IS THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) ADEQUATELY TRAINED TO PROPERLY EMPLOY CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) TEAMS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT WHEN SUCH CAPABILITY IS TASK ORGANIZED WITHIN THE BCT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

GERALD S. LAW, MAJ, US ARMY

A.S. Welding Engineering Technology, Ricks College, Rexburg, Idaho, 1994
B.S. Industrial Technology, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 1997
M.S. Geology and Geophysics, University of Missouri, Rolla, Missouri, 2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2008

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**Is the brigade combat team (BCT) adequately trained to properly employ civil affairs (CA) teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT?**

This study examines whether the BCT is adequately trained to properly employ CA teams in the contemporary environment by examining past contingency operations, current Army doctrine, and CA doctrine. Additionally, this study obtains information through Army training centers, Army research centers and live subjects.

The study concludes that most commanders, units, and staffs: 1) focus on lethal effects; 2) do not understand the mission of non-lethal units due to doctrine and training; 3) do not understand the limits and capabilities of non-lethal units. Additionally, the commander’s attitude directly determines the level of non-lethal unit integration and CA personnel do not understand CA doctrine.

The study recommends the following changes: The Army should update CA and Army doctrine to include: 1) COIN operations; 2) guidance on non-lethal unit integration and employment; 3) define CAT-B role when CAT-A teams are task organized within a gaining unit; 4) require CA limits and capabilities in the OPORD; 5) reexamine battle command and decisive point definitions. The Army should train leaders and CA personnel to learn CA limits and capabilities. Training should be conducted at all Army training and mobilization centers to incorporate CA personnel into the gaining unit’s planning, execution, and post mission operations.

**Civil Affairs, Attachments, Psychological Operations, Tactical Human Intelligence, Contemporary Environment, Contingency Operations, Integration and Employment, Non-Lethal Units.**
Name of Candidate: Major Gerald S. Law

Thesis Title: IS THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) ADEQUATELY TRAINED TO PROPERLY EMPLOY CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) TEAMS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT WHEN SUCH CAPABILITY IS TASK ORGANIZED WITHIN THE BCT?

Approved by:

________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Mr. Ted Shadid, M.P.A.

________________________, Member
COL Gary M. Bowman, Ph.D.

________________________, Member
LTC John Wyman, B.S.

Accepted this 12th day of December 2008 by:

________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
ABSTRACT

IS THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) ADEQUATELY TRAINED TO PROPERLY EMPLOY CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) TEAMS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT WHEN SUCH CAPABILITY IS TASK ORGANIZED WITHIN THE BCT? By MAJ Gerald S. Law, 113 pages.

This study examines whether the BCT is adequately trained to properly employ CA teams in the contemporary environment by examining past contingency operations, current Army doctrine, and CA doctrine. Additionally, this study obtains information through Army training centers, Army research centers and live subjects.

The study concludes that most commanders, units, and staffs: 1) focus on lethal effects; 2) do not understand the mission of non-lethal units due to doctrine and training; 3) do not understand the limits and capabilities of non-lethal units. Additionally, the commander’s attitude directly determines the level of non-lethal unit integration and CA personnel do not understand CA doctrine.

The study recommends the following changes: The Army should update CA and Army doctrine to include: 1) COIN operations; 2) guidance on non-lethal unit integration and employment; 3) define CAT-B role when CAT-A teams are task organized within a gaining unit; 4) require CA limits and capabilities in the OPORD; 5) reexamine battle command and decisive point definitions. The Army should train leaders and CA personnel to learn CA limits and capabilities. Training should be conducted at all Army training and mobilization centers to incorporate CA personnel into the gaining unit’s planning, execution, and post mission operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I thank my wife, Charlene. Without her love, support, and sacrifice, this project would not have been possible. Her dedication gave me the opportunity to accomplish all I could over the years. Additionally, I owe a lot to my children, Zachary and Breanna. Thank you for your understanding and support.

Next, I thank my committee for their support and expertise. Mr. Ted Shadid, COL Gary Bowman, and LTC John Wyman directly contributed to the validity of this research project. They kept me on track and provided advice when I needed it most.

Additionally, I thank the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, Counterinsurgency Center, Army Research Institute, Rand Arroyo Center, and The Center for Army Lessons Learned for their input and advice. Their contributions greatly enhanced the validity of this research project.

Finally, I thank everyone who provided input to this research project through questionnaires and surveys. Your answers provided current in-depth knowledge that directly contributed to completing this thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author’s Experience and Problem Statement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Research Questions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical use of CA Teams and Related Capabilities</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical: 1898 to 1976</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent: 1977 to 2001 (pre 9/11)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of Doctrine</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-0 and FM 3-24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of CA Doctrine</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modularity and the BCT</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of Knowledge Gap</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Hypothesis</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question Methodology</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Training Centers</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Army Research Centers ................................................................................................ 43
Live Subjects ................................................................................................................. 44
  Questionnaire and Survey Methodology ............................................................... 44
  Protection of Live Subjects .................................................................................... 46
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 47

CHAPTER 4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS .................................................. 48

Data from Army Training Centers ................................................................................ 48
  Direct Correspondence with OC/Ts ............................................................... 48
  JRTC Published Trends ......................................................................................... 50
  NTC Published Trends ........................................................................................... 52
Data from Army Research Centers ............................................................................... 53
  CALL Published Theses and Monographs ............................................................ 54
  Interviews, IIRs, and AARs ................................................................................... 56
  Rand Arroyo Center ............................................................................................... 61
  Blogs and Websites ................................................................................................ 63
Data from Live Subjects ............................................................................................... 64
  Questionnaires ........................................................................................................ 64
  Surveys ................................................................................................................... 69
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 74

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 75

Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 75
  Summary of Findings ............................................................................................. 75
  Interpretation of Data ............................................................................................. 80
  Implications ............................................................................................................. 81
Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 81
  Employment of CA Teams ..................................................................................... 81
  Further Study .......................................................................................................... 84
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 85

GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................... 88

APPENDIX A CGSC QAO QUESTIONNAIRE APPROVAL LETTER ......................... 92
APPENDIX B QUESTIONNAIRE (Research Control Number 08-025) ....................... 93
APPENDIX C INFORMED CONSENT FORM .............................................................. 94
APPENDIX D (CGSC QAO SURVEY APPROVAL LETTER) ...................................... 95
APPENDIX E SURVEY FORM (Research Control Number 08-045) ......................... 96
REFERENCE LIST ........................................................................................................... 97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOC</td>
<td>Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>Army Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNCOC</td>
<td>Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSTB</td>
<td>Brigade Special Troops Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center of Army Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Planning Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT-A</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team-Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT-B</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team-Bravo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>Civilians on the Battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operational Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Direct Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRT</td>
<td>Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>High Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military Decision Making Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRX</td>
<td>Mission Readiness Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC/T</td>
<td>Observer Controller Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Five Paragraph Operations Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program Of Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QAO</td>
<td>Quality Assurance Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSTA</td>
<td>Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>Tactical Human Intelligence Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Arial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Author and an Interpreter Talk with Local Citizens in Ar Ramadi, Iraq</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Author Working with a Marine K-9 Search Team</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Alpha Company Soldiers and a THT Talk with Iraqi Citizens</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>A Marine CA Team and the Author Gain Information from Local Citizens</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Research Question Methodology Map</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Questionnaire and Survey Data Collection Plan</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>(Questionnaire) Types of Non-Lethal Units</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>(Questionnaire) Integration Challenges</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>(Questionnaire) Integration Solutions</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>(Survey) Requirement to Integrate Non-Lethal Units</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>(Survey) Types of Non-Lethal Units</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>(Survey) Integration Challenges</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>(Survey) Integration Solutions</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>Brigade/Battalion Checklist for Integrating CA Teams</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Author’s Experience and Problem Statement

The idea for this study started in the houses and streets of Ar Ramadi, Iraq. There, my company learned that counterinsurgency operations require BCTs to employ non-lethal as well as lethal capabilities in the contemporary environment. Employing non-lethal units brings new challenges for commanders trained to fight a conventional fight. Commanders must be able to receive and integrate units having non-lethal capabilities into their formation for mission success, specifically Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operation Teams (PSYOPS), and Tactical Human Intelligence Teams (THTs).

Before deploying to Iraq, A Company, 44\textsuperscript{th} Engineer Battalion supported 4\textsuperscript{th} Squadron, 7\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry Regiment (4-7 CAV) on the Korean peninsula. Its mission, essential to the defense plan of South Korea, consisted of providing mobility, counter mobility and survivability to 4-7 CAV.

Integrating attachments was never a major concern because task organization usually consisted of attaching one engineer platoon to a cavalry ground troop. Alpha Company, 44\textsuperscript{th} Engineer Battalion, trained to fight the conventional fight in Korea and only focused on providing lethal capabilities to 4-7 CAV. The integration concerns were ensuring the commander briefed and linked up each platoon with its respective cavalry ground troop.

The 44\textsuperscript{th} Engineer Battalion along with its parent brigade (2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division) deployed to Iraq in August 2004. In Iraq, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Division
assigned the brigade an area of responsibility within Ar Ramadi. There, the 44th Engineer Battalion assumed a non-traditional role compared to most engineer battalions. Each engineer company functioned as a separate maneuver company. Soon, 2nd Brigade HQ ordered the battalion to conduct a cache search in downtown Ar Ramadi. This involved talking to people in their homes, gathering information and gaining intelligence. Figure 1 shows the author with the aid of an interpreter gaining information from local citizens concerning the location of weapons, explosives, and munitions.

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1.** Author and an Interpreter Talk with Local Citizens in Ar Ramadi, Iraq.

*Source: Picture by Author*

Alpha Company faced many new challenges, to include incorporating units having non-lethal capabilities within the formation. For the cache search mission, the company received a CA team, a THT, a marine combat photographer, a PSYOPS team, a Marine K-9 search team and two interpreters. The company quickly learned that the
contemporary environment of Ar Ramadi requires non-lethal units which bring significant integration and employment concerns. Figure 2 shows the author and Alpha Company personnel working with a Marine K-9 Search Team during a cache search mission in Ar Ramadi, Iraq.

Figure 2. Author Working with a Marine K-9 Search Team.

Source: Picture by Author

The company checked current battalion standard operating procedures (SOPs), battalion and brigade operations orders (OPORDs), and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) for any additional information relating to the integration of CA, PSYOPS, and THTs but found only general references. For example, the information listed under subparagraph d “Attachments and Detachments” of the BN OPORD listed only the type of attachments and time they would be attached. FM 5-0, the Army’s planning and orders production
field manual states, “list units that are attached or detached to the headquarters that issues the order. State when attachment or detachment is effective” (FM 5-0 2005, G-22). FM 5-0, Figure G-4 does not require any information regarding the limits or capabilities of a task organized unit; therefore, the study advocates Figure G-4 needs to be updated.

The company concluded the battalion and brigade OPORDs and SOPs did not address the mission or capabilities of our non-lethal units, to include the CA, PSYOPS, and THT teams, but presented only general references. To overcome this problem, the company conducted and developed numerous activities and procedures through research and experience to ensure proper integration and employment of its non-lethal units. Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows Alpha Company personnel, a CA team, and a THT team gaining information from local citizens regarding recent insurgent activity and the location of weapons, explosives, and munitions.

Figure 3. Alpha Company Soldiers and a THT Talk with Iraqi Citizens.

Source: Picture by Author
Background

Receiving non-lethal units is not new to the Army. Brigades and below have incorporated numerous units having non-lethal capabilities into their formations for years. In his two volume historical account of U.S. Army experiences in counterinsurgency (COIN) and contingency operations, Andrew J. Birtle, referring to the U.S Army’s role in the Philippine War states; “The Army’s many pacification programs placed heavy burdens on small-unit commanders who, without the benefit of additional staff, had to oversee local governments and orchestrate civil affairs activities” (Birtle 2004, 121). CA, PSYOPS, and THTs have existed in varying forms and were employed by U.S. Army units from the Philippine War (1889-1902) up to the Vietnam conflict
(1965-1976); however, due to political reasons, the Army failed to continuously teach its COIN and contingency lessons learned to its officers and soldiers during this time (Birtle 2006, 477).

In 1971, an Army Command query asked for recommendations whether to include civil affairs, psychological operations, and COIN instruction in all U.S. Army schools (Birtle 2006, 480). By 1979, the U.S. Military Academy and the Infantry School at Fort Benning terminated their counterinsurgency instruction, while the Command and General Staff College offered just eight hours. “While counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla doctrine remained on the books, progressively fewer personnel were given the opportunity to study, learn, and practice the tenets of that doctrine” (Birtle 2006, 481).

Soon, the Army turned to conventional warfare training and schooling based on the Soviet threat in Europe. In 1976, the Army released FM 100-5 Operations, which focused on large scale conventional warfare. All “references to counterinsurgency, nation-building, civil affairs, and psychological operations” were stripped from the manual (Birtle 2006, 482). The Army disregarded its contingency experience by preparing to defeat the Soviets in Europe using conventional tactics despite having a history of spending more time over the past 70 years conducting COIN and contingency operations.

Commanders must be able to conduct offensive and defensive as well as stability operations which require the ability to integrate lethal as well as non-lethal means including CA teams concurrently (FM 3-24 2006, 1-19). In the conventional fight, task organization is mainly based on squads, platoons, companies, and battalions attached to
battalions and brigades for creating lethal effects on enemy forces. However, the COIN fight emphasizes unique teams capable of providing non-lethal as well as lethal effects on enemy forces and local populations. Non-lethal units such as CA teams add the ability to create effects within a BCT but bring with them unique concerns associated with their integration and employment. Presently, leaders within the BCT have pre-conceived notions regarding the capabilities and vulnerabilities of their non-lethal units. Not properly integrated, these units can contribute to frustration, improper utilization or even mission failure on the battlefield.

The focus of this study relates to the integration and employment of CA teams within the BCT. The study examines CA integration because most units within a BCT utilize CA teams and more developed CA doctrine exists regarding its integration and employment. However, the research and recommendations determined by this study might be applicable to other types of non-lethal enablers tasked organized within the BCT such as PSYOPS and THT teams.

Based on personal experience and professional reading it is not clear the BCT is prepared to integrate and employ CA teams in the contemporary environment. Additionally, the Army has shifted to full spectrum operations in Iraq and Afghanistan having a past emphasis on training and schooling for conventional warfare. These facts lead to the following research question: is the BCT adequately trained to properly employ CA teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT.
Primary Research Question

Is the brigade combat team (BCT) adequately trained to properly employ civil affairs (CA) teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT?

Secondary Research Questions

How does history illustrate the performance of a BCTs ability to employ CA in COIN and contingency operations?

