### Operational Command and Control Considerations for Detainee Operations

Failures by U.S. forces to properly care for their prisoners have complicated ongoing operations, tarnished the image of joint force commanders (JFCs) and gravely damaged the nation’s reputation. Unfortunately, current joint doctrine for the C2 of detainee operations is too narrowly focused and fails to provide JFCs with adequate guidance. This study examines four C2 tenets in the context of three historical case studies to illustrate shortcomings in the operational C2 of detention operations and how they can compromise the commander’s mission. The author recommends that JFCs consider: establishing a C2 structure for detainee operations that is flexible, visually simplistic and thoroughly understood; selecting a Commander, Detainee Operations based on qualities beyond experience and rank; using friendly forces information requirements to support planning and to remain ahead of potential problems; and employing information operations and public affairs to protect the joint force’s mission and the nation’s reputation.

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- EPW
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- Command and control
- C2
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OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS  
FOR JOINT DETAINEE OPERATIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Failures by U.S. forces to properly care for their prisoners have complicated ongoing operations, tarnished the image of joint force commanders (JFCs) and gravely damaged the nation’s reputation. Unfortunately, current joint doctrine for the C2 of detainee operations is too narrowly focused and fails to provide JFCs with adequate guidance. This study examines four C2 tenets in the context of three historical case studies to illustrate shortcomings in the operational C2 of detention operations and how they can compromise the commander’s mission. The author recommends that JFCs consider: establishing a C2 structure for detainee operations that is flexible, visually simplistic and thoroughly understood; selecting a Commander, Detainee Operations based on qualities beyond experience and rank; using friendly forces information requirements to support planning and to remain ahead of potential problems; and employing information operations and public affairs to protect the joint force’s mission and the nation’s reputation.
The President today asked the Defense Department to invite military observers from five neutral countries to study the latest prison camp uprising. He suggested that Sweden, Switzerland, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia be asked to send high-ranking military observers. The move was designed to bring before the world the true facts about the prison situation, which has resulted in loss of prestige for the United States and an opportunity for a new anti-American propaganda campaign.¹

At first glance, one might believe that they were reading a contemporary account of prisoner abuse committed by U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan, when in fact these words were published by the New York Times in 1952 and described the situation at the Koje-do prisoner of war (POW) camp during the Korean War. The circumstances that commanders found themselves in and the consequences the nation bore as a result of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib have much in common with those at Koje-do some 50 years earlier. Although failures in leadership, planning, and logistics contributed to the botched detainee operations in Korea and Iraq, flawed command and control (C2) also played a major part in actions that resulted in public outrage across the globe, jeopardized the commander’s mission, and severely damaged U.S. credibility. The deficiencies in C2 organization that contributed to the breakdown of U.S. POW operations will be considered using case studies from the Korean War, Operation DESERT STORM (ODS), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

To be sure, detainee operations represent but a single facet among many that operational commanders must consider; however, in an age where the media and other entities can quickly and decisively sway global public opinion, effective operational C2 of detainee operations is vital to the success of current and future joint operations. The guidance contained in current joint doctrine is too narrowly focused and fails to sufficiently address operational C2 considerations for detainee operations and does not adequately consider the dynamics of modern warfare. The corrosive effects of these shortcomings can introduce flaws into the conduct of detainee operations that may not manifest themselves in the short
term, but over time they can undermine the commander’s position and cause serious damage to the joint force’s mission and the nation’s reputation.

The unpredictable nature of current and future conflicts demands that detainee operations figure prominently among a JFC’s C2 considerations; to do otherwise invites consequences that can jeopardize the joint force’s mission. This examination of C2 considerations for detainee operations begins with an introduction to terms and concepts followed by a brief review of existing doctrine and theory relevant to detainee operations. Next, an overview of C2 theory provides the background supporting a review of three historical case studies. These cases, as well as a brief discussion of recent developments in joint doctrine are foundational to the follow-on analysis and conclusions that illuminate detainee C2 shortcomings. Finally, recommendations will be offered for consideration by JFCs as they consider future C2 arrangements for detainee operations.

