THE IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EASTERN EUROPE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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B.S., United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1996

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EASTERN EUROPE, by Maj Derek Schin, 169 pages.

While the United States and Russia have many disagreements, very few of these affect nuclear weapon policy. One that has recently done so, however, is the argument over ballistic missile defense systems in Europe. The United States has signed bilateral missile defense agreements with both Poland and the Czech Republic but none of the countries have yet ratified these arrangements. The uncertainty of the future of these systems, Russia’s opposition to them, and—most importantly—the complex interaction of how these agreements affect strategic stability will all be examined in this paper.

A second aspect of this paper is an examination of the evolution and current definition of strategic stability itself. By providing historical context, it will be shown that the concept of strategic stability is still relevant today.

Ultimately, this paper finds that despite the fact that the limited capabilities of the proposed Eastern European missile defense system itself do not pose a threat to Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missile force, the decisions made by Moscow in response to the system may in fact negatively affect strategic stability.
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The author would also like to thank his committee for letting him wander far and wide while developing this paper. Hopefully they will not be too embarrassed to have their names associated with the end result.
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<td>BMD</td>
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<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [Treaty]</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Poland, by deploying this system, is exposing itself to a strike 100 percent. (Hines 2008)

— General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of Staff, Russian Armed Forces

While these words would seem to be coming to us from somewhere in the Cold War, they were instead uttered in August of 2008. What could possibly have provoked such a sentiment? Surely not a mere ten ballistic missile interceptors stationed in Poland, or a single radar station in the Czech Republic. But this is indeed the very subject General Nogovitsyn was railing against. Even if this was merely empty, bombastic rhetoric, how did we get to this point? And what does it mean for strategic stability? Is there even still such a thing in a post-Cold War and post-Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty world?

Background

Throughout the Cold War, ballistic missile defense was considered a destabilizing element. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, which specifically limited the development of ballistic missile defense systems within the two countries (with one exception on each side; Moscow, to this day, is protected by a ballistic missile defense system which was allowed under this treaty). After the Cold War, the threat of nuclear annihilation initiated by the U.S. and USSR receded. Unfortunately, a corresponding threat--that of proliferating ballistic missile technology--began to emerge.
The United States saw the need to protect itself against such threats, and this led directly to the creation of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in 1993. However, operating a robust and rigorous missile defense system and expanding the technical capabilities of ballistic missile defense could not be achieved within the confines of the ABM Treaty. As a result, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and subsequently created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in the same year.

The BMDO (and, later, MDA) was initially concerned with the threat of a ballistic missile launch originating from North Korea and targeting the U.S. mainland. A development program in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the deployment of a missile defense system at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Fort Greely, Alaska. However, as this program progressed, a new potential threat emerged: Iran.

The need for protection from Iranian ballistic missiles brought forth an entirely new set of problems. First and foremost was the immediate threat of nuclear-capable shorter-range missiles that Iran could potentially deploy in a rapid manner against Europe. A second threat was a long-range Iranian missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Today, there is no protection against such a strike. The United States saw a ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe as the solution to this problem. However, there remained the thorny issues of implementation.

The development of this system raised many questions. For example, would this system fall under NATO, or would the U.S. complete bilateral agreements with individual countries to develop the system? Would a new system utilize existing interceptor technology, or would a new interceptor be developed? Would the U.S. create an entirely new radar system, or--as Russia would later offer when it saw the U.S. was
moving forward with the system despite Russian objections--would the program utilize existing Soviet-era radar systems in the Caucasus? While the answers to some of these questions are becoming clear, the strategic implications of this system are not. In this study, the author will address the impact this system will have on strategic stability.

Before the question can be answered, however, a review of strategic stability is in order--as is a discussion of how strategic stability fits into the current world environment.

That subject will be covered in much greater detail in Chapter 4. At this point, suffice it to say that if there is a chance that nuclear weapons can be used--and that chance exists at some level as long as nuclear weapons themselves exist--then some amount of strategic stability exists. The exact level of stability can increase or decrease; this can happen as a result of many different factors, so long as these factors can have an impact on whether a country is more or less apt to use its nuclear arsenal--regardless of how remote the actual possibility of use is. It is certainly uncommon for a disagreement in the international arena to rise to a level that can affect strategic stability, especially if that disagreement does not involve strategic systems. The question is whether or not the Eastern European missile defense agreements do so.

**Primary Research Question**

Will strategic stability change as a result of the agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to host elements of the U.S. missile defense system?

**Secondary Research Questions**

Why did the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland decide to pursue a missile defense system in the face of staunch Russian opposition to the project?
Why is Russia vehemently opposed to the missile shield deployment in Europe?

How will Russian rhetoric on this subject be reflected in actual operational decisions by the Russian government and military?

Will the desire for a closer relationship with the United States lead the Czech Republic and Poland to make decisions that may not be in their best interests?

Significance

As an emerging issue, there is a lack of true scholarly analysis on this topic. This is not for a want of resources; there is a steady stream of developments and associated reporting and commentary with regard to the topic of missile defense in Eastern Europe, sometimes on a daily basis. A thoroughly researched examination of the possible implications of this system will add to the body of knowledge on this topic and may even contribute to the development of a solution to the problem that is more acceptable to all of the concerned parties.

Furthermore, an examination of the impact on strategic stability of these contemporaneous events regarding missile defense has not, to the author’s knowledge, yet been accomplished.

Assumptions

There are two main assumptions made in the creation of this study. First, the author will assume that regardless of whether the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland actually complete the development and emplacement of the missile defense system, enough work has progressed to potentially alter the strategic stability between these three
countries and Russia; at the very least, enough has been done to provoke a strong response from Moscow on more than one occasion.

The second assumption is that the Iranian missile threat is credible—and perceived as such by the U.S., the Czech Republic and Poland—regardless of ongoing successes and failures in the Iranian ballistic missile program. This assumption is also necessary due to the relative secrecy of that program; however, the recent successful demonstration of an indigenous Iranian orbital launch capability certainly helps to validate this assumption.

The Definition of Strategic Stability

No longer a term solely involving the risk of nuclear war and the relative levels of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, the term “strategic stability” has evolved over time—with no clear consensus on its definition today. This state of affairs is not only a product of the end of the Cold War, but also is due to the proliferation of nuclear states over the last 20 years. It is also a result of the change to the global security environment resulting from the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the subsequent U.S. War on Terrorism. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the ABM Treaty has had an impact as well.

Despite these radical changes to global security since the end of the Cold War, very few examinations of exactly what strategic stability means today exist.

Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras provide an exhaustive treatment of this term in A New Nuclear Century, but they note that it is not used consistently and, “Quantitative analysts are predisposed to focus on the relationships between (1) force structures, force postures, force capabilities, nuclear doctrines, and target set
characteristics and (2) the calculated outcomes of nuclear exchanges” while “Policymakers tend to consider a much broader array of factors that might upset the international equilibrium” (Cimbala and Scouras 2002, 30-31). They then go on to provide a deep analysis of the former, quantifiable definition, without touching on the latter one, which this paper will do.

With that said, this study will define strategic stability as the maintenance of a secure geo-political environment where that environment could be changed by evolving capabilities within the realm of both offensive and defensive capabilities regarding nuclear weaponry. The author has arrived at this definition after examining the historical definition of the phrase and researching the various perturbations that have resulted from changing national nuclear capabilities and deterrence strategies--along with the ever-expanding threat of the proliferation of both nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technologies.

In addition to the definition provided by Cimbala and Scouras above, this definition for strategic stability has been influenced by a presentation given in 2003 by retired Russian Major General Pavel Zolotarev of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He postulated six possibilities for a new definition of strategic stability:

1. The state of strategic stability as related to the probability of US and Russia not using their strategic nuclear weapons against one another not so much because of the state of the relationship between the two nations, but because of other factors, capable of creating a risk of a nuclear exchange between the two.
2. The state of strategic stability as related to the probability of non non-use of nuclear weapons by any nuclear power.
3. The state of strategic stability as related to the probability of preventing wars between nations in general.
4. The state of strategic stability as related to the probability of preventing armed conflicts, including internal ones.
5. The state of strategic stability as related to the probability of non-use of means of armed struggle and terrorism for solving political problems at the interstate and supranational levels.
6. The state of strategic stability as related to the non-confrontational character of the emerging bi-polar international system. (Zolotarev 2003)

This study’s definition of the term, therefore, is an amalgamation of the author’s own views informed with those of Cimbala and Scouras, as well as Zolotarev.

Finally, a clear understanding of the need for a new definition of strategic stability can be illustrated by the fact that the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative approved in 2000 by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, “The United States and Russia reaffirm their commitment to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability” (Arms Control Association 2000). The U.S. subsequently withdrew from that treaty two years later. The lack of this supposed cornerstone rather starkly demonstrates the need for a new definition of strategic stability--or implies that strategic stability no longer exists.

Chapter 4 of this paper consists of a much deeper treatment of the subject. The historical definitions and evolutions of strategic stability are examined, as is the explanation for why the term remains relevant today.

**The Definition of Eastern Europe**

For clarity, this paper will utilize the United Nations Statistics Division definition of Eastern Europe. This definition lists the following 10 countries as belonging to Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine (United Nations 2009).
Other designations, such as Central Europe or East-Central Europe, are certainly also valid when discussing Poland and the Czech Republic. However, in an effort to standardize usage (while at the same time not assigning any particular positive or negative connotations to the term), “Eastern Europe” will refer to the above listed countries throughout this study. It is not intended as a pejorative or as an insinuation that these countries are beholden to any particular ideology or preordained political grouping; it is merely done out of convenience.

Limitations

There are two main limitations incurred by choosing to write about missile defense in Eastern Europe. The first is the author’s inability to proficiently understand and read Russian, Czech, and Polish, making it difficult to conduct in-depth primary research on how these countries view this situation. The second limitation is the current number of unknowns regarding the subject. With a new presidential administration in the U.S. whose views on Eastern European missile defense are still largely unknown, elections in the Czech Republic, the Czechs holding the rotating European Union presidency starting on January 1, 2009, and the very ratification of U.S. agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland still in question, any analysis of this subject will remain incomplete. This is despite the assumption that even if both bilateral agreements were to not be consummated, some change to the strategic stability of the region could occur. Time will therefore also be a limitation affecting the author’s ability to conduct a complete review of all materials available on this subject.

This study will attempt to mitigate these limitations by establishing an “as of” date. In other words, all conclusions and findings will be specifically made with the
knowledge that they are not being prepared in a vacuum. Instead, the answer will bear
the caveat that it could change dramatically based on future events.

Furthermore, the author will mitigate the first limitation by conducting interviews
with English-speaking members of the Czech and Polish governments, as well as missile
defense and national security experts from these two countries.

Delimitations

There are four main delimitations within this study. The first is a deliberate
avoidance of technical issues such as the capabilities of current--or future--ballistic
missile interceptors in the U.S. inventory. While the efficacy of these interceptors will
most likely play a role in the final disposition of a European missile defense shield, this is
only one portion of the issue. Public opposition to the system within three of the
countries involved--specifically, Russia, Poland, and the Czech Republic--focuses less on
the aspect of unproven technology and more on the specter of American hegemony. And
while it could be argued that the opposite is true in the U.S., it remains to be seen whether
the new administration will use such arguments to cancel the current agreements in place
between the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland.

Secondly--and in the same vein as the first delimitation--this paper will not
analyze the proposed missile defense system from a cost-benefit standpoint. That is to
say, there will be no examination of whether the (indisputably large) material cost of
developing, emplacing, and sustaining all of the various missile defense components in
Poland and the Czech Republic outweighs any potential benefits to be gained from such a
system.
The third delimitation is narrowing the examination of possible changes to strategic stability due to the U.S.’s pursuit of national missile defense to one region of the world, namely Eastern Europe. This is despite the fact that the U.S. first sought to achieve a missile defense capability in the Pacific theater, specifically to deter North Korean long-range ballistic missile attacks on U.S. territories and interests--and there was no similar outcry from Russia while this system was in development and testing. Similarly, for that matter, upon Washington’s initial withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, there was a “relatively benign reaction from Moscow” (Harvey 2003, 327).

Finally, this paper is not concerned with divining the legitimacy--or illegitimacy--of the Iranian or rogue state missile threat; the author is instead concerned with the implications of U.S., Czech, and Polish security and missile defense agreements and their impact on the region’s strategic stability.

Therefore, this study focuses on the U.S. emplacement of ballistic missile defense in Eastern Europe as a whole; that is, the author will look at the implications for both Poland and the Czech Republic--and, more broadly, for the U.S. and Russia. These implications will be framed in how they affect strategic stability. And to provide a stronger framework for the conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5, this paper will first perform a thorough examination of the historical evolution of strategic stability in Chapter 4.

It is to be noted that the Russian polemic in opposition to the proposed Eastern European system has been similar in regards to both countries, but not identical; where applicable, these differences will be noted and examined. Similarly, Poland and the Czech Republic have distinct reasons for engaging with the U.S. on this issue; these
differences are also examined in this paper. Many of these similarities and differences are readily apparent upon even a quick reading of Appendixes A through G, which are transcripts of the interviews of the various Polish and Czech security professionals and experts who were interviewed by the author in Warsaw and Prague.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

While the amount of recent information about this subject is relatively large, it consists mainly of newspaper articles describing contemporaneous events and reports to the U.S. Congress. This is directly attributable to the speed at which developments have taken place and also to the uncertainty about the final missile shield deployment plan; in fact, since the actual agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland were not signed until the summer of 2008 and have yet to be ratified by the lower houses of the respective legislatures, the final disposition remains an open question. Therefore, the reality is that there are gaps in the literature because of the fact that this is an ongoing and contentious issue.

Furthermore, the demise of the ABM Treaty in 2002 (to say nothing of the end of the Cold War roughly a decade prior) fundamentally changed the discussion of this topic and rendered much of the then-existing literature out of date, if not obsolete. Books written since then have tended to focus exclusively on the U.S. and Russian dynamic without considering other players--and they all also suffer from the continuously shifting ground that underlies this issue.

Literature written prior to these two seminal events and concerned with how the definition of strategic stability has changed over time, however, does not suffer from these particular issues. While strategic stability has never been a topic that commands multiple rows of books at any library, there have been enough examinations of the subject to allow an in-depth case study to take place. And while most of these books focus on the American views of the subject, they also contain discussions of how the
Soviets (and later, Russians) look at it as well--some of which, of course, are written by the Russians themselves.

However, even after examining the historical aspects of strategic stability and regardless of the exact configuration that the Eastern European missile defense shield will take, the simple act of agreeing to be a part of this system may prove to have profound implications for the strategic stability of the region. Therefore, even though the final chapter of the Eastern European missile defense saga has yet to be written, this study can contribute to the field of knowledge even at this early stage of the game.

As noted, current literature on this subject is sparse. However, a book was published in December of 2008 that tackles this subject, though from a decidedly different point of view than this paper takes. Shield of Dreams: Missile Defense and U.S.-Russian Nuclear Strategy, by Stephen J. Cimbala, looks at some of the same areas that this study investigated when researching this subject. However, Cimbala focused more heavily on the nuclear deterrence and arms control aspects of the situation, while this author is more interested in the overall changes to strategic stability within Eastern Europe--and by extension, the U.S. and Russia.

Furthermore, Cimbala--with James Scouras--has also published A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control, which, though written in 2002, does provide some insights into the evolving definition of strategic stability in a post-Cold War world; this book is, in fact, one of the few works to address just what strategic stability means today.

Unfortunately, as it was written near the nadir of post-Cold War Russian power it does suffer somewhat from a lack of foreknowledge regarding the reemergence of
muscular Russian foreign policy under the later part of Vladimir Putin’s leadership of Russia (though Cimbala does note, with some concern, the direction that Putin’s Russia had already begun to take). Even with these caveats, however, both of these books have been very useful while conducting research for this paper.

Another recently published book, Natalie Bormann’s *National Missile Defense and the Politics of US Identity: A Postcultural Critique*, on the other hand, is an investigation of what the development of a ballistic missile defense system says about the American psyche. It was published in October of 2008, and while touching on the subject of missile defense, has not been a source for this research effort.

Moving on to materials not published within books, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) has put out a number of works focusing on missile defense—and has done so from many different angles that focus on different aspects of the subject. CRS publications on topics ranging from *The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008* to *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe* have been used while researching the missile defense issue.

While numerous newspapers have been following and reporting on the ongoing developments with regards to European missile defense, the *International Herald Tribune* has consistently provided a clear, European-focused view on the subject. Many of the references to events that have occurred contemporaneously with the writing of this paper have been drawn from this source.

The *International Journal*, a publication of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, published a volume titled “Nuclear strategy in the age of weapons of mass destruction” in 2008 which contained numerous articles touching on strategic stability
issues (including one on the Canadian advocacy of strategic stability). Of these, Thomas Scheber’s article “Strategic stability: Time for a reality check” gave the most attention to the subject and put forth a number of arguments about the limitations of stability theory. Furthermore, in 2003, *International Journal* published an article by Frank P. Harvey titled “The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence” which provides a cogent description of how strategic stability has changed since the Cold War and what the term is currently evolving into.

Finally, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have produced numerous presentations, papers, and studies on this subject. The author has reviewed a number of these that are applicable to the focus of this paper. In particular, the MDA’s “Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets in Europe,” DoD’s “Strengthening Transatlantic Security,” and NATO’s “North Atlantic Treaty Organization Topics, Missile Defence,” have all been very useful in the creation of this paper.

As noted, literature relating to the history of strategic stability and to the evolving definitions of the term during the Cold War is significantly more numerous than material exploring the subject since the fall of the Soviet Union; and if the cut-off point is the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty, even more commentaries are included. There are many papers, studies, books, and articles that provide contemporaneous definitions of strategic stability while simultaneously debating how it has--or has not--evolved from its original reliance on deterrence.

In many respects, the 1980s were the heyday of strategic stability discussion. And while there was still no definitive definition of the term in the U.S. (much less
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union) there were certainly numerous examinations of strategic stability and the history of its use. Many of these authors also attempted to predict or frame the future of strategic stability; they were, unfortunately, universally unsuccessful in this undertaking due to the unforeseen--but quickly approaching--end of the Cold War. They were also hampered by the dire outlook for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a widespread belief that the Soviet Union would never accept intrusive verification regimes.

Very typical of this approach is Paul Stockton, writing *Strategic Stability between the Super-powers* in the mid-eighties, who notes the lack of agreement in the U.S. regarding strategic stability while specifically discussing the apparent consensus on the term in the 1950s which quickly evolved into the many competing views seen in later decades. He also attempted to foresee how Soviet policy would impact strategic stability in the future.

An excellent collection of disparate U.S. views on strategic stability, *Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Challenges for the Future*, edited by William T. Parsons, is a report of the proceedings from the Third Annual Seminar of the Center for Law and National Security at Charlottesville, Virginia, which took place from 22-24 June 1984. Of the 16 presentations collected in this book, those given by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council; George A. Keyworth, II, Science Advisor to the President, and Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy; Edward T. Gerry, President, W.J. Schafer Associates; Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic and Nuclear
Defending Peace and Freedom: Toward Strategic Stability in the Year 2000, published by the Atlantic Council’s Working Group on Strategic Stability and Arms Control in 1988 and edited by Brent Scowcroft, R. James Wolsey, and Thomas H. Etzold, gives what may be the most stridently Cold War-era American definition of strategic stability, but also includes as an appendix the definitive Soviet definition of the term as well, as articulated by Vitaly Zhurkin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada at the USSR Academy of Sciences. This publication is invaluable in examining how strategic stability was viewed at the twilight of the Cold War, and provides insight into how the term had to evolve after the Soviet Union’s collapse. It certainly proves its value by containing such diametrically opposed definitions of the term itself.

In December of 1988, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released Securing Strategic Stability: The Panel on the Future of Strategic Systems, chaired by Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr. While the ultimate conclusions of this study were simply to recommend the continued modernization of U.S. strategic forces while simultaneously pursuing arms control treaties such as START, it does provide an interesting variation on a definition for strategic stability.
Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence in East-West Relations, written by Wolfgang Heisenberg in 1989, also reviews the history of strategic stability and how it has changed over time, particularly in the framework of arms control. He goes on to examine four tangible theories of stability: The concept of crisis stability; the concept of stability of mutual deterrence; arms race stability and other concepts of strategic stability; and military stability as a basis of future arms control negotiations. These areas are certainly an important subject on their own, but they do not fit into the classic definition of strategic stability itself.

Written just as the Warsaw Pact was disintegrating, The Effects of Warning on Strategic Stability by Bruce G. Blair and John D. Steinbruner discusses in 1991 how the traditional definition of strategic stability will need to change to account for the new political realities and changing alignments of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, they do not provide an in-depth analysis of the situation, but they are, perhaps, the first to note the need for a new meaning of the term.

Finally, in 2000, Dean A. Wilkening examined the subject in Ballistic-Missile Defense and Strategic Stability. While written prior to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Wilkening does discuss the possibility of the U.S. doing so and also provides a strong argument for why strategic stability remains important in a post-Cold War world.

In relation to the existing literature, this study will hopefully fill a knowledge gap. Little has been written about the implications for U.S. national policy of a change in the strategic stability of Eastern Europe. Even less has been discussed concerning these potential implications for the region itself. This study will attempt to fill in some of these
blank spaces on the geo-political map of the early twenty-first century. It will do so by reviewing the existing literature and dissecting the current situation, exploring the history of strategic stability to place the current situation in the proper context, and finally by conducting interviews with important decision-makers and analysts within both Poland and the Czech Republic. An explanation of how these interviews were conducted will be given in the following chapter, along with a description of the other research performed while preparing this study.
Initial research for this paper consisted of a literature review. The first step of the process was to investigate the history of strategic stability. In fact, as this term has evolved considerably over the years since nuclear weapons were invented, it was important to determine how strategic stability has changed and what it means today before evaluating how it is affected by a missile defense system in Europe. Therefore, the author conducted a case study regarding the phases of strategic stability as seen throughout the history of American-Soviet (and later, Russian) relations. This study is presented in Chapter 4.

Next, the author reviewed the history of the U.S.’s development of ballistic missile defense, focusing on the period following the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It was important to understand how the procedures used to develop the currently-deployed missile defense systems in California and Alaska will impact the development of the Eastern European missile defense system, as well as how this development impacts the decision-making process of the Obama Administration and its impact on world opinion of the system. This phase not only consisted of a review of the numerous Congressional Research Service reports on missile defense and other literature on the subject but also relied on the author’s experience as an intercontinental ballistic missile test launch officer.

The next phase examined the current state of tension among the U.S., Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia regarding various aspects of the proposed Eastern European
missile defense system. This phase relied most heavily on contemporary news reports as there has not yet been enough time to see a proliferation of analysis of the situation.

Even within a few short months, this dynamic has changed numerous times. The relationship between each of these countries was subjected to the greatest potential change with the election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States on 4 November 2008. For example, the next day, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev threatened in exceedingly harsh tones to station Iskander short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad (Bovt 2008)—missiles that are not actually built yet. But reports out of the Kremlin in January of 2009 seemed to back away from this extreme stance (Moscow Times 2009). As of May 2009, this particular issue remains unresolved.

The final phase consisted of interviews conducted by the author in the capitals of Poland and the Czech Republic in an effort to understand the decision-making processes for each country involved in this situation. These interviews were conducted through a grant from the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies and took place during the week of 12 April 2009, roughly one week after U.S. President Barack Obama spoke in Prague and touched on the issue of missile defense.

The author coordinated with the Defense Attaches at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw and Prague to organize interviews. Ultimately, this coordination led to interviews with numerous experts in both capitals.

A number of politicians within both Poland and the Czech Republic had the potential to provide very worthwhile and interesting information about the prospects of missile defense in Eastern Europe. Criteria for selecting interviewees were based on finding credible voices for competing thoughts on missile defense and strategic security
within Poland and the Czech Republic. This desire had to be balanced with the question of access. It would be almost impossible for the author to sit down for an interview with the Czech or Polish heads of state; however, it was more realistic—and also potentially more enlightening—to discover the opinions of the leaders of the various political parties within both countries. In theory, these people will inform and help sway the votes of their parties when the missile defense issue comes up for a vote within the respective legislatures.

Unfortunately, although the author attempted to arrange meetings with representatives from each of the main Czech and Polish political parties, sensitivities regarding the missile defense issue itself prevented many of these from occurring. In the case of the Czech Republic in particular, after Prime Minister Topolanek’s government lost a no-confidence vote—dissolving the government less than two weeks before the author’s arrival in Prague—the interview schedule was significantly impacted.

In any event, interviews were recorded with the following individuals in Warsaw: Minister Witold Waszczykowski, Deputy Head of the Polish National Security Bureau and former lead Polish negotiator with the U.S. on missile defense; Dr. Olaf Osica, Research fellow, Natolin European Centre; and Mr. Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head, Research Office, Polish Institute of International Affairs.

All three men are experts on international security in general and missile defense in Poland in particular. Minister Waszczykowski has served in a number of other positions within the Polish government prior to his current posting. His prior appointments include serving as the Deputy Head of the Polish Mission to NATO, as the Polish Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and as Poland’s Undersecretary of
State, among others. He supports the missile defense system and is a proponent of closer
ties between the U.S. and Poland. He does fear the possibility of Russian interference in
these decisions:

If you decide to strike a deal, or some sort of transaction with Russia right now
and give up the program in Poland, in the Czech Republic, we’re afraid you might
send the wrong signal to the Russians that, well, okay, we accept your assumption
that this is a different area, it’s an area of different security status.
(Waszczykowski 2009)

Dr. Osica and Mr. Kulesa also support the concept of a strong American-Polish
partnership and are wary of a resurgent Russia. They both understand and have
expressed some of the negatives and positives associated with deploying interceptors in
Poland. They have also both written scholarly articles on this topic. Dr. Osica supports a
missile defense agreement between the U.S. and Poland as a “vehicle for other ends. It’s
the end for generating some new political momentum, to consolidate the security of this
region politically” (Osica 2009). Mr. Kulesa also supports the missile defense project if
it leads to greater cooperation between the U.S. and Poland, even though he is somewhat
“skeptical of the impact of missile defense on Iranian decision making” (Kulesa 2009).
These interviews are attached to this paper as Appendixes A-C.