What are the doctrinal integration and employment procedures for CA teams in the contemporary environment?

Does recent literature to include After Action Reviews (AAR), Initial Impression Reports (IIRs) and blogs present any evidence of BCTs struggling with employing CA teams in the contemporary environment?

If so, why are BCTs struggling with integrating and employing CA teams?

Are BCTs struggling to employ CA teams because of leadership issues or doctrinal issues?

What are the trends at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) for BCTs integrating and employing CA teams during training rotations?

What does current literature from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Counterinsurgency Center, Rand Arroyo Center, and the Combined Arms Center say about a BCTs ability to properly employ CA teams and related capabilities?

Do former and present commanders believe there are integration and employment issues within a BCT concerning CA teams? If so, what are they?
Do CA personnel believe there are integration and employment issues within a BCT? If so, what are they?

Assumptions

The U.S military will continue to conduct counterinsurgency operations in low intensity conflicts.

Army units will continue to employ lethal and non-lethal effects in the contemporary environment as part of counterinsurgency operations.

Requirements on task organized non-lethal capabilities within companies, battalions, and brigades will remain constant.

Conducting counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary environment requires companies, battalions, and brigades to integrate and employ CA teams.

Definition of Terms

The thesis defines the following terms in order to clarify their use throughout the study: Non-Lethal Unit, Challenge, Solution, and Enabler.

Non-Lethal Unit - *Any individual, team, or section (attached, OPCON, or TACON) to a brigade, battalion, or company) for the purpose of providing a non-lethal effect.*

Challenge - *Any problem, requirement, or action within a BCT that causes or enforces the degraded use or employment of a CA team.*

Solution - *Any method, activity, or procedure that mitigates or reduces the challenge to an expectable level and enhances the BCT’s ability to employ any CA team, section, or individual.*
Enabler - *any non-lethal or lethal unit that supplies the means, knowledge, or opportunity to provide an effect on combatants or non-combatants. To make feasible or possible to complete a mission.* All other terms pertinent to this study are found in the glossary at the end of the thesis.

**Limitations**

The study presents an historical account of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine and the use of providing CA effects during counterinsurgency and contingency operations from 1898 to present.

The study describes any tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing CA, teams in previous counterinsurgency and contingency operations. The study begins with the Cuban intervention (1898-1902) and the Philippine War (1899-1907) because they represent the U.S. Army’s first major involvement in overseas nation building.

The study outlines current doctrinal procedures for integrating and employing CA teams within the BCT.

The study investigates the implications of integrating and employing subunits within the brigade due to modularity.

The study examines the ability of BCTs to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities by obtaining data from Army training centers, Army research centers, and live subjects.

Finally, the study presents recommendations to commanders and staffs for integrating and employing CA teams within the BCT.
Delimitations

The study does not present any classified material regarding the employment of CA, PSYOPS, and THTs in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The study does not present any classified material from any time period relating to the employment of non-lethal units.

The study does not address the advantages or disadvantages of modularity. It does not take a stance on modularity or determine if modularity is the right course of action for the Army.

The study does not describe or recommend any tactics, techniques, and procedures for any non-military units having non-lethal capabilities to include non-government organizations (NGOs), media, interpreters, and all non-military government agencies.

Significance

The significance of this research is two fold. First, the study helps units within brigade combat teams to properly integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities in the contemporary environment. The focus of the study relates to integrating CA teams only; however, results are applicable to other types of non-lethal units, such as PSYOPS and THTs.

Second, the results of this study will assist commanders with developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); unit standard operating procedures (SOPs); and OPORD planning considerations for integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities into their formations.
Summary

Brigades and below have incorporated numerous attachments into their formations for mainly tactical needs. Some commanders were forced to make quick assumptions concerning the capabilities and vulnerabilities of their attachments, which contributed to their quick integration.

However, the demands of conducting COIN operations require the integration of numerous non-lethal units to include CA teams within a BCT down to the battalion and company level. Additionally, these non-lethal units have unique missions and capabilities, which must be planned for, resourced, and implemented, before the start of any mission.

Company, battalion, and brigade commanders face significant integration and employment challenges in integrating CA teams and other enablers into their formations but can make quick assumptions regarding their capabilities which lead to frustration, improper utilization or even mission failure on the battlefield.

This research project answers the question: Is the BCT adequately trained to properly employ CA teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT? The study investigates the integration and employment of CA teams and related capabilities within a BCT from a historical, doctrinal, training, and leadership perspective. This thesis helps individual units to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities in the contemporary environment and contributes to the Army’s understanding of how to employ non-lethal units and individuals.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study divides the literature review into four types: Historical, Army Doctrine, CA Doctrine, and Modularity impact on BCTs. The review starts with examining historical references describing the employment of CA teams and capabilities by U.S. Army units in past contingency operations from 1898 to 2001 (pre 9/11). Second, the study examines past and present Army doctrine to identify references for the need and use of CA teams and related capabilities. The study further examines current CA doctrine to identify and examine procedures outlining their integration and employment. Additionally, the study examines the impact of modularity on BCTs and their ability to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities.

Furthermore, the review concludes by identifying the presence of any knowledge gaps associated with integrating and employing CA teams in the contemporary environment. The study determines that a knowledge gap exists if history illustrates the presence of integration and employment issues and doctrine presents and describes integration guidance for CA teams and related capabilities. Finally, the study presents its hypothesis based on the problem statement and the literature review. The study’s hypothesis presents an initial answer to the primary research question. Therefore, the study divides the literature review into five sections: Historical use of CA Teams and Related Capabilities, Investigation of Doctrine, Modularity and the BCT, Identification of Knowledge Gap, and Presentation of Initial Hypothesis.
Historical use of CA Teams and Related Capabilities

Historical: 1898 to 1976

This section presents a historical account of employing non-lethal effects and capabilities by the U.S Army from 1898 to 1976, starting with Andrew J. Birtle’s book, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. Birtle’s work describes the Army’s performance in counterinsurgency, overseas constabulary, and contingency operations around the world since the late 1800’s. It sets the foundation for the study because it describes the U.S. Army’s need and ability to integrate and employ CA and related capabilities throughout past deployments.

*Cuba (1898-1902)*

The U.S. Army deployed units to Cuba from 1898-1902 to restore infrastructure and government. By the time MG John R. Brooke deployed with 11,000 soldiers to Cuba, the island had dwindled to a state of confusion and poverty caused by rebellion and war. Cuban commerce was non-existent caused by destroyed agriculture, abandoned homes and villages, and free roaming bandits (Birtle 2004, 104).

The U.S. Army’s first task was “to establish the machinery of military government” (Birtle 2004, 104) by requiring Cuban civilians to lead the effort. U.S. military and civilians provided assistance and made most of the decisions, but Cuban personnel ran the government. In a year, the U.S Army had built and maintained a government in Cuba. Military forces had provided security, humanitarian assistance, established laws, constructed roads, schools, and built a working sewer system for the people of Cuba (Birtle 2004, 105).
By 1902, MG Leonard Wood (MG Brooke’s replacement), spent millions of dollars on Cuban infrastructure by building public buildings to include the country’s first public library, constructing and paving streets, and refurbishing harbors. Over 15 million dollars went into Cuban infrastructure during this time; however, due to Cuban patronage, corruption, and authoritarianism, the Army’s efforts proved futile (Birtle 2004, 106).

Labeled as “America’s first venture into overseas nation building”, Cuba proved to be a failure and disappointment (Birtle 2004, 107); however, the Army had established the necessity of using non-lethal effects to accomplish the task of overseas nation building. During this time the Army employed civil affair capabilities, human intelligence, psychological operation effects, and engineers to accomplish its mission of providing government services to Cuba.

*The Philippine War (1899-1907)*

During the Philippine war, the U.S. Army found itself fighting a determined insurgency due to diverse tribes, languages, and religions spread over a group of 7,000 islands. Initially using conventional tactics against the Army, the insurgents switched to guerrilla warfare utilizing their knowledge of the terrain, people, and climate (Birtle 2004, 110). However, unable to defeat the U.S. Army in the field, the insurgents focused on control of the population.

The U.S. Army’s tactics for fighting the insurgency were based on several years of constabulary operations against the American Indian. Dividing their forces into small units, placing them in multiple bases, conducting raids, and employing search and destroy
missions were common counterinsurgency operations for the Army. However, due to a superior intelligence system utilized by the insurgents, Army counterinsurgency operations failed to achieve any significant results (Birtle 2004, 117).

By 1900, the Army switched to a pacification program labeled the Policy of Attraction, which focused on developing relationships of trust with the local population. Under the Policy of Attraction, Army efforts focused on building schools, roads, markets, and government’s facilities. Additionally, the Army found itself providing educational programs and humanitarian aid to the Filipino population.

The integration challenges for the U.S. Army relates to the numerous construction projects, teaching requirements, and educational programs performed by Army units. These projects placed high demands on small unit commanders who could not control all aspects of government and civil affairs activities (Birtle 2004, 12). Furthermore, by the fall of 1900, the McKinley administration replaced the military government with a civilian counterpart causing resentment within the Army. The Army complained “civilian rule was premature and that it needlessly complicated military operations” (Birtle 2004, 123).

The Philippine War reinforces the necessity of utilizing non-lethal capabilities to accomplish mission goals. During this time, the key for success was “the ability of officers to construct pragmatic pacification policies designed to meet the realities of the guerrilla war in their towns, provinces and districts” (Ramsey 2007, 121). The Army conducted multiple operations, which again required the use of civil affair capabilities, human intelligence, psychological operation effects, and engineers. Additionally, the
Philippine War illustrates the numerous integration issues Army leaders were forced to deal with while working with civilian leaders and government officials.

Operations in Cuba and the Philippines illustrate the Army’s requirement to integrate and employ CA capabilities as well as work with non-military agencies. Furthermore, tactical CA teams were not officially organized during this time; however, these operations illustrate the Army’s first integration and employment challenges associated with non-lethal effects and non-military agencies. Cuba and the Philippines show that officers could not control all aspects of governance and civilian activities while simultaneously conducting combat operations and had difficulty working with Department of State officials. Birtle’s book, however, does not describe any solutions developed by the Army during this time to ensure CA integration and employment.

Andrew J. Birtle’s second book is titled: *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976*. It describes the U.S. Army’s role in developing counterinsurgency doctrine; and conducting advisory and cold war contingency operations. Birtle’s second work describes the Army’s performance in counterinsurgency, advisory, and contingency operations throughout its deployment in Vietnam. This work illustrates the Army’s requirement and ability to employ CA and related capabilities from 1955 to 1973.

*Vietnam (1955-1973)*

If the Army had documented its lessons learned from the Philippine Insurrection, “we could have saved ourselves a good deal of time and effort in Vietnam” (Ramsey 2007, 113). The Army’s experience in Vietnam proves to be very similar to the
Philippine War; however, due to a lack of documentation and disregard for its 40 month Philippine experience, the Army relearned many previous lessons while conducting counterinsurgency and contingency operations in Vietnam throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

The U.S. Army’s first experience with integrating non-lethal units in Vietnam involved mainly incorporating advisors, CA, and PSYOPS. The Army incorporated these non-lethal units by deploying them separately to Vietnam to work with Vietnamese army units and government officials. President Kennedy’s plan to eliminate the Viet Cong and establish government control called for a campaign of “integrated political, military, economic, paramilitary, and police” efforts (Birtle 2006, 315). Over 3000 advisors from the initial 900 deployed to Vietnam to work with South Vietnamese Army units during Kennedy’s first year of office.

The advisors’ mission focused on training the South Vietnamese military to abandon a “Maginot type defensive attitude” (Birtle 2006, 316) and focus on fire and maneuver to find and destroy the enemy; however, it stressed the idea of guerrilla isolation (Birtle 2006, 317). Therefore, U.S advisors taught that removing guerrillas from the people occurs only if the population believes the military are here to help and defend them. Understanding that “fire power is a double edged weapon in a people’s war” (Birtle 2006, 317), U.S advisors stressed the practice of employing unobserved artillery fire only in areas known to harbor Viet Cong or civilians who support them.

Second, due to Saigon’s inadequate civic action program, the U.S Army started sending civic action teams to Vietnam by 1962. In order to stimulate Saigon’s program, the Army integrated “civic action teams and psyops advisors down to the division and
province level” (Birtle 2006, 317). Furthermore, the most successful civic action program during this time was the medical civic action program, which by 1965 had “dispensed over 4.5 million treatments” (Birtle 2006, 317) to the Vietnamese people in order to gain their trust.

Eventually, U.S. combat forces deployed to Vietnam in 1965 due to Saigon’s inability to destroy the Viet Cong, corruption and incompetence within the South Vietnamese government, and Saigon’s failure to stop Communist influence (Birtle 2006, 319). However, the presence of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam did not change American policy in Vietnam. Stressing a doctrine of combined “political, economic, and military measures to remove all causes of unrest while suppressing the overt, military manifestation of discontent” (Birtle 2006, 362), the U.S government maintained this strategy even after deploying combat forces to Vietnam.

Army combat forces integrated non-lethal units by establishing humanitarian assistance (HA), CA, and PSYOPS programs. For example, in order to win the hearts and minds of the people and gather intelligence; the 173rd Airborne Brigade established a civil affairs and psychological operations program within four months of their arrival (Birtle 2006, 396). These efforts contributed to the brigade’s construction of numerous schools, bridges, roads, and churches (Birtle 2006, 396).

Additional combat units conducted similar missions as the 173rd Airborne Brigade and by 1967 the U.S. military had constructed thousands of homes, schools, and wells; almost 200 kilometers of irrigation systems, hundreds of churches, dispensaries, and marketplaces. Vietnam illustrates how U.S. combat forces integrated numerous non-lethal capabilities to include civil affairs teams to build new infrastructure.
Challenges associated with integrating non-lethal units in combat units lay in the vagueness of their roles. Operational concepts were straightforward; however, the “texts were not always sufficiently detailed to guide operators” (Birtle 2006, 406). Unclear roles and confusion existed between combat units, security forces, civil affair teams, and psychological operations due to a lack of definitive explanations as to their purpose and capabilities, which when explained “might have reduced uncertainty and argument” (Birtle 2006, 406).

