MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

TITLE: INTEGRATION OF MILITARY POLICE WITHIN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Integration of Military Police within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

AUTHOR: Major Kurt G. Ebaugh, United States Marine Corps

THESIS: The Marine Corps must generate greater operational agility by improving the integration of Military Police [MP], within the ground component of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF].

DISCUSSION: The three-block war has rendered separate tactical doctrines (offensive/defensive/stabilization) obsolete, replacing them with a mode of warfare that is simultaneously full-spectrum. The criticality of non-traditional forces (high demand/low density units) has driven conventional infantry and artillery units towards nonstandard deployments to perform nonstandard missions. As a result, current homogenous MOS density within battalion-sized combat formations is being questioned. In order to better address the fragile “golden hour” of campaign phase transitions, the Marine Corps must generate greater operational agility by improving the integration of Military Police [MP], within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF]. Possible solutions:

- **USMCR Organizational Realignment**: The Marine Corps realigns a reserve regiment of infantry and two battalions of artillery into certified military police battalions to support projected Marine Corps contingency deployments. This solution will take approximately 5-10 years to mature.
- **Habitual Joint MP Relationships**: Habitual relationships forged between each of the MEFs and U.S. Army military police battalions. These joint relationships will be exercised at NTC/JRTC/CAX and then deployed as joint fighting organizations in support of current contingency operations.
- **Hybridized Maneuver Battalions**: Breaking with homogenous MOS tactical organizations in favor of hybridized maneuver battalions will better integrate MPs where they are needed most—on the ground supporting the MAGTF commanders. It is recommended that tactical level integration of MPs in company-sized formations be driven down to the battalion level.

CONCLUSION: Given the lessons of history and the realities of today’s operational environment, it is fairly obvious that the Marine Corps can ill afford to ignore the proper integration of MPs within the MAGTF/GCE. The Marine Corps simply cannot take a “wait and see” perspective to this ongoing issue. Realistically the Marine Corps will need to adapt a mixture of the above three options.
PREFACE

My interest in this topic of Military Police integration within the MAGTF was kindled by an unlikely collection of academic encounters I experienced last year while attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Forced to endure the mundane topic of Army Force Management, I chose to explore innovative manpower methods/techniques to satisfy the requirement for a short research paper. It was the result of that paper that drove home my realization that the Marine Corps does not have enough MPs to conduct Small Wars—or what has become known today as Stability & Reconstruction Operations. One of my fellow classmates at CGSC, Major Sean Cleveland, U.S. Army-Military Police Branch, was a constant advocate of the multiple functions MPs can provide to the contemporary operating environment. His experiences struck a chord with me that only emphasized what I had already discovered. Lastly, LTC Geoff Babb, U.S. Army retired, former U.S. Army Special Forces, and the instructor for Case Studies in Counter-Insurgency, brought out in repeated case studies the importance of non-kinetic strategies that resulted in lasting long-term stability to those counter-insurgency operations that succeeded in history. It was these academic exchanges that collided thus forming the spark that made this research paper possible.

I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the love and continuous support that my wonderful bride Shannon provided me in the pursuit of my academic endeavors. She has endured two one-year assignments, both of which were easier for me than for her. And lastly, I am grateful to my son Gibson, who daily injected a healthy sense of humor during two years of schoolwork—and proved that playing with Tonka Trucks is more fun than studying Clausewitz.
“The military must provide the National Command Authority with flexible forces that can operate across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives.”  

Introduction

“Where are my MP’s?” is a retort frequently voiced by commanders after the din of mid-intensity combat operations has quieted and the realities of repairing all that has been broken sets in. As current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq can attest, the “three-block war” has become the norm rather than the exception. To succeed within this operational paradigm, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps have struggled to adapt force structure, doctrine, and tactics. The fourth generation warfare operational orthodoxy has characterized the contemporary operating environment as, “lethal, complex, diverse, and diffuse.”

