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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: CREATING A DE-ESCALATION MINDSET

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THESIS: In order for military ways and means to help attain a political end, the military itself must possess the capability to help transform an environment of conflict into an atmosphere of political, social and economic stability. In short, a modern military must have the ability to escalate and de-escalate the level of violence as appropriate, in order to coerce or persuade people, political parties, insurgents, guerrillas or any other actor involved, to return to the conditions necessary to resolve the conflict.

DISCUSSION: The outdated conceptual split between traditional major combat operations and non-traditional “Nation Building” has not only hindered performance at every level of operations but has potentially turned initial tactical advantages into strategic failures. In order to properly bridge the gap between traditional and non-traditional operations and help operational commanders create the appropriate ways to reach the political ends, three supporting concepts must be explored.

- First, the concept of military contact, specifically aimed at gaining an insight into how both persuasion and coercion are important, while understanding that for a long term solution, the ability to persuade is far more significant.
- Second, the concept that it is the operational level of war where the strategic ends and tactical means are reconciled helps demonstrate the overwhelming need for commanders to create clear intent and Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- Third is the concept that successful decision making must be based on suitable lenses or filters created by training, commander’s intent and ROE which in turn helps create the appropriate understanding of the situation within military members at the tactical level.

CONCLUSION: Military operations cannot be considered an end unto themselves. Rather, they must start from within a broad spectrum, beginning and ending with political action. In order to succeed in the future, the operational leaders of ground forces must possess an understanding that their primary function is to reconcile the tactical means available with the end sought by their strategic leaders. This understanding requires operational commanders to create campaign goals, craft commander’s intent and create ROE which help tactical operators of every rank fully comprehend the nature of their operation, who the enemy is, how they should understand the environment, what is meant by decisive force and how their actions help obtain the strategic goals. Ensuring that military operations maintain the flexibility to escalate and de-escalate as well as possess the power of persuasion and coercion (to include economic, diplomatic and informational) is critical to future success.

PREFACE

My interest in this topic began with my exposure to General Dallaire and the events surrounding the failure of the United Nations mission to Rwanda to stop the genocide which claimed the lives of close to one million human beings. My study of Operation Iraqi Freedom led me further down the path towards attempting to understand the dynamics of both escalation and de-escalation and the dual use of persuasion and coercion, particularly in the context of LtGen Mattis' No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy, 1st Do No Harm password. Coming in contact with Major Kirk Nothelfer first during Joint Urban Warrior 05 and then throughout the academic year at the School of Advance Warfighting has absolutely opened my mind to a new world of possibilities and permutation of so many ideas they could fill this whole page.

Lieutenant General Van Riper was invaluable in propelling me towards both expanding and focusing my thoughts. Joint Urban Warrior 06 helped me refine my written project even more. As always the invaluable guidance, support, editing and friendship of Dr. Paolo G. Tripodi, the Bren Chair of Ethics and Leadership at the Marine Corps University has been nothing short of spectacular.

Finally, nothing in my life is possible without the support of my amazing spouse, Sarah. I will be forever grateful for the wonder, beauty and love of all things intellectual she brings to my life.

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. Clausewitz, *On War*¹

To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*²

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have demonstrated the timeless wisdom of both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. One of the lessons being re-learned in OEF and OIF is that military operations cannot be seen as an end unto themselves and in fact the ability to apply violence, no matter how well planned and executed, will not ultimately solve a political problem. Therefore, in order for military ways and means to help attain a political end, the military itself must possess the capability to help transform an environment of conflict into an atmosphere of political, social and economic stability. In short, a modern military must have the ability to escalate and de-escalate the level of violence as appropriate, in order to coerce or persuade people, political parties, insurgents, guerrillas or any other actor involved, to return to the conditions necessary to resolve the conflict.