Recent: 1977 to 2001 (pre 9/11)

In order to investigate the U.S. Army’s ability to integrate and employ CA and related capabilities in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo, the study examines the following books and articles: Richard W. Stewart’s publication: *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994*; an article published by Joseph Fischer, Richard Stewart, and Stanley Sandeler entitled: *Operation Restore/Uphold/Maintain Democracy: The Role of Special Operations Forces, November 1991-June 1995*; and Herbert A Friedman’s website article *PSYOP Against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.*

*Somalia (1993)*

Stewart’s publication emphasizes the use of civil affairs and psychological operation units in Somalia. By early 1991, Somalia lost any resemblance of maintaining a central government due to government officials leaving the country. Soon, Somalia fell into a state of sectarian violence and ethnic warfare started by warlords and gang leaders competing for power (Stewart 2003, 6). Struggling to maintain this power, Somalia’s
warlords raided food storehouses and depots contributing to a massive famine affecting thousands of people.

Due to this famine, the U.S. government decided to intervene in Somalia through humanitarian relief efforts. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF began on 15 August 1992 consisting of airlifting food from Kenya to numerous interior parts of Somalia, thus bypassing ports and long distribution routes (Stewart 2003, 8). Operation PROVIDE RELIEF hoped to provide food directly to the people without involving American military forces on the ground; however, lawless gangs and warring political factions kept most of the food from reaching Somalia populations.

In order to solve this problem, Operation RESTORE HOPE began on 8 December 1992 consisting of U.S. military and later coalition forces deploying to Somalia to secure relief supplies and restore humanitarian efforts. By May 1993, Operation RESTORE HOPE proved successful. Famine conditions were largely reduced or wiped out, markets reopened, and operations to train a Somali national police force had began (Stewart 2003, 13).

A major contributor to the success of Operation RESTORE HOPE was the successful integration of civil affair teams and psychological operation units. “Army civil affairs and PSYOP forces, other elements of the special operations team, also provided critical support to U.S. relief operations during RESTORE HOPE” (Stewart 2003, 13). Additionally, other U.S. Army and Marine units successfully integrated numerous civil affair tactical support teams and civil affairs direct support teams into their formations. This allowed for mutual interaction between international humanitarian
aid organizations and contributed to the completion of critical assessments on medical and engineer facilities (Stewart 2003, 13).

Additionally, U.S. military units integrated psychological operations on a large scale in Somalia, which contributed to the success of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. One method or solution developed to ensure PSYOP integration was establishing a joint PSYOP Task Force. This task force ensured “that information operations were effectively integrated into all plans and operations in theater” (Stewart 2003, 13). Due to proper integration, PSYOP units were able to establish and run newspapers, set up radio broadcasting systems, and integrate tactical loudspeaker teams within U.S. military operations (Stewart 2003, 13).

Operations in Somalia illustrate a success story for integrating non-lethal units within combat forces from the tactical level to the operational level. By the early 1990’s the Army had created and organized tactical CA teams to deploy with combat forces. U.S. Army and Marine units had successfully integrated numerous tactical CA and PSYOP units by establishing a Joint PSYOP Task Force and a Civil Military Operations Cell (CMOC), which synchronized all CA, HA, and PSYOP efforts. “Several civilian veterans of humanitarian operations claimed that it (CMOC) offered the best NGO-military interface they had ever witnessed” (Baumann 2003, 54).

However, operations in Somalia failed due to “clan rivalry and U.S. reluctance to engage in long-term nation building” (Stewart 2003, 13), which identifies a major challenge for integrating and employing non-lethal units. Making a decision to engage or not engage in long term nation building operations would plaque U.S. strategy over the next several years in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Haiti (1994)

The literature review continues with examining an article published by Joseph Fischer, Richard Stewart, and Stanley Sandeler titled: *Operation Restore/ Uphold/ Maintain Democracy: The Role of Special Operations Forces, November 1991-June 1995* and Ed Rouse’s website article *PSYOP in Haiti Operation Uphold Democracy*. The study chooses these articles due to the specific mention and focus of the non-lethal units employed in Haiti. By the mid 1990s, non-lethal units developed specific roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. Use of psychological operations teams, civil affairs teams, and other non-lethal units in support of national objectives across the globe became paramount for OPERATION UPHOLD, RESTORE, and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY. U.S. military forces deployed to Haiti to help restore its democratically elected government and stop a massive Haitian exodus (Rouse 2003, website). The use of non-lethal units in Haiti consisted of a massive psychological plan followed by civil affairs and humanitarian assistance operations. Initially, psychological units broadcasted radio messages from coast guard boats and C-130s to inform the Haitian people of the dangers of leaving the country through boat migration.

Additionally, as U.S. forces deployed to Haiti, psychological tactical teams were inserted to work with Haitian military and civilian personnel to reduce possible tensions (Rouse 2003, website). Eventually, a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) was created “to facilitate civil order and rescue Haitian-to-Haitian violence” (Rouse 2003, website). Operating under special operation units, civil affairs and psychological operation teams were able to pacify 95% of the Haitian population (Fischer
“Unlike soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, who relied on Kevlar helmets, flak vests, and the threatening muzzle of a weapon to cajole Haitians, Special Forces soldiers adopted an approach to pacification built on establishing rapport with the Haitian people and keeping the Kevlar gear largely out of sight” (Fischer 1997, 116).

Non-lethal units to include civil affairs and psychological operations teams proved their necessity and importance throughout its deployment in Haiti. Lessons learned in Somalia revealed the importance of winning over the support of the people and advocating for personnel disarmament through seizing and voluntary turn in programs. Efforts in rebuilding infrastructure and disarmament proved to be successful. By October 1994, the democratic government of Haiti began to assume power with the return of President Aristide. Initially, Haitians viewed U.S. Forces with little optimism, but “thanks to the assistance of PSYOP, considered the American soldiers as saviors of their country” (Rouse 2003, website).

Numerous challenges with integrating these non-lethal units became paramount during operations in Haiti. One major challenge associated with civil affairs teams deployed in Haiti was the absence of a universal understanding of their roles and capabilities. The 96th CA Battalion Commander, LTC Powers made two assumptions, which contributed to frustration, mission creep, and eventfully led to their delayed redeployment. He assumed “that USAID, NGOs and PVOs would be the ones to act ‘on the assessments’” (Fischer 1997, 87) and second, he assumed that his civil affairs teams would provide limited assistance and “would not involve nation building in the strict sense of the word” (Fischer 1997, 87).
Operations in Haiti further illustrate the need and success psychological operation units and civil affairs teams bring to the fight, but introduce the existence of integration challenges associated with these types of units. As illustrated by the continued involvement of U.S. military forces in Somalia and Haiti, history illustrates the importance of non-lethal units and the numerous integration and employment challenges they present to combat commanders.

*Kosovo (1999)*

Next, the literature review continues with examining Friedman’s website article *PSYOP Against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia*. For the last several decades, conflict and unrest had engulfed the Balkans, which contributed to numerous deployments of NATO forces conducting peace keeping and humanitarian operations. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic took power in the Serbian Republic and soon started an ethnic cleansing campaign to purify all of Serbia (Friedman 2008, website).

By the early 1990s, NATO forces began employing psychological means in the form of leaflets in order to assist humanitarian operations. The Sarajevo airport became too dangerous for aircraft to land so humanitarian aid had to be airdropped. In February and March of 1993, over 2 million leaflets were dropped in Srebrenica, Cerska, Gorazde, and Zera, which contributed to the landing of over 159,622 tons of food, medicine, and supplies (Friedman 2008, website).

Psychological operations switched to more active roles by the mid 1990’s. Having a primary mission to deter armed resistance and hostile behavior against Stabilization Forces (SFOR) and Implementation Forces (IFOR), psychological units...
established numerous radio and televisions stations followed by producing posters and handbills to influence local behavior in favor of IFOR/SFOR forces. By November of 1997, SFOR/IFOR psychological units controlled 51 television spots and disseminated over 3 million posters and handbills to the local population (Friedman 2008, website).

In 1999, the Serbs again began hostilities against ethnic Albanians through the use of persecution, rape, and murder. Eventually military actions between Kosovar separatists and Milosevic’s government erupted. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took action and demanded all parties to cease hostilities or face NATO intervention through military force. After Milosevic’s refusal, NATO initiated a 78 day air campaign against Serbia military and political targets.

During the air campaign, psychological units conducted radio broadcasts to keep the people informed and updated. Additionally, over 104.5 million psychological leaflets were produced and dropped during the 78 day air campaign in Kosovo (Friedman 2008, website). Furthermore, units conducted massive PSYOP operations in order to counter Serbian propaganda efforts directed at the Kosovar people.

Besides dropping leaflets and running radio stations, psychological units successfully integrated within brigades throughout operations in Kosovo. PSYOP companies were made up of tactical PSYOP detachments consisting of tactical PSYOP teams, who successfully integrated within maneuver brigades (Friedman 2008, website). This was due to PSYOPS teams and maneuver understanding each other’s role and capabilities. PSYOP teams deployed with maneuver units for conducting cordon and search missions, which required confiscating weapons. “In these cases, the TPTs
deployed with loudspeakers in order to help the maneuver battalion with crowd control should a disturbance occur” (Friedman 2008, website).

Operations in Kosovo further illustrate the need for integrating and employing non-lethal units to include CA and PSYOPS capabilities within combat forces. Combat operations throughout the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo required Army forces to integrate and employ CA, PSYOPS, and THTs. Organized by the early 1990’s, these tactical teams worked with combat forces to gather intelligence, provide humanitarian aid, rebuild infrastructure, and work with government agencies. The literature review revealed some instances of U.S. Army units struggling to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities throughout operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

All authors in the literature contribute to an area of agreement. They agree on the need for U.S. Army units to employ CA, PSYOPS, and THTs from the Philippine War (1898) to the Balkans (1999). Additionally, the authors agree on some instances of U.S. Army units struggling to employ CA, PSYOPS, and THTs while conducting operations. However, the review of literature finds only vague reference as to why these integration and employment problems exist.

### Investigation of Doctrine

The study examines the following U.S. Army Field Manuals: FM 3-0 Operations, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations, and FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
Officially listed as one of the Army’s capstone doctrinal publications; FM 3-0 describes the Army’s operational concept, “Full spectrum operations require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks” (FM 3-0 2008, 3-1). The Army acknowledges the need to conduct a full range of operations since the 1980s, but only recently has the Army incorporated full spectrum operations as its capstone doctrine.

The study reviews FM 3-0 for literature describing the use and employment of CA teams in full spectrum operations. FM 3-0 lists several key concepts regarding full spectrum operations and the requirement to employ non-lethal units. First, FM 3-0 defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency” (FM 3-0 2008, para 2-11). Full spectrum operations clearly require BCTs to integrate and employ CA teams as defined by FM 3-0.

Next, FM 3-0 describes the need for conventional forces to defeat unconventional and irregular threats if host nation and special operations forces are unable (FM 3-0 2008, para 2-47). Typically, special operations forces have integrated and employed CA teams in order meet mission requirements. This was demonstrated in Haiti and other contingency operations; however, conventional forces; specifically BCTs must be able to integrate and employ non-lethal units as well.

Finally, FM 3-0 presents a crucial point describing the use of CA teams at the brigade and battalion level. Full spectrum operations require a “mix of conventional forces to win control and influence over the population” (FM 3-0 2008, para 4-35).
level of civil security and control throughout the population varies significantly at the
tactical level of operations. CA capabilities typically held at higher headquarters must be
released to BCTs and often battalion task forces (FM 3-0 2008, para 4-35). According to
the U.S Army’s capstone doctrine, BCTs must be able to integrate and employ CA teams
and related capabilities.

The study’s literature review continues with examining FM 3-24 for
counterinsurgency fundamentals to include the BCTs requirement to employ CA teams
and any non-lethal unit integration and employment guidance. The study chooses FM 3-
24 because it represents a reversal of continued neglect over the past 30 years by the
American military and the government’s national security policies concerning
counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3-24 2006, preface) and may provide current
information concerning the use of non-lethal units.

The U.S Army published FM 3-24 in 2006 to establish “fundamental principles
for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment” (FM 3-24 2006, preface). In
general, the manual is based on lessons learned, existing interim doctrine, and recently
developed doctrine.

FM 3-24 describes the aspects of conducting counterinsurgency operations. The
manual’s first major point is counterinsurgency operations require units to conduct full
spectrum operations. A military force conducting a combination of full spectrum
operations is the concept of conducting a counterinsurgency. “All full spectrum
operations executed overseas including COIN operations include offensive, defensive,
and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state” (FM
3-24 2006, 1-19). COIN operations involve offensive, defensive and stability operations
but offensive, defensive and stability operations by themselves are not COIN operations. “COIN requires soldiers and marines to be ready both to fight and to build depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors” (FM 3-24 2006, 1-19).

Recently, the Army has placed an emphasis on counterinsurgency operations requiring brigade combat teams to “meet the contested population’s needs to the extant needed to win popular support while protecting the population from the insurgents” (FM 3-24 2006, 2-1). Counterinsurgency operations are conducted among the population (FM 3-24 2006, 2-2), which requires the integration of military capabilities (FM 3-24 2006, 2-1-2-5).

FM 3-24 lists several military capabilities needed to successfully conduct counterinsurgency operations, which include CA, PSYOPS, human intelligence, engineers, and medical support (FM 3-24 2006, 2-5). Therefore, FM 3-24 supports FM 3-0 by identifying that BCTs and smaller units conducting counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary environment must be able to integrate and employ CA, PSYOPS, and THTs into their formations to ensure success.

Review of CA Doctrine

The study examines CA doctrine for published guidance concerning the integration and employment of CA teams within brigade combat teams. This thesis does not describe all CA doctrine but only key points related to their integration and employment. The literature review continues with an examination of FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations and FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

FM 41-10 specifically describes civil affairs command and control relationships in chapter 4 and concept of employment in Chapter 5. Revised as FM 3-05.40 2006, but
not approved for public release, FM 41-10 states, “civil affairs units are attached to the gaining unit due to their dependence for administrative and logistic support” (FM 41-10 2000, para 5-9). Chapter 4 describes two methods civil affairs command and control relationships should work. First, in stability and support operations; civil affair teams conduct HA, MCA, and support to civil administration though the use of country teams and the Security Assistance Office (SAO). These type of operations require working with nonmilitary individuals and agencies (FM 41-10 2000, para 4-8). Second, during contingency operations; civil affair teams conduct operations through civil affairs planning teams (CAPT) and civil affairs teams (FM 41-10 2000, para 4-9). Contingency operations require civil affair teams to augment CMO staffs through attachment to their respective maneuver unit, which require working with U.S. Army and sister service units.

