operational Graphics, dated September 2004, Headquarters, Department of the Army.


13 Ibid.

14 Author’s note: the DA deployment policies required unit, regardless of size to have a 90 lock down period prior to and after a deployment. This meant that personnel could not accept new assignments except in certain categories such as recruiter and drill sergeant assignments. 96th Trans Company operated in the mode for 5 straight years.

15 Author’s note; 88M is truck driver in the Army. The M is short for Military Occupation Specialty. And, in the 96th Trans the skills required even additional training on a Heavy Equipment Semi Truck. The operator had to be license on the specialty piece of equipment.

16 K. Powell, C. D’Angelo, B. Thornburg, and M. Nowak, Unit Cohesion Cross Leveling and Readiness Viability and the Effects of Cross leveling on Unit Readiness and the Impacts on Unit Cohesion, BCP International Limited, 22 November 2006.
Kolenda, p. 77.

Ibid, p. 77.


Ibid.


Author’ note: When Family Readiness Groups are moves into a different chain of command families of the losing unit often feel abandoned or do not identify with the new organization. The judicial system in the Army requires a clear chain of command to execute UMCJ violations and when cases are moved to another chain of command it is hard to execute the process without prior knowledge of the individual or violation.

Joseph E. Whitlock, HOW TO MAKE ARMY FORCE GENERATION WORK FOR THE ARMY’S RESERVE COMPONENTS, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006, pg 14