The focus of this paper will be to demonstrate the connection between the tactical mindset and understanding ground combat forces must possess in order to de-escalate violence and the role of commanders particularly at the operational level, who must create the appropriate ways to attain the strategically acceptable ends. While not losing focus on the fact that coercive military action must often be utilized to help set the appropriate conditions for a successful political solution, all too often the ground forces are focused on training only for the escalation of violence to an overwhelming level rather than an appropriate or decisive level. The outdated conceptual split between traditional major combat operations and non-traditional “Nation Building” has not only hindered performance at every level of operations but has potentially turned initial tactical advantages into strategic failures.³

In order to properly bridge the gap between traditional and non-traditional operations and help operational commanders create the appropriate ways to reach the political ends, three supporting concepts must be explored. First, the concept of military contact, specifically aimed at gaining an insight into how both persuasion and coercion are important, while understanding that for a long term solution, the ability to persuade is far more significant. Second, the concept that it is the operational level of war where the strategic ends and tactical means are reconciled helps demonstrate the overwhelming need for commanders to create clear intent and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Third is the concept that successful decision making must be based on suitable lenses or filters created by training, commander's intent and ROE which in turn helps create the appropriate understanding of the situation within military members at the tactical level. Only through the successful integration of these three concepts will military operations be capable of helping to set the conditions for success in the political realm.

The Spectrum of Military Operations and Historical Examples

From the early 1990's the likelihood of one nation-state becoming involved in traditional warfare against other nation-states has decreased significantly. While examples of traditional warfare between nation-states do exist, such as Desert Storm, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the opening stages of OIF, continuously emerging threats and military operations will add a myriad of new manifestations. Historically, the US Military has occupied the majority of its forces in training for an expedient victory over an equally powerful enemy state. This effort has equated military action with traditional warfare and has created the idea that "Nation Building" is not a military mission and is usually relegated to the realm of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.⁴ In reality though, this emphasis on traditional combat operations has

hidden the fact that the US Military has been providing non-traditional military support to other nations since the creation of the Monroe Doctrine.⁵

Since the 9/11 attack on the US by Al Qaeda operatives, the particular problem of global terrorism has become the focus of a great deal of study and concern. Given the decreasing instances of traditional and the increase in non-traditional military operations combined with daily experiences in both OEF and OIF, military leaders have come to recognize a necessary change in the basic approach to operations. Major General Peter Chiarelli, who commanded the US Army 1st Cavalry Division in 2004 during a period of non-traditional military operations in Baghdad, Iraq, stated:

I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield function to create that “point of penetration;” and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country... We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought.⁶

While there may be times when traditional operations occur, they will almost always begin and end with non-traditional operations. In fact, even during WWII, the US Army understood that while engaging in traditional warfare against the Axis powers, civil military governments would be required and specially trained members of the armed forces must be made available to help conduct “nation building.” The argument may be made that at no matter what point a military operation occurs along the spectrum, the final goal is to de-escalate to a position of national stability, which equates to an increase of vital but non-traditional operations.

The Spectrum of Future Military Operations

The spectrum of military operations cannot be understood linearly, with military forces beginning at one extreme and slowly progressing toward the other. The spectrum cannot be used to limit an operation to one type or another since military forces may be introduced anywhere

along the spectrum and may be faced with either rapid escalation or de-escalation of force.⁷ In order to be effective military leaders must recognize when a specific situation has changed and maintain a high degree of flexibility in their chosen course of action to move through the spectrum as required. This flexibility is the result of proper training, education, equipment and force structure.

At the most non-traditional limit of the spectrum, military operations are likely to occur when a nation has experienced some form of catastrophic environmental disaster. In this situation, the members of the military assist in humanitarian or disaster relief operations designed to help the local and national government with the provision of basic services to those citizens directly affected.

The military may find itself intervening in a nation state facing overpowering domestic turmoil (the Philippines post WWII), a failed nation state (Somalia in the 1990's) or into a nation state that longer has a legitimate and internationally acceptable government (Afghanistan under the Taliban). Operations in these situations will often times be designed to help a government better cope with an unstable situation,⁸ separate hostile forces,⁹ or bring about a change in regime. The situation will normally have international rather than regional consequences because of the potential for humanitarian disaster or the creation of a fertile breeding ground or safe-haven for terrorists and criminals.