FM 3-05.401 presents the inherent responsibilities for gaining and supporting units in relation to the command and support relationships (FM 3-05.401 2003, Table 2-1). If a CAT-A team is TACON to a battalion task force, the CAT-A team has command relationship with gaining unit; may be task organized by the parent unit; receives CSS from parent unit; provides liaison as required by gaining unit and parent unit; has priorities established by gaining unit; and the gaining unit can impose further command or support relationship of CS, GSR, R, or DS (FM 3-05.401 2003, Table 2-1). The table listed is the command and support relationship doctrine used throughout the Army found in FM 5-0 page F-5. No specifics are mentioned or outlined for civil affairs teams.

FM 41-10 and FM 3-05.401 do not include a section for counterinsurgency operations, which could contribute to integration and employment problems. According to FM 41-10, conducting stability and support operations requires HA, MCA, and civil
support through non-military agencies. Conducting contingency operations require civil affairs units to augment CMO staffs at their respective level within maneuver units; however, counterinsurgency operations require HA, MCA, civil support, and augmenting CMO staffs by working with civilian agencies and military units.

FM 3-05.401 describes numerous battalion operations conducted during combat, “the battalion quickly transitions between offensive, defensive, retrograde, and other tactical operations, such as passage of lines, relief operations, and linkup. During stability operations or support operations, the battalion may be required to transition just as quickly” (FM 3-05.401, para 2-152). However, FM 3-05.401 does not discuss the planning roles for CAPT or CAT-A during counterinsurgency operations.

Counterinsurgency operations are a combination of stability, offensive, and defensive operations, not executed by phases or transitions from one operation to another as outlined in FM 3-05.401 and FM 41-10. As identified earlier, counterinsurgency operations involve stability operations, but stability operations alone are not counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency operations require CA units to conduct multiple operations with multiple agencies simultaneously, which the doctrine does not address.

Additionally, FM 3-05.401 describes procedures and guidelines for integrating with SOF forces; however, most conventional units do not routinely integrate and employ CA units. SOF units are not conventional units. Basic differences include, size, chain of command, logistical trail, and mission. Doctrine states, “CA units support SOF and conventional forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels” (FM 41-10 2000, para 3-7). FM 41-10 Chapter 4 and FM 3-05.401 Chapter 2 lack a civil affairs command,
control, and employment section for counterinsurgency operations. This is due to the recent emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and the requirement for more conventional units to integrate and employ CA, PSYOPS, and THTs within the brigade combat team.

Planning considerations are described in FM 41-10 and FM 3-05.401 for CA teams. Civil affairs personnel within the BN or BCT provide input to the BN or BCT OPORD and are required to complete and submit an civil affairs annex (FM 41-10 2008, Appendix F). Additionally, FM 3-05.401 outlines in detail the roles for civil affairs planning teams down to the tactical level; however, it does not mention planning roles for CAT-A teams.

FM 3-0 and FM 3-24 present the key aspects of full spectrum operations to include counterinsurgency operations. These manuals describe counterinsurgency centers of gravity, the recent emphasis on counterinsurgency, importance of winning population support, and the requirements for BCTs and below to integrate and employ CA teams in the contemporary environment.

The study additionally determines that FM 41-10 and FM 3-05.401 present key concepts for the integration and employment of CA teams to include their capabilities, functions, planning, and recommended command/support relationships. However, most of the doctrine relates to the strategic and operational level. Limited references exist for the integration and employment of CA teams within BCTs. Additionally, the study determines CA manuals provide very little guidance for CA integration while conducting counterinsurgency operations. Most references are related to high intensity conflicts, stability, and support operations.
Modularity and the BCT

The study examines the evolution of modularity, its impact on the BCT, and whether the modular BCT functions as it was designed to receive “plug and play” non-lethal enablers. Understanding the impact of modularity is essential to the study because modularity introduces many integration challenges that must be understood within the BCT. Therefore, the study’s review continues with an examination of John J. McGrath’s work: The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the US Army, FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, William M. Donnelly’s book: Transforming an Army at War, Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005, and the CRS Report for Congress, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress.

McGrath’s book describes the evolution of Army brigades as a fighting force from George Washington’s Continental Army to present day brigade combat teams. The focus for the study is the transformation of the BCT from 1999 to present; therefore, the study presents only key structural developments that fostered the BCT into a modular force.

The evolution of the modular BCT started with General Shinseki’s transformation directives in August 1999, which called for a “more responsive, lethal, agile, versatile, survivable, and sustainable” force (McGrath 2004, xi). Soon, the Army initiated two organizational concepts consisting of activating two division level headquarters (without assigned brigades) and creating the training support division concept to enhance mobilization training and rapid deployment (McGrath 2004, 103).

Next, the advancement of computer and communication technology allowed the Army to initiate the Force XXI concept, which called for complete digitalization and
structural change within the brigade. By 2003, the 4th Mechanized Division and some elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were aligned under the Force XXI concept while the rest of the Army retained a modified Force XXI (LCD XXI) concept (McGrath 2004, 105).

Another key brigade development described by McGrath was the initiation of the Interim Brigade Combat Team, which called for a highly deployable and combat capable force. As the 4th Mechanized Division and 1st Cavalry Division fielded Force XXI concepts, two brigades at Fort Lewis transformed into worldwide deployable brigades using a new light armored wheeled vehicle (McGrath 2004, 107). By late 2003, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division became operational and soon deployed to Iraq.

Stryker brigades additionally ushered the creation of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. Identified as another key brigade structural development, the RSTA squadron consisted of three reconnaissance troops and a surveillance troop, which had Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV), Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC), and multisensory capabilities (McGrath 2004, 108). RSTA squadrons proved essential to the success of the brigade and by 2005 would be an essential component of the BCT.

Next, the study examines the impact of modularity, the last key structural development for the BCT. Army directives forced BCTs to move to a modular design, which allowed commanders to add or subtract subunits and capabilities based on mission requirements, commander’s intent and environmental considerations (McGrath 2004, 133). Donnelly describes modularity as a pool of “standardized, self-contained units that could be plugged into or unplugged from larger formations” (Donnelly 2007, iii).
McGrath and Donnelly identify modularity as an interchangeable structure that provides flexibility at the tactical as well as the operational and strategic levels. Additionally, the impacts of modularity has transformed the division headquarters into a controlling headquarters only, which places the BCT as the primary tactical combined arms unit for the Army (McGrath 2004, 137).

FM 3.90.6 states “BCTs are the Army’s basic tactical maneuver units and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently” (FM 3.90.6 2006, 2-1). Modularity requires BCTs to integrate all available military and interagency means to understand all aspects of “terrain, weather, enemy, civil concerns, and friendly forces prior to mission execution” (FM 3.90.6 2006, 2-1). In the past, most of these responsibilities fell on the division headquarters; however, BCTs are now responsible for integrating and employing joint, Army, and non-military agencies.

Next, the study examines whether the modular BCT functions as it was designed to receive “plug and play’ non-lethal enablers. The study examines Andrew Feickert’s CRS report for Congress concerning modularity. His report lists several issues that may impede a BCT’s ability to “plug and play” units, specifically non-lethal enablers. These include: cost, personnel, equipment, and basing (Feickert 2006, 8-17).

Modularity requires additional personnel to include civil affairs, military intelligence specialists, and military police to meet modular BCT requirements (Feickert 2006, 12-13). Additionally, modular BCTs require significant increases in equipment, “particularly command, control, and communications equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery and mortars.”(Feickert 2006, 14). A shortcoming in command, control, and communications equipment greatly impedes a modular BCTs ability to “plug and play”
non-lethal enablers because this equipment “constitutes what the Army considers the key enablers for the modular BCT” (Feickert 2006, 14).

Finally, Feickert’s report suggests the Army should study the operational and combat lessons learned from the 3rd and the 101st Infantry Divisions, which were the first modular divisions to conduct combat operations in Iraq. No lessons learned are listed in the report; however, it suggests studying them to identify tactics and procedures but “also force structure as well as unit manning, two areas of considerable congressional interest” (Feickert 2006, 21).

McGrath and Donnelly describe the modularity concept, which emphasizes the importance of a BCT’s ability to integrate and employ units and effects; however, little information exists for whether the modular BCT function as it was designed to plug and play CA units. A modular design BCT places large demands on commanders and staffs due to the requirement of adding and subtracting subunits and capabilities in a relatively short period of time. This requirement forces commanders and leaders to ensure all units within the BCT are properly integrated and employed.

**Identification of Knowledge Gap**

A review of literature revealed the amount of COIN and contingency operations U.S Army units conducted from the Philippine War (1898) to operations in the Balkans (1999). Additionally, history illustrates a constant requirement for U.S. Army units to integrate and employ CA teams throughout this time period. However, an examination of the data identifies numerous problems associated with U.S. Army units integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities. Furthermore, an examination of modularity and its impact illustrates the importance of a BCT’s ability to integrate and
employ non-lethal enablers, but little historical information exists for whether modular BCTs can plug and play CA teams and other non-lethal enablers.

The study determined a knowledge gap from the review of literature, which directly relates to the primary research question. BCT commanders and staffs need to understand how to integrate non-lethal units, but there is little guidance in the literature to describe how to achieve effective integration. CA doctrine provides integration and employment guidelines but BCTs continue to struggle with their integration. Because of this gap, we need more studies focused on how BCTs integrate and employ CA teams in the contemporary environment.

**Initial Hypothesis**

The study presents an initial hypothesis in order to answer the knowledge gap. The study’s hypothesis, based on the literature review states: Some BCTs struggle to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities because neither civil affairs doctrine nor Army doctrine clearly describes how integration should occur; Additionally, BCT commanders and staffs are focused on the use of lethal capabilities and do not understand the mission and requirements of non-lethal units or how they achieve desired effects.

**Summary**

The amount of literature providing a general understanding of the subject is significant. An historical investigation of Army operations from 1898 to 2001 (pre 9/11) reveals a continued need and use of CA teams and related effects. The data shows the Army has integrated and employed non-lethal units in COIN and contingency operations.
from the Philippine War (1898) to operations in Kosovo (1999). Additionally, history illustrates the presence of numerous integration and employment problems U.S. Army units experienced while working with and employing CA teams and related capabilities in the contemporary environment.

Furthermore, material providing a specific understanding of the subject is also significant. U.S. Army doctrine presents the Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations which includes COIN operations. Next, the literature describes the key concepts of COIN operations and the requirement to employ non-lethal effects. CA doctrine reveals key concepts for CA integration and employment but mainly focus at the strategic and operational level. Additionally, these field manuals focus mainly on high intensity, stability, and support operations and do not describe integration guidelines for their specific teams.

Modularity places large demands on commanders within the BCT. Commanders and staffs must add and subtract subunits and capabilities in a relatively short period of time; therefore, requiring commanders to ensure all units within the BCT are properly integrated and employed based on capabilities.

Finally, the literature identified an information gap bearing directly on the research question. Why are BCTs struggling to integrate and employ non-lethal units? BCT commanders and staffs need to know how to integrate non-lethal units, but the literature review revealed little guidance on how to achieve effective integration. Because of this gap, we need more studies on how BCTs integrate and employ CA teams in the contemporary environment. Are these reasons leadership or doctrinal in nature? The study proposes an initial hypothesis explaining why some BCTs struggle to integrate
and employ CA teams and related capabilities. The study’s hypothesis, based on the literature review states: Some BCTs struggle to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities because neither civil affairs doctrine nor Army doctrine clearly describes how integration should occur; Additionally, BCT commanders and staffs are focused on the use of lethal capabilities and do not understand the mission and requirements of non-lethal units or how they achieve desired effects.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to identify if brigade combat teams are adequately trained to properly employ civil affairs teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT.

Below, Figure 2 Research Question Methodology Map shows the breakdown of all secondary and tertiary questions needed to answer the primary research question. The figure describes the relationship between all research questions and the primary research question.
Research Question Methodology

As discussed in Chapter Two, the study identified an information gap for literature bearing directly on the primary research question. This chapter presents the methodology used throughout the study to fill this gap. The study addresses the information gap by gaining information through the use of recent sources from 2001 post 9/11 to present. Sources include Army research centers, Army training centers, and live subjects. Furthermore, this section describes the sampling method, analyses, standards for significance, and protection of live subjects used for all questionnaires and surveys. Therefore, this research question methodology section is divided into three sections: Army Training Centers, Army Research Centers, and Live Subjects.

Army Training Centers

The study collected data through published and observed trends from the National Training Center and The Joint Readiness Training Center from 1st QTR FY 06 to present. The study collected data from Army training centers through two methods: 1) obtained trends posted on the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website. Trends represent training observations posted by OC/Ts from the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Center; 2) contacted OC/Ts from each training center and asked them to provide first hand observations, information, and feedback for recent units completing
training rotations. All observations relate to a BCT’s ability to integrate and employ non-lethal units, specifically, CA teams.

The study examined observations from OC/Ts to answer the following questions: 1) what types of non-lethal units are BCTs employing? 2) Are BCTs having problems integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities? 3) If so, what are the problems? 4) Why are BCTs having problems integrating and employing these types of non-lethal units? 5) Are these problems leadership or doctrinal in nature? 6) Are the problems related to a BCT’s knowledge, training, organization, or equipment? 7) What activities or procedures are BCTs developing to mitigate these problems?

**Army Research Centers**

The study obtained trends and observations published by Army research centers to include the Counterinsurgency Center, Army Research Institute, Rand Arroyo Center, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The study obtained recent After Action Reports (AAR), interviews, and Initial Impression Reports (IIR) made by units and commanders who recently returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

The study examined AARs, interviews, and IIRs generated from various Army research centers to answer the following questions: 1) what types of non-lethal units did your unit employ? 2) Did your BCT have problems integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities? 3) If so, what were the problems? 4) Why did your BCT have problems integrating and employing CA teams? 5) Are these problems leadership or doctrinal in nature? 6) Are the problems related to a BCT’s knowledge, training,
organization, or equipment? 7) What activities or procedures did your BCT develop to mitigate these problems?

**Live Subjects**

The study obtained information through the use of live subjects. Live subjects consisted of personnel who commanded or held staff positions within a brigade and integrated and employed subunits while conducting operations in OIF and/or OEF. Furthermore, live subjects consisted of students attending the Command and General Staff College Class 08-02.

The study used questionnaires and surveys to answer the following questions related to the integration and employment of CA teams and related capabilities: 1) what types of non-lethal units did your unit employ? 2) Did your BCT have problems integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities? 3) If so, what were the problems? 4) Are these problems leadership or doctrinal in nature? 5) Are the problems related to a BCT’s knowledge, training, organization, or equipment? 6) What activities or procedures did your BCT develop to mitigate these problems?