The three-block war has rendered separate tactical doctrines (offensive/defensive/stabilization) obsolete, replacing them with a mode of warfare that is “simultaneously full-spectrum”, and where the criticality of non-traditional forces (high demand/low density units) has come to the fore. Each Soldier/Marine has been forced to become more comfortable in the role of “part warrior, part diplomat, and part humanitarian.” Current operations have driven conventional infantry and artillery units towards, “nonstandard deployment[s] to perform nonstandard mission[s].” And the individual services have been forced to consider reorganization, in order to, “…to maintain a level of traditional capabilities while enhancing [their] ability to respond to nontraditional, irregular threats.” As a result, current homogenous MOS density within battalion-sized combat formations is being questioned. To succeed in this complex environment, the Marine Corps must generate greater operational agility by improving the integration of critical MOS’s, namely Military Police [MP], within the ground component of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF].
The purpose of this article is to examine this issue, encourage debate, and provide the reader with recommendations on how to better integrate MPs within the ground combat element of a MAGTF. Some may argue that, “there appears to be a tendency within the Department of Defense to change force structure every time a different ‘phase’ along the spectrum of conflict takes center stage.” And it can be readily agreed that changing force structure without first identifying commensurate changes to warfighting requirements is unsound. Nonetheless, the “three-block war as the tactical manifestation of 4th generation warfare”, is upon us now—it is a warfighting requirement that cannot be ignored.

To address this operational seam it is recommended in the near term that formal integration of Marine and Army Military Police organizations within ground combat elements during stabilization and reconstruction operations [S&RO] will result in a broader and more complete range of options towards addressing the complex realities of the three-block war for the MAGTF Commander. A more distant and far more revolutionary solution, which, without breaking the existing ethos or dissolving the corporate expertise of the current MOS system, would employ smart organizational design in the form of baseline battalion-sized force modules. This could generate synergy thru the smart integration of MOS’s that compliment one another in the Homeland Security [HLS] and S&RO realm, yet preserve combat strength to wage conventional war. The bottom line is clear, to do nothing to address this very apparent seam in operational transitions, is not an option and we must be creative since the stakes are high.

The Nature of the Problem

While the operational and tactical requirement for greater MP density within Afghanistan and Iraq has been amply documented, the nature of this problem cannot just be viewed thru a counter-insurgency lens. Stephen Flynn in his critical appraisal of our country’s homeland
security readiness, *America The Vulnerable*, predicts that in the event of a significant terrorist attack upon U.S soil in the form of a dirty WMD bomb or a biological attack, our ability to cordon the affected area and provide an acceptable level of security would quickly overwhelm the law enforcement agencies of local, county, and state police organizations. Therefore, significant military support would be requested from U.S. Northern Command.\(^\text{10}\) It is probable that MP organizations from the National Guard and Army Reserve would be ‘swallowed up’ by the incident thereby driving the Pentagon to send active component forces to assist. Inevitably Marine Corps infantry and artillery units would be called upon to provide assistance to civil authorities to fill the void.

This begs the issue, would the Marine Corps create Military Police Battalions to support such a contingency? And would those organizations be thrown together ad hoc, in which case their preliminary training would bring them to the incident rather late in the game, or would those organizations be actual standing active or reserve MP battalions ready to serve and excel in such a crisis? Today, the Marine Corps could support such an event with infantry and artillery organizations. However, this support would be curtailed as a result of institutional hesitance in the manner in which they would provide such augmentation.

The Los Angeles Riots of 1992 provides an interesting example of such a crisis and how the active component (elements of 1st Marine Division) responded in a scenario that demanded capabilities more akin to Military Police law & order operations. The lessons learned from that experience have clearly been codified, however, we are no better prepared to respond to a similar situation of that scale and importance.\(^\text{11}\)

Why do the Joint Force and MSC commanders demand a significant increase in MP organizations once the threshold has been crossed between sustained ground combat operations and support and reconstruction operations? Is it because the MPs have a unique capability set
that infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery organizations cannot perform? Or is it that the MPs can conduct certain skill sets better than their combat arms brethren? Or is there a discernable mind-set or institutional ethos that the MPs possess that make them more suited to conducting missions in the S&RO/HLS realm? Perhaps the answer is a combination. One thing is for certain, historical precedent within the Marine Corps does not support the need for MPs in the density now desired by MEF/MSC commanders to perform S&RO/HLS missions.

