PROTECTING SMALL COMMUNITIES THROUGH DOMESTIC POLICING: ADOPTING AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO RECOGNIZE POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY

by

Donnie Perry

September 2009

Thesis Co-Advisors:  Robert Simeral
                     Maria Rasmussen

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
### Title and Subtitle:
Protecting Small Communities through Domestic Policing: Adopting an Early Warning System to Recognize Potential Terrorist Activity

### Author(s):
Donnie Perry

### Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

### Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es):
City of Greenwood Village, Colorado
6060 South Quebec Street Greenwood Village, Colorado 80111

### Abstract:
Throughout history, the role of law enforcement has never been more demanding than it is today. In the aftermath of 9/11, local law enforcement agencies have recognized the need to develop new capabilities to protect their communities. Due to the evolving nature of terrorism, public safety organizations must modify the way they respond to crime and acts of terrorism. This report seeks to contribute to the debate among law enforcement organizations regarding how to counter the increasing threat of terrorism. The aim of this document is to assist policymakers by providing an alternate response strategy to the growing criminal and terrorist nexus. Due to limited resources, the challenges of implementing a locally driven information system for police agencies are considerable. Outcome-based policing is a promising methodology that is proactive and information driven. It is a comprehensive strategy that addresses domestic policing and homeland security concerns affecting public safety. This thesis examines the challenge small communities have in combating threats of terrorism through shared intelligence. As a final point, this report outlines how the threat of terrorism and potential terrorist activity has redefined police operations and its impact on small jurisdictions.

### Subject Terms:
Outcome Based Policing, Intelligence Sharing, Terrorism Prevention, Triangle of Terrorism, Public Safety Assessment Triangle, Domestic Preparedness Performance Model

### Security Classification of Report:
Unclassified

### Security Classification of This Page:
Unclassified

### Security Classification of Abstract:
Unclassified

### Limitation of Abstract:
UU
PROTECTING SMALL COMMUNITIES THROUGH DOMESTIC POLICING:
ADOPTING AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO RECOGNIZE POTENTIAL
TERRORIST ACTIVITY

Donnie Perry
Chief of Police, Greenwood Village Police Department, Greenwood Village, Colorado
B.S., Criminal Justice Metropolitan State College, 1985
M.S., Management Regis University, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2009

Author: Donnie Perry

Approved by: Maria Rasmussen
Thesis Co-Advisor

Robert Simeral
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

Throughout history, the role of law enforcement has never been more demanding than it is today. In the aftermath of 9/11, local law enforcement agencies have recognized the need to develop new capabilities to protect their communities. Due to the evolving nature of terrorism, public safety organizations must modify the way they respond to crime and acts of terrorism. This report seeks to contribute to the debate among law enforcement organizations regarding how to counter the increasing threat of terrorism. The aim of this document is to assist policymakers by providing an alternate response strategy to the growing criminal and terrorist nexus. Due to limited resources, the challenges of implementing a locally driven information system for police agencies are considerable. Outcome-based policing is a promising methodology that is proactive and information driven. It is a comprehensive strategy that addresses domestic policing and homeland security concerns affecting public safety. This thesis examines the challenge small communities have in combating threats of terrorism through shared intelligence. As a final point, this report outlines how the threat of terrorism and potential terrorist activity has redefined police operations and its impact on small jurisdictions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. MUNICIPAL LOCALE

### B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

1. Significance and Background

### C. HYPOTHESIS

1. Research Questions and Underlying Challenges
2. Research Methodology
3. Identifying the Threat

### D. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY

## II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

### A. UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1. Domestic Policing: Intelligence versus Information

### B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Ethical Limitations on Collecting Criminal Information

### C. NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF 9/11

1. Community Based Policing, Crime, and Terrorism

### D. A SHIFT IN POLICING: TRANSITIONING FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT TO TERRORISM PREVENTION

## III. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

### A. TAKING LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES TO THE NEXT LEVEL

1. Transforming Local Government: Outcome Driven Strategies

### B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: NATIONAL SCOPE, LOCAL EXECUTION

1. Training, Awareness, and Education
2. The Fusion Center Concept
3. Concluding Thoughts

## IV. INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY

### A. SURVEY RESULTS

### B. KEY FINDINGS

### C. CONCLUSION

## V. RECOMMENDATION/POLICY OPTIONS

### A. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO AND CHANGE NOTHING

### B. IMPLEMENT A TERRORISM EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

### C. IMPLEMENT A LOCAL LEVEL PROCESS TO SHARE INFORMATION

1. The Public Safety Preparedness Model

## VI. CONCLUSION

### A. THE NEW PARADIGM: PROMOTING PREPAREDNESS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
1. Knowledge, Awareness, and Recognition of Terrorist Activity ....59
2. Understanding and Preventing Terrorism.................................60
3. Execution: Protecting Small Communities through Domestic
   Preparedness ......................................................................................60

B. FINAL THOUGHTS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE..............................61

APPENDIX A. ELECTRONIC MAIL SURVEY GREETING ........................................63

APPENDIX B. GREENWOOD VILLAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT
   INTELLIGENCE GATHERING POLICY ............................................................65

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................79
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Greenwood Village Police Department Organizational Chart</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Greenwood Village, Colorado</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.</td>
<td>The Crime Triangle</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.</td>
<td>The Triangle of Terrorism</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.</td>
<td>Public Safety Preparedness Model</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.</td>
<td>Outcome Based Policing Triangle</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
# LIST OF TABLES

| Table 1. | Demographic Profile for the City of Greenwood Village | 2 |
| Table 2. | GVPD Outcome Driven Performance System | 23 |
| Table 3. | SWOC Strategic Analysis Matrix | 26 |
| Table 4. | GVPD Outcome Based Policing Matrix | 29 |
| Table 5. | Response to the Domestic Intelligence Survey | 40 |
| Table 6. | List of Alternatives | 46 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Prior to September 11, 2001, I cannot remember thinking in terms of homeland security or terrorism prevention. Today, Americans can no longer assume their world is safe and secure. Who would ever image commercial airplanes being hijacked and flown into a public building? Sadly, everything changed after that fateful day. The events of 9/11 and its aftermath have led this entire nation to unite for the common purpose of preparedness, prevention, and protection. As first responders in domestic emergencies, local police are now the first line of defense against traditional crimes and acts of terrorism. This document calls attention to the threat criminals, as well as domestic and international terror groups, pose to local municipal agencies. As local law enforcement responds to the persistent threat of terrorism, the ongoing challenge for public safety agencies is the protection of local communities against future attacks. To that end, I am honored to present my thesis capstone, Protecting Small Communities through Domestic Policing: Adopting an Early Warning System to Recognize Potential Terrorist Activity.

As a gesture of my appreciation, several individuals deserve acknowledgement for the completion of this assignment. First, I am quite grateful to my family, friends, and colleagues. I want to thank my wife, Cynthia and our two sons Brendan and Carlos for recognizing the importance I associated with attaining this goal. Unfortunately, I was absent from too many family dinners and social events during the countless months of this program. I am indebted to my peers in Cohorts 0401/0402; they contributed resources, assistance, insight, and encouragement. I appreciate the assistance given by the professional library staff at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). Special thanks to my academic advisors Dr. Maria Rasmussen and Professor Robert Simeral who offered invaluable expertise and support. They also provided much-needed assistance while navigating through the complexities of this commitment.

I am grateful to Mayor Nancy Sharpe and City Manager Jim Sanderson, who allowed me the opportunity to participate in this very important undertaking. I wish to thank Councilmember Ron Rakowsky for the encouraging conversation many years ago and thank you Judge Mary Dulacki for your thoughtful advice. I am especially grateful...
to Dr. Paul Stockton for his vision and input. Finally, my appreciation extends to Faye Saunders, Brenda Denning, Mark Greenberg and Erika Abad for volunteering their time to review this composition. Their attentive insight, support, comments, and understanding were instrumental in completing this project.
I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, the unthinkable happened. An entire nation watched as two commercial airlines flew into the World Trade Center. The unprovoked attacks shattered the illusion that local communities are immune from acts of terrorism. Following these attacks, the role of local police agencies evolved into a new mission. Their new responsibility encompasses homeland security and counterterrorism. The Homeland Security Council defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”¹ This paper explores the challenge of redirecting domestic policing strategies to address the ongoing threat of crime and terrorism. The information in this thesis provides a starting point from which local law enforcement practitioners can begin to ask informed questions about the nature and scope of potential terrorist activity occurring in their communities. Accordingly, in Greenwood Village, Colorado, the executive management team conducted research to determine what organizational and management strategies need to be addressed to deal with the ongoing threat of terrorism effectively.

A. MUNICIPAL LOCALE

The City of Greenwood Village is located in Arapahoe County, on the southern border of Denver, Colorado. The city has common boundaries with several municipalities that include the cities of Littleton, Englewood, Cherry Hills Village, Centennial, and unincorporated Arapahoe County. Originally, a small rural community, Greenwood Village has grown significantly. Today, the city has over 14,000 full time residents and a daytime population of approximately 60,000. The increase in population is due to a large number of businesses located in two nationally recognized business parks. The Denver Technological Center (DTC) is the city’s largest industrial park. It has over 900 acres for residential, office, and retail development. DTC is home to more than 1,000 companies that employ a workforce of more than 30,000.² There are several

high value potential targets located in the city to include federal office buildings, political leaders, and judges. Additionally, the city has the largest high school campus in the state with more than 6,000 students, faculty, and staff. Table 1 provides an overview of the city’s statistic and demographic profile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic/Statistic</th>
<th>Official Figure</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population 2000</td>
<td>11,035</td>
<td>2000 Census</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population 2005</td>
<td>14,175</td>
<td>Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of People Employed within Greenwood Village</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households 2000</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>2000 Census</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households 2004</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>(DRCOG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$132,628</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2004 Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>$80,188</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2004 Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of Schools (public and private)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Greenwood Village Neighborhood Directory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total square miles</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Parks</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Parks, Trails &amp; Recreation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Commercial Banks</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Police Department</td>
<td>2005 Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Budgeted Full-time Employees</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2006 Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Demographic Profile for the City of Greenwood Village

The Greenwood Village city government is an outcome based management organization with a strong service-oriented focus. Outcome based management is an organizational philosophy that combines data relating to inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes into a specific process that measures the performance of the organization. The police department supports the city’s outcome based management philosophy with a local initiative identified as outcome based policing. Outcome-based policing is an expansion of professional policing practices to include problem solving and community-based policing as a means to reduce crime and public order problems. Chapter III covers outcome based policing in more detail.

The Greenwood Village Police Department (GVPD) encompasses 93 employees. There are 67 commissioned police officers and 26 non-commissioned personnel. The Police Chief is the chief executive officer for the organization and has the responsibility
of the management, direction, and control of the overall operation and administration of the department. The command structure includes the executive and management teams. The executive team consists of the Chief, three lieutenants, and a civilian manager. The management team has nine sergeants who are responsible for the day-to-day operations. The department is a full service organization that consists of three service areas: Patrol Services, Detective Services, and Support Services. A police lieutenant or civilian supervisor manages each service area. The following diagram illustrates the current structure of the department.

Figure 1. Greenwood Village Police Department Organizational Chart

The overall mission of the police department is to protect the people, property, environment, and economy of Greenwood Village from criminal acts, man made hazards, or natural disaster. As part of this mission, the organization provides professional police services that contribute to discouraging criminal behavior and enhancing the quality of life in communities. To accomplish this task, the police department strives to reduce

---

3 City of Greenwood Village 2007 Annual Operating and Capital Budget Book.
crime and neighborhood disorder by fostering problem-solving partnerships with residents. Problem solving relies less on arresting offenders, but rather developing long-term plans to impede offenders and protect potential victims. An important factor in sustaining quality of life in the city is the ability to identify public concerns consistently, and then formulate programs that successfully address the issues. The following map provides a visual aid to the city’s geographical location.