**Questionnaire and Survey Methodology**

Figure 3 Questionnaire and Survey Data Collection Plan summarizes the methodology used for all live subjects. The collection plan described below, illustrates the seven steps used to present all sampling goals, dates, approval times, and sampling locations.
Step One. The study developed a questionnaire using open ended questions related to the integration of non-lethal units. The purpose of the questionnaire is to validate the study’s survey, which is done by using a purposive type sampling method that requires live subjects to have experience in integrating and employing CA teams and other non-lethal units within a BCT. The study received approval from CGSC QAO.

Step One completed mid APR 08
Step Two. The study emailed questionnaire to students in Class 08-02. USSD selects students who have command and deployment experience and emails questionnaire to their AKO accounts. Step two completed early MAY 08.

Step Three. Live subjects, who participated in the questionnaire, answered the open ended questions presented in the questionnaire. Live subjects completed and returned questionnaire to the author. The study reached a sampling group total of (n) = 10. Step three completed late MAY 08.

Step Four: The study compiled and analyzed all completed questionnaires in order to determine the questions and available answers for the survey; therefore, validating the survey. The study developed a survey from the results of the questionnaires. Step four completed JUN 08.

Step Five: The study received approval from CGSC QAO to administer survey to students in Class 08-02. Step five completed JUL 08.

Step Six. The study administered surveys through the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Qualify Assurance Office (QAO) to 113 students from class 08-02. QAO selects students using a random sampling method. Approximately 20 students from sections 1 through 5 were invited to participate in the survey. Step six completed AUG 08.

Step Seven: Study reached sampling group total of (n) = 30. Study compiled and analyzed data. Step six completed SEP 08.

Protection of Live Subjects

The study protected live subjects in three ways. First, it gained approval from CGSC Quality Assurance Office prior to administering questionnaires and surveys to
students at CGSC (See Appendix A and Appendix D for approval letters). Second, the study developed an informed consent form describing the purpose, intent, approval status, and volunteer nature of the questionnaire and survey. Finally, the study and QAO secured and maintained returned questionnaires and surveys in order to ensure the privacy of all live subjects.

Summary

This chapter describes the research methodology used to answer the primary research question presented in Chapter 1. The study’s methodology addresses the information gap identified in the literature review and answers the initial hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2. The study addresses the information gap and confirms its hypothesis through the use of U.S. Army research centers, U.S. Army training centers, and volunteer live subjects.

The study obtained data from OC/Ts observing BCTs integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities throughout training rotations at NTC and JRTC. Furthermore, the study examined data from the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Army Research Institute, and the Rand Arroyo Center. Additionally, study obtained data from live subjects through questionnaires and surveys.

Chapter 4 (Data Collection and Analysis) presents all data obtained by the study. Chapter Five (Conclusions and Recommendation) presents the conclusions determined by the study and presents key recommendations to commanders and Staffs for integrating and employing CA teams and related capabilities within a BCT.
CHAPTER 4
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

This thesis determines if the BCT is adequately trained to properly employ CA teams in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT. Chapter 4 presents all data obtained by the study through Army training centers, Army research centers, and live subjects. Therefore, the study divides this chapter into three sections: Data from Army Training Centers, Data from Army Research Centers, and Data from Live Subjects.

Data from Army Training Centers

The study obtains data from the Joint Readiness Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC) through two methods: receiving direct correspondence from Observer, Controller, Trainers (OC/Ts) and investigating trends published on the CALL website by OC/Ts. All data relates to a BCTs ability to integrate and employ CA, PSYOPS, THTs and related capabilities.

Direct Correspondence with OC/Ts

MAJ McConnell, senior CA OC/T at JRTC provided observed trends regarding a BCTs ability to integrate and employ civil affairs teams within the BCT. OC/Ts attach a civil affairs company to the brigade combat team (BCT) during most training rotations at JRTC. The BCT then attaches a civil affairs team (CAT) to each battalion. Observed trends relate to the integration of civil affairs teams; however, trends also relate to PSYOPS and THTs as well.
MAJ McConnell observes the following trends: 1) commanders and staffs do not understand how to employ the Civil Affairs Team (CAT); 2) many CA OC/Ts believe the role of the CA company headquarters is doctrinally undefined, which contributes to unspecified responsibility roles between the BSB, BSTB, S9, and the task organized civil affairs team; 3) the parent CA Battalion does not understand the command and support relationship and attempts to control the CA unit in supply, logistics, and rating chain issues when the task organization clearly states otherwise (Andrew McConnell, June 4, 2008, email message to author).

MAJ McConnell provides additional observed trends regarding the civil affairs teams. These trends relate to the integration of the CAT into the planning and operational framework of the parent unit. McConnell observed: 1) CA teams are not trained to integrate into the planning process at the BN or BCT level. CA personnel do not participate in the MDMP process and fail to provide their capabilities to the gaining unit; 2) Dual logistical requirements exist from the civil affairs parent BN and the gaining unit battalion. For example, when a CA company is attached to BSTB or a CAT is attached to the HHC, an ad hoc logistical relationship results for maintenance support, Class III, and Class V (Andrew McConnell, June 4, 2008, email message to author).

The above trends are additionally supported by MAJ Craig Brower, a former CA commander who stated similar observations: 1) most units do not know how to employ the CA Team Alpha (CAT-A); 2) the CA Company (CAT-B) HQ is often not used correctly at the BCT HQ due to undefined relationships; 3) CA personnel have not been trained to integrate into the planning process at the BCT level and are usually not involved. CAT-A personnel have language capabilities, project management skills, and
should be the lead advisor to the BN commander on the local population and civil projects; 4) future concerns for CA commanders relate to the integration of the CAT-B into an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) within the BCT (Craig Browser, June 10, 2008, email message to author).

The study identified in Chapter 2 the inherent responsibilities for civil affairs command and support relationships (FM 3-05.401 2003, Table 2-1). Additionally, FM 41-10 recommends, civil affairs units are attached to the gaining unit due to their dependence for administrative and logistic support (FM 41-10 2000, para 5-9).

However, JRTC observation trends show a dual logistical chain occurs between the parent unit and the gaining unit. This results due to an undefined relationship, “which results in ad hoc logistical relationships for things like maintenance support, office supplies, ammunition, etc.” (Andrew McConnell, June 4, 2008, email message to author).

Trends related to CA personnel not integrating well into the BCT or BN planning process is confusing. “This results in them standing by waiting to be told what to do instead of participating in MDMP and telling the gaining unit what they bring to the fight” (Andrew McConnell, June 4, 2008, email message to author). The study identified in Chapter 2 that civil affairs personnel must provide input to the BN or BCT OPORD and are required to complete and submit a civil affairs annex (FM 41-10 2008, Appendix F).

**JRTC Published Trends**

Next, the study presents JRTC trends published by OC/Ts on the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website. The study presents trends related to the integration and employment of CA teams and related capabilities. Trends date from 3rd QTR FY 07
back to 4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 06. The JRTC reported the most prominent observed trends for integrating non-lethal units during 3\textsuperscript{rd} - 4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 07 are BCT operations cells not using LNOs effectively and units conducting targeting meetings with mixed results (3\textsuperscript{rd}-4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 07 JRTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library). OC/Ts observe units who consistently fail at properly integrating LNOs into their staffs, which contribute to a lack of information flow from the battalion to the brigade. Additionally, units struggle with integrating non-lethal units into their targeting meetings. “Despite developing a battle rhythm that incorporates daily targeting, TFs developed tasking matrices for the companies that did not integrate all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets” (3\textsuperscript{rd}-4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 07 JRTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Additional JRTC observations from 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 06 show similar trends concerning the integration of non-lethal units to include CA teams. OC/Ts observe units fail at properly integrating external assets through the targeting process. “Some units do not produce an actionable product. Others create tasking matrices for the companies that fail to integrate all available assets” (3\textsuperscript{rd}-4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 06 JRTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Furthermore, OC/Ts observe PSYOPs elements not properly integrated within battalion or brigade task forces. An investigation reveals battalion and brigade staffs do not understand how to employ PSYOPS elements in support of their maneuver plan. “This trend continually plagues the PSYOP community and not enough effort is being made by PSYOP leaders to make these staffs aware of PSYOP capabilities” (3\textsuperscript{rd}-4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY 06 JRTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

51
**NTC Published Trends**

Data from the National Training Center consists of OC/T observed trends relating to the integration and employment of non-lethal units. Trends date from 1st QTR FY 08 back to 1st QTR FY 06. The NTC reported the most prominent observed trend for integrating non-lethal units during 1st – 2nd QTR FY 08 is maneuver units consistently separate lethal and non-lethal units during planning and execution, which contributes to a desynchronizing effect on the BCT course of action (1st- 2nd QTR FY 08 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Trends observed at the NTC during 3rd QTR FY 07 relate to the integration of civil affair and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). First, OC/Ts reported a positive trend of units integrating civil affairs teams with PRTs, which allows a constant flow of information between the PRTs, civil affairs teams, and the BCT. Second, NTC observed trends related to units providing security for PRTs. Security elements for PRTs are inadequate due to their inability to understand PRT missions and conduct simultaneous movements. BCTs that place a strong command emphasis on PRT support and integration are more successful. “Units that have had strong BCT commander interaction, and understanding of PRT operations have been the most productive” (3rd QTR FY07 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

NTC trends for 1st and 2nd QTR FY 06 relate to units integrating and employing numerous non-lethal units to include intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets, military police (MP), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and tactical human intelligence teams (THT). OC/Ts observe military police units not adequately presenting their capabilities to maneuver units. “Brigades have not consistently integrated MP
support for breaching and other maneuver and mobility support operations” (1st – 2nd QTR FY 06 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Furthermore, OC/Ts observe signal intelligence platforms are not being properly integrated or synchronized within the brigade special troop’s battalion (BSTB) and the BCTs. “Taskings generally focus on unrealistic goals and rarely take into account the technical capabilities and limitations of the Prophet System” (1st – 2nd QTR FY 06 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Additionally, OC/Ts observe units failing at understanding and utilizing tactical human intelligence teams (THTs). Brigades and below are assigning non-doctrinal missions to THTs, which cause them to focus on objectives other than human intelligence collection (1st – 2nd QTR FY 06 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Finally, the study presents general trends reported by OC/Ts from the NTC that relate to the integration of non-lethal units. These are: units failing at RSOI; S1 fails to maintain accountability of attachments; unit fails to conduct targeting meetings with lethal and non-lethal units; and units fail at conducting rehearsals, pre-combat checks, and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) with attachments (1st – 2nd QTR FY 06 NTC Trends, 2008, CALL Digital Library).

Data from Army Research Centers

Data from Army research centers consists of published reports and interviews from the Command and General Staff College, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Counterinsurgency Center, Rand Arroyo Center, and published After Action Reports (AARs) from the Army Research Institute.
CALL Published Theses and Monographs

This study presents findings from three MMAS thesis and one SAMS monograph that directly relates to the integration of non-lethal units. The study explains findings from MAJ Robert Merceron’s thesis published in 2007. His thesis relates to the integration of Brigade Special Troops Battalions (BSTB) within the Brigade Combat Team. Historically, there are issues with integrating BSTBs into the BCT. BSTBs have engineer, military police, and signal capabilities and some BCTs struggle to integrate them into the maneuver plan.

MAJ Merceron’s thesis identified three techniques BSTBs and BCTs use to enhance integration, “organize along the warfighting functions, establish relevant meetings, and establish relevant working groups” (Merceron 2007, 19). These techniques enhance the BCT’s understanding of the BSTB’s limits and capabilities by exchanging relevant information, conducting coordination, and providing recommendations for future operations.

Next, the study examined findings from MAJ Michael Barger’s thesis written about the integration of PSYOPS teams in Vietnam. MAJ Barger describes how commanders failed to understand the capabilities of their PSYOPS teams, which resulted in improper utilization and employment. In Vietnam, commanders understood the increasing demands of PSYOPS teams but were never successful in using them to their full potential (Barger 2007, Abstract).

An investigation of MAJ Marger’s thesis revealed PSYOPS teams operated in a “sideshow” type manner instead of fully integrated units. “This is because combat
Commanders of today share the tendency of their counterparts in Vietnam to marginalize supporting efforts that they do not fully understand” (Barger 2007, 89). Commanders failing to understand PSYOPS capabilities were a major obstacle in Vietnam and are currently still a problem in OIF and OEF (Barger 2007, 89).

The study examined findings from MAJ Phillip Swinburg’s monograph published in 2001. His thesis describes the integration of both lethal and non-lethal effects through the targeting process by establishing an Effects Coordination Center (ECC). The ECC enhances the integration of lethal and non-lethal effects by ensuring integrated planning and execution of certain shaping operations and assists in the management of lethal and non-lethal effects (Swingburg 2001, 33). Including non-lethal units in the targeting process contributes to a mutual understanding of the capabilities and missions within the BCT to include the commanders, staff, and non-lethal units.

Next, the study examined a thesis published recently in 2008 by MAJ Brian Lionberger, which describes the military-governance role the Army has assumed in Afghanistan and Iraq. MAJ Lionberger’s thesis provides significance to this study by emphasizing the importance of a BCT’s ability to integrate and employ non-lethal units.

Doctrine states the conduct of COIN operations requires the integration of civilian and military efforts (FM 3-24 2006, 2-1). The essential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, as MAJ Lionberger points out, the military is taking the lead in the reconstruction effort by ensuring the integration of interagency units throughout OIF and OEF. “In both theaters, the military is executing its doctrinal role to provide security. However, it has also assumed a military-governance role due to a lack
of depth in the Department of State (DoS) and coalition government effort” (Lionberger 2008, 120).

A military-governance role requires the military to continually integrate non-lethal units to include civilian agencies into their formations. The Army should “develop the concepts of military support to governance, macro and micro economic rehabilitation, and security service restructuring” (Lionberger 2008, 122), which requires military units to effectively integrate and employ CA teams and other related capabilities.

**Interviews, IIRs, and AARs**

The study examined interviews, AARs, and Initial Impression Reports (IIR) related to a unit’s ability to integrate and employ CA teams and other enablers while conducting operations in the contemporary environment. One interview is listed as For Official Use Only (FOUO) and non-attribution; therefore, the study will not present the commander’s name or unit designation.

The study evaluated comments from commanders who commanded a BCT in Iraq from 2003-2007. Commanders commented on their training and integration issues for conducting stability operations in theater. A question, related to the integration and employment of CA teams presented to them during the interview was: Within the stability operations mission (in particular civil military operations and reconstruction/development), what impact did you observe that this mission had on the planning and execution of more traditional Army missions?