In Prague, an additional four interviews were conducted, also with international
security and missile defense experts. These were with the following: Mr. Radomír
Jahoda, Deputy Director, Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Ministry of
Defense; Dr. Jiří Pehe, Director, New York University in Prague and former Director of
the Czech Presidential Political Department; Mr. Oldřich Černý, Executive Director,
Prague Security Studies Institute, former National Security Adviser to the President of
Czechoslovakia, and former Director General of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service;
and Mr. Jiří Schneider, Program Director, Prague Security Studies Institute and former Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

As a senior official in the Czech Defense Ministry, Mr. Jahoda supports strong economic, political, and military ties between the U.S. and the Czech Republic. He also supports the installation of the missile defense radar system at Brdy in the Czech Republic and, much like his counterparts in Poland, does not believe Russia should have a say in this matter. As he put it, “The Russian statements support me in my view to be positive on the U.S. missile defense. . .They are trying to exercise how much power they still have in this part of Europe and it is something which is worrying me” (Jahoda 2009).

Dr. Pehe, Mr. Černý, and Mr. Schneider all formerly served in the Czech government. While Dr. Pehe supports the U.S.-Czech partnership in general, he puts “more emphasis on NATO than on this bilateral relationship because it’s an asymmetric relationship, the Czech Republic is too small, the United States is too big” (Pehe 2009). However, with this said, he is not against the system being placed in the Czech Republic. Mr. Černý is a strong supporter of the radar system. He believes it will “enhance the already good existing ties with the U.S. and would serve as a sort of wall for our security” (Černý 2009). His fellow member of the Prague Security Studies Institute, Mr. Schneider, also supports the radar system and notes that “once the Americans ask for something, we should consider it very seriously because this is a chance, this is an opportunity” (Schneider 2009). Transcripts of each of these interviews are attached to this paper as Appendixes D-G.

The interviews themselves provided a fascinating insight into why these two countries found it in their interest to pursue these agreements with the United States and
highlighted the many ways--some subtle, some not--that the impact the missile defense agreements will have on strategic stability is different for these two nations.

The questions developed for these interviews focused heavily on perceived impacts from the missile defense system plans. The author worked with Dr. Kerry Kartchner, the Acting Director of the Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach at the U.S. Department of State and the submitter of this research topic to the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, to develop four focus areas for these interviews. These categories comprised the interviewee’s level of knowledge of missile defense as a whole; attitudes toward the program; opinions on how the change in U.S. administrations will affect European missile defense; and, finally, the impact these systems will have on U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Czech relations. The standard list of questions for each interviewee included the following:

- How does this system help or hurt your country’s security?
- How do these agreements affect the stability of your country?
- Will these systems have an impact on deterrence?
- How did you view Russian statements that they will target your country with weapons if you agree to host elements of the missile defense system?
- What concerns do you have on the efficacy of the proposed system?
- Are there concessions you feel should be made by the U.S. and/or Russia on this issue?
- Do you see a need to increase defense spending in your country in response to the Russian threats?
- Do you feel this system is a provocation by the U.S. against the Russians? If so, how?
- What specific positives do you see in the emplacement of this system? What negatives do you see?
- How does this system impact relations between your country and the U.S.?
- Does the change in American presidential administrations impact your feelings about the missile shield plans?
- How do you view the Russian comments immediately following the U.S. election compared to recent reports of more conciliatory language coming from the Kremlin?
These questions formed the basis of each interview; however, the actual discussions that occurred were also guided by each interviewee’s particular area of expertise. Therefore, some questions were not asked during every interview, while there were also a number of questions that flowed out of the conversation and are not accounted for above.

A number of strengths and weaknesses are inherent in the author’s approach to researching this subject. First of all, as a military officer and representative of the United States, there were members of certain political parties in both countries that would have no interest in meeting with the author. Furthermore, the discussion would have been unlikely to be fruitful.

In the same vein, by obtaining a relatively small sample of interviews it was not possible to completely gauge the full spectrum of views on the missile defense issue within both Poland and the Czech Republic. However, the high quality of interviewees--as well as the in-depth discussions that occurred during each interview--help to mitigate this weakness. In fact, the knowledge level of each interviewee is a strength.

For the two interviewees that are currently serving in their respective country’s government, there were certain discussion areas that could not be covered in depth; to some degree, this was an issue with the other interviews as well, but the individuals not currently in a governmental position were certainly more free with their opinions than their counterparts within the government. This was, however, to be expected, as this subject remains controversial in both countries--almost alarmingly so in the Czech Republic.
By bringing together research of past and current ideas of strategic stability; performing a thorough investigation of how the U.S., Poland, and the Czech Republic are carrying out deliberations and how Russia is reacting to each particular new wrinkle in the missile defense saga; and ultimately combining this knowledge with information gathered during the interviews in Warsaw and Prague, the author will be able to answer this paper’s primary and secondary research questions.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Before attempting to determine if a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic will affect strategic stability, it is necessary to determine how strategic stability has evolved; why there are different views of it and what these views entail; and finally, whether the concept is applicable today, and if so exactly how it fits into the current geopolitical environment.

This chapter will first trace the development of strategic stability throughout the Cold War; from the end of the Cold War through the end of the ABM Treaty; and finally to the present day. Along the way, the differences between U.S. and Soviet/Russian views on strategic stability will also be examined--as well as the causes of these differences. Finally, by examining each of this paper’s research questions in turn, a determination will be made on whether or not the missile defense agreements between the U.S., the Czech Republic, and Poland will affect strategic stability as defined in this paper.

An analysis of the term is required for many reasons--most importantly because there truly is no clear consensus on its meaning. It may seem rather straightforward when the Project on Securing Strategic Stability determined in 1988 that:

The two key issues for strategic stability involve removing any incentive for surprise attack during a peacetime alert and persuading the opponent that there is little political or military advantage in attacking first in a crisis. When there is no difference between attacking first or waiting, stability may be said to exist. (Goldberg 1988, 8)
However, arriving at this definition proved anything but simple--and there is no doubt that even such a bland definition as the one above will find more than its fair share of detractors.

The Origins of Strategic Stability

Initially, strategic stability was simply linked to the concept of deterrence (Blair and Steinbruner 1991, 2; Heisenberg 1989, 25). Indeed, “by the time the Soviet Union had broken the U.S. atomic monopoly, only deterrence appeared to offer the U.S. a practical foundation for strategic stability” (Stockton 1986, 6). This reliance on deterrence to provide stability was primitive but, in the very early years of the nuclear age, sufficient.

Eventually, however, strategic stability became much more than a mere byword for deterrence. Complexity became a hallmark of stability, and over the intervening decades newer and more intricate definitions were developed as they became required. Therefore, by the time that Frank P. Harvey wrote on the subject in 2003, strategic stability had ultimately transformed into:

A catch-all expression used by scholars and practitioners to describe a set of interrelated concepts (such as mutually assured destruction), theories (for example, nuclear deterrence), policies (massive retaliation; flexible response; no-first-use), and treaties (Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty), all designed during the Cold War for one purpose—to stabilize the longest nuclear rivalry in history to prevent a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia. The key was to balance strategic forces so that each side could survive a pre-emptive nuclear attack with a sufficiently large stockpile of ballistic missiles to launch a retaliatory strike. The logic was (and remains) elegant and persuasive—so long as the retaliatory (second) strike threatened sufficient devastation, there would be no rational reason to launch first. (2003, 321)
In between these two significantly different eras, however, was a long, arduous process of evolution that was destined to produce many different definitions of strategic stability. One of the reasons for this development was the eventual criticism that deterrence perhaps relied too heavily on the assumption of rational actors. Furthermore, the U.S. also presumed that their Soviet counterparts would react to events in the same way as Americans (and vice versa); this led to situations where each side saw their counterparts apparently acting irrationally. However, the participants saw their own actions as consistent and rational.

One of the consequences of this was that “when in the event this expectation of strategically identical “apes on a treadmill” was proved wide of the mark, Soviet leaders were disparaged for their inability to comprehend the realities of the nuclear age” (Cimbala 2008, 7). Of course, in reality, they were simply reacting in a way that was rational to them.

Therefore, after the early reliance on deterrence, a subsequent focus--beginning in the early 1960s--on “Assured Destruction called for the U.S. to move away from its allegedly destabilizing emphasis on counterforce targeting and to focus instead on Soviet industry and population” (Stockton 1986, 22). Here we see the beginning of a trend that would endure for decades--a disagreement on exactly what constituted a stabilizing or destabilizing element. Often, the Americans and Soviets each expressed opposite opinions about which of these two categories new developments fell into. Occasionally, however, they did agree; but even in these cases, it was not always possible to construct a control measure to eliminate or mitigate an agreed-upon destabilizing element (Stockton 1986, 24).
A threat to strategic stability therefore began to emerge as new and improved technologies were developed that could conceivably enable one side to preemptively strike the other and either negate or seriously weaken a reciprocal nuclear response. These developments decreased strategic stability and threatened to unbalance the equation of mutually assured destruction. In particular, development of anti-ballistic missile technology advanced to the point that one side could conceivably attack the other and destroy a significant portion of the other country’s arsenal, which combined with a missile defense system, could leave the first country relatively unscathed. In order to restore a higher degree of strategic stability, the U.S. and the USSR signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972. This treaty ensured that each side could continue to hold enough targets at risk—regardless of a bolt out of the blue—to prevent a rational decision to launch a nuclear strike.

It should be noted that there were certainly many times when internal disagreements on a particular element’s destabilizing or stabilizing nature occurred within either the American or Soviet camps as well. For example, Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs, defined strategic stability in terms of maintaining parity with the Soviet Union (1986, 5). This parity was to be achieved through development of the Peacekeeper ICBM, which could carry up to 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). At the time, ICBMs with MIRV capability were widely viewed within the U.S. as a destabilizing element (Gaffney, Jr. 1986, 44).

McFarlane, conversely, told an audience, “Our programs are designed to enhance deterrence by maintaining the balance. . . . The Peacekeeper is a vital part of ensuring that
we can respond effectively to a Soviet attack, thus assuring that the war we all agree must
never happen, never does” (1986, 5). He postulated this as official U.S. policy, as well;
earlier in his talk, McFarlane noted that he “would like to describe the Reagan
Administration’s approach to arms control” (1986, 4) while touching on his “daily
contact with President Reagan” (1986, 3). He soon followed with a perfect example of a
notion that the Soviets described as destabilizing but many Americans portrayed as
stabilizing:

If we are to maintain a stable balance into the next century, and if we are to do so
at far lower levels of nuclear arms, we must be more creative in our thinking.
That is the spirit behind the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
President has set in motion a long-term study of policy and technology options
aimed at reducing the threat to the United States and our allies posed by increases
in Soviet offensive capabilities, thus enhancing stability and eliminating
incentives for further growth of offensive armaments. (1986, 8)

This argument can be seen as the direct ideological progenitor of subsequent George W.
Bush Administration policies regarding arms control, strategic stability, and ballistic
missile defense; it is a view that turned the traditional view of the ABM treaty as
stabilizing and missile defense as destabilizing completely on its head (Rhinelander 1986,
63). (It should be noted that the author recognizes there are differences between the
scope of President Reagan’s global SDI and President Bush’s more regionally-focused
missile defense.)

Returning to the subject of changing definitions of strategic stability, another
example that illustrates why strategic stability evolves over time was discussed by John
Rhinelander in a panel on The Future of Arms Control at the Seminar of the Center for
Law and National Security at Charlottesville in 1984:

The two superpowers often do not have the same forces, programs or objectives at
the same time . . . During the 1960s we had more ICBM launchers than did the
Soviet Union. When SALT I began we proposed a freeze on ICBM launchers. The Soviets, of course, did not agree to this proposal. They effectively stonewalled us, and by the time we reached the Interim Agreement in 1972 their numbers of launchers had exceeded ours. (Moore 1986, 155-56)

This constantly evolving strategic situation means that stability is also constantly fluctuating. Arms control agreements give us a chance to reduce the amount of fluctuation and are therefore an important element of maintaining a high degree of strategic stability. But is this a universal view of how arms control influences strategic stability? As shown above with the example of Robert McFarlane, it’s doubtful. In fact the answer, in a word, is no.

**Strategic Stability and Arms Control**

In the U.S., by the 1980s, the impact of arms control on strategic stability was being vigorously debated. As Keith B. Payne, Director of National Security Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy said in his treatise “Arms Control Policy Stability and Compliance:”

Once the self-evident factors of existing political conflict and the possession of nuclear weapons are listed, our understanding of nuclear war causation becomes inherently murky. This problem becomes severe when any attempt is made to establish an arms control regime that will enhance stability, i.e., to reduce the probability of war. The inherent limitation in our understanding of war and peace causation means that any proposed structuring or restructuring of the strategic balance through arms control can have only a highly questionable effect upon the probability of war. (1986, 50)

History, however, has since proven otherwise; since this was written, it can generally be said that the more arms control treaties in force between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia, the better the relationship between the countries--and when there are fewer, the relationship suffers.
In other words, there has not merely been a smooth, continuously upward trend in the relationship between these two countries since the 1980s. After the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, there was also a corresponding deterioration in the relationship between the states. And with the likely end of START in December of 2009, the prospects for a still worsening relationship between the U.S. and Russia seem likely. However, if a new treaty is enacted before then, relations would likely improve; while this does not prove causation, it certainly implies at least some type of correlation.

Certainly, arms control does not always equal an increase in strategic stability. For example, it is conceivable that an agreement could reduce each country’s arsenal below the number necessary to assure a sufficiently unacceptable retaliatory strike. A discussion of the actual numbers involved in these calculations can be found in Cimbala and Scouras’ *A New Nuclear Century*. As they note after discussing the positive impacts that the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, and START have had on strategic stability:

These widely recognized contributions to strategic stability neither support nor refute the assertion that deeper reductions will further enhance strategic stability. Lower numbers per se are simply not necessarily more stable than higher numbers. In fact, there are strong arguments that deeper and deeper reductions will eventually undermine stability because destruction of the first striker by the retaliation of the second striker will no longer be assured. (2002, 27)

Later, when Payne notes that “It would be difficult if not impossible to discern the degree to which the probability of war had been reduced, or precisely why it had been reduced” (1986, 51) due to any particular arms control agreement, he is obviously correct, but this is a straw man. It is not necessary to know to which degree tensions have been lowered; in many cases, it is simply enough to note that they have been reduced (versus remaining stable or increasing).
Certainly, predicting future arms control and strategic stability outcomes is a risky proposition. For example, in the mid-1980s, Raymond L. Garthoff, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, unequivocally pronounced, “INF is dead” (1986, 70) and further stated, “START, too, was fated to fail” (1986, 71). Not to be outdone, Derek Leebaert later postulated, “it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets, with 98 percent of their landmass closed to foreigners, would ever permit similar U.S. [intrusive] inspection” (1987, 14). This was written mere months before Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF treaty allowing precisely these inspections. However, this merely points out just how difficult it is to foresee how events in this field will play out; in many cases, there is no precedent, and the only way to determine how something will affect strategic stability is to see it actually in practice. Often times, once a system has been brought to life, it directly leads to a strong difference of opinion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia on how it affects strategic stability.

**Differing Views of Strategic Stability**

From the earliest days of deterrence, the U.S. and USSR did not see eye to eye on how to establish a credible deterrent or on how different systems and policies affected strategic stability. Originally, the U.S. assumed that the Soviet Union would simply adopt the definitions and elements of deterrence as determined by U.S. theorists. The Americans quickly learned that this was not the case, and that the Soviet ideas regarding stability (and how to maintain it) were perhaps incompatible with the ideas postulated by the American side. This not only has to do with differing opinions on what does and does not constitute a destabilizing element (as described above) but also with the deceptively
complex calculations that led to significant differences between the two sides when considering a definition for strategic stability.

By the late 1980s, it appeared that the U.S. and the USSR would never agree on what precisely constituted strategic stability. In retrospect, this was indeed correct, as this issue was not resolved before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With that said, it is illustrative to see exactly what the differences were at a specific point in time--in this case, 1988, and the publication of the policy paper prepared by the Atlantic Council’s Working Group on Strategic Stability and Arms Control.

While preparing their publication, the Working Group met with members of the Soviet Union’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada; the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Defense. These discussions did not result in a shared definition of strategic stability; in fact, “The differences of perspective between the U.S. and Soviet sides remained too great to be subsumed into the Policy Paper” (Scowcroft 1988, 209). However, the Soviets prepared a paper describing their views, which became an appendix to the Working Group’s report.

The Atlantic Council’s Working Group ultimately defined strategic stability in this way:

We have come to view strategic stability as a condition in which the USSR does not perceive that it can benefit by initiating war or by taking major risks of military confrontation, and in which U.S. behavior is seen as calm, firm, and stable by the Soviets. This condition is not a static one because it encompasses the entire scope of functional capabilities of each side, including the interaction of force structure asymmetries, as well as opposing perceptions and evaluations. (Scowcroft 1988, 2)

Compare this to the concurrent Soviet view:
What is strategic stability today? It must be specifically emphasized that this notion is a complex one, having many facets, that it is a system of interconnected elements that are, at the same time, very different between themselves in their nature. This is why all its basic component parts should be treated as a whole. These parts consist of two main groups, those of political and of material elements, and combine in themselves policies of individual states, interrelationship of forces, military and technological capabilities, arms limitation and reduction problems. There is, finally, a certain inter-connection between strategic and regional stability in those most important regions of the world where the forces of both sides are facing each other. Strategic stability (or instability) results from the policies of states. Strategic situations become more or less stable only as a result of political decisions that are being taken. Development of various weapons systems is always finally a result of political decisions. (Zhurkin 1988, 210)

What is the source of these unbridgeable differences? In the most basic terms, these discrepancies can once again be traced back to the varying views on what constitutes stabilizing and destabilizing elements. In yet another example, during much of the Cold War the Soviets claimed that the U.S. refusal to repudiate the use of a first strike was destabilizing (Zhurkin 1988, 210). However, the U.S. held the exact opposite view, as Washington saw a need to deter the overwhelming Soviet conventional military advantage in Europe--and the decision was subsequently made that the only way to provide that deterrence was to maintain the right to first use of nuclear weapons (Staar 1986, 138).

Countering the conventional force superiority of the Warsaw Pact was not the only example of differing views on what causes harm to strategic stability. For example as President Reagan’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic and Nuclear Forces, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. put it, “When Soviet nuclear forces acquired several important quantitative advantages, we hoped to balance those with qualitative advances” (1986, 41). Once again, the Soviets viewed these improvements in technology as wholly destabilizing, as such accurate weapons could be easily employed as counterforce
weapons (and hence first-strike weapons), versus the significantly less important role
accuracy plays in the targeting of countervalue targets.

In addition to these fundamental differences between American and Soviet
definitions of stability in the 1980s, there have also been serious disagreements within the
U.S. nuclear security community on what constitutes strategic stability. Even when
postulating the same basic formula, it can be glaringly obvious how a commentator views
the phenomena. Take the following description of strategic stability:

Current concepts for deterrence and stability reflect the long-held but questionable
assumption that deterrence--and therefore stability--will be reliable and
predictable if each side possesses the unimpeded ability to inflict a specified level
damage on the other, regardless of which side strikes first. (Scheber 2008, 897)

And compare that description of the term with this one:

The principles of a stable strategic balance have nonetheless been established
reasonably well. The opposing forces are each to be conceded a bedrock
capability to carry out their own assessment of effective retaliation thereby
ensuring the deterrent effect; each is to be denied, however, the ability to destroy
the other’s retaliatory capability in an initial attack, thereby preventing an
incentive to initiate war. (Blair and Steinbruner 1991, 2)

These are two very different ways of looking at the same general idea. But why
are there so many different views on this subject? Frank P. Harvey postulates that it is
because of the transition from the nuclear environment of the Cold War to the post-ABM
Treaty setting:

Adjustments in nuclear strategies have been relatively slow because transitions,
by definition, encompass both ‘continuity’ and ‘change,’ with features of the old
and new nuclear environments interacting simultaneously. This explains why it is
so difficult to resolve policy debates about the future of strategic stability--both
sides are right and wrong about some things, and both sides can produce evidence
to support some of their core arguments. The result is a collection of mutually
exclusive conclusions that bipolar strategic stability is relevant and irrelevant;
nuclear deterrence theory is valid and invalid; mutually assured destruction is
appropriate and inappropriate; the ABM Treaty is essential and obsolete; and
ballistic missile defence (BMD) is stabilizing and destabilizing. (2003, 323)
But how does this tie into a working definition of strategic stability? Does it even make sense in the current geopolitical context? These questions will be answered after analyzing the relative levels of strategic stability that have existed since the beginning of the nuclear arms race. During the nuclear era, there have been four distinct time periods where different levels of strategic stability have existed. These are: Pre-ABM Treaty (prior to 1972); ABM Treaty to the fall of the Soviet Union (1972-1991); Post-Soviet Union to the end of the ABM Treaty (1991-2002); and Post-ABM Treaty (2002 to present). Each of these time periods has its own distinct characteristics and will be discussed in the following sections.

Pre-ABM Treaty (Prior to 1972)

In the first fledgling years of the nuclear age, the U.S. held an unmistakable advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear weaponry. The resulting American theory of massive retaliation was short-lived, however, since “the credibility of massive retaliation depended heavily on the belief that the United States would remain relatively invulnerable to retaliatory strikes by the Soviet Union” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 14). Another hallmark of massive retaliation was the U.S. belief that nuclear weapons were so powerful, they could end wars by themselves; the Soviets--as in many other matters regarding nuclear weapons--did not share this American belief. While they thought that nuclear weapons could be decisive, they did not see them as silver bullets. Meanwhile, the Soviets countered the U.S. massive retaliation policy with a sizable advantage in conventional troops in Europe, effectively holding Western Europe at risk as a deterrent (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 30).
These early years did set the stage for the subsequent arms race; the Soviets worked as quickly as possible to reach a level of parity with the U.S. in all areas associated with strategic weapons (even passing the U.S. in the related space race). Even at this early stage, the Soviets were determined to reach a balance with the U.S. in nuclear weapons. Throughout this period, both sides feared a gap with the other.

In the U.S., strategic stability was seen as a function of deterrence and rested in the principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD). However, MAD was not accepted by the Soviets; instead, during this period, they relied on a preemptive strike strategy as a basis for deterrence—while publicly claiming a reliance on a retaliatory second strike (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 24, 36).

In this earliest phase of the nuclear arms race, strategic stability was fragile, but it did exist. Each side believed that they could deter the other from launching a nuclear strike due to the unacceptable casualties that would be taken even by a “victor.” Deterrence was clearly the basis of strategic stability during this period. It was certainly weak, as both sides thought the other might be planning a preemptive strike, but strategic stability did exist at a high enough level to prevent a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR (though it was not enough to prevent the numerous proxy wars, provocations, and limited wars of this time period, such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 or the Cuban Missile Crisis). This weak level of strategic stability corresponds to the adversarial relationship between the two countries, as well.

ABM Treaty to the fall of the Soviet Union (1972-1991)

After the ABM Treaty was signed, however, strategic stability gradually came to be achieved not only through deterrence but also by agreeing that certain elements of
nuclear weaponry are inherently stabilizing or destabilizing. For example, eventually there was a general consensus that “MIRVed and heavy ICBMs...are generally considered destabilizing because they are simultaneously lucrative targets in a nuclear exchange and, if silo-based or in garrison, vulnerable. Thus, they are much more useful as first-strike weapons than second-strike weapons” (Cimbala and Scouras 2002, 69).

In the same vein, during this period a shift from countervalue to counterforce targeting impacted strategic stability as well. Counterforce targeting and first-strike weapons decrease stability since they make launching a nuclear strike more attractive; the opposite is true for countervalue targeting and second-strike weapons.

The difference between the American and Soviet notions of strategic stability during the 1970s and 1980s was significant, however. This did not have to do with first-strike weapons per se, but rather with the idea of actual prosecuting a first strike; as noted earlier, the Soviets claimed their repudiation of a first strike strategy was integral to strategic stability, while the Americans felt the opposite was true, as deterrence (and strategic stability) are predicated on the belief that a nation is committed to using its nuclear arsenal in the proper scenario. Yet, the Soviets saw deterrence during the 1970s becoming more defensive in nature, generally due to the U.S. agreement to engage in arms control efforts such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 131). These lowering tensions were also a byproduct of détente.

Despite these differences, strategic stability did exist in this period as both sides maintained a balance in strategic forces through the earliest arms control treaties (as well as the ongoing reliance on deterrence). In fact, strategic stability increased in this phase when compared to the previous one. This increase can be linked to the slightly warmer--
though still adversarial--relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. Also, some of this must be tempered by the impact that the Strategic Defense Initiative had on strategic stability during the 1980s, as discussed earlier in this chapter.


After the fall of the Soviet Union, discussions about strategic stability began to fall out of favor. One reason for this was that it was not immediately clear that the successor nuclear states of the USSR would eventually consolidate their weapons under Russian Federation control, and without a cohesive nuclear force opposite that of the U.S., the traditional balance inherent in strategic stability would not exist. In this context it is interesting to note “the U.S. decision in January 1992 to exclude the 1972 ABM Treaty from the list of major arms control accords to which, it has told the former Soviet republics, they should adhere” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 180).

