

BRAZIL'S NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY – A DEEPENING OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LINWOOD HAM, JR.
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2009

This SSCFP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements imposed on Senior Service College Fellows. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-05-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Civilian Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Brazil's National Defense Strategy - A Deepening of Civilian Control				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Linwood Ham, Jr.				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Ave. Carlisle, PA 17013				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Ave. Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT DISTRIBUTION A: UNLIMITED					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Brazilian military dictatorships of 1964-1985 established a national security strategy to modernize the country and populate the vast central and western areas of Brazil. Today's strategy similarly seeks to use the military as a means to advance grand national objectives. Under the leadership of President Luiz Inacio da Silva and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, elected Brazilian officials will seize the mantle of civilian control of the military and provide strategic guidance and direction to the military services on their roles and missions. This project analyzes Brazil's 2008 National Strategic Defense Plan (NSDP) and compares this document to strategies formulated after the return of elected civilian rule. The research will reveal a first of its kind civilian strategy document that directs the creation of a defense structure that can defend its territory, address the threats to the nation, and collaborate with regional and global partners. The research will identify challenges and opportunities for the United States as a new administration contemplates our bilateral relationship. Recommendations will be provided to augment U.S. defense policy in order to serve as a reliable partner and to enhance greater defense relationships in the hemisphere. .					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Military, Policy, Latin America, Civil-Military Relations					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

**BRAZIL'S NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY – A DEEPENING OF CIVILIAN
CONTROL**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Linwood Ham, Jr.
United States Army

Dr. Max Manwaring
Project Adviser

This CRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Military Education Level 1 (MEL 1) of the Senior Service College Fellowship Program – Academic Year 2009.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Linwood Ham, Jr.
TITLE: Brazil's National Defense Strategy – A Deepening of Civilian Control
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 May 2009 **WORD COUNT:** 7,040 **PAGES:** 34
KEY TERMS: Military, Policy, Latin America, Civil-Military Relations
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Brazilian military dictatorships of 1964-1985 established a national security strategy to modernize the country and populate the vast central and western areas of Brazil. Today's strategy similarly seeks to use the military as a means to advance grand national objectives. Under the leadership of President Luiz Inacio da Silva and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, elected Brazilian officials will seize the mantle of civilian control of the military and provide strategic guidance and direction to the military services on their roles and missions. This project analyzes Brazil's 2008 National Strategic Defense Plan (NSDP) and compares this document to strategies formulated after the return of elected civilian rule. The research will reveal a first of its kind civilian strategy document that directs the creation of a defense structure that can defend its territory, address the threats to the nation, and collaborate with regional and global partners. The research will identify challenges and opportunities for the United States as a new administration contemplates our bilateral relationship. Recommendations will be provided to augment U.S. defense policy in order to serve as a reliable partner and to enhance greater defense relationships in the hemisphere.

BRAZIL'S NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY – A DEEPENING OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

Nearly one year following the 2006 Brazilian presidential election, President Luiz Inacio da Silva directed the creation of a new National Strategic Defense Plan (NSDP). Published in December 2008, the NSDP provides an insight into how this important country views strategic threats, national security objectives and the ways in which the country will harness its military power to achieve its strategic objectives. In the months leading up to the release of the Brazilian NDS, Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim and Minister of Strategic Affairs Roberto Mangabeira Unger engaged in a long discussion with the domestic leadership, academia, and partners in the region through international fora and the media. Their message has been consistent: Brazil's civilian leadership will guide military reorganization and military industrial modernization to become a sophisticated defense actor in the region and globally. What President Lula has presented to Brazil is a document that reaches beyond the matter of defense policy and seeks to join many sectors in a way that stokes the engine of national development.

Brazil's military dictatorship of the 1960s-1980s determined that the military instrument of power would propel the country along a path of modernity. Central to this strategic goal was the pursuit of Brazil's form of Manifest Destiny: the conquering and colonizing of the vast Amazon region. Given the current security environment Brazil faces, and its economic ascendancy in a number of key areas, how will the military contribute to Brazil finally realizing its place among the global powers? More important, will this NSDP serve as a blueprint for greater partnership with the United States, or will this policy posture Brazil to seek other regional or external partners on defense policy matters?

This research project reviews the strategic objectives of Brazil's national military strategies during the period of authoritarian rule, then compare and contrast the post-dictatorship strategies of 1996, 2005, and 2008. Through this comparison the project will expose how Brazil will once again turn to the military to be an engine of transformation for the country and form a critical component for Brazil's grand strategy of becoming a new great power in the world. The project will also explore the U.S.-Brazil relationship and how today's relationship portends both greater cooperation and competition.

The emphasis on transforming Brazil's military must be understood in the larger context of Brazil's political, economic, and diplomatic ascendancy and aspirations. This "country of tomorrow" may be, at long last, mobilizing its resources to make that tomorrow come today. This project identifies opportunities and challenges for United States defense policy as a new administration assesses the best way forward with Brazil and the hemisphere as a whole. In this way the project will give voice to Brazil's strategic defense objectives and offer meaningful suggestions on how the U.S. Department of Defense might approach this maturing defense partner to advance not only this bilateral defense relationship, but also how to achieve U.S. defense policy objectives in Latin America as a whole.

