TOWARDS UNIFIED CONVENTIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Joint Operations

by

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Towards Unified Conventions

Interagency transformation has the potential to radically increase the strategic and operational capacities of the U.S. Government’s interagency system. This transformation will require changes to the structure and processes employed by the interagency system. This study explores options such as expanding the Executive Office of the President, expanding the role of the National Security Council, or creating an Office of National Strategy as part of interagency transformation. This study also draws conclusions regarding the costs and benefits of these forms of transformation, the possible mechanisms that could drive transformation, and the need to determine guiding principles that will determine how the interagency system will be employed. This study examines the interconnection between governmental structure, processes, and models of multi-lateral contention.

Transformation, National Security Reform, Interagency Doctrine, Unified Conventions
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

TOWARDS UNIFIED CONVENTIONS, by Michael Longacre, 128 pages.

Interagency transformation has the potential to radically increase the strategic and operational capacities of the U.S. Government’s interagency system. This transformation will require changes to the structure and processes employed by the interagency system. This study explores options such as expanding the Executive Office of the President, expanding the role of the National Security Council, and creating an Office of National Strategy as part of interagency transformation. This study also draws conclusions regarding the costs and benefits of these forms of transformation, the possible mechanisms that could drive transformation, and the need to determine guiding principles that will determine how the interagency system will be employed. This study examines the interconnection between governmental structure, processes, and models of multi-lateral contention.
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<td>Appropriate Responsible Geographic Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability</td>
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<td>DNS</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine proposals for reorganizing the U.S. Government’s interagency system to allow for more efficient whole of government engagement.

Background
Developing combined arms and joint operations capacity were major stumbling blocks to the U.S. military. However, developing both of these capabilities greatly increased the military’s ability to fight and win wars on our nation’s behalf.

In the last twenty years the U.S. military has significantly increased its capability to conduct joint operations. Prior to this period the military was already proficient at combined arms operations; however, a congressionally mandated reorganization of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the form of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the creation of joint doctrine matched to the reorganization, unlocked massive additional military potential.

This potential was demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which gave the U.S. military an opportunity to showcase the revised DOD structure and the recently developed complimentary doctrine. During the Gulf War an unprecedented degree of synchronization took place at the operational level. For example, every last aircraft in the theater (and some from outside the theater) were subordinated to a single air component commander and tasked in a daily Air Tasking
Order (ATO). The ATO allowed targeting staff and logistics planners alike to assign specific aircraft to specific missions, as well as to schedule required maintenance in such a way that over 95 percent of available flight hours were used in the most efficient way possible. This “air campaign” served as a shaping operation that allowed the ground maneuver forces to make short work of the opposing Iraqi ground forces.

This degree of synchronization of air assets had never occurred before in the history of armed conflict. It was made possible by the combination of two main factors: the reorganization of the DOD by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the subsequent development of new doctrine to make optimal use of joint forces in major combat operations.

Prior to developing this joint operations capability, Congress and many senior military officers knew that the military wasn’t living up to its full potential, but weren’t sure how to achieve this potential.

Similarly, today many senior government officials recognize the need for increased capability in whole of government activity, but have not developed a mechanism to actualize the government’s full potential.

If the combination of reorganizing the interagency system and the development of unified conventions could do for the instruments of national power what the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization and subsequent development of the “Operations” doctrine did for joint operations, then the U.S. would possess an unprecedented ability to come out ahead of its enemies and competitors.

Furthermore, countries that have developed the means to wage war in light of developed theories concerning the conduct of war have been more successful than those
who have not done so. An example from history is the German Wehrmacht during the 1930s. Heinz Guderian developed a concept of deep battle predicated on rapid exploitation of enemy weaknesses by utilizing rapid maneuver. The development of this concept allowed the Wehrmacht to develop the equipment, organizational structure, and finally developed doctrine required to conduct this kind of war. In other words, Germany developed their means in light of the ways in which they intended to achieve national ends. In a similar process described in the book *The Third Wave*, by Alvin and Heidi Toffler, the U.S. military developed an operational concept in the 1980s and then developed equipment and organizations designed to execute this concept. Although this concept metamorphosized prior to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the fruits of this operational concept (and the equipment and organizations designed to execute it) achieved overwhelming military successes in these operations.

**Primary Research Question**

What conceptual model of governmental structure and policies will maximize U.S. potential to synchronize the instruments of national power while contending with competing stakeholders on the global stage?

**Secondary and Tertiary research questions:**

To address the primary research question, the following secondary and tertiary questions must be answered:

1. What is the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government?
   a. What structures exist within the U.S. Government to manage the interagency process?
b. What laws and directives form the interagency system of the U.S. Government?

c. What documents are used to manage the interagency structure and processes of the U.S. Government?

2. What are the critiques of the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government?

   a. What organizational imperfections exist in the configuration of the U.S. Government’s interagency structure?

   b. What functional imperfections exist in the interagency processes of the U.S. Government’s interagency system?

3. What recommendations exist concerning improving the configuration and function of the U.S. Government interagency structure?

   a. What recommendations exist concerning the configuration of possible future U.S. Government interagency structures?

   b. What recommendations exist concerning the functions of possible future U.S. Government interagency systems?

   c. What recommendations exist concerning the methods of implementing changes to the U.S. Government interagency composition and function?

Assumptions

This study presumes four main assumptions: (1) that national security and interagency reform will occur in the next few years due to the large body of current thought advocating such reform; (2) that there is a feasible, suitable solution that dramatically increases the ability to project national power; (3) that hints as to how to
achieve this potential exist among existing criticisms of the current U.S. Governmental interagency structure and among proposals by various governmental scholars on how to rectify perceived shortcomings within the government; and (4) that any proposed changes to governmental structure must maintain indisputable legitimacy of the government.

Definitions of Key Terms

Listed below are key terms relevant to this study. These terms are based on a variety of sources to include governmental policy, professional vernacular, and joint doctrine. These definitions will assist the reader in understanding the concepts and the subsequent analysis contained in this paper. Many of the terms below come from existing sources; however, other terms are not found in existing literature. This paper presents them to aid the discussion on interagency transformation.

Comprehensive Approach: A term used to describe multi-lateral activities that include multi-national and multiple nongovernmental organizations working together to achieve goals based on relatively common interests. This term is defined in Army Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

Instruments of National Power: The collective body of precursor conditions and governmental functions that allow nations to influence the world around them. They are Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME). This term is commonly accepted among governmental practitioners.

Interagency Management System (IMS): This planning and execution framework is used for reconstruction and stability operations in post-conflict scenarios. This system was developed by the Department of State
Interagency Process: The functional procedures and methods that are employed by the interagency structure. This term encompasses whole of government (unilateral) and comprehensive (unified and multilateral) approaches. This study introduces this term in order to delineate between interagency activity and interagency structure, as well as to show their relation to the interagency system.

Interagency Structure: The physical composition of the U.S. Government, specifically within the Executive Office of the President. This study introduces this term in order to delineate between interagency processes and interagency organization, as well as to show their relation to the interagency system.

Interagency System: This term refers to the manner in which the interagency structure applies interagency processes. As the name suggests, the interagency system is a system composed of multiple interdependent entities. This study introduces this term in order to show a combination of interagency processes and structure.

Joint Doctrine: Fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. According to doctrine, Joint Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application. This term is commonly accepted by governmental practitioners.

National Chain of Command: The clear and precise chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to military commanders that allows for the employment of military capabilities with legitimate license. This mechanism preserves political freedom by safeguarding the political process from illegitimate control. This mechanism also separates the Executive ability to direct the actions of the military from
the Legislative ability to raise and support a military establishment. This concept is commonly understood by governmental practitioners.

**National Interests:** These are the driving considerations that drive nations to act in their best interests whether they are diplomatic, military, economic, or cultural. These represent the motivations to act. This concept has historically been expressed by the related political science terms *raison d’etat* and *real politick* which collectively expresses how nations act for their own benefit and not in the interests of higher ideals. This term is commonly understood in the field of political science.

**National Security:** Refers to protecting national interests through the any of multiple mechanisms including the instruments of national power. This term is commonly accepted by governmental practitioners.

**National Security Apparatus:** Refers to the portion of the interagency system that is dedicated to protecting the national interest, as well as the nation itself. This study uses this term to delineate between the interagency system and those portions of the system that are dedicated to national security.

**Operational:** This term is used in two separate professional contexts: (1) The first refers to one of the three levels of war in Joint military doctrine. The three levels are tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical activities refer to localized actions by small and medium sized units. Strategic activities refer to national level activities conducted by large organizations. *Operational activities* refer to theater level activities that link tactical actions with strategic goals. This context is rooted in military doctrine. (2) The second context uses the term in regard to *operational capacity*; meaning that an organization has
the capacity to conduct activities that accomplish goals, as opposed to issuing policies that define goals. This context is rooted in common speech.

**Unified Activities**: The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. This term is presented in Army Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

**Unified Conventions**: Fundamental principles that guide the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve common endstates, conditions, and/or objectives. This term encompasses both policies and doctrine. This study introduces this as a new term.

**Whole of Government**: Describes unilateral activities of the nation conducted using the broad capabilities of the entire interagency system. This approach describes the actions of just the U.S. Government, however, whole of government activities allow participation in multi-lateral activities through application of the comprehensive approach and unified action. This term is taken from Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

**Whole of Government Engagement Model**: This is a conceptual construct that allows both strategic and operational level interagency synchronization of the instruments of national power. This model allows increased capability to engage in global competition against a variety of competing entities and adversaries in times of peace as well as in times of war. This model differs from the IMS in that the IMS is designed for post-conflict reconstruction and stability, whereas the whole of government engagement
model is designed as a means of conflict and reaches far beyond reconstruction and stability. This study introduces this as a new term.

Limitations

This project explores reforming the structure and processes of the U.S. Government’s interagency system, particularly those elements most closely related to our national security apparatus. This restructuring would rely on a body of policies and doctrine, collectively referred to as unified conventions, which would allow for maximized efficiency in coordinating the instruments of national power in such a way as to make maximum use of the structure of the national security apparatus. This study, however, does not present a detailed exploration of unified conventions, but rather suggests that a concept or framework of how the government will wield the instruments of national power is critical in reaching truly informed decisions on restructuring the U.S. Government interagency structure. In other words, the proper means cannot be developed without an understanding of what the ways will be.

Trends identified in research indicate several possible approaches to reforming the interagency system; this thesis explores the strengths and weaknesses of each. This study includes exploration of organizational structures and administrative procedures allowing the most efficient application of national power. This exploration includes delineating new responsibilities, relationships, and products produced by governmental entities in order to accomplish their respective roles.
Scope and Delimitations

Due to the broad scope of this project, it is not possible to explore many of the above issues in great depth. In that regard, this study introduces the concept of unified conventions to stress that a whole of government engagement model is required in order to properly discuss how the interagency system could best operate.

This project focuses primarily on legislation that would change the structure of agencies and departments within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). This study also acknowledges that changes would also be likely within other parts of the government as well, particularly in the structure of Congressional committees and sub-committees in order to provide oversight to possible realigned elements of the EOP. However, this study does not address reform to the structure of the Legislature.

This project does not produce a draft version of actual doctrine. Doctrine suggests a highly refined way of doing business. This project merely suggests that a broad understanding of how the government will wield the instruments of national power is required in order to arrive at logical conclusions about what the composition and functional roles will be within the interagency structure that will employ those assets and techniques.

This project does not attempt to present a draft of actual legislation that would reorganize the government. Rather, this project makes several recommendations on interagency reform including interagency structure and processes that could be included in future legislation. Again, this is not an exhaustive, all inclusive set of recommendations; instead it represents several concepts that could be included in a larger body of interagency reform legislation.
Significance

The U.S. Government currently has no doctrine or set of conventions for applying the instruments of national power. The nation has laws that require particular actions and the production of multiple documents that guide U.S. policy, but there is no body of doctrine that tells members of government how to apply these instruments as a system or how to synchronize their application. This study helps to underline the importance of a guiding framework to inform systematic reform.

The U.S. Government will gain an unprecedented ability to shape the world around us to our benefit by creating complimentary governmental structures and a conceptual framework for the synchronization of the elements of national power that is designed to work with the organizational structure.

However, the specific doctrine and conventions that compliment the new structure cannot truly be developed until the exact composition and functions of the new governmental interagency structure is determined, although a rough concept of how this structure will be employed is useful in determining what the structure should be.

This study also draws attention to possible second and third order effects of many theorists’ proposals. Increased understanding of these second and third order effects will enable making more informed decisions regarding interagency reform.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of the literature review is to evaluate existing literature relevant to this thesis and to identify gaps between existing study and the research questions identified in chapter 1.

Organization

This chapter begins with a summary of the types of literature reviewed during the course of this study and then proceeds to a more in-depth discussion of the most relevant pieces used in this study.

Summary of Literature

Five types of literature are relevant to this study: (1) The first is joint doctrine. This body of writing serves as a guide for military commanders and staffs to conceptualize how the military instrument of national power may be best employed. (2) Second is the immense volume of thought in service school papers as well as professional military and national security related journals. Articles and papers of particular relevance were those critiquing the current structure and function of the U.S. Government, as well as proposing organizational change. (3) Third are the reports on governmental policy, structures, and functions compiled by the Congressional Research Service. These reports quickly and accurately outline issues related to the current structure and function of the U.S. Government. (4) Fourth, this study examines the work done by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) which is a body of highly respected governmental
scholars, current and former members of the military, as well as current and former members of government. (5) Finally, this study makes use of U.S. Code and Presidential Directives as primary sources to examine the exact requirements and prohibitions placed on U.S. Governmental structures and functions.

Significant Literature

Joint Doctrine

Joint Publications are the doctrinal documents that serve as guidelines to inform members of the military how to think about conducting joint military operations, as opposed to what to think about conducting joint military operations. They establish joint expectations and perceptions. Joint doctrine defines the role of doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

The three most noteworthy Joint Publications in regard are: (1) JP 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (2) JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and (3) JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*. These publications are the three fundamental Joint Publications and collectively serve as the keystone to Joint Operations and Joint military application.

Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, defines in broad terms why we have a military and how the military fits in with the other instruments of national power. It also describes how the military fits into the national level chain of command. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, provides a framework for conceptualizing how the military acts while conducting joint operations. And Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, outlines planning considerations that allow
joint commanders and staffs to organize the commander’s concepts into logical sequences that will accomplish desired military endstates.

