ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT: LEVERAGING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by
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2009

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# Achieving Unity of Effort: Leveraging Interagency Cooperation Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

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  America’s wars cannot be won simply by applying lethal effects. The U.S. military can defeat any adversary using lethal effects to gain, clear and hold key terrain or cities faster than at any other time in history. However, winning the war includes winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population and requires a different kind of effect—one that involves non-lethal or soft power effects. Although this battle to win the hearts and minds of the local populace is not new, U.S. Government (USG) agencies have had to quickly integrate, in an ad hoc manner, in Afghanistan and Iraq and relearn some of the hard lessons. Executive Branch agencies including the Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have worked in stovepipes to develop their own core competencies with minimal cooperation. To understand the consequences of staying with the status quo one only has to look at the early days in Afghanistan and Iraq and continuing challenges. Given, these experiences, senior military and civilian leaders alike have called for a “whole of government” approach. This thesis rediscovers how interagency cooperation developed from earlier Japan and Vietnam experiences and their lessons learned to offer suggestions for the future relationship between the DOD and USAID. While each agency has made efforts toward improving cooperation, these agencies must work even closer together to systematically integrate efforts via a formal interagency exchange program. Cooperation during peace builds institutional relationships that can be a powerful lever to help achieve unity of effort during war.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT: LEVERAGING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), by MAJ Quy H. Nguyen, 114 pages.

America’s wars cannot be won simply by applying lethal effects. The U.S. military can defeat any adversary using lethal effects to gain, clear and hold key terrain or cities faster than at any other time in history. However, winning the war includes winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population and requires a different kind of effect--one that involves non-lethal or soft power effects. Although this battle to win the hearts and minds of the local populace is not new, U.S. Government (USG) agencies have had to quickly integrate, in an ad hoc manner, in Afghanistan and Iraq and relearn some of the hard lessons. Executive Branch agencies including the Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have worked in stovepipes to develop their own core competencies with minimal cooperation. To understand the consequences of staying with the status quo one only has to look at the early days in Afghanistan and Iraq and continuing challenges. Given, these experiences, senior military and civilian leaders alike have called for a “whole of government” approach. This thesis rediscovers how interagency cooperation developed from earlier Japan and Vietnam experiences and their lessons learned to offer suggestions for the future relationship between the DOD and USAID. While each agency has made efforts toward improving cooperation, these agencies must work even closer together to systematically integrate efforts via a formal interagency exchange program. Cooperation during peace builds institutional relationships that can be a powerful lever to help achieve unity of effort during war.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is motivated by a belief that I can make a difference by contributing to the wealth of thoughts and ideas already proposed to achieve unity of effort, both pre-conflict and during stability operation. This principle has been considered and discussed by many but has always seemed just beyond reach. Perhaps one more thought or idea will make the difference. After all, it is not their quantity or even their quality that will be the final measure of interagency unity of effort. It is the actual implementation of long-term cooperation efforts by the USG agencies that really count.

Secondly, this thesis is made possible because of the committee’s insightful guidance and thoughtful direction. Their subtle reminders to persevere and not so subtle constructive feedback made the difference in how the research was shaped and written. A debt of gratitude also goes out to the 20D SGA for his substantive contribution of material. The professionalism, expertise and patience required and displayed by the entire instructor team are deeply appreciated--thank you for an awesome year of learning, both about the profession of arms and about myself. You truly are the masters of your craft. Collectively, you have chiseled my thoughts and strengthened my hands.

Finally, a heartfelt gratitude goes out to my family and those individuals I get the privilege to call friends. It has been said that in viewing art the first impression or reading may attract the attention of the casual viewer; however, it is not until the second reading that the true message actually emerges. In terms of a second reading, the credit for accomplishing this thesis actually belongs to my family and dear friends as they ultimately provided the “superhuman” motivation to push through the fog. Thank you for sharing your time with me and offering your precious thoughts. You have my heart.
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
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<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We need to do everything we can to ensure the PRTs can do their work. When we succeed, the Iraqis can run the country themselves and we can go home. We are, in a sense, the exit strategy.¹

— Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) member, anonymous

There must be improved unity of effort between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This study seeks to improve interagency cooperation to achieve unity of effort between the DOD and USAID, both pre-conflict and during stability operations. First, the successful attributes of interagency cooperation during post-WWII occupation of Japan, and the successful pacification of Vietnam’s countryside during the Vietnam conflict are used as a basis to understand how to conduct interagency cooperation. Second, the study traces developments in interagency cooperation, including the initial obstacles faced, between the DOD and USAID during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Third, the importance of cooperation between the DOD and USAID for future operations and conflicts is explored. Fourth, the study highlights the most significant obstacles facing the DOD and USAID’s cooperative efforts in the current environment. Finally, to achieve lasting unity of effort between USAID and DOD, the study concludes with a recommendation for an interagency policy directive that includes a formal interagency exchange program.

Background

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs preparation of joint doctrine “to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint
operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations.”

Joint doctrine is considered authoritative and “applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands and the services.”

It is expected joint doctrine “will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”

Joint Publications (JPs) 3-0, 3-08, 3-16, and 5-0 stress the critical importance of joint and interagency unified actions across the full spectrum of military operations, including stability operations.

Unity of Command versus Unity of Effort

According to JP 3-0 there are twelve Principles of Joint Operations, as seen in Figure 1 below. The most important principle for a military organization is unity of command. Unity of command puts the responsibility of an operation under the direction and control of a single commander and his chain of command by providing clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships. Applying this principle consistently allows military organizations to minimize the confusion and lack of clarity that can accompany a complex operation by having direction and intent from one authoritative source. For a joint and multinational operation, that authoritative source is typically the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or unified commander. Subordinate commanders are expected to follow and carry out actions via decentralized execution to meet the JFC’s intent. The degree of control will depend on the nature of the operation or task, including the willingness of the commander to take on risk in order to achieve mission success.
While this critical principle works well for a military operation involving only military forces, it does not always apply effectively when such operations involve non-DoD agencies, as these agencies do not fall under the military chain of command. Without unity of command it is harder to ensure unified actions and synchronization from all agencies involved to meet the JFC’s intent. Unified actions are “planned and conducted by joint force commanders in accordance with guidance and direction received from the President and Secretary of Defense, multinational organizations, and military commanders . . . to achieve common objectives.”

Because USAID does not fall under the DOD’s chain of command or vice versa, DOD and USAID have a coordinating relationship vice a direct command relationship. This makes unity of effort toward a common objective inherently harder to achieve. The reason for this varies, but clearly each organization or agency brings its own perspective and cultures, tactics, techniques, procedures, competencies, and agendas. Any one of these differences can potentially work with or against the overall logical lines of operation. The DOD’s core competency, for example, is to create lethal effects that achieve objectives in order to meet the commander’s ultimate intent. USAID’s core competency, on the other hand, is to create non-lethal effects by implementing reconstruction and rebuilding programs in order to meet the intent of the DOS and/or the U.S. Ambassador in a particular country. Therefore, it is essential for all parties to coordinate planned actions to maximize unity of effort, and to ensure the military’s lethal actions do not inadvertently counter the rebuilding efforts of the USAID. According to Major General Michael Tucker, Chief of Operations in Afghanistan, the problem with the interagency isn’t lack of effort or initiative. The problem has to do with “cross
integration of stovepiped efforts.” The JFC and subordinate commander’s central role is
to try to enhance cross integration of the stovepiped efforts of each of the agencies in the
theater of operation in order to achieve unity of effort.

Figure 1. Principles of Joint Operations

The complexity and inherent risks associated with unity of effort are numerous,
especially when an operation involves multiple governmental agencies, non-
governmental agencies and multinational forces. As important as unity of effort is, it is
not currently listed as a principle for joint operations in joint doctrine (see Figure 1). It does, however, receive mention in Appendix A, paragraph 6, Unity of Command, as being paramount as “unity of command may not be possible” during multinational operations and interagency coordination. Thus, to be effective the agencies must strive to achieve unity of effort through better interagency cooperation in order to reduce the risks associated with these complex operations.

This study focuses on the DOD’s relationship with USAID due to USAID’s important capabilities, role and impact during stability operations. During stability operations the need to successfully employ soft power using non-kinetic effects can be more important than the employment of kinetic effects. USAID is a key partner with the DOD as part of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in both Afghanistan and Iraq, making it vital to improve cooperation in order to maximize unity of effort. A USAID Foreign Service PRT member captured the essence of why achieving unity of effort in stability operation is “paramount” after six years in Iraq; “We need to do everything we can to ensure the PRTs can do their work. When we succeed, the Iraqis can run the country themselves and we can go home. We are, in a sense, the exit strategy.”

Regarding interagency cooperation and coordination with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, guidance from JP 3-0 provides a degree of flexibility for the interagency and military to follow the lead of other governmental agencies: “... other agencies may be lead effort during some operations with DOD providing support; however, U.S. military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.”

5
Further, JP 3-0 points out that presidential directives guide participation by all U.S. civilian and military agencies in operations requiring civil-military integration. In December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 designates the Department of State (DOS) as the lead agency

(i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and
(ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Presented with the presidential directive, DOS established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was “given a mandate by the National Security Council Principals to be the focal point for the U.S. Government on stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.” While this research will focus specifically on interagency cooperation with USAID, it is important to note USAID is an agency that falls directly under the DOS (see Figure 2); thus any discussion of USAID will likely have an implicit reference to the DOS. The DOS and USAID share a common mission statement to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.”
The expanded mission statement speaks to the alleviation of human suffering to mitigate the threat of extremism and destabilization of individual countries while promoting conflict resolution and prevention, human rights and democracy, and “countering international terrorism that threatens vital U.S. interests at home and abroad.” Other notable aims from the mission statement include “support[ing] the spread and adoption of democratic ideals worldwide, promoting fundamental universal values such as religious freedom and worker rights, and helping create a more secure, stable, and prosperous world economy through accountable governance.” Although The DOS and USAID share a common mission statement, USAID is an agency with
USAID and DOD Overview

Thus, USAID is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. As of March 2009, the total estimated number of USAID employees stood at 2,417. USAID administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance programs and acts as the lead Federal agency for U.S. foreign disaster assistance. It manages a network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic growth, encourages political freedom and good governance. Response to natural and manmade disasters is one of its primary missions. The agency’s authority and responsibilities differ from that of the DOD (see Appendix A). USAID developmental assistance is authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, Title II, also known as “Food for Peace.” Led by the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, USAID is the principal agency charged with coordination the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

The DOD’s authority and responsibility is derived from the National Security Act of 1947. Its authority includes the following: (1) Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. (2) Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests. (3) Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States. The Commander in Chief is the President of the United States. To carry out its responsibility, the operational chain of command flows from the President, through the
Secretary of Defense to Combatant Commanders and their subunified commands and fielded forces. Its administrative responsibility to train, organize and equip is authorized under U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{19} DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is DOD’s primary point of contact under the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**USAID and DOD Organizational Structures**

USAID consists of a central HQ staff in the Washington, DC area and a number of overseas missions, offices, and regional organizations (see figure 3). USAID has four geographic bureaus in Africa; Asia and the Near East; Europe and Eurasia; and Latin America and the Caribbean. These offices have responsibility for the planning, formulation, and management of U.S. economic development and/or supporting assistance programs in their areas. There are three types of country organizations; USAID Missions, Offices of USAID Representative, and USAID Sections of the embassy.\textsuperscript{20} USAID has four staff offices and five functional bureaus responsible for its overall policy formulation, program management, planning, interagency and intra-agency coordination, resource allocation, training programs, and liaison with Congress.
International disaster assistance activities are coordinated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (see figure 4).\textsuperscript{21} OFDA manages a Crisis Management Center to coordinate disaster assistance operations when necessary. OFDA Regional Advisors have the required secret or SCI security clearances and work regularly with the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGO
representatives as well as senior officials in U.S. embassies and USAID missions and offices. This preexisting network allows the USAID advisors unique access to support that may not readily available to the military.

Figure 4. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OFDA has developed a response capability called Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) as a method of providing rapid response assistance to international disasters. DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to international disasters. The structure of a DART is such that it can grow or shrink based on the size, complexity, type and location of the disaster, and the needs of the embassy and/or USAID mission and the affected country.23

The DOD consists of the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force. The Commandant of the Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Field Activities, Defense Agencies and Unified Combatant Commands (COCOMS) all report to the Secretary of Defense (see figure 5). There are six geographic COCOMS and four functional COCOMS responsible for joint operational planning and mission execution within their theater of responsibility. The geographic COCOMS include Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM). It should be noted the sixth geographic COCOM, Africa Command (AFRICOM), was recently stood up, but has not been updated in Figure 5 below. These geographic COCOMS cover vast areas of the globe and under the authority and responsibility of a single Joint Force Commander (JFC). For instance, the CENTCOM area covers both Afghanistan and Iraq and is currently under the command of General David Petraeus. The functional COCOMS provide capabilities typically in support of the geographic JFC and consist of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). For example, space capabilities are provided by STRATCOM while military airlift capabilities are provided by TRANSCOM.