But in many ways, the 1990s exhibited an extremely high level of stability due to the verified elimination of all missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty, START entering into force, the negotiation of START II, and the general decrease in tensions between the U.S. and Russia. That is to say, strategic stability did not end after the Soviet Union fell; instead, strategic stability increased to unprecedented levels as a non-adversarial relationship began to emerge between the two sides. This occurred as deterrence receded slightly into the background and arms control agreements with rigorous inspection protocols came to the fore (this is not to imply that deterrence was no longer a basic part of strategic stability, merely that in this period arms control agreements unquestionably played a part in maintaining strategic stability).
As the perceived threat from Russia began to decrease, the U.S. began to once again promote missile defense as a stabilizing rather than destabilizing element. This opinion was based on the fact that nuclear and ballistic missile technology and knowledge were beginning to proliferate around the globe, and it was becoming more likely that a nuclear weapon would be launched at the U.S. by an entity other than Russia; this led to the last phase of strategic stability, the Post-ABM Treaty period.

**Post-ABM Treaty (2002 to present)**

As described earlier in this paper, the U.S. eventually saw a need for protection from nuclear-capable states that, unlike Russia, did not possess a large or sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Such countries were not constrained in the historical way by deterrence due, at least in part, to the possibility of rogue elements or non-rational actors within these countries controlling a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile.

This brokered another significant disagreement in the definition of strategic stability between the U.S. and Russia as the Russians continued to believe that missile defense was destabilizing. The American view differed as the missile defense envisioned by the U.S. did not have the capability to stop a retaliatory strike from Russia (hence maintaining deterrence in the eyes of Washington). However, the Russians felt that, in the future, such a system might have this capability. And, much as in classic deterrence theory, if one side no longer has to fear this retaliatory strike, then a first strike becomes more attractive for that side.

This decreases strategic stability because not only would the side with missile defense feel they could win a war, but the side without it could feel compelled to launch a first strike of their own in order to overwhelm the missile defense system, or even to
launch an attack prior to the system becoming fully operational. Furthermore, this is an example of how stability can be affected even if only one side believes something is destabilizing; if that side begins to make decisions based on a feeling of vulnerability, strategic stability will decrease as they take tangible actions in order to mitigate this perceived inequity. Finally, this decrease in stability can be seen to parallel the deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Russia, as well; while there has not been a return to a strict adversarial relationship, it is certainly now a troubled one. Therefore, strategic stability has decreased in this phase, though the environment still remains more secure than before the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Ongoing Need for Strategic Stability

Earlier in this paper, it was noted that, at its most basic level, strategic stability exists to some degree as long as there are nuclear weapons (and therefore the inherent, albeit minimal, risk of them being used). But even if there is always some basic level of strategic stability, might it be possible that relationships between nuclear-armed countries are so stable that the concept is irrelevant? After all, the concept that strategic stability exists between the U.S., France, and Great Britain is somewhat ludicrous (Harvey 2003, 327). However, Dean Wilkening, in Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, provides the following answer to this question:

Maintaining strategic stability is important for the simple reason that substantial nuclear arsenals will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, and there is little evidence that defences can replace deterrence for protecting the U.S., or any other country, from large nuclear attacks. As long as the major powers rely on nuclear deterrence for their security, maintaining stability between them is important. The question then becomes what level of defence might pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear forces of Russia or China. (2000, 23)
Therefore, regardless of the exact definition, it is clear that strategic stability continues to exist and is relevant. Furthermore, as Cimbala and Scouras point out, “Enhancing strategic stability has been--and continues to be--the central motivation for engaging in nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the Russian Federation today” (2002, 25).

This is not to say, however, that the balance is solely dependent on the actions of the U.S. and Russia, as might have been argued in the past. In fact, Frank P. Harvey points out that:

Bipolar strategic stability and deterrence will be redefined in the context of contemporary international politics or it will cease to be relevant. While the logic of mutual nuclear deterrence is impeccable, its relevance will continue to vary from context to context, depending on the health of the relationship in question. In a post-Cold War world, stability must be expanded to accommodate the realities of a complex international system with expanding sets of interlinking and interdependent nuclear relationships. (2003, 340-41)

Therefore, as long as these additional relationships are taken into account, strategic stability continues to have a place in discussions regarding nuclear weapons and deterrence. Harvey’s observations also point to the fact that maintaining a balance in these different international relationships must be a part of any Post-ABM Treaty definition of strategic stability.

Finally, though it was said in 1984 about the U.S. and the USSR, the following excerpt from John Norton Moore’s introductory remarks at a panel discussion on arms control and strategic stability still has value today when looking for how to increase strategic stability:

How do we, through discussion on both force structure and arms control, encourage a strategic environment that is more stable for both superpowers? And how do we achieve that goal when both sides have such different strategic force structures and such seemingly divergent views on arms control? We should also
focus on other kinds of theoretical issues such as identifying and blocking possible pathways to nuclear conflict. We must determine what are the most likely scenarios that would lead to nuclear war between the United States and the USSR, and then drive measures to prevent such a chain of events. Can we, for example, envisage a variety of new confidence-building measures which could be used to block a particular kind of pathway such as the accidental launch? (1986, 150)

These remain relevant questions today when attempting to find ways to improve strategic stability. And while these questions are not the be all and end all, they do provide a strong framework to work from.

Having developed these insights into the historical definition of strategic stability and examined how stability has changed over time, while also noting the differences that exist both internally within a nation and externally between rivals when defining the term, and, finally, by looking at why the notion of strategic stability is still important today, the author feels confident in using the definition for strategic stability first described in Chapter 1 and supported in this chapter: Strategic stability is the maintenance of a secure geo-political environment where that environment could be changed by evolving capabilities within the realm of both offensive and defensive capabilities regarding nuclear weaponry. This definition—along with a reverence for the historical underpinnings of the term—will inform the analysis in the following sections and the conclusions and recommendations developed in the next chapter.

Analyzing the State of Missile Defense in Eastern Europe

Whether or not the original plan behind a European component to U.S. missile defense was solely to combat the threat of Iranian missiles, there is no doubt that the project has now evolved to encompass a much wider scope, at least politically. The goals of the Bush Administration notwithstanding, there are now many unintended
consequences and competing agendas to contend with. Therefore, there are many components of this issue that affect strategic stability; these conclusions will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

From shoring up Polish wariness about NATO’s Article 5 protections to the Czech belief that this system will actually be an important part of an integrated European missile defense shield, these factors have different implications for the stability of Poland and the Czech Republic, as well. Foremost among the issues, however, is the question of how this proposed system will change the dynamic of influence in the region. The following sections will address these issues through the lens of the author’s primary and secondary research questions before identifying specific conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5.

**Why did the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland Decide to Pursue a Missile Defense System in the Face of Staunch Russian Opposition to the Project?**

The answer to this question seems obvious at first glance. In a zero-sum, bipolar game, if the U.S. wins, then Russia loses--and vice versa, as well. However, the world has changed markedly since the fall of the Soviet Union; if in 1985 one predicted that in less than twenty years the U.S. would be fighting a major war in Afghanistan while Russia was perhaps the most important energy supplier for Europe, one would not have been taken seriously.

There are numerous issues for the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland where Russia’s cooperation is essential--on everything from providing overland routes to Afghanistan to relying on Russia for natural gas and military hardware supplies. So the question remains: If Russian acquiescence (or even assistance) is vital in so many areas,
and Russia is opposed to the missile defense project, then why press on with it? In

Prague, on 5 April 2009, U.S. President Obama offered the following rationale, which
could certainly be seen as an answer:

So let me be clear: Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed. (The White House 2009)

This statement clearly marks Iran as enough of a threat in the eyes of the U.S. that to ignore Tehran’s actions—even in the face of Russian objections—would not be in the best interests of the United States or Europe as a whole. Therefore, despite Russian objections, it can be seen that the U.S. believes it must be ready to protect itself and its allies against an Iranian threat. In this specific regard, there is very little to differentiate the positions of the Bush and Obama Administrations. However, the exact method used to pursue this strategy is markedly different.

A concise explanation of these differences would be that the Bush Administration wanted to follow a similar development plan for European missile defense as they followed for the California and Alaska interceptors; that is, build the facilities and emplace the system while concurrently testing the interceptor. The Obama Administration is setting conditions for the efficacy of the system prior to building the required infrastructure in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Politically, there also appears to be a significant difference in the Obama Administration’s sensitivity to the concerns of America’s allies and partners when contrasted to the Bush Administration. Among other places, this conciliatory tone runs
through the same speech given by President Obama in Prague that is quoted above (The White House 2009).

Finally, there are differences in how the two administrations have attempted to create dialogue with both Russia and Iran. Unfortunately, it is too early to determine exactly how these differences will impact the missile defense issue.

Moving on to the Polish and Czech reasons for pursuing this system, we see many similarities but numerous important differences as well. The most important shared goal is a very broad desire to increase the level of cooperation between themselves and the U.S. However, the specific goals of each state, and the rationales behind them, are markedly different. This is especially true when considering that there are many competing reasons for supporting these agreements even among the missile defense advocates in each country.

In Poland, the desire to increase ties with the United States is very much a security question. There is a strong sentiment in Poland that NATO’s self-defense clause, Article 5, is neither strong enough nor will it be applied equally among older and newer NATO member nations (Waszczykowski 2009). Furthermore, Article 5 will never be an appropriate response to lower-level foreign interference that does not reach the level of an actual invasion (Osica 2009); for example, the Estonian cyber attacks in 2007 certainly could not trigger an Article 5 response, as there was never an armed attack during that crisis.

This lack of faith in Article 5 was one of the bigger reasons why the Poles pursued the missile defense agreement with the U.S. in the first place. In fact, as Minister Waszczykowski put it during his interview with the author in Warsaw:
I served as the deputy head of mission to NATO so I learned from the very beginning that we are different—that we are considered differently. The newcomers, they have no contingency plan that is the same as the others. And it was of course from the very beginning the dream of some security experts—those who were aware of the situation—that we were supposed to search for additional security guarantees. And of course the most important was to get links, bonds with the United States.

Minister Waszczykowski then pointed out that the first attempt to forge these closer bilateral ties came during the Iraq War, but they were largely unsuccessful. The Polish government then made the decision to address these concerns by going forward with the missile defense and associated agreements.

Therefore, the Poles specifically believe that by increasing the American presence in their country, they will increase the security of the region by deterring Russian advances. However, the impact that the interceptors themselves will have on the region’s strategic stability is a separate issue and does not necessarily correlate to the (perceived) increase in Poland’s security; this aspect will be discussed later in this chapter.

The current Czech attitude is, for some, quite straightforward. If you consider “former [Czech] President Havel on this, his position on this is very simple; they’re our friends, we made a commitment, let’s try to keep it, it’s the least we can do for them” (Černý 2009). But this statement does not cover why the Czechs agreed to the radar in the first place—nor does it consider the fact that approximately two-thirds of the Czech populace is against the system as of April 2009 (Pehe 2009). To understand the Czechs’ thinking we must look at two distinct characteristics—the political and economic aspects of the debate.

The Czech Republic, on the whole, does not see the same problems with NATO’s Article 5 that Poland does. In fact, Czech Defense Ministry Deputy Director Radomír
Jahoda stated in his interview with the author, “In our strategic papers, for example the security strategy of the Czech Republic, we say that the cornerstone of our defense and security is NATO and its Article 5” (Jahoda 2009). One manifestation of this is the focus in Poland on increasing military ties between the U.S. and Poland, whereas in the Czech Republic much of the focus is on the economic (and to some degree, political) benefits that can be gained from the U.S.-Czech relationship.

Conversely, the Czechs are much more concerned that this system might divide them, to some degree, from the Alliance. For this reason, the Czechs have been strong proponents of the so-called “NATOization” of the proposed U.S. missile defense system (Černý 2009). That is to say—in the Czech view—this system must be one of the pillars of a Europe-wide missile defense initiative.

The military aspect also contributes to the arguments of Czech missile defense opponents. This argument states, as former National Security Adviser to the President of Czechoslovakia Oldřich Černý put it during an interview with the author, “We had Russians for 20 years, why should we let the Americans in, we finally got rid of the Russians only to let in the Americans.” He then pointed out that this is a rather primitive argument, but is very appealing to the masses; in other words, it’s not actually a security issue for these people at all, but is instead a “false notion of national pride” (Černý 2009).

However, from a practical point of view, Czechs also see this system giving the U.S. something for (relatively) nothing, while at the same time needlessly antagonizing Russia and potentially making themselves a target for Russia and, perhaps, Iran and other rogue states. Czech missile defense proponents, on the other hand, feel that Russia will
continue interfering with internal Czech politics regardless of whether or not the U.S. and the Czech Republic reach a bilateral agreement on missile defense (Pehe 2009).

Economically, advocates of missile defense in the Czech Republic hope that this system will bring short-term construction jobs as well as long-term economic benefits to both the Brdy region and the Czech Republic as a whole. Also, many see the 2008 removal of visa requirements for Czech visitors to the U.S. as exemplary of the visible benefits that the missile defense agreement produces. Furthermore, the majority of Czechs opposed entry into NATO in the 1990s, but have since reversed this view; now, most Czechs see that becoming a member of NATO paved the way for the Czech entrance into the European Union--and all of the economic benefits this membership entailed. It is possible that a similar change in opinion could happen with the radar system (Schneider 2009).

In conclusion, although it may be a slight simplification to say so, it can be seen that the executive branch leadership of the U.S., Poland, and the Czech Republic all feel that the benefits of emplacing this system outweigh the negatives associated with Russian opposition. In other words, despite a possibility that Russia will perceive this system as a destabilizing element that would harm strategic stability, there are numerous gains to be had for the missile defense system participants outside of the nuclear realm.

**Why is Russia Vehemently Opposed to the Missile Shield Deployment in Europe?**

Russia’s stated concerns involve two similar arguments. The first is that the planned missile defense elements located in the Czech Republic and Poland will have the
capability--or are even designed outright--to counter existing Russian offensive missiles. This argument is flawed on multiple levels.

First, there will only be 10 interceptors in Poland, far fewer than the number of Russian ICBMs that could possibly be affected by the interceptors. Even the most rabid anti-missile defense experts such as Dr. Ted Postol, who claims that Polish-based interceptors could in fact shoot down Russian ICBMs, only asserts that the vulnerable Russian missiles would be ones from the western part of Russia (Semenkovich 2007).

Furthermore, the U.S. has offered to provide Russian inspectors access to the European missile defense sites in order to verify their operational configuration. The U.S. has done so, in fact, at the expense of their Polish and Czech colleagues. The U.S. initially made this offer to Russia without the knowledge of their European partners (Kulesa 2009).

It is not a stretch to say that this particular incident helped harden public opinion against the missile defense system, particularly in the Czech Republic (Kulesa 2009; Jahoda 2009; Pehe 2009). Much of this angst can be traced to the Munich Agreement of 1938 when Great Britain, France and Germany decided Czechoslovakia’s fate. The Czechs coined the phrase o nás bez nás (about us, without us) to describe that event (Englund 2004). The phrase found new life during the missile defense debate when the U.S. told the Russians that they would be free to come onto Czech soil without Czech foreknowledge.

These offers and explanations were not enough to mollify Russia. In fact, Russian rhetoric against the system became more strident rather than less.
The second Russian argument is that the U.S. will continue to build additional missile defense systems in other regions of the world after completing the European phase of missile defense, and that these systems, taken together, will have the capability to destroy any missile launched by Russia. Clearly, this would harm strategic stability by obviating deterrence; such a system would be destabilizing. While slightly more plausible this argument, too, is flawed.

From the Russian point of view, the belief that the European missile defense system is an incremental step towards a worldwide missile defense capability does not rest merely on paranoia. Russia believes that during the 1990s, amid the turbulence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, the West made a promise that NATO would not expand to include former Soviet Republics (de Borchgrave 2008). Therefore, the Russians believe that if the U.S. reneged on this promise regarding security in Europe that they will do so again on missile defense; and Russia must stop the process now before it becomes inevitable.

Unfortunately, Russia’s then-President Putin actually acknowledged the viability of missile defense when he offered to let the U.S. utilize a Soviet-era radar installation in Gabala, Azerbaijan--as well as noting that Russia would not object if the U.S. installed missile defense systems in Iraq or Turkey (Chivers 2007).

This tacit recognition of the value of missile defense gives lie to many of the Russian claims. For example, they say that Iran is not a credible threat and therefore the system is designed against Russia, but they simultaneously don’t object to the system being placed in locations outside Eastern Europe (Waszczykowski 2009). If the Russians
acknowledge the value of this missile defense system, there would presumably not be a change to strategic stability, as the geo-political environment would remain secure.

Therefore, we are still faced with the question of why Russia is voicing such strong opposition to the system. If their fears about the ability of the U.S. system to invalidate their ICBMs are not legitimate, and they also do not object to the actual idea of missile defense—as long as it is located somewhere other than Poland and the Czech Republic—then we are left with their loss of prestige in the region and the increased presence of the U.S. in what was formerly the exclusive sphere of influence of Moscow.

When discussing this subject, it is impossible to completely separate the European missile defense issue from other Russian security bugbears—for example, Russian adventurism in Georgia is probably more closely tied to the Kosovo situation than missile defense, but there is certainly a large sphere of influence component as well.

With that said, the reach of power extending outward from Moscow is certainly an important symbol of Russian power both internally and externally. In many ways, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s prestige and standing in the world community fell precipitously. Only their arsenal of strategic weapons allowed them to retain even a semblance of their former power throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (as noted previously, placing all of these weapons under Russian control also maintained the impetus behind strategic stability itself). The shrinkage of the buffer between Russia and the West in a time when Russia is regaining its swagger on the international stage is intolerable to Moscow. This leads us to the question of what Russia will do to prevent this loss of influence.
How will Russian Rhetoric on this Subject be Reflected in Actual Operational Decisions by the Russian Government and Military?

If the Russian objections are indeed based primarily on a loss of power in the region, it may be possible to better predict the actions that they will take in the face of continued missile defense cooperation between the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland (while their objections do not appear to actually be based on concerns about strategic stability, it is still possible that the actions they take will affect strategic stability regardless). With that said, the range of possible reactions is very broad. The spectrum runs the gamut from nullifying current arms control treaties, placing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, and refusing to come to terms with the U.S. on a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on one extreme to something as simple as slowing down the supply of helicopter parts to the Czech Republic on the other end; any of which is within the realm of possibility. This study will look at the implications for a number of these options--many of which are not mutually exclusive.

There appears to be a showdown looming over one of these possibilities in particular: The negotiation (and ratification) of a follow-on treaty to START. This has the potential for a confrontation due to the very aggressive timeline the U.S. and Russia have set for the completion of these treaty talks; they would like it to enter into force before START itself expires in December of 2009. It is unlikely that Iran will accede to the demands of the U.S. regarding their ballistic missile and nuclear programs within this short amount of time (whether a treaty can be signed within this timeline is another matter as well), and therefore based on President Obama’s 4 April 2009 speech in Prague, it would not seem likely that the U.S. would give in to Russian demands to eliminate European missile defense as a condition for crafting START’s successor. Predicating the
U.S. path on Iran’s actions should, in this case, give the U.S. enough leverage to keep the
issue from derailing the treaty negotiations. This is coupled with the fact that both
countries appear to be quite keen on creating a new arms control agreement.

However, even after President Obama’s Prague speech, Russia has continued to
insist that they will make European missile defense an integral part of the negotiations.
In fact, on 10 May 2009, the Russian News and Information Agency quoted Prime
Minister Putin as saying:

One needn’t be an expert to understand: if one party wants or would have an
umbrella against all kinds of threats, this party would develop an illusion that it is
allowed to do anything and then the aggressiveness of its actions will increase
numerously, and the threat of global confrontation will reach a very dangerous
level.

This explicit linkage of missile defense systems in Europe to deterrence and strategic
stability intentionally conflates the stated limited (and technically feasible) objectives of
the U.S. missile defense system with the ability to defend against “all kinds of threats.” It
is also baffling why Russia has taken this tack after publicly stating on numerous
occasions that their ICBMs are too advanced for U.S. interceptors to stop--which is
certainly true.

Therefore, in this case, it appears that the rhetoric will have a significant impact
on the arms control negotiations currently being conducted through the summer of 2009.
If the U.S. remains staunch in its decision to preserve the right to European missile
defense, this could prevent a treaty from being signed at all, which has definite second-
order effects on strategic stability. These effects would come about when START
expires in December 2009. At that point, there will no longer be an intrusive inspection
regime in place between the countries for the first time in over 20 years and the only even
somewhat substantive treaty still existing will be the Moscow Treaty, which is also known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--SORT--or the “SORT-of Treaty” in some circles (Schneider 2009). By eliminating a number of strong arms control measures, strategic stability will decrease.

The pronouncement that has caused the most uproar, however, is the constantly changing Russian rhetoric regarding theater ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. On the day after Barack Obama was elected president, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a speech that, among other things, promised the deployment of Iskander short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad to counter the threat of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. By the end of January 2009, reports out of the Kremlin had Russia backing off of this threat (Moscow Times 2009). Within two weeks, however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as quoted by the Russian News and Information Agency on 11 February 2009, claimed:

We do not mean our possible response to the deployment of the Third Site as a threat, and this has long since been made clear. This would be merely a forced military-technical step in the event that the Third Site is physically created. If it is not created no reaction will follow from Russia.

In this way, Russia has attempted to frame the debate on the proposed Iskander deployment as a simple technical necessity while describing it as the “Third Site” (this phrase references the missile defense facilities in California and Alaska and the first and second sites; it is generally used by the Russians to refer to the Eastern European missile defense system and certainly carries connotations that there could be an additional fourth site, fifth site, and so on in the future). However, this is certainly not a foregone conclusion, and the Polish and Czech views of the situation reflect the American perspective that this is indeed a veiled threat from Moscow--particularly since the
Russians have SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles stationed in Kaliningrad at the current time. The Polish view of this situation describes it as a bluff (Waszczykowski 2009; Kulesa 2009). And in the Czech Republic, it is seen in the larger context of a Russian strategy that commits to or promises an action and then demands a concession for a return to the starting condition; it is a way for Russia to maintain the initiative on this issue (Schneider 2009).

As for low-level bilateral cooperation between Russia and Poland and Russia and the Czech Republic, it is generally assumed that Russia will use issues such as gas delivery irregularities and military replacement part shortfalls to register disappointment with the ongoing missile defense situation, but it will not interrupt these deliveries for a significant length of time--particularly since, in many ways, Russia relies on Europe for revenue and cannot truly afford to be seen as an unreliable partner (Jahoda 2009; Schneider 2009).

Therefore, in the eyes of some, is unlikely that there will be long-term economic trouble between Poland and the Czech Republic and Russia as a result of these agreements; this certainly remains to be seen. However, it appears that there will be significant impacts in the political and military realms due to Russian policy changes that are reflected in statements from Moscow. If Russia does indeed change the deployment strategies for their ballistic missiles and refuses to go forward with arms control treaty negotiations over the disagreement with the U.S. over missile defense, these actions will almost certainly result in negative consequences for both Poland and the Czech Republic.
Will the Desire for a Closer Relationship with the U.S. Lead the Czech Republic and Poland to Make Decisions that may not be in their Best Interests?

We have seen that Russia will likely take certain measures and actions as a result of the missile defense agreements between the U.S. and the Czech Republic and Poland. It is also possible that countries other than Russia will also find these agreements onerous and will act in a manner detrimental to Warsaw and Prague.

A perfect example of the first scenario--Russian enmity--is seen in the possibility that the U.S. and Poland will not emplace any interceptors but will go forward with other arrangements that were concluded concurrently with the missile defense agreement--specifically, stationing a single Patriot missile battery in Poland. As the Patriot system is incompatible with the current Polish air defense system, a single Patriot battery can’t be part of an integrated air defense system for Poland--and as Łukasz Kulesa from the Polish Institute of International Affairs notes:

The Russians would treat it as a provocation, and of course there was a more plausible explanation when the thing was supposed to be a part of the modernization of the whole system. Because then Poland could easily say to the Russians, you’re also buying new systems, you’re also refurbishing your forces . . . But right now if we don’t buy more and there would be some statement from our politicians on how it improves the level of our air defense around Warsaw . . . there might be this very optimistic, even triumphant message coming from Poland--and of course the Russians will immediately say, this is a provocation, this is hostile, this is adding to the insecurities in Europe. And that would be the criticism directed at the United States, so that could be a very serious flash point. (Kulesa 2009)

In this way, the Poles would have very little in the way of actual extra security (a token Patriot battery manned by U.S. personnel--whose presence, arguably, is more significant than the missiles themselves) but would incur the ire of Russia; Dr. Olaf Osica of the Natolin European Centre opined during his interview with the author that Russia will place Iskanders in Kaliningrad regardless of exactly where missile defense currently
stands because “they are trying to drive a wedge between allies” (Osica 2009). And if Russia can use the missile defense issue to alienate Poland from the rest of NATO and the European Union, Warsaw will find its interests threatened. This possibility affects Prague in much the same way.

Although it is a much more remote possibility, another negative consequence for Poland and the Czech Republic is the fact that by increasing their ties to the U.S. they take on a higher profile in the war on terrorism. In the past, Spain and Great Britain were targeted by terrorist attacks which led to a sharp decrease in public backing for government support of U.S. policy and a change in governmental positions; Poland and the Czech Republic run a slight risk of increased visibility due to these agreements which could arguably lead to terrorist attacks within these countries (Waszczykowski 2009).

Finally, there are other economic issues beyond Russia, as well. In the case of Iranian natural gas there is an obvious gap between the interests of the U.S. and Poland; by throwing their lot in with the U.S. on a missile defense system that is ostensibly targeting Iran, Poland will find it difficult--if not impossible--to conclude any type of agreements with Iran that would lessen the Polish dependence on Russian gas (Osica 2009).