Service School Papers and Professional Journals

These works providing samples of current and historical professional thoughts regarding interagency and defense reform. This study categorized papers and articles into three areas: (1) existing structure, (2) criticisms, and (3) suggestions.

There is a significant record regarding the NSA of 1947 and the GNA of 1986. The vast majority of historical papers and articles concerning governmental reform address the GNA. Summaries of the provisions of the act and their contributions to national defense abound throughout service school papers and professional journals. The most useful and concise article is *Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols* by James Locher. This article is older (written in 1996) and discusses the goals of the GNA and assesses the progress towards achieving these goals ten years later. Other works were more detailed and covered the history of national security reform from prior to the NSA of 1947 and progressing through post GNA of 1986. One particularly informative work was: *Organizing for National Security*, which is a collection of papers edited by Douglas Stuart. This collection offered a detailed history of many of the behind the scene events that helped to create our current national security apparatus. Four papers were of special significance in researching both historical or conceptual background on the national security apparatus and proposed changes to that apparatus. These papers were (1) *Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education*, a School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph written by Robert Smith, (2) *An Interagency Reform Act: Preparing for Post-Conflict Operations in the 21st Century*, a U.S. Army
Another large body of papers and articles concerned the “beyond Goldwater-Nichols” concept that recommends changes to interagency structure and functions in light of perceived shortcomings in the current system. Four of these papers are mentioned above (Smith, Luscynski, McKinney, and Halvorsen). An additional service school paper that offers deep insights into interagency reorganization is “Transforming the National Security Council: Interagency Authority, Organization, Doctrine,” which is a U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project by Clay Runzi. This paper focuses more on proposed changes to the system than it does on the history of national security. Several articles were of special significance, these are: (1) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, by Peter Chiarelli; (2) Death of the Combatant Command; Toward a Joint Interagency Approach, by Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Davis, and Lee Wight; and (3) In Search of Harmony, Orchestrating ‘The Interagency’ for the Long War, by Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley. These articles offer short explanations of problems within the national security system and present brief explanations of solutions that could potentially solve these problems.

Several papers offered critiques of the existing governmental interagency structure and process. Three major contributing works with in-depth critical analysis
were: (1) an occasional paper titled *Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2*, by Michael Donley. (2) *Solving the Interagency Puzzle*, by Sunil Desai, and (3) *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* a report by Michele Flournoy. These three works examine at great length the issues that cause the most problems within the national security apparatus and the larger interagency system.

**Reports by the Congressional Research Service**

The Congressional Research Service prepares reports at the request of Congress. These reports may serve as generally educational material or may be commissioned to inform and support particular important decisions. This study makes use of two reports prepared to provide general background to members of Congress on the National Security Strategy and the creation of executive departments.

The report on the National Security Strategy outlines the statutory requirements regarding the publication of the NSS and each of its subordinate documents. This document offers concise summaries of what is included in each document, who publishes it, and special consideration for those documents.

The report on the creation of executive departments was published as background information when Congress developed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The report examines congressional history in creating cabinet positions and cabinet departments within the executive branch of government. The study identified legal precedence in the legislative branch of government passing laws regarding the executive branch without amending the Constitution.
Project on National Security Reform

The PNSR is an ongoing project. Its senior guiding coalition includes a former Speaker of the House of Representatives and multiple former Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense. As its name suggests, the subject of the project is reform related to national security, not necessarily to reform of the larger interagency system, to include all interagency processes. The PNSR Preliminary Findings Report was particularly useful in identifying critiques of the existing interagency structure. The critiques outlined in this report are articulated by practitioners of national security and governmental function who are highly experienced in governmental management and know firsthand the shortcomings of the existing interagency system. This report is perhaps the most far-reaching analytical review of criticisms of and shortcomings within our national security apparatus. The PNSR Preliminary Findings Report identifies seven fundamental insights and seven imperatives regarding interagency structure and function. This study integrates many of these insights and imperatives into the sections on critiques of our existing interagency structure and on recommendations for change.

U.S. Code and Presidential Directives

These laws and directives are the base documents that create organizations, assign specific powers, set specific limits on powers, as well as define relationships for these organizations and the individuals who work within them. Many of these primary source documents are difficult to use in their original form due to numerous amendments after they became law. Other updated versions of these same documents that include the amendments do not accurately reflect the legislation at the time it first became law. This
study made frequent use of secondary sources to track the dates and major significance of changes to legislation.

This study makes use of three legislative acts: (1) the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, (2) the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986, and (3) the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002. All of these laws specify and prohibit specific powers of national security actors, create new organizations, and attempt to make the executive office of the President more responsive to the President’s needs.

Congress passed NSA 1947 in order to correct deficiencies in the national security and defense systems of the U.S. that were identified during WWII. This act represents the most far reaching national security reform in the history of the U.S.

Congress passed the GNA of 1986 to achieve eight specific objectives mainly centered around improving military advice to the President, reinforcing civilian control of the military, creating unity of command with the GCCs, and strengthening joint military organizations.


This study also makes use of Four Presidential Directives: (1) Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56); (2) National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1); (3) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1 (HSPD-1); and (4) National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44).
President William Clinton issued PDD 56 in 1997. This directive provides policy guidance on interagency activities designed to achieve unity of effort related to complex contingency operations. The Directive formally established the “lead agency” construct that designates specific governmental agencies as the primary planner for particular contingency operations.

President George W. Bush issued NSPD-1 in 2001. The document restructured the National Security Council (NSC) forming both regional and functional Policy Coordination Committees, and abolished several categories of working groups within the council. The directive also specified additional non-statutory attendees of the NSC Principals Committee meetings.

President George W. Bush issued HSPD-1 in 2001. The directive established the Homeland Security Council (HSC), which is one of the President’s three primary councils. This directive is still in effect and is supplemented by the above mentioned HSA of 2002.

President George W. Bush issued NSPD-44 in 2005. This directive formally replaced President Clinton’s PDD 56 of 1997. NSPD-44 outlines interagency guidance for Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) in order to promote national security through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization effort for foreign states. The directive specifies the Department of State as the primary instrument to coordinate the U.S. Government’s involvement in failed or failing states. The directive also created the position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (CRS) who was intended to act as the lead in coordinating R&S activities.
Gaps in the Record

There are significant doctrinal and conceptual gaps concerning interagency reform. The major gap is in the lack of developed theory on the ways in which the means will be employed. This issue is largely beyond the scope of this study, but demands recognition.

Military doctrine identifies and defines the whole of government and unified approaches, in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*; however, this doctrine does not speak authoritatively for any part of the government outside of the military. This study did not identify an interagency doctrine, or even refined conceptual bodies of thought on how to employ the whole of government in a unified context.

Another element regarding interagency reform that is notably absent are proposals that include multiple new organizations to manage separate functions of the interagency system. Although many authors recommend the creation of specific agencies and organizations, none of them recommend multiple organizations.

Trends

The above works represent a large body of very intelligent work concerning interagency reform. This study identified one major trend in the literature: legislative reform. The general consensus among most governmental scholars and practitioners is that it is time for an interagency reform act that will do for the U.S. whole of government what the GNA did for the DOD. There are several other trends within this overarching trend. There are: (1) centralized councils, (2) regional oriented organizations, (3) interagency culture, (4) interagency doctrine, and (5) interagency training.
Centralized Councils: much of the writing recommends: (1) expanding the role of existing agencies and councils; (2) combining existing organizations; or (3) creating new organizations that will provide a centralized forum for all activities related to the best interests of U.S. These recommendations span a broad range of possible solutions and most of these include further centralizing national authorities.

Regionally oriented councils: many theorists recommend the creation of regionally oriented agencies or organizations to either advise the President on interagency matters or to act as deputized authorities to issue orders on behalf of the President regarding specific regions. These recommendations tend to be relatively specific in regard to organizational structure, leadership arrangements, and specific responsibilities.

Interagency culture: this trend is particularly pronounced with theorist and practitioners with military experience. This trend is most likely due to the military experience with the GNA that, among other goals, aimed to create joint military culture. The general trend is that interagency culture will be heavily related to building a pool of interagency professionals who are conversant with multiple instruments of national power and understand how these instruments interrelate.

Interagency doctrine: many theorists recommend creating an organization composed of representatives of the various existing governmental agencies that would develop doctrine regarding interagency activities. However, these all suggest that this will be done post reorganization and that doctrine will be developed to determine how to use the interagency organization after it is reorganized.
Interagency training: much of the reviewed literature recommends training interagency related topics at either existing governmental educational institutions, or creating new institutions to perform this role.

A disturbing trend is that interagency reform is universally addressed without a detailed conception of how exactly each of the instruments of national power are interrelated and without a conceptual formalized framework for transitioning between various forms of conflict. As noted, much of the literature addresses doctrine, but merely states that interagency reform must create organizations to design interagency doctrine. None of the studies suggest that a concept of interagency doctrine should inform the actual process of interagency reform.

Significance of Thesis in Relation to Existing Literature

This study departs from existing literature in several ways. First, this study identifies the need to develop a concept of unified conventions in order to truly evaluate the exact purposes of new (or revised) governmental organizations, specific organizational structures, specified responsibilities, and prohibited activities required in order to enact meaningful interagency reform.

This study uses the vast amount of research previously conducted on the topic of interagency transformation. The critiques and suggested changes serve as a point of departure that allows further analysis by this study in order to examine the merits and difficulties of the most common trends in recommended courses of action.
Chapter Summary

Legislation and Presidential Directives organize the U.S. Governmental structure, and outline its interagency processes. Therefore changing these structures and processes will require legislative reform and possibly Presidential directives. Current military doctrine provides guidance regarding one instrument of national power; however, it is the most developed guidance regarding any one of these instruments. The other agencies and departments within the government have written policies, but do not have developed doctrine or conventions that inform how to think about their operations and activities.

The PNSR Preliminary Findings Report identifies many shortcomings of the interagency system. In addition to that study, service school papers, and articles from professional journals serve to critique the national system and to provide suggestions on possible solutions to many of the identified problematic issues.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Again, the purpose of this thesis is to examine proposals for reorganizing the U.S. Government to allow for more efficient whole of government engagement. This chapter describes the methodology used to explore organizational proposals.

Organization

In order to answer the research questions posed in Chapter One, this study addresses three main topics to include: (1) existing governmental structure, (2) critiques of our existing interagency structure and process, and (3) recommendations for changing our interagency structure and processes. These three topics are tied directly to the three secondary research questions.

Prior to discussing the various research methods used during the course of this study, this chapter describes how the study gathered information, what research criteria were used to determine the relevance of available information, and describes the individual blocks of research used to organize the study. After discussing the specific research methods employed by this study, this chapter then addresses the positive and negative attributes of the adopted approach and the actions taken to obviate these identified weaknesses.

Steps Taken to Obtain Information

This thesis makes extensive use of existing U.S. Joint Military doctrine, military theory, U.S. legislation, Presidential directives, white papers, and professional journals.
Current military doctrine was available on the Command and General Staff College Student SharePoint web portal. This study accessed current doctrine from this source. Outdated, but historically relevant doctrinal material was obtained through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library historical collection. White papers on developing joint doctrine were also available on the Joint Electronic Library. This thesis makes extensive use of web-based research on the Combined Arms Research Library using data-based service school academic papers, professional journal articles, military and interagency white papers, as well as other primary and secondary sources. Further standard web based searches were conducted as required to obtain additional material. Academic advisors and senior military officers also informed the search effort on occasions when other research did not yield required results.

Research Criteria

Overhauling the interagency process is a complex issue that requires exploration from multiple angles. Initial research included additional focus on broad conceptual models regarding interagency doctrine and unified conventions. However, as this study progressed it became clear that addressing doctrine to integrate the instruments of national power is too broad a subject for a Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis.

The research investigated the current layout of U.S. Government structure and methods of coordinating the instruments of national power. This investigation included as primary sources legislation and presidential directives that mandate governmental structure and the production of guiding documents. Due to the many revisions and amendments to national security legislation, this study made use of secondary sources to
track the timelines and additional considerations behind subsequent revisions to national security legislation. As discussed, this study does not make use of case studies, but does give special attention to the GNA due to its relevance to national security reform. The special considerations embodied in this legislation are likely to be applicable to future transformation, especially in regard to national security. This study investigates multiple sources of criticism of the existing interagency system. These criticisms include studies that are internal to the government and those of independent national security specialists.

There is a large body of work currently in progress on national security and interagency reform. This study makes extensive use of two of these projects preliminary findings and criticisms of existing governmental structure, using them to draw conclusions about future governmental structure. However, this study does not include the work in progress of these studies or changes to government structure within the last year, because of the nascent nature of these works and preliminary forms of new offices.

There is also a large body of work that addresses recommendations for national security reform. This study makes use of these to identify broad trends that may be categorized into like groups for further analysis and evaluation.

Research Methodology

To answer the research questions raised in chapter 1, this study divided the research into three secondary questions. To review, they are: (1) What is the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government? (2) What are the critiques of the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government? and (3) What recommendations exist concerning improving the configuration and function of the U.S. Government interagency structure? In order to answer these secondary research
questions, this study divided the research into the following three complimentary areas: (1) Existing U.S. Government Structure, (2) Criticisms of Existing U.S. Governmental Structure, and finally, and (3) existing proposals for interagency reform.

Existing U.S. Governmental Structure

This block of research is designed to determine the interagency structure of the U.S. Government, the laws and directives that mandate the structure, as well as the processes and supporting documents that are required in order to make the national security apparatus function. This block serves as a point of departure from which to address reorganization of the interagency structure of the U.S. Government. This block of research includes existing laws, directives, and policy that govern the manner in which the U.S. Government applies the elements of national power. This block of research is tied to secondary research question number one: What is the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government? and its supporting tertiary research questions: (a) What structures exist within the U.S. Government to manage the interagency process? (b) What laws and directives form the interagency system of the U.S. Government? (c) What documents are used to manage the interagency structure and processes of the U.S. Government?

Critiques of Existing U.S. Governmental Structure

This block of research is designed to identify critiques of the existing U.S. Governmental structure. This block of research focuses on criticisms made by governmental scholars, governmental experts, and members of government. This study does not introduce independent critiques of the U.S. Governmental model. This block of
research is tied to secondary research question number two What are the critiques of the existing interagency system employed by the U.S. Government? and its supporting tertiary research questions: (a) What organizational imperfections exist in the configuration of the U.S. Government’s interagency structure? (b) What functional imperfections exist in the interagency processes of the U.S. Government’s interagency system?