At the high end of the spectrum, in operations usually defined as war, the military may find itself intervening in another nation for the specific purposes of defending a legitimate national government against an attack by a third-party nation. These types of operations may include any number of scenario's ranging from the defense and subsequent expulsion of a national army from a sovereign state similar to Desert Storm to a scenario similar to the defense

of Taiwan from an attack by Chinese forces. While this type of scenario lends itself to a more conventional military to military approach, there may also be non-state actors operating in a portion of the nation that is not necessarily supporting of the national government (Hamas, Irish Republican Army, Al Qaeda, Special Forces). Even at the most traditional end of the spectrum, the defeat of another nation's army is not an end in itself. The defeat of the army enables the intervening military force to then de-escalate the situation and return the nation to a state of balance and stability so that an acceptable political end may be reached.

Historical Examples and Lessons Learned

The study of two historical cases will demonstrate how viewing military operations as specific types rather than as occurring across a spectrum of both escalation and de-escalation can lead to either mission failure or severe setbacks.

The 1994 UN Mission to Rwanda – A Case of Inability to Escalate

When Major General Dallaire arrived in the small African nation of Rwanda as the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), his mission was to enable and enforce the Arusha Peace Agreement. The Arusha agreement created a northern demilitarized zone between the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and mandated that popular elections be held for a new government, more representative of Rwanda's ethnical diversity. Secretly, the more radical elements of the Hutu government never intended to surrender any amount of power to the Tutsi's even though the RPF was poised to complete the defeat of the RGF and take Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.

Since the UN mission was intended only to separate the RPF from the RGF, the leaders of the UN did not believe UNAMIR needed robust combat or combat support capabilities. Consequently, UNAMIR was allotted just over 2,500 lightly armed troops, a small supply of

inadequate armored vehicles, extremely limited internal or external logistical support and no real casualty evacuation capability. The consequences of these factors were not realized until 6 April 1994 when Juvenil Habyarimana, the President of Rwanda, was killed and the infamous Interahamwe (Hutu militia) began calling for the extermination of the Tutsi “cockroaches.” Major General Dallaire found he did not have the force structure or preparation to be an effective interdiction force required to conduct traditional military operations in the face of a rogue and illegitimate government. Simply stated, UNAMIR was trained only to de-escalate and could not coerce the Hutu’s into compliance through military action. Consequently, in the subsequent 100 days from 6 April through 14 July 1994 over 800,000 Rwandan’s, mostly Tutsi, were slaughtered while the UN Peacekeepers were relegated to powerless witnesses of the genocide.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)I – March to May 2003 – A Case of Inability to De-Escalate

In March of 2003 the US led military coalition began the process of expelling the hostile Ba’ath Party and its leader, Saddam Hussein from Iraq. The military planning for the mission was based on two main assumptions: first that the Iraqi people would welcome the action; second the Iraqi people would willingly (and even peacefully) re-create their own legitimate government. Military planners largely viewed their efforts as a traditional war against another traditional force with no overwhelming need for military personnel who were educated, trained and equipped for a long-term and hostile occupation in support of the new government.

Within a year Iraq had a new legitimate interim government designed to guide them through the creation of a democratic country. The need for a large number of personnel trained in FID operations became an imperative yet forces either were not available in the required quantities or simply did not exist. As a further complication of the artificial segregation between traditional military operations and “Nation Building,” military personnel quickly found

themselves in situations for which they had not been trained or educated and the rules governing contracting and expenditure of reconstruction money prohibited effective use by commanders. For example, during OIF in 2005 in the Anbar province the lack of US State Department envoys capable of allocating funds to reconstruction projects meant that military commanders were less effective in de-escalating security problems. Rather than being able to provide long term and financially expensive community support projects they were left only with the option of escalating the situation through show of force patrols and raids.¹⁰ Simply stated, the coalition forces were trained and equipped for escalation when what was really needed was a force focused primarily on de-escalation and persuasion in order to win the “hearts and minds” and support of the Iraqi people while retaining the ability to escalate and coerce violent insurgents into cooperation.