Figure 5. Department of Defense

USAID and DOD Capabilities and Core Competencies

USAID’s core competencies (see Appendix B), have a focus on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. It is designed to provide assistance in emergency situations all over the world by working with the military and contractors to provide basic necessities
such as emergency medical supplies, food and water, sanitation and technical assistance. It works in cooperation with U.S. embassies in country and can directly provide cash grants to local relief organizations. It maintains stockpiles of relief commodities in Maryland, Panama, Italy, Guam and Thailand for emergency use as required. In disaster response situations, it works in conjunction with the DOD by requesting and pays for airlift or sealift, as well as reimbursing other agencies in relief efforts. Although not listed, USAID currently provides reconstruction and stabilization services in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

DOD has the inherent capability to respond rapidly anywhere in the world making it uniquely able to perform a function no other department or agency is currently capable of performing (see Appendix C). It also has the capability to plan for and respond with the appropriate level of lethal effects. During combat operations, it can deliver overwhelming firepower against a target or simply provide limited precision strikes to meet the JFC’s intent. In natural or manmade emergencies or stability operations, it can provide port operations, port security, sealift, airlift and airdrop in addition to civil military operations, force protection, communications, reconnaissance and other forms of unconventional warfare operations as needed.

USAID and DOD Interagency Relationship

One of USAID’s greatest strengths is its network of relationships used in carrying out its mission. USAID has established relationships with several USG agencies and dozens of NGOs and IGOs. Some of these include: U.S. Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Geological Survey, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the DOD. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID draws on these
corporations and organizations to coordinate the USG’s response to a given contingency.
Similarly, these organizations turn to USAID for advice and assistance when they need
USAID expertise and support.

The DOD plays a major role in almost all the interagency interaction. It is
involved in interagency coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is a member of the National Security Council (NSC),
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as an advisor to the NSC.
The DOD is key in the entire NSC interagency process, with representatives assigned to
all NSC sub-groups and most policy coordinating committees (PCCs). DOD Directive
5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is
DOD’s primary point of contact under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (see figure
5). The Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, J-4, on the Joint Staff is the point of contact
for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Assistance Program.

When USAID requests specific services from DOD, such as airlift, it pays for
those services. The geographic combatant command (COCOM) commander can directly
coordinate with USAID/OFDA to obtain military and civilian assistance efforts.
Additionally, under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, DOD has statutory authority to
respond to overseas manmade or natural disasters in order to prevent the loss of life. The
Secretary of Defense provides such assistance at the direction of the President or in
consultation with the Secretary of State. In these cases the DOD and USAID will work
in concert to provide assistance.
To support stability operations, and in concert with the DOD, USAID personnel have been asked to deploy to more dangerous locations requiring increased personal commitment and a greater acceptance of risk than seen in the previous 30 years. The resulting consequences of increased and unexpected requirements for nation building leave both organizations with challenges to overcome and opportunities to expand their core competencies to meet continued global deployment requirements. Each of these agencies have made great strides in adapting to a new security landscape where the need for the application of the diplomatic instrument of power and the use of soft power can be as important as the use of the military instrument of power and its corresponding kinetic effects. Unfortunately, insufficient cooperation and years of underfunding soft power capabilities have left both agencies unprepared to fully meet their commitments in recent conflicts.

Recognizing that current and future operations will likely find DOD and USAID personnel working side by side to employ both lethal and non-lethal (soft power) effects, this thesis focuses on improving the institutional relationship between the DOD and USAID to achieve unity of effort in stability operations. For maximum effectiveness during a contingency, it is in the best interest of both the DOD and USAID to work closely together to further enhance the effective employment of the nation’s soft power arsenal.

**Primary Research Question**

What can be learned from current DOD & USAID working relationships in order to improve cooperation and achieve lasting unity of effort between these organizations?
Secondary Research Questions

How well did interagency cooperation contribute to unity of effort in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Why is cooperation between the DOD and USAID important?

What were the initial obstacles faced by DOD and USAID cooperative efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Were there indicators of unity of effort between the DOD and USAID in Afghanistan and Iraq?

What are the most significant obstacles facing the DOD and USAID’s cooperative efforts?

Will increased interagency liaison assignments, planning, training and exercises improve unity of effort between USAID and DOD? If so, how?

Significance

It is widely accepted that the U.S. military’s current ability to conduct conventional warfare is unmatched by any other nation in the world. An article from the Journal of Strategic Studies professes “Operation Iraqi Freedom was planned as a military campaign to defeat enemy forces . . . [and] was one of the most impressive victories ever seen. The invasion campaign not only displayed a known technological superiority of the American military, but also an operational flexibility and effectiveness that took the world by surprise.” Regrettably, victory cannot be achieved by conventional means alone, or by means involving only kinetic effects. The lack of planning for stability operations turned what appeared to be a quick victory in May 2003 into a long war, more than six years later, with tragic losses of tens of thousands Iraqi
civilians and 4294 U.S. service members as of 16 May 09. Certainly, planning for stability operations does not guarantee instant victory nor does it eliminate the loss of human lives, but without adequate planning for stability operations the U.S. has paid a dear price in terms of its credibility both at home and abroad. As a result, the strategic consequences for the lack of planning for stability operations cannot be understated. This and other lessons learned must be applied vigorously throughout the various governmental agencies.

Presently, the DOD continues to expend great efforts in planning for and conducting exercises with kinetic (hard power) effects. However, the DOD appears to lack plans for, or lack sufficient exercises involving, scenarios with non-kinetic (soft power) effects, as required when conducting full spectrum operations involving other U.S. government (USG) agencies. While the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) does provide some degree of unity of effort for interagency planning at the operational level, it appears its efforts may be insufficient and have room for improvement, particularly in terms of rehearsing those plans with all the relevant interagency partners, and in particular, USAID. Improved interagency cooperation to combine these effects is needed to achieve unity of effort during stability operations as called for in 2005 by DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be . . . exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.” In July 2008, USAID published its Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy providing the foundation for cooperation with the DOD in
the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. Despite these publications, cooperation appears to be ad hoc and have room for improvement. In October 2008, a published study by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a bipartisan, private-public partnership, also supports the case for improved cooperation by stating there is “a need for improved collaboration on security matters among branches of the U.S. government; executive departments and agencies . . . which are currently hamstrung by interagency competition and stovepiped structures.” Given continued cooperation shortfalls, the agencies must actively pursue additional measures to better coordinate efforts. Both the DOD and its complementary interagency partner, USAID, should take the next concerted and deliberate “leap in interagency cooperation” by building new institutional structures and maintaining practices that support and reward cooperation if it plans to achieve unity of effort at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in the future. To this end, this research study explores what may have worked in the past and what currently prevents further improvement in cooperation between USAID and DOD.

Assumptions

The U.S. will continue to engage in combat operations and stability missions for the foreseeable future.

The need for improved interagency cooperation and use of soft power will continue to be at the forefront of the USG’s use of its instruments of power.

Adequate U.S. government resources can be made available to support interagency cooperation and programs.
Historical studies and their lessons are relevant and can be used to improve interagency cooperation.

**Definitions**

Civil affairs: Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations, also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.\(^{32}\)

Civil affairs activities: Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations.\(^{33}\)

Civil-military operations: The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces, also called CMO.\(^{34}\)
Civil-military operations center: An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent, also called CMOC.\textsuperscript{35}

Coalition: An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance.\textsuperscript{36}

Coalition action: Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations.\textsuperscript{37}

Coordinating authority: A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.\textsuperscript{38}

Interagency: Made up of, involving, or representing two or more government agencies: interagency cooperation.\textsuperscript{39} For the purposes of this thesis, both DOD and USAID are individual agencies of the federal government.
Official development assistance: Facilitate the efforts of the people of developing countries to achieve self-sustainable economic and social development in accordance with their needs and environment, in cooperation with them in the developing activities; and to provide humanitarian assistance. There are six developmental goals to be pursued through bilateral foreign assistance programs: the encouragement of broad-based economic growth and agricultural development; the strengthening of democracy and good governance; the building of human capacity through education and training; the stabilization of the world population and the protection of human health; the protection of the world's environment for long-term sustainability; the providing of humanitarian assistance and the re-establishment of conditions necessary for political and/or economic development.  

Stability operations: Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.  

Soft power: The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.  

Unified action: The synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.  

Unity of effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization--the product of successful unified action.
Limitations

1. This study only addresses issues in the unclassified domain.

2. A second limitation is the willingness of military or USAID personnel to supply the research information.

3. A third limitation is a general lack of access to USAID personnel. This limitation was mitigated with access to public and private professional studies, Congressional testimonies and professional journals which included firsthand accounts from USAID personnel.

Delimitations

1. Although there are instances where quantitative data is used for analysis, this research effort does not rely strictly on the use of quantitative data; rather, it focuses mostly on qualitative data from open source publications.

2. While USAID is critical to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, this paper does not discuss in detail all the scenarios requiring humanitarian assistance involving USAID. Rather, this research effort primarily aims to improve interagency unity of effort in stability operations in light of their recent difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a secondary aim to improve unity of effort in other contingency or crisis response situations.

3. This research focuses on pursuing the problems and solutions involved with applying “soft power” or non-kinetic effects versus addressing kinetic effects, for which the DOD is seen to have no peers.

4. This study does not go into depth regarding multinational operations, although it is recognized that operations undertaken by the U.S. will normally involve a coalition
of nations, which will make interagency cooperation that much more important. USG agencies will normally not work unilaterally, but in cooperation with coalition partners. For this reason achieving unity of effort in multinational operations becomes extremely difficult as the number of nations and organizations increase. “In most multinational operations the differing degrees of national interest results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and coalition members. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their country’s forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles.”\textsuperscript{15} Because of the varying level of objectives, commitments and interests, interagency coordination and cooperation is paramount.

**Summary**

There must be improved unity of effort between the DOD and the USAID. Despite recent publication of DOD and USAID policy directives, interagency cooperation between these complementary agencies of hard and soft power is ad hoc and has room for improvement. Given the continued cooperation shortfalls and stovepiped efforts, these agencies must actively pursue additional measures to better coordinate efforts. A continued shift, not only in thinking but also in practice, must be pursued to enhance interagency cooperation between the DOD and USAID. To this end, Chapter 2 explores the literary works available to understand past and current prevailing thoughts and practices with regard to interagency cooperation between the DOD and USAID to understand what may be hampering closer cooperation.

\footnote{Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” *Foreign Service Journal* 84, no. 3 (March 2007): 39.}

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, II-3.


8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, A-2.

9 Dorman, 39.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, II-8.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 1.

20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, A-M-3.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., AM-4.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., A-C-5.

25 Ibid., A-M-5.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., GL-7.
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, GL-28.
44 Ibid., GL-29.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There is no shortage of ideas and thought available regarding full spectrum operations, particularly given recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. The majority of this work’s literary foundation comes from legislation, policy directives, joint and army doctrine, professional studies and publications such as the Project for National Security Reform (PSNR) and the Foreign Service Journal, speeches and Congressional testimonies, seminars and guest speakers, personal interviews and recent research from both military and civilian institutions. Generally, the works found support the assertion that more interagency cooperation is needed in stability operations. There are ample lessons learned from historical cases for contemporary consideration. Insights into State Department issues and challenges are included in testimonies from high level USAID officials to Congress. Below are synopsized discussions of relevant works. Not all sources found are highlighted below.

Legislation

In December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 designates the DOS as the lead agency to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government agencies. This was an important initiative that provided presidential direction for DOS. Its purpose was to use the whole of government approach to integrate the efforts of USG agencies to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the
response capabilities of multiple USG entities and to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.¹

**Policy Directives**

Two essential policy directives were found to be prominent among the discussions involving interagency cooperation during stability operations for the Department of Defense and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 28 November 2005, is the current policy directive for the DOD. While this directive “establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense,,”² it does not specifically address cooperation with USAID. On the other hand, an important document with respect to USAID and DOD cooperation is USAID’s PD-ACL-777, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, July 2008, which establishes the foundation for specific cooperation with the DOD in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication to facilitate a whole-of-government approach.³

**Joint and Army Doctrine**

Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007, provides the basic framework for unified direction and effort of the armed forces. The clear delineation of supported and supporting command relationships is important.⁴ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, addresses the need for
military forces to work with other government agencies, international government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and elements of the private sector in the operational area as part of a strategic security environment and in the context of irregular warfare, defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population” requiring the employment of “the full range of military and other capacities.”

Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol II, 17 March 2006, offers an important discussion on “considerations for effective cooperation,” and “managing stabilization and reconstruction operations.” Planning considerations are referenced using Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Operation Planning is defined as “the overarching process that guides joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crisis.”

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008), are also foundational documents needed to gain an understanding of current Army views and tactics, techniques and procedures. In FM 3-24, the Army rediscovers what it means to be in a counterinsurgency fight. It had been 20 years since it published a “field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations.” FM 3-07 is a further realization of the hard business of nation building with the concession that “military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail . . .we must
strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.”

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) serves as a menu of tasks in a common language, which are the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations. The UJTL provides the common language for describing capabilities of our Armed Forces for use by the Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, and the Services. The UJTL supports the Department of Defense in joint capabilities-based planning, joint force development, readiness reporting, experimentation, joint training and education, and lessons learned. It is the basic language for the development of a joint mission-essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission-essential task list (AMETL) used in identifying required capabilities for mission success. Candidate UJTL Tasks can be submitted for review, adjudication, approval, and integration. The Universal Joint Task Manual provides detailed information on how to develop Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks, conditions, measures, and standards, and how to use them to effectively describe joint capabilities needed to support joint missions.10

Professional Studies and Publications

To help understand the hard lessons learned from interagency cooperation efforts, which made post-WWII Japan reconstruction and the pacification efforts during the Vietnam War successful, this thesis will refer to the 650 page publication by the Project on National Security Reform (PSNR). The PSNR is a leading national think tank comprised of nine analytic working groups, which examined different aspects of the national security system and are developing recommendations for addressing problems within their respective domains. PSNR’s goal is assist the U.S. in identifying and
implementing the kind of comprehensive reform that the government urgently needs. It is led by James R. Locher III, a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that modernized the joint military system.

A key work in understanding the initial obstacles faced by the interagency is the article entitled, “IRAQ PRTs: Pins on a Map,” in the March 2007 *Foreign Service Journal*. The in-depth article discusses the reality of service in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2006 when Iraq PRTs were first stood up. It defines the Iraq PRT Mission as spelled out by National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, Rob Tillery, in Oct 2006.

[The mission is] to assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population . . .as the provincial governments demonstrate increased capability to govern and manage their security environment . . . each PRT would transition to a traditional USAID training program to develop local governance capacity.  

Whether it’s building roads and bridges or health reconstruction, lessons from recent operations offer insights into the need for increased interagency cooperation. A RAND study entitled, “Health System Reconstruction and Nation Building” speaks to the challenges of health reconstruction in Iraq. This independent study adds to the volume of lessons learned from recent operations.

**Speeches and Congressional Testimonies**

Amongst senior military and civilian leaders, there has been increased discussion on interagency cooperation and a whole of government approach to better leverage the expertise inherent within each of these agencies. The Congressional hearing on:

"Domestic Crisis with Global Implications: Reviewing the Human Capital Crisis at the
State Department " offers insight into a current challenge or obstacle faced by the State Department and USAID. “Due to the mismatch between resources and requirements, hundreds of Foreign Service positions worldwide are now vacant.”\(^{14}\) It further highlights “a human capital management system that is in crisis and a Foreign Service that is at a tipping point.”\(^{15}\) “Statement of James Kunder, Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East USAID Assistance to Afghanistan Before the Committee on International Relations Sub-committees on Middle East and Central Asia and Oversight & Investigations U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2006.” The statement speaks to the close working relationship between the DOD and USAID. “This inter-agency approach has been one of the most successful aspects of the PRTs.”\(^{16}\)

**Seminars and Guest Speakers**

This grouping of sources illustrates that despite ongoing efforts by the USG with interagency cooperation, the current system is still “broken” due to insufficient focus on non-kinetic effects.\(^{17}\) Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and current Burke Chair for Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, went as far as to suggest that military officers who believe otherwise would do the nation a favor by “resigning” their commission. Dr. Cordesman points out that even the metrics being reviewed and discussed are misleading and focus too much on kinetic effects.\(^{18}\) Various other interagency presentations, from both military and civilian leaders, to students at the Command and General Staff College also point out that the interagency process needs more integration.\(^{19}\)
Personal Interviews

Three important interviews were conducted. Two interviews offered firsthand accounts of those who were directly involved with interagency cooperation and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). First, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Steve Foster, Retired, an expert in civil-military affairs, and a current instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, recounts his experience while serving with 10th Mountain Division and 18th Airborne Corp as Deputy Director and later Director of Civil Military Operations (CJ9), Afghanistan as part of Combined Joint Task Force 180 from March 2002 to November 2004.

[There was] an institutional resistance mindset to integrate across the U.S. government [and] compounded by the lack of understanding of what success looked like [in terms of] an ill-defined strategic guidance. The DOD was reluctant but out of necessity engaged nation building activity while supporting insurgency campaign planning.

When asked about his views on DOD cooperation with USAID, he added that his perspective was formed while serving as the designated military liaison to the USAID country team located in Kabul, Afghanistan as well as liaison to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

There was absolutely a realization that, institutionally, the DOD has to partner with USAID to engage their skills because the enemy thrives on instability and depends on our lack of political will and our fast food approach to foreign policy. USAID pragmatically [speaking] is an important agency because people matter. Having been on the ground at a number of provinces after a kinetic attack, there are second and third order effects [that cannot be ignored]. [Today] the Army is trying to fill the gap called for in [DOD Directive] 3000.05 with 4 Civil Affairs Battalion, a two year training pipeline, but their focus is primarily on Special Operations Forces (SOF). This represents 5 percent of the DOD’s capability. The remaining 95 percent of the planned capability resides in the Reserves, which have difficulties with recruiting and retention due to the current ops tempo.
Mr. Foster further mentioned that today’s PRTs were modeled after the Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) concept used in Vietnam. He goes on to say “during Vietnam interagency partners trained together for six months to a year at Fort Bragg.” This was an important interview which further illustrates the need for improved interagency cooperation with USAID from a career Civil Military professional.

The author also interviewed Air Force Major Jose Rivera, who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan between April 2006 and June 2007, as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76, Reconstruction Officer in Charge (OIC) overseeing PRTs and Embedded PRT (EPRT) Officer of Public Works, respectively. But unlike the preparation that went into interagency cooperation efforts associated with CORDS, which trained for six months to a year, including language training at Fort Bragg, Major Rivera only received two weeks of orientation prior to his second deployment to Iraq as part of the EPRT. This interview also found that there were duplication of efforts between the military and USAID due to independent efforts by each of the agencies. Major Rivera recalls, “We would show up at a site ready to begin construction to find out that USAID already started on the same project. It wasted a lot of people’s time.”

The third interview was conducted with a USAID Foreign Service officer, Andy Levin, on 4 November 2008. The interview mainly highlighted a complex interagency working relationship between the DOS and USAID due to the different types of money received. Currently, some of the funding for reconstruction is received via earmarks, which is a good way to receive funding, so long as the particular senator or congressman continues to win re-election. Due to the nature of the funding and timing of funding received it is hard to plan ahead. If DOS and USAID mission were funded from the same
pot and the level of funding was consistent year to year, it would reduce the level of uncertainty and enhance better planning and execution.\textsuperscript{23}

**Recent Research from Military and Civilian Institutions**

“Achieving unity of effort at the operational level through the interagency process,” by Christopher R. Jones, “tests the proposition of whether problems achieving unity of effort are due to the organizational structure of agencies functioning at the operational level, the operational framework wherein coordination takes place, or organizational culture.”\textsuperscript{24} First, the thesis recommends congressional legislation is the most viable means to bring together agencies with different interests, capabilities and strong cultural beliefs, using the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act as a model. Additionally, the author recommended strengthening of the interagency process at the operational level by creating a regionally based interagency headquarters in charge of “nonmilitary operations.” While the creation of a regionally based interagency headquarters appears to have some merit, focusing on nonmilitary operations alone would further create friction between military and nonmilitary agencies. Other works from the Army Command and General Staff College, as well as those from the National Defense University and civilian education institutions, were helpful in providing context with regard to the interagency enterprise and offer recent discussions on planning and various models to describe the interagency process. A notable thesis, written by Anh Nguyen Pham from the University of Hawaii, suggests planners require an understanding of both formal and informal institutions and cultural practices to guard against instability. The author posits that there is a critical balance in the relationship among the government and its ability to provide governance, its society or cultural norms, and the need for economic development. The
lack of balance or understanding can lead to national instability.\textsuperscript{25} Planning for
reconstruction and stabilization, therefore, should take into account this balance of
governance, societal and cultural norms and economic development, an idea that requires
the involvement of both military and civilian expertise.

The Internet

Overall, the internet and in particular Google Scholar provided instant access to
many relevant government sources, articles and required pieces of data for analysis.
Numerous government and independent websites provided additional PRT information
for examination. The trend over time shows improved interagency cooperation and
perhaps even some examples of unity of effort, but that early PRT experiences were less
than desirable.\textsuperscript{26}

Summary

The clear trend found from research material is the need for increased interagency
cooperation and the whole of government approach. Additionally, there is a sense of
urgency and a convergence of thoughts and ideas at various levels of government on how
to achieve unity of effort between the agencies. Yet, despite all these ideas achieving
unity of effort, stability operations continue to be just beyond the reach of the
interagency. The next chapter will address the research design of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{1}The White House, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, 2.

\textsuperscript{2}U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations}, 1.

\textsuperscript{3}U.S. Agency for International Development, \textit{Civilian-Military Cooperation
Policy}, 1.
4Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, V9-V11.

5Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 (2006), xi.

6Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, 5-6.


11Dorman, 22.


15Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Brian Helmer, Timothy Michael Carney, David A. Morris, and Brenda Oppermann, Interagency Panel (Lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 14, 2009).


21 Ibid.


23 Andy Levin, Interview by author, November 4, 2008.


CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design of this thesis involves a descriptive analysis of sources through the lens of improving long term interagency cooperation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to support the notion for, and increasing the use of, soft power to help the U.S. to obtain its strategic objectives.

How the Research Evolved

As the research began, it was apparent that Joint and Service Doctrine would play an important role in setting a baseline for understanding interagency cooperation. Relevant joint doctrine and Army doctrine that currently direct how the military will conduct stability operation in an insurgency fight was thoroughly reviewed. Next, a general review of publications was conducted on interagency cooperation, including official testimonies and speeches by high level officials within the DOD and DOS, followed by personal interviews with DOD and USAID individuals with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience.

Analysis of recent and historical events by professional publications and prior research provided support for a model to understanding how unity of effort could be achieved. Interviews and testimonies provided further amplification on current problems facing either the DOD or USAID. To gain an understanding of USAID a personal interview was conducted with Andy Levin, an USAID Foreign Service Officer (FSO). Further research material on USAID came from additional interviews with DOD
personnel who had direct working experience with USAID, foreign service journals, and
DOS and USAID websites.

It was apparent the call for improved interagency cooperation became more
strident not only from military academia, professional journals, scholarly studies, or
independent research papers, but also from senior Defense and State Department
officials. The impetus and urgency for change also brought increased attention and
research material to the forefront. Many recommendations emerged from various
sources. While there are ample recommendations for implementation at various levels,
recent updates from the field suggests interagency cooperation and the achievement of
unity of effort is still years away. This thesis attempts to make an immediate impact by
narrowing the focus on DOD cooperation with USAID, a critical agency within the State
Department which seldom gets mentioned in discussions involving interagency
cooperation.

Designing the Analysis

This study is designed in such a way that readers from either the DOD or USAID
will gain a better understanding of the other agency with the background provided in
Chapter 1. With this initial understanding, Chapter 4 provides further analysis of
interagency cooperation between these organizations based on their shared experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq. These recent experiences will then be viewed through the lens of
interagency cooperation efforts during the post-WWII occupation of Japan and
pacification efforts during the Vietnam War.
Interagency Cooperation During OEF and OIF

Stability operations and rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan had unexpected results following combat operations. Examining how the interagency cooperation picture developed during the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts should uncover why successful stability operations may have been hampered by insufficient interagency cooperation prior to conflict. Major obstacles and lessons learned may provide clues for how the DOD and USAID could better cooperate to achieve unity of effort. Progress in cooperation between the DOD & USAID at the PRT level will be analyzed to understand what proved helpful in stabilizing much of Afghanistan and Iraq. By contrasting these current conflicts with successful interagency cooperation during post-WWII Japan and Vietnam, the analysis will illustrate the need for lasting interagency cooperation between the DOD and USAID.