Existing Proposals for Interagency Reform

This block of research is designed to identify requirements and solutions that others have suggested for integrating interagency activities into a comprehensive whole of government process. This block of research identifies common trends in these recommendations and categorizes them into like groupings for further analysis and evaluation. This block of research is tied to secondary research question number three What recommendations exist concerning improving the configuration and function of the U.S. Government interagency structure? and its supporting tertiary research questions: (a) What recommendations exist concerning the configuration of possible future U.S. Government interagency structures? (b) What recommendations exist concerning the functions of possible future U.S. Government interagency systems? and (c) What recommendations exist concerning the methods of implementing changes to the U.S. Government interagency composition and function?

Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology

The methodology in this study is cogent and judicious; however, the methodology has certain intrinsic strengths and weaknesses. The strength of this methodology is that
by limiting its scope, the study can focus on the large body of existing work on the subject of national security reform. By pairing the research questions with specific blocks of research, this study is able to explore the relevant issues more thoroughly.

The weakness of this method is that the narrow breadth of study results in leaving out one critical element of national security reform, which is determining methods with which the reorganized governmental structure will approach national security to ensure that the means developed by national security reform are congruent with the ways in which they will be employed. A second weakness of the methodology is that the in-depth research into the vast quantity of current research reveals many theoretical models that could address the shortcomings of our current interagency structure and processes. Simply stated, there are too many recommendations to individually evaluate each within a single MMAS. This weakness is overcome by organizing related recommendations into archetypical representations and then analyzing these representations in detail.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Again, the purpose of this thesis is to examine proposals for reorganizing the U.S. Government to allow for more efficient whole of government engagement. This chapter evaluates many of these recommendations.

Organization

This chapter first addresses the existing U.S. Governmental structure, then goes on to outline criticisms of our governmental structure. With these criticisms in mind to act as a guide, this study explores various proposals to change particular elements of our national structure. This chapter then explores other concepts related to governmental reorganization and then finally evaluates the ramifications of these proposals.

Existing Governmental Structure

Before exploring contemporary criticisms of our current governmental structure or potential fixes to address these criticisms, this study first examines the existing structure of U.S. Government. This section addresses research question one: What is the existing interagency structure of the U.S. Government? It also examines the tertiary research questions: (1) What structures exist within the U.S. Government to manage the interagency process? (2) What laws and directives form the interagency structure of the U.S. Government? (3) What documents are used to manage the interagency structure and processes of the U.S. Government?
The initial structure of the U.S. Government was not intended to provide national security in the way that we understand it today. When the founding fathers ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1788, they intended on creating a government that balanced the powers internal to the government among three governmental branches: (1) the legislative, (2) the executive, and (3) judicial. The founding fathers did not anticipate the complex world environment that exists today and therefore did not create organizations designed to provide national security in today’s complex environment. In 1789, the War Department (the precursor to today’s DOD) seemed to provide all the national security that was required. As the international environment and national security became more complex, the U.S. Government passed legislation creating new organizations while directing how these organizations would interact with other governmental bodies to provide for the national defense. These laws include NSA 1947 (with several subsequent amendments and revisions), the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986, and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002.

The National Security Act of 1947

Following World War II (WWII), the U.S. Government attempted to solve some of the endemic problems in the national security apparatus that were identified during the war. In the text of the act itself, it states that the act is intended “to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States.”

Although the National Security Act is touted today as the major contributing factor to our national security apparatus, the bill was far from having universal consensus. The fight over the legislation is described by Amy Zegart as a “brassknuckle
fight to the finish." Nearly a year and a half before the signing of this act, President Harry S. Truman proposed the creation of a singular Department of National Defense. Legislation based on President Truman’s recommendations went to Congress in April 1946; however, the Naval Affairs Committee “objected to the concentration of power in a single department” and took measures to block the bill. “President Truman renewed his efforts in 1947, sending draft legislation to Congress after vetting with the Army and the Navy.” After several months of debate and several amendments, the bill passed on July 9, 1947.

On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the act into law. The act was the first major overhaul of the national security apparatus since the signing of the constitution. The act reorganized the armed forces, the intelligence community, and the instruments of foreign policy under the general direction of the National Security Council. Congress enacted major amendments to the act in 1949, 1953, and 1958.

The act renamed the War Department as the Department of the Army, preserved the Department of the Navy, and created the Department of the Air Force. The act consolidated all three services under a newly minted National Military Establishment. The 1949 amendment to the act renamed this organization the Department of Defense. The act created a formalized Joint Staff and created the positions of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act delineated powers of a formalized multi-service council named the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to advise the President on the employment of the military and to act as an executive agent of the National Military Establishment. The 1953 amendment to the act rescinded the role of the JCS as an executive agent. Perhaps the most far reaching
provision of this act, in regard to defense, was the consolidation of military power under the position of Secretary of National Defense (renamed the Secretary of Defense in 1949). According to Floyd A. McKinney, President Truman “was one of the most vocal advocates calling for integration of the elements of the defense in a single department under one authoritative responsible head. The inference was that an integrated defense department that coordinated and synchronized the elements of military power was preferred compared to the stovepiped, service-oriented defense establishment of pre-World War II.”5 The Secretary of Defense was to become that “one authoritative responsible head.” Title III of the Act created various positions of Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense to assist the Secretary of Defense in administering the DOD.

The National Security Act also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the position of Director of National Intelligence to direct the CIA, and the National Security Agency.

In addition to changing the structure of government, the act required particular procedures and safeguards to be followed. For example, Section 108 of the code directs drafting the National Security Strategy Report. Section 501 of the act empowers Congress with oversight of intelligence activities. Section 503 outlines the President’s authority to direct and procedures for initiating covert intelligence operations.

President Truman felt the positive effects of the act almost immediately. In a 1949 message to the U.S. Congress he noted that the act “provided a practical and workable
basis for beginning the unification of the military services and for coordinating military policy with foreign and economic policy.”

The National Security Council

Since the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) has been the core element in forming foreign policy. Congress created the NSC to advise the President regarding national security policies, such as integrating the foreign and domestic policy relating to military, diplomatic, and economic issues. The NSC is one of the President’s two primary councils on security; the other is the Homeland Security Council. It is one of three permanent Presidential councils to include the National Economic Council.

Michele Flournoy states that each successive President has changed the structure of the NSC to meet their particular goal, needs, and styles. In a U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Paper, Floyd McKinney expands on Flournoy’s assertion and adds that “Under President Truman, the NSC was dominated by the Department of State and primarily monitored policy implementation. President Kennedy preferred a less structured approach to policymaking and coordination; therefore, he dismantled the NSC in favor of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.”

The NSC system currently consists of four separate councils, committees, and groups. They are: (1) the National Security Council, (2) the Principals Committee, (3) the Deputies Committee, and (4) the Policy Coordination Committees.

The attendees at the various councils, committees, and groups are both statutory and non-statutory. The principals committee is chaired by the President and composed of
the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Treasury, and the National Security Adviser as permanent statutory members. Some additional attendees are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, as well as heads of other governmental departments and agencies, as appropriate to the circumstances.

The day-to-day business of the NSC is managed by the National Security Advisor whose office coordinates the various committees and groups that do the NSC’s heavy lifting and leg work. One of the more important types of committees are the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) that are designed to serve as “the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC.” NSPD-1 directs that there be six PSC/PCCs that have the following six regional orientations: (1) Europe and Eurasia, (2) Western Hemisphere, (3) East Asia, (4) South Asia, (5) Near East and North Africa, and (6) Africa. The document also orders eleven functional NSC/PCCs that range from “democracy and human rights” to “records access and information security.” NSPD-1 directs that “Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank.”}

**The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986**

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), represents the fourth major revision to the
national security apparatus of the U.S. since the end of WWII. This legislation represents the most influential change to the U.S. national security system after the National Security Act of 1947.

Due to apparent failures of the joint military community (such as the disaster at Desert One during the failed hostage rescue attempt during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980 and the invasion of Grenada in 1983), members of Congress decided to take action to overhaul the structure of the DOD.

In 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn commissioned a study that would become known as the Locher Report, after the study’s director, James Locher.\(^\text{10}\) On the heels of that report, President Ronald Reagan established the Packard Commission, also named after the commission’s director (Davis Packard)\(^\text{11}\) to independently explore a reorganization of the DOD.

The individual elements of the GNA were products of both the Packard Commission and the Locher Report. Both the House and Senate passed DOD reform bills during the summer of 1986, and the conference report to resolve discrepancies from the two bills passed both houses on the September 17\(^\text{th}\) of that year. President Ronald Reagan signed it into law on October 1, 1986.

Congress declared eight functions for the legislation; however, this study draws special attention to the following five functions: (1) reorganizing the DOD and strengthening civil authority, (2) improving military advice to key decision makers, (3) delineating operational chains of command, (4) improving the pool of joint officers, and (5) improving operational effectiveness and DOD administration.
Civil Authority

The act significantly strengthened the power of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to the GNA, individual service secretaries claimed to have responsibilities and powers outside of the Secretary of Defenses purview; the GNA rectified these claims by specifying that the Secretary has the authority to act on any issue he chooses within the DOD. The GNA gives the Secretary increased power over planning by allowing him to issue Defense Planning Guidance and Contingency Planning Guidance to subordinate staffs and war fighters.

Improved Military Advice

The GNA designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the primary military advisor to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, and to the NSC. GNA also created the position of the Vice Chairman to assist the Chairman with his duties. The act also made the CJCS a member of the NSC.

Delineated Operational Chains of Command

The GNA clearly delineated the operational chain of command, stating that it ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and to the GCC commanders (then called Commanders in Chief (CINCs)). The act specifically prohibits the Joint Staff from exercising operational control of military units.
Joint Officers

The GNA incentivizes duty on joint staffs by making this kind of duty a prerequisite for promotion to flag officer rank. These provisions greatly changed the military culture and helped to create a joint culture within the military.

Improved Operational Effectiveness

The GNA improved the efficacy of the GCCs by consolidating more war fighting power and operational control under the GCCs when required. By removing operational control from the service chiefs, the legislation prevents disunities in operational direction such as those that occurred during the Vietnam War when each service directed units in the field without nesting operations into an overarching campaign plan. The act specifically empowers GCC commanders with eight authorities which strengthen their ability to command the GCCs.

Improved DOD Administration

The GNA streamlined the offices within the OSD to make the organization more responsive to the Secretary. The additional duties assigned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also served to make the OSD more efficient.

The act directed the Presidential production of the National Security Strategy (NSS) that serves as a governmental wide guidance document to inform the government on the President’s goals and objectives. The NSS is described in more detail later in this study.
Opposition to the Goldwater-Nichols Act

Of note, the senior members of the military were generally opposed to this reform while the congress considered the legislation. As Douglas Lovelace notes in the book *Organizing For National Security* “On one side of the debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that reform was necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of Defense and the services.”¹² This opposition seems to echo the prior opposition to the NSA of 1947.

**National Security Strategy**

The *National Security Strategy (NSS)* is a non-classified report used to document the “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”¹³ This document includes “foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities”¹⁴ as they “pertain to the U.S. Government as a whole.”¹⁵ The mandatory content of the document has changed several times since its creation in 1947. The executive branch prepares this document annually and issues it to Congress in order to present in broad terms how the administration views the major national security concerns and how the administration plans to address them. The document generally addresses grand strategy and relies on supporting documentation (such as the *National Defense Strategy*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *National Intelligence Strategy*, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*) to provide elaborating guidance.

The *NSS* galvanizes strategic goals, but does not coordinate or synchronize operational level goals or policies. The document sufficiently aligns our long-term
strategic endstates (ends) but does not provide for operational level alignment of ways
and means. The NSS is a mechanism for guidance, but not synchronization. For example,
the subordinate National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP) can direct military planning and polices, but cannot direct non-DOD agencies’
actions to better synchronize whole of government activities.

Quadrennial Defense Review

In order to refine guidance issued in the Congressionally mandated NSS, the
DOD uses the Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) The QDR
is both a process and a document. The document is submitted to Congress to inform the
Legislature on DOD’s broad strategy for ensuring the national defense of the U.S. The
document offers context, defines objectives, and identifies required capabilities and
means. The two primary subordinated documents to the QDR are the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). These documents serve to
translate the issues in the QDR into more refined and detailed policy guidance to the
Department of Defense.

to mandate that the QDR include a detailed discussion of the National Defense Strategy
of the United States. The Congressional Research Service Report to Congress on the NSS
outlines the legal requirements for this document:

The QDR is to be conducted during the first year of every Administration
(“during a year following a year evenly divisible by four”). The QDR report is to
be submitted to Congress the following year, not later than the President submits
the budget for the next fiscal year. The Secretary of Defense is to conduct the
review “in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and the
review is to look out 20 years into the future. The legislation does not specify the classification level for the report.\textsuperscript{16}

The NDS is used to further refine guidance on national defense. The document identifies security threats, defines objectives, summarizes capability requirements, and discusses risks related to the national defense of the U.S.

The NMS is used to provide strategic direction to the military regarding how to support the NSS and the NDS, as well as to inform Congress how the military supports the national strategy. In order to achieve this goal, the NMS further develops objectives, missions and required capabilities from analysis of the NSS, NDS, and the larger environment as it pertains to national security and military issues.

\textbf{Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan}

Another document used to issue guidance to the various elements of the DOD is the \textit{Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)}. This classified document is based on the most current NSS, QDR, and NDS and is the cornerstone document that the Joint Staff utilizes to issue deliberate strategic planning guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JSCP does this by assigning specific planning tasks and force apportionments to each Combatant Command and service component.

\textbf{Presidential Decision Directive 56}

President William Clinton issued PDD 56 in 1997. This directive provides guidance and specifies methods and practices vital to interagency success. The directive directs U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize lessons learned from experience and
to continue improving the planning process for complex contingency operations. The PDD’s intent is to achieve unity of effort among the interagency community and international organizations that are engaged in “complex contingency operations” such as the peace accord implementation conducted in Bosnia by NATO beginning in 1995.

The Directive provides five primary tools for the interagency process: (1) an Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee which is composed of the Assistant Secretaries, (2) an integrated, interagency political-military (Pol-mil) implementation plan, (3) interagency rehearsals, (4) interagency After-Action Review (AARs), and (5) training in interagency processes.17

Specifically, PDD 56 directs the NSC Deputies Committee to establish interagency working groups as appropriate to develop policy and conduct planning for these complex operations. The Deputies Committee would normally achieve this goal by forming an Executive Committee with suitable membership needed to supervise day-to-day management of interagency activity in complex contingency operations. The Executive Committee coordinated all agencies as needed for the contingency, to include those not typically included in the NSC structure.

As Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institute summarizes, PPD 56 provided a “format for a generic political-military or ‘pol-mil’ plan to provide the interagency community a framework in which to facilitate coordination for certain complex contingency operations. The generic pol-mil plan contains extensive planning factors to be considered by the interagency community in any given operation.”18 Specifically, the pol-mil plan must include “a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency
objectives, and desired endstate.”¹⁹ It must also outline an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts, identify the primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation, and address major functional tasks.

Additionally, the PDD directs the NSC to coordinate with U.S. Government educational institutions such as the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the U.S. Army War College, and the Command and General Staff College in order to develop and run a coherent training program spanning the interagency process.

PDD 56 also introduces the “lead agency” concept that is commonly used today to coordinate interagency activities and gives an example of lead agency requirements in Annex A of the directive.


The most recent major adjustments to the larger interagency community happened in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These adjustments are also the combined products of three separate legal documents: (1) the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number One, (2) the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and (3) the DOD Unified Command Plan of 2002.

President George W. Bush created the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in September of 2001 with Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number One (HSPD-1). In 2002 Congress formed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the passage of the Homeland Security Act. This act is intended to prevent terrorist attacks against the U.S., reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism, to minimize the damage
from, and to assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within the U.S.\textsuperscript{20} The Homeland Security Council (HSC) exists with the same goals, but serves to advise the President on objectives, commitments, and risks related to the security of the U.S. homeland.

The HSA enacted large scale governmental restructuring that created the DHS, created the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and consolidated multiple governmental functions under the DHS. The Assistant Secretary’s office is responsible for all activities related to homeland defense within the DOD.\textsuperscript{21}

As mentioned, the HSC was created by HSPD-1 and not the by the HSA. Whereas the NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947, the HSC belongs to the Executive Office of the President (EOP), but it is not a separate entity of the EOP in the same fashion as the NSC.\textsuperscript{22}

In the text “The National Security Council: A Legal History of the President’s Most Powerful Advisors” Cody Brown of the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) notes the key similarity and key difference between the HSC and the NSC:

The functions of the HSC, as described in the Homeland Security Act, paralleled the functions of the NSC under the National Security Act. In both cases, the HSC and NSC were responsible for assessing the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States, and for making recommendations to the President with respect to homeland security or national security policies, respectively.

The Unified Command Plan of 2002 (UCP 2002) created U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) which acts in conjunction with DHS in order to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States”\textsuperscript{23} within the limits delineated by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. USNORTHCOM consolidated existing
homeland defense and civil support that had previously been the purview of other military organizations under a singular unified GCC.

The cumulative effect of the HSA, HSPD-1, and UCP 2002 is to provide the U.S. Government with congruent ends, ways, and means to protect the U.S. homeland.

**National Security Presidential Directive 44**

President George W. Bush used National Security Presidential Directives to “replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States.”

President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) in 2005. This directive supersedes the previously discussed PDD 56 issued by President Clinton in 1997 and outlines interagency guidance for reconstruction and stability. The stated purpose of this directive is “to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”

The document specifies the DOS as the primary instrument to coordinate the U.S. Government’s involvement in failed or failing states. The document directs the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to plan, prepare for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”
This document also authorizes creating the position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (CRS) and empowers the Coordinator with 12 specific powers ranging from ensuring “program and policy coordination” to providing decision makers “with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations.” The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability serves as the chairman of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.

The directive tasks the Department of State to “Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability” related to stability and reconstruction, as well as to “Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization.”

As previously stated, the CRS created the Interagency Management System (IMS) to manage R&S activities in failed and failing states. The CRS and IMS are not authoritative outside of this context.

Critiques of the Existing Model

Now that this study has outlined the existing interagency structure and functions of the U.S. Government, it will next address criticisms of that existing structure before exploring proposals that may rectify these perceived shortcomings.

There are many criticisms of the existing interagency system. This study does not introduce new criticisms of the existing structure or processes, but rather presents the
criticisms of established theorists. By addressing these criticisms, this section answers secondary research question number two: What are the critiques of the existing interagency structure of the U.S. Government? It also examines the tertiary research questions (a) What organizational imperfections exist in the configuration of the U.S. Government’s interagency structure? (b) What functional imperfections exist in the interagency processes of the U.S. Government’s interagency structure?

Organization, Disorganization, and Lack of Alignment

The most common criticism of the interagency system identified by this study is the general lack of cohesive alignment.

The system relies on cooperation instead of direction. Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee, states that the current system relies on the good will of national level secretaries and cabinet officers. He adds that “it is unrealistic to expect that our nation will always have cabinet officers in place who make it a priority to work well with each other.” The Chairman goes on to claim that “until our government reforms the interagency process, we will continue to have problems.”

In a paper at the National Defense University, William Mendel and David Bradford claim that the national level interagency process is designed to “formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national level security policy and strategy.” However, as Thomas Gibbings points out, “No regional or operational-level body exists which is charged with supporting and coordinating the various mandates generated at the national level.” The processes described by Mendel and Bradford are difficult without the implementing body mentioned by Gibbings.
Unity of Effort

Unity of effort refers to commonality of purpose across multiple organizations. This term is adapted from the military term unity of command, which is considered to be one of the principles of war. The concept has changed from unity of command due to the fact that unity of command is impossible in some cases involving foreign entities, and not legally feasible in many domestic instances. This concept can be applied to small organizations, the interagency, multi-national operations, and large international groupings. According to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, “unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.”

This task is no small undertaking.

With regard to operational level unity of effort, Ross Coffey claims that “The lack of unity of effort is the principal impediment to operational-level interagency integration. Simply put, no one is in overall control of the efforts.” Coffey draws attention to the fact that although the President directs the larger whole of government, that nobody is deputized to control individual operational-level applications of the whole of government. This study asserts that this lack of control is perhaps rooted in the large body of documentation developed incrementally over 50 years that mandates how our government agencies interact.

The JCS published a document in 2000 titled *Joint Vision 2020*. This document asserted that the “the primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of
But perhaps the issue is not how to achieve unity of effort in spite of these issues; rather, how does the government reconcile diverse cultures and competing interests so that unity of effort may be achieved? These reasons may not be limited to the mere lack of direction on how to work together, but may extend to the lack of guiding influence that can shape and change the nature of organizations.

Relying on unity of effort (as opposed to unity of command) among *ad hoc* collections of organizations means that those organizations must work on a voluntary basis without an arbiter for disagreement other than the nation’s chief executive. It then stands to reason that in order to correct these problems, we must create binding and obligatory relationships between governmental agencies that are cemented by law.

**Interagency Culture**

Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institution states that “the entire interagency community is dominated by individual agency cultures rather than a common interagency culture.” As Desai also points out, this condition is paralleled by conditions before the GNA when “joint operations were conducted without permanent agreements and thus never resulted in a joint culture of ‘jointness.’” This observation of GNA may offer clues as to how to create interagency culture.

Desai also states that interagency reform is “Unlikely to achieve the full desired effect of paradigm shift from strong agency cultures to a strong interagency culture” unless intentional steps are taken to create this culture.

James Locher suggests that this lack of common interagency culture may be due to the lack of “common interagency planning process, methodology, or lexicon.” For
example, often employees of separate agencies have difficulty communicating due to the lack of common professional language. On occasion communication is frustrated by terminology with separate and sometimes conflicting or contradictory meanings within separate cultures.

In a work that was one of the winners of The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest in 2005, Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard assert that “a fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national security structure and that the lack of national-level joint interagency organizations undermines the ability of the United States to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies.”40 As Floyd McKinney put it “Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard surmised that the United States has fundamentally mismatched its national security structure to the challenges of the current strategic environment. This mismatch between means and ways results in a piecemeal response to most international issues.”41 McKinney is pointing to the divergent approaches of separate agencies. He seems to be asserting that the “piecemeal responses” are the product of each agency’s unique approach to the problem. In this respect, unique approaches may be part of the problem; however, these different approaches may offer increased flexibility in the form of more options available to a leader who had the authority to direct agencies that advocate those approaches. This flexibility makes a certain degree of differing cultures a positive contribution to government.
Outdated

The U.S. Commission on National Security Reform of 2001 stated that “The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War of the last half century have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the executive branch of the U.S. Government. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy.” This criticism may itself be outdated since after that report the U.S. Government passed the HSA of 2002 and created the DHS as discussed previously in this study. However, the changes specified within the HSA are mainly centered on domestic security and do not largely effect foreign interactions. Whereas NSPD 44 is focused on foreign capabilities, it works within existing structures and specifies methodology for the limited fields of reconstruction and stability. Even though there have now been major changes to the executive branch, these changes have focused on domestic security and not national security or the whole of governments, meaning that the “outdated” criticism is still valid, even if dated.

Policy vs Execution

The ability to translate strategic goals into tactical action relies on the ability to plan and the ability to execute the plan. In other words, identify required actions and required assets, assign the required assets, and then get the assets to work on the required actions. This study quickly explores operational level planning and execution.

The retired British general Rupert Smith states that a nation needs “to have the ability to bring [interagency entities] together, at least to the theater level and probably
lower, so that their actions are directed by one set of hands and are coherent. The core principle of this recommendation is not employed within the U.S. Government.

Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee claims that “The few existing mechanisms to bring together the departments that should play a role in developing national security policy and translating that policy into action are weak.” Particularly Chairman Skelton seems to find fault with the lack of operational level capacity to translate strategic policy into the tactical actions that will achieve the desired results.

Chairman Skelton’s remarks reflect on the lack of a governmental body that has the power to oversee the operational level of interagency activity. However, as noted by many critics of our current interagency process, many of our governmental agencies simply do not have the assets that can go to other parts of the world and put their subject matter expertise to good use as an instrument of national policy. Michelle Flournoy claims that “One of the biggest problems observed in Iraq, for example, is the paucity of operational capacity in the State Department.” On this issue, Flournoy concludes that “building deployable operational capacity in the civilian agencies needs to be a critical priority of U.S. national security policy.” The result is that no operational capacity exists within some agencies and that there are no operational planning bodies with overarching authority across agency boundaries.

Ross Coffey identifies the effect that the absence of operational level bodies has on higher level governmental bodies. “Strategic-level entities must resolve operational-level problems because current interagency organizations have no mechanisms to resolve
issues at the operational level.” In other words: we don’t have operational level planners for the interagency, so strategic policy makers end up filling the role of operational level planners. This situation does allow focus on operational level actions, but it allows this focus at the expense of other functions, in particular the ability to conduct long term strategic planning.

Changes Between Administrations

The PNSR preliminary findings report states that “During political transitions, institutional memory and authority is absent and policy formulation is weakest.” The interagency process is more a product of executive policy, than it is a product of legislation. This is mainly due to the fact that the vast majority of the agencies involved belong to the Executive Office of the President. Because so much of the interagency process is the product of presidential orders and directives, each administration has an opportunity to change the functions of the interagency process. This transition creates opportunity for disunity during transitions from one administration to the next.

History has shown that these opportunities range from the far reaching, such as President George W. Bush issuing HSPD-1 that created a new and separate Presidential Homeland Security Council, to the not so far reaching, such as President Bush’s NSPD that invited extra attendees to meetings of the NSC and replaced Interagency Working Groups with Policy Coordination Committees.

Floyd McKinney draws special attention to the NSC. He claims that “The role of the NSC has changed many times to match the needs and inclinations of each succeeding chief executive.” Due to the changing of primaries and deputies that compose the
committees of the NSC and the large percentage of their small staffs that also change during a turn of administrations, much of the possible continuity between administrations is lost. McKinney also points out that “the small structure of the NSC staff limits its ability to plan and execute long-term strategic policy. Likely because of this inability, the Brookings Institution found that the NSC is immersed in policy detail and focuses predominantly on the short-term. Furthermore, an NSC encumbered by analyzing second-order foreign policy business will not be able to fulfill its primary function of advising the President.” McKinney’s statement raises the question: what roles should the NSC play? The NSC could intermix any combination of: (1) advising the President, (2) developing coherent interagency policy to support Presidential decisions, (3) overseeing the implementation of policy, or (4) directing specific interagency action in response to a national emergency. This study will address these questions later, but these various roles beg to question if each new administration should be offered an opportunity to disrupt these processes in such a way that one of these functions (which no other body is empowered to perform) does not occur. One of these functions being neglected is more likely in the current arrangement than it would be if the apparatus were directed by Congressional legislation.

Duplication of Effort

On a guest blog for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Ike Skelton, states that even when U.S. Government agencies “share common interests and common goals, they often fail to coordinate effectively, if at all. This can cause agencies to duplicate efforts, or worse, to work at
cross purposes, which hardly makes the most of our resources to achieve our strategic objectives."^51

This is echoed by the PNSR in their Preliminary Findings report that states:

The national security system’s structure performs poorly at coordinating labor. This reflects a systemic inability to routinely coordinate and integrate effort across functional departments and agencies even when the national security mission obviously requires doing so. The departments and agencies are nearly autonomous, in many cases duplicating the capabilities of other departments to allow them to act even more independently. These complex overlapping functional and regional sub-structures within and between bureaucracies encourage competition rather than collaboration.^52

However, inefficiency may not be all that counter-productive due to the advantages gained from additional perspectives. For example multiple bodies create opportunities for opposing views and multi-perspective analysis. Ultimately the ability to analyze multiple points of view may be more valuable than the savings created by eliminating duplication of certain efforts. Multiple channels to achieve the same goal may also be beneficial.

Regional Orientations

The Hoover Institution claims that “the regional lens through which the U.S. Government agencies look at the world is just as important to interagency coordination and cooperation as the procedures they employ.”^53 This is incongruent with the current method in which each agency uses separate regional structures to orient their policies and operations. For example the DOD organizes the world into six regions and a Regional Combatant Commander has responsibility for each region. These commands are AFRICOM (Africa Command), CENTCOM (Central Command), EUCOM (European Command), PACOM (Pacific Command), NORTHCOM (Northern Command), and
SOUTHCOM (Southern Command). An illustration of these geographic regions is at Figure 1.

Figure 1. Department of Defense Geographic Combatant Command Boundaries

The DOS uses six somewhat different regions, each organized into a Bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary of State or by an Ambassador at Large. These bureaus are African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern
Affairs, South Asian Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and the sixth region is organized under the Office of the Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary for the New Independent States of the Former USSR. An illustration of these geographic regions is at Figure 2.