Lessons Learned

Rwanda and OIF, become particularly relevant to our analysis when properly placed along the spectrum of military operations. It should be noted that, although particular conflicts may belong to opposite sides of the spectrum (Rwanda – non-traditional, OIF – traditional), due to the dynamic nature of conflicts, the situation may change and the operation will have to quickly and appropriately transition (Rwanda – traditional, OIF – non-traditional). Therefore, any force involved in a military operation must be prepared to shift its focus as the situation changes. Consequently a force organized, educated, trained and equipped only for a specific type of operation will likely be unprepared and potentially incapable of shifting focus when the situation changes. Most importantly, any military force entering a future conflict must be trained and equipped to recognize and apply the proper methods of both escalation and de-escalation in

order to create the desired effect within a nation, to include its populace, military and political structure.

Escalation and De-Escalation Across the Spectrum

In a broad definition of the spectrum of military operations that crosses from traditional to non-traditional roles, the basic understanding of three key elements must also be updated.

First is an updated understanding of how the role of both coercion and persuasion may serve as enablers for successful military operations. Second is the understanding of how the tactical/operational/strategic levels influence the spectrum of military operations. Third is the need to understand decision making in the context of recognition primed decisions which will help clarify what military leaders must do at the operational level in order to enable the tactical to accomplish the strategic.

Contact

In contrast with traditional military operations, the primary focus in non-traditional military operations is not solely the defeat of an armed force or the unseating of a nation's political leadership. Rather, the focus, at its most basic level, is the correction of some fundamental grievance which then causes instability within a given culture, society, population group or country. The first important realization that must be made is that human beings have the ability to operate from a "free will"¹¹ and therefore are capable of a seemingly infinite number of actions. Fortunately, most individuals although capable of independently acting from their own free will, normally organize themselves into groups that share familiar and similar sets of beliefs. These groups fall into a number of categories to include cultures, societies, population groups and even nationalities.

When one group interacts with another, there is normally some form of competition. This competition may not be hostile or even adversarial, but given the fact that the world is reliant on limited resources, and the groups will maintain differing opinions as to how to allocate those resources, the presence of competition cannot be denied. The methods of reconciling the desires of one group with another will normally take on a mixture of two forms: persuasion or coercion. While persuasion and coercion are not mutually exclusive and the same event can have elements of either action, the act of persuasion implies that one party agrees because they come to recognize that the argument is sound and that their needs will be met. Coercion meanwhile, implies that although the parties agree to a proposal, it is mainly due to the recognition that failure to do so will bring negative and unacceptable consequences to the less powerful group. In other words, a resolution based on persuasion is normally more palatable and in accordance with both parties while a resolution based on coercion implies that one party has knowingly imposed their will on the other.

In order for persuasion to be effective, hostile situations must usually be de-escalated away from high levels of violence, since raging gun battles are not conducive to meaningful dialogue. Until both parties' grievances are reconciled, a persuasive resolution cannot be reached. The implication for military commanders then, is that in non-traditional military operations, the goal must be de-escalation as soon as the situation permits or at any rate escalation away from dialogue needs to be avoided as long as possible. LtGen Mattis when preparing his forces for service in Iraq in 2004 provided the following de-escalation guidance:

If they (the individual Marine or soldier) could take a shot across a crowded marketplace to kill a terrorist but put a woman or child in danger, then they did NOT take the shot. They had to try and stay friendly one minute longer, one second longer, so that we could try to win the people over.¹²

The consequences of a resolution reached through coercion can be seen in the Rwanda example. The successful military operations of the RPF (Tutsi) forced the RGF (Hutu) to agree to the Arusha accords out of military necessity rather than out of recognition that their needs and desires were being met. Consequently, once UNAMIR arrived, the RGF, still not satisfied with the outcome of the Arusha accords, was provided with the chance to regroup and create a new strategy. The new strategy included convincing the average Hutu that the accords were not in their best interest and would not provide a solution that truly addressed their needs. With their new support the RGF broke their agreement and with the help of the Hutu population escalated the competition by attempting to completely erase their Tutsi competitors.