Brazil's armed forces are relative newcomers to the business of civilian control of the military. The armed forces relinquished political power to elected civilian officials in 1985, and received a civilian ministry of defense under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1999. Brazil's history was forged in large part by the political weight the armed forces carried and the role it assumed as the guarantor of order so that progress

may ensue. In the first half of the 20th century, the military became an active player in the struggle between regional and national power. General officer-led “moderating interventions” (otherwise known as coups d’état) kept internal peace and removed civilian regimes deemed unhelpful to the progress of the country.¹ This role ensured that civilian politicians always took into account “military prerogatives”.

Brazilian politics experienced a seismic transformation in 1929-1930 which altered the traditions of presidential succession. Urban political forces began to challenge the established rural-base political machine. These forces, backed by different sectors of the Brazilian Army, clashed in 1929 after the assassination of the opposition’s vice presidential candidate. The rising urban political elite represented commerce, light industry, the professions and the bureaucracy, and these voices called for “authentic representation” rather than the back room machine politics of the past.² The so-called “tenentes”, representing military officers who were also so enlightened, revolted on behalf of this burgeoning political power and the coronels, those military officers who traditionally backed the rural political machine, stepped aside as this new wave swept into power the opportunistic politician Getulio Vargas. This presidential transfer, endorsed by a new political class and guaranteed by a new generation of military leaders, paved the way for Brazilian populism and autocratic rule, consecrated by Vargas in 1937 as the “New State”, or Estado Novo.³

During the Estado Novo the military became an increasingly powerful political force and achieved its warfighting legitimacy through participation in combat operations during World War II. Key during this period was the consolidation of a military conscious that sought a strong military through the creation of a strong state.⁴ Under

Vargas, Brazil experienced a focused effort in national industrialization and federal intervention in export transactions designed to reap greater foreign currency. The military was a major proponent of state-led industrialization, and established the legacy for future government responsibility for the strategic direction of the national economy.⁵ The Brazilian Army saw combat in the Mediterranean theater during World War II and, as the only Latin American military force to have fought in Europe, only enhanced its national prestige and domestic political arbiter. Vargas found himself on the wrong side of the military in 1945, leaving office in a bloodless coup when forestalling the threat of a working class political force in Brazil.⁶

Vargas returned to power in 1951, but he did not court the military as a guarantor of his presidency. He reduced military budgets and favored the support of the urban labor forces over traditional politically-affiliated military centers of support.⁷ As Vargas sought to cultivate this new constituency, the post-WWII economic debate gave him political focus and direction. The concept of developmentalist-nationalism, by which a country passes from an agrarian to an industrialized nation, had backers from a younger generation of technocrats, bureaucrats, and military officers.⁸ The idea of economic development as a national strategic objective became Vargas' point of focus. Over time, however, the military became increasingly suspicious of Vargas and his labor affiliation. Populism during deep economic crisis left Vargas vulnerable to many constituencies seeking an end to his comeback.⁹ Vargas' suicide launched Brazil into political turmoil.

After a brief caretakership, Juscelino Kubitschek won the presidency in 1956. His tenure is most noteworthy for accelerating the pace of national development. Though a populist, Kubitschek sought accommodation with all significant political forces as a

means of assuring political stability.¹⁰ His motto of “fifty years in five” resulted not only in the creation of a new capitol, Brasilia, hacked from the heart of the jungle in 1956-1960, but also the initiation of the Amazon highway. This expansion demonstrated the government’s backing of a “specifically Brazilian” manifest destiny.¹¹ The military under Kubitschek benefitted in the form of increased budgets, but the administration’s level of corruption exposed Kubitschek to military intervention.¹² Kubitschek’s development plan spent Brazil into inflation, and he lasted only one term in power. The military, long interested in the security of the Amazon, would take up the work of westward expansion in the years to come.

The Brazilian military institutionalized the debate and discussion of political affairs through its various club, associations, and publications. These fora provided the means for the competing camps to deliberate when and for whom the military would intervene to settle a presidential political dispute. What the military lacked was an academic forum to study the very nature of Brazilian politics and government. Brazilian military leadership emerging from World War II saw a need for such an institution of higher learning and, with the help of the United States, inaugurated the Brazilian Superior War College (ESG) in 1949.¹³ The school was critical to the transformation of the military from a moderating force in political disputes to a political force in its own right.

In the fifteen years between the graduation of the first class from ESG in 1950 to the removal of President Goulart in 1964, the Brazilian military’s thinking was shaped by a number of external and internal factors that led to the belief that their very institution was in danger of destruction. The most significant external factor was the rise of

communism, and the specter of Fidel Castro's Cuba leading a wave of communist uprisings in countries throughout the hemisphere. Brazilian military officers feared a Cuban-styled communism in Brazil that would not accept the moderating role of the military and, instead, would destroy traditional military structures.¹⁴ Over time, the Brazilian military would become increasingly worried about ties between Goulart and communist supporters.