![Map of Greenwood Village, Colorado](image)

Figure 2. Greenwood Village, Colorado

### B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Terrorist and criminal activity often crosses jurisdictional boundaries; therefore, local police agencies must have the ability to access critical information that could help identify a suspect or solve a crime. Before 9/11, local police agencies placed little emphasis on fighting terrorism. The challenge of counterterrorism and intelligence gathering was primarily the responsibility of federal agencies. Following the terrorist attacks, the role of domestic policing evolved from a unilateral operational focus to include the asymmetrical threats associated with terrorism. Additionally, the battle

---

4 Microsoft Corp., Microsoft MapPoint, 2005.
against terrorism and terrorist groups also include domestic organizations. The anthrax cases in 2001, the 1996 Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, validate the fact that terror campaigns can occur anywhere in the country. As target rich locations such as New York, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles become less vulnerable, smaller communities like Greenwood Village become more susceptible. Due to the additional responsibility placed on domestic law enforcement, there is a need to ensure that local police receive the essential information to respond effectively. Effective terrorism prevention is dependent on comprehensive information sharing.

1. Significance and Background

In a democratic society, the first obligation for government is to protect its citizens from violence. For public safety organizations, there are no greater challenges than to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. Motivated by the tragic events of 9/11, the new challenge for law enforcement is preventing and interdicting terrorist activity in local communities. Today, protecting local communities from acts of terrorism requires that police and sheriff’s agencies develop an information network that builds on existing community partnerships to identify potential terrorist activity. In this post 9/11 environment, timely and accurate information is vital in terrorism prevention. A single piece of information can be vital in the discovery of criminal or terrorist activities. Accordingly, information must be proactive if police and sheriff’s agencies are to be effective in preparing, preventing, and responding to criminal acts or acts of terrorism.

C. HYPOTHESIS

What is the role of domestic law enforcement in the fight against terrorism? From a state/local perspective, improving law enforcement’s ability to safeguard communities while fighting crime and terrorism relies on the development of an effective strategic plan to clarify the role and responsibilities of local agencies. This research concentrates on how small law enforcement agencies can be a valuable partner with state and federal agencies in the fight against terrorism. This thesis also examines the issue of domestic
intelligence collection, legal issues, and the impact on civil liberties. The focus of this study is to identify an alternative response strategy for small police agencies to recognize criminal or terrorist related activity.

1. Research Questions and Underlying Challenges

Due to the evolving link between organized crime and terrorism, local police agencies must reorganize to meet this challenge. It is paramount that public safety agencies be able to detect and deter criminal activity used by terrorist organizations as material support for their operations. Successful counterterrorism efforts require local government, federal agencies, and private sector entities to establish effective information sharing through collaborative partnerships. State and local law enforcement executives must adopt standards for managing an information sharing process. The following questions guide the research for this study.

- Should local police have a role in fighting terrorism?
- What is the impact of counterterrorism activity on local jurisdictions?
- What needs to be accomplished to protect small communities from terrorist attacks?
- How effective is local government in identifying terrorist or terrorist groups?
- What is the most efficient and effective way for local jurisdictions to manage and share information about potential terrorist events?
- Should local jurisdictions develop and implement an information system to strengthen intelligence sharing with state and federal agencies?
- What barriers exist that have hindered effective information sharing between federal, state, and local authorities?

2. Research Methodology

Over the past few years, several attempts have been made to improve communication among law enforcement agencies. The research for this project is to conduct a study on implementing an information sharing system that could serve as a model for small law enforcement agencies. The purpose is to assess the information sharing that exists and to offer suggestions on how to improve current practices among law enforcement agencies. The two primary objectives for the study are the following.
What initiatives have been undertaken to improve the sharing of information?

Whether local law enforcement agencies believe that the current information-sharing process is effective?

The evaluation of various publications on the Internet and other resources is one method used to achieve both objectives. The second technique is to prepare and administer a domestic law enforcement survey utilizing the Zoomerang® survey tool. Police departments representing a diverse mix in terms of geography, jurisdiction, and population receive a survey containing 25 questions via email. Recipients that do not respond to the survey within a certain amount of time also receive a follow-up email. The analysis focuses primarily on two areas. The first part concentrates on how and why law enforcement agencies share information. The second section solicits agency’s needs, expectations, and best practices in establishing a regional sharing initiative. The SARA Model (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) introduced in Chapter II is used to analyze the data obtained from the survey. Additionally, the SARA model assists with defining the scope of the problem, assessing alternatives, and identifying possible solutions.

3. Identifying the Threat

Emerging trends taking place in the Middle East and throughout the world consist of direct attacks on local governments and their citizens. From the Madrid, Spain train bombing in 2003, to the Mumbai, India attacks in 2008, the terrorist’s paradigm has shifted from military targets abroad to the safety and security of local communities. Thwarted attempts in Illinois, New York, Virginia, New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, and California underscore the seriousness of this emerging threat.5 Terrorist threats, along with the damage or destruction of critical infrastructure can have a major impact on national, regional, and local economies. Potential targets in Colorado, especially Greenwood Village, include emergency services, medical and educational facilities, banking institutions, transportation avenues, tourism, and military complexes.

---

5 United States Northern Command, MARFORNORTH Force Protection Weekly INTSUM (June 7, 2007).
D. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis speaks to the desire of anyone who wants to learn or understand more about policing terrorism in small communities. The possibility of homegrown or international terrorists operating in local communities is real and requires a different mindset by local police. For that reason, the discussion and direction of this project takes its lead from the first chapter. This initial chapter presents a brief geographic profile of a small community along with the research questions that guides the focus of this essay. Second, this chapter introduces the ongoing challenges confronting police and sheriff’s agencies in the domestic war on terrorism. Next, it outlines the purpose and significance for developing and implementing a collaborative information network in local jurisdictions. Finally, Chapter I identifies the problem, theory, and challenge explored throughout this document. A noteworthy example is the struggle between federal, state, and local agencies to share important information. The next five chapters offer the suggestion that police organizations must change their philosophy, organizational structures, and processes to be more effective in the ongoing battle against crime and terrorism.

Chapter II begins by examining relevant literature on understanding terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering, and the impact on civil liberties. This chapter answers the question of intelligence versus information. Moreover, it focuses on the law enforcement role in domestic intelligence collection. It examines the legal implications associated with terrorism related investigations. It also includes an awareness of applicable federal and state laws, constitutional issues, as well as related legal considerations. In addition, it studies the distinctions between law enforcement intelligence and defense intelligence. Due to the controversy associated with gathering information and surveillance related to terrorism, violations of individual civil liberties are a major concern. Additionally, this chapter offers a glimpse of how community policing and problem-solving strategies go hand in hand when trying to identify potential terrorist activity. Next, it introduces the crime triangle along with the triangle of terrorism and asks whether the lessons learned from existing crime-fighting strategies can be effective in winning the war on terrorism.
Since two jets flew into the World Trade Center, local police must be aware of emerging threats and be ready to meet the challenge involved in countering terrorism or criminal incidents. Chapter III outlines the research methodology used in this thesis as outcome based policing. Simply stated, it is a term developed to identify a policing style that epitomizes an organizational philosophy. Outcome based policing refers to goals citizens expect the police to accomplish. These fundamental goals have long been part of the police mission, which allows the police department to direct appropriate resources toward fighting crime. Outcome-driven policing ultimately creates accountability for department members in fulfilling their responsibilities to reduce crime while addressing activities impacting public safety. It has realigned traditional reactive policing practices to a proactive results-oriented approach. In short, Chapter III proposes an alternative method of policing enabling law enforcement managers to implement domestic intelligence gathering into existing crime prevention strategies. This chapter also discusses the difference between outcome driven and intelligence-led policing.

Intelligence gathering and information sharing is the foundation for successful law enforcement operations. Chapter IV attempts to recognize and understands how exiting law enforcement agencies share information. In the fall of 2008, a survey of law enforcement leaders identified issues related to the sharing of information among municipal police and other law enforcement agencies. The survey collected information on the types of information needed by participants, the extent that this information was disseminated, and the barriers that prevent participants from sharing information. The surveys were directed to the chief executive officers of each agency. The intent was to sample the current level of information sharing among a select group of agencies. The data analysis led to a number of explanations regarding why agencies do or do not sharing information with other agencies. The survey results outlined in Chapter IV provide the basis for valid concerns between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

While the first four chapters of this document consist of preparatory steps, Chapter V discusses police capabilities to respond to a potential terrorist attack. This section describes a policy need, strategies, and various options for addressing terrorism related events. This chapter recommends a specific course of action to enhance domestic
security and public safety. It outlines a comprehensive informational process, developed by this author and introduced in this thesis, as the Public Safety Preparedness Model (PSPM). The PSPM is an early recognition system designed to gain access to reliable information about criminal or terrorism related activity. The primary focus of the model is to advance the knowledge and understanding of terrorist activity based on careful analysis of available information. The PSPM offers compelling reasons why local police agencies should adopt an integrated information process to recognize potential terrorist or criminal developments. The model informs, teaches, and assists local police agencies to recognize terrorist activity and foster regional information sharing. Implementing the public safety preparedness concept demonstrates the value of an information-driven approach to terrorism prevention and crime control.

*Protecting Small Communities through Domestic Policing* aims to give the reader a basic understanding of the evolving terrorists’ threat and its impact on local jurisdictions. Chapter VI links lessons from the proceeding chapters and identifies concerns local police agencies must address to fight crime effectively and prevent terrorism. In the past, police organizations achieved a variety of outcomes that included reducing crime, minimizing fear and disorder, solving neighborhood problems, in addition to improving the quality of life in communities. Lately, local law enforcement practitioners now promote information driven policing as a fundamental responsibility to improve local intelligence operations. As a result, the use of information-driven policing is essential when creating a strategy to recognize potential terrorist activity. To help summarize and review the lessons learned throughout this project, the author uses the Outcome Based Policing Triangle (OBPT). The OBPT is an outcome driven approach designed to understand the function of domestic policing and its applications for addressing criminal events, disaster management, and emergency preparedness. The model begins with the legal requirements discussed in this thesis to assist local police in establishing intelligence driven strategies. The model also provides the knowledge, understanding, and practical application to help balance procedures for maintaining public safety and homeland security.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

In recent years, a growing body of research has sought to explain the impact of global terrorist groups on domestic law enforcement agencies. The literature review for this document has framed the issue regarding the need for change in how local law enforcement organizations effectively address contemporary terrorism. Many terrorist intelligence analysts warn that the radical Islamic Jihad movement poses the greatest threat of terrorist attacks against the United States. According to Richard Clarke in his book, Against all Enemies (2004), he identifies several attacks that include the attack on American Marines in Beirut, Pan Am flight 103, and the attack on the USS Cole while docked in the port of Yemen in 2000. Recent suicide bombings in several countries demonstrate these bombing remain a preferred method of attack among extremists. In an article written by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism” (2003), Hoffman explains, the tactics of suicide terrorism have a strategic logic of their own. A suicide attack is a premeditated act of violence conducted by an individual or group of individuals with the full knowledge and understanding that the attacker almost certainly dies in the execution of the act. While there has not been an attack of this nature in the United States, some people include 9/11 as a suicide attack. In view of that, the threat of a terrorist attack against local communities remains one of the most pressing challenges for domestic policing.

A. UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The problem with understanding terrorism is that there is no standard definition. Multiple definitions lead to a lack of understanding about individuals who perpetrate criminal acts. For example, compare and contrast the two separate and distinct definitions offered by the Department of Defense and United States Congress. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce, or to intimidate

---


governments, or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”

On the other hand, Congress recognizes acts of terrorism as, “violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the laws of the United States, or any State law; or, would be a violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Although the Department of Defense’s definition focuses on religious or political objectives, Congress’ definition focuses on criminal procedures. The difficulty in not having a universally accepted definition affects the legal status and prosecution of individuals who commit terrorist acts. Despite the varying definitions, shielding local communities from acts of terrorism requires an effective network for collecting and analyzing information. Fighting crime and acts of terrorism is all about information. Preventing terrorism through information sharing is vital to public safety and domestic security.