The military lessons to be taken from this example are that coercion may be necessary to force “hard line” groups to make and maintain a resolution. Consequently, if coercive force is used to reach a resolution, a viable threat must be retained in order to continue the threat of coercion (which UNAMIR could not do) or the resolution must persuade the general population that their needs are truly addressed and conflict is actually resolved. Failure to do so will allow even a small, dissatisfied organization the chance to break the resolution through effective propaganda efforts (which is continuing to occur in Iraq).

Strategic/Operational/Tactical Decisions

Traditionally decisions or actions taken by a government are described as falling into one of three categories: strategic, operational or tactical. The strategic level consists of the decisions taken by the highest levels of political and military leadership which set the overall end or ends the nation intends to achieve. The operational level is represented by specific decisions or actions taken at the highest-level of military command within a theater of operations. The operational actions translate political ends into the ways that tactical units executing the

operations can help achieve those ends. Finally at the tactical level, smaller units execute the military operations or battles with the mission of achieving an operational or campaign goal through the application of military means in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures in contact with the enemy.

While the traditional model is a useful way to describe the creation of ends (strategic), the determination of ways (operational) and the application of means (tactical), the recognition of such clearly defined levels is increasingly blurred, particularly when embarking on non-traditional military operations.¹³ Therefore, the Strategic/Operational/Tactical model must be viewed through a more holistic approach; specifically actions directed by the operational level must attempt to fully reconcile tactical means with strategic ends.¹⁴ In other words, the operational planners must create appropriate commander's intent and mission type orders, craft the proper rules of engagement and account for the necessary logistics, equipment and reinforcement's necessary to enable the individual soldier or Marine to either escalate or de-escalate a situation at the local level as necessary.

Decision Making

The seemingly unrelated concepts of de-escalation enabled persuasion leading to a more stable solution in a non-traditional military operation and the three levels of war (strategic/operational/tactical or ends/ways/means) are made manifest and then merged in the form of decisions made across the spectrum of military operations. The common denominator for human action is the fact that a decision has been made which has resulted in an act. The decision may have been made long before the action was taken and may not have been made by the actual individual executing the decision.

The first difficulty in describing decision making in the context of any military operation is to demonstrate how higher level guidance or decisions influence lower level actions, without stripping those lower level actors of their ability to follow their own free will. The difficulty is resolved through the understanding that while every individual has his or her own free will, by freely joining the military, he or she agrees to suspend the right to completely autonomous action and is willing to subjugate free will to the necessity of the situation. The leaders of the group will help the individual act appropriately by creating the filters through which an independent actor will receive information regarding an emergent phenomenon, process that information and then act within a prescribed set of parameters. During stressful situations, those filters will enable individuals to observe an event, orient themselves through a framework of mental analysis, decide on the best possible course of action and then act in accordance with their decision.¹⁵ The best example of this process, at the tactical level, is the “Immediate Action Drill” in which personnel rehearse their reaction to a specific event, like an enemy ambush, in order to ensure that if the event were to happen for real, the unit reaction would be coordinated and individual actions would support mission accomplishment and survival.

In other words, an individual soldier or Marine analyses information pertaining to emergent phenomenon through filters, created by numerous non-military and military sources alike. The non-military sources of filters include but are not limited to: the values of an individual’s parents, community, culture and religion. The military, through training, education and the example and intent of leaders, attempts to mitigate the influence of non-military filters to those created for the purposes of properly analyzing emergent phenomenon in the context of military necessity. Therefore it is incumbent upon leaders to provide filters for analysis that enable soldiers and Marines to make the best possible decision in all military operations.