However, even with these arguments, the increased economic, military, and political ties that the Czech Republic and Poland are creating with the U.S. are seen to outweigh these negatives (Osica 2009; Černý 2009). One reason for this is that the tangible, easily identified benefits are much easier to quantify than the nebulous threats to national security resulting from elements outside the Czech Republic and Poland that are hostile to the missile defense system.
Therefore, while there are both hard security and energy security issues implicit with missile defense that will negatively impact Czech and Polish security, the overall decision to go forward with the missile defense agreements seems--in the eyes of many--to be in the best interests of each country (Waszczykowski 2009; Jahoda 2009). However, it remains possible that in the higher-level analysis of strategic stability, these agreements could have unforeseen consequences. These consequences, conclusions, and recommendations will be addressed in the final chapter.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After examining strategic stability in depth during the previous chapter and then answering the secondary research questions put forth in this paper, a number of conclusions can be made regarding the impact that Eastern European missile defense will have on strategic stability. This chapter will examine these conclusions by answering the primary research question, provide recommendations for U.S. policy, and outline some areas for further study.

Will Strategic Stability Change as a Result of the Agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to Host Elements of the U.S. Missile Defense System?

After a thorough inspection of this subject, there are indeed scenarios involving the missile defense system agreements that can have an impact on strategic stability. In fact, strategic stability could be altered in a number of ways. These impacts are predicated on this study’s definition of strategic stability, which, as stated earlier, is the maintenance of a secure geo-political environment where that environment could be changed by evolving capabilities within the realm of both offensive and defensive capabilities regarding nuclear weaponry.

If Russia does indeed change its strategic weapon postures, placements, or targeting in response to these agreements, then strategic stability will be affected. This would be due to Russia’s perceived loss of deterrence (or proclaimed loss of deterrence)--or could come about even if Moscow is actually only concerned with their loss of influence in the near abroad. This is because taking the above measures would make the geo-political environment less secure, even if the U.S. is convinced that the missile
defense system makes the world more secure due to the containment of Iran. As this study has examined, it is not inconceivable that this will happen. This will negatively impact strategic stability because Russia will make decisions based on their feeling that deterrence has been affected.

Completing the installation of the Eastern European missile defense system would further harm strategic stability. Since the Russians perceive the agreements affect strategic stability, they actually do, regardless of whom the system is actually designed against. For if the Russians act on this perception--by putting into place procedures or systems to mitigate what they see as a threat to their nuclear arsenal--strategic stability will be decrease as Russia becomes, to some degree, more reliant on their strategic weapons due to their perceived loss of a deterrent capability; as discussed earlier, this leads back to a preemptive strike strategy.

Global implications of the European system must be taken into account as well. If, as Russia claims to fear, this system is merely a step in the creation of a ring of missile defense systems encircling Russia (and perhaps China), the possibility--however slight--of the complete end to deterrence would exist. That is, the U.S. could conceivably have a first strike capability against Russia (or China) without fear of retaliation. And while the idea of such an attack sounds absurd to American ears, in Russia it doesn’t seem farfetched at all (Waszczykowski 2009). By eliminating deterrence--and therefore eliminating the original basis for strategic stability--this scenario would upset the balance that has existed in one form or another since the 1950s.

A second unlikely scenario would come about if Russia were to abrogate the INF Treaty. This would have an even more profound effect on strategic stability and could
even spark a new IRBM arms race; however, this seems a more remote possibility than simply changing postures, placements, or targeting as noted above, due to the fact that the INF Treaty is “a strong card for the Russians” (Osica 2009). Cancelling this treaty would certainly give the U.S. leeway in a number of areas that would be detrimental to Russian interests and might not even gain that much for the Russians in return.

Finally, there is the single most likely way that the missile defense system agreements could affect strategic stability. By possibly derailing a follow-on to START, and thereby allowing START to expire without a successor treaty in place, the greatest negative impact to strategic stability would occur by eliminating the security and arms control measures contained in the treaty.

Conversely, if a new arms control agreement can be reached, then stability would likewise increase as a result of the new treaty by enhancing security (once again, the caveat from earlier in the paper applies; it is possible to have a treaty that harms strategic stability by, for example, reducing the number of weapons on each side to a level that does not provide deterrence). However, barring a strong agreement with verification measures in place, we will not see this result.

Based on the trajectory that the Eastern European missile defense system debate has already taken, coupled with the most recent statements regarding arms control treaty negotiations from Russia, it seems that the U.S. and Russia are heading for a showdown on this issue that could indeed have a drastic influence on strategic stability. To be clear, this impact on strategic stability does not come from the actual ability--or more accurately, the inability--of the proposed system to affect Russian ICBMs and the Russian ability to hold American targets at risk. After all, there was truly no impact to
strategic stability resulting from the emplacement of missile defense assets in California and Alaska, for the same reason. On the contrary, the actions outlined in this paper that Russia will take in response to the Eastern European missile defense system agreements are what will cause a change to strategic stability.

Conclusions

This paper has reached a number of conclusions regarding European missile defense. In the end, there are four specific points to be made regarding this situation; while the first three do not directly affect strategic stability, they are important considerations to keep in mind when studying the impact of the missile defense agreements between the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland.

First, all three of these countries will realize specific positives and negatives from the missile defense agreements. In general, the positives are increased political, economic, and military ties between these countries, while the negatives are impaired dealings with Russia, Iran, and, to a much smaller degree, the NATO member nations not part of the agreements.

Next, Russia’s stated objections to missile defense--that it is designed to and could counter Russian ICBMs--are not valid. Prior to launching their most vehement protests, Russia had already acknowledged the viability of a missile defense system to respond to the Iranian threat when offering the use of the radar site in Gabala, Azerbaijan--as well as noting that a system in Turkey or Great Britain would not raise their ire.

Third, despite their claims to the contrary, Russia is instead concerned about the U.S. establishing a greater, more permanent existence in the traditional Russian sphere of
influence. In the face of this newly enlarged American presence, Moscow will follow through on actions that will have both short-term and long-term negative repercussions for Poland, the Czech Republic, and the overall American-Russian relationship. These will take the form of everything from attempts at economic blackmail via reductions in energy supplies to a lack of willingness to work with the U.S. in other areas that should be of mutual concern, such as Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in general.

And finally, while the U.S., Czech Republic, and Poland will experience military, economic, and political benefits from these agreements, this may well come at the expense of strategic stability. This could happen as a result of the redeployment of Russian nuclear and conventional assets in response to elements of the missile defense system being emplaced in Poland or the Czech Republic; through the Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty; or, in the most likely case, by preventing a follow-on arms control agreement for START.

With that said, these agreements can most readily negatively impact strategic stability by derailing the arms control treaty negotiating process. Following through with the missile defense agreements would have an even greater negative impact, as Russia would, as described above, take actions to counter a perceived loss of deterrence, thus upsetting strategic stability. Therefore, there are numerous implications for the U.S. and for American security policy that must be considered.

Recommendations

While the Obama Administration appears to be taking a middle-of-the-road approach--that is, reacting to Iranian moves and insisting on tested, reliable systems
before building any systems--eventually they will be forced down one of two paths: Either confrontation or collaboration with Moscow. Both of these have potentially negative impacts for the strategic stability of Europe, as well as the world at large; but they also both have prospective positives, as well.

Collaboration with Moscow is perhaps the easier path to forecast. Simply put, coming to an agreement with Russia to stop pursuing European missile defense might result in some gains for the U.S. in areas such as the negotiations for the follow-on to START or in maintaining Russian support for overland resupply to Afghanistan, but it will do so at the expense of Washington’s Eastern European allies. It is clear to both Poland and the Czech Republic that such collaboration would embolden Moscow in its dealings with the two countries. The implications for what will be seen as conceding the sphere of influence to Russia could be severe.

Granted, in this situation, the strategic stability of the region will likely not be affected, as there will no longer be any real or perceived provocations on the U.S. or Russian sides involving strategic systems. However, it will drive a wedge between the U.S. and the Czech and Polish governments while simultaneously giving Russia tacit permission to assert their authority in Eastern Europe. This is, therefore, a suboptimal solution to the problem; in the context of the research question, however, it would be an acceptable solution.

As noted in the opening section of this chapter, it now appears that Russia will insist on the cancellation of European missile defense as a foundation--or even a precondition--for the new arms control treaty negotiations; there have certainly been
many hints from Russian leadership that this will be the case (Huhta 09).

Therefore, collaboration would seem to be an attractive option.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that collaboration in this case could prevent
damage to the region’s strategic stability, it would harm Washington’s political,
economic, and military interests in the region—as well as those of the Czech Republic and
Poland. Due to these factors, collaboration is a poor choice.

Confrontation with the Russians on this issue would also create positives and
negatives. On the positive side, the U.S. would maintain unfettered access to Eastern
Europe. Washington would also be able to preserve its freedom of action with regards to
Iran by not bringing in yet another party to complicate the equation; by not making a
bargain with Russia, the U.S. can interact with Iran as it sees fit without having to keep
any side agreement in mind.

However, as explained in this paper, confronting Russia on this issue—with
neither Washington nor Moscow willing to give in—will probably scuttle the ongoing
arms control talks and will thus have a strong negative influence on the region’s strategic
stability. Therefore, this is also not the best choice. If collaboration and confrontation
both result in unacceptable outcomes, how can the U.S. move ahead from its current
position?

**A Third Way for the Third Site?**

There is one very politically astute—yet admittedly, incredibly difficult—middle
approach that the U.S. may be able to pursue. If Iran can be removed as a threat, then the
U.S. can cancel the European missile defense program without giving control of the
process to the Russians when doing so. This will allow the U.S. to enhance strategic
stability by removing what appears to be the largest impediment to a negotiated follow-on treaty for START, while at the same time maintaining the support of Washington’s Eastern European allies.

While this is not an especially trenchant or novel analysis, the best choice for the United States is to prevent Iran from becoming a threat to peace and stability. As a result, this will eliminate the need for missile defense on Washington’s terms. While cancelling missile defense in this way may ruffle the feathers of the most ardent missile defense supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic, overall it will be seen as an acceptable solution—and perhaps the only solution. In fact, in the consensus view of the experts interviewed for this paper, there is a subtle yet important difference between cancelling missile defense because of Russia or because of a resolution of the Iranian problem; “It wouldn’t be a shame if in a certain phase you get the change of attitude of Iran and then this site will be abandoned” (Schneider 2009) expresses this sentiment rather succinctly.

Finally, by paving the way for a follow-on to START by eliminating the contentious issue of missile defense, the U.S. can enhance strategic stability rather than give Russia the excuse to degrade it; it appears that the best way to achieve this goal with the fewest negative consequences is to eliminate the need for the European missile defense system in the first place.

Recommendations for Further Study

The most obvious area for further study is to develop strategies to prevent Iran from achieving the technological capabilities they appear to be seeking in the nuclear and ballistic missile arenas. This would establish conditions for halting the emplacement of
missile defense elements in Eastern Europe in accordance with the stipulations laid out by President Obama in his Prague speech—which, as noted above, would provide a way for the U.S. to cancel the missile defense system plans without destroying bilateral relationships with Poland and the Czech Republic or ceding the area to Russia’s sphere of influence.

Another subject for further study would be an attempt to more distinctly determine if the negative impact to strategic stability that the Eastern European missile defense system will create is actually damaging enough to make it undesirable; this study merely attempted to determine if there was any such impact in the first place. In other words, is it possible that the current level of stability is so strong that introducing a slightly destabilizing element could still be worthwhile due to the other benefits it would bring to the U.S., Czech Republic, Poland, and even NATO or the world as a whole? This is an important question that remains unanswered--but one that may very well need to be considered in the near future. After all, if a missile defense system is deployed in Eastern Europe, the world may be safer from the point of view that other states are protected from an Iranian or rogue state missile attack, even at the expense of incrementally pushing Russia towards actions that could harm strategic stability.
APPENDIX A.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. OLAF OSICA

The following is a transcript of an interview with Dr. Olaf Osica, Research fellow, Natolin European Centre, conducted on 14 April 2009, in Warsaw, Poland:

SCHIN: How do you see the implications for this system helping or hurting your country’s security?

OSICA: Actually the system as such has nothing to do with the security of this country. I would say it is a vehicle for consolidating the security of this country--or undermining it, depending on how you see it. So first of all, it means that the whole debate about missile defense in this country was not about missile defense. It was not about Iran, it was very much about the Polish-American relationship in the security context--what it means for the Polish-American alliance.

Are we going to talk about more security guarantees, or less? What does it mean for NATO, actually? And you could see the trend was that--especially after 9/11, and the war in Iraq, and all of those trans-Atlantic debates--there was a decision made in this country that it’s better to build our security on the Polish-American relationship and that’s why we actually went with missile defense. So that was a vehicle for some other business--which contradicts the U.S. Government approach.

SCHIN: But along those lines, with the very strong reactions it provoked from Russia, do you see the stronger security ties between the U.S. and Poland as worth it--will they outweigh the Russian threat?

OSICA: The Russians approach missile defense more or less the same as their contemporaries--as a foreign policy tool, as a vehicle to get some leverage on the previous U.S. administration. There was a debate in Poland--those saying we may risk our relationship with Russia, which in a way isn’t so bad, because the Russians aren’t treating us as partners, and you can only lose things you do have. So maybe if we have missile defense, if we have these bilateral agreements, first of all our standing in Washington would increase, our position, hence our security--we will be a much more secure country.

And by that, the Russians would change their tone towards us, because if Poland would become a quasi-partner--a strategic one--with the U.S., than of course the Russians will have to change the “name of the game” in Poland. But there are some people saying that first of all, we need to have no more quarrels with the Russians, because it impinges our interests in the European Union and our security. It’s not just about hard issues, it’s about political issues, it’s about energy policy, it’s about economic issues, it’s about some EU programs, democracy, the Ukraine. So from this perspective, then, missile defense--it would actually kill the whole idea. And then their argument went that especially if the
new U.S. administration withdraws, then we will wind up with empty hands. And this is more or less what happened.

SCHIN: True, but the additional agreements, like the Patriots, those should still serve as a guarantor of security?

OSICA: When the whole debate on missile defense in this country was conducted in the context of the war in Iraq, the Polish division was a disappointment with regards to military assistance, money, contracts, whatever. So the political elite in this country started from a very high level saying that yes, if we agree, then military assistance will have to increase significantly. But we ended up with one Patriot battery which is kind of a symbolic issue—I wouldn’t underestimate it, it’s good, for the first time we’ll have a small U.S. unit on Polish soil—but on the other hand we have to know we’re in a face-saving exercise on both sides.

Negotiations were going in the wrong direction until Georgia happened and it was a shock on both sides, I think. So the U.S.--and this is my guess--came to a conclusion that they can no longer risk their credibility in this part of Europe and say we are not going to just give you this one Patriot battery, because of what it means if serious things happen one day. And on the Polish side it was that we shouldn’t play this game any longer because we’ve got Russians in Georgia and so this Patriot system was a good PR opportunity for everyone to say it’s a win-win in the end.

SCHIN: So that was definitely what you saw in August after Georgia happened, the agreement was signed and it was put in that context, a win-win?

OSICA: It was win-win I would say. It was better than many people anticipated because it started as a Polish-American political project, and it was nearly a disaster for the Polish-American relationship, so again against this background, it was clearly a win-win.

SCHIN: Do you think that having that one Patriot battery will lead to more cooperation in the future?

OSICA: Well I think the ball is in the U.S. court. From the Polish perspective it’s a good departure point for something, for other things, but the question is, what are those other things? Not so many people know, what can we expect in terms of what should we expect, and what is feasible and realistic to expect from this new administration. Because the main difference between the George W. Bush Administration and the new one is they changed their approach to missile defense. The previous administration looked at the project as being capabilities-driven. You need technology, you’ve got this idea, so the military aspect was the first thing.

Now we see the Obama Administration, they are looking at missile defense---on the European side of course---as a kind of a political tool, to get at an emergent Russia. They want to play with this idea. Viewing it from the Polish perspective, it’s more about not
the project itself, but they want to have this bargaining chip with Russia. So now we’re talking foreign policy, whereas in the past three years we were talking defense and military technology.

SCHIN: I think the new administration, their words are, “We’ll go on with this system as long as it’s technically capable and it’s feasible” but they’re emphasizing the fact that it’s in Iran’s court.

OSICA: Of course, but this is how they try to move Russia.

SCHIN: Right. What specific positives do you see if we do emplace this system?

OSICA: Well first of all, you have to go back to the history of NATO enlargement. What happened, and actually what didn’t happen, which is much more important. NATO declared at the Madrid Summit in 1997 that they were going to deploy forces and infrastructure in this area and this is when the story starts. The NATO enlargement was mainly a political exercise with a certain strategic ambiguity built-in and now it is the main reason why this country--and also the Czech Republic if I’m right--wants missile defense, or simply some kind of U.S. infrastructure. It is to cross this red line drawn by Madrid. Yes, politically we’re part of the West and NATO, but literally we’re still not, we’re kind of a “B Member” of NATO. So it’s a departure point, everyone is clear in this country that ten launchers is not a big deal. But it is part of a signal, that if these red lines are to be crossed, but now we can build upon it something more serious, if it’s in the U.S. interests and if the U.S. shares our security perspective and our concerns, which is not a foregone conclusion.

SCHIN: No, that’s not a given. So what concerns do you see from the Polish people? Just two years ago 55% of the Polish people were against having the system here but I don’t know if you would say the same percentage of people are against a strong U.S. partnership.

OSICA: The main fear was actually that if it’s up to the Polish security and defense--if the whole system or part of the system is deployed against Russia to put it in simple terms--then yes. But if it’s only about Iran and rogue states, then there’s a fear that Poland might--like in Iraq or Afghanistan--might be simply used by the U.S. in some sort of war on terrorism without any impact on it. That was actually the lesson from Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan. People in this country are reacting much like countries in Western Europe during the Cold War.

On one hand, yes, we want the U.S. umbrella because it provides security and defense for our country, but on the other hand, well, the Americans have this global perspective and you never have influence on their policy and so there’s a kind of fear that we might become involved in a war we don’t want to be in--more like the French line of argument. So that was missile defense.
The opposite issue, not opposite financially, but yes this is about missile defense, it’s about Iran and rogue states, but then comes something which the U.S. government decides it wants to build some infrastructure, or give some military assistance directly to promote the security and defense of this country. That was the only reason that it could work, and when public opinion polls were in favor. So when it turned out to only be about missile defense against Iran and actually having Russians on board, then Iran and rogue states should be of the same concern to Russians—which, to some extent I agree—then to the Americans we say on one hand we’re supporting your wars which we don’t always want to participate in, but at the same time we’re being pacified by Americans vis-à-vis the Russians because you share the same security concerns and that’s what it means.

So that was basically when we had a serious debate on missile defense in this country and once people realized that we might be involved in another kind of Iraq or Afghanistan situation—if that’s the case, then sorry no, but only because it’s American. That’s always the Western kind of approach, because this country’s transforming. The nineties are gone. A new generation, new experiences with Iraq and Afghanistan, and people are less, I would say, enthusiastic about the U.S.. I would say realistically it’s good, because if they’re realistic they may have a sober assessment and they won’t have unrealistic expectations of the government.

SCHIN: Do you think that since 2004 are Poles—especially young Poles—identifying more as Europeans?

OSICA: Well yes and no, I mean yes they are because they travel to study, and they spend holidays so it’s an utterly new generation. It was just the U.S. with a green light, and it’s all of Europe now. On the other hand we’re building this country and it’s also true that the younger generation is much more conservative than their European counterparts. Even the Polish leftist parties are quite rightist compared to Europeans. There is a kind of ecological closeness. The history, there is something impalpable but still relevant to describe the younger generation than mine to the United States. But in terms of pure policy terms it’s not the nineties, it’s not the eighties, so people are doing different things, asking questions, which they actually have never asked before.

SCHIN: Okay, trying to look in the future a little bit now—do you see the current Obama Administration continue fairly in the same path they’ve already set out upon—that the Bush Administration put them upon? They have an agreement here in Poland, we have an agreement with the Czechs—but they’re not ratified yet by parliament, in your view do you see the Polish government satisfied with where the agreements are at right now?

OSICA: I think yes, but just as I said before, the ball is in the U.S. court. I think this government will do nothing as long as there is no clear, unequivocal message from Washington. So what’s the prospect for, for this project?
SCHIN: Do you think this is tied to the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that the U.S. and Russia are negotiating now?

OSICA: Well it’s a good question. The sad thing about missile defense and the U.S.-Polish relationship in Europe is that we lack this regional, strategic perspective. Because the problem with the Polish perspective is not to have some U.S. infrastructure or base or whatever, the problem is that there are certain security problems which are not solved. Kaliningrad, first one. CFE treaty, second one. Russian withdrawal from NATO, and then there is, I would say, the soft underbelly of European security, which are the Baltic states.

I think, yes, the Baltic states are members of NATO, but I think there are some severe limitations to their presence in NATO and Russia sees that very clearly. And so when you look from this regional strategic perspective of Baltic states security, you see actually there are some problems that need to be addressed. And they were not addressed during NATO enlargement, because that was the idea, to have this dual-track strategy to enlarge and approach Russia. That was the case in the nineties, that was the case with the previous one before the last one, in 2004, and the NATO enlargement strategy that involved the Baltic states.

And these are problems which are not addressed by the European Union because the European Union, especially in the context of the German-Russian relationship, Germany has caused a lot of problems for this region. On one hand Germany is clear and it’s a NATO ally of Poland, there are no doubts. But the funny thing with German political and German foreign security policy is they have this kind of schizophrenia between on one hand, business needs and on the other, the security community. I think when you talk to people in Germany, those who deal with security issues and defense issues, they more or less assure Polish concerns of Russia, the security and strategic situation of this region.

But then the business community actually has a different approach. They want to have these strategic business deals with the Russians. I think that Nord Stream, the Baltic pipeline for example, by that, you could say, a purely business opportunity, they’re undermining the political stability of this part of Europe. And the European Union is very reluctant to be involved in hard security issues for many reasons. Especially when it comes to the Baltic states, the message seems to be quiet.

And then you see this level of this second circle, not hard security but soft security, there are certain developments which I would say are not good. With the new Russia, the way that Russians are trying to undermine the security of Estonia, the Bronze Soldier, the cyber attacks, all those espionage things, we see that Russians are just sticking their fingers in things. And they do it because they’re checking the reaction, not only the EU reaction of course, but the EU reaction is clear, the EU does nothing. From the Russian perspective, the Germans seem to be on board with Russians.
Then they’re checking the NATO reaction--there’s no reaction, because yes, there’s this sacrosanct Article 5, but there’s using some soft political influence, they’re not going to invade Estonia, of course not. So what they want to do is apply with all differences, the Georgian scenario. You have minorities, you have some problems, you have the prizes, which lasts for years and everyone seems to be unhappy because the frozen conflict--at least that’s what we believe, and they’re checking the U.S. reaction, and NATO and the U.S. are utterly focused upon this other conflict--it’s Afghanistan. It’s in Europe, it’s the Black Sea, it’s the Mediterranean, it’s Africa. So that perspective, what you need--especially for this--it’s what this previous administration didn’t get, didn’t understand; missile defense, well, the Russians interpreted this the same was as we did and also the Baltic states, this is a kind of American comeback to the region.

And the funny thing was to observe the previous U.S. administration was doing its best to avoid this kind of impression because they wanted to have the Russians on board, and Poland also, an evolving state, the Lithuanians, they were doing their best to give this interpretation: Yes, of course missile defense is against rogue states, Iran, but it also means that we have Americans again in this region. There are certain things that the Russians won’t be able to do.

And so the whole thing with the Iskanders, everyone knows that the Russians are going to deploy Iskanders because they have modernized their missiles in Kaliningrad, it has nothing to do with missile defense, but they are trying to drive a wedge between allies. Especially with other Europeans, the Germans, and this is what it’s still like, in the context of START negotiations--it doesn’t really matter if we have missile defense or not. The thing is just, what are the consequences of having or not having it? Does it mean that the U.S. is negotiating certain deals with the Russians? And they have this regional perspective, the Baltic Sea perspective, but there are things that need to be addressed, because NATO enlargement did not solve all of these things. Or not, if it’s only about U.S.-Russian bilateral negotiations, it’s not good. Because we need to have this regional perspective, to be on board while we’re negotiating those new strategic treaties.

SCHIN: Would you say that NATO enlargement caused the CFE problems that we’re having?

OSICA: Well, yes and no. The Russians never liked it actually, but the thing is when you for instance look up north, there was a new face of Scandinavian defense cooperation because of the High North. So my concern would be that you have security of the Nordic states, the High North being consolidated for the first time since the end of the Cold War. And then you have this soft underbelly, the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. With Kaliningrad, the Baltic states going through the very severe financial, economic crisis. And Poland is exposed to that.

So I would say the point is that we have been debating missile defense also in this regional strategic context. What it means for U.S. security and what it means for NATO, also. Because the Norwegians, they want to have NATO back. We want to have NATO
back here as well. So there are a bundle of things which need to be addressed. And missile defense was a very good vehicle for addressing that. The previous administration didn’t understand that, absolutely. And the question is whether the new administration will have their minds and eyes open to the message that it’s not about actually just having this military assistance, increasing military assistance, having their arrangements and the missiles deployed, it’s about some political initiatives that they need to take, in the context of START, INF, CFE, because when you just have the nuclear regime working, but the conventional regime is not working, the question is, what kind of message are you sending?

SCHIN: And when the United States pulled out of the ABM Treaty, that was something that maybe also led to the CFE issue, it gave Russia license to pull out of CFE or at least not to participate in the way that they’re supposed to with CFE. Do you think that maybe a renewed commitment to START could bring Russia back to the provisions of CFE?

OSICA: No, I don’t think so, because to the Russians, they don’t link in that way. Of course they don’t link in purpose because they only want to make a deal with the U.S.. The point is that from the Polish perspective--also a Baltic state perspective--the point is how to make a link, how to sell the whole issue to the new administration. Although there is logically no link but there should be a link established. Because then it means that otherwise this region is becoming, yet again, I would say, in between.