1. Domestic Policing: Intelligence versus Information

In today’s challenging times, municipal law enforcement agencies must provide domestic security against the threat of terrorism as well as criminal activity. Establishing a network for information sharing enhances communication and improves the identification of criminal or terrorist suspects. In the domestic policing environment, information is not the same as intelligence. Generally, “intelligence is information a policymaker needs to make an informed decision.” For law enforcement purposes, intelligence is information of value collected and analyzed in support of a criminal investigation. Conversely, information may come from open sources to provide police investigators with a strategic view of a crime problem. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) defines criminal intelligence as, “information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent or monitor criminal activity.” To be brief, law enforcement intelligence refers to analyzed information

---


about crime while defense intelligence monitors threats to national security. Information gathering and intelligence analysis is critical in getting local police the information they need to fight crime or terrorist related activity.\textsuperscript{12} The likelihood of an effective police response to criminal activity increases proportionately as the accuracy of the criminal intelligence increases.

Historically, police and sheriff’s agencies share criminal information with other law enforcement agencies. However, in the fight against terrorism, what is the role of local police in domestic intelligence collection? A significant problem with criminal intelligence is the limitations on the levels of intrusions local police can perform on the public. Intelligence collection, when used as a tool for national security or domestic law enforcement, can limit and ultimately negate the rights of citizens. To avoid the impression of local police spying on citizens, it is important to understand there are specific terms and guidelines associated with intelligence collection. State and federal constitutional rules of evidence govern law enforcement intelligence while the same restrictions do not apply to defense intelligence.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the United States Code of Federal Regulations 28 CFR Part 23 governs intelligence collection for municipal agencies. The regulation pertains to non-federal intelligence operations and the following guidelines apply.

- When an officer has reasonable suspicion that supports the belief that information relates to a criminal activity, the information can be collected, analyzed, stored, and shared.

- If the officer has facts that the information is connected to criminal activity the officer may collect, analyze, and share the information only long enough to determine if the information reasonably relates to a crime.

- If reasonable suspicion is not obtained within a reasonable amount of time, the information must be purged.\textsuperscript{14}


The dilemma associated with domestic intelligence collection is that local police and federal agencies have a different set of standards. For local police, the key to domestic intelligence collection is to ensure that the information is legal, accurate, and not maintained or stored unnecessarily.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Historically, America has gone to great lengths to protect the safety, security, and freedom of its citizens. Some political theorists are concerned that the federal government’s use of secret surveillance and data mining could lead to increasing distrust of government agencies and undermine democratic principles. How far are U.S. Citizens willing to go in restricting civil liberties as part of preventing another terrorist attack? What is the appropriate balance between civil liberties and homeland security? At what point can a person’s civil liberties be overridden by “emergency” powers and administrative decrees on secret search to prevent terrorism? The United States Constitution provides safeguards for individual rights to privacy. A specific safeguard against unreasonable governmental intrusion is the requirement that absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain a search warrant prior to engaging in a search. More importantly, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides safeguards against unlawful government intrusion.15 Today, there is growing public concern over domestic intelligence collection as it relates to the impact on civil liberties and constitutional safeguards. Local police agencies must be careful when gathering information that can subject them to legal and civil liability.

1. Ethical Limitations on Collecting Criminal Information

In March 2002, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against the Denver (Colorado) Police Department alleging the department engaged in a practice of gathering and storing illegal information on Denver area residents. According to the complaint, “Denver Police had created illegal files on more than 3,200 individuals

Denver Police used the illegal files to monitor and record law-abiding citizens engaged in non-criminal activities. Following thirteen months of litigation, a legal settlement required the Denver Police Department to develop and implement rules based on federal regulations governing the collection of domestic police intelligence. Additional noteworthy examples include lawsuits by the ACLU against the Los Angeles Police Department for collecting information on the Mafia and the Black Panthers in the late 1970s. Throughout history, tension has always existed between public safety and individual liberty. Currently, the debate has rekindled following the adoption of the USA Patriot Act, which gives the federal government greater surveillance powers.

C. NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF 9/11

As a rule, the principle duties of police organizations are the prevention of crime, the protection of life and property, along with the enforcement of laws. From the night watchmen of the seventeenth century to the traumatic events of 9/11, the history and development of police in the United States relate to the central issue of safeguarding communities. Immediately following 9/11, numerous law enforcement agencies assimilated homeland security strategies as part of their new responsibilities. For most agencies, keeping up with this increase demand has been difficult. As a result, international and homegrown terrorist, lone wolf, and extremist groups, are some of the most significant threats encountered by law enforcement agencies. Today, criminal activity is the lifeline to terrorist operations. Although both terrorists and criminals engage in illegal activities, their goals, tactics, and motives vary. Terrorists have political or ideological goals while criminals usually seek material profit. Nonetheless, acts of terrorism can include a number of crimes such as kidnapping, extortion, or murder.

17 K. Jack Riley et al., State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 32.
Over the past few years, police officers have been instrumental in the fight against terrorism. For example, in July 2000, FBI agents raided a house in Charlotte, North Carolina. As part of the operation, agents received information from the local sheriff that terrorist suspects were using a house as a base for smuggling cigarettes. During the raid, the FBI found cash, weapons, documents written in Arabic, and a sufficient quantity of cigarettes. The smuggling operation exploited the tobacco tax differential between North Carolina and Michigan and netted millions of dollars in illegal proceeds. Profits from the illegal operation were used to fund Hezbollah terrorist activity.20 Furthermore, in December of 1999, Algerian terrorist operative Ahmed Ressam conspired to leave a bomb at the Los Angeles Airport. An alert Customs Inspector in Port Angeles, Washington noted his suspicious behavior and located over 100 pounds of explosives, four rudimentary timing devices, and two jars of liquid explosives.21 Additional notable arrests by local authorities include Timothy McVeigh and the Olympic Park Bomber Eric Robert Rudolph.

1. Community Based Policing, Crime, and Terrorism

The first recognition that terrorists are operating in local communities often follows an investigation of criminal or suspicious activity. By developing and enhancing community partnerships, citizens can become force multipliers and drastically increase the eyes and ears of police in local communities. In view of that, informed citizens have immeasurable power to help reduce crime and improve safety in their neighborhoods. The Colorado Regional Community Policing Institute (1996) defines community policing as, “an organizational wide philosophy and management approach that promotes community, government, and police partnerships.”22 The institute also asserts that community policing consist of three core components: community partnerships, problem solving, and organizational change. While community partnership recognizes the value

22 Colorado Regional Community Policing Institute, Community Policing Basic Training Manual (Denver, CO, 1996).
of bringing stakeholders into the policing process, problem solving identifies and addresses specific concerns of community members. Chapter III discusses the third component, organizational change in detail; however, it requires a clear recognition that forging external partnerships require changes in the organizational structure of policing.

Community based policing and problem-solving strategies are vital resources in gathering locally driven intelligence. Through community policing, police officers can develop a network of information to fight crime and terrorism. As an integral component of community policing, problem solving is the perfect model for the prevention and intervention of terrorism. Problem solving identifies concerns residents feel represent the biggest challenge to the safety and security of their neighborhood. Problem solving addresses a particular problem, determines a course of action, implements a process, and then follows up in an evaluative manner. As a result, a number of law enforcement agencies have embraced problem solving as one of their crime reduction strategies. To identify and resolve community problems properly, numerous police and sheriff’s agencies have adopted a process of scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA). Through SARA, police officers gather information about the problem from residents living in the area. The following is a brief overview of the SARA model of problem solving.

- Scanning: Officers look for possible problems as part of their daily activity to identify neighborhood crime and social disorder problems.
- Analysis: In this phase, officers collect information about the problem so they can understand the conditions that cause the problem to occur. Officers must answer the standard questions: who, what, where, how, and why? A thorough analysis reveals the scope, nature, and underlying causes of the problem.
- Response: The knowledge gained in the analysis stage concentrates on the causal factor of the problem. The response should seek the assistance of public and private sector organizations or anyone else that can help to develop and implement solutions.
- Assessment: Officers evaluate the effectiveness of their response to determine the impact. Quantitative and qualitative data measures the effectiveness of the response. Officers can use the results to revise the response, collect more data, or redefine the problem.23

---

The SARA Model is systematic, sequential, and cyclical in nature. The model is used to analysis, evaluate, and assess the survey data in Chapter IV.

D. A SHIFT IN POLICING: TRANSITIONING FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT TO TERRORISM PREVENTION

The shift in policing philosophies toward terrorism has forced police agencies to reevaluate the mission of their organizations. To fight terrorism, police can use traditional problem solving strategies for the early detection of terrorist related criminal activity. An important concept in problem solving is the crime triangle. The crime triangle (Figure 3) consists of three elements: victim, offender, and location.

![The Crime Triangle](https://example.com/crime-triangle.png)

Figure 3. The Crime Triangle\textsuperscript{24}

The theory behind the crime triangle is that by removing one of the components from the triangle, the crime does not happen. For example, by eliminating the target/victim from the crime triangle, a criminal may have the desire but the crime cannot occur. Likewise, if the offender is at a location where a crime could occur but there are no potential victims in the vicinity, no crime does take place. The same theory applies to location or environment. If an offender or victim is nearby but the location is not

vulnerable to criminal behavior, no crime occurs.\textsuperscript{25} In essence, all three components must be present for crime or criminal related problems to transpire. Generally, crime dissipates if one or more components are removed from the triangle.

Similar to the crime triangle, the triangle of terrorism (Figure 4) has three core components: target/victim, terrorist, and government. The connection between the governments, terrorists, and their targets is that terrorists understand they cannot negotiate directly with a nation’s government. Terrorists use violence or the threat of violence against their targets to infuse fear and uncertainty. Targets/victims turn to their respective governments for protection. The government’s response to terrorist demands is usually through military force or police action. In their effort to instill fear, terrorists strike at government and/or civilian targets. Preventing or mitigating acts of terrorism requires an effective and efficient assessment of vulnerable targets. Local governments must conduct a threat assessment of their respective communities to determine potential terrorist targets. Targets can include business parks like the Denver Technological Center, mass transportation, community facilities, or major events. Terrorists may also target areas frequented by citizens, such as schools, residential areas, and places of worship.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{triangle_of_terrorism.png}
\caption{The Triangle of Terrorism\textsuperscript{26}}
\end{figure}

As indicated in Figure 4, governments respond to terrorist demands through military force or police action. Since some political regimens dispute terrorism, terrorists realize they cannot negotiate directly with a nation’s government. In the center of the triangle of terrorism is the core problem of material support or assistance for terrorist cells. Terrorists need people or entities willing to fund them or provide them with fraudulent documents to facilitate their travel and complete their operations. Terrorists simply cannot succeed without support networks from state sponsored governments or insurgent organizations having a significant role in their activity. The practice of providing material support for terrorism in the form of money, food, clothing, or other services has been particularly detrimental in the domestic war against terrorism. In addition, in the triangle of terrorism, the terrorist is an element beyond control. If federal, state, or local agencies can disrupt the support networks that provide sanctuary to terrorists, they can effectively impact the ability for terrorists to operate.

In the domestic war on terrorism, money is the fuel for terrorist operations. Terrorists use traditional criminal offenses such as fraud, money laundering, trafficking in narcotics, and street crimes to support their objectives. It is during their illegal activity that terrorists are most susceptible to detection by local police agencies. By focusing on collapsing the criminal/terrorist nexus, local police can defeat terrorism through methods that might not otherwise be apparent. Through analysis of the crime triangle, strategic interventions are designed to address the underlying issues that lead to negative outcomes. The same is true for the triangle of terrorism. To prevent terrorism requires understanding how government, terrorist, and their targets interact. If any of the three core components are eliminated, the triangle collapses. Therefore, understanding the role of police/community partnership as it relates to public safety and terrorism awareness is critical.

To recap, domestic and international terrorism has become a reality for local police agencies. However, discrepancies between definitions within different levels of government hinder the overall effectiveness of terrorism prevention. How can the Department of Defense and the United States Congress have two different definitions for terrorism?