While this threat occupied significant attention, internal political factors made the Brazilian military even more fearful. Brazil endured stagnant economic growth during the late 1950s and a precipitous decline, coupled with staggering inflation, in the early 1960s. The military, thrust into the middle of striking workers and government or private employers, developed a belief that labor unions and "mobilization politics" were the root causes of inflation and bad economic policy.¹⁵ Increased agitation from the enlisted forces, and a belief that this new political actor would combine efforts with trade unionists, led the officer corps to believe that the long-standing image of the military as "above class" was being eroded and this agitation was destroying military cohesion.¹⁶ The Brazilian military, observing these and other factors altering the nature of political contestation, sought a way to explain this change and determine the best way for it to respond.

The military, faced with a type of corruption and petty politics that was destroying normal political intercourse, sought to express the danger posed by this phenomenon to the future of the nation. The military began to believe that it must respond to the breakdown of politics by expanding its purview into direct governmental activities. Students and instructors at ESG developed the notion of a military profession that would

concern itself with tying together internal security and economic development to consolidate the nation's efforts for assuring security and growth.¹⁷ The ESG theory on Brazilian national security became the way the majority of general officers, and a significant number of civilian technocrats who attended ESG, thought about the threats to Brazil. The breakdown of the norms of political contestation led to the rise of the Brazilian military that, as an institution, would not simply arbitrate the dispute for the presidency but assume executive responsibility and lead the nation.

The military dictatorships of 1964-1985 ushered in the period of "bureaucratic authoritarian" rule in Brazil. The Brazilian military and a cohort of civilians (ESG graduates) instituted this approach to focus national efforts to rebuild society and the nation.¹⁸ The Brazilian Doctrine of National Security, developed over the first fifteen years of ESG, became the philosophical underpinning for the pursuit of "order and progress" and the justification for oppression in order to make significant economic advancements. While the military immersed itself in running the nation, its concern over the force waned. By the time the era of military rule had ended, Brazil's generals were more concerned with antiquated equipment than the need to intervene in domestic politics.¹⁹ The military proposed a significant restructuring and procurement plan to Congress in 1985, calling for an increase of troops and purchase of expensive military hardware. Rather than subordinating military interests to civilian control, the armed forces strengthened their hand regarding decisions on military strategy, forces, structure and resources within the construct of democratically elected governments.²⁰

The military and civilian leadership took great pains to initiate and sustain a deliberate and forward-looking transition of power to democratically elected officials.

Key to the process was a commitment by the various parties to maintain moderation during the presidential elections, and forestall actions that might provoke the conservative elements of the military.²¹ The military's efforts before the transfer of power in 1985 to recapitalize the force with men and materiel would signal the beginning of a new era where military budgets would not be guaranteed. In the first years under civilian rule, the political focus was squarely on consolidating democratic rule, not redressing grievances against the military. Under President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) Congress killed a bill in 1990 that sought a twenty-five percent pay increase for the military while requesting a small increase for civilians. Though Congress subsequently passed a much larger pay increase, the message was clear: civilians would play a role in determining military salaries and budget.²²

Amazon development and security policy, long a concern of Brazil in general and the military in particular, remained a key national issue under the influence of the generals. As their domestic role began to change, the military looked to the Amazon and saw regional and international threats that justified its national security policymaking position and its need for a recapitalized force. Under President Collor "antienvironmentalism" replaced anticommunism as the military's rhetorical tool to influence Brazil's Amazon policy.²³ In the early 1990s the Brazilian generals began to look at the United States and the United Nations as opportunists in a "New World Order" that threaten the Amazon through military intervention.²⁴ The military, seized with an ongoing debate about its domestic role, was additionally burdened with assessing the external environment. The next administration would introduce new tools to rationalize the process of strategic defense policy.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) continued the process of imposing civilian control of the military while maintaining support of the uniformed services. Key to continued transition was Cardoso's plan to shield the military from the effects of the financial reform that impacted other parts of the government and the military's adaptability to changing circumstances.²⁵ This meant generous pay raises and approval for the purchase of major weapon systems. Additionally, the military maintained its preeminent position in the formulation of Amazonian policy. The military viewed "national security" as the colonization of the Amazon coupled with military surveillance as the best way to address the threat of an external threat to the region.²⁶ Such support by Cardoso for these military equities established a foundation of trust, which made possible the promulgation of a national document for defense and creation of a civilian Ministry of Defense.

The formulation of the Brazilian National Defense Policy (NDP) was muted and uncontroversial which facilitated a continuation of evolving roles and relationships between civilian and military leadership. Published in 1996, the first-ever document articulated the nation's guiding principles for defense. The NDP made it clear from the outset that the strategic statement would focus on external threats, not the sensitive issue of domestic political stability. The NDP acknowledges the difficulty in assessing the totality of future threats, given the geopolitical transformation of the post-Cold War. Cardoso made clear through the NDP that the regional and international environment called for the continued use of diplomacy so that Brazil may "live in peace and harmony in accordance with the principles and norms of international law..."²⁷

Despite benign statements about regional and international threats, the NDP did call for maintaining a “defense system adequate to safeguard the Nation’s sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law...”²⁸ The NDP balanced statements of diplomatic engagement and the application of military power to defend Brazilian interests. The NDP pointedly underscored a continuance of military roles in protecting the Amazon, development of the Amazonian border areas, and “support activities” regarding national integration, civil defense and domestic development.²⁹ This inaugural strategic defense document is important more for simply being written than for articulating a strategic vision for national security. In fact, Cardoso’s actions toward the military in his second term were more reflective of his desire to assuage the military’s fear than his intention to implement his written defense policy.