![Department of State Regional Bureau Boundaries](http://www.state.gov/www/regions.html)

Figure 2. Department of State Regional Bureau Boundaries

The six regions of the DOD and DOS are clearly much different.

The Central Intelligence Agency organizes into four geographic regions and has done so since 2003 when it added the fourth regional office which is dedicated solely to Iraq. The three other regional offices are: (1) The Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA), (2) The Office of Russian and European Analysis (OREA), and (3) The Office of East Asian, Pacific, Latin American and African Analysis (APLAA).54
In his essay “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institution points out that for foreign relations “the number of regions currently in use varies from three to 33. Even in cases where two agencies have the same number of regions, the regional boundaries often differ. Many agencies have different regions from their parent departments, whereas some have no regional structures but rather require all local offices to report directly to their national headquarters.” Yet “Some domestic regional structures do not even follow state boundaries, so that some states fall into more than one region. While the Department of Homeland Security may succeed in aligning the regional structures of the agencies now under its authority, many others are not under DHS’s authority and will remain unaligned without action to that end.” The author goes on to claim that “This situation is simply not tenable given all the other complicating factors in planning national policy and conducting complex operations.”

The above criticisms collectively make a strong argument for aligning each agency’s view of the world using the same geographic boundaries. The other side of the argument is the claim that each agency needs a different set of geographic boundaries due to that agency’s unique contributions regarding U.S. interests. This argument is essentially the same as the argument presented in opposition to realigning military boundaries as part of the GNA. The argument was that each service needed different boundaries due to their unique contribution to military activities. This argument may be valid to a degree. The important question to ask becomes: do the benefits of realigning boundaries outweigh the benefits of maintaining separate boundaries?
Lead Agency

The “Lead Agency” construct was established by President William Clinton in 1997 with PDD 56. The lead agency construct is intended to make use of existing governmental structures to assign responsibility for developing policy related to complex international problems that transcend the roles of any one governmental organization. This is perhaps the most common mechanism used to formally integrate the policies and actions of multiple governmental agencies.

The lead agency construct is widely criticized as inadequate for the national security demands of the U.S. Government. The following is an excerpt from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) preliminary findings in July 2008:

The most common formal integration mechanism is the lead agency because the departments and agencies are established, work well in their domains, and control resources. Prior to the 1947 Act, the Department of State was the lead agency for national security policies. Creation of a formal interagency process—a reflection of the more complicated problems emanating from the security environment—diminished the Department of State’s prominence as lead agency for national security affairs. Today, other departments and agencies are also likely to be designated as lead agency. The advantage to the lead agency model is that it affixes responsibility and uses existing organization. The disadvantage is that the lead agency approach does not work well. First, lead agencies cannot secure the level of cooperation they need to be effective:

It's very hard to have any player be both a player and the referee. The assistant secretary of state comes to the meeting to chair it and to represent the State Department. This puts him in an extremely difficult position, particularly when other agencies have equal or greater equities. It puts him in an impossible situation.[Richard Haass, quoted in Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler, "The Bush Administration", (Oral History Roundtables,04/19/1999).]

Lead agencies lack de jure and de facto authority to command other Cabinet officials or their organizations to take integrated action. This is true even at the level of cabinet officials, as Zbigniew Brzezinski explains:

Integration is needed, but this cannot be achieved from a departmental vantage point. No self-respecting Secretary of Defense will willingly agree to have his
contribution, along with those of other agencies, integrated for presidential
decision by another departmental secretary--notably, the Secretary of State. And
no self-respecting Secretary of State will accept integration by a Defense
Secretary. It has to be done by someone close to the President, and perceived as
such by all the principals. [Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington

The inability to ensure collaboration by a lead agency is true at lower levels as
well, including the country teams led by ambassadors in overseas embassies.
[Robert Oakley and Michael Casey, "The Country Team: Restructuring America's
a senior National Security Council official who served in four administrations has
noted, lead agency really means sole agency as no one will follow the lead agency
if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities. [Rand Beers,
“Structure Challenges Seminar,” 1st Panel, Proceedings from a Project on
National Security Reform Conference on Integrating Instruments of National
Power in the New Security Environment July 25-26, 2007; available at:
_FINAL.pdf>] Moreover, those people who are assigned to support another
agency often are not rewarded and may well be penalized in performance
evaluations and assignment opportunities.56

The lead agency construct does not create unity of effort or unity of command
because the system affixes responsibility without also delegating authority to compel
compliance from other agencies, nor does it allow the lead agency to censure or correct
another agency for not complying with lead agency directions.

Gorman and Krongard conclude that an interagency reorganization act that “relied
on the lead agency concept would most likely fail in the absence of ‘joint’ organizations
throughout the Federal Government similar to the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
and the combatant commands.”57 Gorman and Krongard seem to accept that the powers
to compel compliance and to censure for non-compliance are vital to an organizations
ability to direct other organizations.
Czars

Due to intrinsic limitations of the lead agency construct, Presidents sometimes appoint “czars” who are deputized to act as lead individuals with authority to coordinate related policies among multiple governmental agencies.

Logic might lead one to believe that this system would hinder the normal functions of an agency at the expense of task for which the czar is appointed. Many of the critics of the lead agency construct argue that by consolidating related policies under a common mission set directed by a deputized representative would return mission focus to the system. However, the PNSR finds that:

- czars, like lead agencies, lack authority to direct Cabinet officials or their organizations. As presidents recognize, czars “…may be a pain to the cabinet and will appear to the cabinet secretaries to fuzz up their direct lines to the president.’ Presidents choose czars hoping they will be able to informally cajole or otherwise orchestrate a higher degree of collaboration, not because they are empowered to compel collaboration. The czar may lower his or her expectations and simply play an honest broker role, but they will still be viewed as interested parties because of their proximity to the president, much the same way cabinet officials perceive the national security advisor.\(^{58}\)

- It seems that many of the same critics are not content with either the lead agency or the czar solution to mission focused interagency coordination. In both cases the lack of authority to direct interagency assets or capabilities controlled by cabinet secretaries inhibit the efficacy of these systems.

Lack of Doctrine

Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institute identifies three doctrinally related impediments to successful integration of the interagency activities: (1) lack of doctrine,
(2) lack of authority to develop doctrine, and (3) developmental processes in each agency that are focused on its own agency. They are described below:

“First the interagency community lacks a formal overarching concept of operations or ‘doctrine’ for coordination--for either routine or crisis response situations. Second, the interagency community lacks an independent authority responsible for the development and training of personnel in such a doctrine.”

The NSA of 1947 that dictates much of our interagency organization does not direct the development of a doctrine that could establish common core principles, procedures, and technical definitions. In contrast, the GNA of 1986 legislates the development of joint doctrine applicable to the collective joint body of military services.

Desai goes on to comment on personnel policies:

personnel policies within most, if not all, agencies develop personnel who are primarily dedicated to their own agency rather than the interagency community. These factors are similar to those that thwarted interservice coordination within the U.S. military prior to the development of its joint culture.

In regards to these impediments, Desai first recommends creating an integrated operations doctrine for the interagency. The essay compares military interservice rivalry and lack of unity from the pre-GNA era to the current interagency era:

First, although it intends to encompass all elements of national power, the plan format emphasizes diplomatic and military considerations thereby marginalizing the other elements of national power, such as economic, intelligence, and law enforcement. Second, it promotes division by implicitly recognizing two distinct communities, military and nonmilitary, rather than one interagency community. Third, it fails to incorporate the importance of vertical coordination (among federal, state, and local governments) as well as the complete breadth of horizontal coordination (among the different entities of government, the private sector, and the international community). Fourth, it perpetuates the dominance of individual agency cultures in the interagency community by building each interagency task force around a “lead agency.” For example, “Joint-Interagency Task Forces,” used in multiagency counter-drug operations, report to the regional military commander. Likewise, even though many agencies contribute to them, the FBI’s “Joint Terrorism Task Forces” are FBI-centric.
McKinney also comments on the requirement for, and lack of, a solid educational system for the interagency community. He states that “national security component requires civil service and military professionals with broad experience in the interagency process, and with depth and knowledge about policy issues. Although the military has codified requirements for interagency coordination in Joint doctrine, truthfully, there is no single entity responsible for managing coordination and providing strategic leadership and direction across the interagency community.”

Preliminary Conclusions Concerning the Interagency System

In regard to the existing U.S. Governmental organization, this study makes the following preliminary conclusions: As a nation, the U.S. does a good job at galvanizing national power at the strategic level by using structures such as the NSC, HSC, and NEC, as well as documents such as the NSS, NIS, and JSCP. However, the nation does a poor job of synchronizing operational level activities across the boundaries of the instruments of national power. This study views the above points as frictions that the government must allay if the interagency is going to operate as smoothly as possible. The question becomes: Are the benefits of a more smoothly operating interagency system worth costs of eliminating these frictions? This study now explores these costs and benefits.

Possible Benefits of Reorganization

The previous section of this study discussed criticisms of the current interagency structure. This section discusses some potential benefits to be gained if restructuring elements of our interagency community were to occur as recommended by many theorists. This section addresses secondary research question number three: What
recommendations exist concerning improving the configuration and function of the U.S. Government interagency structure? It also explores the following tertiary research questions: (a) What recommendations exist concerning the configuration of possible future U.S. Government interagency structures? (b) What recommendations exist concerning the functions of possible future U.S. Government interagency systems? and (c) What recommendations exist concerning the methods of implementing changes to the U.S. Government interagency composition and function?

The PNSR preliminary findings report states that “Systematic deficiencies burden the President with issue management.” Therefore, reform may offer an opportunity to reduce this burden and allow the President to make decisions, as opposed to managing issues. However, if done incorrectly, reform could also limit the President’s power to act or his ability to lead. This study addresses the issue under the assumption that reform must not encroach on Presidential authority.

The Hoover Institution at Stanford University claims that there will be “significant savings” in eliminating redundant national security structures. These changes “could potentially result in significant savings--thereby offsetting the cost of implementing them. Codifying interagency procedures would reduce time lost in *ad hoc* efforts. Integration of regional staffs could produce substantial savings in funds and free hundreds of personnel for other assignments, including assignments to advanced professional education courses, without leaving positions in the operational organizations vacant. But most important, the interagency community as a whole would be more efficient and effective.” The author is obviously recommending consolidating some
governmental functions. Although the appropriate level of consolidation is open to debate, the consolidation of certain redundant functions would clearly eliminate certain duplications of effort.

An opportunity to align diverse cultures, allay competing interests, align differing priorities, and identify common purposes would make the EOP more efficient. It would also provide to the President a body to assist him to “articulate a vision, set goals and objectives, determine priorities, provide guidance, and monitor results” of the collective actions of the EOP.

Reorganization could also make the military instrument of national power more responsive to (and more closely aligned with) all of the instruments of national power and national strategic objectives. Reorganizing could also provide additional civilian oversight of military employment.

This study now explores possible ways in which interagency transformation could possibly occur and multiple options on what the product of reorganization could be. After describing the options, this study then evaluates the possible strengths and weaknesses of the individual recommendations.

How to Reorganize

If governmental reorganization were to occur, the question of how to reorganize can be asked in two contexts. The first involves the process which is used to drive reorganization. The second involves product, or what the reorganization will look like when it is complete.
The Process of Reorganization

With regard to process, the reorganization may be instigated by the executive or the legislative branch of government.

The section titled “Changes Between Administrations” of this study summarizes criticisms regarding how, under the current laws, each President has broad authority to reorganize the EOP as he sees fit. By legislating the structure of certain organizations that are vital to national security, Congress would provide an enduring structure designed to operate as a coherent whole. As suggested by the many theorists who comment on this issue, a common structure would provide stability between administrations. This study concludes that additional stability between administrations would improve national security by eliminating frictions related to periodic restructuring.

Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institution suggests that legislation is the better alternative, but presidential orders will also play a role. In the piece “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” Desai states that “new legislation will be necessary to achieve an enduring interagency culture.”

Each previous administration has changed the interagency system. These changes have been transitory. In cases in which Congress has acted, such as the NSA of 1947 and GNA of 1986, the changes have been both further reaching and more permanent. This study therefore concludes that interagency reform should be the product of Congressional legislation.
The Product of Reorganization

With regard to the product of reorganization, this study identified multiple possible routes. However this study views only two of these routes as feasible. One is to expand existing organizations and add additional tasks to what they do. The other is to create a new organization (or organizations) specifically designed for the task of directing whole of government action. This study discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches for managing the interagency process. The discussion presented in this study is meant to serve as an exploration; this exploration does not infer any recommendations or conclusions besides those that are presented in Chapter Five of this study.

In a paper titled “Rethinking the Interagency System” Michael Donley explores four alternative mechanisms for improving coordination and synchronization in the interagency process. Clay Runzi summarizes the alternatives as:

Broadening the responsibilities of the NSC. This course of action would enable existing interagency committees to expand outside the traditional NSCS policy development role and participate in the actual planning and oversight of interagency operations related to their areas of specialization.

Creating new interagency structures within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Noting that experience in interagency operations of all kinds require a constant, dynamic interaction between policy development and execution throughout the continuum of pre-crisis or conflict planning, military operations, and post-conflict activities.

Create new interagency structures outside the EOP. Modeled on this approach, future interagency centers could be used to coordinate regional affairs throughout the U.S. Government, or functional purposes such as disaster/contingency support or stability operations.

Assign responsibility for interagency integration at operational levels to a “lead” agency, specifying Executive Branch department and agency support/supporting roles.
In the original text, Donley discusses the pros and cons of each of these solutions. In regard to creating structures outside of the EOP, Donely himself questions the “authority and the legitimacy” of decisions made by such a body. This study also views decisions made without the authoritative backing of the Executive or Legislative branch of government as having questionable legitimacy. This study presumes that unassailable legitimacy is a requirement for the U.S. Government; therefore, the issue of questionable legitimacy makes this possible solution not acceptable.

As previously noted in this study, the lead agency approach is widely criticized, and has not solved the interagency puzzle in the many years since President Clinton created it with PDD 56, meaning that continued reliance on the lead agency approach is likely to result in additional calls for improvement.

Due to the lack of apparent legitimacy and continued reliance on the much criticized lead agency approach, the two courses of actions above do not seem to be suitable, feasible, or acceptable. Therefore, this study does not explore these two options any further. However, this study conducts an independent exploration of the two acceptable and feasible solutions: (1) Broadening the responsibilities of the NSC and (2) Creating new interagency structures within the EOP.