---

one common enemy? Chapter II defines terrorism and introduces terminology and concepts used by local practitioners in the profession. This chapter also identifies legal concerns associated with actions taken by local law enforcement agencies as well as individuals within those organizations. When does information gathering for the benefit of citizens become illegal “spying” and a violations of civil rights? What is the appropriate balance between civil liberties and collective security? This section discusses problem solving and identifying possible solutions. As discussed in this chapter, the real focus of problem solving is the solution, not the problem statement. If terrorism prevention is the objective, does the question then become an unavoidable infringement on civil liberties? The next chapter discusses alternatives to traditional and contemporary policing strategies designed to produce a desired outcome for a safe community.
Modern day policing in America is basically reactive in nature. Consequently, local police respond or react to incidents or criminal activity after the event has occurred. As the movement toward a homeland security mission continues, police agencies look for new measures of police performance. To help meet this challenge, three basic theories embody the research methodology for this thesis; problem solving, the crime triangle, and outcome based policing. While Chapter II explains problem solving and the crime triangle, outcome based policing stems from a citywide outcome based management approach. It is an expansion of professional policing practices to include traditional policing and community policing as a means to reduce crime and public order problems. Outcome based policing is an alternative policing method based on the concept that police officers and citizens work together in creative ways to solve community problems. This concept effectively integrates the following four components that are the backbone of the police departments’ performance management system.

Inputs are investments, the resources (personnel or equipment) that organizations use to obtain their goals. Processes are a systematic series of actions that can be at the level of an individual worker or combinations of workers. An output is an activity that is within the control of the producer. For example, the police patrol function, (effort) is produced when a certain course of action is taken. Outcomes are the complete product or changes in conditions that indicate progress toward a program goal or mission. They are the end-results or benefits of an organization’s activity.

Table 2. GVPD Outcome Driven Performance System

As illustrated above, inputs are the resources that contribute to the delivery of police services. In most instances, inputs include different types of support systems within an organization that facilitate the attainment of specific results. In other words, inputs are the resources consumed through the process of producing an output. Support systems include equipment, supplies, and personnel services. Examples of this support include crime pattern identification through crime analysis, standard operating procedures, and the availability of personnel to implement a strategic plan. A process is “a particular way of accomplishing something in conjunction with a series of steps followed in a regular definite order; it involves a systematic way of thinking.”28 Outputs are the direct product of program activities or services used. For example, police officers have the authority to use force against the public such as their power to stop, detain, or arrest people. Appropriate outcomes include lower crime rates, lower response time for police service, or the reduction of traffic accidents at a particular location. Through outcome based policing, the Greenwood Village Police Department converted from an incident driven or reactive system of policing to one of proactive problem solving.

In general terms, outcome based policing employs inputs (resources) into a process (activities) that produces outputs (work effort) aimed at influencing the outcome of public safety (results). Some outcomes reflect traditional police practices, such as solving crimes, while others tap into police initiatives consistent with problem solving strategies that address quality of life issues designed to prevent crimes from occurring. An important part of making outcome based policing a reality is the ability to consistently identify public safety concerns and formulate strategic plans that successfully address problems. Outcome based policing calls upon officers to build meaningful relationships with the public and private sector then proactively work with residents to address neighborhood concerns. To be brief, outcome based policing is the continuous improvement or systematic enhancement of community based policing and proactive problem solving strategies. Using the philosophy of outcome based policing, a comprehensive strategy was developed to address the enduring challenges in the domestic war against terrorism.

A. TAKING LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES TO THE NEXT LEVEL

In the post 9/11 era, many public safety agencies have reengineered their operating systems. The primary reason is to provide their respective communities with the highest level of service while increasing the feeling of neighborhood security. One of the most important tasks in creating a new system is to develop a roadmap or blueprint just like an architect or contractor. To bolster the organization’s ability to respond to terrorist related events, this author created an action plan to meet the growing challenges of neighborhood security and community safety. Additionally, to provide a common direction, five specific goals were set as part of the action plan to identify the role local police have in terrorism prevention. To begin, the first goal examined the role of outcome based policing in the context of neighborhood security, domestic intelligence, and terrorism prevention. The second goal ensured ethical safeguards in intelligence collection. The third goal outlined a policy controlling the gathering and dissemination of criminal information. The fourth goal reshaped the agency mental models, behavior, and skills of the men and women who execute this new mission. Instead of just responding to crime, the police department now works to prevent the next criminal or terrorist event from occurring.

Generally, police organizations are accountable not only for what they are trying to accomplish but also for the operational strategies they employ. One of the first steps in establishing an action plan is to focus on what the organization needs to achieve. To help the department meet its ever-changing public safety mission, it is beneficial to do an analysis of what factors support the organization, and which ones can be an impediment. This kind of examination is a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges assessment or a SWOC analysis. According to John Bryson, a SWOC analysis is an easy technique through which managers create a quick overview of a company’s strategic situation.29 The purpose of a SWOC analysis is to develop a framework that identifies strategic issues facing the organization and identify obstacles and opportunities for reaching strategic outcomes. The following matrix recognizes and addresses the

department’s strengths and weaknesses, identifies and takes advantage of the agencies’ opportunities, and recognizes the organization’s challenges associated with a local homeland security initiatives or public safety mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Factors</th>
<th>Agency Directives</th>
<th>Political Support</th>
<th>Community Outreach</th>
<th>Training Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>● Employees</td>
<td>Identify stakeholders - employees - residents - businesses - community leaders</td>
<td>● Community partnership</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>● Geographic awareness</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Response to crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Fiscal resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Mission and vision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaknesses</td>
<td>● Analysis of information</td>
<td>Commitment to the community</td>
<td>● Feedback from community</td>
<td>Terrorism awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Communication</td>
<td>Lack of focus provided to the organization</td>
<td>● Citizens’ fear or apathy</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Complacency</td>
<td></td>
<td>● Relationship with news media</td>
<td>- awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Lack of focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>● Organization change</td>
<td>Educate elected officials about the new mission of local law enforcement.</td>
<td>Establish partnerships -private entities -community members - neighboring jurisdictions</td>
<td>Legal issues along with constitutional safeguards in citizen contacts and arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Continuous improvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Technological advancements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>● Development of intelligence policies.</td>
<td>Government regulations &amp; restrictions such as illegal immigration.</td>
<td>● Increase in crime, protection of critical infrastructure.</td>
<td>● Operational readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Data acquisition, analysis, management, storage, and dissemination.</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>● Emergency preparedness &amp; response.</td>
<td>● Target hardening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Vulnerable Assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. SWOC Strategic Analysis Matrix

The SWOC analysis helps to identify areas where focus is needed and is critical to the success of any strategic plan. Crucial steps contained in the SWOC analysis include the following.
- Agency Directives: Provide changes or additions to the current operating system
- Political Support: Develops support among political, business and community leaders
- Community Outreach: Educate the community about terrorism prevention and solicit feedback from the public
- Training Needs: Identify new skills required to combat terrorism effectively and promote best practices in policing

1. **Transforming Local Government: Outcome Driven Strategies**

The threat of terrorism, including the fear of terrorist activity, remains prominent in the minds of many Americans. Consequently, public safety efforts must focus on investigating, preventing, and combating terrorist threats to local communities. Law enforcement’s best practice against crime and terrorism is sustainable police initiatives through community-based partnerships. The focal point of sustainability is to ensure that core-policing practices contribute to safe communities free from terrorist attacks or criminal activity. In recent years, the evolution of intelligence in domestic policing allows law enforcement to focus resources based on a desired outcome. Outcome driven strategies include intercepting terrorist surveillance and reconnaissance by identifying pre-incident terrorist indicators that enable law enforcement to develop a substantial focus on crime design to affect the safety and security of local communities. Outcome driven strategies are similar to a model known as intelligence-led policing.

Intelligence-led policing is a “collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations, community policing, and problem solving.”

Through intelligence-led policing, police can access criminal and personal databases, such as public library or credit card records. Limitations associated with this model are that it often only identifies the suspects for investigation. Some criticism of intelligence-led policing is the approach can raise issues surrounding infringement of privacy, racial profiling, and government harassment. In contrast, outcome based policing uses only criminal databases as part of its intelligence operations. Adopted from the crime triangle,

---

30 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

outcome based policing is a multi-prong approach that identifies suspects, potential victims, and possible target locations to solve crime and prevent terrorism. With respect to intelligence-led policing, outcome based policing is a process driven by behavior-based indicators of suspicious or criminal activity. To combat terrorism effectively, law enforcement must change their antiquated ideologies that are counter productive to terrorism prevention. The federal government and state agencies must dispense with the myth that contemporary policing is not an effective method for preventing terrorism. The same outcome driven standards used to fight crime can be successful in disrupting or deterring terrorist activity.

The switch to outcome driven policing requires an emphasis on outcomes and expectations, which is why a mission statement and organizational focus is essential. The following matrix gives an overview of the transition to outcome based policing by GVPD.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional Policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terror Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome Based Policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism Prevention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management Focus</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>Operational Strategies</td>
<td>Tactical Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Articulate clear goals and measures based on an analysis of threats and vulnerabilities</td>
<td>Create coordinated action plans</td>
<td>Utilize innovative and collaborative programs to identify, replicate, and share best practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat Recognition</td>
<td>Public Safety Assessment Triangle</td>
<td>Community Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Statement</td>
<td>Department Policies</td>
<td>Safe Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment</td>
<td>Neighborhood Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>Intelligence Gathering</td>
<td>Crime Fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-incident Indicators</td>
<td>Awareness Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Analysis</td>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>Terrorism Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>SARA Model Problem Solving</td>
<td>Constitutional Based Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Impact</td>
<td>Criminal Interdiction</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>Public Safety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. GVPD Outcome Based Policing Matrix
A consistent message that resonates throughout the matrix is continuous improvement by strengthening a local response to terrorism prevention and preparedness.

B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: NATIONAL SCOPE, LOCAL EXECUTION

Police organizations are in the business of producing safe communities. In the past, police performance involved a narrow set of criteria such as crime statistics, number of arrests, and citations. Today, successful law enforcement organizations have well-developed systems to monitor inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes. The major benefits are efficient and effective targeting of enforcement, improved identification of problems, better allocation of resources, and open lines of communication with community members, plus police officer ownership. Assessing outcome driven policing is a qualitative and quantitative process. It requires police officers working with citizens to enhance public safety in their respective neighborhoods. Successful outcomes necessitate a reduction in citizen fear, neighborhood disorder, and crime problems for the people who live and work in local communities. In other words, success affects citizen satisfaction with police service. Establishing and maintaining an outcome driven approach to terrorist threats requires an awareness that provides street level officers with a greater understanding about terrorism.

1. Training, Awareness, and Education

There is no doubt that police training is a continuous and ongoing process. Beginning with the basic police academy and continuing through career development, most police officers train their entire career. Typically, police training has focused on traditional methods of fighting crime; however, police officers making traffic stops, answering calls for service, and interacting with citizens can be a crucial source for gathering information. At present, terrorism awareness and intelligence training is clearly an essential part of effective terrorism prevention strategies. Prior to 9/11, few police agencies provided training on terrorism prevention. Today, training is imperative to understanding the goals and ideologies of terrorism. Training guarantees that
individual police officers understand terrorism as well as their critical role in detection and prevention. Training should include an overview of terrorism in addition to identifying and countering the threat terrorists present.

As the gatekeepers of public safety, street level officers must receive adequate training and background information on terrorism, they must learn to recognize potential terrorist threats, and they must understand the link between crime and terrorism. Federal agencies such as the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have recognized the role local police have in fighting terrorism. Several federal agencies have developed programs like the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) to address local issues and aid in the sharing of information between federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Preventing and detecting terrorism requires that law enforcement broaden their training to recognize potential terrorist activity. As part of an early terrorist recognition system, all law enforcement officers, regardless of rank or assignment, should receive training pertaining to terrorism awareness and homeland security. In view of the fact that terrorism and other criminal activity occur locally, cultivating an information-driven network within their jurisdictions does help local police protect and serve their communities more effectively.