Referencing the Marine Corps’ Caribbean constabulary experience, The Small Wars Manual describes the need for a talented pool of Marines to conduct operations akin to S&RO/HLS (MOOTW), but does not specifically recommend the formation of a separate MOS to deal with these missions. The Small Wars Manual goes on to identify a requirement for mature individuals to conduct operations involving close contact with local indigenous populations, much like that required to properly conduct S&RO/HLS missions.12

Currently the MP MOS requires an entry-level GT score that is higher than the other combat arms MOSs. Specifically the enlisted MP requires a GT of 100 whereas the artillery and infantry MOSs require a GT of 90 and 80 respectively.13 It is doubtful that a GT score is an accurate indicator of an increased maturity level. Furthermore, it is even more of a stretch to use the GT score as an indicator of an individual’s ability to interact properly with indigenous persons in a stabilization/reconstruction environment. Nonetheless, it is clear from the Small Wars Manual that there is an acute need for individuals, likely NCOs or SNCOs, that possess both a greater maturity and a predisposition towards interacting favorably with indigenous persons from a country (often third world) that is in crisis. Worldly wisdom is not normally a concrete enough characteristic to test for on an ASVAB, but clearly it is what is needed to succeed and better yet excel within the S&RO realm.
In addition to a unique ethos, MPs also bring technical expertise that is invaluable to the S&RO/HLS environment. An example of this technical expertise is the forensic handling of a crime scene critical to conducting a credible investigation that can withstand the rules of evidence; even in a foreign court system. It is this attention to detail, albeit a function of good training, but also a function of their organizational ethos, that is clearly a force multiplier in stabilization & reconstruction operations. Additionally, military police are more fully equipped to process a crime scene, terrorist attack, or IED explosion. The meticulous process whereby a crime scene is reduced to its component parts and re-assembled to solve the crime, apprehend the attackers, and dole out justice is the result of superb gumshoe detective work, which is inherent to an MP organization. It is this aspect of the MP expertise that brings to the forefront this capabilities set a well-trained MP organization brings to S&RO/HLS which is value added to a MAGTF or GCE.

The Military Police Community

Currently, out of a combined fighting force of about 490,000, the U.S. military has approximately 15,000 military policemen (Army and Marine) on active duty. Additionally there are 22,000 military policemen residing within the reserve and National Guard establishments—almost 60% of the total force MP community. There are currently about 12,000 MPs assigned to the Central Command.14

The MP community is charged with five battlefield functions: maneuver & mobility support (M/MS), area security operations (AS), law & order operations (LO), internment/resettlement operations (I/R), and police intelligence operations (PIO). Using Afghanistan as an example, these battlefield functions currently nest under the following tactical tasks: Detainee operations (I/R), Police Tactical Training/Mentorship/Partnership/Support (PIO,
LO, & AS), Border Operations (AS, M/MS, LO, & PIO), Law and order operations [law enforcement, customs operations, and force protections of key facilities] (LO), Police intelligence operations (PIO), all under the general tactical employment of massing effects (or centralized control/centralized execution). It must be emphasized that MPs can support the commander in any of these missions, but not all of them simultaneously, which is obviously problematic.  

An MP battalion T/O configuration is 18 officers and 500 enlisted personnel organized into 3 companies of 4 platoons each. Each platoon has 1 officer and 40 enlisted Marines, which are broken down into 3 squads. The platoons consist of regular MPs along with a variety of Marines trained in specific fields such as military working dog handlers, criminal and accident investigators, and physical security specialists. Each platoon is equipped with 13 HMMWVs and is armed with M2 .50 caliber machineguns, Mk19s, M240Gs, shotguns, M203s, M16s, SAWS, 9mm pistols, and non-lethal weapons. Additionally, each MP platoon possesses a communications suite that is slightly better than that of a tank platoon.  

The curriculum for MOS qualification at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for an enlisted MP is the following: “Miranda rights and military law, evidence collection, search and apprehension, police reports and forms, vehicle inspection, traffic directing and convoy escorts, interrogations and interviews, and response to such incidents as suicide attempts, rape, damage to private property and domestic abuse.” In short, these are all skills currently highly sought after in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have tremendous utility in addressing the mixed bag of issues inherent to HLS and S&RO at large.  