Attributes from Japan and Vietnam as a Model for Cooperation

This section takes a look at interagency cooperation attributes that contributed to the success of post-WWII Japan as well as the attributes of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) structure that was so successful in pacifying much of Vietnam’s country side during the Vietnam War to use as a model for interagency cooperation. While history doesn’t offer a solution for every problem, understanding what worked well in past conflicts may offer clues to bridge tried solutions with fresh ideas to come up with viable options to address current and future questions. For instance, the post-war rebuilding efforts in Japan have been viewed as a success. The U.S. and Japan continues to be staunch allies following the fierce fighting, horror and bloodshed that began when by Japanese warplanes attacked Pearl Harbor on Sunday,
December 7, 1941, and ended only after the U.S. delivered nuclear weapons against Japanese home islands on August 6, 1945 and August 9, 1945. A look at WWII’s post-war period in Japan is warranted in the search for what interagency cooperation efforts there were to understand what the “picture of success” may have looked like.

Prior to the occupation of Japan, the Roosevelt administration created a joint operational plan for civilian and military agencies that included input from federal entities, as well as experts outside the government. The interagency strategic and tactical approach emerged from an organization known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC became the authoritative policy-making body charged with reconstruction planning. The goals of the U.S. occupation were to promote a modern, democratic, capitalist Japanese state; to support the rise of a broad middle class able to own property and participate in the national and international economy; to adapt existing Japanese institutional structures to manage the government and implement reforms; to promote continuity and economic stability; and to repress, co-opt, and redirect the elites who had been responsible for the rise of Japan’s militarist expansion.1 Given the apparent success of SWNCC’s efforts to integrate interagency efforts during the post-WWII occupation of Japan, in October 2008, the Project on National Security Reform (PSNR), a leading national think tank whose goal is to assist the nation in identifying and implementing urgent comprehensive reform, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a non-partisan, nonprofit organization that examines past successes and failures of the presidency, highlighted the key attributes that made the occupation of Japan such a success (see figure 3).2
The most essential ingredient for interagency status and success, therefore, came from the delegation of presidential authority to SWNCC to create actionable policy and allowed for sustained interaction and transparency across the agencies. The cross-pollination of military and civilians working as embeds increased effectiveness and clear leadership in implementing policies. In addition to SWNCC and its associated attributes, a second model for understanding interagency cooperation is the use of the combined civilian-military counterinsurgency program named Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), during the Vietnam War.

Arguably, the Vietnam War, which occurred between 1959 and 1975, presented the U.S. with the greatest counterinsurgency challenge prior to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war was fought between communist North

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**Successful Interagency Cooperation Attributes from the Occupation of Japan**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Delegation of authority by the president aimed at the creation of actionable policy.</td>
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<td>Incorporation of all available experts in the policy development process.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Institutionalization of the interagency to permit sustained interaction.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Ongoing joint review and integration of policies conducted at the political level.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Information transparency and a consensus approach, allowing interagency cooperation as equals.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Clear military leadership in implementation, supported by embedded civilian experts at all operational levels.</td>
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Source: Project on National Security Reform, 525.
Vietnam, backed by its communist allies including the Vietcong, a southern insurgency, and South Vietnam backed by its allies including the U.S. With superior training and materiel support, the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally were able to deliver overwhelming kinetic effects to win battles, but eventually lost the war following the pullout of U.S. combat forces in 1973. While the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally did not win the war, the success of CORDS, which served to pacify the country sides against insurgency influences, has since been studied and considered as a successful example of interagency cooperation. CORDS was the primary mechanism to organize, resource and lead the effort to legitimize the South Vietnamese government by being responsive to the needs its own people—to win their hearts and minds—especially to influence those in rural areas against its rival government from the North. At the “direct decision of the president” CORDS accomplished nearly all that it was expected to achieve despite initial objections from the State Department and USAID.³

CORDS was thus an ad-hoc experiment in placing nearly all the interagency assets (civilian and military) involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager and then placing that civilian within the military hierarchy as a deputy commander of military assistance command Vietnam (MACV), the military headquarters in Saigon. This bold, indeed unprecedented, move provided the pacification support effort nearly unfettered access to military resources, personnel, energy, organizational skill, and logistics. By centralizing planning and management in one headquarters, then replicating that management structure at each level of the government of South Vietnam (military region, province, and district), CORDS built and operated a truly effective interagency headquarters.⁴

Once again, with the direct involvement of the President, the integrated command structure forced cooperation and enabled CORDS to successfully perform its mission linking a single civilian manager to the military chain of command and effectively provided support to all levels of the South Vietnamese government as well as its armed forces fighting against the insurgencies and conventional forces from the North. This
model for effective interagency cooperation using CORDS combined with the
authoritative making body from Japan, SWNCC, will further help to examine the contrast
in interagency cooperation during recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Summary

The research began with a thorough review of doctrine to set a solid baseline for
what is already known and what is expected within the area of interagency cooperation.
Analysis of historical events in Japan and Vietnam provided support for a model to
understanding how unity of effort could be achieved. Chapter 4 will provide an analysis
of recent interagency cooperation efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and analyzed against
successful attributes for interagency cooperation from Japan and Vietnam. The
combination will either lead to new discoveries or uncover old lessons that will need to
be relearned with emphasis on improved cooperation between the DOD and USAID.

1Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer, “Planning for Reconstruction and
Transformation of Japan after WWII,” Applying a ‘Whole-of-Government Approach,’
Case Studies, vol 1, of Project on National Security Reform, ed. Richard Weitz
(Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform and Center for the Study of the

2Ibid., 525.

3Richard W. Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency
Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” Applying a ‘Whole-of-
Government Approach,’ Case Studies, vol 1, of Project on National Security Reform, ed.
Richard Weitz (Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform and Center for the

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

In fact, it is not possible to separate kinetic from non-kinetic because winning this ‘war’ is as much political as military.¹
— Diyala Province PRT Leader, Kiki Munshi

Introduction

Given past successes with interagency cooperation, what can be learned from recent DOD and USAID cooperation efforts to achieve lasting unity of effort? This chapter provides analysis covering the need for improved interagency cooperation by looking at the whole of government approach and the need for change. Recent interagency cooperation efforts from OEF and OIF will be discussed to understand how USG agencies initially integrated. Of special interest is the interaction between DOD and USAID and at the PRT level. Successful attributes from Japan and Vietnam will then be used to contrast recent interagency integration efforts to understand the areas needing improvement. Finally, this chapter will explore the lack of resources and capabilities gap preventing further improvement in cooperation between USAID and the DOD despite recent DOD and USAID policy changes.

The Whole of Government in a Counterinsurgency Fight

From the whole of government perspective, there are various models to explain war theory through the use of the relationship between the government, its people and the military, including Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity: the people, the commander and his army, and the government. Poignant to his discussion is the assertion that national policy created by the government must take precedence over the military, and thus, war is just a
“continuation of policy using other means.” Clausewitz further discusses the idea and defines the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies must be directed.” In a counterinsurgency fight where the host government is supported by a foreign military, arguably, the center of gravity is the will of the local populace to support the host government. Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies offers three essential questions from the perspective of the local populace in Afghanistan as it considers which side to support: (1) Can the host government win? (2) Will the U.S. stay? (3) Is aligning with the U.S. less costly than getting along with the insurgents? The implication is if the answers to all these questions are yes, then there is more likelihood the coalition can win the will of the people. These answers are based strictly on the perceptions of security and well being of their families and not based on religious ideology or anything else. Dr. Cordesman succinctly states “these are wars of perception--not how we [the U.S.] perceive it, but how others perceive us.” And they have to perceive the U.S. presence is to their benefit. Thus, kinetic effects “do not indicate progress in winning the hearts and minds in a protracted war.” What are also needed are the soft effects of a whole of government approach, with expertise from other USG agencies to those provided by DOD. The problem, however, is these agencies, and specifically USAID, have a “lack of capacity” which has led to a “massive failure in Iraq.”

Interagency “Jointness” and the Need for Change

In the words of Secretary Gates there is a need for greater cooperation or jointness between the DOD and its interagency partners if American operations abroad are to
succeed. "Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory...[and]...we must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the important soft power capabilities developed to atrophy or even disappear.”

A discussion of “jointness” is difficult without a necessary mention of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, establishing a high level requirement for joint operations. One could argue the level of success achieved by today’s joint war fighting team is directly correlated to the requirements and guidance of Goldwater-Nichols. General David Petraeus drives home this point:

The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the government--both military and civilian agencies--and unity of effort is crucial to success.

Interagency Cooperation from Recent Conflicts

What about interagency cooperation in recent conflicts? Prior to September 11, 2001 the interagency cooperation picture consisted of a three-tiered National Security Council (NSC) system for interagency coordination based on National Security Presidential Directive 1 which replaced 102 interagency working groups. Joint doctrine also did not help or guide the services adequately with regard to the cooperating with other governmental agencies during times of war. Despite Joint Vision 2020’s recognition that “The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort,” not much progress was made by the interagency to solve such a challenge.

After September 11, 2001, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for “integrated operations, which must permeate all phases of conflict,
from planning and war to stability and reconstruction.” With the approval of SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stood up an interagency coordination cell with authority to coordinate directly with the necessary agencies. This interagency coordination cell was created in November 2001, a month after a U.S.-led military coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan’s Taliban government. The cell was named the Joint Interagency Task Force–Counterterrorism (JIATF–CT) and contained 30 military billets and any willing participants from other USG agencies. By December non-DOD participants joined the task force in the mountains of Afghanistan and included: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Diplomatic Security Service, Customs Service National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service, New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Justice, Treasury, and State Department. While this was an important first step, it does show a lack of preparation and planning on the part of the U.S. government as a whole. Trying to integrate in this ad hoc manner after initiation of combat operations was necessary; however, not necessarily the most effective way to guarantee the successful conduct of operations. U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Steve Foster, Retired, recounts his experience while serving with 10th Mountain Division and XVIII\(^{th}\) Airborne Corp as deputy director and later director of civil military operations (CJ9) Afghanistan as part of Combined Joint Task Force 180 from March 2002 to November 2004. “The DOD was reluctant but out of necessity engaged in nation building activity [with other interagency partners] while supporting insurgency campaign planning.” Unfortunately, this realization came too late. It was “like playing with a pick up team in the middle of a Super Bowl.”
Based on geographic combatant commanders’ need for increased interagency coordination and planning, the National Security Council (NSC) established a limited capability JIACG at other combatant commands (COCOMs) in 2002 with an initial DOD cadre and “three DOD funded positions for representatives from Treasury, State, and Justice at each COCOM.” Later, the CENTCOM JIACG transformed into a more capable JIACG by adding representatives from Energy, Treasury, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the DOS International Information Programs.\textsuperscript{15}

While the CENTCOM JIACG was the next important step, it only improved interagency coordination and not necessarily interagency cooperation. Traditionally, the CENTCOM Plans Directorate would oversee civil-military operations such as humanitarian assistance and refugee control, security assistance and foreign military sales in coordination with the commander’s political advisor (POLAD) and a State Department representative. The newly stood up JIACG was “instructed to broaden and improve these relationships, but not to supplant them.”\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, recognizing inadequacies with interagency coordination and cooperation and its immediate need to improve, in December 2005 NSPD 44 attempts to build a whole-of-government approach to conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by designating a lead agency, Department of State (DOS), to oversee Reconstruction and Stabilization. In response, DOS stood up the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS) with the mandate by the National Security Council Principals to be the focal point for the U.S. Government on stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.”\textsuperscript{17}
The Importance of DOD and USAID Cooperation

As efforts were being made to improve interagency cooperation and especially planning, a critical agency within the Department of State was ignored. Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Steve Foster who became the director of civilian military operations in Afghanistan, Combined Joint Task Force 180, and also the military liaison to USAID’s country team in Kabul recalls:

There was absolutely a realization that, institutionally, the DOD has to partner with USAID to engage their skills . . . because people matter. Having been on the ground at a number of provinces after kinetic attacks there are second and third order effects [that cannot be ignored].