COL Robert P. Ashley, Commander, 525th BFSB described how units arrive in theater believing that training for HIC prepares them to conduct COIN and stability
operations. He warns of numerous bad assumptions to include, “just because your unit can conduct high intensity conflict operations doesn’t mean you can conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations” (Gregory Puccetti, CALL Representative, Interview with COL Robert P. Ashley, BFSB Commander, March, 2008).

Next, COL Wayne Grigsby, Commander, 3HBCT/3ID described the challenges of conducting stability and COIN operations. Stability operations are a part of counterinsurgency operations; however, COIN operations are not stability operations. Stability operations require a unit to conduct numerous functions such as integrating and employing enablers to include CA teams, which can become overwhelming for a brigade staff. The interview reflects that commanders may need to reorganize the brigade staff from their traditional roles and find talented individuals to fill the unusual roles; however, you must remember the basics. Conduct the MDMP and targeting process with your units to ensure you are meeting the commander’s intent and synchronizing all of the BCT’s resources (John Perterson, CALL Representative, Interview with COL Wayne Grigsby, HBCT Commander, 2007).

Additionally, a brigade commander from the 1st Armored Division commented on the integration and employment of CA and PSYOPS units and the problems associated with building an information operations team. His interview is classified FOUO and non-attribution; therefore, the study will not present his name and unit.

The commander says his brigade’s problems consisted of PSYOPS teams implementing messages that did not address the issues the brigade had in its battlespace. “The PSYOP community was wedded to a cold war construct tightly managed at a high
level in terms of themes and authority used to present information to the Iraqis” (Rob Quintrell, CALL Representative, Interview with BCT Commander, December 2005).

Furthermore, the commander stated his problems were caused by the brigade staff not understanding civil affairs and PSYOPS capabilities, which contributed to multiple IO (Information Operation) problems. To overcome this, the brigade staff assigned an IO OIC who controlled the civil affairs, PAO, and PSYOPS teams. “Use the FA BN CDR as the IO OIC. He had all the civil affairs, PSYOP, PAO and engineers (Rob Quintrell, CALL Representative, Interview with BCT Commander, December 2005).

Next, the study evaluated two Initial Impression Reports (IIR) submitted by the 4th Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. Initial impression reports provide a summary of key events, insights, observations, and lessons learned from the unit during its deployment. An investigation of these reports revealed numerous integration issues with civil affairs teams and other related capabilities.

The 4th Infantry Division reported that organization, doctrine, manning, and training are not understood among CA personnel, staffs, and commanders. Furthermore, CA doctrine should be reviewed for counterinsurgency operations and CA assets are not properly integrated or employed by maneuver commanders (CALL Initial Impression Report, HQ 4th Infantry Division, February 2007).

The unit experienced CATs working under little to no guidance or supervision due to the command and support relationship. Initially, the CATs operated under a general support (GS) relationship to the maneuver units; however, once they were moved to a direct support (DS) relationship, the CATs contributed directly to the success of the unit. A DS support relationship allowed maneuver units to provide direct guidance and support
to the CATs over a GS support relationship (CALL Initial Impression Report, HQ 4th Infantry Division, February 2007).

The study evaluated additional comments made by the unit, which revealed the CA battalion or brigade did not provide clear guidance or an overall CA strategy to the CATs or maneuver units, but instead functioned in an administrative role. The infantry division HQ suggests current CA doctrine, manning, organization, or training or a combination may be responsible for parent CA units HQs functioning only in an administrative role (CALL Initial Impression Report, HQ 4th Infantry Division, February 2007).

Additionally, the 4th Infantry Division’s IIR provides the following insight on the integration and employment of CA teams: 1) maneuver commanders must receive training on CA doctrine, employment, and reconstruction operations prior to deployment; 2) properly integrated civil affairs teams receive guidance and support from the gaining unit; 3) properly integrated civil affairs teams played a major role in conducting successful operations by the unit; 4) as stated by CA doctrine, CA units and CATs should be (Direct Support) DS to the gaining unit; 5) CA officers (from the parent CA unit) must function as a staff officer in the gaining unit; 6) CA brigades and battalions (parent units) must provide planning and advisory services on all aspects of CA operations to the gaining units they support (CALL Initial Impression Report, HQ, 4th Infantry Division, December 2007).

Next, an examination of 25th Infantry Division’s IIR revealed numerous observations for CA team integration and employment. The division reported the G9/S9 position is not filled by personnel having the rank and experience needed and the CA
staff is undermanned from the division down to the battalion, which contributed to inadequate CA integration and employment. “Integration of CA operations from corps through division down to battalion level did not always work effectively due to the lack of trained and experienced C9, G9 and S9 staffs” (CALL initial Impression Report, HQ, 25th Infantry Division, September 2007).

In theater, civil-military operations are a major non-lethal fires engagement which requires daily interaction with host government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and Department of State officials. This creates enormous demands on the division down to the battalion level to “plan, coordinate, manage, supervise, interact and negotiate with all those engaged within their assigned battlespace” (CALL Initial Impression Report, HQ, 25th Infantry Division, September 2007). Currently, the division G9 (O5 and a small staff) is unable to handle all civil military requirements; furthermore the BCT and the battalions are unable to handle all of their civil military requirements due to inadequate training and lack of personnel.

The 25th ID recommended the G9 position should be filled by an O6 due to the increased experience and in-depth technical knowledge requirement. Furthermore, this trend follows down to BCTs and battalions. BCTs should have an O4 and an O3 accompanied by a more robust staff. Battalions should designate a S9 position and fill it with an O3 and staff. Currently, battalions do not officially have an S9 position and utilize the FSO, S2, or S3 to fill this role.

The study determined from both IIRs that: 1) little to no training with CA teams and other enablers occurred prior to deployment; 2) CA personnel need to be better
trained and prepared to fully integrate into the gaining unit’s planning process; 3) the division down to the battalion should increase the grade of their G9/S9 position and CA staff due to the increased experience and knowledge requirement for conducting civil military operations. Additionally, IIRs recommended that CTCs (Command Training Centers) and MRXs (Mission Readiness Exercises) should incorporate all aspects of CA operations and other enablers into all training scenarios for units deploying to theater.

Rand Arroyo Center

The study investigated the Rand Arroyo Center for trends related to the integration and employment of CA teams within the BCT. The Rand Arroyo Center, the U.S. Army’s only federally funded research center maintains numerous monographs and articles related to Army integration and CA capabilities. Russell W. Glenn’s monograph entitled Urban Battle Command in the 21st Century is examined below due to its CA and doctrine focus.

Glenn’s monograph describes numerous challenges associated with conducting urban operations in the 21st Century. First, he discusses the issues Army units faced in Mogadishu in 1993 and other contingency operations. Glenn identifies one challenge units and commanders faced; the ability to integrate and employ CA capabilities. Additionally, he presents Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) findings which conclude that urban operations require “more public affairs officer support and civil affairs activities” (Glenn 2005, 6). TRADOC authors imply commanders and units conducting urban operations must be prepared to integrate CA teams and other related capabilities. Additionally, they need to “prepare their units for such demands before they
deploy” (Glenn 2005, 7).

Second, Glenn’s monograph introduces current flaws in Army doctrine, which may contribute to commanders and units focusing on lethal effects only. The Army’s definitions of battle command and decisive points have a force on force, two party orientation.

For example, FM 3-0 defines battle command as “imposing the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy” (FM 3-0 2008, 5-2). However, not all contingency and stability operations involve an enemy. History illustrates there are numerous challenges associated with “urban operations that are independent of or only marginally related to the enemy even when a foe does exist” (Glenn 2005, 13).

Another example of U.S. Army doctrine that may contribute to commanders giving less consideration to non-lethal capabilities is the definition of a decisive point. FM 3-0 defines a decisive point as “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success” (FM 3-0 2008, 6-11). This definition addresses physical things that give an advantage over an enemy, which are usually targeted by lethal effects. However, the definition fails to address individuals or nonphysical entities such as information, a belief, or a predisposition, which are usually assessed or targeted by non-lethal capabilities.

Glenn’s monograph describes the importance of CA capabilities in urban and contingency operations. Second, it identifies that future Army operations will consist of urban and contingency operations, which will require commanders to integrate and employ CA units and capabilities. Finally, Glenn’s monograph presents flawed concepts
of U.S Army doctrine that may contribute to commanders focusing on lethal affects and force on force concepts.

**Blogs and Websites**

The study examined blogs and websites for information related to the integration and employment of CA teams and related capabilities. A paper published by the Small War Journal introduces the idea of Iraqis providing non-lethal effects in COIN operations. The article pointed out the need and importance for “every maneuver commander at the company level and above who own battle-space must understand the insurgency and the importance of non-lethal effects” (Gorkowski 2008, 3).

The Small Wars Journal posted the primary research question on its website on 6 MAY 2008 for comment. Numerous blogs were posted by council members who served in OIF or OEF. The blogs reveal significant integration challenges for numerous non-lethal units to include lack of PSYOPS teams with print capability; lack of understanding PSYOPS capabilities by commanders, staffs, and small unit leaders; and the presence of red tape which limits PSYOPS teams to generate messages (“Schmedlap”, Small Wars Journal, May 7, 2008, blog sent to author).

Analysis of blogs and websites revealed friction between public affairs and civil affairs units occurs due to a mutual misunderstanding of each other’s capabilities. “PA needs to have their work screened to ensure no OPSEC breaches and to ensure that it does not conflict with the PSYOP mission (but it does not necessarily need to reinforce PSYOP)” (“Schmedlap” Small Wars Journal, May 7, 2008, blog sent to author).

An examination of blogs that relate to activities BCTs are using to integrate non-lethal units reveal that establishing an Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
(EPRT) to control the civil affairs teams, contractor advisors, and State Department Functions is a solution BCTs are using to ensure their non-lethal units are integrated into the maneuver plan.

Additional functions for the EPRT include synchronization of the infrastructure reconstruction within the area of operations; advises the commander for spending the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) money; and meets with local sheiks. “In the short of it, yes all these functions are being utilized at the BCT Level but I think it will take a while before any real or meaningful measure can be made as to their effective inclusion into BCTs” (“JC” Small Wars Journal, May 18, 2008, blog sent to author).

Blog entries from the Small Wars Journals illustrate significant PSYOPS, public affairs (PA), and civil affairs integration issues caused by a lack of capabilities understanding on the part of commanders, staffs and small unit leaders.

Data from Live Subjects

Questionnaires

The author developed and administered a questionnaire (see Appendix B) to volunteer live subjects. The questionnaire consists of open ended questions regarding the types of non-lethal units, challenges experienced, and solutions implemented for integrating units with non-lethal capabilities, specifically CA, PSYOPS, and THTs.

CGSC emailed live subjects informed consent form (see Appendix C) and questionnaire form (see Appendix B) through AKO accounts. The study gained informed consent by requiring all volunteer live subjects to read and sign informed consent prior to completing questionnaire. Finally, study required live subjects to email informed consent
form and questionnaire back for analysis. The study reached a sampling group total of (n) = 10 on 13 JUN 08.

The study divides the results from the questionnaire into three figures below showing the types, challenges, and solutions for integrating non-lethal units. Figure 7 (Questionnaire Types of Non-Lethal Units) lists the most common types of non-lethal units live subjects integrated and employed while deployed in a brigade combat team. Figure 8 (Questionnaire Integration Challenges) lists the most common integration and employment issues live subject indentified while integrating non-lethal units and Figure 9 (Questionnaire Integration Solutions) describes the most common activities or procedures live subjects developed or conducted to mitigate the integration issues.
Figure 7. (Questionnaire) Types of Non-Lethal Units

Source: Questionnaire Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-025)

Figure 7 describes the most common types of non-lethal units identified by live subjects in the questionnaire. Seven out of ten live subjects identified civil affair teams as the most common type of non-lethal unit integrated within a BCT, followed by tactical HUMINT teams and PSYOPS teams. “At the battalion level we had a civil affairs company HQ, CAT-A, and a 4 man HUMINT that were attached” (MAJ Josh Miller, May 8, 2008, questionnaire response sent to author).
Figure 8.  (Questionnaire) Integration Challenges

Source:  Questionnaire Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-025)

Figure 8 describes the most common integration challenges live subject identified in the questionnaire. Six out of ten live subjects identified mission understanding as the most common integration problem followed by understanding transportation and command support relationships. Most parent units did not know or understand the purpose of civil affair teams or how to employ them. “We did not understand what the purpose of the team was; they were not integrated well into our formation” (MAJ Paul Wilcox, May 1, 2008, questionnaire response sent to author).
Figure 9. (Questionnaire) Integration Solutions

*Source*: Questionnaire Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-025)

Figure 9 describes the most common integration solutions live subjects identified in the questionnaire. Five out of ten live subjects identified conducting research of non-lethal unit capabilities as the most common type of integration solution conducted. Other activities conducted by live subjects include establishing a CMOC; conducting AARs, in-theater training, back briefs and targeting meetings with their non-lethal units.

Parent units mitigated their integration issues by conducting research into the limits and capabilities of their non-lethal units. “I would ask for a capabilities brief from the non-lethal elements that you are assigned. Some of the doctrinal capabilities are just
not translating into reality downrange” (MAJ Trever Fulmer, May 22, 2008, questionnaire response sent to author).

**Surveys**

The study developed a survey from the results of the questionnaire. Upon completion and validation, the study emailed surveys to students using a random type sampling method. The study’s survey consisted of questions asking participants the types of non-lethal units integrated, integration challenges experienced, and solutions implemented.

CGSC QAO office emailed participants the survey (see Appendix D). All completed surveys are stored on the CGSC QAO data base. The survey reached a sampling group total of \( n = 30 \) on 30 SEP 08.

The study divides the results from the survey into four figures below using a nominal distribution. Figure 10 (Survey Requirement to Integrate Non-Lethal Units) shows the number of live subjects required to integrate or employ non-lethal units during their deployment. Figure 11 (Survey Types of Non-Lethal Units) lists the most common types of non-lethal units identified by live subjects while deployed. Figure 12 (Survey Integration Challenges) lists the most common integration problems identified by live subjects. Figure 13 (Survey Integration Solutions) describes the most common activities live subjects implemented to mitigate the integration problem.
Figure 10. (Survey) Requirement to Integrate Non-Lethal Units

Source: Survey Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-045)

Figure 10 presents the number of live subjects who integrated non-lethal units into their formations during deployment. 24 out of 30 live subjects integrated non-lethal units and 6 out of 30 did not. 80% of the 30 live subjects surveyed were required to integrate and employ non-lethal units during their deployment.
What non-lethal units did you integrate into your unit?