The underlying strength of an MP, especially within the Stability and Reconstruction environment, is his/her MOS culture and ethos--“They [MPs] maintain order, but try to forgo force.” Furthermore, “It’s their [MP] subdued yet persuasive presence most Army [and
Marine] planners value on the battlefield.” For instance, using a real world scenario, “You have to understand [that] U.S. convoys going 60 MPH honking and cussing and pushing civilian vehicles off the road sends a definite IO message. Simply by enforcing traffic laws on U.S. convoys, MPs send an [important] IO message.” The MP community is known for it’s polished professionalism, which contributes to the following truth, “Presence coupled with restraint can have a very important effect on counter-insurgency operations, however, presence coupled with the absence of restraint can have the exact opposite effect.”

Looking to History for Answers

Looking to history for tactical and operational solutions to address this operational seam amplifies the nature of the problem. The Marine Corps got off to a late start in terms of creating a Military Police MOS. A formal MP MOS was created in 1970. Previously the Marine Corps created ad hoc Military Police units for World War II, the Korean War and Vietnam conflict. For example, during World War II, the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion was formed in 1944 and served in the Okinawa campaign. It conducted convoy traffic control, refugee control, POW control, tomb clearing operations, and straggler control. During the Korean War the 1st Military Police Battalion provided security for North Korean prisoners of war, augmented security for main supply routes, and performed law & order operations.

In Vietnam the Marine Corps created three provisional MP battalions, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th battalions, all of which were headquartered at Danang Marine Air Base/Marble Mountain. These three battalions provided base security to free infantry and artillery battalions to conduct operations elsewhere in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In addition to installation security these battalions also conducted NVA POW security, limited convoy security, counter-black market operations, bridge security, and law & order operations.
When the Marine Corps did finally create its own military police MOS, it did so not as a result of a tactical need for MP expertise in Vietnam, but rather more to provide law enforcement aboard major Marine Corps installations in CONUS and Okinawa. This mindset ultimately hurt Task Force Semper Fi during Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989. TF Semper Fi was assigned the 534th MP Company from the U.S. Army’s 16th MP Brigade. The nature and tempo of U.S. operations in Panama resulted in a large exodus of Panamanian EPWs, which the Marines organic to TF Semper Fi were ill prepared to process.26

The Marine Corps has historically undertaken amphibious operations. The rapid and relatively coastal nature of these operations did not lend to the creation of MPs for a robust rear area. The purview of MP operations was considered antithetical to the expeditionary spirit of the Marine Corps. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm changed that predication. Marines in Saudi Arabia in 1991 pushed inland much further than previously required. The Marines utilized their few MPs in a role much like U.S. Army MP organizations oriented on the five main functions of MPs, but focused primarily on MSR security and EPW handling.27

In 1998 the Marine Corps experimented with its MP formations. Prior to 1998, formations of MPs were largely at the company level within the Division, Force Service Support Groups and Marine Air Wings. In 1998, the Marine Corps reorganized the MP community into one battalion of MPs per MEF. The concept as tested was to provide a general support MP capability to the entire MEF. However, turf wars over who received the preponderance of MP support from the MEF were to be solved by returning the MPs as company level organizations similar to pre-1998 status quo.28 In essence, the validation of that experiment was inconclusive, as the changes were not deemed value added. The ability to mass a battalion sized formation of MPs was not recognized as a significant force multiplier to the MEF.
However, today in the wake of OIF3, the Marine Corps has once again formed an ad hoc provisional MP battalion from the activated 5th Battalion of the 14th Marine Regiment. Traditionally the Corps/MEF GS artillery battalion within the Marine Corps Reserve establishment, 5/14 upon activation and pre-deployment training, was certified an MP Battalion. So while the Marine Corps continues to address its resource shortfall in MP battalions by forming ad hoc MP formations, it does so with no long-term solution to this capability gap.