USAID’s competencies and expertise with reconstruction and stabilization are critical to winning the hearts and minds of the local population, yet none of the JIACGs, whose mission is to coordinate interagency planning, included a representative from USAID. A lone DOS representative is insufficient to properly assist geographic combatant commands (COCOMs) in their operations planning for stability operations. While USAID falls under the DOS, it is an autonomous agency with different competencies and authorities than the DOS. Their relationship with the DOS is such that “USAID receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.” DOS can set high-level policy direction for USAID and provide diplomatic coordination between governments, but to implement those policy decisions USAID has to carry out the work that matters to winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. It is not unlike the relationship between the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who sets policy and the combatant commands with individual services that have to carry out the mission. USAID brings civil capacity expertise to support what matters to the common person such as emergency relief supplies, reconstruction of schools, restoration of power, and
local governance training programs, etc. Additionally, USAID's strength is its field offices around the world. They work in close partnership with private volunteer organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, other governments, and other U.S. government agencies, such as the Agriculture Department. USAID has working relationships with more than 3,500 American companies and over 300 U.S.-based private volunteer organizations.²⁰

When it comes to funding, the DOS and USAID receive different authorizations and appropriations, which have diverse purposes even though their request for funding goes to Congress via the DOS.²¹ These differences are not unlike the differences between the various services within the DOD. While the services make up the DOD, one service cannot necessarily properly speak for another without sufficient and thorough coordination. This is why combatant commands have billets with representation from all services. There is also a potential for conflict based on possible competing interests between the DOS and USAID for missions or funding which may prevent the maximum desired outcome of interagency cooperation.

As interagency cooperation evolved, USAID began to emerge as an important agency, primarily as a member of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Afghanistan PRTs were first established in early 2003. Initially PRTs consisted of 60 to 100 soldiers. Eventually, team composition expanded with Afghan advisors and representatives from civilian agencies like the DOS, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.²² These initial PRTs were military-led, usually with a DOS Foreign Service officer deputy.²³ Over time, more PRTs became civilian-led with a military deputy.²⁴ Whether having a military leader or a civilian leader is better for PRT effectiveness is unclear. Air Force
Major Jose Rivera, Reconstruction Officer in Charge (OIC) for Combined Joint Task Force 76 in Afghanistan, who oversaw six PRTs, points out, “having a military officer lead a PRT early in the stabilization phase makes sense due to a greater dependency on security requirements” which could be better coordinated. While the PRT structure demonstrated continued improvement with regard to interagency cooperation, PRT arrangements were still established “on the fly” as a result of inadequate planning for the stability phase of Enduring Freedom.

In November 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice inaugurated the first Iraq PRT in Mosul, roughly two-and-one-half years after the fall of Baghdad. Despite this delayed timeline, it was acknowledged by those on the ground in Iraq that ‘The PRTs were rolled out before they were ready for prime time . . . [and no one] knew what they were supposed to do.” Unlike the Afghanistan model, Iraq PRTs, are “civilian-led, and fall under the National Coordination Team, which is part of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office. Team composition included a DOS Foreign Service Officer, including USAID personnel and its contractor for the Local Governance Program, RTI International.” Although PRTs in Afghanistan were stood up for two years prior to Iraq’s PRTs, it doesn’t appear any interagency cooperation gains in Afghanistan translated to Iraq in November 2005.

Initial Obstacles Faced by the DOD and USAID’s Cooperative Efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq

Obstacles in Afghanistan, as discussed by Major Rivera, included skepticism by the military of the PRT structure and its USAID partners. Additionally there was frustration with independent efforts on both the part of DOD and USAID which led to
duplicated efforts and waste--the opposite of unity of effort. “Everyone was doing their own thing,” added Major Rivera, “which ended up causing a duplication of efforts. We would go to a site with funding in hand and find out that USAID has already started working the same project.” The initial obstacles for PRTs in Iraq were numerous and impeded progress. Further, Major Rivera stressed the military was skeptical of the PRT and at times frustrated with USAID, but made it work. There were issues with the chain of command because “we cannot tell USAID team members what to do . . . [and USAID members] don’t have to answer to you, which slowed things down.”

A number of other personal accounts highlighted major obstacles faced by those in Iraq. One Foreign Service PRT member recounts spending most of his first nine months in Iraq “fighting for resources and funds rather than being out working with Iraqis.” In fact among PRT leaders interviewed by the Foreign Service Journal, the consensus was “no PRT should be started until the requisite operational and infrastructure support were in place.” Another member recalls the lack of guidance and no clear chain of command or delineation of responsibility. There was also the perception that the higher ups did not understand the situation on the ground. Security at times made it impossible to get the job done as contractors get killed or kidnapped. PRT successes were seen as primarily due to individual improvisations and creativity. A summary of the initial obstacles as seen by those who were part of early PRTs are provided in figure 7. As a whole, the initial Iraqi PRT experience demonstrated the lack of a systematic approach to employing soft power. While some of the obstacles (such as initial skepticism and security concerns) cannot be avoided, better planning, a clear chain of
command and adequate resources would have helped these PRTs become functional sooner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Obstacles Faced by Iraq PRTs</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. High-level wrangling between DOS and DOD over who would provide security, support and funding</td>
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<td>2. No memorandum of understanding was in place to delineate each agency’s responsibility</td>
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<td>3. Initial skepticism by the military about the program</td>
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<td>4. The process had been ad hoc according to those who went to the first PRTs</td>
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<td>5. Foreign Service members were not given clear instructions on their roles and functions</td>
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<td>6. Support from Embassy Baghdad and Washington were inadequate</td>
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<td>7. Mandate to PRTs came down without an influx of sufficient funding, training or personnel</td>
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<td>8. Perception that higher-ups were not aware of realities on the ground</td>
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<td>9. The lack of security at times can halt PRT operations</td>
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<td>10. Success depended on personalities and acceptance by the military</td>
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<td>11. A clear chain of command between military and civilian members was not defined</td>
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<td>12. The lack of planning, coordination and leadership</td>
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Figure 7. Initial Obstacles Faced by Iraq PRTs

*Source*: Created by author.

Robert Pope, who served as an Iraq provincial action officer at PRT Ninawa from October 2005 to November 2006, recalls that reconstruction projects had “no oversight or accountability.” As a result, schools and roads were falling down or torn up within six months of being built.\(^{34}\) Cultural issues and infighting within the PRT ultimately contributed to wasteful spending and structures that were not built to standard. One such project was in Diyala Province for a $76 million maximum-security prison which will “probably never house an inmate.”\(^{35}\) After three years, the contract was terminated in June 2006 due to cost overruns and schedule delays. Among its issues were major structural problems such as improperly laid concrete floors and poorly built walls.\(^{36}\)

In terms of health care reconstruction, the lack of a lead actor to coordinate planning and funding was a major impediment. There was little coordination among the
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the country, to include almost none between the NGOs and the Coalition Provisional Authority. Health care reconstruction in Iraq followed a similar pattern with infrastructure reconstruction. Key lessons learned were that successful health system reconstruction requires planning, coordination, leadership, and security. Health-sector reform must be sustainable by the country’s own health care providers and leaders; successes occurred because international organizations, NGOs, and the USAID developed contingency plans in the event of armed conflict and prepositioned supplies in Iraq and in neighboring countries.37

Indicators of Unity of Effort from PRTs

Despite their inauspicious beginnings, PRTs did eventually demonstrate that interagency cooperation, if not unity of effort, can take place. In Afghanistan, successful soft power effects went hand in hand with cooperation between the DOD and USAID. In addition to coordinating closely with the DOD, USAID also worked closely with the Department of Agriculture, and the DOS to ensure activities in development, diplomacy and defense complement and strengthen U.S. foreign policy goals. This interagency approach has been one of the most successful aspects of the PRTs. James R. Kunder, USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, testified . . . Our presence on the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) has allowed us to build closer relations with local officials and community leaders to better understand local needs and development goals. Since the Coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries staffing a PRT are able to offer the necessary protection for our staff, PRTs have been a useful platform for USAID to monitor our programs throughout the country and ensure that aid is being delivered to the right people.38

A number of other indicators of the effects of PRT unity of effort between the DOD and USAID were seen by June 2006 in Afghanistan. Nearly five years after the
first attempts by U.S. government agencies to cooperate in the mountains of Afghanistan in November 2001, Afghanistan’s central government was stable with Hamid Karzai as its president. Legitimacy of governance had been achieved due to the efforts of both the DOD and USAID working together. After Hamid Karzai was chosen to lead the Afghan Transitional Authority, in December 2001, in Bonn, Germany,39 USAID, with military forces primarily providing security, supported the governance process by funding and helping with the logistics for the emergency “Loya Jirga,” or tribal grand council. The Agency went on to support implementation of the rest of the Bonn accords including the “Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections and the seating of parliament.” 40 These actions were augmented by a series of "transition initiatives", that demonstrated to the people of Afghanistan concrete dividends from the new government. These dividends included rebuilt schools and textbooks for school children. Rebuilt markets and improved road networks and trade routes to connect Kabul with Kandahar and Herat also infused confidence in the people of the central government’s ability to rule. With DOD security support, USAID went on to unify five different currencies into one and launched a program to support the Afghan Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank with monetary and fiscal policy. Other indicators included successful upgrades of the Kajaki Dam, the premier source of hydroelectricity for southern Afghanistan, so the region could have access to a reliable supply of electricity. By June of 2006, USAID working as part of provincial PRTs, was able to help a vast majority of Afghans who historically have not had access to electricity or safe water. In some remote mountainous villages, the nearest paved road is a two-week walk away. Road networks were paved to reduce travel time. Kabul and other major cities throughout the country saw “quick”
economic growth. “Normal” life saw cell phones everywhere, free radio and television stations, and more and more women making their own choices about their lives.\textsuperscript{41} In total, USAID had built 524 schools which could accommodate up to nearly 400,000 students, and 528 clinics with the capacity to serve 340,000 patients per month.\textsuperscript{42}

Given some indicators of interagency cooperation success, as demonstrated at the PRT level in Afghanistan by the end of 2006, the U.S. government turned its focus and limited resources to Iraq, at the risk of fragile gains in Afghanistan. One-and-a-half years after the first PRT was first established in Mosul in November 2005, nine additional PRTs were established in Iraq by March 2007 with locations at: Erbil, Ramadi, Hilla, Baqubah, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Nasariya, Basrah, and Baghdad. As PRTs gained traction, President Bush called for more civilian participation via a “civilian reserve corps” in his 2007 State of the Union address.\textsuperscript{43} As many as 19 Iraq PRTs were planned, but the call for civilian service to active war zones such as Iraq was a still a new reality, even for Foreign Service Officers.\textsuperscript{44} By March of 2008, the total number of PRTs in Iraq grew to 31 including thirteen “embedded” PRTs (EPRTs), formulated as part of President Bush’s New Way Forward strategy. Embedded teams work hand-in-glove with military units at the brigade level.\textsuperscript{45}

By April 2008, the government of Iraq and other provincial governments “want and value PRT programs.”\textsuperscript{46} In fact polling data indicates the need for essential services has replaced security as the most important concern in the minds of most Iraqis.\textsuperscript{47} PRTs remain the lead for providing essential services and other civil capacity within Iraq. The DOD and USAID continue to play a key role in delivering those services and capacity.
Further Analysis of OEF and OIF Against the Models of Success in Japan and Vietnam

Interagency challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq paint a picture as though U.S. government agencies have rarely integrated or have forgotten how to work together to bring about successful stabilization and reconstruction. Yet this was seen in post-WWII Japan and pacification efforts during the Vietnam War. It is, therefore, apparent that the agencies’ capabilities have in fact atrophied, as alluded to by Secretary Gates. There were apparent missteps at all levels of war--strategic, operational and tactical (see figure 8.)

Interagency cooperation in Japan started even prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) became the authoritative policy-making body charged with reconstruction planning. SWNCC had delegation of authority from the President which it used to perform joint reviews at the political level to ensure integration of policies took place. Additionally, because of the backing of the President, interagency positions were valued and regarded with prestige. Similarly, it took the President to loosen interagency gridlocks in Vietnam at the angst of both the DOS and USAID. Thus, the decision to place pacification authorities and assets under a civilian and putting that civilian under a military commander as a deputy commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) forced integration and cooperation that replicated to all lower level organizations. Therefore, in both Japan and Vietnam unity of effort was achieved after an interagency body or organization was created with the support of the President. This facilitated clear leadership and a chain of command that included both civilian and military counterparts. With improved cooperation, both
SWNCC and CORDS were then able to focus on deliberate planning and policy integration.

Figure 8. Successful Historical Interagency Attributes vs. Recent Obstacles

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<td><strong>Initial Obstacles Faced by Afghan Interagency Effort and Iraq PRTs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic / Political Level</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. Support from Embassy Baghdad and Washington were inadequate (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;2. Mandate to PRTs came down without an influx of sufficient funding, training or personnel (Afghanistan &amp; Iraq).&lt;br&gt;<strong>Operational Level</strong>&lt;br&gt;3. The lack of planning, coordination and leadership (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;4. High-level wrangling between DOS and DOD over who would provide security, support and funding (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;5. The process had been ad hoc (Afghanistan and Iraq).&lt;br&gt;6. No memorandum of understanding was in place to delineate each agency’s responsibility (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;7. Foreign Service members were not given clear instructions on their roles and functions (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;<strong>Tactical Level</strong>&lt;br&gt;8. Initial skepticism by the military about the program (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;9. A clear chain of command between military and civilian members was not defined (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;10. Perception that higher-ups were not aware of realities on the ground (Iraq).&lt;br&gt;11. The lack of security at times can halt PRT operations (Afghanistan &amp; Iraq).&lt;br&gt;12. Success depended on personalities and acceptance by the military (Iraq).</td>
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Source: Created by author.