![Bar chart showing types of non-lethal units](image)

**Figure 11.** (Survey) Types of Non-Lethal Units

*Source:* Survey Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-045)

Figure 11 presents the most common types of non-lethal units live subjects integrated and employed while deployed. 20 out of 30 participants identified interpreters as the most common type of non-lethal unit integrated into brigades and below. Furthermore, 16 out of 30 live subjects identified civil affairs teams, followed by 15 out of 30 identified tactical human intelligence teams, and 13 out of 30 identified psychological operations teams.
Figure 12. (Survey) Integration Challenges

Source: Survey Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-045)

Figure 12 presents the most common integration and employment problems identified by live subjects while working with non-lethal units. 12 out of 30 live subjects identified lack of mission understanding as the most common problem associated with integrating and employing non-lethal units.

Furthermore, understanding non-lethal unit support and transportation requirements are the 2nd and 3rd most common problem associated with integrating non-lethal units. 8 out of 30 live subjects did not have problems integrating non-lethal units and only 1 out of 30 live subjects selected the “other” category; therefore, reinforcing the survey’s validation.
Figure 13 presents the top nine activities live subjects implemented to mitigate the integration challenges. 11 out of 30 live subjects identified conducting rock drills, PCCs/PCIs, and targeting meetings with their non-lethal units as the most common activities used to mitigate integration problems. Additionally, live subjects also identified developing SOPs with their non-lethal units and briefing OPORDs to their non-lethal units as the second and third most common integration solution.

Source: Survey Results from Class 08-02 (Research Control Number 08-045)
Finally, 6 out of 30 live subjects did not need to develop any integration activities and only 1 out of 30 live subjects selected the “other” category; therefore, reinforcing the survey’s validation.

Summary

The study presents data collected from OC/Ts at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center; Army Research Centers to include CALL, Army Research Institute, COIN center, and the Rand Arroyo Center; blog and email responses sent to the author; and volunteer live subjects. All data obtained by the study relates to the integration and employment of non-lethal units, specifically CA teams.

The data shows numerous integration and employment problems experienced by commanders, staffs and CA personnel. Army training centers, research centers, and live subjects identified numerous instances of BCTs struggling to integrate and employ CA teams and related capabilities. These instances are related to failure in doctrine and leadership. Conclusions and recommendations will be presented in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents all conclusions and recommendations determined by the study. The conclusions consist of a brief summary of the findings, interpretation of the data, and implications of findings. The recommendations consist of doctrine and training activities commanders, staffs, planners, and force developers should consider when integrating CA teams. Chapter 5 concludes with further study suggestions.

Conclusions

Summary of Findings

Historical

A review of history shows that since the early 1900s, the primary use of U.S. military forces has been conducting counterinsurgency, contingency, and nation building operations throughout the world. However, in spite of its long history of conducting COIN, contingency, and nation building operations the U.S. Army has continually focused its “studies and training on major wars and on the strategic and tactical doctrines that governed them” (Birtle 2004, Foreword). It failed to consistently train its officers and soldiers on the lessons learned in gaining popular support and removing armed insurgents (Ramsay 2007, 113).

BCT commanders and staffs have focused on lethal capabilities and give less consideration to non-lethal capabilities due to two reasons: 1) U.S. Army doctrine from the tactical to the operational level of war is primarily focused on fighting a conventional enemy using lethal effects on a linear battlefield; 2) U.S. Army training is mainly focused
on fighting in phases against a symmetrical enemy using lethal effects. Until recently, commanders and staffs trained on employing mechanized and light forces against a conventional enemy have ignored past nation building experience.

The study identifies numerous integration challenges for non-lethal units conducting operations from the Cuban intervention to Kosovo. Cuba and Panama illustrate the amount of confusion and tension that exists when unit commanders are required to control too many government and CA programs (Birtle 2004, 12) and when State Department officials and soldiers do not understand each other’s mission and capabilities (Birtle 2004, 227). Integration challenges in Vietnam again relate to the vagueness of their roles. During this time, the division of roles between combat units, elements with CA missions, and PSYOP units were not clearly explained and resulted in “uncertainly and argument” (Birtle 2006, 406). Additionally, unit commanders focused on tactical matters because they did not understand the importance of conducting psychological operations (Birtle 2006, 426).

Operations from Somalia to Kosovo illustrate an improvement in non-lethal unit integration due to establishing CA coordination cells in the wake of our experience in Vietnam. U.S. Army and Marine units established a Joint PSYOP Task Force, CMOC, and a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo, which contributed to mission understanding and synchronization between non-lethal units and combat forces (Rouse 2003, website).

*Army Training Centers*
Senior CA OC/Ts at the JRTC reveal that: 1) battalions do not understand how to employ the civil affairs team; 2) gaining units and the CA company headquarters are confused with who (BSB, BSTB, or S9) takes responsibility for supporting the task organized unit; 3) confusion results from CA (CAT-B) headquarters being doctrinally undefined; 4) CA battalions exert control over the civil affairs teams while the teams are attached to the gaining unit; 5) CA soldiers do not integrate well into the gaining unit’s planning process because civil affairs soldiers and staff officers from the gaining unit do not understand how CA contributes to the MDMP and targeting process.

Published JRTC trends report that: 1) units fail to integrate non-lethal personnel and effects into their targeting meetings; 2) units did not include or integrate external assets into the targeting process; 3) units did not properly integrate non-lethal units into their task forces. Furthermore, published NTC trends reveal that: 1) maneuver units consistently separate lethal and non-lethal units during planning and execution, which contributed to a desynchronized COA; 2) units properly integrated CA teams within PRTs; 3) units provided inadequate security elements for CA teams and PRTs; 4) units who place a strong command emphasis non-lethal integration are more successful; 5) units continued to use non-lethal units in non-traditional roles due to not understanding their mission and capabilities; 6) units fail to properly understand and utilize tactical human intelligence teams (THTs), which contributed to THTs focusing on objectives other than human intelligence collection; 7) S1 fails to maintain accountability of attachments; 8) units fail to conduct rehearsals, pre-combat checks, and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) with non-lethal units and related attachments.
Army Research Centers

Published Army Research Center papers reveal that: 1) some commanders in Vietnam did not fully integrate PSYOPS teams into the maneuver plan due to not understanding the role and capabilities of PSYOPS units; 2) commanders ensure integration by including lethal and non-lethal effects into the targeting process; 3) Army units must be able to integrate and employ non-lethal units due to its leading role in reconstruction efforts in OIF and OEF.

After Action Reports (AARs) reveal that: 1) units should not assume training for High Intensity Conflict (HIC) prepares them for COIN or stability operations; 2) techniques to ensure non-lethal integration are: reorganize the staff from traditional roles and conduct targeting process to include non-lethal units; 3) some commander’s and staffs have a lack of appreciation for what non-lethal units do for information operations; 4) brigade staffs do not understand the capabilities of CA and PSYOP units; 5) assigning an Information Operations (IO) OIC is a technique to integrate and synchronize CA teams, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and PSYOPS operations.

Initial Impression Reports (IIRs) identify that: 1) units had numerous integration issues with CA, human intelligence, and PSYOPS teams; 2) organization, doctrine, manning, and training are not understood among CA personnel, staffs, and commanders; 3) CA doctrine should be reviewed for conducting counterinsurgency operations; 4) the command support relationship for CA teams within a brigade combat team should be Direct Support (DS) not General Support (GS); 5) direct support allows the gaining unit to provide support and guidance to the civil affairs team; 6) maneuver commanders need training on civil affairs doctrine and employment; 7) maneuver units train little with civil
affairs, tactical human intelligence, and psychological operation teams prior to deployment.

Blogs and websites provide the following insight: 1) some commanders, staffs, and small unit leaders do not understand PSYOP operations; 2) friction exists between public affairs units and CA units due to a mutual misunderstanding of capabilities; 3) commanders should establish an Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Team (EPRT) to synchronize CA teams, contractors, advisors, and State Department functions; 4) the integration of non-lethal units depends heavily on the attitude of the commander.

Live Subjects

Questionnaires (n=10) revealed that: 1) the top three non-lethal units working within brigade combat teams are: CA, THT, and PSYOPS teams respectively; 2) the top three reasons why units fail at effectively integrating and employing non-lethal units are not understanding the non-lethal unit mission, transportation requirements, and command/support relationship; 3) the top three activities conducted by units to mitigate the integration challenges are: units learning the capabilities and missions of non-lethal units; establishing a CMOC; and conducting AARs, in-theater training, back briefs and targeting meetings with non-lethal units.

The study determines from its surveys (n=30) that: 1) the top four non-lethal units working within brigade combat teams are: interpreters, CA, THT, and PSYOPS teams respectively; 2) the top three reasons why units fail at integrating and employing non-lethal units are lack of understanding non-lethal unit missions, support requirements, and transportation requirements; 3) the top three activities conducted by units to mitigate the
integration challenges are to conduct targeting meetings, PCCs/PCIs, and targeting meetings with non-lethal units.

**Interpretation of Data**

The study concludes that leadership within the unit contributes to most integration problems experienced by maneuver and non-lethal units. However, the study found evidence of inadequate doctrine, which also contributes to integration problems among non-lethal units, specifically civil affairs teams.

From the above data, the study determines four leadership related reasons why units fail to properly integrate and employ non-lethal units, specifically CA teams: 1) most commanders and staffs focus on lethal effects only; 2) some commanders and staffs do not understand the mission of non-lethal units and continuously separate lethal and non-lethal during planning and execution; 3) some commanders and staffs do not know the capabilities of non-lethal units to include, transportation and support requirements; 4) the attitude of the gaining unit commander and staff directly determines the level of non-lethal integration.

In addition, the study finds four doctrinal related issues that contributes to a units failure to integrate non-lethal units: 1) some commanders and staffs do not understand the Army’s current CA doctrine; 2) some non-lethal units and personnel do not understand or know their own doctrine; 3) CA doctrine needs to be updated to include counterinsurgency operations; 4) the CA company headquarters (CAT-B) is doctrinally undefined.
Implications

The study determines five implications from the interpretation of data: 1) commanders and staffs must understand the importance of using non-lethal units in full spectrum operations to include counterinsurgency operations; 2) commanders and staffs must be able to integrate and employ non-lethal units in full spectrum operations to include COIN operations to be successful; 3) employing non-lethal units effectively requires the full integration of non-lethal units into the gaining unit; 4) one way to ensure a commander’s understanding of his non-lethal units is to include them in the BCT targeting process; 5) in order to properly integrate and employ non-lethal units, commanders and staff must first know the non-lethal units weapon, transportation, support, communication, protection, and equipment requirements.

Furthermore, the study concludes commanders and staffs should conduct the following activities in order to learn the capabilities of their non-lethal units. These include conducting: 1) pre-deployment training with non-lethal units; 2) targeting meetings, MDMP, and rockdrills with non-lethal units throughout the planning process; 3) backbriefs, rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs with non-lethal units prior to mission execution; 4) AARs with non-lethal units upon completion of mission; 5) Record the capabilities and lessons learned for each type of non-lethal unit task organized within the brigade.

Recommendations

Employment of CA Teams

The study presents the following recommendations that will contribute to a BCT’s ability to properly integrate and employ CA teams:
Leadership:

To enhance leader confidence in integrating CA units 1) leaders should conduct pre-deployment training with non-lethal units; 2) leaders should conduct targeting meetings, planning and rockdrills with their non-lethal units throughout the planning process; 3) leaders should determine if a non-lethal unit changes the gaining unit’s method of execution; 4) leaders should conduct backbriefs, rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs with non-lethal units prior to mission execution; 5) leaders should conduct AARs with non-lethal units upon completion of mission; 6) leaders should record and update the limits and capabilities of all non-lethal units task organized within the BCT.

Doctrine:

The Army should update CA doctrine to include COIN operations and provide specific guidance to non-lethal unit integration and employment within BCTs. Currently, CA doctrine focuses on conventional and stability operations using a phase-by-phase method and lists general guidance for command/support relationships. Additionally, CA doctrine should define the role of the CA company headquarters (CAT-B) when CAT-A teams are task organized to gaining units.

Additionally, FM 5-0 should include addressing the limits and capabilities of non-lethal units in subparagraph d “Attachment and Detachments”. Currently, FM 5-0, Figure G-4, subparagraph d “Attachments and Detachments” requires only information regarding when attachment or detachment is effective. Gaining unit commanders and staffs should know the communication, weapon, support, transportation, equipment, and protection requirements of their non-lethal units. Subparagraph d “Attachments and
Detachments” should require commanders and planners to provide this information to the gaining unit in when the gaining unit is task organized non-lethal units.

Training:

The Army should train CA personnel to participate in the planning and targeting process of the gaining unit. Non-lethal unit personnel and gaining unit personnel should understand the importance of incorporating non-lethal unit personnel into the planning and targeting process. Furthermore, CA personnel should understand the importance of non-lethal effects and how they contribute to success of the gaining unit. Training should start at BNCOC continuing through ANCOC for NCOs; and at OBC continuing through CGSC for officers.

The Army should train leaders to learn the limits and capabilities of their non-lethal units. At the NTC, JRTC, Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), BCTP, and all mobilization centers should incorporate the issues listed in the Leadership paragraph above into their Program of Instruction (POI):CA Team Training. In addition these Training centers should require leaders to use the BDE/BN checklist presented in Figure 14 for integrating and employing CA teams. The checklist requires leaders to address the limits and capabilities of their non-lethal units by answering the corresponding questions presented in Figure 14.