2. The Fusion Center Concept

Information fusion has emerged as the fundamental process to facilitate the sharing of information at the national, state, or local level. The concept of information fusion refers to the process of managing the flow of information across different levels of government to support the identification of terrorism related threats. The focus of any fusion center or terrorism early warning system is to identify precursor events while assessing terrorist behavior to prevent or mitigate terrorism. In 2005, the State of Colorado put into practice a Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC). The mission of the CIAC is to provide an integrated multi-discipline information-sharing network to analyze and disseminate information. The model relies on the idea of sharing data among various databases to put information into the hands of key decision makers in a timely

---

manner. The Colorado program provides a platform for local agencies to share information related to criminal threats in addition to potential state and national terrorist events. Participation in a state or regional fusion center can maximize the collection and sharing of vital information.

3. Concluding Thoughts

A review of Chapter III consists of a strategic management philosophy called outcome based policing. This chapter began by discussing the four key components of an outcome driven performance system that is the foundation for GVPD Outcome Based Policing Matrix illustrated in Table 4. The matrix has three important outcomes that include criminal interdiction, terrorism prevention, as well as the perception of safety and security in local communities. The table also examines specific law enforcement outcomes that contribute to the overall mission of public safety. Terrorism can affect an entire community. Terrorist acts and other criminal activity can be catastrophic events that demand the utmost in proactive preventative strategies. As a result, an important component for domestic information collection is to educate citizens about the early warning signs associated with crime and terrorism. It is time to maximize the potential for information sharing with various entities to prevent terrorism and other criminal activity. Public education, along with appropriate police training, enhances police-community partnerships and allows citizens to assist in the information collection process.

An overarching conclusion to this section is that bringing change to an organization requires planning, coordination, and the creation of a culture in which the organization is committed to solving community problems. As mentioned throughout this thesis, police training and continuing education must constantly underscore the importance of constitutional rights as well as new technologies for sharing information. Likewise, establishing fusion centers has been a vital step in assisting law enforcement agencies understanding of the evolving threat environment in the domestic war on terrorism. Introducing outcome driven policing into traditional policing strategies allows
street level officers to work hard at detecting criminal activity while working simultaneously to prevent terrorism. The next chapter discusses the outcomes of the law enforcement domestic intelligence survey used for this project.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
IV. INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, law enforcement agencies across the country were criticized for their lack of information sharing. In the years following the attack, federal, state, and local agencies have recognized the need to share and disseminate important information. The ideal behind this survey is to document the information sharing initiatives that currently exist in the law enforcement community. In November 2008 through February 2009, a multi-state information sharing survey was administered to 438 agencies in 28 states using the Zoomerang survey software. Survey questions were designed to obtain a practitioner’s perception on the importance of sharing information among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The survey was distributed via email with a link to the online questionnaire. Based on the email response notifications, 54 of the 438 contacts had email addresses that were no longer functional. Therefore, seventy-nine responses were received from 383 contacts. To generate additional responses, a second request was sent to the remaining 304 contacts. A copy of the electronic mail greeting is located in Appendix A.

The survey primarily focused on four areas: information sharing, agency directives, fusion centers, and terrorism awareness training. The questions used for this project were short and collected basic information to increase the response rate. Not all participants answered every question. For example, only 70 respondents answered the question regarding federal guidelines that regulate criminal intelligence records and only 73 participants answered the question about regional information sharing. Seventy-four respondents answered the question on fusion center participation and almost all respondents, 78, answered the question regarding organizational guidelines for investigating terrorist activity. An assessment of the participant pool demonstrated a diverse agency response that strengthens the reliability of the survey. Multiple law enforcement agencies participated in the survey, which included university police, municipal police, sheriff departments, as well as federal and state agencies. The survey revealed that various agencies at all levels collect some type of information that fits under the umbrella of public safety (crime control) or homeland security (counterterrorism).
A. SURVEY RESULTS

One objective for this survey was to identify information sharing systems currently in place. Questions were included to determine how the information sharing systems are being used. How do local agencies share information? What affects the sharing of information for local police agencies? Why do local law enforcement agencies share information? What information do local police agencies share? Twenty-four surveys came from agencies with population of less than 20,000. Ten surveys came from agencies with populations between 20,000 to 49,999 people. An additional ten surveys were received from agencies with populations between 50,000 to 99,999; thirteen surveys came from agencies with populations between 250,000 to 999,999; and seven surveys were from population greater than 1,000,000 people. In Colorado, a variety of police and sheriff agencies assisted in completing the survey. Listed below is a breakdown of the size of participating agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
<th>Response percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 to 49,999</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 99,999</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 249,999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 to 999,999</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 1,000,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous attempts have been made over the last decade to improve communication among law enforcement agencies. According to the survey results, many participants acknowledge a need for more interaction among law enforcement agencies to develop contacts and establish best practices for sharing information. The main findings from the survey are that police need, want, and share information. However, survey respondents reported they receive less information than they need to support their public safety and homeland security missions. For example, the survey suggest there was no reliable system of sharing information prior to the 9/11 attacks. The following table summarizes the results of the domestic intelligence survey.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you believe information sharing is important at the state level?</td>
<td>79 responses</td>
<td>Yes 79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 responses</td>
<td>No 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you believe information sharing is important at the local level?</td>
<td>79 responses</td>
<td>Yes 79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 responses</td>
<td>No 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you believe information sharing is important at the federal level?</td>
<td>77 responses</td>
<td>Yes 77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 responses</td>
<td>No 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Does your agency have an early intervention program to identify potential criminal or terrorist activity?</td>
<td>79 responses</td>
<td>Yes 38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 79</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Does your agency have a terrorism liaison officer?</td>
<td>79 responses</td>
<td>Yes 41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 79</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Does your agency have guidelines for investigating terrorist activity?</td>
<td>78 responses</td>
<td>Yes 39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 78</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Does your agency meet or exchange information about criminal or terrorist activity with other county or municipal agencies?</td>
<td>77 responses</td>
<td>Yes 69</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Does your agency coordinate terrorist investigations with other local, state, or federal agencies?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Is there a fusion center available in your state?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. If yes, do you share information through the fusion center network?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Does your agency use a multi-jurisdictional approach to information-sharing?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Are you confident that as part of a national intelligence network, your department will receive actionable intelligence through your local fusion center?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Does your police department subscribe to the standards of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Does your police department subscribe to the guidelines for information and intelligence sharing from the Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Does your police department adhere to the regulations of 28 CFR Part 23 for its Criminal Intelligence Records System?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Does your department provide training on terrorism awareness or counter-terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Does your law enforcement agency subscribe to the philosophy of Intelligence-Led Policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Is your police department a member of the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Do you believe it is important to keep law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence separate, particularly with respect to state and local officers on Joint Terrorism Task Forces?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. Has your agency identified any national or transnational terrorist activity in your jurisdiction?
76 responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Has your organization been involved in any terrorist related incidents in the last five years?
78 responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Do you believe the lack of information sharing among local, state, and federal agencies has improved since 9/11?
79 responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Should local law enforcement agencies rely on federal agencies to provide terrorist information affecting local communities?
78 responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. The FBI has been designated as the lead federal law enforcement agency in the domestic fight against terrorism. Have you or anyone in your department interacted with their counter-terrorism personnel to discuss the threat of terrorism in your jurisdiction?
79 responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Response to the Domestic Intelligence Survey

Overall, 100% of the respondents agree that information sharing is important at the federal, state, and local level. However, only 52% of the agencies have a terrorism liaison officer and 48% have an early intervention program to identify potential criminal or terrorist activity. Although 90% of the survey participants exchange information about
criminal or terrorist activity and 87% coordinate terrorist investigations with other law enforcement agencies, only 50% have guidelines for investigating terrorism. Generally, rules and regulations as well as formal organizational processes are not perceived as obstacles to the sharing of information. When asked about organizational guidelines or agency directives, 81% comply with the federal regulation of 28 CFR Part 23 regarding criminal intelligence records, and 74% subscribe to the guidelines for information and intelligence sharing from the Office of Domestic Preparedness. However, only 58% follow the standards set by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.

In this era of crime without borders, 84% of the participants believe in the philosophy of intelligence-led policing and 71% of the responding agencies are members of some type of regional information sharing system. It is interesting to note that 47% of the respondents believe it is important to keep law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence separate. An examination of the questions regarding terrorist activity in local jurisdictions revealed 41% have identified national or transnational incidences within their jurisdiction but only 24% have experienced terrorist activity within the last five years. In the area of information sharing, 84% believe information has improved since 9/11 and 75% have contacted the FBI to discuss the threat of terrorism in their jurisdiction. Surprisingly, 52 out of the 77 agencies that responded provide terrorism awareness training for their departments; however, only 47% believe local agencies should rely on federal agencies for information.

Although there continue to be questions about the mission and effectiveness of fusion centers, the survey indicates that fusion centers face significant challenges. For example, larger agencies contribute regularly to fusion center operations while some smaller and mid-size agencies struggle to comply with the standards set forth by local centers resulting in gaps of information exchange. As a result, only an average number of responding agencies (42) are confident their organization receives actionable intelligence through their local fusion center network. When asked about a multi-jurisdictional approach to information sharing, 96% of respondents have used this method. Sixty-six (88%) of the respondents reported that they have a fusion center available in their state and 80% have shared information through a fusion center network.
B. KEY FINDINGS

In general, the survey revealed that “information sharing” is critical to successful law enforcement operations. However, there are still too many barriers to sharing information between federal, state, and local jurisdictions. For local police to be successful, it is critical that municipal police strengthen the communication links with other law enforcement agencies. Lessons from the post 9/11 environment have shown that no one agency or information system is sufficient when fighting crime or preventing terrorism. Even though the aim of the survey is to gauge the level of information sharing done by law enforcement agencies, the inability to share timely and accurate information remains a prevalent issue within the law enforcement community. The next step is to determine how locally driven information can provide value to the national effort to protect local communities. While the scope of this review was limited, results indicate several additional areas of research are worth pursuing. Listed below are several interesting perspectives taken from the survey concerning information sharing.

- Information sharing since 9/11 remains a significant challenge
- Effective information sharing comes through strong partnerships
- Information sharing must be an integral part of all aspects of domestic law enforcement
- There is a clear need to establish policies directives and/or regulations to promote an efficient mechanism as part of a fundamental practice in sharing information
- The ability to share information, even unprocessed information, can greatly improve the understanding of criminal as well as terrorist networks
- Information sharing within and among agencies at the federal, state, and local level must become more widespread
- Establishing an environment where information is shared proactively requires overcoming significant obstacles that reside within the local law enforcement and intelligence communities
- Agencies responding to the survey indicated that information sharing with federal agencies is important
C. CONCLUSION

Finally, the current level of cooperation between local law enforcement and federal agencies is inadequate, although the federal relationship has improved. The challenge faced by the law enforcement and intelligence communities is not information sharing per se, but rather, what type of information should be encouraged and exchanged on a regular basis. When it comes to policing crime or fighting terrorism, information sharing clearly is the force-multiplier that enables police officers to be more productive. The results of the domestic law enforcement survey can be used by local agencies to evaluate their own programs. The next chapter recommends a policy need, strategies, and various options for addressing terrorism.
V. RECOMMENDATION/POLICY OPTIONS

Due to concerns associated with crime and terrorism, it is paramount that local police have every available tool to maintain safety in their respective communities. As a first step, better sharing of information can significantly improve local jurisdictions’ capability to ensure public safety. For example, during the summer of 2005, a high profile serial rapist assaulted several women in multiple cities throughout the Denver metropolitan area. The suspect attacked one victim while stealing her car, and then led police officers on a high-speed chase. If a practice of sharing information was in place, local authorities may have identified and tracked the suspect faster. Identifying and monitoring crime patterns and activities that occur in other jurisdictions are vital to successful law enforcement operations. In Greenwood Village, police have had a number of contacts with individuals listed as “persons of interest” by the FBI. For example, following a lengthy criminal investigation, a fraudulent company was uncovered and suspected of laundering money to the Middle East in support of terrorist activity. In a second example, a European male was apprehended looking into the windows of private residences. A follow-up investigation revealed fraudulent documents that include multiple passports and drivers licenses from Europe. The FBI subsequently identified the suspect as a person of interest. Finally, a Middle Eastern male produced fraudulent identification documents during a traffic stop. An ensuing investigation revealed additional counterfeit/suspicious documents such as passports, letters, and fraudulent account numbers from the Middle East.33