SCHIN: Caught in the middle.

OSICA: Right, caught in the middle, exactly. Because you know I’ve got no problem with having missiles in Poland provided there are no Russian missiles on the Belarussian side. The same with Kaliningrad. It’s about transparency building. CBMs, confidence building measures, that’s what we need to start with the Russians, because the Russians are using various levers, the economics in NATO, they want now to try to build with the Americans a new START, INF this year.

But at the same time they don’t want to talk even the top issues, for reasons of respect, the issues which have real important meaning for security in this part of Europe. I would say the north and eastern part of Europe. So that’s how to build a linkage. I know, it’s not easy, but that’s how I think that the missile defense, as long as it’s on the agenda, it provides an opportunity for this government and the Polish government a way to do this thing. Because the thing is politically of course, the issues, there are certain commitments on the U.S. side, there were certain declarations on the Polish and Czech side, there are the U.S. commitment and Russian commitment to START and INF, and we somehow have to find a way out of this one-dimensional missile defense approach towards a more, not only regional, but global approach.

SCHIN: That was when Putin said the United States could use the site in Azerbaijan that they have, as a more joint thing. I think the United States gave the impression that we’re going to think about that but deep down I think everyone knew that wasn’t a possibility,
that wasn’t going to happen. What was the Polish view on that part of it? What’s the Polish view on Russia being brought into the missile defense idea?

OSICA: The Polish view is basically that you need this dual approach to Russia. That on one hand, yes you need to engage Russia, yes you have to cooperate with Russia. But then on the other hand, you have to set limits for the cooperation. The Russians should be part of the cooperation but not a part of the institutional framework I would say. And secondly that you have to also demand something from Russia in trade. What’s a problem, I guess the main NATO problem, the problem from the Polish perspective is how to engage Russia and at the same time also get leverage from Russia. And this is what we lack, because now we’re not just in Afghanistan, we need Russia because of Iran, START, you need Russia so that it’s a new Russia, like it or not, live with that. But the point is how to change this approach where the Russians are making certain they’re expecting NATO, the U.S., Poland to make certain concessions but are unwilling to make any concessions on their own, that’s a problem.

SCHIN: Right, they seem to place almost false concessions by saying the day after the elections they’re going to put Iskanders in Kaliningrad and a month or two later saying, well, maybe not.

OSICA: Exactly. But the thing is the U.S. will not put missile defense in this country and the Russians won’t deploy the Iskanders because they don’t have enough money for Iskanders, but in five years they will do it! Just simply as a part of modernization and then they will modernize the missiles they have in Kaliningrad and in five years time they will use another excuse, a pretext of saying, I don’t know, because NATO is talking to Ukraine.

They’re fishing for opportunities to justify their actions which they are going to take anyway. And this is what we have to stop, we need not only to have some political lead on the deals but also some structural institutions. The CFE results, to see it’s not the nineties, it’s outdated, it’s clear. But we need something to replace CFE not simply that Russia, the Russian Chief of General Staff will say we’re not going to deploy Iskanders because the Americans are talking to us. No! You need a certain regime.

You need a regime to be put in place when it comes to conventional forces in this part of Europe and this is the word that nobody really uses in the West, even the U.S., but you need such red lines when it comes to the Baltic states. Russia, they have to know that it isn’t just Article 5--because Article 5 is great, there are no doubts--but fine, NATO and the U.S. cannot base their entire strategy in this part of the region on Article 5 because we’re not talking about Russia invading us. We’re talking about Russia undermining incrementally the security of this region using covert means and options, excluding the military one. So we have to simply go below Article 5 and start talking about regime, institutions, some kind of strategic reactions to the political dialogue, something very serious.
SCHIN: Do you think the missile defense discussions will lead to that?

OSICA: It was my hope, actually, but it ended up just as a kind of Polish-American quarrel so that in this sense it was a missed opportunity. Because that is one mistake that the Polish side is committing again and again--missile defense, Article 5, or this defense or infrastructure is not the end in itself. It’s only the vehicle for other ends. It’s the end for generating some new political momentum, to consolidate the security of this region politically.

And then you can use missile defense in some other ways, the debate about how to update Article 5 but not simply to focus on the end results, because you may have missile defense in this country without having tackled any of those problems which I mentioned to you before. And that was my fear, I was one in this country criticizing it because it’s not the issue to have a small military base. The issue is to have this base and have American senators and policy makers know that they’ve got this base here, not only to provide security against Iran, but also it means they have certain commitments in this region. So we have to change the interpretation of the whole thing.

SCHIN: I think that’s probably not the view that the Bush Administration had.

OSICA: No, I don’t think so.

SCHIN: But it’s certainly still possible that the new administration will take that tack.

OSICA: Well, it’s always possible.

SCHIN: Do you think that these senators that are going to be here--who are pretty important senators, sitting on the Senate Arms Services Committee--are going to look at these commitments? [Senators Carl Levin, Bill Nelson and Susan Collins were due to arrive in Poland later that week and would be meeting with Dr. Osica, Minister Waszczykowski, and others.]

OSICA: It’s hard, I will say that you need to refocus because there were great things done with NATO enlargement and now we see that we are losing momentum. And the thing is how to not lose this momentum. How to build on what we built 10 years ago, or five years ago with the Baltic states’ inclusion into NATO.

So the thing is now so much talk about having infrastructure, because as I said this might come or not, but the point is to have a strategic, but still a political perspective. To refocus on this region and say what are the problems. To see this region not only as a kind of Central-Eastern Europe because that’s one of the things which has changed in saying that you cannot worry about the security of this country, is much more you should talk in the context--at least I try to convince people to discuss it in the context--of North-Eastern Europe vs Central-Eastern Europe.
Poland’s security is bound to Lithuania and the Baltic Sea more than to the Czech Republic and Hungary and Slovakia. That’s how it is—we have different security contexts in this part of Europe.

SCHIN: But the energy security part of it, it’s tied very much together in a Central-Eastern context.

OSICA: It is indeed, okay, it’s a good point, but what can you do. For the U.S., energy security stands for oil and the Middle East. Here energy security stands for gas and Gazprom. I mean, I can’t see any other approach. I mean, yes, I do believe that the Americans would like to just have this problem solved, but what can you do, it’s EU.

Of course you have this horrible problem, but also you’ve got energy security, you’ve got the Baltic Sea, so Nord Stream, and again South Stream, so you can see Russia is trying to drive this huge political alliance from the south and the north. And it’s clear that the southern flank is important, but it’s not so much about Ukraine and Slovakia, it’s about Nabucco, it’s about Iran, it’s about Turkey, it’s about the Black Sea. But it’s far away, this is something that does not affect Poland’s security directly, but indirectly, yes. But when it comes to the Baltic Sea and Nord Stream, this affects us directly.

SCHIN: So you would say that most of the Russian statements about missile defense are just a cover for things that they are planning on doing anyway?

OSICA: I think so…yeah, exactly. They are trying to see how far they can go without any kind of reaction on the NATO side or the U.S. side.

SCHIN: Do you think that maybe they saw the quick signing of the agreement between the U.S. and Poland in the wake of the invasion of Georgia as a negative reaction that they are going to try to keep from provoking again, or do you think that they thought it was it a foregone conclusion, it was going to happen anyway?

OSICA: Well it’s a good point. I don’t know actually, I think that the Russians are clear that it was about Georgia but on the other hand, maybe the lesson they learned—if I were Russia, the lesson I would learn would be, don’t use military threats, because then you see a reaction.

SCHIN: Right, although they didn’t see a military reaction from the U.S. at all, nothing in Georgia…

OSICA: Well I know but in terms of relationships within NATO, between countries of this region and the U.S., it’s a new thing. But as long as they pursue this soft approach, they undermine the security because there’s a lack of hard lines, they use business tools, economic tools, and try to keep as many problems as possible under the EU umbrella, under the NATO umbrella, they might be successful. Because then there is no U.S. reaction. Because the U.S. appears only when there is some hard security thing at stake.
But the thing is that, as with Georgia, it might be too late. Because like with the Bronze Soldier, I remember just last year I was with a good friend of mine here in Natolin, we were traveling through the Nordic states, and came back to Georgia, security in the Baltics, things like that. And we were talking to some members of the European Parliament, and I remember talking to an Estonian, saying that the Bronze Soldier thing, the riots they had, that was a kind of alarm bell for Estonians who see first of all you need a perimeter defense. Because it may start like in Georgia, outside the country. So you have to change the way you approach your territorial defense in a traditional way, you may approach transformation of the armed forces, and secondly you have a situation like this, then what’s the role of NATO actually? And it starts with some civilians throwing stones at each other and then you see everyone is observing, is it time for the fight or not, are they Russians or Estonians, and then in the end of the day the Russians are introducing their peacekeeping forces for stability of the situation.

SCHIN: Much like Transniester.

OSICA: Sort of like this, this is the kind of scenario they have in mind and I think they’re right because when you look that’s a problem, America’s not present here. And some people say yes you need missile defense because it’s going to be a red light somewhere in the Pentagon, you know, we have some interest or even if we don’t care, from time to time at least someone’s looking in that direction. Because we have some stuff there. So if it’s not, then nobody looks in this direction and when we look it might be too late.

SCHIN: And I think you can maybe look at the Estonian example for that too, because there wasn’t really a U.S. reaction for that.

OSICA: It was post facto, that’s the problem, there was a RAND study on the axis strategy of the U.S. and it was in the case of the Baltic states and so we see when you take the time aspect that requires, and then you discuss the Georgian crisis, which was for me a very good lesson on how a crisis actually evolves in real-time circumstances. Then you could observe that in the months after the crisis, after the war, we were still discussing who started the war. And of course Georgia is not part of NATO, there are no NATO obligations or U.S. obligations, but still as a kind of process, how it evolves, this kind of interpretation of events, who started it, just, come on! As long as it is not clear who started it, you don’t have Article 5 initiated so, well, you need much more than Article 5 and you need some treaties, you need some more political attention for certain problems.

SCHIN: And so would you say that just the fact we’re even having the missile defense discussions between the U.S. and Poland, that is illuminating the red light at least a little bit, maybe it’s not bright yet, but it’s on just a little bit?
OSICA: Yes, this is what I was trying to sketch out: Poland should not be in a hurry with missile defense. The longer we’re discussing it, the main thing is just to look at it as a process. The same way the Russians are approaching the Medvedev proposal. It has nothing to do with the content, it’s just a façade. Well the story, there’s nothing inside, but as a process, because it gives you the opportunity to link certain things and to talk with Americans.

And as soon as you have this built, it’s done! There is only this red light on the world map in the Pentagon. That’s it, that’s what it is! And you’ve got these treaties, some communication, but it’s not about just that, it’s blueprints established, and it’s good because you need this kind of institutional link. But the key point is to have missile defense on the Polish-American agenda as long as possible, and try to use it as a vehicle for addressing certain things--for attracting American attention to problems of this region. And in this perspective you may, at the end of the day, you may not have this. And it’s okay, if you use this time for building some kind of new approach and insight to this region, and you have other things. So that’s more or less been the approach to it.

SCHIN: That fits with what I’m looking at with this. I went into this project thinking that the missile defense discussions--even if not completed--will have an impact on the strategic stability of the region is and it sounds like you would say the same thing--these discussions are, at worst, keeping U.S. attention here, and at best, they will lead to something more.

OSICA: Some conclusions, at the end of the day, it may be the deployment of missiles, or not, but just something, the base--that’s the main important thing. And this is why actually, if I were Russia, I would be more than happy just to have this missile defense here, and that’s it. The Russian security perspective--it’s great, as it was after we joined NATO.

But then in the current of time, sooner or later, we would discover the same problems which are not solved. Because we have got Russia like this, we have Kaliningrad, we have Nord Stream, the Baltic pipeline, you’ve got this new momentum in the High North with NATO and still strategically exposed to all of the same things, it’s only the first reaction, that’s great, we’re safe. But then, until the first prizes is up and then…

SCHIN: Do you think that a lot of the new Russian agreements with Belarus are a reaction to this?

OSICA: There is a problem with that, because it was a few years ago that Russia upgraded its missile system, so the problem is that even though it’s Belarus, from a strategic point of view, we still border with Russia.

SCHIN: And right now in fact Russia controls their--

OSICA: --Air control, everything is in Russian hands.
SCHIN: Yes, and that was the latest agreement.

OSICA: Some people say it’s good because the Russians are much more, well, I would say [Belarus President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka is much more reckless. So it’s better the Russians control things, at least they will be rational, but in strategic terms it means we still border Russia. From Belarus and Kaliningrad. And some people say the financial crisis hits Russia so badly that they will not have enough time and money to play the old games. But some people say because of the financial crisis they will hurry up to do certain things, because the problem in Russia, domestically, is how to consolidate security, how to consolidate the power sector, the army, if you have no money.

You need to have this sector on your side if you want to govern this country, so you have Georgia, which was a very good thing domestically; it was a very good decision. You have Georgia, it brings this message that we’re still strong, but what would be the second choice? Some people say Ukraine, but when you look at what’s going on in Ukraine, the Russians they don’t actually have to do anything to have Ukraine again. The issues, economically, strategically, Crimea maybe, but it’s just not something that’s a big deal. After the Orange Revolution, for the first time they had the impression they’ve lost Ukraine, but now they’re discovering that no, we didn’t.

SCHIN: And they have until 2017…

OSICA: Exactly. And so the Baltic Sea and especially the Baltic states are very good because you still have strong tensions between especially Estonia and Russia, you got the minority thing, the Russians pick the minority’s cause, you know the Russians are just really furious about the Estonians. The Estonians are really happy about the circumstances because they want to be described as Scandinavian and at the same time they don’t have this pragmatism and realism of Finland. In this sense they’re caught between this Baltic or Slavic or Nordic identity so I think that Estonia and the Baltic states are very good objects for Russians, domestically, you have this enemy which is small and at the same time you may test U.S. and NATO reactions, how far they can go. And with that it provides you access to the Baltic Sea. Not actually just the ports, the pipe systems, everything with the Estonians, Lithuanians, so you have access. Especially since in the north you see that Finland and Norway are pooling their forces. They learned their lessons, and Russia has the North Fleet and everything, but the Russians know that the High North is too strong. So they can only talk with the Scandinavians as equals. Then you’ve got the U.S., Canada, so it’s a very shaky ground for Russia, very anxious what they’re doing there. But here, in the south, well…

SCHIN: Well they would have even more room in Moldova--

OSICA: Moldova, that’s an interesting one, but it’s a different thing, because nobody really takes care of Moldova. You have the Transniester problem, but so what? So yes in terms of controlling it, but actually I would say in terms of Moldova, they would be
happy with the status quo--to simply control countries but not to take full responsibility for them. Just like with Belarus, it’s better to have Lukashenka, than to take overt support economically, politically, and being accused of certain things. No, it’s Lukashenka’s regime, so we are safeguarding our interest there, and the rest is a façade. But we need this façade to be in place. But with the Baltic states it’s different, because you cannot have this façade.

SCHIN: Certainly not, not with NATO, not with the agreements. I’ve asked you all the questions that I had, we’ve discussed a lot of areas, is there anything else on your mind?

OSICA: There’s a funny thing with Iran that actually might also be of interest to you. That we do not perceive Iran as a threat in this country, I think there’s much more understanding of Iran as a state with its own identity as extreme, but its people are not especially so. I’m not an expert on the Middle East, but people say that Iran is actually quite an indispensable part of the region. But of course they’ve got those crazy guys, the young generation of people who run society, who run around and you have to have Iran on board if you want to solve the problems.

So in this sense, it’s good to hear the message coming from this administration that we will deal with this country. Yes, there’s a problem with drugs, there’s not a threat, but it’s a problem. But we need to change the way we talk to Iran. Of course there is a hidden agenda because we need Iranian gas on the market to lessen our dependence on Russia. So in this sense I would say there’s a kind of Polish-American difference of interest--especially the past administration--because we know that the only way to hit Russia economically and force its hand is for the rest of the European Union to diversify, to change the EU approach to the diversification of energy supplies is by having Iranian gas on the market. This is what the Americans are blocking. So that was one of the big mistakes that the previous administration made in this country. They were trying to say, well, missile defense is for an Iranian threat. Come on.

SCHIN: Do you think that may have something to do with the Polish people not being for missile defense, thinking that perhaps if we have a missile defense system here that will make Iran less likely to have favorable trade relations with Poland?

OSICA: Well, what we would not want to see is to consolidate the Iranian regime. It’s funny, of course it’s a question of distance, you may use the same argument vis-à-vis Belarus and reach a different conclusion. That’s because you always have the same dilemma--if Iran’s your neighbor you have a different approach than if it’s some other country with more or less the same threat indicators but it’s far away.

So why don’t you talk to them? I would say that the first thing is just try to give a chance for bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran, see what happens--and then also remember that Iran is one of the central powers in the region. And from the Polish point of view, if you have Turkey, Iran, fully fledged established central powers in the region, it’s good, because it probably complicates Russia’s game.
I just thought of a funny story, I was touring one of the Lithuanian ministries, we were talking about NATO enlargement and Ukraine, and my comment was actually why are we interested in having Ukraine on board? It waters down NATO power and everything. And the answer was, well you know, as long as Ukraine is a potential candidate for NATO membership than Russia will have to deal with it somehow so they focus on the south and when the thing’s off the table then they again get free hands in our region.

So this is more or less also the Polish framework on Iran, you have to just bind Russia in the south, with Iran, with Turkey, so to confine its freedom to maneuver strategically, it’s good although there’s this question of the Iranian regime. But still you know the experience of this country, which was a communist country--I go to the library and read periodicals from the beginning of the nineties and the way in which many Western countries, even the U.S., approached Poland was as a place where nationalism, Catholicism, war with Ukraine, all of these were big issues. So after experiencing such, you have a different approach to problems like Iran, somebody’s just saying these are bad guys, religious fanatics, islamofascists…well, not really, because we lived in a country like Iran, a totalitarian one, we know what kind of threats it brings with it, it’s a strange situation, but we know you may dismantle this regime from within with economic policies.

So there’s a lesson, I would say that there is a much more differentiated approach to Iran in this country because of the strategic issues and also because of our own experience and what it means to be a totalitarian regime. They labeled us as ultra-Catholics and nationalists and then even if you don’t know Iran you know that the mechanics are pretty much the same--it’s just leverage and policy positions. And the thing is not to label but simply to look at the nature of this, there are always many levels of analysis and you should know to focus on this.

SCHIN: That’s an interesting parallel, something I hadn’t thought of in this respect.

OSICA: You just remember that there are movements brought by, some people, some conservatives and reality is just in the United States and they see NATO enlargement to Poland, and that would mean a war with Russia, because the Poles just hate Russia, they are so bad, to bring them on board, but that gives you a kind of a distance to think about that, we have a much more relaxed approach. Of course, it’s far away and we don’t feel the threat, and on the other hand we want the Iranian gas on the market.

SCHIN: That’s a good point. I really appreciate your thoughts, it was great.

OSICA: My pleasure.
APPENDIX B.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ŁUKASZ KULESA

The following is a transcript of an interview with Mr. Łukasz Kulesa, Deputy Head, Research Office, Polish Institute of International Affairs, conducted on 14 April 2009, in Warsaw, Poland:

SCHIN: I recently read your paper, and it’s now been two years since you wrote it. What do you think has changed on this topic since then?

KULESA: To start with, of course our position is different, but it’s a rather peculiar one. Because on one hand we’ve got the agreement, plus the declaration of strategic cooperation [both signed on 20 August 2008] which takes care of a lot of the issues that we were talking about during the negotiations. What we wanted to have was this additional engagement with the United States. But at the same time we’ve got the new administration and we know that the new administration would have a different approach to the missile defense than the Bush Administration.

And right now we are trying to figure out what this approach is going to be about, and I think we would need to be very flexible in how we shape the future of this deal on the Polish side. Because we reached a certain point which we wanted to reach with the Bush Administration, but right now we’re still quite flexible, we didn’t ratify it, we didn’t make any hasty moves so basically the only thing that we are now concerned about is to be consulted with and to have the way-ahead that would take into account our situation and our position.

And it was very encouraging to hear President Obama say, first of all, that he appreciates the moves by Poland and the Czech Republic and that he puts certain really common-sense requirements for the system—dealing with Iran, cost-effectiveness, and successful testing—which is okay, because at the very beginning of his administration people were talking about a grand bargain with Moscow, this part of Europe was being glossed over and all of these signings would be simply forgotten. But if under this requirement there is a decision with the site, to delay the deal or if he wants to change the deal, then I think that would be okay. So right now Poland basically sticks to the certain part, which is the non-binding political declaration of strategic cooperation. And some part of Poland would like to push forward with it regardless of the state of the main deal.

What else changed? I think we underestimated the Russian position, the Russian opposition to this project. And the fact that this opposition would be supported by certain politicians both in Europe and in the United States. Actually here you have a kind of alliance of the people who are seriously concerned about the impact of missile defense on strategic stability, on relations between the United States and Russia, the United States and China, and the specialists from the arms control community also reacted quite strongly against it. And also the alliance of Russia and, let’s say, France and supporters
of Russia, who thought of it as another sign that Russia is excluded from making really important decisions, and that is why we should find a way to bring Russia back on board.

So this is the result, the approach pursued by the Bush Administration very much has run its course. But we’re still not sure what is the new course for the new administration. Because from our point of view—and you can see it in statements from the Foreign Minister, from the Prime Minister—what is important is to have this kind of general idea that the issue be fought over in Washington and that we would not be the ones that are going to push for a deal which the United States doesn’t really want. We wouldn’t be preparing the ground, digging the place for the launchers, so this is quite obvious, it’s for the United States to decide. At the same time the United States should somehow link to the previous administration’s obligation because as we see it the deal was signed with the United States, it wasn’t signed with the Bush Administration or [Former U.S. Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice personally.

SCHIN: It does seem to me that the most recent statements by the Obama Administration—including by President Obama himself—are that he is going to, in the broad sense, continue with the program and the project even if it’s not quite as quickly, perhaps. Do you see it that way?

KULESA: Well, we’ll see, because the components—the system as such—is, as you know, so wide and so sophisticated that you can clearly without any doubt see that missile defense as a project will be pursued further. But what about the pacing of putting together different elements of this system? That’s a completely different matter. Of course, the Russians, they spoke at the first chance, and they wanted to make sure that they blocked this system completely. They didn’t get it as of now and we hope that they wouldn’t get it also in the future, because that would be clearly a sign of Russian influence over our strategic decision making, if Russia is able to block the system only because Russia doesn’t like it. If the system is not ready to be operational, if it’s too expensive, that’s okay with us. But if it’s not put here because Russia doesn’t like it, then it goes into very sense of the idea why we want the system in the first place. Because as you’ve probably figured out, the Iranian program was low on the list of priorities here. And high on the list was the idea of having a very important, as it seemed, U.S. installation on our ground as a kind of insurance policy for the future.

SCHIN: That is a definite contrast between the U.S. view and the Polish view and it’s something that I talked about with Olaf [Osica] as well, in that the U.S. view really does seem tied to the Iranian situation; in fact President Obama alluded to that as well that we’ll continue with this if Iran continues along their path. Whereas your perspective is that, “We don’t really care about the Iranian situation, we’re more concerned about the ramifications for the strategic stability of the region?”

KULESA: Well, just to put it in the right perspective, of course we do care about Iran and its nuclear program—and its ballistic missile program, as well—and we are doing a lot on different tracks to also engage Iran. And as far as I know in a couple of weeks our
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs is going to Tehran to deliver the right message. At the same time when we have people from the Missile Defense Agency, they came to Poland and they show us the slides with the range of Iranian missiles, we said, okay, this is your idea, this is something which you are interested in. For Poland it got secondary importance, mostly in the framework of the NATO and solidarity issues, but for us whether we are in the range of Iranian missiles or not, it’s of secondary importance. What’s important is to have it here and for the United States to consider it important enough to invest politically to this region of the world.

SCHIN: And do you think that that ties into the NATO theater defense at all? Do you see a link between those two?

KULESA: Well I think that all the thinking in NATO about this subject was basically driven by the Americans. The U.S. presented something and then everyone tried to find the ways where the United States and NATO can link, and in what sense it could link, we had the project on theater missile defense even before the national MD system and the U.S. discussion accelerated.

So everyone knew if there is a NATO force and an expeditionary operation deployed out of theater, then somehow we should find a way to protect it against aircraft and ballistic missiles. So that would be done regardless, I think, of the developments around the U.S. project. But right now, of course, everyone wants to try to link it, try to find a way in which these two systems can complement each other. But still the language that NATO used is a very balanced one. Everyone is really careful not to have support which goes one step too far—a support which hurts them or creates some kind of financial obligation for the rest of the allies. Or at some point in the future when the United States says we’re not doing it alone, we’re doing it in the NATO framework, who’s going to pay the bills?

Of course some of the allies would like to see some of the technological spin-offs from the U.S. project in their own missile defense systems. So that’s why everyone is eager not to appear to be the one who blocks it, and have all the ways of cooperating with the United States in a bilateral way also open, but at the same time it’s really, really sure not to make NATO wholly committed to the U.S. project.

SCHIN: Getting back to the actual missile defense system itself, do you think that the benefits that the missile defense agreements are going to bring to Poland outweigh the negatives that they system brings in terms of attention from Russia?

KULESA: I think a lot depends, firstly, on the developments in Iran. If it gets nuclear weapons, if it decides to mate it with delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles, then all of the sudden everyone is saying that missile defense is actually a good idea, it’s good that we have it. Even though I’m kind of skeptical of the impact of missile defense on Iranian decision making, even during a crisis, but that’s a completely different story. But all of a sudden everyone will get interested in missile defense.
But secondly there is the attitude of the U.S. Administration. It used to be seen as one of the crucial installations for the security of the United States. And now it turns out that it’s actually one of the really important, but still not most important installations. Then of course the fact that it’s on this or that territory also matters less for the U.S. Administration. So this kind of varies, and from my point of view we’ve already invested a lot politically into this project. And much of the negative was already there, it’s already done, the Russian position--all this talk in some of the European capitals, so that was already a done deal.