The creation of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense in 1998 did little to upset the balance of civilian-military relations in the short term. The first minister was an unknown politician from the small state of Espírito Santo who Cardoso fired within months as a result of mishandling a roiling political crisis within the Ministry and firing an esteemed Air Force officer who Cardoso later selected as the Air Force commander.³⁰ Additionally the Cardoso administration rolled out the new ministry in tandem with a commitment to reequip the military. The recapitalization plan called for \$3.6 billion in major purchases of aircraft, helicopters, and other weapon systems that would take place through 2015.³¹ Such largess softened the impact of the dual efforts to strengthen civilian’s hand and assured these historic steps would not lead to a crisis in civilian-military relations. Thus it fell to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003 to present) to institutionalize the civilian expression of national security priorities and the posture of the military.

President Lula's National Defense Policy of 2005 was a substantial effort to establish a coherent strategic vision from which the Ministry of Defense and services could rationalize its plans to meet the defense needs of the nation. Unlike its predecessor, this NDP is a framework that defines essential strategic terms, explains regional and international environments, and outlines Brazilian strategic interests. Lula makes clear that the NDP is the primary document for defense planning, that all elements of national power are considered, and that the Ministry of Defense is in charge of coordinating efforts for the nation's defense.³² In these ways the NDP establishes a conceptual foundation from which President Lula could articulate the security and defense capabilities needed to defend the nation.

Lula's NDP sounded the continuing theme of regional and international integration. The document makes clear that diplomacy is the centerpiece of assuring Brazil's security and multilateral fora are the venues for addressing and resolving issues. What distinguishes this NDP from the 1996 version is the indirect criticism of the United States as "unipolar power" which foments instability and tension.³³ That said the NDP endorses the need, based on UN resolutions, to prevent and combat terrorist threats and participate in peace operations. The NDP reiterates its right, as guaranteed by the UN Charter, to "legitimate defense" if attacked and speaks of an "invigoration" of military presence in the Amazon region and borders as well as continued social and economic development of the Amazon and border areas.³⁴

Despite the success of a national strategic document that established defense guidance for the nation, the annual military budget shares the same lack of focus and purpose as previous administrations. Military budgets under Lula as a percent of GDP

averaged 1.5% through 2006 (on par with Peru and Uruguay, less than Bolivia and Ecuador) with a high of USD\$15.3 billion and low of USD \$11.6 billion.³⁵ Simply put, the policy rhetoric did not match defense appropriations. Since the military handed over power, budgets and appropriations reflected the degree to which the president advocated specific military projects (arms purchases) or institutional interests (Amazon defense or pay and benefits). Twenty years on and military budgets, the true barometer of a nation's defense priorities, still lacked a linkage to a defense strategic vision.

In 2007, President Lula announced his intent to develop a new defense strategy for Brazil in 2007. Much had changed since the publication of his 2005 plan. First was the appointment of Nelson Jobim to Minister of defense. Jobim ascended to the position after the firing of Minister of Defense Waldir Pires in the wake of air traffic control scandal of 2006-2007. A career politician, Jobim took the appointment as a mandate to affect real civilian leadership over defense matters. Second was the appointment of Roberto Mangabeira Unger as the Minister of Strategic Affairs, less a ministry than a title and authority from Lula to chart a broad strategic course for Brazil that not only addressed defense matters but also stretch across multiple governmental disciplines as well as social and economic sectors. President Lula, with two years left in his second and final term of office, decided to bring two thoughtful and well-respected men together to forge a document that might rationalize future defense decisions.

During the yearlong drafting of the strategic defense document Ministers Jobim and Unger engaged domestic, regional, and international audiences in a discussion on a vision for Brazil's strategic defense. Jobim explained that, while brought on to address the air traffic control crisis, his interested extended far beyond this matter. He

told Lula that the time had come to understand military necessity within the context of “the country and modernity” and civilians were responsible for determining military tasks with the thought of national aims in mind.³⁶ Unger saw Brazil’s great potential juxtaposed with domestic ambivalence toward national greatness and envisioned an opportunity to turn “imagination into the possible” through crafting this national strategic vision.³⁷ Jobim and Unger represented the marriage of a new approach to rationalizing the defense needs of the nation and a new vision of development for Brazil. These two ideas are informed by traditional interests, but are merged in a way that may truly allow Brazil to achieve greatness that its ambivalence belies.