Developing and implementing an information sharing process between multiple jurisdictions is necessary to overcome barriers to intelligence sharing. A system that shares information regarding potential suspects improves the ability of police to solve criminal cases more quickly. The overriding capabilities of a comprehensive system expand regional collaboration and strengthen information sharing among law enforcement agencies. Creating an information network among local agencies enables street level officers to be more productive in fighting crime and policing terrorism. The

33 Greenwood Village Police Department, Police Records Division, City of Greenwood Village, Colorado.
The purpose of a local information system is to provide intelligence to smaller jurisdictions to augment investigations, enhance domestic security, and apprehend wanted individuals. The following table is an overview of three options to consider when addressing domestic intelligence concerns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action (A)</td>
<td>Maintain the status quo and change nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action (B)</td>
<td>Implement a terrorism early warning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action (C)</td>
<td>Implement a local level information process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. List of Alternatives

A. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO AND CHANGE NOTHING

The domestic intelligence survey in Chapter IV suggests the existing practice of sharing information among law enforcement agencies needs improvement. Simply maintaining the status quo prohibits local agencies from communicating with one another across jurisdictional boundaries and prevents the agencies that need vital information from having access. Officers must continue to rely on outside sources to gather and pass on information concerning potential illegal activities. Due to unwarranted barriers between local and federal agencies, local police do not have access to specific intelligence about criminal suspects or terrorist groups. Another disadvantage to changing the status quo is the cost of technological staff and the impact on the overall budget for small and mid-size agencies. Advantages include better oversight and administration of intelligence operations as well as reduced chances of lawsuit by ensuring compliance with restrictions on purging and dissemination of confidential information. Also, traditional crime fighting operations do not lose previous dedicated and scarce resources. In addition, local police can maintain their established relationships with communities and businesses.

B. IMPLEMENT A TERRORISM EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

A Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) system is a multi-agency management tool designed to counter terrorism at the state or local level. The primary focus is to mitigate terrorism through detection and deterrence based on careful analysis of intelligence
information. The objective is to monitor trends and assess threats while reducing vulnerabilities. Primarily, an early warning system can fill the void in available information about terrorism for state or local law enforcement organizations. The advantage of implementing a TEW is to provide a comprehensive and effective approach to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorism. A TEW provides a form of intervention to assist in preparing for natural disasters as well as terrorist incidents. Models, such as the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning (LA-TEW), can be adapted and applied to local communities. The LA-TEW objectives contain advanced information (warnings) to prepare for appropriate mitigation and response to different types of terrorist activity. Some examples include the following.

- Intake point for all terrorism related leads including criminal reports
- Conduct threat assessments and harden critical infrastructure estimates
- Scan and monitor open source indicators of terrorist activity to assess trends and potential outcomes
- Synthesize threat information from all sources to develop situational awareness
- Use Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) to network with each other
- Issue advisories, alerts, and warnings, as well as special reports

Following 9/11, efforts to create TEW Groups or state fusion centers have increased; however, many variables can interfere with implementing a TEW system. These variables include budget considerations, adequate personnel and equipment, as well as continuous on-going training. TEW Groups can hamper policing efforts with too much information and distract police organizations from their public safety mission with false leads, and futile fishing expeditions. The disadvantages also include upgrading technological software, as well as modifying agency reports, and procedures. Furthermore, investing in a TEW system stretches staffing allocation and resources beyond its present capabilities. Implementing a TEW can also be too expensive for local communities. Greenwood Village, like other small agencies, cannot justify having an employee assigned full time to a federal, state, or regional task force. The disadvantage

---

for this option is that the process is often inconsistent and disconnected when no local structure exists to collect and disseminate information. Another disadvantage includes a lack of training on gathering and assessing critical information.

C. IMPLEMENT A LOCAL LEVEL PROCESS TO SHARE INFORMATION

For local police to be successful, an integrated information process must exist that allows police agencies to gather information from sources within their community, then incorporate it with information gathered from various governmental and private sector entities. Such an exchange allows officers to identify potential suspects or targets providing a greater possibility for prevention and interdiction. The research for this composition examined past police practices to create a Public Safety Preparedness Model (PSPM) to support an agency’s entire crime fighting operation to include terrorism prevention and criminal enforcement. By creating and developing a locally driven information process, local police do not have to rely upon outside sources to gather information regarding criminal acts or terrorist events. The PSPM (Figure 5) is a tool local police can use in the collection of indispensable information. The concept of the model is to improve domestic intelligence efforts through building effective partnerships that promote safe and secure neighborhoods. There are several benefits associated with the public safety model. First, officers have immediate and unfettered access to local information as it develops. Second, citizens seek out officers to provide them with new information that may be useful for criminal interdiction or long-term problem solving. Third, collaborative relationships between the police, community, and private sector promote a continuous and reliable transfer of information.

To summarize, an analysis of the three options reveals the following. The first alternative, to maintain the status quo, is not a viable option. Greenwood Village and other small law enforcement agencies are not prepared to undertake a significant role in preventing terrorist attacks. However, it is worth mentioning that more than half of the domestic survey respondents, 53%, believe the safety of local communities is the responsibility of local government, not federal agencies. Second, option two is an

---

unrealistic approach because many small jurisdictions cannot afford the loss of personnel or do not have the resources to employ a full-scale intelligence operation. Therefore, option three is the best solution to ensure at least one department member trains and understands the language and analytical process of information gathering.\textsuperscript{36} This liaison can serve as the agencies’ point of contact for sharing intelligence reports with appropriate agency members as well as other organizations. Neighborhood security and terrorism prevention efforts improve when local police collect information and share it with the appropriate organizations. To conclude, it is highly recommended that local police agencies develop and implement a thorough information sharing process. The rationale for implementing a local process is to facilitate information sharing between appropriate agencies.

Figure 5. Public Safety Preparedness Model
1. The Public Safety Preparedness Model

Strengthening a community’s ability to combat terrorism means increase demand for relevant information in support of domestic security efforts. Applying the PSPM to police officers’ everyday practice is an important step in creating an information-driven culture for small law enforcement agencies. As mentioned previously, the purpose of the PSPM is to gain access to information. The primary objective is to enhance the knowledge and understanding of terrorist early recognition in the realm of local, regional, and national significance. One of the principle outcomes for the PSPM is the identification of criminal or terrorism-related threats to public safety. This comprehensive process makes it possible for local police to have a key role in securing the communities they serve. More importantly, the model incorporates outcome driven policing and problem solving strategies into existing information sharing operations.

While the domestic survey highlights the need for law enforcement to share information, the PSPM provides precursor information to assist local police in recognizing potential terrorist activity. The focus of the model is to produce a process that transforms terrorist or criminal related information into actionable intelligence. Therefore, a major goal for the PSPM is the collection of information that can provide a nexus between criminal and/or terrorist organizations. Applying the public safety model to daily law enforcement practice is an important part in developing an intelligence capacity for local police agencies. Proper application of the PSPM ensures effective information sharing between multiple agencies. The PSPM consists of four basic tenets: preparedness, prevention, protection, and partnerships.

Preparedness begins with a thorough understanding of the Triangle of Terrorism outlined in Chapter II. It consists of identifying and understanding potential threats, assessing vulnerabilities and investigating suspicious behaviors. It ensures that law enforcement agencies are prepared for criminal acts associated with terrorism by providing training on department policy and procedures in addition to assessing community vulnerabilities. An important step to addressing threats of terrorism is to strengthen police partnerships with community groups and empower citizens to take
action through participation and cooperation. Domestic preparedness through public vigilance can be a powerful tool. In essence, preparation is the key to preventing terrorism.

Prevention is the first goal in the national strategy for homeland security; it involves detecting, deterring, and mitigating criminal activity or terrorist acts. Prevention is the process of identifying the risks associated with terrorism affecting the safety and security of local communities. The methods include increasing arrest and depriving criminals or terrorists their means to an attack and deny their resources or support mechanisms needed to complete an attack. It involves the elimination of potential targets and the reduction of community vulnerabilities. Understanding security measures and exploring future needs that ensure the safety of citizens are essential steps in preventing terrorist attacks in local communities. Prevention begins with information; in the fight against terrorism, information is the key to survival. Strategically, the application of prevention necessitates protection.

Protection incorporates the practical application of the PSPM. Protection encompasses safeguarding citizens’ and critical infrastructure from terrorism acts, weapons of mass destruction, or other types of emergencies. For example, the mission of the Greenwood Village Police Department is to protect the people, property, environment, and economy of Greenwood Village from criminal activity, man made hazards, or natural disaster. Ultimately, protection means making people and places less vulnerable to terrorism. Law enforcement organizations must build strong partnerships with their community members to enlist support and assistance to combat crime and terrorism.

Partnerships are a very important component of outcome driven policing and terrorism prevention. It involves creating liaisons with local law enforcement agencies, community groups, and private entities to enhance domestic and emergency preparedness efforts. Police/community partnerships have a fundamental role in modern day policing and problem solving. Effective partnerships can help local agencies prepare or prevent terrorism by providing an exchange of information relating to potential terrorist activity. Through crime prevention and citizens living or working in their communities, vital
information alert local agencies regarding potential attacks. For instance, the public may encounter potential victims/targets or see and hear things where their local police do not have a presence. Therefore, citizens must learn and understand what to look for, what is happening, and how to report what they see to local authorities.

Implementing a local intelligence process includes developing a standardized policy that promotes information collection while protecting constitutional rights. Establishing specific guidelines regarding information gathering minimizes the concerns of local police surveillance on private citizens. From a police practitioner’s perspective, improving law enforcements’ ability to safeguard communities while fighting terrorism requires the courts to address the dichotomy between individual freedom and national security. The federal Constitution protects an individual’s civil liberties against illegal actions by the government. For that reason, information systems must have legal safeguards to withstand constitutional challenges and public scrutiny. According to the information survey, policies establish internal controls and proper oversight for the collection, retention, dissemination, and disposition of criminal intelligence. Therefore, Appendix B provides a model policy for consideration prior to implementing an information analysis process.

As a final point, failure to implement an information analysis process hampers the dissemination of information between local police and regional task forces. Winning the domestic war on terrorism requires basic information sharing across all levels of government. The development of an effective counter terrorism system is a process, not an event. The PSPM is an information-driven system designed to identify potential criminal or terrorist activity that continues to evolve over time. The model provides local police with a realistic process for exchanging intelligence, investigative reports, and other noteworthy information. By focusing on the process of open communication, small municipal agencies like Greenwood Village can begin to take steps to prevent or deter potential terrorist incidents. The end outcome is that local police agencies are not an adjunct to intelligence communication, but rather a robust participant. Implementing the public safety model serves eight corresponding goals.
- Strengthen information sharing
- Improve multiple jurisdictional partnerships
- Recognize terrorist and/or criminal threat capabilities
- Enhance terrorist early warning in small communities
- Provide an up-to-date understanding of the domestic threat environment
- Allow local entities to identify emerging crime and quality of life trends
- Support problem solving and other outcomes driven activities
- Ensure oversight and accountability to protect against the infringement of constitutional protections and civil liberties

Prior to the dissemination of an information-driven system, several questions are worth considering. The following questions relate to significant concerns that can become obstacles to the implementation process. First, does the new mission require hiring additional officers? Second, what type of information does the organization collect? Third, who has access to the information? Fourth, what type of safeguards needs to be in place to prevent abuse? Fifth, is the executive staff open to implementing a comprehensive system to address criminal and terrorism related activities? Six, what impact does a homeland security mission have on the overall budget? Seven, if changes are necessary, what is the impact of these changes on the organization? Eight, do first line supervisors support the change to an information collection and dissemination process? Nine, are the residents of the area familiar with, and supportive of the concepts associated with police/community partnerships to enhance terrorism awareness? Ten, is a format for terrorism training and awareness in place or must it be developed and implemented? Finally, do elected officials of the jurisdiction support the change?