But on the positive side, if the United States decided to go further with the project, then we hope that other parts of both the project and the declaration would be completed. And then we have some positives also to show to our population. So right now we’re talking about the decision of the administration, and if the decision is negative, then kind of limiting the damage and saving the most from the political declaration. And I think this administration will be prepared to meet us halfway. Or if it’s positive, then all of these positive things that we were told about should finally come to Poland and the Czech Republic. But as I said, most of the negative consequences already happened.

SCHIN: And I would agree with that, but of course there’s always room for more negative consequences from Russia, is that something to be concerned about?

KULESA: Yes, there’s the very interesting, very important topic of Russia and here it’s obvious that the Russians, I think they cannot be bribed, they cannot be persuaded. They made it one of the pillars of their current thinking about how to deal with the West and with the United States. And if you read the Russian statements actually they said it’s not only the Czech Republic or Poland, they regard the missile defense system as such a threat to strategic stability and I think in the next couple of months you will see the Russians over and over trying to insert it into the talks on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, on the discussion of the so-called new European security architecture, the Medvedev Initiative, and all other forums, it will come back.

And of course if they learn that the decision of the U.S. Administration is to move ahead with the project, or part of the project--I don’t know, maybe the radar in the Czech Republic is somehow better positioned than the interceptors--then of course they would be forced to do something, finally. And then we’ve learned that with Russia it’s very important not to overreact and to see what’s the substance behind certain declarations. A good example is the whole Iskanders in Kaliningrad affair.

We knew perfectly well, because the Russian military people told us publically, that they have no Iskander launchers ready to be deployed. They will have them in a couple of years, a couple of months. And even if they did have them, it’s basically substituting one weapon system for another because they already have the Tochka [SS-21 Scarab in NATO parlance] system in Kaliningrad. So we knew they’re kind of bluffing, that’s why there was no nervous reaction in Poland.
On the other hand this bluff was bought by some of the European capitals, and then when
the Russians, a couple of months later, announced they probably would not deploy
Iskanders in Kaliningrad all of a sudden we heard our German colleagues saying, wow,
what a big gesture from the Russians, they are not deploying. And probably some of
them thought the Iskanders were already there.

So of course there are some moves that the Russians might take if the project moves
forward but I think none of them serious enough to threaten the security of Poland as
such. I mean, deployments, a change of force postures, the real serious ones. Moving
ahead with other relations between the Belarusian and Russian armed forces, moving
some Russian armed forces to the Belarusian territory, signs that would be truly
threatening.

On the other hand, statements about pointing the missiles, about probably pulling out of
some of the treaties, CFE doesn’t work as far as Russia is concerned, so they can say as a
response to aggressive actions of the United States they are forced to move out of the
CFE regime. INF, it’s a tricky subject because it’s a strong card for the Russians so I
don’t think they will be ready to give it away just in this stage. That might be something
for the later stages.

Of course there are lots of very tough political statements also from the Russian military,
but nothing that we should be really concerned about even if it would probably be
interesting to see the reaction of other NATO allies to these kinds of aggressive Russian
statements. Because with Iskanders, we say to everyone who wanted to listen, see, we’re
doing nothing, it’s the Russians. So next time you accuse us of being anti-Russian, you
look at the statements.

SCHIN: I don’t think it’s implausible to say that the Russians will have soldiers in
Belarus in the not too distant future. You’ve seen some of the security agreements
they’re putting together between those two countries, they very well could place soldiers
there.

KULESA: Well you’ve got an agreement on an air defense system, which is basically
codifying something that’s already in place, and basically that why the Belarusians didn’t
want to sign it for a very long time, because it clearly gives them the lesser position in
this union. I’ve read about the possible deployment of new air defense systems, but this
is the stuff that Belarus would be buying from Russia. And since we have no plans of
invading Belarus the anti-aircraft system is not that important.

On the other side if all of the sudden they wanted to buy the Iskander at a reduced price,
that would be something really worrying. But no, the Belarusians themselves right now
they’re having this very delicate game, they’re trying to balance between Russia and the
European Union, and in many cases they see Polish support for their participation so it’s
not that obvious that they would take this offer even if the financial terms were good.
On the negative side, of course if we fulfill this part of the declaration that talks about deployment of the Patriot missiles in Poland, that would be a big deal for the Russians. And the Russian fear machinery, they will make the most out of it. Especially since this deployment was thought of as a sweetener to the main deal, but if the main deal doesn’t happen, then you are left with a battery of the missiles—which is very good but completely incompatible with our own system, we don’t really know what to do with it.

As far as I know we thought this would be the beginning of the modernization of our whole system and we would buy more of the Patriots at a later stage, so this will be kind of a display of technology plus training. But with the crisis, I don’t think we would buy anything in the near future. So you’d be left with this Patriot battery and already now the Russians are saying, we’ve read the declaration, we know what’s there. And we know against whom you want to have these Patriots deployed.

SCHIN: So you think that just a single battery of Patriots would be a provocation?

KULESA: The Russians would treat it as a provocation, and of course there was a more plausible explanation when the thing was supposed to be a part of the modernization of the whole system. Because then Poland could easily say to the Russians, you’re also buying new systems, you’re also refurbishing your forces. We could say that we also want to sell to the Belarusians, so what’s the big deal? Every major country in Europe wants to provide its own security.

But right now if we don’t buy more and there would be some statement from our politicians on how it improves the level of our air defense around Warsaw—everyone is saying around Warsaw, I don’t know why we should have a battery of Patriots—but still you have to understand for Poland, especially our politicians, it’s kind of a magical thing with this weapon system. Everyone knows what it is, what it does, but not that many people have seen it close up.

So there might be this very optimistic, even triumphant message coming from Poland—and of course the Russians will immediately say, this is a provocation, this is hostile, this is adding to the insecurities in Europe. And that would be the criticism directed at the United States, so that could be a very serious flash point.

SCHIN: And you would say that maybe the Russian reaction would be perhaps formally pulling out of CFE?

KULESA: That might be the first step. Of course the second thing is very much devised in Moscow and they see more than just one step at a time. But that would be a perfect opportunity to do something spectacular. Even taking some of the Iskanders which they have in one of the training units, I think around Moscow—taking some of them, putting them in Kaliningrad and have them shown to journalists and shown on Vesti TV [a Russian state-owned 24-hour news channel] that this is our answer, and our Iskanders are
so good they can pierce through the Patriot shield easily. That would be the time to do something like that.

But, at the same time, the ball is very much on the U.S. side, and I think that sooner or later it will be seriously thought over and considered; what are the pros, what are the cons, what do you do instead, because it’s clearly written in the declaration and the talks still have the first non-permanent deployment already this year, so it’s coming.

SCHIN: It definitely is. In 2007 you talked about how 55% of the Polish people are against the missile defense system but even with that said there probably would not have been any problem with the parliament actually voting in favor of it, as opposed to the Czech Republic where it’s actually quite questionable whether or not they could even pass it. Do you think that that has changed in 2009?

KULESA: On that count it stays bound, the parliament. If there is the authority of the Prime Minister, there is no problem with the two parties which form the coalition, and the Peace and Justice—in opposition of course—is 100% a supporter of the system so there are no problems in the parliament.

But of course the parliament would be very interested in how the political declaration is being implemented. And this government is very much concerned with appearing strong in foreign affairs and security policy, so they would need to show that actually we got something out of this deal. As for the public opinion, of course we have this high of support for the missile defense when you had the signing, plus the Russian-Georgian war, so all of the sudden you had it basically turned upside down, 50% supporting, 25% against it.

But then it came back, so in September already you had 41% for it and 46% against. So it’s more or less balanced, but I think the number of people against would be going up a little bit, the number of people supporting would go a bit down, because people read the newspapers and people see that this is probably questionable in the United States itself, so if it’s questionable there, why should we go into it?

But we are still much closer to the balance than in the Czech Republic and we didn’t have any form of the organized protests or NGOs of the size and scale that they have in the Czech Republic. Of course we didn’t have the major opposition party going against the deal, but we had the usual mix of the radicals plus some people in the parliament, the leftist party. But these meetings and protests, I think they never drew more than 100, 200 people, depending on the weather. So nothing on the scale in the Czech Republic.

SCHIN: Yes, certainly not. So if the Patriots aren’t going to act as a driver for the modernization of the military, do you think that—I kind of asked this a different way a little earlier—do you think that even that small number of Patriots help guarantee Polish security? Or does it weaken it because of the Russian objections?
KULESA: I believe that the security in Europe, especially hard security, it’s right now 90% image and perception and maybe 10% hard work. And you know in terms of image, it’s a big boost for our public opinion, for our politicians. Of course the military people think otherwise. And if you read some kind of publications more directed towards the professionals, of course people are starting to ask the question, what do we do with one battery? How do we integrate it with our command and control system? Who would have the final word in what instances can you use it?

And in most of these instances the answer is, it’s not really encouraging. It makes sense as a training platform, but not really as a part of a defensive system. I mean personally, in spite of us being close allies and everything, I would have some doubts to outsource the security in such an important area to anyone else, including the United States. I think there are some kinds of core capabilities that we should guarantee on our own. We’re not the Baltic republics, there’s some core set of capabilities that we should be able to guarantee ourselves. And especially taking into account the size of Poland, it’s quite evident that we need our own solutions and we need our own systems and most probably we need to pay for it.

You’ve got to understand that in Poland there’s always this element of magical thinking that at the end of the day we’ll be saved by some chance or luck, you know, the mercy of the others, so the Poles are always saying that there is the regular way, but always the miracles—and you can always count on the miracles if you don’t do it in the regular way, you can kind of bail out at the last moment. But no, people who do the counting, they see that the period for which we can use our old air defense systems, it’s five years, seven years, ten years at the latest.

But if you think seriously about changing the equipment you have to think now. So I think lots of people basically took the opportunity which presented itself, the negotiations with the United States, and decided this is one very complete area and we can push forward with the assistance of the United States. But no, our budget for procurement was slashed one-third this year so right now it’s mostly about surviving, it’s not about planning new acquisitions of this size and this scale.

SCHIN: But do you perhaps see an increase in defense spending happening as a result of the perceived Russian threat, even though a lot of it is just talking about targeting, is that something you think might happen?

KULESA: No, I think it wouldn’t be enough to increase the defense spending. It’s a curious thing because on the one hand everyone says how concerned they are about the security and especially the eastern side of our border but on the other hand when it comes to money, everything goes against the increase in spending. So right now the talk is about keeping the spending as it is, at 1.95% [of GDP], and that would already be something. And we also tend to distinguish between the hype and the public side of the Russian announcements and the practical capabilities of the Russian armed forces. And these I think are just considered to be too low for any kind of contingency in this part of
Europe. And when talking about the military capabilities we still consider the NATO link to be the most vital one. We’re making sure it’s not only us versus anybody else but actually there’s this basic solidarity and shared assessment of threats in the Atlantic alliance.

SCHIN: Do you think that Russia’s offer to use the radar system in Azerbaijan was an attempt to drive a wedge in between the U.S. and Polish and Czech positions?

KULESA: It most certainly was. But it doesn’t mean that it was a bad offer. The beauty of this offer was that it’s quite a powerful argument that before you start digging something, just make sure that there is a threat. So of course the timing when it was made basically meant that the element of political intrigue was very much evident and neither the United States nor Poland or the Czech Republic wanted to really take a pause and think about this offer. Because if we engaged in these negotiations or talks, even exploratory talks with the Russians, there would be no time to conclude the agreements because starting from the second part of the last year everyone was more or less panicking in DC.

So the timing was limited, but the offer, the Russians said that it’s on the table but it might be developed a bit further and then put on the table again. And it’s difficult to say what the Obama Administration will do. I think also in Poland there is this feeling that we should find a way to involve the Russians in a constructive way in some areas. That, of course, the way that the Medvedev proposal was presented and the whole tone of the system has collapsed, it’s not very good one, but still, there is a problem that the Russians are really left aside in some things, even in issues that concern them. They usually are presented with the option of either signing up or leaving the room. So we should find a way to include them in some of the things we do.

So for example threat assessment, but done by professionals, and in a professional way, taking into account the advances in the Iranian ballistic missile program, does tend to be a good step forward. But this can be done without formally giving Russia a voting right in the decision on missile defense. We can talk, we can exchange information, but if it’s a given the Russians are going to insist that there is no threat whatsoever from Iran, and they didn’t move with the ballistic missile program a bit, I mean, this cannot be a talking point to do something about it.

SCHIN: It’s very difficult to make that argument with Iran, it’s almost like they’re trying to help the U.S. make its argument--they just demonstrated the ability to reach orbit.

KULESA: Yes, so that’s a powerful argument, of course, different interpretations, the assessment of how useful it is from the military point of view, this can be made. Personally I see no reason why it cannot be done with the Russians, but not also without doing it instead of the planned deployment, but as part of the larger package on missile defense. I think under those circumstances there would be no opposition from this part of Europe. Right now the biggest danger and the biggest problem is that this feeling that we
are somehow left out of this game, that right now this is the United States and Russia talking to each other, solving the issues and then telling us what the outcome is.

SCHIN: That was a huge part of the Czech reaction in that when President Bush announced that we’re going to go ahead and let the Russians inspect this, and they’re going to be a part of it, and it was really done without the knowledge or acknowledgement of the Polish and Czech point of view. And the Czechs in particular, they weren’t pleased, to say the least.

KULESA: The Czechs have a special sensitivity about the deployment of the Russians, it’s the same with us, and we’ve learned it was Secretaries Rice and Gates that went to Moscow and they started to say, “Yes, a Russian permanent presence in the facility,” which would be on our territories, it hurt a little bit.

In that sense, I have to say that the Obama Administration has started at a very low point in terms of confidence on this side, because everyone knew what was going on during the campaign. And then there was this press release about the letter from Obama to Medvedev, grand bargains, so for many people it kind of confirmed this notion that sooner or later we’d be sold out.

Then when the message right now is mostly about the practical usefulness and the nature of Iran, it starts looking a lot more promising, especially to us, and when we got the signals from the administration that said don’t worry, you won’t be forgotten in this deal. And I think that realistically speaking this is already something, this is more or less the maximum that we can get. Since we cannot, even if we can somehow force the administration to move ahead with the deal as bargained, we cannot force the U.S. Congress to finance it.

SCHIN: That’s very true. The Obama-Medvedev letter is really interesting because of the press reports about it, but then both sides actually denied not that it took place, but they denied what had been reported in the press. And that was kind of curious how that came out.

KULESA: Well here it basically came out as this very sensational headline saying that yes, there’s a deal in the making and some people said, “We told you so, we should have never done this deal in the first place,” while others said, “Let’s go and speed up the process of ratification so we could somehow persuade the Americans to move forward with the deal.”

It lasted for about four or five days and then you have this second wave of articles saying what might be the real substance of this letter and then it started looking like a U.S. Administration that we know and like. And then I personally talked to some people in Washington last week and asked them about this letter and they said, more or less it was just showing the link between this segment of the MD system and the Iranian developments. Nothing more, nothing less. Which as I said, it looks much better than
just saying that we can trade the installation for Iran. Especially that we don’t really
know how Russia could be helpful in the Iranian case. The basic decisions there are done
by the Iranians, not by the Russians. So that was the weak part of all this news coverage
of this proposal.

SCHIN: Do you have any specific concerns about how well the system works? Are the
technical aspects of it a concern?

KULESA: There are some concerns, I would say, about the question of the damages and
liability—as you know in the agreement itself it was, let’s put it like this, good
negotiations on the U.S. side. And it’s my suspicion that probably our side said, the
chances of it ever being used and then being sued about it are so slim that we can put that
aside and agree to the U.S. version of the draft. But that’s just my suspicion.

But among those who analyzed this agreement, this thing about the issue of possible
improvements to the base, there is this clause saying that there will be consultations
between the U.S. and Poland. But, now, consultations are not agreements, so there is the
concern too, if indeed the facility is there, at some point the United States decides to
either increase the number or increase the ranges, change to different systems, what
impact would it have on Poland, to what extent would Poland be engaged in this process?

There was also an issue being raised about the possibility of the system to be used in
space warfare, let’s say. Well, it’s technically possible to use this kind of interceptor as
an anti-satellite weapon—well, there is a problem between the techies and the lawyers. So
the techies are saying yes, it could probably do that, the lawyers are saying that the
purpose of using this installation is stipulated in the agreement, so even if it’s technically
possible it would be illegal, that would be a clear breach of the agreement.

The issues of the jurisdiction situation on the ground, that was an issue during the
negotiations, especially people from around the facility wanted to know, what would be
the impact? What would be the jurisdiction? But as far as I know this is right now being
negotiated in the supplementals to the agreement. But it was never serious enough to
impact the course of the negotiations. At the very beginning there was this basic
misconception about excluding the territory from the jurisdiction of Poland and putting it
under the jurisdiction of the United States, some people are still kind of repeating this
argument but very soon it turned out it’s not Guantanamo [Bay Naval Base, Cuba], it’s
Ramstein [Air Base, Germany], more or less.

SCHIN: That’s definitely the way it’s looking. What are your specific thoughts on
where this agreement will go under the Obama Administration?

KULESA: My very personal thoughts, I think taking into account the impact of the arms
control community on this administration and the emphasis that Obama puts on arms
control, nuclear disarmament, and this system as the one proposed by the previous
administration would have fairly slim chances of being fulfilled, being put in place. Of
course, there might be some event changing all this formula, Iran going nuclear openly, that can change a lot.

But without that I would say there is a lot of thinking in Washington on how to slow down, concentrate on the question of money, concentrate on the question of testing, but without appearing too weak or appearing to sell out the issue to the Russians. Because as I said, especially for me, because I also kind of approach it more from the arms control angle, I think the Bush Administration underestimated the kind of answer they would get from the Russians, from the Chinese, also the question of dynamics between India and Pakistan which can be very interesting to watch.

They thought that it can be neatly separated between the system which just deals with a couple of warheads of a rogue state, and a system that gives you basic capabilities to intercept Russian and Chinese warheads. And both the Russians and Chinese, they didn’t buy this argument. They said no, we don’t believe you, as clear as that. You say ten interceptors, there will be 100. We did our math, yes, you can intercept the ballistic missiles from Kozelsk [Russian ICBM base southwest of Moscow] probably, nobody knows for sure, but you know, they stick to this argument and the whole rationale of the Bush Administration starts to tremble.

Because you cannot guarantee for sure that it is only this system. And obviously the kind of capabilities that you need to strike down one kind of ballistic missile can possibly in the future be used against different kinds of ballistic missiles. So it was all a question of trust and the development of relations between the United States and Russia, and here I think we all grossly underestimated the Russian position, the Russian insistence on being opposed to this project.

SCHIN: Do you think that stretching out the length of time that we’re doing the negotiations and studying this, is that advantageous to the Polish-U.S. relationship?

KULESA: You mean right now, or before the whole process of negotiations?

SCHIN: Now and in the future, if the timeline is going to be extended to put the system in place, is that going to be helpful for the U.S.-Polish relations, especially from a Polish point of view?

KULESA: Well it depends on what kind of relations you have in mind. Because for a long time we kind of stuck to this notion of strategic partnership of us being not only important but also liked by the U.S. Administration and us doing a lot to convince the United States that we are a close and reliable ally. And here in 2003, participation in the Iraqi operation, this is a case in point. We did a lot. Then right now I think there’s this period of reevaluation that’s kind of putting the relations on a more realistic basis.

And here, unfortunately, the missile defense, for some people, created an additional argument that we are so important and with this first league of the allies of the United
States, which is not true. If we are going to keep having these delusions of grandeur, it’s not beneficial to our relationship. So for me, the sooner that we get into the ground and we say this system will be delayed--our relations stay, but they are not that important, they are not that good. There will always be a different way for us, to Russia, to Poland, to Germany, the better for the overall health of our relationship.

So from that point of view, the worst thing would be to keep this situation of suspension, that we don’t really know where we are going, that there will be this undercurrent of criticism and people saying this is again the United States not fulfilling its promises to Poland. So the sooner we have a coherent position of the new Administration the better.

And even if it’s not about having this system in, even if it’s not having the Patriots, it’s better to have a treaty fast, because then we can go over it and think of the different issues in which we are sharing the same interests and the same assessment. If the message is, we’re not doing it because we don’t have faith in the system, then it will be understood, at least by the decision-makers. But if the message is that we need some time, because we don’t really know what to do about it, then it would be a strong argument for those saying no, at least the Bush Administration they knew what to do, this administration is starting to look really weak and really indecisive. So that would be the worst scenario.

SCHIN: Okay, that’s interesting. I’ve asked you all of my questions, are there any more points that you want to talk about? Any final thoughts?

KULESA: Well, we covered public opinion, we covered the politicians, the future, Russia. You know it’s important to note that in other European countries, those who are supporters of this system are more or less keeping quiet, but those who are against it have the ‘we-told-you-so’ syndrome, and all of a sudden everyone wants to make sure that everyone knows they were against the system, and they were trying to slow it down. But I think we’ve covered more or less everything.

SCHIN: Thanks again for your time.
The following is a transcript of an interview with Minister Witold Waszczykowski, Deputy Head of the Polish National Security Bureau, conducted on 15 April 2009, in Warsaw, Poland:

SCHIN: Thanks again for meeting with me, Minister. And of course the first question, as we just talked about, how do you think the agreements that we’ve entered into change the strategic stability of the region?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well, we have to start from the beginning of NATO enlargement, somewhere in the nineties. It was not sure that the change in Poland, in Central Europe--we started searching for new security arrangements and of course naturally we investigated several institutions like the United Nations, like OSCE originally, searching for a security mechanism.

And, to make the long story short, the obvious answer is that NATO is the only one which would be able to provide security for this country. Also security for our transformation, because we started at the end of the eighties, beginning of the nineties, not only a security transformation but also social, economic, democratic transformations and it was obvious that NATO was supposed to secure and defend us from any problems--you know, shit happens--so we thought also that NATO enlargement would stabilize the process of economic and political transformation and our access to the European Union. So that was a deliberate act to first choose NATO and then go ahead with economic and political stability and integration into the European Union. Unfortunately, pretty soon we realized that we are a rather tough political project and security project. Few of us knew that at the very beginning. And of course when we start alarming our people and authorities we were named as hysterical…well I don’t want to remind you what kind of epithets and curses were used.

But personally for instance I knew from the very beginning because I had the privilege to work from ’97 to ’99 in NATO headquarters. I was the first one who went to Brussels by the invitation we got at the Madrid Summit to open the first Polish mission to NATO. For the first three-four months I was in charge of the mission and then I served as the deputy head of mission to NATO so I learned from the very beginning that we are different--that we are considered differently. The newcomers, they have no contingency plan that is the same as the others.

And it was of course from the very beginning the dream of some security experts--those who were aware of the situation--that we were supposed to search for additional security guarantees. And of course the most important was to get links, bonds with the United States. And I think that the first major opportunity was the Iraq adventure. And that was...
a decision taken by the former Social Democratic government--[Aleksander
Kwaśniewski was the president and [Leszek] Miller was Prime Minister--and they
learned from the very beginning that joining the American coalition against Iraq, against
[Iraqi President Saddam] Hussein, and largely against terrorists and to join the general
war on terrorism, it was not only the idea to find the terrorists of course but also to get a
vehicle, an instrument to get close to America and to make them aware about the military
security situation also in this part of the global village.

It was not very successful I guess. So in the final adventure of this government they
decided to pull our troops from Iraq, it’s another story I criticize often--it was an unwise
time, just two weeks before an American election. We spent five and a half years in Iraq
just for nothing. My opinion is to stay just a few months longer and then come up to
Obama and say we have no support for such operations. Either we sign a different
contract with you--more beneficial for us--or we resign. And they resigned without even
trying.

So the next opportunity to get closer to Americans and to create some sort of security and
strategic links was missile defense. And the former government decided to participate in
these negotiations and this concept--okay, there’s a threat form Iran, there’s a threat from
rogue states, there’s proliferation of missiles, an adventure in nuclear weapons. We may
sign an agreement, we may negotiate an agreement of deployment of a base here but it’s
supposed to be a large package of military and security cooperation with the United
States. That was not a hidden agenda because we started openly discussing and
negotiating from the very beginning.

We shouldn’t just sign the agreement, deployment of a base, but the base was supposed
to be protected and we were supposed to develop--together with Americans--contingency
planning to defend the base. The base is located too close to some of our neighbors…we
are not certain about developments in the domestic situations of these countries, and we
provided open information that our military is not in good shape. In a few years form
now we’ll have to resign some systems, some anti-missile systems, aircraft systems, and
if you think that Poland is going to be a reliable partner in NATO and Europe and you’re
a partner of this missile defense initiative, well we’ll have to reinforce this change of pace
and modernize.

So we’ll have to open the separate simultaneous tracks of modernization of our troops, of
our forces, and finally we have to create on the basis of this agreement the base, the
military modernization, some kind of a political chapeau. So my invention was to
propose to the Americans, if it was impossible to have an official, formal, and legally
binding bilateral alliance, because there are thoughts we are part of NATO so the Senat is
not going to ratify some kind of additional bilateral alliance, let’s create some sort of
binding political structure. And they accepted to sign the political declaration and part of
this declaration is a provision that we will participate in some sort of consultative
permanent body working at the level of under-secretary of state from the Pentagon,
Minister of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Department of State, that means that
our political relationship will not depend on some sort of courtesy consultations, but it will be some kind of institutional link between Poland and the United States...some kind of a substitute formal alliance. And then at the end we decided to also talk about other missiles.