This study does not propose a specific name or organizational structure for any of the below mentioned organizations. This study addresses these organizations using the most generic, but descriptive names possible. This study restricts itself to discussing considerations for the functions that these organizations would be required to fulfil if they were to be viable additions to the U.S. Government.
Broadening the Responsibilities of the NSC

Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley recommend expanding the role of the NSC and placing a single “senior director” in charge of it to act as a director. They recommend adding an office to the NSC “devoted strictly to strategic planning.” Additionally, they suggest that “every civilian agency need[s] a fully resourced strategic planning office.”

Clay Runzi claims that “In order to establish a deliberate, effective, and efficient interagency process, the NSC must be empowered with lasting authority to develop adept interagency coordinators and orchestrate interagency doctrine.” Runzi goes on to argue that “Transforming the NSC will provide an organization closely attuned to the President’s direction in leveraging multiple elements of national power.” Runzi’s published his study in 2007, six years after NSPD-1 created the NSC/PCCs that currently fulfill many of the functions discussed in Runzi study. However, the major missing pieces are lasting authority and interagency doctrine. To rectify these shortcomings by broadening the NSC system, solidification in law would create the lasting authorities and a separate functional PCC would be required to create interagency doctrine.

Some governmental scholars, such as Christine Wormuth and Jeremy White, suggest that the NSC and the HSC should be merged. This would create a more streamlined process, particularly if the National Economic Council (NEC) were included in this consolidation so that all of the President’s primary advisors were part of the same body. This would create a very large body of advisors to the president.

In testimony before Congress, I.M. Destler stated a similar conclusion by the PNSR that recommends “the creation of a President’s Security Council (PSC) to encompass not only the subjects currently addressed by the NSC and the HSC, but with
international economic and energy policy ‘fully integrated as well’

In this case, additional functions are added to increase the representation of other forms of national power. This sounds like a combination of the NSC, the HSC, and the NEC; in other words, combining all three Presidential Councils. The expanded role of the NSC would lead to increased power of that body and therefore an increase in the power of the National Security Advisor, or similar managing director, who is an appointed, not an elected, official.

Cogent arguments could be made either way to claim that this combination of existing bodies constitutes expanding the role of the NSC, or that it constitutes a new organization. Since this recommendation seems to include the NSC as a component of a composite organization, this study treats the recommendation as a broadening of the responsibilities of the NSC.

The major functional strengths of this approach are that: (1) the NSC and ultimately the President will have more direct control over key details regarding interagency operations; (2) this solution would place in one location and one body all the advisory expertise to allow the body to act as a coherent whole (3) disagreements on how to implement policy will be quickly adjudicated by a final and high authority.

The major functional drawbacks to this approach are that: (1) the single body will be responsible for the formulation of both ends related policy and ways related policy; (2) without the creation of additional bodies, the organization will be responsible for determining policy and overseeing operational level activities to ensure compliance with policy guidance; (3) the inability to effectively monitor activities in the field will prevent
Correcting these activities when required. The net cumulative result of these effects would be to detract the NSC from the unique advisory role to the President that only the NSC can provide, unless other organizations were also created; and (4) the increased power of the National Security Advisor may be undesirable to some people.

Creating New Interagency Structures Within the Executive Office of the President

This study identified several trends regarding recommendations for new organizations within the EOP. This study categorizes these new agencies using the generic descriptive terms of an Office of National Strategy, a Unified Staff, Appropriate Responsible Geographic Organization, and Subordinate Task Oriented Organizations. These categories are discussed below:

Office of National Strategy

Michael Donley suggests that “A single interagency system is needed to coordinate, manage and oversee national security matters for the President. Its scope and reach should be defined to include the national security organizations / structures within the EOP, between the EOP and departments and agencies, and departments and agencies with national security missions / functions. This system should not be limited only to policy development.” This kind of reorganization has the potential to limit the power of the President if done incorrectly. This kind of reorganization may also empower the President as a decision maker if done correctly. To ensure that such an organization did not limit the power of the President, the organization would require specific restrictions
to ensure balance within the government and so that the organization served to inform
Presidential decisions and would not infringe on Presidential decision making abilities.

As generic terms for such an organization and its leader, this study uses the terms
Office of National Strategy (ONS) and Director of National Strategy (DNS). This study
does not recommend a specific structure for such an organization, but explores possible
functions and implications if such a body were to exist.

In a similar recommendation, Gorman and Krongard suggest creating “national-
level, joint interagency issue-focused organizations that bring together the relevant
policy, military, intelligence, and other parts of the Government.” Such a body must
possess integrating mechanisms for interacting agencies. The system must also possess
integrating mechanisms that allow interaction with other stakeholders such as other
governments, NGOs, and corporations.

The current PCC arrangement takes the first step in providing focus to regionally
and functionally oriented issues. The PCCs allow for general policy decisions regarding
multiple instruments of national power and the many governmental agencies that will
implement these policies. However, the PCCs fall short of full integration because the
Principal Committee members are not required to act on the recommendations of the
PCCs. The law requires that the PCC directors be under secretaries or assistant
secretaries. This requirement means that in many cases the PCC director works for the
Secretary of their department and is not empowered to direct full interagency compliance
without the consensus of the NSC principals committee or the direction of the President.
If this theoretical ONS existed, it could manage the president’s decision process for national strategy decisions. The office will coordinate interagency papers such as a possible Quadrennial National Security Review as discussed later in this study.

Vital to the efficacy of this organization would be the ability to monitor performance in the field and adjust as necessary. Therefore the ONS could possibly be invested with “the capacity to oversee and discipline” the unified organization in a similar fashion as the OSD does in order to direct, monitor, and adjust the activities of the DOD.

It would allow for decentralized decision making based on presidential guidance and congressional mandates. The inability to conduct decentralized decision making is one issue cited in the PNSR initial findings report.

Gorman and Krongard recommend that a hypothetical joint-interagency structure would organize “under one organization and one senior leader.” Floyd McKinney recommends creating a Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) that would supervise the interrelated governmental functions related to security and associated strategy. He recommends that the “Secretary of DNSS would have statutory responsibility over the major interagency actors to include, but not limited to, the Departments of State and Defense.” However, this consolidation of power does not seem wise unless the proper balance of power can be maintained within government to prevent a challenge to Presidential authority by such a director.

Most theorists describe the DNS as an “executive director with powers to develop policy, integrate interagency efforts, and monitor implementation of Presidentially
approved strategies on a day-to-day basis.”79 The president is clearly the final decision maker; however, a deputized assistant to the President could organize the process for presenting issues to the president for his decisions.

“President John Adams stated, ‘The essence of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries.’ If President Adams’ observation is correct, then the organization tasked with leading the interagency process must be an arbitrator of disputes, coordinator of action, and a central body responsible for harmonizing the national elements of power.”80 The DNS or senior director of the NSC could theoretically serve to control rivalries between agencies within the EOP while retaining the President as a final arbiter when decisions are made.

In testimony before the Sub-committee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee I.M. Destler stated that one of the recommendations of the PNSR is the “Statutory creation of a Director of National Security (presumably replacing the current presidential national security assistant), supported by a statutory executive secretary.”81

The ONS and DNS would have to be answerable to the president who is the commander-in-chief, as well as to Congress in a regulatory fashion, but not in an operational sense.

The ONS could be empowered to direct, monitor, and adjust the activities of subordinate operationally focused organizations (such theoretical organizations could conduct the operational level implementation of policy goals as discussed later in this study) and be able to adjust their activities when required. This raises the question of
what role would existing cabinet secretaries have in directing, monitoring, and adjusting the activities of these operationally focused organizations. This question is explored further in this study in the section titled Existing Agencies.

Any subordinate structures of the ONS must account for vertical and horizontal coordination, especially domestically at the local, state, and federal levels.

The major functional strengths of this arrangement are: (1) a body would exist to streamline the implementation of Presidential decisions, (2) it would maximize operational level control of interagency activities; (3) it would not challenge the authorities of the executive or legislative branches; and (4) the President will remain the final decision maker.

The major functional drawbacks of this arrangement are: (1) This kind of expansion may increase the size and complexity of governmental function; (2) This expansion may have the longest adjustment period since it is the least similar to the existing governmental structure, (3) the DNS would be a very powerful figure, which may be viewed as undesirable since the DNS would likely not be an elected figure.

Parallel Military and Office of National Strategy Organization

If including command authority over military forces were deemed inappropriate for the ONS, then a parallel structure of ONS and DOD may be an alternate solution that would allow for the benefits of consolidating interagency functions, but would not present a threat to civil authority by placing control of the military under the direction of an individual that could conceivably challenge the President.
In such an arrangement an ONS could be charged with the responsibilities and authorities presented in the previous section of this study; however, the DOD and SECDEF would retain control of the military instrument of national power. This arrangement would minimize the risk of a non-elected official gaining too much power within an administration and challenging Presidential authority, or derailing the decision process within the EOP. These parallel channels of military and non-military agencies would prevent too much power being vested under one person. However, this may create a bifurcation of efforts within the government, or worse yet; a polarizing competition between the two organizations. If such a polarized or competitive relationship developed it would render moot any benefits gained by reorganizing the interagency system in the first place.

This option depends on the decision regarding the question: should the military chain of command be included under an ONS? If the answer is no, this solution allows concentration of many interagency functions without placing military units under the command of the concentrated organization. The major strength of this arrangement is that it would safeguard against consolidation of too much power under one official. The major weaknesses of this arrangement are that it may: (1) intensify rivalries, and (2) make coordinated DOD and ONS activities difficult to closely coordinate.

Unified Staff

If separate advising and policy making bodies were desirable, another beneficial organization might be a unified staff that could augment the activities of the ONS or that could exist alone. One solution is to approach a Unified Staff in the same manner as the
military Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is composed of the Chiefs of Staff for each military service. Prior to the GNA, the service Chiefs of Staff enjoyed operational command authorities; however the GNA divested the Chiefs of this authority and redefined their roles as force providers who are responsible for training and equipping their respective forces. This arrangement allowed concentration of operational control under GCCs and make the military more responsive to civilian control under the SECDEF. A whole of government reorganization may create a similar arrangement in which governmental agencies serve as providers to regionally oriented authorities who are directed by another organization. Other implications of such an arrangement will be explored later in this study, but this arrangement could possibly allow for separation of operational control and of policy decisions. This separation could help to safeguard against private agendas driving both policy and its implementation. This separation could also improve Congressional oversight by creating situations in which one body is not responsible for both developing policy and then implementing that policy at the operational level.

Such a staff would most likely require a chairman to advise the President. This advisory role is similar to the Chairman of the Joint Staff (CJCS) who advises the President on military matters, but who is not part of the operational chain of command. If the chairman of the unified staff’s role were similar to the role of the CJCS, then this chairman would not have operational authority and could eliminate bias from particular agencies. This kind of bias was a problem within the military before the creation of the position of the CJCS and subsequent refinement of his responsibilities by the GNA. As stated by James Locher, “In a congressional report entitled Defense Organization
published in 1985, the Secretary [of Defense’s] efforts were seen as ‘seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice.’”\(^{82}\) A unified staff would eliminate any such bias, especially if they were not an actual actor, and did not stand to gain from operational decisions or from established fiefdoms.

This staff could prepare additional supporting documents to support the DNS’ decisions, such as how the JCS prepares the JSCP, while the OSD prepares the QDR.

The major functional strengths of a Unified Staff would be: (1) making separate advisory and operational organizations would result in less agency bias in the advice available to the President, (2) increased ability for Congress to exercise oversight of administration policy and implementation, and (3) increased protection against private agendas guiding policy and its implementations.

The major functional weaknesses of Unified Staff would be: (1) creation of another level of bureaucracy and possibly enlarging the government as opposed to reducing its size by eliminating redundancy, and (2) adjudication of policy and its implementation would require high level arbitration. Without an organization such as an ONS, this role would have to be played by the President, however, with the current NSC system the President currently has this role without the benefit of dedicated body for either function.

**Operational Control Organizations**

Peter Halvorsen states that in regard to the U.S. Government “No mechanism exists for planning or implementing interagency decisions at the operational level.”\(^{83}\) Many theorists have proposed possible structures to provide this function; these
recommendations include Regional Security Councils, Joint Inter-Agency Commands, and Regional Command Staffs.

This study groups recommendations for these operational control organizations into two epitomical categories: (1) those that are responsible for geographic areas of responsibility, and (2) those that are organized to tackle specified problems. The following sections discuss and analyze these two archetypes.

Appropriate Responsible Geographic Organization

This study uses the generic term Appropriate Responsible Geographic Organization (ARGO) to describe any organization that would function as an operational level body to direct the regional efforts of national agencies. This study does not recommend a formal name for such an organization, nor does it recommend an exact organizational structure. ARGOs represent an archetype of an organization, not an actual organization. Possible mechanisms that could be employed by these ARGOs are discussed below.

In an article titled “In Search of Harmony,” Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley recommend establishing Regional Security Councils that could do for interagency coordination what regional component commands do for the Department of Defense. The authors suggest that these councils should be composed of senior members of national security organizations and that they would coordinate regional policies and activities on a day to day basis in order to advance U.S. interests.

In an article titled “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach” Jeffery Buchanan, Maxie Davis, and Lee Wight, recommend
forming Joint Inter-Agency Commands, or JIACOMs. The authors describe their JIACOMs as “operational level organization[s] responsible for planning, integrating, and executing all U.S. regional foreign policy. It would contain or have direct access to and tasking authority over all U.S. agencies likely to be involved in planning and implementing these policies, up to and including the use of military force.”85 As the authors suggest, creating such an organization may result in the GCCs as we know them today, losing significant influence.

A study titled “Reforming the Interagency at the Operational Level” by Peter Halvorsen suggests that the U.S. Government should “create unified interagency staffs at each of the regional commands to augment or replace the present military-centric Combatant Commands”86. The Halvorsen study names these operational level organizations “Regional Command Staffs.”87

This study groups the above recommendations into the category of ARGO. These theoretical ARGOs represent those kind of organizations.

ARGOs would focus on operational level action and would not be involved in setting or directing national policy. ARGOs represent the organizations that would place existing governmental means in action using the appropriate ways to accomplish the ends articulated by higher level policy bodies. ARGOs would allow for decentralized decision making based on Presidential guidance and Congressional, ONS, or Unified Staff policies (if either of these later two bodies existed as policy making bodies).