Everyday, first responders put themselves at risk as part of their job. Defending local communities from acts of terrorism requires enhanced information sharing and across all levels of government. Success depends on creating communities in which citizens actively contribute information to public safety and homeland security efforts. The more information a community has about terrorist behavior, the better law enforcement agencies are in addressing potential terrorist events. Adopting the PSPM
enhances the ability of small agencies like Greenwood Village to share information. To maximize intelligence capabilities, inter-agencies communication and information sharing must improve on the federal, state, and local levels.
VI. CONCLUSION

All across the country, the conventional role of domestic policing is changing. Terrorism awareness, preparedness, and prevention are very challenging and significant issues for local police agencies. The tragedy surrounding 9/11 made it clear that homeland security begins with the safety and security of local communities. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., local governments can no longer assume their communities are safe from unprovoked attacks. The terrorist attacks in 2001 were the turning point for how local governments approach the issues of community safety and neighborhood security. Today, police organizations must balance their traditional crime-fighting mission with emergency preparedness and the ongoing threat of terrorism. Achieving a culture of preparedness that protects the safety and security of small communities requires unprecedented cooperation and a fundamental change in the collection and sharing of information. The use of information-driven initiatives is essential when creating an alternate response strategic to recognize potential terrorist activity.

In view of that, this thesis began by asking the following questions. Should local police have a role in combating terrorism? What is the impact of counter-terrorism activity on local jurisdictions? What needs to be accomplished to protect small communities from terrorist attacks? What is the most efficient and effective way for local jurisdictions to manage and share information about potential terrorist events? Should local jurisdictions develop and implement an information system to strengthen intelligence sharing with state and federal agencies? Clearly, the domestic intelligence survey outlined in Chapter IV suggests local governments have a significant role in the collection and sharing of information that can be beneficial across all levels of governments. A key solution to improving information sharing is to include local efforts in a regional and national perspective. It is important to have a local response strategy to collect information and disseminate it to the appropriate government authorities who can “connect the dots” by identifying trends related to potential criminal or terrorist activity. A system such as the PSPM can gather information and provide reliable intelligence about criminal or terrorism related activity.
A. THE NEW PARADIGM: PROMOTING PREPAREDNESS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

To help local police meet existing challenges, timely and accurate information about who the terrorists are, where the terrorists operate, why/how terrorists select their targets, and what is their method of attack is essential. Therefore, this author envisioned the Outcome Based Policing Triangle (OBPT) in September 2005 during in-house training for the Greenwood Village Police Department. Modifications to the triangle (Figure 6) illustrate the lessons learned throughout this project. Appropriately, the OBPT is a valuable asset in the practical application of information collection. Similar to the SARA model in Chapter II, the OBPT has four key components: knowledge, understanding, execution, and impact. In the OBPT, knowledge represents the collection and evaluation of information. Knowledge involves acquiring information through a variety of open sources and is comparable to the scanning step in the SARA model. The analysis phase in SARA equates to the second step in the OBPT that addresses understanding. Likewise, the response phase in SARA relates to the execution stage in the OBPT relating to information dissemination. Any response should include the knowledge gained in the analysis phase that concentrates on the underlying factor of the situation. Finally, the assessment segment of the SARA model is equivalent to the fourth step in the OBPT that includes evaluation and feedback. The key to the OBPT is developing congruency among the first three components: knowledge, understanding, and execution.
1. **Knowledge, Awareness, and Recognition of Terrorist Activity**

Threat recognition is the most important task in gathering information to identify the pre-incident indicators of terrorism and other criminal related activity. Given the fact that police officers are the first line of defense, they must have information about terrorist activity within their jurisdiction as well as the locations of potential targets. It is important that police officers have the knowledge or background information about terrorist organizations, their method of operation, as well as the probability of any attacks. A successful response to terrorism depends greatly on the knowledge and understanding of the nature of terrorism by local authorities. The concept of “connecting

---

37 Carter, “The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function: State, Local, and Tribal Agencies.” The Outcome Based Policing Triangle is an outcome driven approach designed to fight crime and prevent terrorism.
the dots” requires knowledge of terrorist ideologies and behaviors so that suspicious patterns and trends become evident. To ensure small police agencies develop a better understanding of the methods and practices used by terrorist organizations, this thesis is designed to inform public safety responders about the characteristics and behaviors associated with terrorist activity.

2. Understanding and Preventing Terrorism

In the domestic war against terrorism, knowledge is only half the battle. Local police officers cannot effectively counteract or respond to what they do not understand. Street level officers and first responders must learn to understand the evolving terrorists’ threat. They must know, understand, and recognize the potential intelligence value of pre-incident terrorist indicators. Therefore, preventing terrorism necessitates understanding how criminals/terrorists and their targets interact. Additionally, it is imperative that local police agencies understand they are now dealing with a different type of criminal offender. Typically, police officers deal with criminals who participate in routine criminal activities. In recent years, several terrorist plots such as the Millennium Bomber, Operation Smokescreen, and the Miami Terrorists highlight the value of recognizing and understanding potential terrorist behavior. The implication of terrorist involvement in smuggling operations, attacking military bases and other types of conventional crimes merits increased awareness by local governments. Thus, a thorough understanding of terrorist ideology is vital to eliminate or counter the terrorist threat successfully.

3. Execution: Protecting Small Communities through Domestic Preparedness

Execution is the most important step because it creates the momentum for reaching the desired outcome. Since terrorists train to assimilate into their surroundings, the fight against terrorism requires local police to identify potential threats in their respective jurisdictions. Implementing the OBPT requires a change in philosophy for all personnel, and a change in the organization’s structure to support the concept. The OBPT allows police officers to gather information from both their sources in the community, along with their contacts in federal agencies. Early identification of potential
suspects and their targets create a greater opportunity for officers to prevent or deter terrorist activity. Practical implementation of the OBPT requires thorough knowledge and understanding of the three principles that comprise the model. Due to the evolving nature of terrorism, public safety organizations must modify the way they respond to emergencies and acts of terrorism. In the same way that terrorists adapt to increased efforts toward prevention, public safety agencies must continually reengineer services to protect local jurisdictions. As an alternative to traditional policing strategies, the OBPT is a competent methodology that is outcome based and information-driven.

B. FINAL THOUGHTS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Every citizen has a role in preventing, detecting, and deterring terrorism. Together, government leaders and community members must be prepared to assist local police and first responders in protecting families, neighbors and communities. The success to securing the nation against terrorist attacks is dependent on enhancing partnerships within local communities. Information gathered on the streets and in local communities is one of the most powerful tools for police agencies. To promote the reporting of suspicious incidents, local police must prepare information to inform citizens about the indicators, characteristics, and behaviors that can reveal possible terrorist activity. A successful response to terrorism enhances the safety and security in local neighborhoods through enhanced community involvement. Prompt reporting of suspicious activities can prevent potential attacks. Local agencies cannot effectively protect life and property without the support and cooperation of the citizens living in communities. Sustaining and building community trust can greatly assist local agencies in addressing terrorism-related issues.

While the basic public safety mission of local police departments has not changed, law enforcement practitioners now recognize information-driven policing as a fundamental responsibility to improve local intelligence operations. Throughout this document, the author has established that the current level of cooperation and information sharing between local, state and federal agencies is inadequate. The PSPM can serve as a centerpiece to address acts of terrorism and other criminal behavior through the timely transfer of information from local citizens to their respective police agency as part of the
intelligence continuum. This thesis offers solutions for protecting small communities by providing an early warning system to recognize potential terrorist activity. The PSPM, the OBPT, and the attached intelligence policy in Appendix B, offer a multi-layered approach for small law enforcement agencies to consider when gathering domestic intelligence.
APPENDIX A. ELECTRONIC MAIL SURVEY GREETING

Dear Colleague:

Following the 9/11 tragedies, the world has taken a different view of domestic and national security. Local law enforcement agencies are now recognizing the critical need to share and disseminate information. As a recognized government decision maker, you are invited to participate in a brief survey that seeks to better understand your agency’s function and priorities in the role of information sharing among local law enforcement agencies.

The survey will provide important information regarding the role of law enforcement in addressing potential criminal and terrorist activity at the local level. This study is being conducted as part of a research project at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. It is envisioned that the information collected will be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of information sharing.

To complete the survey online, click on the URL below, or copy it into the address/location bar of your browser. Make sure you copy the whole link as it will sometimes wrap to the following line. The survey should take 5-10 minutes to complete. Please fill out and complete the survey as soon as possible.

**Link:** [http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB228H8TJ9DT4](http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB228H8TJ9DT4)

_The information reported will be used in aggregate form; no agencies will be directly linked to the information provided._

Thank you for responding to this survey; your participation is very important to the outcome of this project. As a participant, you may receive a complimentary copy of the survey results by contacting Donnie Perry at dperry@greenwoodvillage.com. Please feel free to forward this survey to your colleagues.

Thanks very much for your participation!

Best regards,

**Donnie Perry**  
Chief of Police  
Greenwood Village Police Department  
City of Greenwood Village, CO
GUIDING PRINCIPLE

The purpose of this directive is to gather intelligence in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security in order to protect citizens from harm. This policy establishes internal controls and proper oversight for the collection, retention, dissemination, and disposition of criminal intelligence in conformance with the privacy interests and constitutional rights of individuals, groups, associations or other legal entities. The police department will gather information pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, thereby complying with all applicable federal, state and local laws, including 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23.

DEFINITIONS

Assigned Intelligence Personnel – Law enforcement officers who are assigned by the Chief of Police, or his/her designee, that are responsible for maintaining and disseminating criminal intelligence data gathered by the department. Assigned intelligence personnel are responsible for overseeing the department’s criminal intelligence and are responsible for complying with the requirements as set forth in this document.

Criminal Intelligence Data Information - has been processed, collected, evaluated, collated, and analyzed to be used in connection, with and in furtherance of, law enforcement investigative purposes. Criminal intelligence involves data collection from both overt (information available to the general public) and covert sources. Criminal intelligence includes information that relates to an individual, organization, business, or group reasonably suspected of being involved in the actual or attempted planning, organizing, financing, or committing any criminal act as defined in Title 18 of the Colorado Revised Statutes or:

- International and/or domestic terrorism, which for purposes of this section, will be defined as acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal law and are intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.

- Any other criminal offense, which is not directly related to purely expressive behavior and is consistent with the purpose and intent of this policy.
Criminal Organization – A group of individuals associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of criminal conduct or activity.

Intelligence Data – Information collected through undercover operations and through photographic, electronic, or other media.

Intelligence Files – Intelligence information that has been collected, processed and retained in a criminal intelligence information file, and that may be shared within the law enforcement community.

Purge – The complete destruction of a physical criminal intelligence file and the permanent deletion from any department computer files, systems, or databases.

COURSE OF ACTION
The collection, retention, dissemination, and disposition of criminal intelligence is one of the essential functions of law enforcement. All department employees will adhere to the procedures established in this policy to ensure the security, confidentiality, and proper maintenance and dissemination of criminal intelligence. Criminal intelligence information will be collected and retained as specified in this policy. The goal of the police department is to:

- Provide liaison, coordination, and resource assistance in the collection, analysis, storage, and exchange or dissemination of criminal intelligence information in on-going investigations or prosecutions of serious criminal activity.
- Provide criminal intelligence information to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies on individuals and organizations involved with criminal conduct or activity.
- Provide analysis of organized crime and criminal enterprises in Colorado. This includes identification and/or projection of major changes in crime trends.

PROCEDURES FOR MANAGING INTELLIGENCE FILES

INFORMATION SUBMISSION CRITERIA
The department will only collect or maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual or organization if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual or organization is involved in criminal conduct or activity. The existence of reasonable suspicion will be based on specific facts that will be documented in the criminal intelligence file.