In order to more fully understand the role of a commander in shaping an individual's capability for escalation and more importantly de-escalation, strong contributions are offered by Malcolm Gladwell and Gary Klein. In his book *Blink*, the author Malcolm Gladwell creates and defends the argument that often times the most rapid and powerful decisions are those that occur quickly, prior to any type of formal mental or verbal debate, a process known as adaptive unconscious.¹⁶ Unfortunately, those same decisions are likely to be the most directly affected by prejudice and bias held at a sub-conscious level. Those biases and prejudice are often made manifest in the actions taken by individuals in stressful situations.¹⁷ For members of the military who not only have to make judgments pertaining to the life and death of people they do not truly understand, they have a further difficulty because of the unclear identity of "the enemy" in non-traditional operations.

In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, American service men and women routinely refer to members of the Iraqi population and even members of the greater Middle East population as "hajjis." Whether the term is meant to be derogatory or not, the result is that the individual Iraqi is understood in an abstract way and is denied their individual humanity. The use of the abstract term "hajji" in such a broad way essentially lumps both friendly and non-friendly individuals in the same category. The likely consequence is that in the emotion of war, either traditional or non-traditional, the net result will range from simple dislike to hatred of anyone who is a "hajji."¹⁸ This creation of an abstract term also allows for soldiers and Marines to become less sensitive to the humanity of the individual and in protracted, stressful situations they are more likely to "surrender reason to the emotional contagion of the communal."¹⁹ In short, without a well-crafted and concrete understanding of both the enemy and the local populace, military personnel who are forced to make quick decisions, may very well be overly influenced by their

sub-conscious prejudice/bias. That prejudice/bias reinforced by their military cultural imperative or mindset of “mission accomplishment first” are then dangerously predisposed to make the tactical mistakes which in turn have grievous strategic consequences.²⁰

In his book, *Sources of Power*, Gary Klein describes how training, education and previous experience can help overcome some of the more emotional or subconscious reactions described in *Blink*. According to Klein, “most poor decisions may result from having inadequate knowledge and expertise.”²¹ Adequate knowledge and expertise are the keys to proper decision making because more often than not, a person faced with an emergent situation will immediately recognize cues that help them reconcile what they perceive with what their experience tells them they should do. This process often resides at the subconscious level for individuals who are trained to deal with certain situations,²² and as pointed out by Gladwell, the use of the subconscious opens the door to interference by bias and prejudice.²³ When faced with a particularly stressful situation, like those found during non-traditional military operations where it may not be clear what the mission is or who the real enemy is, Klein lists the potential effects stressors have on proper decision-making:

- The stressors do not give us a chance to gather as much information.
- The stressors disrupt our ability to use our working memory to sort things out.
- The stressors distract our attention from the task at hand.²⁴

The conclusion to be taken from both Gladwell and Klein points toward the responsibility of commanders at every level of command to help create the proper decision-making conditions for their individual soldiers and Marines. The conditions must be started at entry-level training in the form of the proper filters designed to encourage openness to other cultures. These filters will help individuals avoid forming abstract understandings and prevent the creation of inappropriate bias. At the operational level, commanders must create an understanding of the

situation and the people in it, which enables the tactical operators to understand their mission in the context of the strategic goals. A proper image of the individuals involved, which is not degrading or dehumanizing, will help soldiers and Marines to develop a strong ability to de-escalate and identify all those situations in which they can use persuasion vice coercion. Finally at the tactical level, leaders must constantly reinforce this proper image to ensure that their subordinates are primed to perform in accordance with the strategic goals.

Conclusion

Military operations cannot be considered an end unto themselves. Rather, they must start from within a broad spectrum, beginning and ending with political action. In order to succeed in the future, the operational leaders of ground forces must possess an understanding that their primary function is to reconcile the tactical means available with the end sought by their strategic leaders. This understanding requires operational commanders to create campaign goals, craft commander's intent and create ROE which help tactical operators of every rank fully comprehend the nature of their operation, who the enemy is, how they should understand the environment, what is meant by decisive force and how their actions help obtain the strategic goals. Ensuring that military operations maintain the flexibility to escalate and de-escalate as well as possess the power of persuasion and coercion (to include economic, diplomatic and informational) is critical to future success. Small unit leaders, company and below, are being placed in a position to have a direct positive or negative impact on strategic success, therefore, leaders must be trained and educated to make the best possible decision based on the value of a human being rather than on a generalization.²⁵ In order to remain relevant for the next fifteen to thirty years, the US Military must make the transition from a force focused on tactical victory to a force focused on strategic success.