Detainee operations are a specialized field of effort that may be unfamiliar to many military professionals. Accordingly, a brief review of terms and concepts that describe these operations is in order. Over the course of any armed conflict, responsibility for prisoners begins at the moment individuals are captured and ends with their repatriation or transfer to the custody of another power. Depending upon the conflict, the length of time prisoners are held can vary from months (as in ODS) to years (as in OIF). Within DOD, the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for the military’s detainee program. At the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) level, the Provost Marshal (PM) is the special staff officer responsible for coordinating Military Police (MP) assets and operations. The PM section provides staff advice in support of detainee operations to include coordinating all logistics requirements. In turn, the ASCC is responsible for conducting detainee operations
supporting the joint force. Due to their unique training, qualifications, and force structure, the Army’s MP force is assigned to conduct detainee operations across the spectrum of conflict. Domestic and international law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and DOD policy govern the manner in which U.S. forces act toward detainees. Specifically, DOD policy directs that from the moment of capture, all detainees shall be treated humanely at all times during all armed conflicts, however characterized, and in all other military operations. Note that no relationship exists between a detainee’s classification and the treatment to which they are entitled. Consideration for the defense and humane treatment of detainees always takes precedence over the chaos of battle and the need to obtain intelligence.

Detainee operations are a complicated undertaking with potential to adversely impact the conduct of operations at all levels of war. The reality that the operation of detention facilities will be conducted under the scrutiny of international media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a factor that JFCs cannot afford to ignore. Past experience has shown that transgressions involving the handling of prisoners are quickly picked by NGOs and the media alike, resulting in situations that can spiral quickly beyond the JFC’s control.

The focus of this investigation centers upon operational C2 structure and key relationships that exist among the JFC, his staff, and the Commander, Detainee Operations (CDO). Joint Publication (JP) 3-63, Detainee Operations is the primary doctrinal guidance used by JFC’s for operating detention and interrogation facilities. The Army’s FM 3-19.40, Internment and Resettlement Operations is the relevant service doctrine that provides direction to MP forces. As a result of the Abu Ghraib scandal in late 2003, both joint and
service doctrines were extensively revised in order to prevent future occurrences of prisoner abuse by U.S. forces. Specifically, guidance for operational C2 of detention operations was provided in an effort to “prepare U.S. forces to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all categories of detainees in accordance with applicable U.S. law, the law of war, and applicable U.S. policy.” While these changes to doctrine offer some incremental improvements, they continue to fall short in their purpose of providing the JFC (and his staff) with comprehensive guidance on establishing C2 of detainee operations.

Operational C2 theory and doctrine lie at the heart of exercising effective command and control. The inherent complexity of modern warfare exerts ever-increasing importance on C2. It is not uncommon for a JFC to be responsible for coordinating the efforts of thousands of personnel from multiple Services, government agencies, multinational partners, and non-governmental organizations. The cornerstone of effective C2 is unity of command, which places all forces and resources used in an operation under the authority of a single commander. JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States goes further to state that, “C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command.” Thus, it stands to reason that a breakdown in C2 can seriously jeopardize a joint force’s ability to accomplish its mission.

Effective C2 relies upon a short list of tenets that can be found in joint doctrine and in related literature. Over time, these fundamentals have become widely accepted in defining the characteristics of C2 and evaluating its effectiveness. Although all of these tenets will not be addressed here, those most relevant to this study will be discussed. First among these is simplicity. According to joint doctrine, unity of command is best maintained through an uncomplicated chain of command that establishes well-defined command relationships and
clearly delineates responsibilities. Span of control is another important criterion advocated in joint doctrine. It affects the reach of a JFC’s authority and varies depending upon the mission and his ability to command and control the action required. Span of control is relevant to many factors, including the number and diversity of subordinates, C2 network capabilities, number of activities and objectives, range of weapon systems, the physical area controlled, and force capabilities (among others).