The 2008 National Strategic Defense Plan (NSDP) is a first of its kind, though the third attempt by a Brazilian president to articulate the defense priorities of the nation. What underpins the NSDP is the notion of national development and that federal actions henceforth must advance a larger objective of national growth and progress. The NSDP speaks of liberation of the nation through the pursuit of a sort of independence embodied by the mobilization of physical, economic, and human resources, autonomous technological enablement, and the democratization of educational and economic opportunities for all Brazilians.³⁸ The NSDP makes clear that the succeeding defense strategic analysis will be bound by a greater purpose – achieving the goal of becoming a developed nation.

The NSDP reiterates Brazil’s commitment to peace and non-intervention, a theme stated in the 1996 and 2005 defense policies. The document makes clear, however that in order for Brazil to “occupy its proper place in the world” the country must take deliberate steps to defend itself from “not only from acts of aggression but

threats.”³⁹ This defense policy quickly distinguishes itself from the two previous national defense policies by establishing strategic guidance for the armed forces, and establishing the first instance of articulated civilian guidance to the uniformed services:

“...the Armed Forces must be organized and oriented so that they may better discharge their constitutional mission and their duties in both peace and war. We will list strategic guidelines pertaining to each of the Armed Forces components and we will specifically spell out the relationship that must prevail between them. We will describe ways of transforming such guidelines into practical activities and operational capacities and propose the line of technological evolution that will be necessary to ensure the practical implementation of these guidelines.”⁴⁰

Previous defense policy pronouncements were either a parroting of well-worn institutional pet projects or an airy statement without any substance. This NSDP makes clear that the civilians will set the parameters for service missions in Brazil.

The NSDP establishes the roles and missions of the Armed Forces as the first of three “axes” upon which this policy is built. The second is the reorganization of the national defense industry. It is true that previous defense policy called for a linkage between the armed forces and the defense industry. In this instance, Jobim and Unger view this linkage as fundamental to achieving the vision of national independence. Success for this axis is the creation of indigenous defense technology capacity so the armed forces current and future requirements are met.⁴¹ By harnessing the indigenous defense industry Brazil would serve the dual purpose of strengthening its defenses while advancing its modern technology industry, which would significantly contribute to national development.

The third axis is the role of compulsory military service. This serves the dual purposes of a strong defense and deeper development. This policy in particular transcends the need of troops in uniform and seeks to connect the armed forces with greater society and draftees from all social classes with public service. Unger spoke of a “sustained broadening of opportunity” for Brazilians, and compulsory military service provides one vehicle for Brazilians to seek an opening to better their lot.⁴² The NSDP seeks a selection streamlining, selecting the draftees with the best physical and mental aptitude for military service, with others who fall short offered the opportunity of public service in some other capacity.⁴³

The NSDP outlines a number of objectives that are truly strategic in nature. The notion of defending Brazil’s land, air and maritime space is reinforced from previous policy. What is unique is the conceptualization of the “triad” of monitoring/control, mobility, and presence, which codifies the strategic ways in which defense elements must be postured to retain the nation’s sovereignty. This guidance forms the critical element to expressing the defense means, thus the organization of the armed forces, necessary to defend Brazil.⁴⁴ The guidance seeks to reconcile the vastness of Brazil’s territory, the paucity of forces, and the areas which are vital to the nation (e.g. Amazon, border area, Petrobras oil fields). The NSDP calls on the armed forces to design forces to meet these requirements, defense industry to equip the armed forces to meet their missions, and the people to serve a role in the execution of the policy.

The NSDP makes important inroads in the professionalization for the young civilian ministry of defense and the strengthening of the Brazilian joint staff. The ministry of defense has largely deferred to the uniformed services and service commanders in the substantive business of defense policy. Remembering that the transfer of power to elected civilians took place less than twenty four years ago, and the creation of the ministry of defense less than ten years ago, it is understandable the pace and trajectory of deepened civilian control of the military. The NSDP states the minister of defense will manage the services in all aspects except those reserved for the president in the constitution, and that a Joint Staff would serve to ensure unity of effort amongst the three services.⁴⁵ These statements are a sea change in how the services interact within government and establish greater distance between the services and the presidency. While these edicts are natural separations of roles within a mature defense establishment, this construct may strain current capacity. The Ministry of Defense does not have the capacity for full civilian oversight, and Jobim must take care to identify the functions and expertise necessary for his ministry and the Joint Staff to exercise greater control over the services.⁴⁶

The NSDP identifies a mismatch between current troop locations in the country and areas where current or future security requirements exist. The strategy identifies the North, West, and along the South Atlantic as key areas for military presence or locations for potential deployment.⁴⁷ The NSDP directs the services to relocate its forces to better meet the defense objectives of the nation in depth. The strategy does not forget the historical and psychological

importance of the Amazon region. The document recognizes Amazonia as “one of the foci” of defense priorities in Brazil and strongly rejects the notion of external influence on the region.⁴⁸ While the harsh language of foreign designs on the Amazon remains, Jobim and Unger recognize that Brazil must do more to better safeguard this ecological treasure. The extended discussion within the NSDP is not merely geopolitical rhetoric, but also directive to the services on improving its capability to preserve Amazonia “for mankind and itself.”