ARGOs would allow focus on national priorities and missions in ways that transcend the functional focus of individual agencies. By focusing on these priorities and
missions, ARGOs would avoid the functional bias that each agency brings to the table, especially while in the “lead agency” role. Creating agency neutral organizations also avoids the problematic condition in which the “national security system provides resources for national security functions, not national missions.”  

Collectively, this means that ARGOs could focus on problems from a multi-perspective, multi-functional, and interdisciplinary approach instead of through the unique lens of a single agency.

As mentioned in the section titled Regional Orientation of this study, aligning agencies so that they use the same geographic boundaries will allow better interagency coordination. The Hoover Institution suggests that “aligning these various regional structures into a single structure would foster unity of effort, enable far better planning and conduct of policy and operations in each region, and ensure that all advice to the president comes from the same frame of reference.” ARGOs should most likely have geographically defined boundaries; however, these boundaries are likely to be most appropriately determined based on the unique groupings of threats, political orientations, cultural characteristics of particular regions. Similar principles hold true domestically as well as in other parts of the world. Therefore domestically oriented portions of federal agencies should also align authorities (for example: local, state, federal) and regional organization using the same geographic boundaries regardless of if a domestic ARGO were to exist.

Many theorists recommend various “command” relationships regarding ARGOs. Most of these recommendations place the ARGO under the direction of some sort of DNS or ONS organization, or under the direction of a senior director of an expanded
NSC type body. These arrangements would mean that operational chain of command could flow from the President to the DNS (or through a senior director of the NSC), to the ARGOs. This arrangement would be similar to the current military chain of command that flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the Regional Combatant Commanders. This arrangement could possibly require a change to the current national level chain of command if military organizations were to be controlled by an ARGO. Or the alternate solution is to employ a parallel structure of command that retains the military chain of command intact as is: flowing from the President, through the SECDEF, to the GCCs, with a separate chain for an ONS that has power over other agencies and departments, but not the DOD. Maintaining the current national level chain of command would eliminate potential contention concerning control of the military. However, separating operational control from policy through a parallel organizational arrangement using either (1) an ONS, NCS, PSC and/or Unified Staff and (2) the DOD may eliminate any conceivable risks associated with a change to the national chain of command.

Empowering ARGOs with operational decision making capacity would also require that cabinet secretaries be divested of some of their powers just as the services chiefs were by the GNA. The repercussions of such an action is discussed further in the section titled “Existing Agencies.”

ARGOs could possibly direct national agency assets as required in order to focus on regionally specific problem sets. By having these assets and functional expertise assigned on a semi-permanent basis, the ARGOs would be able to efficiently direct the unique capabilities of these agencies in a coordinated and synergistic fashion. These
semi-permanently assigned assets may possibly have a similar relationship to the ARGO as is currently covered by the military arrangement named Combatant Command or COCOM authority which states: “Combatant command [authority] provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and provide authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.” Again, if an ARGO director had similar powers as the GCC commanders currently have, a decision would be required to determine if the ARGOs could command military forces or not. As discussed above, this decision reflects far reaching implications concerning the national chain of command. If an ARGO director were to have command of military forces, it would require changing the construction of the current chain of command structure.

A possible responsibility of the ARGOs could be to conduct regionally focused crisis planning utilizing the unified conventions framework. The ARGO could prepare interagency contingency plans as directed by whichever set of appropriate bodies existed (NSC, ONS, PSC, or the Unified Staff) depending on the responsibilities laid out by interagency reform legislation.

ARGOs could direct the formation of temporary subordinate task oriented organizations as required to focus on unique problem sets or crisis situations.

The ARGOs differ from the existing six regional Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) in that the PCCs address policy recommendations; however, they do not have the authority to implement activities because they do not have tasking authority over the
actual organizations that conduct the required activities. The PCCs also carry particular bias due to the fact that the PCC coordinators are assigned by the Secretary of State, which means that the Secretary of State has the opportunity to appoint Under and Assistant Secretaries to these positions based on that official’s agreement with the Secretary. ARGO directors appointed by the President (and then confirmed by Congress) might not have the agency bias that arguably exists with the regional PCCs directors appointed by the Secretary of State. ARGOs would also possess the ability to task agency assets based on NSC or ONS policy decisions.

The major functional strengths of ARGOs are that it would: (1) add unprecedented operational capacity to our interagency system, (2) eliminate agency bias in operational interagency activities, and (3) increase Presidential control of Governmental by creating a director who answers to the Presidents and who acts on the President’s behalf to oversee U.S. Governmental activities within a specified geographic region.

The major functional weaknesses of ARGOs are that it: (1) may require changing the current structure of the national level chain of command, and (2) may require a decrease in cabinet level secretary authority to direct agency activities in the same way that service chiefs lost the authority to direct service activities post GNA. This change may not be “bad” but would likely face opposition from powerful opponents, namely the cabinet secretaries themselves.
Subordinate Task Oriented Organizations

This study uses the generic term Subordinate Task Oriented Organizations (STOOs) to describe the function, and does not attempt to assign a definitive name that will be taken forward into final implementation of interagency reform.

In cases in which an ARGO director would like to delegate authority to a subordinate organization they could form a STOO, which could be some type of Unified Task Group (UTG) or Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF), to focus on the issue at hand. STOOs would allow highly refined focus on a particular mission or particular set of problematic conditions.

The use of STOOs allows special emphasis on specific missions. A STOOs relationship to an ARGO may be viewed similarly to the relationship between a GCC and a JTF.

Depending on the task at hand, the specific composition of the STOOs may provide a means of interacting with particular NGOs and corporations that may otherwise be more difficult with our current organizational model. In this respect, STOOs may represent a way to request extra-governmental assistance for particular problem sets in ways that are innocuous and do not alienate particular organizations. For example Green Peace is probably more amenable to working with elements of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), than with DOD.

If STOOs are to be temporary task-oriented organizations, then a matrix management model would perhaps be an ideal way to approach their organization. “Matrix organizations” are temporary organizations that draw from existing labor pools and assets available in order to apply the resources to a specific project. These human and
equipment resources report to, and are directed by, project managers while they are employed on a particular project. At the STOO level, a STOO director would request desired assets (in the form of personnel and equipment from specific governmental agencies) from the ARGO, and would direct the actions of these resources until the assigned task is complete.

STOOs might use the existing name Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATFs); however, at present, JIATFs exist as subordinates to GCCs and are subordinate staff organizations that are expected to coordinate all interagency activity within the GCC; they do not exist to resolve specific mission related problem sets. Preserving the name JIATF may confuse some members of government, and therefore may not be worth preserving. However, the name is popular and has name brand recognition that may give these organizations more traction with key decision and policy makers.

One major obstacle to effective STOO operations is a current legal requirement for many agencies’ assets to take directions or to seek approval for action from their agency headquarters in Washington, D.C. A STOO could not effectively control their assigned assets unless these reporting and approval requirements were removed.

The major functional strengths of this arrangement are that it: (1) applies to the problem at hand the most appropriate capabilities from each government agency, (2) consolidates under a single director the authority to task the agency elements assigned to him in order to best achieve desired policy goals, (3) would allow rapid and tailored response using a specifically task organized interagency structure, and (4) would have a temporary nature meaning that as soon as a problem was rectified that the STOO assets
could be reassigned to another STOO so that long term government waste would be reduced.

The major functional weakness of this arrangement is that it would require divesting operational tasking authority from Cabinet level secretaries. Although this divestiture would greatly increase unity of effort, it would result in opposition from the secretaries.

Existing Agencies

The GNA of 1986 did not merge all of the military services into one service; it preserved each service so that the best features of each service could contribute to the overall joint community. This study does not endorse dismantling existing agencies in order to create any of the above discussed governmental bodies. Rather it supports using realignment of supervisory authorities to create intentional and deliberate inter-reliance on the best features of each existing agency in ways that increase the efficacy and potency of these agencies, as well as those of the U.S. Government as a whole.

Two of the above mentioned recommendations for ARGOs suggest that GCCs may be replaced by JIACOMs or RCSs. This study suggests that replacing the GCCs would be akin to disbanding the individual armed forces in order to replace them with a single military service. The ARGOs would operate most efficiently by using the GCCs either as: (1) subordinate entities that would coordinate and direct joint military activities within the assigned region, or (2) parallel structures that would answer to the President independently from the ARGO. However, a balance of power and a clearer or shorter national chain of command may be more important than efficiency due to the relative
severity of failures in the chain of command vs failures in efficiency levels. Although two parallel structure would prevent unity of command below the Presidential level and Presidential approval of operational activities may cause undue strain on the President.

With the possible exception of the DOD, the existing agencies may become more like the military services in that the services are force providers that train and equip their own services, but do not have operational authority. The services develop their own doctrine in support of joint doctrine, recruit, acquire equipment, and train personnel how to use that equipment in accordance with doctrine. Making the existing agencies more like the services in this regard would represent a separation of the ways and means that are currently consolidated under each governmental agency, just as the ways and means were consolidated under each military service prior to GNA.

However, separating the ways and means does not mean that cabinet secretaries become sidelined. Again, this study refers to the GNA which separated the ways and means at the service level. The SECDEF still issues policy guidance for the services and also issues operational guidance to the GCCs. A similar arrangement would be possible across agencies under a DNS and ONS arrangement and depending on certain conditions might be possible for a director of a PSC.

Currently existing U.S. organizations should most likely undergo an alignment of regional boundaries. At the time of this study, an exploratory investigation is underway regarding the alignment of regional boundaries between DOD and DOS. However, a realignment of regional boundaries is likely to be more effective if it includes realigning all U.S. agencies as opposed to just DOD and DOS.
Subordinate elements within our existing agencies should also be realigned so that functional consistency across agencies is more likely. For example, under current design the Political Advisors (POLADs) are members of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs within the DOS which is subordinate to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, but works within the DOD to advise regionally focused military commanders. The POLADs typically work within the JIACG of a GCC. This arrangement makes the advice offered from the POLAD less consistent with the thoughts within the regional offices of the DOS that are in the Bureau of Political Affairs. Likewise the POLADs are also one step further away from the regionally oriented PCCs. This study recommends that a reorganization of U.S. agencies should, to the greatest extent possible, align internal structures and assignments along functional and regional departments as appropriate.

Congressional oversight from sub-committees must be considered. However, Congress should not interact in an operational capacity. Congressional guidance should be integrated through policy which operational level organizations can adapt to specific situations. An example is the way in which the House Armed Services Committee interacts with the OSD to formulate policy, but does not direct the GCCs on particular issues. Congress would have a major role in overseeing and apportioning resources within the ONS. These roles should involve committee oversight of particular activities as well as approving the budget.

Congress, as outlined in the U.S. Constitution, is the authority for ratifying treaties and must be consulted, in accordance with Article II, Section 2, if the President
wishes to enter into a new treaty. The requirement to integrate Congress into treaty-like agreements is illustrated by an example from WWII. During WWII, Executive Order 8982 established the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) on December 17, 1941. Vice President Henry Wallace served as the chairman of the BEW which oversaw offices of import, export, and war analysis. When President Roosevelt issued an executive order in April 1942 allowing the BEW to enter into contracts with foreign nations, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and multiple members of Congress objected. However, the issue did not come to a head until February 1943 when Vice President Wallace attempted to consolidate other purchasing authorities under the BEW. The Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones (a former senator), also weighed in on the issue which resulted in President Roosevelt disbanding the BEW. Executive order 9361 disbanded the BEW and established the Office of Economic Warfare on July 15, 1943. The Office of Economic Warfare oversaw several specific corporations related to the war effort, held less power and had more restrictions placed on it than the BEW. This historical example illustrates that any attempts to include binding agreements into national security activities must do so with proper integration of Congress.

**Common Components of any Organization**

Regardless of the structure adapted, this study identifies common features any reorganization of the National Security System must address. These features are mainly related to function and are outlined below:
The preliminary findings report of the PNSR calls for the “Creation of a national security workforce bound by a national security culture”\(^92\) A common interagency culture (or at least more closely aligned set of cultures) would share values, goals, policies, procedures, leadership and decision making methods. However, before this change could happen, old cultural biases would have to be overcome. And the PNSR report states that striping away the “insular and independent departments”\(^93\) is as much a function of creating a new interagency culture as it is in drawing a new organizational chart.

The Hoover Institute states that before Goldwater-Nichols “joint operations were conducted without permanent agreements and thus never resulted in a joint culture of ‘jointness.’”\(^94\) James Locher looked at the effectiveness of GNA ten years after it became law and concluded that GNA helped to create joint culture and that joint culture has resulted in greater military efficacy. Likewise, the creation of a certain degree of interagency culture would likely increase interagency efficacy.

Buchanan, Davis, and Wight state that “leadership must find a way to embrace each organization’s culture and draw out the benefits”\(^95\) of each. This approach is somewhat different than the most commonly accepted approach which seems to be to superimpose a new interagency culture on top of all the existing agency cultures.

Regardless of the degree to which a new interagency culture is created, clearly there is a need for each agency to possess more officers who are conversant with the lexicons, structures, and functions of multiple governmental agencies. This capacity is likely to be a combined product of: (1) creating a new interagency culture, (2) more closely aligning groupings of interagency cultures, (3) increasing educational
requirements so that officers understand the unique cultures of other agencies, and (4) training leaders to harness the unique attributes of particular agency cultures.

When Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn made the case for the GNA they “predicted that meaningful implementation of [the] many changes, especially cultural ones, would require five to ten years.” A similar, if not longer, timeline may be required for a unified reorganization act to take full effectiveness.

**Doctrine and Training**

**Doctrine**

In order to create interagency doctrine, an organization is required to develop doctrine for unified structures. Military doctrine serves as a guide on how to do this; each military service still develops its own doctrine and the joint staff creates joint doctrine which gives the context to the individual services’ doctrine. The GNA tasks the CJCS with “developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces, formulation policies for the joint training” of the joint forces.

This arrangement is similar to how each branch of the military develops, uses, and incorporates its own doctrine internally, but joint military organizations use joint doctrine. This system will allow each agency to conduct its activities as it deems most fitting; however, when they interact with other agencies and organizations, they have a unified framework with which to proceed. Each agency should serve as the proponent for its own doctrine and internal procedures, unless legislators see fit to regulate how a particular agency does this. Each agency’s doctrine should be subordinate and supportive of the superseding unified doctrine conventions. The implication is that individual agency
doctrine and the body of unified conventions would need an approval process for each instrument’s conventions and doctrines.