Unlike Japan and Vietnam, OEF and OIF saw a lack of adequate support from the highest levels of government to integrate interagency efforts. In particular there was not an interagency body to ensure integration. Although S/CRS was eventually stood up following NSPD 44 in December 2005, to date it still lacks both manpower and funding it needs and has not been able to fully integrate interagency efforts. Also, the lack of trained civilian personnel who can deploy continues to be a major concern. Because of
this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has begun the call for an immediate commitment to generate soft-power expertise from the agencies that can be deployable. It was stated by the CJCS during his address to students and faculty at Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, N.J., on Feb. 5, 2009. “The president, the leaders of agencies, everybody has to be committed to generating this capacity down through the agencies.” The commitment and delegation of authority from the President followed by systematic civilian-military integration of the agencies by SWNCC were the key attributes that made efforts in Japan successful and further loosened interagency gridlocks, which made stabilization efforts with CORDS possible in Vietnam.

At the operational level, the lack of institutionalization of the interagency system prior to the recent conflicts led to poor planning that resulted in ad hoc integration in both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRT implementation had a lack of leadership and came with little instructions on its roles and responsibilities for those at lower levels in Iraq who had to carry out daily operations. Interagency obstacles from recent experiences were, thus, the symptoms of structural problems with how the agencies operated, trained and planned prior to war. While USG agencies may “have the proper expertise for ‘soft-power’ mission(s),” a large number of those were not available to deploy. For example, while there were numerous Department of Agriculture employees with the expertise needed to assist with agricultural development in Afghanistan, they were not required to deploy. As a result, members of the National Guard with requisite background from their civilian jobs ended up filling those assignments to bring the expertise to Afghanistan.
Similarly, the lack of an institutional approach to generate soft power and interagency cooperation led DOD members to take on roles they were not accustomed to. Although members of the military may be flexible and adaptive, State Department officials, such as those from USAID, are subject matter experts in many areas where military personnel are not. For example, Iraq has a need for experts in governance, which USAID provides. Yet when it comes to volunteers to fill the need, half of the positions are filled by the military.51 Moreover, although USAID eventually played a key role in the successes experienced by PRTs, USAID had not been a part of the JIACG at the COCOMs to assist with planning prior to conflict, nor was interagency assignment to a COCOM seen as career enhancing. “Field work was seen to be more important” than a desk job at a COCOM.52 This view of interagency work as being less important was, of course, different from the efforts with Japan when interagency work was seen as having high status. With regard to planning, the COCOMS simply did not have sufficient expertise to properly plan for stability operation. For example, an essential stability task for the military to perform is “support to governance.”53 Although the DOD has the expertise to provide the basic civil administration functions of the host-nation government and initial response to reconstitute leadership at multiple levels of governments, including the restoration of essential public services, it does not have the complete cultural understanding to plan for the exercise of authority through formal and especially informal traditions and institutions of the local populace. These traditions and institutions require delicate balancing to prevent instability in governance, as “governance is much broader than the idea of government, and accounts for the role of other non-state actors and stakeholders” in the daily activities of the local neighborhood,
province or nation.\textsuperscript{54} And while a recent study on the lack of cultural planning from Afghanistan and Iraq suggest greater investments in cultural training for improved planning,\textsuperscript{55} USAID through its network of NGOs and local contacts--those who already understand local traditions and institutions--could have filled this planning gap. Planning for reconstruction and stabilization, therefore, should take into account the balance of security, governance, economic development and societal or cultural norms, a notion that requires the involvement of both military and civilian expertise. The lack of an institutional approach to interagency cooperation at the operational level, therefore, impacted tactical operations in a number of ways.

Thus, the tactical level saw an ill-defined chain of command that inadequately addressed the roles and responsibilities of the interagency, one that contributed to skepticism and at times inadequate security to support PRT missions. The lack of information and direction from above became an impediment to those who first arrived to PRTs. In Diyala Province it took nine months to get adequate resources to meet mission requirements.\textsuperscript{56} Success on the ground came down to individual reliance on personality to get the job done rather than a systematic, well thought out plan with sufficient resources, as was the case at the Anbar PRT. “You have to make everything happen yourself,” lamented an Anbar PRT member.\textsuperscript{57} Further, the lack of cultural understanding, and, therefore, insufficient cultural planning, led to the inappropriate display of the dead bodies of Odai and Qusai Hussein, which contributed to the view of the two brothers as martyrs by insurgent sympathizers.\textsuperscript{58} Eventually, PRTs did succeed in demonstrating a degree of unity of effort in both Afghanistan and Iraq by delivering critical reconstruction and stability through governance and economic development.
Lest current lessons learned and synergies once again atrophy, the DOD and USAID should work closely together to institutionalize any lessons learned and best practices at the PRT level. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Bryce Brakman, Zabul PRT commander from February to December 2008 expresses concern for the current assignment process, which doesn’t take advantage of his recent experience. “An assignment to a higher headquarter [in the CENTCOM theater] or even [one that works directly with] USAID would be more beneficial to take advantage of what I’ve learned in 10 months at the PRT.” Unfortunately, significant obstacles prevent further improvement in cooperation. These include USAID’s lack of resource flexibility and training opportunities, as well as the overall soft power expertise gap that currently exists.

**USAID Lacks the Resource Flexibility and Training Opportunities**

Current demands for Foreign Service officers to serve at critical overseas locations leave USAID with little resources, or flexibility to address the need for improved cooperation elsewhere. This has been the most significant obstacle facing the DOD and USAID’s cooperative efforts. To further emphasize this lack of flexibility, figure 9 below illustrates how the total number of active duty DOD personnel dwarfs the total number of DOS and USAID Foreign Service Officers available to deploy. DOD has a pool close to 1.4 million in uniform ready to respond or deploy overseas as compared to only 7,500 DOS Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). Of the FSOs, USAID only has 1,000, which makes up less than 0.1 percent of the total combined DOD and DOS pool of those who are able to deploy. Even with the small number of available FSOs, only 25 percent of the 1,000 USAID Foreign Service Officers were available to serve in Iraq.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan in 2007. The large majority, up to 75 percent of USAID FSOs, were required to meet other commitments around the world.62

The point of the illustration is not to say the number of FSOs should even come remotely close to the number of DOD active duty personnel, because the DOD and DOS have different authorities and responsibilities. The mission accomplished by the DOD goes well beyond just those required during stability operations, disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, which USAID has the authority and expertise to perform. For DOD to meet its mission, it must organize, train and equip forces and provides those forces to combatant commands whose role is to plan and conduct full spectrum operations, kinetic and non-kinetic, on a moment’s notice anywhere in the world via air, land or sea. As has been seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, even stability operations require sufficient security or any hope of reconstruction and stabilization will come to a grinding halt. Sufficient security is easier said than done and requires a well trained and equipped joint and even multinational force to accomplish. Thus, DOD’s many capabilities, including those delivered from space, do not come without cost or manpower requirements. To meet all of its missions effectively, the DOD requires its current manpower level.

The chart simply makes the point that the DOD has the overwhelming flexibility in terms of manpower resources to address today’s operating environment, one which soft power effects can mean the difference between success or failure. Although the members of the nation’s diplomatic instrument of power have done their best to respond to the call for increased interagency cooperation, they are simply resource constrained due to current deployment commitments.
Figure 9. Comparison of DOD Active Duty to Foreign Service Officers

*Source.* Created by author.

Additionally, given the DOD’s 1.4 million manning number, the chart does question whether the DOD has the right mix of personnel to address the shift in national security needs from a Cold War structure and manning requirement to that of an increasingly complex and dangerous world with more and more non-state actors using unconventional means. The time has come for DOD leaders to rebalance and shift DOD manpower resources to address the current national security landscape, in which the demands for the generation and employment of soft power are at a premium. The diplomatic instrument’s lack of resources has not gone unnoticed. Even the nation’s top defense official weighed in on this issue. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been a strong advocate for “increasing the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets and increasing their manpower rolls [to] encouraged greater
flexibility within the tools of U.S. power.” The associated implication for DOD manpower resources to address soft power requirements is still unclear.

In addition to apparent manpower shortfalls to address soft power effects, the budget picture for 2007 also illuminates the stark contrast in funding for DOS International Affairs compared to that of the DOD FY07 Total Budget of $510 billion. In figure 10 below, of the $32.6 billion in funding for DOS International Affairs, USAID’s portion is only $4 billion. A similar funding profile is seen with the approved FY07 Supplemental Budget. While the DOD received approval for a total of $173 billion, DOS only received about 1 percent in comparison, or $6.1 billion. Of that portion, USAID received about 5.5 percent of $6.1 billion or roughly $340 million. Clearly, in terms of the magnitude of budgets to support annual requirements and operations abroad, USAID barely makes it onto the chart.

The implication is that only the DOD, not the DOS or USAID, has the budget flexibility to address any immediate and critical requirements. As recent as of November 2008, the Project on National Security Reform (PSNR) also views the interagency system as being “grossly imbalanced . . . [and] supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.” Further, because of the gross imbalance between the military instrument of power and the diplomatic (and developmental) instrument of power, over 20 percent of U.S. bilateral official development assistance, a function of USAID, is currently administered by DOD employees.
Figure 10. Comparison of FY07 Budget and Supplemental Funding

Source: Created by author.

In his plea for funding to hire additional Foreign Service Officers, the President of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), John K. Naland, testified to Congress on the “human capital crisis at the state department” on July 16, 2008. He cites 12 percent to 20 percent of Foreign Service jobs will be vacant or go unfilled due to fully staffing Afghanistan and Iraq requirements. “Unfunded mandates include 325 positions in Iraq, 150 in Afghanistan, 40 in the office to coordinate reconstruction efforts, 100 or more training positions to increase the number of Arabic speakers, and 280 new positions in areas of emerging importance such as China and India.” Moreover, of those positions
able to be filled, 19 percent of employees were in jobs they were not trained for. This is supported by a 2006 GAO study that found up to 29 percent of the Foreign Service did not meet the language requirement associated with their position.\textsuperscript{70} Salient to his testimony is the lack of long-term professional training.

Foreign Service members continue to be shortchanged when it comes to training, especially long-term professional training. As a result, today’s Foreign Service does not have to a sufficient degree the knowledge, skills, abilities, and outlooks needed for 21st century diplomacy. For example, while Army officers are sent to six-to-nine month-long professional education courses three times during their careers, Foreign Service members are rarely offered even one such opportunity. AFSA estimates that less than 20 percent of Foreign Service Officers have had training in negotiating (imagine if only 20 percent of Army officers had been trained to fire a weapon).\textsuperscript{71}

“Meanwhile, the Taliban gains influence,” as the U.S. government continues to under-resource its non-DOD agencies to meet current national security requirements for increased training and employment of soft power, asserts Dr. Cordesman, former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and current Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.\textsuperscript{72}

**Attempting to Address the Problem of Inadequate Resources**

In attempting to address the need for an increased civilian pool with the right deployable expertise, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the lead USG organization within the DOS to oversee reconstruction and stabilization, developed a civilian surge plan in its 2009 budget request. USAID also asked for additional budget to meet current shortfalls. According to the Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations for 2009,

... USAID’s workforce must keep pace with its increasing program management responsibilities for existing and new programs. The Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget aims to strengthen USAID’s operational capacity by
increasing USAID’s permanent Foreign Service Officer corps by 30 percent, supporting more training, and increasing resources for information technology to provide increased accountability in U.S. foreign aid programs.\footnote{73}

Once approved the FY09 budget will provide for a Civilian Response Corps, including a 250-member Active Response Corps, a 2,000-member Standby Corps across civilian Federal agencies, and a 2,000-person Civilian Reserve Corps made up of experts from outside the Federal Government who can quickly deploy in response to crises. This will greatly improve the U.S. civilian response capabilities.\footnote{74} However, as of March 2009, both the civilian surge plan and USAID’s budget request for 300 additional personnel have stalled on Capitol Hill, preventing DOS and USAID from taking on new hires.\footnote{75} The FY10 Budget requested by President Obama continues to “increase the size of the Foreign Service in both the Department of State and the USAID. The U.S. Department of State Budget Highlights states “An increased cadre of State and USAID Foreign Service officers will help advance our critical foreign policy goals and deliver on our expanding U.S. foreign assistance commitments.”\footnote{76} Even if both the FY09 and FY10 budgets were approved by Congress to increase soft power capabilities, there is still a need for further interagency integration and cooperation to ensure unity of effort and to fill the current expertise gap.