So you’re right that the former government was trying to use this opportunity to negotiate the missile defense also as a kind of improvement of static position and reaching a security position of Poland here in Europe. The difference—and you may ask in the next question, probably—the difference between the former government and this government and my decision to quit the government of [Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław] Sikorski and his people who are running the country, I mean the government’s positions, they thought differently. They thought that well, we already participate in NATO, the European Union, we don’t need an additional alliance with the United States--this is a paper alliance, a paper guarantee, and the base is beneficial only for the United States. This is a pure transaction—“They want it because they’re afraid of Iran, of course they have to pay.” So to them it’s a purely businesslike transaction, while I said this is not.

SCHIN: You would say that to some degree the more United States troops and assets that are located in your country the better for the security of Poland?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Yes, you may say this.

SCHIN: So would you say that Article 5--well I shouldn’t put words in your mouth, I should just ask the question--

WASZCZYKOWSKI: No you might put this, because Article 5, it’s obvious that it’s very ambivalent and ambiguous. Article 5 had a different meaning in the so-called Cold War and has a different meaning right now; although it was ambiguous from the very beginning, but for the first forty years the Allies did not question the meaning of this article.

Although it was ambiguous they thought it was in a very automatic way supposed to be implemented. In the nineties, especially in recent years, we were constantly reminded by our partners and allies that this is not an automatic solution, it is not an automatic mechanism and every time there is a conflict, these mechanics which are part of Article 5 will be reviewed and applied case by case. So that was the thought of the last several years that was obvious to announce it.

It was reminded to us also a year ago, when Mr. [Javier] Solana was visiting us as a representative from the European Union, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy], after a glass of wine, that what I mentioned at the very beginning that NATO enlargement was a political plan. And he revealed to us that in 1995, 1996, NATO headquarters called in some military games or some scenarios from the Marshall Center, from the NATO School in Oberammergau, the NATO School in Rome, and from of course member countries, and
the answers were that well, this is a political plan. Those countries are not going to be defended the same way as the old NATO countries were, the old countries were different.

And recently, two or three weeks ago, Ron Asmus--famous Ron Asmus--was interviewed by the Polish weekly *Polityka*, and he openly mentioned that, “You are the NATO member Class B from the very beginning.” I think I have a copy someplace…let me show you on the cover…”You are NATO-B.” This is “for ten years we did not create on the continent a new defense plan for old and new NATO members. Because of that, some countries are more prone to attack than the others.” And it was in *Polityka*, March 28th this year. And that shows everything. So we were right starting negotiations with the United States, missile defense shouldn’t be the only instrument to defend us from Iran but also it’s supposed to be used by us as a special opportunity to strengthen ties to the United States.

SCHIN: Right. Would you say that the fact that Russia has objected so strongly to the missile defense aspect of it, does that part of it outweigh the strength that you’re gaining from the United States?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: The Russian position was clear from the beginning…well maybe not from the very beginning because I understand that some years ago, they were offered to participate in missile defense, they were positive but hesitant. I remember they rejected participation only because they were not able to participate technically and financially. But that was before we were considered--I mean Poland and the Czech Republic, so close to Russia. Then when you reviewed the plans to locate, deploy these installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, they started to question and object to this initiative in a very illogical way.

A few weeks ago I had an open discussion with Mr. [Dmitry] Rogozin in Paris--the Russian Ambassador to NATO. What he said is illogical because first, they are questioning there is a threat from Iran. They say Iran just holds cards which are modernize, maybe reach up to 1500 kilometers but are not able to reach Europe and they do not have a ballistic missile so there is no reason to have such an initiative. So questioning the threat from Iran and from North Korea they at the same time are saying we might join and create together with Americans and others a world-wide anti-ballistic missile system. So if there is no threat from Iran and North Korea, against whom is such a world-wide system supposed to be created?

So that’s the first illogical argument. The second is questioning the system. They are questioning the location and deployment of the installation in Poland and the Czech Republic. But on the other side they are saying, well, you can move it to Turkey or to the UK. So that’s another illogical statement. That means that, what? There is a threat! But we don’t like the answer to this threat because the answer is too close to our territories. So it’s another illogical one.
That shows that although we tried NATO and the European Union, Russians they understand that maybe they live under the wrong assumption, or maybe they have some kind of pledges from European countries in the beginning of the nineties, that although these countries--Central Europeans--will belong to NATO and the European Union, we in the old Europe countries will still consider them, from a security point of view, different.

We sometimes say that it’s a situation for us similar to the situation of the 1970s and the 1980s that Finland was put in. And you remember the term “Finlandization.” That means the countries that are located on the edge of the border with Russia or the Soviet Union are able to participate in the political and economic structure of the West, but they are not able to participate in the military structure of the West; that was the case in Finland. So it looks like we’re in a quite similar position. So we want to change the situation. We think that such opinions like that of Ron Asmus--who was actually the architect of NATO enlargement!--shows that there is something at stake. That we are considered different; the security structures of Poland, the Czech Republic, other Central European states, are different from the western countries.

SCHIN: OK, we’ve talked about most of the positives that you see coming from this system. Do you see any negatives coming from the emplacement of this system?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well, there could be some of these. First, of course, open threats, intimidation from the Russians. They already started some years ago reminding us that in case such a base is located or deployed in Poland, they will deploy additional troops and missiles in the Kaliningrad region. And they will target us. This is intimidation; the Secretary General of NATO reminded them it’s unacceptable at the NATO Summit.

The second is that of course having such an installation on the territory on Poland, an American installation in Poland, we may be more identified by the rest of the world with American foreign policy, American security policy. And so it’s a natural fear in Poland that some countries, those who support terrorist operations, they may try to sneak into Poland and to do some harm to such an installation just to hurt the Americans. But I would say it’s a rather remote threat because Poland so far is a quite homogeneous country. We don’t have large foreign communities, we don’t have Muslim communities, our Muslim community is very, very small, tiny. I believe that most of them are Polish converts, people who married Muslims, it’s not the case of England or some of the Western countries; Algerians living in France, Pakistanis living in the UK. So I don’t expect major problems, but we cannot definitely say that.

And there is always the argument of the opponents that if we accept an American military base then we will be on some kind of American leash and we will have to follow the global policy of the United States. Well my answer is: Germany--they have 70,000 American soldiers! And have you noticed any leash on the neck of Mr. [Gerhard] Schröder when he was signing agreements with [Vladimir] Putin? Let’s see, Italians, they have [U.S.] military bases, and Italy is the biggest trade partner of Iran!
SCHIN: Going back to Article 5, we know that’s very iffy, especially if you look at the Estonian cyber attacks. That’s maybe a way where there’s a threat to a country’s sovereignty--

WASZCZYKOWSKI: And there was no answer from NATO. Now before Estonia there was a quite important case of 2002, 2003; the request of Turkey. Not to get reinforcements, but at least just to talk about the future scenarios. And NATO refused to talk, to give advice to Turkey. And to us it was very much an alert.

SCHIN: So that might be another example. Do you feel the change in American administrations will change the Polish view on missile defense?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well that’s a confusing situation for us of course. I understand that we committed some mistakes. We signed agreements in August of last year but it was not implemented, it was not ratified. Then they slowed down the decision on the bilateral SOFA which was supposed to be part of this agreement. So in such a case the Polish government gave a bargaining chip to America’s new administration.

They want to discuss with the Russians, the Iranians, they have this card on the table-- “Well, you see we signed this agreement but it’s not implemented so we still have time for discussion, and we need to go back to the time before this document was signed.” So that’s part of the story.

But the second part is that we absolutely understand that your administration has the right to discuss openly with Iran and Russia the other alternative approaches, alternative solutions. And of course if you manage to persuade the Iranians to give up their nuclear program, to give up the missile program, there would be no justification for the missile site in Poland. Maybe there would still be justification for radar in the Czech Republic because it’s better to monitor the situation. So naturally.

But, well, I’m not very optimistic about the possibility of changing Iranian determinations. I spent some years living there as Ambassador to Iran so I think they are so committed to developing the program and they will pass some point of no return. And so I think there is no recipe, no package for Iranians from your side that will satisfy them. But this is another long story.

The bigger problem for us is the problem of the Russian position. If you decide to strike a deal, or some sort of transaction with Russia right now and give up the program in Poland, in the Czech Republic, we’re afraid you might send the wrong signal to the Russians that, well, okay, we accept your assumption that this is a different area, it’s an area of different security status. So our question is, if there is no missile defense then what? What would be there, something of a substitute? Some kind of substitute security arrangement which will not allow Russians to think they can come back and recreate the sphere of influence.
SCHIN: It would be basically giving the sphere of influence or the “near abroad” back to Russia?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Exactly.

SCHIN: That’s the concern raised by other people I’ve interviewed too--it’s definitely high up on the list. Do you think that will lead to a need for Poland to increase its defense spending?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Hmm. We suffer because of the crisis, as many other countries, so in the next few months it will be impossible to increase substantially the military spending. We’d rather count that the situation will be taken into consideration by NATO and maybe you will help us to convince NATO to move some NATO installation to the territory of Poland. Because so far, though we belong to NATO for ten years, we have just a symbolic training camp in Bydgoszcz --which is still not fully operational. Nothing else. So if there is no American installation, no missile defense installation, well I think that we’re supposed to develop realistic and viable contingency plans, NATO contingency plans, and eventually to move some NATO installations.

SCHIN: You think that lengthening the period of negotiations with the United States is a mistake, but could that also be an advantage by focusing the attentions of the United States more on this region? Is that a possibility?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Do you mean future negotiations?

SCHIN: No, I mean negotiations right now, for example the SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement], or the fact that you haven’t ratified the agreements in the Seym?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: I don’t know what the status of discussion is, I don’t know what directive is coming from America, so mostly I’m learning about the progress or lack of progress on this issue from my American colleagues, at the Embassy, or maybe people who are visiting us, and I think that’s it’s a positive for the government right here in Poland because first they told us that they cannot ratify the agreement related to the base--they prefer to ratify the package of agreements, so the base and the SOFA. So that’s why they negotiate the SOFA. But they negotiate the SOFA very slowly. And now the question is if eventually the SOFA is negotiated, are they going to ratify the SOFA only? Or together with the base agreement? Because the SOFA is also a precondition to send the Patriots from Germany.

SCHIN: How do you think this ties into NATO theater defense? Or does it at all?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well I can only rely on NATO official documents although I have a chance from time to time to talk to an American colleague who works for NATO named Daniel Fata who is in charge of this program. From the very beginning our position was slightly different than the Czech Republic because for them, they even
created some terms like “NATOization” of the system. They wanted to have this American initiative as strong as possible to tie into NATO plans. Now we don’t mind. But we understand that this is not a typical NATO program. This is a program with a few countries, which belongs to the Americans.

So we were afraid to insist on “NATOization” because we were afraid that the finger on the trigger would be one that’s too political. Just like the war over Kosovo, for instance. There was a war by committee, as General Clark once said. No, the system is supposed to defend us, and we’re supposed to have a clear chain of command, not to be a hostage of any political deliberation in a framework of the North Atlantic Council.

But we understand that NATO is developing two additional missile defense plans. One is supposed to defend NATO troops deployed in a peacekeeping role or military missions somewhere, which is mobile I would say, because there would coordination by NATO countries to provide some money, develop some equipment. And the second program is to have this multi-layer territorial defense of NATO countries. Although this one is required, but I think it’s a political fiction, because this one is to be anti-Russian. So I can only expect the Germans and French to provide money for this, and they will expect then to buy American military equipment, because so far there is no alternative to Patriots and THAADs. There is no European substitute, there is no European hardware for this.

SCHIN: Do you have concerns about how well the missile defense system we’re proposing works? Any concerns on the Polish side for that?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: We understand that the missiles that are supposed to be deployed here are not produced yet. Because the American base in Poland is supposed to be equipped with different equipment than you already have in California and Alaska--three stage missiles--but what they think about missiles in Poland are supposed to be two stage missiles. So we understand that you have to develop, produce, and test this missile, although we noticed the different approach of this administration.

The former Bush Administration wanted to build the base and simultaneously develop the hardware and test it, they thought it was enough time to do this. The approach of this administration is that first we have to develop the missile, test them, and if they are proven to work then we can go ahead with building a base. So it’s a different approach. Well, the other equipment, well the radar, that’s easy to ship it from somewhere.

SCHIN: The radar is definitely the easy part. Do you think that the Russian rhetoric is anything more than just words? Are there concerns here that this is part of a bigger game? Or are they simply trying to intimidate?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well they are trying to convince us--and I had several meetings with Sergey Kislyak, used to be Deputy Minister, now he’s Ambassador to Washington--and what he said was quite open. He tried to convince us that the American project is just the beginning of a much, much bigger project to surround the Russians and China
with a huge chain of anti-missile bases. And they were—you probably know the large report of Dr [Theodore] Postol about this—there are two names, Postol and some other one—the guys from MIT. And they produced at least a year ago, maybe two years ago, a big report with the main argument that missile defense is not against Iran or rogue states, it’s just the beginning of a big security shift, a big shift in balance. There was the whole discussion of the possibility of second strike. If you have a missile defense system which is working, you are actually depriving the other side the ability to retaliate.

SCHIN: Right. There is no more deterrence.

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Yes, there is no deterrence. Of course from a theoretical point of view, you’re right in such an approach. But can you imagine, and that was my question to Kislyak and the Russians, because they think that if the whole missile system is developed and employed, then there will be a major war between the West, United States, Russia, and China over the resources, especially Siberian resources. Oil, gas, wood, water… I said, Mr. Kislyak, do you believe, and you ask me to believe that an American president, democratically elected, will launch a war and kill 100 million Russians to get a grip on some rivers in Siberia? “Oh, yes,” he said. “Maybe not this government, but in 10, 15, 20 years.” I cannot believe it, I said, that someone will value more access to just oil and gas than the lives of 100 million people, even if they are hated as Iranians or Russians or Chinese.

So that’s a problem, but it’s very difficult to discuss this with Russia because their minds are overtaken with the geopolitical game. And they laugh at the concept of democracy, development, the concept of European integration, NATO integration, they think that European integration is driven mostly by the ambitions of the Germans and French, it’s nothing to do with democratization, liberalization of economies, and stability and welfare. So they still think in a Lenin way of thinking, which is “Who, whom?” It’s just a geopolitical game. It’s difficult to reach and discuss with them.

SCHIN: Do you see any room for concessions on either the U.S., Russian, or Polish sides for this?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well, we already involved the Russians; yes, we accepted the joint American concept of creating a verification regime. And we are able to accept a monitoring system, an electronic system, we are able to accept also the visits, the inspections, but we cannot accept permanent military persons, for obvious reasons.

It’s not that historically we’re afraid of permanent stationing of Russian troops on the territory of Poland. That’s not the case. The case is rather practical. According to the agreement we signed with the Americans, and this is part of a legally binding agreement, the whole American system is supposed to defend us, supposed to guarantee us that we will be defended against any ballistic missile attack on the territory of Poland. Let us say Iran. You have access to the documents, you can see. So the system, if this is a security-type, a guarantee-type agreement, supposed to work when we Poles and Americans
decide that we are threatened, we cannot make this system hostage to the position of a third country, like Russian monitors, Russian verifiers in the base. Because if we are threatened, we are immediately supposed to launch and operate this system. We cannot accept that the Russian monitor may say, “Well, I don’t think Iran is going to threaten you.”

So we might discuss electronic devices, we might discuss about frequency of the visits of course, how to facilitate access to the base of these monitors. The second condition, because first this is not permanent monitoring. And the second, this is a typical criterion of any kind of verification system; the verification system must be reciprocal. So if they want to verify, they want to monitor us? We have a right to do the same on the other side. They cannot or do not want to accept it because this is an American installation. So maybe for Americans they will do this, but not for Poland, not for Czechs.

SCHIN: Do you think that on the soon-to-be started--and in theory, completed--negotiations for a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and SORT, do you see any concessions on missile defense being made during that process?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: Well, it is like the end. It is obvious that the first Russian answer was, as I remember a few days or weeks ago, they are not going to help you with Iran. And they are not going to accept that if Iran gives up the right to develop missiles and nukes, the Russians will accept that you will also give up deployment of the missile defense. The answer was, well, we have to negotiate this thing in the framework or as the bigger package of arms control negotiation. That might be a signal that they might try to use arms control discussions and negotiations as a rather political instrument. Just like they were using the negotiations in the seventies and eighties. Because what’s the main problem for Russia, the main ambition of Russia? To become again a superpower, equal to the United States.

And an intimate dialogue, discussion, negotiation on arms control will give them a better status. And we’re afraid that although it would be nice a world without nuclear weapons, or at least less nuclear weapons--who would object?--but because we live closer to Russia so we understand them, well I don’t want to say better, but we understand them in a different way. So we suspect that they will try to use this as an opportunity to again make their international mission, international agenda more feudalistic. So two birds, sitting above, and the others are just vassals waiting for the decisions--“What did they decide?”--and we’re supposed to follow. So that’s a fear here in Poland, that they will try once again to subordinate the whole international relationship to the bilateral discussion between the United States and Russia on security issues and arms control.

SCHIN: We’ve evolved past that, supposedly, since the Cold War. That’s all of my questions; any final thoughts on the Polish security situation?

WASZCZYKOWSKI: There was a side discussion between the U.S. and Poland on how Poland is supposed to be defended, and you may ask also the RAND Corporation because
they provide an elaborate program. It’s some kind of a clash of philosophies. Because when we decided finally and we persuaded the Americans to start discussions on the modernization of Polish troops, naturally they asked, well, what’s the threat perception? Where’s the challenge, who is threatening you? It was difficult for the Polish military to prove that we are threatened by the Russians.

The main argument was, well, look at Russia, look at the size, look at the capabilities, they have such an amount of military hardware that they could decide to use, we are defenseless. It’s like in an opera, when you see the room in opera and there is a rifle which is hanging above the fireplace in the first act, there’s a saying that in the last act eventually it will be fired [ironically, Russian playwright Anton Chekov’s "Mantelpiece Rule"]). So that was the argument by the Polish military that if you have so many soldiers and hardware you might have to use it. Okay, so the Americans accepted, let’s assume you are right. So how do you want to defend? And the Polish concept is still a kind of 1939, you know, we have to create some kind of Eastern Maginot Line, start with Patriot missiles around Warsaw. Well they said if they decide to attack you, they will launch 100, maybe 200 missiles, just to destroy the Polish territory in half an hour. So even if we put 12 batteries of Patriots on the Wisła River, it’s no help. So Americans say, well, preemption; if we sense that they are preparing an attack, we’ll have to be faster. We’ll have to come from Ramstein [Air Base, Germany], wherever, and destroy all the launchers. But, well I’m not a specialist in this military discussion, I just had a chance to monitor some discussions. If you’re interested you can talk to them and reveal some more.

SCHIN: Thanks again for your time.
APPENDIX D.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. RADOMÍR JAHODA

The following is a transcript of an interview with Mr. Radomír Jahoda, Deputy Director, Defense Policy and Strategy Division, Czech Ministry of Defense, conducted on 16 April 2009, in Prague, Czech Republic:

SCHIN: The first question I have goes to the heart of my paper, do you see a change to the stability of the region just because of the agreement that the United States has signed with the Czech Republic on the radar system? Or do you think that it will actually require placing the radar here to change the stability of the region, especially with the Russian-Czech, Russian-Polish, Russian-U.S. dynamics?

JAHODA: My feeling is that this region is stable with or without U.S. missile defense systems. In Europe, European missile defense system is just part of our defense systems and the stability of this region is much more ensured by our membership in NATO as well as in the European Union—but of course NATO is a different organization so it has more to say in the field of defense. Some say that it may cause instability rather than stability because they think that the Russians will be upset and they say that they are upset about U.S. intentions to have this system here in Europe and that they will aim their missiles at our cities and so on. So the question is if they just threaten us, or would they do it—or the other question is, we do not know at which targets their missiles are aimed today.

SCHIN: It’s interesting because in Poland they see NATO as not enough of a guarantor of their security, mainly they think that Article 5 is not really strong enough, that maybe there are some interpretations of Article 5 that could leave them out in the cold, so to speak. Do you have the same kind of concerns about NATO?

JAHODA: No, in our strategic papers, for example the security strategy of the Czech Republic, we say that the cornerstone of our defense and security is NATO and its Article 5. And when there was work on the NATO CPG, the Comprehensive Political Guidance a few years ago, we stressed the importance of Article 5. And actually we stress it always when it comes to this Article is somehow questioned or if some countries want to put emphasis on something else. We can speak about missions beyond the NATO area of responsibility, as we are in Afghanistan or elsewhere, but we always believe that the core task of the alliance—which is the collective defense—will be maintained. But of course our historical experience, we can sometimes hear some voices here in the Czech Republic that perhaps if something was going to happen, our experience with alliances is not very good in this country. It’s just, was it, in March of this year, when it was the anniversary of the Munich agreement of the Second World War, President [Václav] Klaus in his speech mentioned the role of the United Kingdom, the negative role of the United
Kingdom, and France because of the alliance with the Czech Republic. So the question is what he had in his mind saying that.

SCHIN: This is a good question. I think the historical impact will always be there and it’s easy for us in the United States to forget that. By the same token, I think that we in the United States see, maybe, this ability to bring the bilateral agreements for the radar system and the interceptors as a better guarantor of security in some ways.

JAHODA: That was of course one of our intentions to have the security somehow more guaranteed. Perhaps not having something written in the paper, but just by stronger cooperation because it would not be only the radar side on the Czech territory, there are some other treaties or agreements which have been signed between us or are in the state of being concluded. Of course, the question why this stronger cooperation? We thought that it will increase our security.

SCHIN: Right. And do you think that the change in the American administration and different statements that they have made, does that affect your security?

JAHODA: It does not affect our security as such. But it has an impact on the issue itself.

SCHIN: Maybe on the willingness of the Czech people to go forward with it?

JAHODA: Yes. In my view Mr. Obama was very clear a few ago here in Prague but even as he left the Czech Republic there were different interpretations in the media by the politicians, what he meant by saying that we will continue with missile defense systems, if they work well and if they are cost efficient and we will deploy radar here if Iran will not stop what they are doing. So in my view it was a quite clear message. If Iran continues, we would like to have the radar site here. If Iran stops enriching uranium and constructing ballistic missiles we will not deploy it here. But the interpretations made by politicians, it’s like…unbelievable.

SCHIN: I had the same reading of it that you did, it seemed very clear to me, too, but even in the United States, people on both sides seem to be interpreting it in different ways depending on how they want to see it. It seems that they’re not just listening to what he said, but they’re trying to look for something that he didn’t say.

JAHODA: Trying to read something between the lines.

SCHIN: Exactly. What specific positives do you see coming from the emplacement of this system, if it does become a reality here in the Czech Republic?

JAHODA: As I see it, stronger relationship between us and in my view it will have an impact on a better security and defense capability of this country. It’s also a contribution of the Czech Republic to the collective defense of NATO because we know that in NATO we are talking about missile defense.
SCHIN: Right, theater missile defense.

JAHODA: It will take some more time, I’m afraid, but we have some options on the table in NATO and all of the options calculate the U.S. as a pillar. So if we provide territory for this system I think it’s sort of a contribution to the collective defense of Europe, the Alliance. It will be, in my view, another second positive effect of the system.

SCHIN: Along the same lines, are there negatives that you see from the system?

JAHODA: As I’m a supporter of the system, I do not see any negatives.

SCHIN: You’re not concerned with the Russian statements, you think it’s just rhetoric on their part? Or do you see them--

JAHODA: The Russian statements support me in my view to be positive on the U.S. missile defense. Because I think what they are doing, they are trying to exercise how much power they still have in this part of Europe and it is something which is worrying me. I do not want to be in a part of the world which is influenced too much by Russian politics.

SCHIN: The way the Poles put it, numerous people that I spoke to there, said things along the lines of, “It’s okay if the U.S. decides not to have the system because they feel that Iran is not a threat, or because they think it’s not technically capable.” But they say, “It’s definitely not okay if they decide not to do it because the Russians don’t want it to happen.” Would you have the same view?

JAHODA: Yeah, the same view and unfortunately before the end of the last year or at the beginning of this year, before Mr. Obama came to office and shortly after he was elected, some declarations made by him or by his administration were not very clear. It looked like, “Okay, we’ll be talking to the Russians and we will circle this issue somehow,” and we read it like he will offer the Russians something, or I don’t know, and we will leave the idea of having the missile defense in Europe. We feel like we’re, not betrayed, but being traded between two big nuclear countries.

SCHIN: O nás bez nás [About us, without us], I take it?

JAHODA: O nás bez nás, yes. Of course, we understand that we are a small country, six million people and so on, the United States and Russia are a different world.

SCHIN: Do you see maybe a need to increase defense spending in response to what the Russians are saying or would this give you an opportunity to decrease defense spending by engaging in a stronger partnership with the United States?
JAHODA: I’m afraid that our current policy of the Czech government and parliament will not think the defense spending is driven too much by what you said. We just look at how much money we have and if they feel, or they see, that GDP is shrinking, well we are looking for ways how to reduce our governmental spending and they cut the defense budget regardless--everything, it seems, sometimes. There are opportunities to cut it by a half and will take care of it. We still have 2.2%, then 2%, and now we are something like 1.4% and I’m afraid that next year it will be even less because of the financial crisis.

SCHIN: So basically it’s completely separate from the issue, there’s nothing you can do about that, it’s on the policy side. Do you see any areas where the United States should make concessions for the concerns that the Russians have? Is there any aspect of it that they should be concerned about it? As in, the Russian’s big claim is that this system is designed to counter them or can be used to counter them. So they’ve been looking for ways to stop that. For example, one of the Russian ideas was to set up a joint system at the Russian radar site in Azerbaijan. But we looked at that as not being really effective. Are there other things that you think would make sense for the United States or maybe the Czech Republic to help take care of those concerns?