Jobim and Unger recognize the lack of a named threat and the reorientation of the armed forces around the country opens the question of the use of the military in a domestic setting. The President is authorized to use the armed forces in a domestic setting, and the NSDP emphasizes this mission would arise only if orders and when police forces are unable to maintain public security.⁴⁹ The NSDP anticipates the need for further consultation with federal and state legislators to address the proper legal tools needed to more effectively carry out a domestic mission, thus making the first outreach to another branch of government to strengthen defense policy.

Brazil has made it clear in previous policy that it prefers to address disputes in international fora. The 2005 defense policy was noteworthy in spelling out Brazil’s commitment to multilateral organizations to peacefully resolve disputes. A significant feature of the NSDP, and a key theme Minister Jobim pressed during the run-up to the publication of the policy is the South American Defense Council. The NSDP views the body as an integrative mechanism that not only would serve to prevent regional military conflict and

foster greater military cooperation, but also combine the efforts of the defense industries of participating nations.⁵⁰ The concept differs sharply from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's missives about a South American military alliance. Indeed informal consultations in the wake of regional crises in 2008 (e.g. Colombia/Ecuador, internal unrest in Bolivia) provided a venue for a constructive airing of grievances. Minister Jobim does acknowledge the idea may never be embraced, but holds onto the idea as a way of increasing the international profile of the region on defense matters.⁵¹

Peacekeeping is another NSDP objective that aims to raise Brazil's international profile and promote a stronger voice in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. Brazil has long coveted a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, but recognizes that it must beef up its international resume to make a reasonable argument for inclusion if another seat is made available. The Brazilian army has performed well in the lead of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, and the NSDP underscores the need for the armed forces to be prepared for peacekeeping missions so the country may meet UN collective security requirements worldwide.⁵²

The NSDP makes clear the policy of advancing indigenous defense technology and will seek partnerships not based on ideology, but on the deal that allows for the growth of the Brazilian defense technology sector. The policy again seeks the support of legislators to "protect" local defense entities in the conduct of public transactions.⁵³ The December 2008 announcement of a strategic alliance between Brazil and France in the development of a nuclear-powered

submarine represents the type of partnerships that is being sought. Brazil will place a premium on maximizing technology transfer and industry improvements in future foreign weapons sales. The next significant test of this policy is the ongoing “FX2” fighter competition. Aircraft from the United States, France, and Sweden are in competition, and Brazil is expected again to seek an agreement that advances its defense industry expertise.

The level of detail the NSDP has for the capabilities and weapon systems is unprecedented. Each service receives a laundry list of capabilities and weapon systems that will inform the doctrine that will be employed and the procurements that must be made. The Navy is directed to build a force of conventional and nuclear powered submarines, power projection vessels, ground and sea-launched aircraft, littoral and riverine craft, and marines that can be employed for any number of missions.⁵⁴ The Army is tasked to become more expeditionary, a “vanguard” force reorganized into brigade sets to maximize its effectiveness as a protector of the border and strategic first responder in a territory that needs reinforcement.⁵⁵ The Air Force must dominate Brazilian airspace, effect seamless monitoring of the aerospace environment, and render rapid air transportation of Army units to any trouble spot in the country.⁵⁶ These and other capabilities the services have been asked to acquire comes with a need for a detailed strategic funding plan and budget process that prioritizes capabilities and synchronizes budget requests to a list of prioritized programs. The implementation plan and timeline is a good start, but Jobim and Unger must create a system to get this ambitious project up and moving.

The NSDP identifies space, “cybernetics” (communications and networks), and nuclear sectors as areas of strategic interest which requires national attention and the defense sector’s close scrutiny. In particular the nuclear policy is where the NSDP makes its boldest statements. While adhering to constitutional and international treaty obligations, Brazil is nonetheless focused on developing nuclear technology and building nuclear power plants so it may have this peaceful indigenous capacity.⁵⁷ It appears that the creation of nuclear power connotes a level of modernity and development that advances Brazil’s development objectives. The advancement of nuclear power in Brazil may serve to complicate the defense environment, adding yet more national assets to the list for critical asset protection. Announcing the development of nuclear power technology may invite greater international scrutiny, the type that Brazil has rejected regarding the Amazon rain forest.

The NSDP lays out a number of policies that span the breadth of government. The document will require the participation of all branches of government and at least nine ministries. The document is more than a simple expression of defense policy; it is a call to arms for the entire nation. The objective far exceeds the defense of the nation, however. This plan seeks to mobilize the nation for yet another crack at putting Brazil on a fast track to developed nation. The 2009 defense budget request reflects a 28% increase from 2007, which suggests President Lula is serious enough to put resources behind these lofty ideas.⁵⁸ This NSDP, therefore, should be closely studied to understand where bilateral opportunities may exist and where obstacles may be present.