- Employees are prohibited from creating and maintaining their own individual intelligence files on any citizen, group or organization. Any intelligence information gathered must be forwarded to appropriate intelligence personnel.
SUPERVISION OF DATA ENTRY

All criminal intelligence data will be reviewed and approved by an assigned intelligence personnel supervisor prior to entry into any criminal intelligence file. The supervisor will determine that the criminal intelligence data conforms to this policy and was not obtained in violation of any applicable federal, state, local law or ordinance, or department policy. The badge number of the approving supervisor will become part of the file.

FILE CRITERIA

All information retained in the criminal intelligence file will meet the criteria prescribed by the department. There are two types of intelligence records; permanent and temporary files.

- Permanent Intelligence Files - Criminal information may be retained in the permanent intelligence files for up to three (3) years. At that time, criminal information will be automatically purged unless new criminal intelligence has been developed establishing reasonable suspicion that the individual and/or organization continues to be involved in a definable criminal activity or enterprise. When updated criminal intelligence is added into the permanent files on an individual or organization already listed in the database, such entries reset the three (3) year standard for retention of that file. Permanent intelligence files must be periodically reviewed to be in compliance with this policy.

- Temporary Intelligence Files - Criminal information may also be entered into temporary criminal intelligence files when there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but that finding is based, in part, upon “unreliable” or “unknown” sources, or where the content validity of the information is “doubtful” or “cannot be judged.” All temporary intelligence files will be specifically designated as such and must be reviewed by a supervisor every sixty (60) days for validity. This interim review must be documented in the temporary intelligence file. Temporary intelligence files will be retained no longer than one (1) year. At that time, temporary files must be either purged or converted into permanent intelligence files. All temporary intelligence files will be kept distinctly separate from the general database.

EXCLUDED MATERIAL

Only lawfully collected information based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that meets the department’s criteria for file input should be stored in the criminal intelligence file. The department will not collect or maintain information about the political, religious, social views, associations, or activities of any individual or any group, association, corporation, business, partnership, or other organization, unless such information directly relates to criminal conduct or activity.

Information specifically excluded from criminal intelligence files in accordance with 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 includes:
- Criminal history files
- Contact card systems
- Mug shot systems
- Offense and accident report systems
- Criminal investigatory case files
- Information on an individual or group merely on the basis that such individual or group support unpopular causes.
- Information on an individual or group merely on the basis of race, gender, age, or ethnic background.
- Information on an individual or group merely on the basis of religious or political affiliations, or beliefs.
- Information on an individual or group merely on the basis of personal habits and/or predilections that do not break any criminal laws or threaten the safety of others.
- Information on an individual or group merely on the basis of involvement in expressive activity that takes the form of non-violent civil disobedience that amounts, at most, to a misdemeanor offense.

INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION

Information retained in the criminal intelligence files will be labeled for source reliability and content validity prior to entry or submission. Information that has not been evaluated, the source reliability is poor, or the content validity is doubtful is detrimental to our agency’s operations and is contrary to the individual’s right to privacy. The classification of criminal intelligence information is subject to continual change, the passage of time, the conclusion of investigations, and other factors that may affect the security classification or dissemination criteria assigned to particular documents. Documents within the criminal intelligence files should be reviewed on an ongoing basis to ascertain whether a higher degree or lesser degree of document security is required and to ensure that information is released only when and if appropriate.

- Source Reliability - The reliability of the source is an index of the consistency of the information the source provides. The source will be evaluated according to the following:
  - Reliable – The reliability of the source is unquestioned or has been tested in the past.
  - Usually reliable – The reliability of the source can usually be relied upon. The majority of the information provided in the past has proved to be reliable.
  - Unreliable – The reliability of the source has been sporadic in the past.
  - Unknown – The reliability of the source cannot be judged; either experience or investigation has not yet determined authenticity or trustworthiness.
- Content Validity – The validity of information is an index of the accuracy or truthfulness of the information and will be assessed as follows:
  - Confirmed – The information has been corroborated by an investigator or other reliable independent source.
  - Probable – The information is consistent with past accounts.
  - Doubtful – The information is inconsistent with past accounts.
  - Cannot be judged – The information cannot be judged; its authenticity has not yet been determined by either experience or investigation.

- Sensitivity - The sensitivity of the information will be classified according to the following standards:
  - Sensitive – Information including but not limited to; active police investigations, informant identification information, corruption, and those reports which require strict dissemination and release criteria.
  - Restricted – Information obtained through intelligence channels that is not classified as sensitive and is for law enforcement use only. Restricted information may include previously classified sensitive information for which the need for a high level of security no longer exists.
  - Unclassified – Information that is public in nature. This includes arrest and criminal record information as well as other information contained in records of official actions.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Criminal intelligence information may only be shared with other law enforcement agencies with the express written approval of an assigned intelligence personnel supervisor or commanding officer. Assigned intelligence personnel will disseminate criminal intelligence information only to law enforcement authorities who agree to follow procedures regarding information receipt, maintenance, security, and dissemination. The agency and/or officer requesting the information will agree in writing to be bound by department policy and will follow procedures relating to the storage, retrieval and dissemination of the information provided. Information from a criminal intelligence file may be disclosed orally, in writing, or through inspection of files. Assigned intelligence personnel will not release any original intelligence documents.

The release of criminal intelligence information will be based on a need to know and right to know basis. The facts establishing the requestor’s need to know and right to know will be documented in the criminal intelligence file.

- Need to know – Requested information is pertinent and necessary to the requesting agency in initiating, furthering, or completing the performance of a law enforcement activity.
  - Criminal intelligence information will only be shared with other members of the police department on a need to know basis. The officer requesting the information and the justification for the request will be noted in the file.
• Right to know – Requester is acting in an official capacity and has statutory authority to obtain the information being sought.

This will not limit the dissemination of an assessment of criminal intelligence information to a government official or to any other individual, when necessary, to avoid imminent danger to life or property.

Intelligence information will be released according to the following classification and release authority levels:

• **Sensitive** – Information in this class may only be released with permission of the assigned intelligence personnel commanding officer to law enforcement agencies that have a demonstrated right to know and need to know.

• **Restricted** – Restricted information may be released by assigned intelligence personnel to law enforcement agencies that have demonstrated a right to know and need to know.

• **Unclassified** – Any assigned intelligence personnel may release this information to a Greenwood Village officer or other law enforcement agency with special rules relating to unclassified juvenile information. The Chief of Police is the official records custodian and the Chief of Police must approve the release of information to the public or media.

In maintaining criminal intelligence information, the department will ensure that administrative, technical, and physical safeguards (including audit trails) are adopted to ensure against unauthorized access and against intentional or unintentional damage.

• A record indicating the agency and/or officer requesting the information, the law enforcement purpose for the request with the need to know or right to know, the assigned intelligence personnel approving the sharing, the date of the request, and the date of the provision of information will all be documented in the criminal intelligence file.

• Information will be labeled to indicate levels of sensitivity, levels of confidence, and the identity of requesting agencies and control officials. Information release is subject to routine inspection and audit procedures as established by the police department.

SECURITY OF FILES

Criminal intelligence files will be physically secured in locked cabinets or electronic files that are equipped with security protection measures. Those files and databases will be secured during off-hours and when the office is vacant.

• Key access to the intelligence office will only be granted to assigned intelligence personnel.

• Locks, combinations and system passwords will be changed upon the transfer of any member.
Assigned intelligence personnel will adopt a “clean desk” policy to include the removal of sensitive documents from view when not in use. The orientation of computer monitors will be such as to preclude casual observation by visitors and there will be control of sensitive conversations.

REVIEW AND PURGE PROCEDURES
Reviewing and purging of all information that is contained in the police department criminal intelligence files will be kept on an ongoing basis, but at a minimum, will be accomplished annually. The dates when reviews occur will be noted in the criminal intelligence file. The maximum retention period is three (3) years for permanent intelligence files and one (1) year for temporary intelligence files. These files must be purged following the retention period unless the information in that criminal intelligence file has been updated. The department may update the criminal intelligence file at any time based on reasonable suspicion of new criminal activity, extending the retention period. The decision to purge information should be guided by the following considerations:

- Whether or not the information in the criminal intelligence file continues to comply with the reasonable suspicion standard.
- Defined retention periods for permanent and temporary files.
- Specific credible threats to government officials and/or law enforcement officers.

Any information that is found to be collected or retained in violation of this section, or found to be inaccurate, misleading, or obsolete, will be purged. Any recipient agencies will be advised of such changes and that the information has been purged.

TRAINING
An annual review of this policy will be conducted with updates made based on recent court decisions and national best practices. The assigned intelligence personnel supervisor will ensure that all intelligence personnel receive annual updated training regarding this policy and any recent court decisions and best practices regarding criminal intelligence information. An outline of the training will be kept on file and the training will be documented in the officer’s training records.

JUVENILE INFORMATION
The Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act, C.R.S. 19-1-301 to 19-1-309.5, restricts the use and dissemination of information relating to juveniles. All intelligence data relating to juveniles will be identified as a juvenile record. The police department may disseminate juvenile information rated “sensitive” or “classified” pursuant to the provisions of this document. Juvenile information rated “unclassified,” unlike adult information rated “unclassified,” may not be released to other law enforcement agencies without a showing of a need to know.
SANCTIONS
Any member of the department found to have violated the procedures enumerated in
this policy will be subject to discipline pursuant to the department’s general
disciplinary policy.

GREENWOOD VILLAGE POLICE FIELD INTELLIGENCE REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED  CONFIDENTIAL – RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATELY FORWARD TO DETECTIVE SERVICES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
(ORIGINAL REPORT, NO COPIES TO BE LOCATED ELSEWHERE) (PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY)

IR NUMBER: _____ (TO BE ENTERED BY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL)

SUBJECT PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION:

NAME:


SUBJECT PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION- i.e.  SCARS, TATTOOS, MARKS:

SUBJECT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: ______________________

DRIVERS LICENSE NUMBER AND STATE, IF APPLICABLE_____________________________________

SUBJECTS LAST KNOWN ADDRESS__________________________________________

SUBJECT LAST KNOWN WORK ADDRESS________________________________________

VEHICLE____________________________________________________________________________

ASSOCIATES, IF APPLICABLE_________________________________________________________________

DATE OF CONTACT_________________: TIME OF CONTACT_________________________

LOCATION OF CONTACT_____________________________________________________________________

REASON FOR CONTACT_____________________________________________________________________

OFFICERS NOTES, including organization, group, gang and/or extremist group of subject, if known: (Attach second
page, if necessary)______________________________________________________________________

OFFICER MAKING CONTACT: (NAME AND BADGE NUMBER)____________________________________

REVIEWED /VERIFIED BY ___________________________ DATE __________

ROUTING: _______________________________ DATE __________

NON-ROUTING EXPLANATION
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION REQUEST/AGREEMENT

I, _____________________________________________, a duly recognized law enforcement representative, have requested information on ___________________________________________. I understand that by receiving this information, I agree to abide by the Greenwood Village Police Department policy and procedure regarding the release of intelligence information.

The requested information is to be used in the legal course of my law enforcement position and shall not be released to any other than in a legal course of law enforcement/investigation duties.

A record of any release of this information, to other than the person signing below, shall be kept as to whom the information was released to and why. A written record of this activity shall be forwarded to the Intelligence liaison supervisor at the earliest possible date.

The Greenwood Village Police Department follows the guidelines of 28 CFR Part 23 and this information is releasable only upon agreement to follow the Greenwood Village Police Department policy and procedure as related to Intelligence information under 26 CFR Part 23.

__________________________________________
Receiving Signature

__________________________________________
Date Received

__________________________________________
Witness, assigned personnel
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
LIST OF REFERENCES


City of Greenwood Village 2007 Annual Operating and Capital Budget. City of Greenwood Village, CO.


Fusion Center Support Team. “Efforts to Develop Fusion Center Intelligence Standards.” The Police Chief (February 2005): 47.


Microsoft Corp. Microsoft MapPoint, 2005.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Dr. Maria Rasmussen
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

4. Captain Robert Simeral
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

5. Jim Sanderson
   City of Greenwood Village
   Greenwood Village, Colorado