*Continuity*, while not mentioned in joint doctrine, is a C2 tenet advanced by Dr. Milan Vego, a widely recognized expert in joint operations. According to Vego, a C2 organization should undertake at most only incremental changes prior to or during an operation. Only in the face of dramatic and unforeseen developments should significant changes in C2 occur. This applies not only to C2 structure, but also to those personnel in key leadership positions. Continuity is crucial to effective coordination of forces and resources and plays a vital role in maintaining productive relationships between commanders and their subordinates at all echelons. *Flexibility* is a C2 fundamental that is considered important in joint doctrine and is also promoted by Vego. Simply put, flexibility is the characteristic that enables a C2 organization to adjust to changing conditions in the operational environment without losing effectiveness. It is achieved through decentralized C2 by appropriately delegating specific and well-defined functions and responsibilities. It is through the lens of these four tenets: simplicity, span of control, continuity, and flexibility that the operational C2 of detainee operations will be examined using three historical case studies.

The case studies considered in this examination are derived from the Korean War (1952), Operation DESERT STORM (1991), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003), because their scale and relevance to modern warfare reflect the most challenging scenarios a
JFC is likely to face. Additionally, they contain both the common and unique challenges that a JFC may have to contend with while conducting detainee operations in a potentially unsupportive information environment.

**The Korean War**

Koje Island (Koje-do) is located some 40 miles off the southern coast of Korea. Following the Inchon landings, the JFC directed the construction of its main POW camp on Koje-do to eliminate the risk to his forces posed by multiple evacuations of large numbers of enemy prisoners in-country. The JFC also believed that confining the prisoners on an island would impede their ability to escape while increasing the safety of his rear areas.

The JFC, General Matthew Ridgeway, was dual-hatted as the Commander In Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and CINC U.S. Forces Far East (CINCFE). His land forces commander was the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK), Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. EUSAK was a combined force of some 550,000 men that was responsible for conducting both the ground war and detainee operations on the Korean peninsula. The 2nd Logistical Command, commanded by a brigadier general, executed the POW mission on Koje-do under the C2 structure shown in Figure 1 with an assigned force of over 9,000 men (some 6,000 less than requested). The camp itself, designed to hold no more than 38,400 prisoners, was a revolving door for

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**Figure 1. C2 of Korean War Detainee Operations**

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commanders. During its two and a half years of existence, Koje-do had no fewer than 13 commanders, none of them with POW experience.\textsuperscript{12}

The POW load was manageable until the combat operations following the Inchon landings caused the collapse of communist forces trapped between the pincers of CINCUNC’s army. The number of captured personnel exploded from fewer than 1,000 to over 137,000 in just four months.\textsuperscript{13} The JFC’s belief that hostilities were nearly at an end, massive overcrowding, and a guard force with insufficient training and numbers contributed to a steady decline of conditions within the camp. These problems were compounded by the Geneva Convention’s failure to anticipate an ideologically driven prison population, and the U.S. force’s total lack of experience and doctrine for dealing with tens of thousands of hostile captives.\textsuperscript{14} Hard-core communist agitators’ exploitation of these worsening conditions led CG EUSAK to appoint a brigadier general as camp commander to restore order in February 1952. Concern over complaints voiced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and unfavorable reporting by the media limited the commander’s options and effectively ruled out the use of force to regain control. Events came to a head on 7 May, when the prisoners seized the camp commander for three days and negotiated the signing of a list of demands and admissions crafted to humiliate the U.S. and undermine the UN mission. The Army’s (and Washington’s) efforts to contain the damage caused by the release of these documents to the public were ineffective and likely prolonged the war. As a result of the crisis, the Korea Communication Zone (KCOMZ) command was established in July to relieve EUSAK of the POW mission. KCOMZ’s commander was eventually able to acquire the resources needed to weed out the agitators and regain control of the POW population.\textsuperscript{15}
**Operation DESERT STORM**