The United States should find much to like within the Brazilian National Strategic Defense Plan. It is first a reflection of the lengths to which the civilian leadership will go to assume its place as the leader on defense matters. The NSDP not only demonstrates a willingness to direct the military, but also provide the guidance and backing needed to execute the military missions the civilian leadership has outlined. The document makes clear Brazil's desire to create a sustained defense system without seeking handouts. Creating the capacity to secure its vast territory and borders benefits regional stability and sets the proper example to the countries that border Brazil and have transnational threats of their own to manage.

The United States should assume that Brazil's insistence on technological independence stems, in part, from disappointments with US technology transfer policy. The US decision to block the sale of Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela in 2006 stands in contradiction to Brazil's desire to integrate regional defense industries and maintain its freedom of decision on such arms sales. The United States retain veto power over third part transfers of US technology. The Brazilians are likely eyeing warily the US F/A18 submission for the "FX2" competition, mindful that their desires of full technology transparency may be thwarted.

The United States should assume a degree of skepticism from Brazil regarding Amazonia. Though the NSDP is lean on Amazonia threats, there is a section that describes a potential "asymmetrical war" against a threat of significant strength that threatens the Amazon under the guise of protecting the

world from environmental degradation.⁵⁹ Concern that another military force could become that threat to the Amazon may stifle attempts to deepen the military-to-military partnership with Brazil. A US Southern Command official commented that rather than allowing concerns like this hamper bilateral efforts, the United States should seek areas of mutual benefit take on lingering doubts about US intentions head on.⁶⁰ A way forward may be to seek areas within the NSDP where civilian-to-civilian partnerships could form the foundation for greater confidence in working with the United States.

Determining ways to engage Brazil's military in the wake of the NSDP must also include an appreciation for what activities must pass muster with the Department of State and their Brazilian counterpart Itamaraty. The new US administration must make decisions regarding what interests are at stake in Latin America and what kind of relationship with Brazil best serves our interests. A State department official stated there is much to gain from a closer relationship with Brazil, but there is a lot of legwork ahead to convince Itamaraty and others of the value in a deeper military-to-military relationship.⁶¹ As the new administration surveys the landscape, Brazil continues to court and be courted by France, Russia, and others willing to find common ground within Brazil's defense policy.

The United States should take this opportunity to assess the strategic interests that are served by a strong bilateral relationship with Brazil and by a Brazil that exhibits regional, hemispheric, and global leadership to advance interests of mutual interest. The Pentagon and SOUTHCOM have a number of

tools at their disposal to improve military-to-military relations with its counterparts, but such efforts alone may be insufficient to achieve significant strategic objectives commensurate with the objectives Brazil has spelled out in the NDSP. Brazil's plan seeks not only strategic defense and military objectives, but also a completely different framework for the nation to address security matters. That framework includes a level of interagency coordination and public discourse that is unprecedented in Brazil's history.

The United States should be willing to meet this effort not through the promotion of a strategic partnership or alliance, but a deliberate pursuit of issues of mutual interest and corresponding bilateral overtures, beginning with and led by the Department of State. Despite the revolutionary approach toward national security, Itamaraty will hold sway over external security initiatives. Itamaraty not only holds the key to realizing the grand objectives laid out in the NDSP, but also is essential in establishing and sustaining strategic partnerships in the pursuit of their national security objectives. State must engage its Brazilian counterpart to establish the diplomatic foundation, based on a comprehensive US assessment of the US strategic and security interests served by a greater relationship with Brazil, for greater defense cooperation.

The NSDP suggest a comprehensive and collaborative effort by some thirteen Brazilian ministries to meet the proposed strategic objectives. Brazil does not have an interagency architecture or process to work through the detailed implementation of the NSDP. Here lies another opportunity for the United States to offer Brazil an opportunity to exchange ideas on a governmental

strategic security decision-making and implementation process. The United States can employ current and retired government officials to share insights on U.S. policy implementation, while the Brazilians can discuss the way forward plans as outlined in the NSDP in a way that establishes a foundation for a durable strategic national security decision-making system.

DoD need not wait for some historic agreement forged by State and Itamaraty to exploit opportunities to partner with its Brazilian counterparts. One significant supporting contribution may be assistance in the expansion and professionalization of Brazil's Ministry of Defense. The NDSP notes the need to create a cadre of career defense professionals to match the expanded role of the ministry and expansion of civilian control of military matters. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has institutionalized civilian control of the military through the management of policy, force readiness, finances, and purchases. Current and former OSD officials can be instrumental in the growth and development of a Brazilian civilian cadre through a persistent program of engagement and exchange that fosters the growth of a professional civilian defense sector.

The Joint Staff and US Southern Command may play an important role by sharing the uniformed perspective on US efforts at greater military "jointness" and civilian control of the military. The US Joint Staff is a product of a sixty-two year evolution in US national security systems and processes, initiated in general by the National Security Act of 1947 and clarified in detail by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The NDSP represents aspects of both of these historic US laws, and the opportunity presents itself for a series of high-level bilateral

discussions so Brazil may incorporate key insights from their US counterparts of their choosing. Such a program may form the foundation for a Brazilian version of “best military advice” for its civilian defense leadership and elected officials. A newly empowered Joint Staff might emerge that informs and complements civilian defense decision making and leadership. Over time the Joint Staff may have created a level of trust and have forged a routine working relationship with its Brazilian counterpart that Joint Forces Command, the US combatant command charged with joint training and doctrine development, might be employed as a means for persistent engagement with the Brazilians on the science and art of “jointness.”