On the other hand, having a more mature Military Police institution, the U.S. Army has addressed this operational problem in a similar manner. Until World War II the United States Army created and utilized military police organizations on an as needed basis. Not recognized as a specific branch until 1942, military police organizations were largely ad hoc, serving in support of a specific crisis and where then stood down or disbanded. However, in World War II the clear need to have military police organizations to enforce military government paved the way for designation as a distinct branch with a discrete mission.

Since military government affected those areas of the battlefield liberated by the allied advances into North Africa and the Mediterranean islands and coast of Italy, most of these operations took place within the “rear” of allied combat formations. In concert with Civil Affairs, MPs provided population and resource control, POW handling, battlefield area circulation (aka-MSR management), and basic law & order. These battalions were Corps, Army, and Army Group assets. Such practices carried over to the Korean Conflict in much the same manner. However, during the Vietnam War, U.S. Army military police organizations were formed into groups of battalions. These groups provided general support military police functions to each of the Corps Tactical Zones and primarily focused on external security and law & order for the major military cantonments within Vietnam.
Post-Vietnam, U.S. Army MPs returned to the four (later expanded to five) main pillars of Military Police work. This focused primarily on the rear area of the Air-Land Battle. Recognized as a combat support MOS, their talents were still identified with those actions within the rear area. Such a historical precedent continued uninterrupted until the Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During OIF, there was a demand for MP brigades to fight a counter-insurgency in the main battle area—a very important distinction. As recently as two years ago, the Army searched for a new organizational construct leveraging the relative strength in supporting arms with the need for more operationally agile combat formations. Redefining the smallest holistic combat formation as the brigade, and not the division, the Army pushed to develop balanced Brigade Combat Teams, which incorporate numerous units and MOS specialties that historically resided in the division. The result was assigning an MP platoon down to the brigade level. While still a rather small complement of MPs for a brigade sized element, it did demonstrate an appreciation for the apparent capability to make a credible transition from sustained ground combat to stability operations. Backing up this token MP force are the massed MP Battalions that would be attached to the Division level headquarters to handle post conflict stability and reconstruction operations.

A Three-Part Long Term Solution

To increase the Military Police infrastructure within the Marine Corps will involve multiple manpower actions; many of which are not palatable from a manpower perspective. Options include a significant increase in end strength, decreasing force structure in other MOS(s), or a combination of both. To recommend an increase in end-strength is frequently not a saleable bill of goods—especially since active duty end-strength increases require Congressional action. Increases in end-strength also involve other hidden costs that span the DOTMILPF.
the other hand an equally hard sell is the reduction in other sets of MOSs, in other words, creating a bill payer to support the increase in the Military Police population within the Marine Corps. The main consternation in force restructure is which capability, in the form of MOS excess, can be pared away from the active and drilling reserve force structure—especially one that is tied to requirements based upon existing or forecasted threat models.

The Marine Corps can realign organizational capabilities within the SMCR (drilling reserve system) to make up for the need in Military Police. As has been recently demonstrated by 5th Battalion, 14th Marines, provisional MP battalions can be formed in short order and deployed after a prescribed train up period commensurate with most reserve unit activations supporting OIF/OEF. The formation of provisional MP battalions clearly fulfills the immediate need for additional MPs to support mission capabilities for the joint force, but it is a temporary fix for what could be argued is a permanent problem. The Marine Corps has on numerous occasions resorted to creating provisional MP battalions, as elaborated upon earlier, but this planned ad hoc formation of MPs does not really address the standing need for a MP capabilities set and the peculiar ethos desired to perform MP missions in support of the real world three-block war. Thus the Gordian knot remains uncut.

While it can be argued effectively that the Marine Corps Reserve infantry and artillery battalions can probably best reorient into provisional MP battalions as the need arises, it does so with certain liabilities. Numerous USMCR drilling reserve units employ local law enforcement officers within their officer and enlisted ranks. As an observation, many of these Marines regardless of MOS are incredibly good Marines. Their law enforcement training, not too unlike the military training, prepares them quite well for the rigors and demands of activation. This fact predisposes infantry and artillery reserve units to being converted to provisional MP units since there is in-house expertise to train the remainder of the force. Additionally, they
receive pre-deployment training oriented on MP individual and collective training standards to
bring them up to the necessary certification levels before shipping OCONUS. However, their
ethos is part infantry or artillery and part MP. The steeping in the institutional ethos and culture
of the MP community is not as deep as their active duty full time MPs or their U.S. Army MP
Brigade brothers in arms.