If unified conventions were to exist, each governmental agency would still develop its own doctrine (with a review to ensure it fits into unified conventions); yet unified conventions would be developed by an interagency body that could ensure general approaches were consistent with all available ways and means.

Training

Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institution claims that “personnel from all agencies should be required to receive training in interagency coordination. Even though not on the same scale as the military’s joint staffs.” He goes on to state that “Many positions at all levels in every agency could be effectively filled by personnel from other agencies. For example, Department of Justice personnel could serve in legal sections, Department of Homeland Security personnel could serve in security and force protection units, and CIA personnel could hold billets in intelligence sections.” He goes on to recommend that for foreign service “Such assignments also should include personnel whose jobs are common to all agencies (for example, human resources, administration, and communication) as well as regional experts and analysts.”

Flournoy recommends the creation of a National Security University. Others, such as Gorman and Krongard, have recommended an expansion of the current role of the National Defense University in order to train the “new cadre of strategic practitioners.” They suggest that “much like career military officers, national security personnel should attend professional education and be assigned inside interagency
organizations and outside their departments and agencies.”\textsuperscript{101} John Lucynski points out, the NDU already fills some of this role: “Responding to PDD 56, in 1997 the NSC designated the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C., as the lead agent for establishing a program of education and training that focused on multi-agency coordination and planning for complex operations.”\textsuperscript{102}

Clark Murdock and Richard Weitz recommend establishing a “Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would be run jointly by DOD’s National Defense University and the State Department’s National Foreign Affairs Training Center.”\textsuperscript{103} Indeed, authors such as Robert E. Smith suggest that no new institutions are needed to implement this kind of interagency training; that existing institutions and curriculums can be adapted to meet the needs of increased interagency training requirements.\textsuperscript{104}

Interagency training should include training at both the strategic and operational levels. Strategic level education regarding interagency processes may be appropriate at the NDU, however, operational level training should be conducted at operational level schools such as is the case at the U.S. Army CGSC that has a department dedicated to Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (JIMO).

Unified education and assignments would begin to overcome the individual agency cultures that are so universally recognized as obstacles to interagency operations.


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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Again, the purpose of this thesis is to examine proposals for reorganizing the U.S. Government to allow for more efficient whole of government engagement. This chapter draws conclusions concerning creating these efficiencies.

Organization

This chapter summarizes recommendations for further study and for action before drawing final conclusions.

Recommendations for Further Study

This study identified a great volume of research conducted on the structures and organizations that interagency reform might create. However, very few works exist that explore how exactly these groupings of agencies would be employed: there does not seem to be a great deal of work being conducted on interagency doctrine.

This thesis recommends that further study be conducted regarding unified conventions. This will allow for a clearer picture of what the interagency must be capable of doing in order to ensure that the final product of interagency transformation will match required means with ways.

Again, the German Wehrmacht would have been just another army if it had not developed specific organizational structures and equipment that were specifically designed to complement the concept of deep battle. If the U.S. chooses to implement
interagency transformation without a clear vision of how the government will employ the reformed interagency system, then the result will be just another governmental structure.

Revising the current structure of Congressional committee and subcommittee may also have benefits. Congress would very likely want to have oversight of the activities of an organization such as an ONS. Committees that could monitor the activities of, and manage Congressional budgeting concerns regarding such an organization would allow more complete integration of any new organizations within the EOP. The exact nature of this realignment is an excellent issue for further exploration.

**Recommendation for Action**

Creating effective operational level interagency capacity will require loss of power of the cabinet secretaries. As noted earlier, the service chiefs resisted the GNA due to the lack of operational authority that the act would cause for the secretaries by giving operational authority to the SECDEF and GCCs. However, the military looks back and lauds the GNA as one of the most significant and effective pieces of legislation regarding the military. Future generations are likely to look back and applaud limiting cabinet secretary operational control due to the benefits gained by shifting operational control of interagency capabilities away from functionally oriented agencies and towards organizations such as ARGOs or STOOs.

**Supporting Documentation**

This study classifies supporting documentation into two categories: (1) Originative documents: those that create new organization and (2) Managing documents:
those that are directed by the first category and that are used to manage the organizations that are part of the National Security System.

Originative Documents

As discussed earlier, this study suggests that legislation by Congress is the preferred method to reorganize the interagency system. This is because no lasting interagency reform has occurred without a Congressional mandate. This will be the most successful means of reorganization because it will create conditions that require compliance with particular mandates and will be able to enforce the compliance by specifying remedies for non-compliance.

Current legislation requires certain agencies to be directed by their headquarters in Washington, D.C. As Ross Coffey identifies, this was a major hurdle to operations in Vietnam before President Johnson authorized the CORDS program. As Coffey puts it: “Part of the problem was tied to the statutory obligations of each agency to remain responsible to its headquarters in Washington.”1 New legislation should eliminate such requirements, except for rare exceptions.

This study concludes that just as the service chiefs were opposed to the GNA because they would lose power and influence, likewise, those who stand to lose power and influence by realigning the roles and responsibilities of governmental agencies will be opposed to governmental reorganization. This opposition is another reason why Congressional legislation will be the most effective way to initiate meaningful change. Only Congressional legislation is likely to be able to effectively divest these powerful officials of their operational level controls.
Due to the entrenched powerful positions within the government, the director of any interagency management office must have his or her power firmly established by specifying the relationships and powers of existing agency heads vis-à-vis this director. In order to eliminate any claims to the contrary, establishing law should (like the GNA) leave no doubt as to the authority of the such a director. Goldwater-Nichols states clearly “The Secretary [of Defense] has sole and ultimate power within the department of defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act.” A similar clause should be included in any interagency reorganization act. However, as noted earlier, special attention must be paid to the SECDEF as is appropriate to any decision on the structure of the national chain of command.

Legislation should direct the formation of doctrine. The laws that do so should direct who is the proponent for each organization’s doctrine and should delineate which doctrines take precedence in cases of discordance or incongruency.

Legislation should delineate between powers and restrictions on powers. Therefore, specific articles in legislation should specify the authorities of any new organizations or key officials within these organizations. Legislation should endow these organizations with the capacity to create new abilities or competencies when needed.

Likewise, legislation should specifically prohibit participation of certain offices in the operational chain of command or any governmental agencies, secretaries, or others that may interfere with the operational decisions of ARGOs or STOOs.
Legislation should require the production of particular documents that will help to manage the interagency process. Recommendations for these documents are enumerated below in the section titled “Managing Documents.”

Legislation or policy should also direct professional development requirements for advancement within the interagency field. These laws or policies should also formalize incentives for officers who fulfill unified assignments, including: (1) Additional Skill Identifiers, (2) Improved chances for promotion based on filling unified billets, and (3) Improved chances for promotion based on operational deployments in unified billets. Military and civilian employees alike should have their careers incentivized in similar fashions to encourage seeking out unified assignments. Flournoy points out that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation added “the creation of the Joint Service Officer designation and associated incentives for officers to seek joint service as a way of advancing their careers.”

Flournoy goes on to point out that an additional benefit “to such a career path would be to enhance interagency education and training opportunities.”

Managing Documents

This study addresses new documentation and does not include existing documentation mandated by law in this section, except for purposes of reference or comparison.

Several authors recommend publishing a document such as a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR). This document could be published by the DNS, a senior director of the NSC, or the White House. Flournoy recommends that this
document “should be conducted at the outset of every administration. This QNSR, driven by the White House, would produce a classified national security planning guidance document in addition to the unclassified National Security Strategy already mandated by Congress.”

This study did not find a recommendation for it, but another possible document that could serve the unified community well would be a Unified Strategic Capabilities Plan (USCP) similar to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This document could be used to issue guidance from ONS or PSC to the ARGOs. If separate ONS, PCS, or Unified Staffs existed, the QNSR and USCP could be issued by separate organizations (just as the QDR is issued by the OSD and the JSCP is issued by the JCS).

Again, the exact structure of the USCP and QNSR would be driven by the national chain of command decision.

deployable operational capability

This study recommends that the specific agencies would require a deployable population and surge reserves for emergencies. These measures will prevent problems such as the “Paucity of operational capacity” that Flournoy sites regarding the State Department.

This study also recommends that certain agencies maintain training pools. The military has such a pool and when Colin Powel was Secretary of State, so did DOS. However, the requirements placed on DOS by the Global War on Terror depleted this pool. Expeditionary pools should be large enough so that training pools are not depleted.
and so that the interagency community can possess a regenerative process that allows deployed organizations and persons to retrain, reset, and prepare for future deployments.

**Budget and Procurement**

Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee states that interagency reform “will require budget coordination across agencies.” The chairman’s comments seem to suggest either a lot of busy work between agencies without authority to make a decision on the issue, or the creation of an office for unified budgeting and procurement that is directed from within the EOP is needed that will be subject to congressional oversight and approval for budget recommendations.

A unified budgeting office would allow a high level unified budget review would ensure proper prioritization based on guidance from within the EOP, or possibly from the staff of the DNS. Another solution is that the White House budgeting office continues their current role with the addition of managing the unified budget. Any of these solutions would allow the budget to be integrated into the President’s budget proposals, subject to approval by Congress, and subject to further reviews by congressional Committees on Appropriations.

**Integrated Systems**

This study identifies a need for common systems that can be used by broad segments of the interagency community, the public sector, as well as the larger international community in particular cases as well. Integrated systems will ensure that procurement is streamlined where appropriate and allows for interoperability of governmental equipment.
The PNSR identifies a need for “a comprehensive and flexible investment strategy that generates and appropriately applies the human and financial resources needed to meet goals and objectives.” This statement refers to personnel and money; however, the “fiscal resources” will allow the development and purchase of interoperable systems that can serve the interagency community as a whole.

To aid this process, the industrial community (composed of aligned stakeholders) must be given the proper incentives to develop these integrated systems for us. And for allied national stakeholders when deemed appropriate.

Human Resources

The PNSR further clarifies the human resources requirements for “effective recruitment and a robust education and training system.” That project also identifies the need for the “creation of a national security workforce bound by a national security culture.”

The language in this section of the PNSR study is similar to the language used to describe the requirements and concerns voiced during the debate over the Goldwater-Nichols debate before Congress passed that bill.

As previously discussed, personnel in the interagency community will need interagency education. This education includes a particular core sets of skills and periodic training as their careers progress, so that they can assume positions of increased responsibility with the interagency community. This training should be required for continued advancement and special designation as interagency service officials. The specific training and educational requirements should be legislated as outlined in the
section of this study titled Supporting Documentation. This education should begin with operational level training mid-career at schools such as Command and General Staff College and eventually include strategic level education for select individuals at schools such as the National Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

Equipment and Hardware

This study asserts that the nation would benefit greatly by using common equipment and hardware across the government. These shared systems, will make the interagency process more efficient in time and money, and will allow re-allocation of finite resources in order to tailor the national security apparatus to the highest priority tasks when needed.

For example, shared data bases could, in the words of Joint Vision 2020, enable a “concept labeled the global information grid will provide the network-centric environment”\textsuperscript{12} that will provide information superiority. Inventory tracking systems may be part of this information grid. However, the hardware that enables these shared tracking systems and feeds the data bases may need to be standardized at civil and military air and sea ports.

Leadership

Our governmental agencies produce senior leaders of diverse backgrounds and capabilities. These diversities create the opportunity to select the right leadership capabilities and the right back-ground skills to address the right problem sets. This study recommends that leaders from any of several governmental agencies could be selected to direct an Appropriate Responsible Geographic Organization (ARGO). This study
recommends that the senior leaders of the ARGOs should be selected based on the characteristics of the areas for which they will responsible. For example the director of the organization responsible for the U.S. homeland, probably should not be military unless the nation is attacked by a foreign invader. The director for an area such as Europe, with its many small countries with developed governments and economies may be best prepared by assignments in DOS. The director for the currently war-torn middle east may be best served by a military background. While the director for largely undeveloped Africa may be best selected from USAID.

**Summary and Conclusions**

This study concludes that two major screening decisions must be made before further conclusions may be drawn regarding interagency reform. These decisions are: (1) should the national chain of command be altered to allow for operational control of military assets by non-military organizations, and (2) should cabinet secretaries’ power be limited in order to increase the ability to synchronize strategic and operational level interagency activities. Affirmative answers to either of these questions would require special safeguards; however, affirmative answers to these questions would greatly increase the nation’s ability to contend with national stakeholders. Congress must decide if the benefits justify the costs.

This study asserts that our national security structure will be most effective if it is matched to the modes in which we interact with other global stakeholders. Unified conventions must be capable of spanning the entire spectrum of conflict and address each of the modes of contention. A clear conception of how the government would employ
unified conventions in relation to global stakeholders is required in order to properly create an interagency system that can best achieve desired results.

The interagency system is just that: a *system* composed of multiple entities. A revised interagency system may require multiple new substructures. To offer an analogy: the defense system of the U.S. is represented by the DOD: it is composed of the OSD, the Joint Staff, the GCCs, and the actual services that do not issue operational decisions, as well as various other smaller organizations such as the Inspector General and other defense agencies. The National Security System relies on multiple bodies. The single National Security Act of 1947 created many of the above mentioned agencies and organizations all at once because Congress was attempting to create a *system* for national security.

A unified theory of contention combined with structural reform with developed processes will maximize the nation’s ability to achieve policy goals. This study asserts that the nation would be served best by separate bodies designed to: (1) determine policy and articulate desired ends, (2) provide the means to accomplish policy objectives, and (3) place the means in action using the appropriate ways. In other words, separate bodies responsible for ways, means, and ends, as well as a mechanism to bring coherence between the ways and means in order to achieve desired ends.

This study recommends reorganizing the EOP with the above roles in mind. This reorganization could possibly involve: (1) expanding the role of the NSC into a PSC, (2) creating a new organization such as an ONS to manage integrating all interagency processes, (3) creating an organization such as an ONS while keeping the military chain
of command separate, or (4) creating a new organization such as a unified staff.

However, without a clear concept of an interagency contention model, or concrete answers to screening questions above, this study is inconclusive in this regard.

This study also concludes that creating ARGO and STOO type organizations would greatly increase the operational level capacity of the nation.

Whatever system is implemented, it must be simple enough to be understood and must clearly identify: (1) roles and responsibilities, (2) relationships between organizations and individual officers, and (3) prohibitions and restrictions.

By matching the national interagency system with a developed theory of contention and creating operational level capacity through centralized strategic policy organizations and decentralized operational application organizations, the nation could gain unprecedented ability to protect the national interests.

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