U.S. forces operated five POW camps in Saudi Arabia from January through May 1991. This relatively short operation is often touted as one of the best detainee operations in modern history. General Norman Schwartzkopf was the JFC in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) and was also the Commander in Chief (CINCCENT) and the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC). Third Army (ARCENT) served as the ASCC and had Executive Agent (EA) responsibility for conducting detainee operations, although staff responsibilities resided with the CINCCENT Provost Marshal. Using a C2 organization strikingly similar to EUSAK (see figure 2), ARCENT also assigned responsibility for detainee operations under its Support Command and gave an Army Reserve Unit, the 800th MP Brigade (BDE), theater responsibility for conducting the POW mission.

Supporting forces, such as Military Intelligence and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) detachments and a Field Hospital were attached to the brigade, whose size swelled to more than 7,300 personnel, nearly twice the number normally commanded by a brigadier general. ARCENT’s responsibilities in the KTO were highly complex, as it simultaneously served as the Army’s component command, theater support command, and numbered field army. It was comprised of two corps with nearly 334,000 active duty and reserve soldiers.
Initial plans assumed that approximately 4,000 detainees would be captured within the first six months of the war, but a drastic revision of initial estimates predicted that 100,000 detainees would be captured within the first week alone. Fortunately, sufficient time and forces were available to accommodate the nearly 87,000 personnel captured by coalition forces. Though large, the prisoner population was compliant and posed no problem to the guard force. The last prisoner in U.S. custody was transferred to the control of the Saudi Arabian government on 2 May 1991, a mere 105 days from the beginning of hostilities.20

**Operation IRAQI FREEDOM**

U.S. MP forces operated several facilities across the Iraq theater of operations (ITO) that accommodated both security and criminal detainees in addition to POWs. Security detainees, often rounded up in large numbers, were those Iraqi citizens held by U.S. forces for suspected involvement in the insurgency that followed the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Due to a lack of facilities, POWs, security detainees, and criminals were often held in the same location.21

General Tommy Franks, commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), designated the Third Army commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, as his Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). In addition to his responsibilities as the ASCC, General McKiernan was now responsible for planning and conducting all land operations in Iraq with a force of approximately 173,000 troops from 23 nations.22 CFLCC had what was widely believed to be very best staff in the Army and had been focused on planning and operations in Iraq for a year and a half.23 Following the conclusion of hostilities, General Franks redeployed the CFLCC because he felt that a Corps-level JTF could handle what he believed to be a relatively short post-conflict phase followed by a redeployment of U.S.
forces. On 15 June, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) was established as the new operational-level command in Iraq using the Army’s V Corps headquarters as its core, and the newly appointed Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (previously the commander of First Armored Division) as its commanding general. Prior to the establishment of CJTF-7, V Corps had carried out a purely tactical mission and had a much smaller, more junior, and relatively inexperienced staff than did the CFLCC. CFLCC planned detainee operations in the ITO using ODS as a template. After CFLCC redeployed, ARCENT (the ASCC) retained operational control (OPCON) of the Army’s the 800th MP BDE (a theater asset) and placed them under CJTF-7’s tactical control (TACON) as shown in figure 3. Under CJTF-7, the 800th MP BDE’s commander reported directly to CJTF-7’s deputy commander. The robust insurgency that CJTF-7 found itself in was completely unexpected and resulted in a demand for intelligence that spawned a rapid surge in the detainee population. From late May through the end of November, the prisoner population skyrocketed from about 600 to over 10,000. It is from this environment, hauntingly similar to Koje-do, that the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal arose to jeopardize the coalition’s mission in Iraq and to seriously damage U.S. credibility worldwide.
Recent Developments in Joint Doctrine