The Marine Corps does not require five reserve artillery battalions. Conceptually it does;
one battalion per reserve regiment for DS artillery and two additional cannon battalions to
perform GS/GSR MEF and Division artillery fires. However, this is a capability that does not
match the most likely activation/employment options, but instead is a capability that has been
retained to address the worst-case high intensity/medium intensity combat contingency akin to a
China or North Korean conflict. A study to assess the feasibility of converting at least two
reserve artillery battalions to military police battalions is clearly needed. The current
“establishment of two security battalions with anti-terrorism/force protection and military police
capabilities” within Marine Forces Reserve is insufficient.\textsuperscript{34} Additionally, converting at least
one Marine reserve regiment of infantry to MP is also recommended. This study also needs to
visit the feasibility of entry-level MOS qualification for those two organizations in the
appropriate density of 58XX MOS mixes by rank.

It is also recommended that the active component return MPs to MEF level in the
battalion sized formations with the appropriate leadership (a MEF Provost Marshall) to make the
change stick institutionally. Moreover, home-station Marine Corps Base law enforcement
should be civilianized to the greatest extent possible and augmented by detachments from the
MEF MP Battalion in order to preserve law & order [LO] proficiency.

Another option towards addressing the apparent disparity of MPs within the active
Marine Corps component is to form habitual joint force relationships between U.S. Army MP
battalions and the standing MEFs. Coordinating this effort with the Army will require a great deal of negotiations and finesse in administering and bringing to fruition, especially since the Army will be the main manpower bill payer to stand up such a capability. While not a Marine organization, in that the Army MPs would be devoid of the institutional inculcation of Marine values and ethos, their main expertise would be MP. Therefore, by ethos and MOS qualification they would be the best force to conduct MP related missions. Using combat support Army MP Battalions would best provide for the continued needs of each MEF. Furthermore, joint integrated training at the CAX, JRTC, and other joint training exercises would test and strengthen the habitual relationships formed. This option may force the Army MP Brigades to be very busy, especially as the Army experiences zero end-strength growth. If the Army elects to utilize its limited end-strength growth towards expanding other capabilities or MOSs this option may not prove realistic.

A more distant solution drastically alters current manpower organizational structures. Understanding that the Marine Corps will continue to retain its central mission of forced entry capability from the sea based upon it’s historical amphibious experience, the Marine Corps will also gravitate towards a more formalized recognition of small wars as a mission and one with which the Marine Corps will be the lead service. Although not completely consonant, both missions could be enhanced by utilizing a revolution in organizational structure. Realizing the Marine Corps needs to shoot, move, and communicate in both missions, the Marine Corps would reorganize along functional vice MOS structures. One could argue the MAGTF already does this at the macro level, however, this option drives that functionalization down a few layers deeper.

The Marine Corps needs to create hybridized maneuver regiments and battalions, which would be organized on functional capabilities vice given a specific MOS orientation. Instead of
a homogenous MOS-centric infantry battalion, the structure would be a collection of all necessary MOSs within one battalion, but principally heavy in infantry and military police companies, with the addition of a composite combat engineer company, civil affairs and psy-ops detachments, and a truck platoon. Tactical level integration of these MOSs under the functional design of a maneuver battalion would enhance the broad capabilities set of this battalion and at the same time make better use of MOS specialization across the full spectrum of anticipated operations.