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- ¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Trans. Peter Paret, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
- ² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Trans. Samuel B. Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
- ³ For the purposes of clarity, the term traditional warfare will be used strictly to identify those operations within which one military force engages with another military force, examples include military operations such as Operation Overlord in WWII or the defeat of the Iraqi Army during Operation Desert Storm. All other military operations ranging from Foreign Internal Defense as in El Salvador to the humanitarian assistance provided by members of the military during the tsunami relief effort in 2004 will be classified as non-traditional.
- ⁴ Nation Building entails all those activities involved with re-establishing a government and its associated services. This is exemplified by the activities that have taken place since the end of combat operations in OIF, to include restarting basic human services (water, electricity, garbage collection), creation of a representative government at all levels and creation of a civilian police force.
- ⁵ These types of events occurred so often in fact that in 1940 the Marine Corps published its Small Wars Manual, designed to guide Marines as they embarked on the effort of building or rebuilding a foreign nation.
- ⁶ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace, The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, p. 4.
- ⁷ There have been a variety of attempts to classify operations into one type or another, Low Intensity Conflict, Mid-Intensity Conflict, High Intensity Conflict, Military Operations Other Than War – just to name a few. Each fails to completely describe any specific conflict because of the dynamic nature of warfare.
- ⁸ Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. Also called FID. Taken from: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 December 1989), under the words "Foreign Internal Defense."
- ⁹ In United Nations (UN) terms, this form of intervention would be considered peacekeeping if some sort of agreement has been reached between the government and non-state actors and they need to simply be separated. If the national government needs assistance in dealing with non-state actors in a more forceful way the UN would consider this a peace enforcement mission.
- ¹⁰ Chris Allbritton, "Looking Out on Hostile Territory," *Time*, 14 November 2005, 43.
- ¹¹ The concept of free will means that each individual has the capability to make decisions for themselves and will be affected by the other individuals around them in a unique way.
- ¹² Maj Yaroslaski interview with General Mattis 30 August 2005, Quantico, VA.
- ¹³ This concept is represented by General Krulak's description of the "Three Block War" found in General Charles Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, *Marines Magazine*, January 1999.
- ¹⁴ This concept was presented and developed by Professor Bradley Meyer during numerous seminars throughout the School of Advanced Warfighting, Academic Year 2005/06, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. Reconciling the Strategic with Tactical is to create the necessary and appropriate ways (Campaign Plans, defeat nation X's fielded forces and provide a secure and stable environment for election to occur) within which tactical means (bombs, bullets, tanks, platoons, airplanes, etc.) can be used so as to mean a stated strategic end (the removal of a repressive regime and the creation of a democratic government capable of self governance, defense and trade within the global economy).
- ¹⁵ This process is was described as the OODA loop by John Boyd and has been adopted by the Marine Corps as the doctrinal understanding of how decisions are made. MCDP 1 and MCDP 6.
- ¹⁶ Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink, The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2005), 11.
- ¹⁷ See the Harvard Bias Test as described in: Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink, The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2005), 84-86.
- ¹⁸ J Glenn Gray, *The Warriors*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 134-135.
- ¹⁹ Gray, 134
- ²⁰ These types of tactical incidents in which even a Private First Class can have damaging strategic affects are typified in the events surround the Abu Garaib prisoner abuse in 2004.
- ²¹ Gary Klein, *Sources of Power*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 284.
- ²² Klein, 33.
- ²³ Gladwell, 84-86.
- ²⁴ Klein, 275.

²⁵ As an example, the term “haji” is used in Iraq by coalition forces to describe every Iraqi. This term and the abstract vice personal understanding it implies may have a negative influence on the decision-making ability of tactical operators during stressful situations.

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