In the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, joint doctrine has strived to provide JFCs with guidance that will help them avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. A key feature of this guidance is the creation of a Commander, Detainee Operations (CDO) position within the joint force C2 organization. Figure 4 depicts notional C2 relationships between the JFC, the CDO, and his staff in the most recent joint doctrine. Less clear, however, is the C2 relationship between the CDO and the JFC’s subordinate commanders or the ASCC. In fact, joint doctrine does little to improve the clarity of these relationships by going on to say that CDO can report directly to the JFC or to a designated functional or service component commander. Although recent joint doctrine defines the CDO’s responsibilities fairly well, the location of the commander responsible for conducting detention operations in the JFC’s C2 organization and his underlying support relationships remain as ambiguous and ad hoc as they ever were. Now that a historical context has been established and current developments in joint doctrine revealed, these cases will be examined through the lens of widely accepted tenets in effective command and control.

Figure 3. Notional Detainee Operations C2 within the JOA\textsuperscript{25}
Simplicity

In both the Korean War and ODS cases, C2 organization of detainee operations was fairly simple and straightforward. The C2 relationships between the JFCs and the commanders operating prison facilities appear to have complied with extant doctrine. Despite a seemingly uncomplicated C2 construct, JFC oversight left much to be desired.

Having a visually simple C2 structure does not rule out the possibility that it can be compromised by the complexity of the underlying relationships required to support it. The rigors of combat and shifting priorities can deteriorate these relationships, causing them to fracture. In both cases, the joint force headquarters staff lacked the training and experience needed for effective detainee operations planning.\(^\text{27}\) Worth noting is a habit of benign neglect that JFCs have historically accorded detention operations which contributes to a lack of awareness concerning them. Indeed, the template for the disastrous detention operations in OIF was lifted from the success that was ODS.\(^\text{28}\)

Unlike the Korean War and ODS, simplicity was clearly overlooked when forming detainee operations C2 for OIF. The most significant C2 issue involved the command relationship between ARCENT, CJTF-7 and the 800\(^\text{th}\) MP BDE. Given the fact that CJTF-7 was the operational level headquarters for the ITO, its C2 relationship with the 800\(^\text{th}\) MP BDE should have been one of OPCON, not TACON. When investigating the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, General Anthony R. Jones found that the 800\(^\text{th}\) MP BDE’s TACON relationship to CJTF-7 complicated C2 of detainee operations and resulted in “disparate support from the CJTF-7 staff, lower priority in meeting resource needs for detention facilities, and the lack of intrusive, aggressive oversight of the unit by CJTF-7 leadership.”\(^\text{29}\) The C2 relationship between CJTF-7 and the 800\(^\text{th}\) MP BDE was further complicated by the
command relationship that existed between the CJTF-7’s deputy commander and the 800\textsuperscript{th} MP BDE commander. This relationship marked a significant departure from joint doctrine, which does not normally place forces under the command of the JFC’s deputy.\textsuperscript{30}

To be fair, CJTF-7’s departures from joint doctrine were probably undertaken by what was perceived to be operational necessity in the face of extraordinary circumstances. The CJTF-7 staff had to operate at one-third of its planned strength with a severely under-resourced MP force in what was predicted to be a relatively non-hostile environment. The added burden of providing direct support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) further drained the resources of CJTF-7’s staff. However, the complexities in C2 that arose from this situation and their consequences demonstrate the hazards posed by operating with an overly complicated C2 organization.\textsuperscript{31}

**Span of Control**

In the Korean War case, the JFC granted EUSAK a broad span of control. The demands of waging a bitter ground war combined with the challenges of controlling 137,000 hostile prisoners in his rear area severely strained his span of control and shattered his C2 organization. The two brigadier generals under EUSAK responsible for conducting detainee operations were overwhelmed by the challenges of controlling a hostile prison population, and their failure entailed grave strategic consequences for the nation.\textsuperscript{32}

During ODS, the JFC was far more effective in the way he managed his subordinates’ span of control. In his C2 organization, he placed responsibility for detainee operations under his ASCC, which in turn aligned under his Support Command, headed by a major general. The JFC retained JFLCC responsibilities within his own headquarters, enabling him and his staff to focus on the ground war while the ASCC commander concentrated on
providing support. These decisions, in conjunction with the operation’s short duration, compliant prisoners, and their expeditious transfer to Saudi control contributed greatly to the success of detainee operations during ODS.