This checklist provides a list of questions leaders should consider prior to mission execution. The items listed in the left column are areas identified by Army training centers, Army research centers, and live subjects that if understood contribute to a units ability to properly integrate and employ CA teams and other non-lethal units. Leaders determine if they understand the items listed along the left column of the checklist using
a YES or NO answer. The questions listed in the second column are an initial suggested based on the result of this study. They should be expanded and modified as it is used (See Figure 14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade/Battalion Checklist for Integrating CA Teams.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How Mission supports BCT/BN mission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do my teams understand how they fit into the maneuver plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do my maneuver elements understand how my CA Team fit into the maneuver plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Did my CA team conduct rehearsals, PCCs, and PC with my unit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Does the CA Plan support the maneuver plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Did the CA Team participate in the planning process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I understand what type of vehicles my CA Team requires?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I know the implications of their vehicles to my convoy plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do they need any additional vehicle loads?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapon Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I know the weapons my CA teams deploy with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Can I plan on employing their weapons as part of my defensive plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Are they planning on my unit providing ammunition (Class V) to them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection Requirements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Can my CA teams protect themselves?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do they need additional MP, ADA, or Chemical assets for protection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Are their vehicles adequately protected?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-What type of radios are my CA teams using? Are they compatible with my communication systems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do they know my call signs, frequencies and SC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Did we conduct a COMEX with my CA teams?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment Requirements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do my CA teams require additional equipment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I know if they are bringing extra equipment for my mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I have to provide have I assets? As it part of my lead plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Requirements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do my CA teams need additional security in order for them to conduct their mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-What additional security do they need?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Is it mounted and/or dismounted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Has this been rehearsed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command/Support Relationships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I and my CA team understand the CMD/SPT relationship?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Does the CA parent unit understand the CMD/SPT relationship?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do any agreements have to be made between my unit and their parent unit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support Requirements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do I understand what my CA teams require for support during the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Have all issues with Class I, water, Class II, and Class V been addressed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Has the support plan for these units been rehearsed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Does the parent unit understand how they will support their CA team?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Execution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do my CA teams change how I will execute the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Do any other non-natal units change how I will execute the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-If so, do I know the changes and have I planned for it?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 14. Brigade/Battalion Checklist for Integrating CA Teams**

*Source:* Checklist by Author

**Further Study**

The study focused exclusively on integrating and employing DOD non-lethal units, namely CA teams, but included references to PSYOPS, THTs and related capabilities within the BCT. The study recommends further study on determining if
BCTs are adequately trained to properly employ media, contractors, and interpreters in the contemporary environment when such capability is task organized within the BCT. BCTs are employing non-DOD units to include contractors, media, and interpreters throughout the contemporary environment for many reasons: 1) the use of contractors has increased over time by the Army due to equipment, operational tempo, and force requirements; 2) information operations have become a major factor in conducting military operations, which contributes to BCTs continuously integrating media and reporters into their formations; 3) BCTs conduct full spectrum operations around the world; therefore, requiring the assistance of interpreters.

The study recommends a further investigation of CA doctrine for two reasons: 1) FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations is revised as FM 3-05.40 but not yet approved for public release. Once the manual is released, the study recommends examining doctrine for counterinsurgency implications and civil affairs integration and employment guidance to gaining units; 2) the literature review did not examine PSYOPS and THT doctrine and recommends examining these non-lethal units for COIN implications and integration and employment guidance to gaining units. Finally, the study recommends examining implications of modularity and how “plug and play” requirements affect the units within the BCT.

Summary

The study answers the question, “Is the BCT adequately trained to properly employ CA and related capabilities when such capability is task organized within the BCT?”
It concludes that some BCTs struggle to integrate and employ their non-lethal units due to issues related to leadership, doctrine, and training. The leadership issues consist of: 1) most commanders and staffs focus on lethal effects only; 2) some commanders and staffs do not understand the mission of non-lethal units and continuously separate lethal and non-lethal effects during planning and execution; 3) some commanders and staffs do not know the capabilities of non-lethal units, to include transportation and support requirements; 4) the attitude of the gaining unit commander and staff directly determines the level of non-lethal unit integration.

The study’s four doctrinal issues consist of: 1) some commanders and staffs do not understand CA doctrine; 2) some non-lethal units and personnel do not understand or know their own doctrine; 3) CA doctrine does not address counterinsurgency operations; 4) the CA company headquarters (CAT-B) is doctrinally undefined.

The study recommends the following doctrinal changes: 1) the Army should update CA doctrine to include COIN operations; 2) CA doctrine should define the role of the CA company headquarters (CAT-B) when CAT-A teams are task organized from the parent unit to the gaining unit; 3) the Army should update FM 5-0 to include addressing the limits and capabilities of non-lethal units in subparagraph d “Attachment and Detachments”.

The study recommends the following changes to Army training: 1) the Army should train CA personnel to conduct planning and the targeting process with their gaining unit; 2) the Army should train leaders on the importance of integrating non-lethal effects and how they contribute to the success of the gaining unit; 3) the Army should train its commanders and staffs to learn the limits and capabilities of their non-lethal
units. Furthermore, Army units should utilize the BDE/BN checklist presented in Figure
14 to properly integrate and employ CA teams and other non-lethal units.

The study recommends further study on a BCT’s ability to integrate and employ
media, contractors, and interpreters in the contemporary environment and the
implications of modularity “plug and play” requirements on a BCT’s ability to task
organize, integrate, and employ all types of units available to the BCT.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAR</strong></td>
<td>After Action Review. An assessment conducted after a mission that allows soldiers and leaders to discover what happened and why. Consists of a professional discussion that enables soldiers to understand why things happened during the execution of a mission. AARs are not a critique but include the participants and focuses directly on the tasks and goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attach</strong></td>
<td>The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. A unit that is temporarily placed into an organization is attached. See FM 5.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asymmetrical</strong></td>
<td>Having no balance or symmetry. A conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in a struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAT-A</strong></td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team-Alpha. A civil affairs team consisting of a team leader, team sergeant and two civil affairs specialists. Provides Civil Military Operations planning and assessment support to maneuver commanders. See FM 41-10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Affairs</strong></td>
<td>Designated active and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil-Military</strong></td>
<td>To establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations. See FM 5-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CMD/SPT</strong></td>
<td>Command/Support Relationship. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command, operational control, tactical control, or support. See FM 1-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterinsurgency</strong></td>
<td>Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DS</strong></td>
<td>Direct Support. A mission (support relationship) requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. See FM 5-0 (FM 101-5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Spectrum Operations</strong></td>
<td>The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. See FM 3-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS</strong></td>
<td>General Support. A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgency</strong></td>
<td>An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. See FM 1-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td>A process of combining or accumulating. Synchronizing operations with all aspects of Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations. See FM 4-0. The synchronized transfer of authority over units and forces to a designated component or functional commander for employment in the theater of operations. Combat units merge into the operational plan. Consequently, integration planning and coordination must occur early in the force projection process, continuing until force closure. Integration is complete when the receiving commander establishes positive command and control over the arriving unit, usually in a tactical assembly area. See RSOI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUMINT</strong></td>
<td>Human Intelligence. The collection of information by a trained human intelligence officer from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel and capabilities. See FM 3-24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lethal</strong></td>
<td>Relating to or capable of causing death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modularity</strong></td>
<td>Army transformation intended to produce evolutionary and revolutionary changes which improve both Army and Joint Force capabilities to meet current and future full spectrum challenges. Involves transforming from a division-based to a brigade-based force. Consists of creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units capable of assembling into or ‘plugged into” larger formations with minimal augmentation or reorganization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Non-lethal
Not relating to or intending of causing death. Actions in combat to include a wide range of intelligence gathering, disruptive, and other activities. Actions persuade the local populace to withhold support from the enemy and provide information to friendly forces.

Non-lethal Units
Any team, section, or individual attached to a unit or a commander for the purpose of providing non-lethal capabilities or means to that unit or commander; primary function is to provide non-lethal capabilities, means, or actions; may be U.S. Army or sister service.

OPCON
Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objective, and giving authoritative direction to accomplish to mission. See FM 5-0 (FM 101-5).

OPORD
Five Paragraph Operations Order. Contains as a minimum a description of the task organization, situation, mission, execution, administrative and logistics support, and command and signal for a specified operation. See FM 101-5.

PCC
Pre Combat Checks. Checks performed by junior leaders prior to mission execution. Usually consist of checking weapons, vehicles, equipment, communications, and soldier’s knowledge.

PCI
Pre Combat Inspections. Inspections performed by leaders prior to the execution of operations, ensures Pre-Combat Checks were performed. Used to ensure units, soldiers, and systems are fully capable and ready to execute. Usually consist of inspecting weapons, equipment, soldiers’ knowledge, and communications.

Procedures
Standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task. See also tactics, techniques, and procedures. See FM 3-90.

Prophet System
Military intelligence collection, jamming, processing, and reporting system. The Prophet system disseminates intelligence information on the battlefield through a Prophet control (PC) element collocated with the brigade tactical operations center (TOC).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organization, groups, and individuals. See FM 1-02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. RSOI consists of those essential and interrelated process in the Area of Operations (AO) required to transform arriving personnel and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Operations</td>
<td>An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. See FM 3-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
<td>Set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. Also called SOP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>The employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy in order to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. See FM 3-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques</td>
<td>The general and detailed methods used by troops and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment and personnel. See FM 3-90.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>Tactical Human Intelligence Team. A team who is trained to collect information from individuals for the purpose of answering intelligence information requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR: MAJ Gerald Law

SUBJECT: Request for Research: Challenges/Solutions to receiving non-lethal attachments.

1. Your request to conduct interviews of 25 students attending the Command & General Staff School is:
   
   - Approved
   - Approved with Conditions (see below)
   - Denied (see below)

2. Your Research Control Number (SCN) is **08-025**.

3. You are required to submit an *End of Project Data Collection Report* to the CGSC Quality Assurance Office when data collection for your project is complete. This report can be found at: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/QAO/download/End_Of_Data_Collection_Report.doc.

4. Should you have questions concerning the above, please contact Mr. Rick Steele in the CGSC Quality Assurance Office, room 3524 Lewis & Clark, (913) 684-7331, DSN 552-7331.

Notes:

- This approves you only to conduct interviews of 25 CGSS students. To conduct a follow-on survey, you will need to request approval through the CGSC Quality Assurance Office.

- Students must be volunteers and you must arrange interviews at a time that will not conflict with classes.

Ricky Steele
CGSC QAO
Survey & Research Control
APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE (Research Control Number 08-025)

Questionnaire              Date:

Name/Rank: ___________________________   CGSC Class: _____________________

Year/Unit at time of deployment: ________________

During your deployment, did you integrate non-lethal attachments (i.e. PSYOPS, HUMIT, Interpreters, Civil Affair Teams etc…) into your company, battalion, MiTT or brigade prior to conducting counterinsurgency operations?

YES     NO

If YES   What types of non-lethal attachments did you receive?

What were the challenges your company, battalion, MiTT, or brigade faced while integrating non-lethal attachments? (Feel free to use additional space as needed)

What were the solutions your company, battalion, MiTT, or brigade developed for integrating non-lethal attachments? (Feel free to use additional space as needed)

Would you like to meet face-to-face to discuss your answers? IF YES, please email me at gerald.law@us.army.mil  Thank you for your time.
My name is MAJ Gerald S. Law and I am conducting research regarding the integration and employment of non-lethal units within a brigade combat team. I am a student from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Section 2A working on a Masters in Military Art and Science.

In order to gain information regarding my research, I will be conducting surveys asking for your input concerning the integration challenges and solutions for units having non-lethal capabilities within a brigade combat team prior to conducting counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary environment.

This is a chance to provide your lessons learned regarding the integration of non-lethal attachments. I really appreciate what you are doing. Your answers will directly contribute to the validity of this research project.

Please understand that:
-This survey had been approved by the CGSC Survey and Research Control Center. Research Control Number 08-025.
-Your participation in this survey project is completely voluntary.
-You can withdraw from the project at any time.
-At any time you wish to withdrawal, any surveys completed by you will be given back for your disposal.
-Please do not discuss any classified or incriminating material.

I will use your answers for identifying challenges and solutions for integrating non-lethal attachments. Your answers will influence future survey questions and can/will be cited in my work.

Your survey may become part of the CGSC reference library for future use.

Do I have your informed consent? YES NO Sign__________________

IF YES, please answer the five questions on next page.

Thank you for your time and attention.

MAJ Gerald (Gary) Law/Section 2A
gerald.law@us.army.mil
MEMORANDUM FOR: MAJ Gerald (Gary) Law/Section 2A

SUBJECT: Request for Survey Research: The Integration of Non-Lethal Units

1. Your request to administer a survey to CGSS students attending ILE during AY 08-09:
   - □ Approved
   - □ Approved with Conditions (see below)
   - □ Denied (see below)

2. Your Survey Control Number (SCN) is **08-045**. This survey number must be clearly displayed on the front of your survey instrument’s cover letter as illustrated below:

   CGSC APPROVED SURVEY
   SCN: 08-045
   05 August 08

3. You are required to submit an *End of Project Data Collection Report* to the CGSC Quality Assurance Office when data collection for your project is complete. This report can be found at: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/QAO/download/End_Of_Data_Collection_Report.doc.

4. Should you have questions concerning the above, please contact Ms. Maria Clark in the CGSC Quality Assurance Office, room 3521 Lewis & Clark.

**Notes:**

- This approves you to administer the survey only students attending CGSS during AY 08-09.

*Electronically Signed*

Maria L. Clark
CGSC QAO
Survey & Research Control
While deployed, did you integrate non-lethal units (i.e. Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, Tactical Human Intelligence, Interpreters, etc.) into your unit?  YES  NO

What non-lethal units did you integrate into your unit?

___Civil Affairs Teams
___Tactical Human Intelligence Teams
___PSYOPS Teams
___Interpreters
___Media
___Other

What challenges did your company, battalion, or brigade face while integrating non-lethal units? (Check all that apply)

NLU= non-lethal unit

___Understanding Mission of NLU
___Understanding NLU Communication Requirements
___NLU Security Clearance Level
___Understanding NLU Equipment Requirements
___Understanding NLU Transportation Requirements
___Understanding NLU Support Requirements
___Understanding NLU Protection Requirements
___Knowing NLU Weapon Capabilities
___Knowing NLU Level of Security Training
___Knowing NLU Associated Doctrine
___Other

What methods or activities did your company, battalion, or brigade develop for mitigating the challenges while integrating non-lethal units? (Check all that apply)

___Establish CMOC
___Research NLU Capabilities
___Brief OPORD to NLU
___Conduct Rock Drill with NLU
___Develop SOPs with NLU
___Conduct PCC/PCI with NLU
___Conduct In-Theater Training with NLU
___Conduct AAR with NLU
___Conduct Targeting Meetings with NLU
___Other

The survey is now complete. Please click Finish to exit the survey. Thank you for your time and attention.
REFERENCE LIST


Department of the Army. 2007. Student Text 20-10, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis. Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Department of the Army. 2006. Field Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC.


Department of the Army. 2005. Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. Washington, DC.

Department of the Army. 2006. Field Manual Interim 5-0.1 The Operations Process. Washington, DC.


Department of the Army. 2006. Field Manual 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. Washington, DC.


Merceron, Robert. 2007. Brigade Special Troops Battalion Integration within the Brigade Combat Team. MMAS Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
250 Gibbon Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Mr. Ted Shadid  
DJIMO, Rm 3172C  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

COL Gary Bowman, Ph.D.  
Center for Military History  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

LTC John Wyman  
CTAC, Rm 4151  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301