Obviously, battalion command would not be infantry-centric, although that MOS would likely continue to dominate the maneuver battalion community. The Battalion Commander, Executive Officer, and Operations Officer would likely be billets of different MOSs—theoretically enhancing the true integration of the multiple MOSs within the maneuver battalion. As a result, no longer would there be a gap in capabilities between major combat operations and stabilization/reconstruction. The same unit could function equally well based upon METL prioritization, prior-experience, leadership, and training. Reinforcing units of pure engineers and MPs would continue to find their place on the battlefield in order to weight and mass a main effort, however, the broad capabilities inherent in a infantry/MP battalion mix would be resident in one single organization. Utilizing such an organizational construct would also better facilitate the advertised concept of swarming via distributed operations. Albeit this option would pierce existing MOS primacies within the Marine Corps, it would more realistically address the tactical and operational requirements associated with the contemporary operating environment and moreover would better leverage the finite “golden hour” of transition from conventional to stabilization operations.
Conclusion

Given the lessons of history and the realities of today’s operational environment, it is fairly obvious that the Marine Corps can ill afford to ignore the proper integration of MPs within the MAGTF/GCE. The Marine Corps simply cannot take a “wait and see” perspective to this ongoing issue. Realistically the Marine Corps will need to adapt a mixture of the three options mentioned above. While modifications to force structure do take time and often face stiff opposition as a result of legacy resistance to organizational change, they are critical. Major modifications to the SMCR, a 5-10 year fix to this problem, need to start immediately. Additionally, the immediate implementation of habitual joint service relationships between the existing MEF’s (or Divisions) and specific U.S. Army combat support MP battalions, is an interim solution as the Marine Corps Reserve adapts to meet the demands of an expanded Marine MP force. Lastly, looking distant, perhaps 10-20 years, utilizing manpower innovations emphasizing functional organizational design will close the loop on the need for a broadened capability and skill set resident within an infantry battalion turned maneuver battalion. However, in the meantime, the Marine Corps will continue to apply ad hoc task organizations to successfully address the expeditionary demands for short-term Military Police expertise.

“A gun [or grunt] on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process.”35
Endnotes:


2 Charles C. Krulak, The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas, presented at National Press Club, (Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997), p. 139. Full text paragraph from which this family four word quote derived is as follows: "In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war."


4 Joint Urban Warrior 2006 conference, hereafter cited JUW 06. The author of this article attended the Joint Urban Warrior 2006, a joint exercise co-sponsored by J-9, U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Warfighting Lab, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, which took place during 2-7 April 2006 in Potomac, Maryland. The conference brought numerous subject matter experts together to discuss in an academic forum Small Wars, Urban Combat, and Counter-Insurgency. The conference was held under the auspices of “non-attribution”, therefore, when citing a source from this conference the subject matter expert will remain nameless and his/her military/government affiliation will be left unknown. Should the various SME’s from this conference publish works in the future that publicly proclaim that which was presented in the conference this article will be updated to reflect the same.

5 Ibid.

6 Thomas Connally and Lance A. McDaniel, Leaving The Tubes At Home. (Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, October 2005), pg. 31.

7 James A. Pace, Civil-Military Operations Center. (Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, June 2005), pg. 10-11.

8 Thomas L. Carriker, No More One-Trick Ponies. (Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, June 2005), pg. 33.

9 JUW 06.


15 Major Sean Cleveland, Military Police Branch, U.S. Army, member of 10th Mountain Division MP battalion, unclassified interview via email dated 14 March 2006. Also William J. Harkins Jr. Can Military Police Provide Relevant Support to a MEU Commander. (Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, July 2000), pg. 57-58.

16 Harkins.


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Based upon authors own observations while serving at Inspector-Instructor for Company L, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, located at Johnson City, Tennessee. Author served in this capacity for over three years and participated in the activation of this U.S. Marine Corps Reserve unit for operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

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Cleveland, Sean Major, Military Police Branch, U.S. Army. Member of 10th Mountain Division MP battalion. Unclassified interview via email dated 14 March 2006. Major Cleveland is currently serving in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Conference:
The author of this article attended the Joint Urban Warrior 2006, a joint exercise co-sponsored by J-9, U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Warfighting Lab, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, which took place during 2-7 April 2006 in Potomac, Maryland. The conference brought numerous subject matter experts together to discuss in an academic forum Small Wars, Urban Combat, and Counter-Insurgency. The conference was held under the auspices of “non-attribution”, therefore, when citing a source from this conference the subject matter expert will remain nameless and his/her military/government affiliation will be left unknown. Should the various SME’s from this conference publish works in the future that publicly proclaim that which was presented in the conference this article will be updated to reflect the same.

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