As in the Korean War case, the JFC’s failure to properly manage his subordinates’ span of control contributed to CJTF-7’s inability to exercise effective C2 of detainee operations. Nowhere was this demonstrated more clearly within CJTF-7 than the span of control exercised by the Deputy commanding general. Although overall responsibility for detainee operations was assigned to the C-3 (Operations) and delegated to the Provost Marshal, the JFC made his deputy commander directly responsible for the oversight of all brigades assigned or TACON to CJTF-7, including the 800th MP BDE. When one considers that CJTF-7 was operating with only one-third of its authorized manpower, struggling with a violent insurgency, and tasked with providing direct support to the CPA’s ongoing stability and support operations, it is clear that the Deputy CG’s span of control far exceeded his capacity and ultimately isolated the JFC from his detention operations.

Continuity

Continuity has several dimensions that are relevant to C2, two of which are continuity in personnel and continuity in policy. During the Korean War, the former provided fertile ground for escalation of the prisoner crisis, while the latter sowed seeds of confusion that came to fruition at Abu Ghraib. During Koje-do’s brief two and one-half year existence, it had no fewer than 13 commanders. Such rapid turnover in leadership resulted in poor communication between the JFC and camp commanders and ineffective oversight of the camp itself. It is little wonder that the crisis at Koje-do was able to take root and escalate as it did before control of the situation was lost.

Comment [SLP5]: CJTF-7 remained in the direct chain of command of the U.S. Central Command, but also was charged with a direct support role to the CPA. Command relationships of subordinate tactical commands previously under V Corps remained as previously outlined in Operational Orders. Therefore, the divisions' and Corps' separate brigades, which included the 205th MI Brigade, remained under the CJTF-7. The level of authority and responsibilities of a command of this magnitude is normally vested in a four-star level Army Service Component Command under a Regional Combatant Commander.

I purposely neglected this because this factor was beyond the control of the JFC, making the CCDR responsible for this issue.

Comment [SLP6]: Start here... then on to conclusions!!!
Operational C2 of detainee operations during ODS displayed excellent continuity. Once force structure adjustments were made and the C2 organization established, continuity in policy and leadership were maintained throughout the duration of the operation. Without question, this factor contributed significantly to the success of the POW mission.

During OIF, continuity in C2 broke down on many levels, and with disastrous results. The hasty transition of ITO responsibility from CFLCC to CJTF-7 caused problems with detainee operational C2 as previously discussed. Also of significant relevance were changes to detainee operations C2 policy that were promulgated by numerous fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) by CJTF-7. Of particularly interest were those FRAGOs pertaining to the command relationship between the 800th MP BDE and the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) BDE, but these lacked sufficient oversight due to competing priorities. 35

Flexibility

During ODS, the JFC’s C2 of detainee operations demonstrated impressive flexibility before combat operations began. When revised intelligence estimates showed that 100,000 prisoners were likely to be captured within the first week of hostilities, the JFC responded decisively by acquiring the additional force structure needed to accommodate these additional prisoners. The JFC’s decisions were based on sound intelligence and helped ensure his MP forces were equal to their task. What is unknown is whether or not his C2 organization could have withstood an unexpected escalation or extension of hostilities.

During both the Korean War and OIF, C2 of detainee operations became flexible only in the wake of disaster and in response to international condemnation. In the Korean War, the JFC’s C2 organization utterly failed to adapt to extensive changes in the operational environment that were evidenced by a sudden and massive increase in the number of
prisoners and their increasing hostility. In much the same way, detainee operations C2 during OIF failed to adapt to an escalating insurgency and fractured under stress caused by ineffective oversight, chronic under-resourcing, and a steadily rising prisoner population.