The Gap between Current Policy Requirements Compared to the Availability of Resources and Soft Power Expertise

Despite the apparent lack of resources USAID remains committed to the whole-of-government approach. In July 2008, USAID published a Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy citing “improved cooperation is a critical element of stabilization efforts in fragile states, particularly in pre- and post-conflict environments.” In
formalizing and clarifying parameters for USAID’s interaction with the DOD, it establishes a number of guiding principles including the recognition that “USAID is the lead U.S. government agency for U.S. foreign assistance planning and programming . . . [as well as the] principle advisor on development issues.” The policy also spells out USAID’s commitment to the DOD as it “will strengthen ties and its planning, training and implementation capacity to contribute to interagency security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.” DOD Directive 3000.05 is clear in its guidance on the relationship between stability operations and combat operations, as well as broad language for supporting the interagency.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Further, the policy directs U.S. military forces to be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. These tasks include: rebuild indigenous institutions including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; revive or build the private sector, including encouraging economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and develop representative governmental institutions. With the exception of rebuilding security forces, these directed tasks do overlap with USAID’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Moreover, military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout “all phases” of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be “exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.”

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problem, however, is a gap in the current policy requirements compared to the availability of resources and the availability of soft power expertise that currently exists within the USG. The combination of the recently published USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy and DOD Directive 3000.05 present the opportunity and mandate to leverage joint-interagency cooperation and training between the DOD and USAID to further integrate their currently stovepiped efforts.

Summary

Winning the nation’s wars is as much political as it is military. Thus, the nation’s leaders have called for a whole of government approach to take advantage of all of the nation’s instruments of power, including those instruments of soft power. Prior successes with stability operations demonstrate that interagency cooperation can be achieved. It is not that interagency have not or cannot integrate successfully; it is that there is atrophy at work. For OEF and OIF, interagency cooperation at the onset was problematic and took months to integrate and years before unity of effort was achieved at the PRT level. While there are indicators of success at the PRT level, why is it that as a whole USG agencies continue to struggle with cooperation and continue to have stovepiped structures? The answer is the USG has a current expertise gap and still does not have a program, with adequate resources, to facilitate long-term integration by the agencies. Although S/CRS was eventually stood up as an interagency body to ensure integration of interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts, it still lacks a program to institutionalize hard lessons that were relearned by USAID and DOD in OEF and OIF. Chapter 5 offers recommendations to improve interagency cooperation between USAID and the DOD in order to achieve unity of effort, including a formal exchange program.
1Dorman, 29.


4Cordesman, lecture.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.


10Ibid.

11Ibid., 11.

12Ibid.

13Foster.

14Ibid.

16 Bogdanos, 12.


18 Foster, interview.


20 Ibid.

21 Levin, interview.


23 Dorman, 22.


25 Rivera, interview.

26 Dorman, 22.

27 Ibid.

28 Rivera, interview.

29 Ibid.

30 Dorman, 33.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. 38.

33 Ibid. 37.

34 Ibid., 28.

36 Ibid.

37 Jones, 4.

38 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Statement of James R. Kunder.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


44 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Statement of James R. Kunder.


48 Garamone.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Foster, interview.

53 Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-13 - 3-14.

54 Pham, 12.

55 Benjamin T. Delp, “Ethnographic Intelligence (ETHINT) and Cultural Intelligence (CULINT): Employing under-utilized strategic intelligence gathering disciplines for more effective diplomatic and military planning” (Technical paper, James

56 Dorman, 32.

57 Ibid, 33.


59 Bryce Brakman, “Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team: Experience and Lessons Learned” (Brief to Air Force Element, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 28, 2009).


61 Dormant, 28.

62 Ibid.


67 U.S. Agency for International Development, FY09 International Affairs Budget.

American Foreign Service Association, written testimony of John K. Naland.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cordesman, lecture.


McNamara, briefing to JAWS class.


Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new realities while preserving those core competencies and institutional traits that have made them so successful in the past.¹

— Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense

Introduction

As a matter of national security and priority, the nation’s leaders need to do everything they can to ensure lasting interagency cooperation and unity of effort, lest the hard lessons learned from the sacrifices of DOD men and women in uniform, its civilians and those civilians of other U.S. government agencies, once again will atrophy. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD and its complementary soft power interagency partner, USAID, have been asked to take on more diverse roles across a full spectrum of operations including reconstructing bridges and schools, stabilizing governments, creating economic development as well as the traditional role of maneuvering to find, fix and destroy enemy forces in a joint and multinational environment. While these missions and taskings are not necessarily new, lessons learned from recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and, as well as earlier operations involving stability and reconstruction, should be applied vigorously so that neither the DOD nor USAID will need to relearn these lessons in the future.

Proposed and Current Measures to Improve Interagency Cooperation

In 1997, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 established the National Defense Panel which called for the “establishment of an interagency cadre
based on long-term, multi-faceted career development” that includes military and civilians to fill key billets in the national security structures. By February 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century recommended formation of a civil service interagency cadre called the National Security Service Corp, which would allow individuals to have “rotational assignments and professional education” in order to “hold certain positions or to be promoted . . .” In July, 2005 the Center of Strategic and International Studies also proposed a “national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training.” It further recommends that Congress provides the civilian agencies an additional “10 percent float” in manpower billets in order for the program to work.

A July 8, 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress calls for an institutional approach to building a permanent “interagency cadre of national security professionals . . . aimed to adjust the organizational cultures of all agencies with national security responsibilities, in order to make interagency collaboration and integration second nature.” In doing so, it attempts to create a National Security Professional Development Program that would entail education, training, and exchange tours to gain “a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.” However, taking such action requires congressional funding and support and which has been difficult to come by in light of the recent economic difficulties facing the nation. There currently is still a gap to be filled.

In November 2008, the Project on National Security Reform (PSNR) characterized the interagency system as being “grossly imbalanced . . . [and] supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.” Thus, it also
put forth a number of recommendations for interagency reform by calling for a new concept of National Security and begun work on a draft for a new National Security Act.\footnote{7}

Despite these “high level” recommendations there has not been much progress or funding support to properly implement them. Given the current gap, the agencies have had to once again defer to ad hoc efforts in the pursuit of unity of effort. One example is an initiative by the Army National Training Center to employ former USAID personnel with PRT experience to assist in pre-deployment training for soldiers prior to their deployment to a PRT.\footnote{8} Fort Bragg has also implemented a program to train PRT commanders for up to six months prior to deployment, including training opportunities with interagency partners.\footnote{9} USAID recently offered a three-day USAID familiarization course available to military personnel and seven new reconstruction and stabilization training courses are being offered for civilians and military at the Foreign Service Institute.\footnote{10} While these, and similar training opportunities not listed, represent progress toward improved cooperation, they are born of pressing necessities for immediate integration prior to deployments into Afghanistan or Iraq.

From the strategic perspective, the creation of S/CRS did bring about a Washington based interagency decision making body, supported by a full interagency secretariat that performs planning and operations functions. S/CRS, however, has been resource constrained and has not stood up as quickly as designed; thus, it continues to lack an effective program to fully integrate interagency efforts. Although DOD Directive 3000.05 is clear in its guidance on the relationship between stability operations and combat operations, as well as broad language for supporting the agencies, it does not explicitly address interagency cooperation with USAID. What is missing is a “joint-
interagency” policy memorandum between the DOD and USAID to solidify the commitment for improved interagency cooperation between these two agencies. From the operational perspective, as recent as April 16, 2009, the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) published a Unified Common Plan (UCP) with the aim to usurp independent stovepiped efforts that were at times counterproductive and duplicative. The UCP brings together a formalized interagency planning and execution framework to “building Civil Capacity at the regional, provincial, and local level in Iraq.” And while the sum of recent measures indicates a degree of commitment, initiative and leadership in the right direction, they are, by themselves, ad hoc efforts once again at risk of atrophy similar to what took place after successful interagency cooperation efforts post-WWII in Japan and successful CORDS operations in Vietnam.

For lasting improvement in interagency cooperation and the achievement of unity of effort there must be institutional and structural changes in how the agencies operate. Sometimes such institutional changes must be forced, as seen by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which forced “jointness” and “cross-pollination” by the military services. However, as effective as the U.S. military has been in combat, it has been found to be insufficient to address current national security needs in which the requirement for interagency cooperation and application of soft power can be as potent as the application of hard power. Absent a similar act for the agencies to force cooperation, it is still possible to improve interagency cooperation given Presidential commitment and Congressional funding support. After all, interagency cooperation and unity of effort was twice achieved, first in Japan then in Vietnam, with the direction and delegation of
authority from the President and funding from Congress. The following recommendations are meant to improve unity of effort between the DOD and USAID as part of the whole-of-government approach. While senior DOD leaders like Admiral Mullen have admitted “we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments,” the time to act is now.¹³

**Recommendations by the Author**

Presidential commitment and Congressional funding support are requisite ingredients to provide the foundation for lasting unity of effort by USG departments and agencies. Therefore, the President of the United States must reiterate his commitment to strengthening the nation’s soft power capabilities and interagency cooperation with a cover letter to accompany an “Interagency Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy” between the DOD and DOS. This interagency policy with signatures from the DOD, DOS and USAID is necessary to put the weight and flexibility of the military and the policy direction of the DOS behind interagency cooperation with USAID. The signature requirements will also strengthen the DOS and USAID’s cooperation commitment towards the DOD. Although current DOD Directive 3000.05 and USAID’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy call for increased cooperation, this interagency policy with specific implementation guidance, to include a formal interagency exchange program, is the next critical step to merge and integrate each agency’s policy intents. Details of the proposed formal interagency exchange program are as follows.
Proposed DOD and USAID Interagency Exchange Program Guidance

Given the impetus of NSPD 44 and to achieve unity of effort, the DOD and USAID shall work in partnership and with S/CRS to further develop and implement a formal Interagency Exchange Program for DOD and USAID personnel to enhance the employment of soft power effects required by national imperatives. Just as joint assignments have served the DOD extremely well, by integrating combined arms for maximum lethal effects, cross-flow assignments between the DOD and USAID will create the opportunity for both military and civilian officers to better leverage each other’s core competencies through shared information and expertise. Interagency assignments shall be considered important by the participating agencies and officers selected to participate must be duly chosen and developed for advancement.

The exchange program shall be designed to immediately leverage limited resources and expertise to close the current soft power capabilities gap required by the national security landscape and internal policy directives. At the same time, it shall have the foresight to develop longer-term capabilities. While current operations allow ample opportunities for DOD and USAID personnel to work side by side in Afghanistan and Iraq, sustaining current gains between the DOD and USAID at the PRT level cannot be taken for granted and must be safeguarded for the future to prevent atrophy. Thus, the interagency exchange program between the DOD and USAID represents an important step in this direction.

The program shall be managed by an interagency cadre including representation from the DOS, USAID and all services within the DOD. The interagency cadre’s charter will be to provide leadership, management and program development. The agencies shall
take the initiative by calling for an initial cadre of volunteers interested in developing soft power skills to further support and develop the proposed exchange program. A cost estimate will need to be conducted by the cadre to determine the scope of program funding requirements to cover additional billets, education and training programs and other operational funding needs. Once finished, the cadre will work to submit the total funding requirement as part of the President’s annual budget request to Congress.

Proposed Exchange Program Manpower Staffing

The program shall be designed with additional interagency manpower billets and given staffing priority. Officers selected for the program will be designated with a skill identifier to enable effective management for career and long-term development. A sustainable, functional and learning organization must have a proper mix of experienced personnel and novices in the pipeline willing to serve. For long-term viability, the program must put a premium on developing not just senior officers, but also junior to mid-grade officers.

Proposed Education and Training Program

The need to reverse years of imbalance in education and training programs for soft power must be met with decisive action to close the gap on the part of the USG. Interagency education program levels will mirror current military professional education levels. Opportunities will be available at the appropriate time and years of service to receive interagency training and development. The program shall include opportunities currently employed by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) with interagency students, but expanded to include other on-the-job and operational cross-flow
assignments. This opportunity will translate into faster integration at all levels of war and will help achieve unity of effort in future operations.