US Southern Command may compliment Joint Staff efforts through similar exchanges that facilitate Brazilian “jointness” in the land, air and maritime domains. This idea would also incorporate the interaction and collaboration between military, government civilian and private civilian entities in the conduct of operations consistent with the operational objectives of the different Brazilian services. What SOUTHCOM must first address is areas where Brazilians might be reluctant to collaborate. Care must be taken to expand the level of confidence that currently exists as a result of existing security cooperation activities so that deeper bilateral military activities might ensue. US Southern Command should then offer to partner with the Brazilian military to assist, where the Brazilians agree, in realizing the land, maritime, and air domain objectives spelled out in the NSDP.

The Brazilian military forestalled professionalization as a result of the dictatorship period of 1964-1985. In just twelve years succeeding Brazilian governments have made important steps in democratizing Brazilian society through the expansion of civilian defense leadership. The 2008 National Strategic Defense Plan is the most significant expression of civilian control of the military in Brazil. Its publication charts a clearer course for addressing the nation's security goals, charges a greater number of ministries with actions in the pursuit of these goals, and invites the greater Brazilian populace to be a part of the security debate. Surely the concept of a strategic defense policy is necessary but insufficient to meet the country's security needs. Additionally, the Brazilian government must resource the Ministry of Defense and uniformed service to meet the objectives set forth in the document or nothing will be gained. While much work is ahead to reconcile the myriad objectives that are laid out in the plan, the NSDP represents another important step for Brazil in making the country of tomorrow a reality today.

Endnotes

¹ Robert Hayes, *The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporate Mystique*. (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1989), 144.

² Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 13.

³ Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 113.

⁴ Hayes, 167.

⁵ Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, 47.

⁶ Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*, 125.

⁷ Hayes, 199.

- ⁸ Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, 89.
- ⁹ Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*, 136.
- ¹⁰ Hayes, 203.
- ¹¹ Candace Slater, *Dance of the Dolphins: Transformation and Disenchantment in the Amazonian Imagination*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 26.
- ¹² *Ibid*, 204.
- ¹³ Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 176.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*, 156.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*, 141.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid*, 165.
- ¹⁷ Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), 55.
- ¹⁸ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 35.
- ¹⁹ Skidmore, ed., *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil 1964-1985*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 273.
- ²⁰ Alfred Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), xvi.
- ²¹ Skidmore, "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974-1985," in *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 32.
- ²² Daniel Zirker and Marvin Henberg, "Amazonia: Democracy, Ecology, and Brazilian Military Prerogatives in the 1990s," *Armed Forces and Society* 20, no.2 (Winter 1994):259 in ProQuest (accessed September 17, 2008).
- ²³ *Ibid*.
- ²⁴ Joao Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker. "Nationalism, National Security, and Amazonia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil," in *Civil-Military Relations, Nation-Building, and National Identity: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos, Dharendra Vajpeyi, and Amir Bar-or, in Praeger Security International Online (accessed September 17, 2008).

²⁵ Joao Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker. "The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso – Overcoming the Identity Crisis." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no.3 (Autumn 2000): 149 in JSTOR (Accessed September 17, 2008).

²⁶ Ibid. 161

²⁷ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Brazilian National Defense Policy* (Brasilia: Office of the President, 1998).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Celso Castro, *The Military and Politics in Brazil: 1964-2000*, Working Paper Series (University of Oxford, 2002), 24.

³¹ Filho and Zirker. "The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso – Overcoming the Identity Crisis," 154.

³² Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, *Brazilian National Defense Policy* (Brasilia: Ministry of Defense, 2005).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Military Expenditure Database – Brazil," <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4> (accessed January 25, 2009). While Brazil's military budgets in 2007 and 2008 increased to USD \$17B and \$18B respectively, this reflected no change to spending as a percentage of GDP.

³⁶ Nelson Jobim, "Brazil: A Defense Overview," speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2008, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080321_brazil_jobim.pdf (accessed September 17, 2008)

³⁷ Alexei Barrionuevo, "'Minister of Ideas' Tries to Put Brazil's Future Into Focus," New York Times, February 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/americas/02unger.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed September 17, 2008).

³⁸ Nelson Jobim and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *National Defense Strategy* (Brasilia, Ministry of Defense and Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, December 2008) translated in Open Source Center (accessed January 30, 2009).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Barrionuevo.

⁴³ Jobim and Unger, *National Defense Strategy*.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Senior US defense official, interview by author, Washington DC, December 17, 2008

⁴⁷ Jobim and Unger, *National Defense Strategy*.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Military Expenditure Database – Brazil,"

⁵⁹ Jobim and Unger, *National Defense Strategy*.

⁶⁰ Senior SOUTHCOM official, interviewed by author, Miami, FL, December 2, 2008.

⁶¹ Senior US State Department official, interviewed by author, Washington DC, December 18, 2008.