As in the ODS case, the key to exercising flexibility is to do so before disaster occurs. In an unrelated case, one JFC did so in 2007 and changed his C2 organization to better support C2 of detainee operations. In this case, existing joint and service doctrine offered little guidance to JFCs for dealing with a rising insurgency within their detention facilities. Realizing that his current C2 organization was ill-equipped to deal with the problem, he appointed a detainee operations commander who grasped the underlying cause of insurgencies and possessed the creativity to undertake an innovative approach to the problem. The results were a resounding success. By acting decisively and getting ahead of the potential crisis within his detention system, he was able to maintain operational and informational control of events as they unfolded. Within a year, the insurgency inside his camps was quelled and incidents of violence decreased from 10,178 to only 178.36

**Recommendations and Conclusions**

The C2 organization for detention operations should be as simplistic as possible. As noted earlier, a visually simple diagram is a good start, but falls short of assuring success. JFCs should take the extra step of ensuring that the critical relationships that underpin the complex administrative and logistic requirements are established and the policies that support them are in place.

When an operation is apparently small in scale, unlikely to suffer dramatic change, or short in duration, guidance in current joint doctrine will likely suffice. However, should the nature of the operation show indications of changing significantly in size, scope (includes
criminal or other types of non-combat detainees), or character (insurgency, short vs. long-
term, etc.), consideration of factors beyond those described in joint doctrine should be
considered so that the CDO’s span of control is not compromised.

Recent revisions to doctrinal framework make CDO selection essential to effective
C2 of detainee operations. A CDO candidate should not only possess the required
qualifications, but also have the JFC’s full trust and confidence. Recent experience shows
that joint doctrine should invite the consideration of a variety of factors for CDO selection,
not just experience and rank. General Patraeus’ deliberate selection of a reserve Marine
Corps major general to head detention operations in Iraq broke the mold for selecting CDOs
and conclusively demonstrated the importance of a JFC not only being acutely aware of what
was happening inside his detention facilities, but also the importance of choosing the right
commander.37 Once selected, the CDO should be retained to the extent that continuity of
operations is maintained and the JFC is satisfied with the CDO’s position within the joint
force’s C2 organization.

These cases have shown a propensity for the C2 of detention operations to remain
fixed despite drastic changes in the operational environment. Friendly forces information
requirements (FFIR) should be made capable of providing the JFC with information needed
to maintain the flexibility of his C2 organization in the face of unforeseen challenges that
could jeopardize the operation of detention facilities. Doing so will enable the JFC and his
staff to effectively plan for and solve emerging C2 issues before they become crises.

There is likely no faster way for a JFC to lose control of detainee operations than to
have the media or an NGO make public allegations of detainee abuse. Treatment of
prisoners has always been and will continue to be of high interest to the media and NGOs.
Because the U.S. receives significantly more than its fair share of scrutiny in these matters, JFCs should remain sensitive to the status of their prisoners. Accordingly, the JFC’s Public Affairs should be telling the world about how well our prisoners are treated while those personnel responsible for conducting Information Operations maintain vigilance and act aggressively to protect the JFC’s (and the nation’s) interests.

In an age where diverse actors can use information power to quickly and decisively shape public opinion on a massive scale, JFCs cannot afford to ignore problems or repeat mistakes made by their predecessors. The risk to international and coalition support that underpins nearly all joint operations is simply too great. Indeed, several commanders have learned to their regret that one of the quickest ways to erode public support is failing to properly care for their prisoners.

At present, current joint doctrine has made important, but modest steps in addressing its past shortcomings; however, there is still much to do. Critical gaps remain in the detainee operations construct, such as the roles, responsibilities, and linkages between the CDO, Provost Marshal and the ASCC. Until joint doctrine addresses these complexities in a more comprehensive way, sound application of C2 tenets can help JFCs to more effectively anticipate potential problems and avoid the consequences of failed detainee operations.
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