For both DOD and USAID officers identified to participate in the interagency exchange program, the recommendation for education and training to close the knowledge, skills and abilities gap include a certification program. This certification program shall be designed to maintain foreign language fluency, area and cultural knowledge, leadership and management ability, negotiating skills, public diplomacy know-how, and job-specific functional expertise spelled out in DOD Directive 3000.05. This will include the skills required to rebuild indigenous institutions, judicial systems, private sector, economic sector, necessary infrastructure, and representative governmental institutions. The interagency exchange training program shall work directly with the DOS Foreign Service Institute and the Army’s National Training Center (NTC) to ensure the current deployment training programs being employed endure.

Proposed Interagency Exchange Activities

In addition to training and education, activities related to interagency exchange positions shall have a strong operational focus with the aim of improving unity of effort in the context of civil military operations (CMO) and its associated soft power effects. These activities are designed to further improve operational integration as a follow on to time spent in education and training environments. For instance, a program already exists to send Civil Service personnel on overseas excursion tours when there are no Foreign Service volunteers. There is also a program allowing Civil Service personnel to convert permanently to the Foreign Service. These programs could also be temporarily supplemented with military personnel with the right mix of skill sets, experience and
additional Foreign Service training provided by USAID. Finally, a capstone operational assignment for a DOD officer, at the grade of O-5, would be a position as a PRT commander followed by an assignment to a higher headquarters where operational experience gained can be reintegrated to further improve policies or plans.

An operational assignment exchange for USAID is a seat at the COCOM JIACG to assist with planning. Since USAID Disaster Assistant Response Team (DART) provides specialists trained in a variety of relief skills to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to international disasters, they could be integrated into COCOM JIACGs. These experts understand the needs of the embassy and USAID mission, and have access to other government and NGO networks who understand the cultural norms and practices of the affected country and can offer valuable advice to commanders during planning. COCOM planning for reconstruction and stabilization shall also take into account the balance of security, governance, economic development and societal or cultural norms, a notion that requires the involvement of both military and civilian expertise. This USAID expertise added to the COCOM staff will assist with cultural planning and should eliminate some of the initial obstacles and counterproductive effects seen by those first on the ground in recent conflicts.

The interagency cadre shall work with exchange program participants to develop an Interagency Universal Joint Task Lists (IUJTLs) specific to Reconstruction and Stability Operations in order to have a common language for task planning, training and prioritization. Currently S/CRS has an Essential Task Matrix that provides a framework for contingency reconstruction planning. This task matrix shall be converted into an IUJTL task list for interagency use. This common set of IUJTLs tasks similar to the
UJTLs will facilitate a common understanding of tasks and terms. This will help the DOD and USAID PRT team members to integrate quicker in a training environment, as well as when deployed.

Further, the interagency exchange program participants shall be given the responsibility to capture lessons learned and best practices currently seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, a similar version of the OPA & MNC-I Unified Common Plan could also be implemented in Afghanistan. Lest the USG interagency system repeats the mistakes made in the earlier days of PRT implementation, lessons learned should be captured, institutionalized and archived.

Development of and participation in training and exercises will create a common set of standing operating procedures to improve on the fragile successes achieved in the neighborhoods of Iraq and provinces of Afghanistan. The agencies must “practice like they play.” Although each operation may be inherently different and will come with unique challenges, it will be helpful to establish and codify in doctrine and applicable training manuals a notional PRT task organization that DOD personnel and Foreign Service Officers can familiarize themselves with and train on. One of the strengths of the DOD’s organizational structure is its use of command relationships compared to the USAID practice of a formal coordinating relationship. The DOD’s command structure offers an unambiguous chain of command resulting in clearly defined command relationships and delineation of authority, as well as responsibility. To this end, interagency exchange cadre will support the development of two PRT command structures--one with a military lead and one with a civilian lead. Whether one is preferred over another will be dependent on the level of security in the area of operation.
This structure further ensures unity of effort by assigning interagency personnel under one chain of command, similar to the CORDS structure used during the Vietnam War. As a note of emphasis, however, and in keeping with the views of the SECDEF to guard against the perception of "creeping militarization" of U.S. foreign policy, an exercise with a notional PRT structure should have the military in a lead role to start, but as the exercise progresses it is also very critical to practice transferring authority to a civilian counterpart. The exercise should continue with the civilian counterpart in the lead as the environment becomes more permissive. The rationale is for the military to overcome the friction and reluctance of being subordinate to a civilian leader in an active war zone, as has seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq PRTs.

**Exchange Program Funding**

To achieve long-term unity of effort, executive branch departments and Agencies must have the support of the President of the United States and funding from Congress. A redirection of monetary support to programs aimed at improving interagency cooperation should come from the President, Congress, and the agencies, including DOD and USAID. Without a commitment to long-term funding, the interagency exchange program will fail before it even begins. This cannot and must not be allowed, if the nation is to begin strengthening its soft power capabilities. To be clear, the U.S. military was fully funded and the best organized, trained and equipped with the latest technical means to employ kinetic effects on the eve of September 11, 2001. However, the destruction witnessed that morning offer a humbling reminder that no matter how well the nation’s conventional forces were funded for kinetic effects, it did not ensure the
protection of its citizens from acts of terror by those non-state actors who were willing to commit them.

Of the utmost priority is funding to bolster both S/CRS and USAID manpower shortfalls. These organizations need to immediately hire the personnel required to begin the long rebuilding process to fill the USG’s gap in capabilities for the application of soft power. Next, Congress must provide funding for the additional interagency billets required to support the proposed exchange program, including funding for an initial cadre and exchange program education and operational activities, as outlined above. Without the required funding to support a formalized and sustained interagency exchange program, it will be next to impossible for the agencies, including DOD and USAID, to close the current soft power capabilities gap and will prevent lasting progress towards interagency cooperation between these agencies.

Additional Research

For future research, specific USAID, DOD, or service specific billets and skills most suitable for the interagency exchange program need to be explored. An analysis should also be conducted to include other DOS billets into the exchange program. In addition, as monetary constraints have impeded interagency cooperation, additional research should be done on the current fiscal funding process with the goal of improving flexibility and efficiencies. As it stands, current fiscal law is fairly restrictive and cumbersome to execute. It is not conducive to the flexible sharing of resources across appropriations “intra-agency,” much less being conducive to the flexible sharing of resources interagency. Moreover, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction website has a number of comprehensive audit reports pointing to even more potential
areas for research, including reports on current PRT performance and issues related to reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Finally, for further comparative analysis on the whole of government’s role in conducting stability operations in a counterinsurgency fight, one could further analyze the proposed *Counterinsurgency: Perception of the Local Population Model* against prior counterinsurgency conflicts such as the Philippines and Vietnam or current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. From the whole of government perspective, figure 11 below proposes a new model for understanding how to win the heart and mind of the local population.

![Counterinsurgency: Perception of the Local Population Model](image)

**Figure 11.** Counterinsurgency: Perception of the Local Population Model  
*Source:* Created by author.
Most discussions involving counterinsurgency operations take a U.S. centric view. This model proposes that in order to win a counterinsurgency fight, the USG must not look at nation building from its own view, but the view of the local population. In this type of protracted struggle, the center of gravity (COG) is the will of the people to either support the host government or the insurgency. The will of the people is attained through their hearts and minds, which is grounded in culture and history, and is not likely to change overnight or even over the course of years. This counterinsurgency COG is supported by three legs: an effective military that can provide security, an effective civil capacity to provide governance, and long-term capital resources to sustain the war. Instability in any one of these legs will result in an unstable peace.

Summary

To sum up the paramount importance of achieving unity of effort, this thesis, once again, borrows the words of an anonymous PRT member, “We need to do everything we can to ensure the PRTs can do their work. When we succeed, the Iraqis can run the country themselves and we can go home. We are, in a sense, the exit strategy.”\textsuperscript{16} As a matter of national security and priority, the nation’s leaders need to do everything they can to ensure lasting interagency cooperation and unity of effort lest the hard lessons, learned from the sacrifices of DOD men and women in uniform, its civilians and those civilians of other U.S. government agencies, once again atrophy. Interagency cooperation must start months, if not years, before the first boots hit the ground, in order to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the local population in a far away land.

Improved unity of effort between the DOD and USAID can be achieved with a continued shift, not only in thinking but also in practice, and supported by adequate resources. The
implementation of a joint-interagency policy followed by the proposed formal
interagency exchange program between the DOD and USAID, would represent a serious
commitment on the part of the nation’s leaders to generate lasting soft power capabilities
to complement its unrivaled hard power capabilities. The promise for interagency
cooperation during peace might in fact be proven to be a powerful institutional lever to
achieve unity of effort during a contingency or during times of war.

1Kruzel.
3Ibid., 4.
5Dale, 1.
6Project for National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, vii.
7Ibid, iv.
8Dan Ricci, (written comment provided during thesis seminar discussion, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 18, 2009).
9Brakman, Brief to Air Force Element.
10McNamara, Briefing to JAWS class.
12Dale, 6.
13Garamone.


16 Dorman, 39.
APPENDIX A

AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR USAID AND DOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Agency for International Development</th>
<th>Department of Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. USAID directs all developmental assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, Title II (“Food for Peace”) and similar legislation. USAID Focus: (1) Agriculture, (2) The Environment, (3) Child Survival, (4) HIV/AIDS, (5) Population planning, and basic education.</td>
<td>a. Under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the DOD's responsibility include the following: (1) Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. (2) Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests. (3) Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. USAID administers a wide variety of programs in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. It administers certain US bilateral assistance programs including the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund; the Development Assistance (DA) account, and other specialized DA accounts for credit programs and disaster assistance; the Economic Support Fund; Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States; Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union under the Freedom Support Act; and Public Law 480, title II (“Food For Peace”).</td>
<td>b. The President of the United States. The President exercises authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. USAID is also the principal agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Agency administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and longterm humanitarian assistance in response to disasters as declared by the ambassador (also known as the COM) within the affected country or higher Department of State authority. USAID/OFDA may also expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and other sources of relief capacity.</td>
<td>c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the SecDef. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef and transmits communications between the SecDef and combatant commanders and overseas activities of combatant commanders as directed by the SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. The Administrator of USAID is the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.</td>
<td>d. Secretary of Defense. The SecDef is the principal authority to the President for all DOD matters, with authority, direction, and control over the entire Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. When a disaster declaration has been made by the Ambassador, USAID coordinates the USG response. The Director of OFDA has primary responsibility for initiating this response. The Administrator of USAID, as the Special Coordinator, has delegated the authority to coordinate response to international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under the Agency’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. USAID/OFDA responsibilities include: (1) Organize and coordinate the total USG disaster relief response. (2) Respond to embassy and /or mission requests for disaster assistance. (3) Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation. (4) Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.</td>
<td>e. The Military Departments. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the combatant commands. This administrative control provides for the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by the SecDef to another component.</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. NSDP 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, provided more emphasis on building civil capacity including reconstruction and stabilization programs and projects in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a Provincial Reconstruction Team. These programs include infrastructure projects, economic development and governance to achieve long-term stabilization.</td>
<td>f. Combatant Commanders. Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.</td>
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Figure 12. Authority and Responsibilities for USAID and DOD

### USAID Capabilities and Core Competencies

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID Capabilities and Core Competencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. To respond to longer-term, complex emergencies such as civil strife, population displacement, and other manmade disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To provide useful, and at times critical, information in these areas through its collection of data on US disaster assistance, world disaster histories, US and other donor country actions in case reports, country preparedness reports, and commodity use.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. To obligate up to $50,000 in cash, in cooperation with the US embassy or mission, for supplies or services to assist disaster victims (the Agency’s International Disaster Assistance budget includes a $75 million appropriation each year for contingency operations).</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. To make cash grants to local government relief organizations or international voluntary agencies handling emergency relief.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. To purchase needed relief supplies.</td>
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<td>f. To access important data through its Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System.</td>
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<td>g. To transport relief supplies to the affected country.</td>
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<td>h. To reimburse other USG agencies for disaster relief services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. To acquire disaster relief supplies from OFDA stockpiles.</td>
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<td>j. To provide additional funds to support activities in the following essential sectors: shelter, water and sanitation, health, food, logistics, and technical assistance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. To maintain stockpiles of standard relief commodities in Maryland (United States), Panama, Italy, Guam, and Thailand.</td>
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</table>

Figure 13. USAID Capabilities and Core Competencies

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES MILITARY CAPABILITIES

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<th>UNITED STATES MILITARY CAPABILITIES</th>
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<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
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<td>Defense Operations</td>
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<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
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<td>Nuclear Deterrence and/or Warfare</td>
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<td>Strategic Attack</td>
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<td>General Air Superiority</td>
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<td>General Ground Superiority</td>
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<td>General Naval Superiority</td>
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<td>(Force Protection)</td>
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<td>Direct Action</td>
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<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
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<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>General Space Superiority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex Contingency Operations</td>
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</table>

Figure 14. United States Military Capabilities

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Sources


Other Sources


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