JAHODA: I think that we’ve offered quite a lot, I mean the United States to the Russians. I mean the participation in the missile defense system. You offered them the possibility to have their officers in the HQs and some other places to share data and I remember that you might say that it is a one-sided positive approach, but it has always been refused by the Russians. And my feeling is that they will always refuse it because they simply would not want the United States to have a greater role or presence in this part of the world and that the Russians want to exercise their sphere of influence here. It’s just about the influence.

SCHIN: Do you think that this entire system is a provocation by the United States against the Russians?

JAHODA: No.

SCHIN: That’s something that I think a lot of Russians seem to believe. We’ve already talked a little bit about President Obama’s statement while he was here and it seemed very clear. With that said, where do you see the system going here in the Czech Republic? This is getting into a political question, but do you think it is possible that the Czech parliament will actually ratify the agreement with the United States?

JAHODA: I believe that it is still possible. It is not possible during the interim government, in this pre-election period, because we probably will have new elections in October of this year. So I do not think that the parliamentarians will deal with this issue but I would not exclude it after. You know that we have lower and higher chambers of the parliament and in one of the chambers, the Senát, the agreement was approved. Now it’s just the lower chamber of parliament and it will depend on the composition of that chamber after the elections…and mostly through the position of the Social Democrats.
SCHIN: Do you think that Jan Fischer will impact this one way or the other?

JAHODA: No, I hardly believe that he will use words like “missile defense” during his period in government. There is no need for it. But, perhaps someone will ask him about it and he’ll be pushed to react to it.

SCHIN: Do you think he’s in a position to impact it really?

JAHODA: I don’t think so. It’s really in the hands of the political parties and mostly it’s in the hands of the Social Democrats because the discussion about missile defense, you probably know, it started when they were in power. And they just turned 180 degrees after they went to opposition in parliament and they realized that people were balancing between supporting it and not supporting it. They used it as a card in their domestic policy, which makes it very difficult for them to change their stance again by 180 degrees. But I think in their rhetoric they are still keeping the door open. I think what Mr. Obama said was helpful even for them because there are two options and they depend on what Iran is going to do.

SCHIN: He appealed to the common sense part of it I think and talked about how that works. Another interesting thing in Poland was hearing different views on whether Iran is even a threat worth worrying about. Even the people who support the system say “Yeah, we don’t really care about the Iranian part of it, we just care about increasing the ties with the United States.” Do you have that same view in the Czech Republic? In Poland, for some it was more important to them to increase their ties to the United States than to defend against what they considered a fairly small threat from Iran. Is that similar here? Does having a better relationship with the United States outweigh an Iranian ballistic missile threat?

JAHODA: I remember that in 2002 it started simply, purely like a defense issue. But there was a threat perceived from the side of Iran and some other countries and there was an idea to build this missile defense pillar here in Europe and elsewhere. In 2006 and 2007, after the elections in the Czech Republic, I would say that it was still perceived as a defensive system, of course, but because the parties that were in power were more pro-trans-Atlantic they wanted to make this trans-Atlantic relationship stronger and so on, so it is a possibility it will make our ties with the United States stronger.

SCHIN: That brings us to a few questions on the system itself and what your country has to gain from it—how you see the relationship with the United States on actually operating the system, for example. Is there a fear here that the U.S. will simply come in and walk all over you guys to control it? Or do you feel that there will be an actual partnership with the way it’s operated?

JAHODA: We believe there will be an actual partnership because it’s in our agreement that there will be a Czech commander that will be present at the radar station with his
staff and they will have access to nearly everything. I say nearly because I understand there will be, from a military point of view, there might be something which only American eyes can see, but it’s in our written agreement that a Czech commander will have access to the information about missile defense threats and missile defense related issues that concern the European space, not what concerns specific or other areas of interest to you. So I believe that there will be a partnership and we also will have our officer in the United States, in Colorado and some other areas with the Missile Defense Agency. I even do believe that as time goes on we will even be able to have an officer integrated with the U.S. military or civilian experts that would run the radar because you know that it is the case between you and the United Kingdom and Canada; of course, those are ties that you have created for far longer and there is not a problem of who speaks what.

SCHIN: Well, some of the Canadians do speak French...that makes it more difficult you know. But you’re right we do have a very strong link with them especially in the space and missile arena, there’s no doubt about it. Do you think that this does tie in well with the plans of the NATO theater missile defense? Do you see this as a competing idea or a complementary idea?

JAHODA: A complementary one.

SCHIN: Even though in a time of scarce resources there’s going to be some countries that say “We can’t spend as much on the NATO theater missile defense because we have to spend money in other places, and the U.S. and the Czech Republic and Poland are spending enough money on their missile defense,” do you think there’s a sense of that? The way that theater missile defense is for NATO as a whole, some people would say that’s a competing idea, rather than something that works together--because these agreements that the U.S. and the Czech Republic and Poland have signed are bilateral agreements, and so they exclude NATO. And there are concerns that there won’t be a strong tie to the NATO missile defense--that we won’t be able to integrate those two systems. Do you feel that the integration can still happen?

JAHODA: We believe in it, and as I said, in NATO we have five options on the table for NATO missile defense and one of them is without the American European pillar. And I do not believe that without the United States that NATO will be able to have missile defense. So I don’t see this as competing. It purely was very hard work done by the Czech diplomats in Brussels and elsewhere later with support of the United States that we started to speak in NATO that the U.S. system is complementary to the NATO one and we pushed the NATO bureaucrats to a meeting in the papers. It took us some time to pursue it--our American counterparts took issue with this way. And from our side, it was motivated by the domestic political situation, there were some parties, like the Greens, who said, “We will not support it unless this missile defense is part of a NATO defense system.” But you look at the NATO missile defense and the practical point of view--there is not much money among the European countries. There is not any system like
that it has been tested and so I cannot imagine that the NATO countries will start from
the beginning--they will start from something.

SCHIN: Would you say that as far as the agreement between the U.S. and the Czech
Republic that the greater the U.S. presence the better for the security of the Czech
Republic, or at a certain point would there be too many troops? Do you think there’s a
limit there?

JAHODA: We think that for the security of the Czech Republic it’s better when we have
the Americans in Europe or in the Czech Republic. It’s the beginning of our discussion
about Article 5 and what, perhaps, we can feel about the European Alliance and so on.
And unfortunately the European Union did not give a very good example during the gas
crisis. Because France and some other countries are very comfortable with their
situation, they were not harmed too much. So they didn’t care about Romania, Slovakia,
and countries like that. And it was just gas. So it can raise some questions about what
will happen if we didn’t have NATO, we have just the European Union, the European
security and defense policy, blah blah blah, and if something goes wrong,…You can see
that from the side of politicians from Germany and, say, Italy, there is a very big
willingness to talk to Russians--in our view, to make concessions to them.

SCHIN: Last summer the Russians did take a few concrete steps, or at least it seemed
that way, when after the U.S. and Czech Republic signed their agreement, there were
some problems with the gas pipeline the next day. Do you think that that may be the
future of this conflict, where it becomes more economic in nature, and the Russians try to
use means that certainly would not provoke an Article 5 response? I mean there’s no way
you can use Article 5 to justify taking actions against Russia if there’s just problems with
the gas pipeline.

JAHODA: I don’t believe that we have to take actions against the Russians in case the
foundation stone of the new radar site is laid down, perhaps they would again turn the
pipeline down for some time but I do not believe that it will be permanent. There
wouldn’t be a long-term action, just a short-term reaction or something like that. Because
even though we have signed the agreements, they were approved by the Senát, and so on,
and the Russians are sometimes pretending to use their rhetoric, actually it does not have
an effect on the bilateral relations between our two countries. We still have business
between us, we do what we need to do. I mean, there are still foreign affairs, or even
ministry of defense meetings with our counterparts--we have different views on things, of
course. I think it will be a short-lived reaction but the less we are dependent on the
Russians, of course, the better. And we have we still have a lot of military equipment
which comes from the Soviet times, so we are dependent on the Russians for spare parts--
particularly as far as our helicopter fleet is concerned. We experienced some difficulties
and we think that the delays caused by the Russian side are sort of a pressure on us. We
declared to them we will deploy our helicopters to Afghanistan, it was to happen in the
spring of this year, now it will most probably happen by the end of this year. We realize
there are obstacles from the Russian side regarding the modernization.
SCHIN: That is kind of a hard question whether or not that’s something that will continue indefinitely or is short term. The Estonian example is also important here with the cyber attacks, which were a very focused response to Estonia. But in the long term maybe not a very important response. Contrasted with of course Georgia, where there is now a long-term Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia where they’re even moving troops in now to those regions, constructing bases. So probably the big difference there is Estonia’s in NATO, Georgia is not. Obviously the Czech Republic is in NATO, so maybe it does go back to Article 5 after all? Where the Russians know they can take certain actions in delaying parts, turning off the gas pipeline, but nothing overt?

JAHODA: They will take economic actions or political actions but I do not believe they will take any military actions. When they were saying that they will aim their missiles at us, some of our politicians said, okay, we’ll aim our missiles at Karlovy Vary, or Carlsbad, it’s a spa town near the German border which many, many Russians go to.

SCHIN: If for some reason the United States does pull back from these agreements and it appears that the reason why they’re doing it is because of the Russians and not because of the Iranians, would there be a long term harm to U.S.-Czech relations because of that? Is that something that could cause a severe damage to relations?

JAHODA: It would not be well received here, of course. But of course it depends on who would be in the government. Because even today the Social Democrats say that for them it’s important that the relations between us and between the United States and Russia are very good and they also say that missile defense is not good because it makes the Russians upset. So if we have a government like this, I don’t think that it will be cause any difficulties in our relationship. They would be happy if the current political scene continues. There is a difference between a big country and a small one, you know, we would be unhappy--very much so. But it’s…

SCHIN: Right, I guess there’s only so much you can do.

JAHODA: We’d like to believe that if there is a decision not to build this radar site here--which would come from your side--the explanation for the decision is somehow different than saying that we are good friends with Mr. Medvedev or Putin and not do it.

SCHIN: It seems to me that probably the most likely outcome is that instead of getting these agreements signed immediately and starting construction right now, things are going to be more drawn out. There’s going to be a period of time that we do some testing, because we’re going to use a different type of missile here than we’ve already got in California and Alaska. So it’s going to require testing and development. And instead of doing that concurrently with building the sites here, I see us doing that first and then making the decision to build the sites. Is that how you guys view it? Is it better if it’s drawn out?
JAHODA: I think having more time is better for Czech domestic politics because during that period of time consultations can continue, and even the Social Democrats may change their view on that because in two years from now they will be able to say “You see, we are talking, there are more tests, tests abound, the system is very good, there’s not any negative impact on the population, the missiles are hitting their targets, and Iran continues--it would be unfortunate--with what it’s doing so we really need to this system and we moved forward with NATO and so, we agreed.” But we say in our security strategy that diplomacy’s first and military power is second. And if we believe that we are building that missile defense system because we are threatened by Iran or some other countries, if there is not a threat than there is no need to have this system here. And if there is a chance to persuade Iran somehow not to continue, I think it would be much better for all of us. But so far I see that nothing is working with Iran and I cannot imagine Iran having nuclear weapons. I’m afraid that it would cause something.

SCHIN: Also, they certainly seem to be continuing their missile program, putting satellites in orbit, the technology required to do that is very similar to the technology needed to create an intercontinental ballistic missile. So there are really strong signs that they are going to continue that, at least in my opinion. I think that’s pretty much it, I definitely appreciate your views on the subject.

JAHODA: I certainly hope that it will be helpful.
APPENDIX E.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. JIŘÍ PEHE

The following is a transcript of an interview with Dr. Jiří Pehe, Director, New York University in Prague, conducted on 16 April 2009, in Prague, Czech Republic:

SCHIN: So, like I said, what I’m focusing on is the impact to strategic stability that the agreement for the radar system specifically will have, but also in the broader context, what that means for the region’s security. So I’ll start by asking you for any general thoughts that you have on the subject.

PEHE: Well, what it means for the region’s security, I think that one very general remark actually goes right to the root of this whole controversy surrounding the radar. And that is the fact that while officially--from the American point of view at least--the radar is, and the missiles in Poland are, to protect the United States and certain parts of Europe against Iranian and North Korean missiles, this is not something that is on anyone’s mind here. The only reason they want those American bases here and quite frankly they could be anything, it wouldn’t have to be an anti-missile defense base, it could be something else--is to have Americans here against Russia.

This is unfortunately--I say unfortunately--it’s something that has been in the background here from the beginning. And it has never been really articulated. These politicians went along, followed this American line, it is against Iran and North Korea and we have to help our American friends and so on, but everyone knew, just like in Poland, that the reason why we want this is to have an American military base here so that the Russians leave us alone if anything ever happens, so as a deterrent. And the same in Poland.

So I think that speaking about the stability and the strategic considerations, there’s this unspoken premise that has never really been clearly articulated by anyone and this is--at least in the Czech Republic--what has hindered productive discussions on this subject. Because you cannot have a productive discussion when you are talking about an “A” but in fact you are talking about a “B.”

SCHIN: That’s actually something that I heard a lot in Poland as well. In fact, I would say that the agreed-upon thought up there was that it was much more important to increase the trans-Atlantic ties between Poland and the United States than it was to have the missile systems up there. But that dances around the question of how it impacts the security of the region, because even though the Poles say they feel much more secure with having American troops on their soil, the fact that the system itself may be destabilizing is another question.

PEHE: Well, essentially we have had a lot of discussion here about whether this would make us safer, ultimately, or whether it would actually attract threats. The first round of discussions was about Iran and North Korea, which I never found very plausible, whether
that means if Iran or North Korea ever decide to attack that they would first not attack this installation here to knock it out. So I simply quite frankly couldn’t imagine how and why that would be done by a country like North Korea, which may have two missiles to shoot.

But of course when Russia got involved and started protesting, making this into a big issue, then a lot of people got scared that actually it may destabilize the region more than stabilize it, because if Russia says this is threatening us, we feel threatened, and as a result we will aim our missiles or reprogram our missiles to target places in the Czech Republic, Poland and so on, that of course made a lot of people worried.

Whether this was just talk, or whether it was real, it doesn’t really matter because it has a psychological effect on how people perceive this threat. Also I would say there is one more dimension to stability which is that the Czech Republic and Poland are not only locked into this trans-Atlantic relationship with the United States but they are also members of European structures. And there have been people from the beginning who felt that building this on a bilateral basis with the United States is actually counter-productive. I don’t say destabilizing, but counter-productive, because both the United States and the Czech Republic and Poland on the other hand are members of NATO. So this should be a NATO initiative and the United States should have started in Brussels talking about it but not in Prague and Warsaw.

And I think that is also why you will find a lot of people here in this country opposing this, because you have various reasons for opposing this project. You have primitive fears on the one hand, or you have distrust towards any foreign troops or military alliances, which goes back in Czech history because we had military alliances that didn’t really work, one of them occupied us. But then you have more sophisticated arguments, such as yes, we have nothing against the radar itself, but why is it not part of a NATO defense? This is the kind of argument of, for example, the Green party—which is basically in favor of the radar. The say we will support it but only if we know it has been made into a NATO-wide project. We don’t want to support it if it’s only a bilateral project.

SCHIN: Do you think that Czechs in general, or you as well, do you see that these agreements with the United States may be a guarantor of Czech security more so than Article 5 of NATO?

PEHE: Well this is what I personally have doubts about. I think that Obama very well stressed that when he was here, when before he started talking about radar, not many people noticed this, but before he got into the issue of radar he made this comment that we are all members of NATO, we are friends, and NATO is based on the premise one for all, all for one. So be assured that the United States will always stand by you and so on. Then he went into the radar issue, and I think he did it on purpose; he simply was saying, look, you are already covered. If we don’t build the radar here, which may happen, which he sort of hinted at, you are still covered, so don’t panic. We are your friends, if
the Czech Republic is attacked then NATO under Article 5 and the Washington Treaty will protect you.

So my feeling is that it doesn’t do all that much or doesn’t add anything extra. In fact, I would argue that if there ever is some kind of a military threat or security threat to the Czech Republic for example, and the Article 5 is not activated for any reason or it doesn’t work because some countries may say we are not going to go into war with Russia for the Czech Republic in the end, no matter, they may not care about the NATO or Washington Treaty in the end. I don’t think that the United States would wage a war with Russia, which could spiral into nuclear war, just because of the Czech Republic or just because of a military base that has 300 soldiers.

Just like the United States didn’t really escalate the conflict with Russia in Georgia, and they had, what, 800 military advisors there helping to modernize the Georgian Army? Did it help the Georgians? No. So I think that I would, I’m one of those people who certainly put more emphasis on NATO than on this bilateral relationship because it’s an asymmetric relationship, the Czech Republic is too small, the United States is too big and I think that there would be a lot of discussions before the United States would go into some kind of major conflict, let’s say with Russia, just because of the Czech Republic. If it were because of NATO, because of Europe, because of other allies, then yes. So I’m skeptical on that threat.

SCHIN: Well some would say, and this was actually a common theme in Poland, that Article 5 is fine for major conflict but these agreements--in particular in Poland with the Patriot battery that they are getting but also the interceptors themselves--will lead to greater U.S. involvement in Poland which in and of itself will keep Russia from doing the little things that they’ve used as provocations in other places; interference on a lower level that couldn’t be justified a response under Article 5.

PEHE: It’s possible. It’s possible, I cannot exclude this, but my feeling is that a lot of this is driven by a certain lack of self-confidence here in our own democratic system. This is, some people argue or you can taste it in their arguments, we should be afraid of ourselves, but if we have the Americans here, our democracy will be stronger. And my point is that if we are not able to build a sound, healthy democracy on our own, no amount or volume of U.S. involvement will save us from ourselves.

The U.S. cannot do much about the fact that for example the Communists may win the elections here. What would they do, would they invade the country and overthrow the Communist government? No. So yes, I understand the argument about Russia, Russia’s interference and so on but again, going back to Georgia, it didn’t help the Georgians very much because the Russians have their own people among the elites working for them. They’re much more at home in Georgia, just like they are in Poland or the Czech Republic, working from behind so to speak and so my argument is that unless we can protect ourselves and our democratic institutions on our own, then we will not be safer just because we have Americans here.
SCHIN: Going back to what President Obama talked about while he was here, he basically laid out a couple conditions for the future of missile defense. First it’s predicated on a continued Iranian threat. And second it’s also contingent upon technical capabilities, being technically feasible. Did you see anything, reading between the lines, more than that, or is this more of a continuation of President Bush’s strategy?

PEHE: You know, it was one of those statements which—I was on Czech television when Obama spoke, and my first remark was look, this is the kind of statement that you could hear about a lot. Politicians on the right will interpret it as yes, the radar will be here, politicians on the left will say no, that means no radar. And this is still the case. I mean, these conditions are so broad and you can interpret them in such a broad way, such as for example the Iranian threat, what is it exactly? Where it becomes so great or so serious that Obama would say that no matter what it costs, we are going to put the anti-missile defense, we don’t know. It’s up to him and his advisors how to interpret this threat.

My feeling, my personal feeling is that it is slightly more in the direction of no radar. That given the budgetary constraints, given the fact that this is still not a system that works 100%, that yes there have been successful tests but in a controlled environment basically, and it can, if it continues, cost billions, will they approve it, put it on the back burner. I don’t say they will abolish it but it is just not a priority.

SCHIN: I think there’s a good chance that it will also not be a priority, but--

PEHE: One more thing, quite frankly also I think that if Iran does build its nuclear capability there is a great chance that it will escalate into some kind of conflict there. I remember—I will not name him—my conversation with a certain Israeli diplomat here whom I asked about this, I said what will you do if they get a nuclear bomb, what will you do? And he said they will never build it, we will not allow it, basically.

SCHIN: A lot of people would say that simply by demonstrating the capability to put a payload into orbit the Iranians have proven they have a ballistic missile capability, so you know that’s definitely something that could already be pointed to; they have the technology, they’ve demonstrated the technology.

PEHE: Do you know there’s another important aspect of this that no one has paid enough attention to, even in the articles about Iran in U.S. talk magazines, reports on foreign affairs and so on. No one has explained satisfactorily why the mutual deterrence that worked with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc wouldn’t work with Iran? You could argue it’s a theocratic regime, they are crazy, they would love to become martyrs, but would it go so far that they would be willing to sacrifice their whole country, their families? Why wouldn’t they have the same instincts that the Soviets had? They knew that if they ever got into a nuclear war they would be obliterated.
And here it would even be one-sided, they could do a lot of damage with nuclear warheads to some major U.S. cities, but then they would be obliterated completely, just deleted from the face of the Earth. So why wouldn’t this kind of deterrence work with them, that’s a good question that someone should ask.

SCHIN: Yeah, there are two views on that. The first is the fact their president has explicitly called for the elimination of Israel and so that has led to a lot of people saying they would use these weapons if they get them because they have very clearly stated that--

PEHE: Ideological--

SCHIN: Yes, ideologically it needs to be wiped off the map. On the other side, though, this was an interesting parallel that one of the Polish experts brought to my attention that was really quite interesting. He said that in the early nineties there were a lot of Western commentators who talked about how Poland could never become a Western-style democracy because it was too authoritarian, and very highly religious, almost a theocracy and it was impossible for a country like that to turn towards democracy, and obviously that’s now happened. And now we see a lot of the same words being applied to Iran and so it was an interesting parallel that he raised that he sees Poland almost like Iran in some ways.

PEHE: Not to speak of the fact that Iran was a democracy already, it had that experience, it’s not something that would have to be built completely from scratch but that’s besides the point…

SCHIN: It is, it’s outside the scope and if I start looking at that kind of stuff my paper would be hundreds of pages long. [We did not get into the discussion that in some of these countries that have recently acquired or are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons safeguards may be lax or insufficient, leading to rogue elements unconcerned about retaliation gaining control of the weapons.] Do you see this system perhaps being a provocation on the part of the United States towards the Russians?

PEHE: Well quite frankly not the system itself, but the way it was handled by the Bush Administration it occasionally looked like to us a small provocation, almost like pushing the Russians and telling them look, you have no business in telling us what we should do and what we can do in your former satellites. This bullying was partly there, how strong it was, I think to a large extent is was just a perception, and certainly on the part of Russia that perception was stronger than what would be warranted by any rational argument. I always thought the Russians don’t really think it’s a threat to them but they decided to use it, because they took and sort of escalated the conflict, otherwise they were looking for pretexts, and Putin needed to create this image for himself as a defender of Russian interests and so on.
So I think that it was in a way much more symbolically for both the Bush Administration and the Putin Administration than what it really was. And what the real meaning of that is. But you know, being a political scientist I also know that politics has its symbolic level, and things always work on a symbolic level as well. So there was an element of this sort of bullying and some people in the Bush Administration trying to see how far they can push the Russians and the Russians trying to find out how far they can push the Americans.

SCHIN: So with that said do you see any concessions that should be made on the U.S. or Russian side on this issue?

PEHE: Well the conditions, you can have a scale of concessions, one would be they simply sit down, they say either we will not build it because it’s not necessary, or we will build it but we will do it jointly. Because quite frankly if it is against Iranian or North Korean missiles, we are both threatened.

Or they will find some kind of a negotiated solution along the lines that [U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates suggested when he went to Russia a year and a half ago. When he came back here, to everyone’s surprise, he announced there could be Russian observers; at the time it was really a shock to everyone, but now perhaps it could be a possibility.

So again, once you remove this symbolic level of mutual bullying, it becomes somehow much easier to find some kind of consensus. An issue that seems to be such a big thorn in the mutual relationship becomes all of a sudden a minor issue.

So it could be that just because Obama brought a new culture into international affairs, and there are other issues like his plan to decrease the number of nuclear weapons--however realistic that is--that may be something that is good for the Russians and they may feel that okay, he’s locking us into some kind of a dialogue, making us an important partner, everyone around the globe can see we’re negotiating about the most important thing, reducing the risk of a nuclear holocaust. So maybe we could just stop talking about the radar and let the Americans do it.

SCHIN: So do you think that it could be explicitly tied to the follow-on negotiations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty?

PEHE: I think it will be. I think it’s a bargaining chip now, basically. That was something I thought in Obama’s remarks, that when he connected this with the next part of his speech on nuclear disarmament he was basically telling the Russians, the words between the lines, look, this is not such an important thing for us, we can play with it. If Iran behaves, we won’t build it. If we can have Russia as our partner because we are working together on nuclear disarmament, and we work on other projects, we don’t need it.
So I think that at this point it’s become much more of a bargaining chip than it was under the Bush Administration, which I think wanted to build it simply because it was part of the Star Wars system, maybe because there were some--I don’t know, this is too brazen of me--friends in the arms industries and so on who were waiting for the contracts.

SCHIN: Do you think though that if it is made part of the follow-on agreements that it could be seen as the U.S. backing down on the issue? If basically they agreed to not follow through with missile defense and it could be traced back simply to the Russians don’t want it to happen, could that have an impact on the security of the region?

PEHE: Yes, yes, that would certainly, if it were perceived as if the United States were backing down just because of Russian pressure, then it would certainly impact this region, I mean, psychologically. Because then this is what you can already read in many commentaries; Obama is naïve and the Russians will try to play the same game with him that they tried to play with John Kennedy in the beginning. He has to show them in the end that he is tough, so certainly.

If he made a concession like that just because the Russians don’t want it and he would get nothing in return, that would cause a lot of uneasiness or fear, certainly among a lot of top commentators here and the influence could be felt but I don’t think that he is that naïve. He’s got people around him who’ve been working on Russia for a long time and they know that you don’t give Russians something for nothing. That’s the biggest mistake you can make.

SCHIN: No doubt. So how do you view those Russian statements that talk about explicitly targeting elements of missile defense if they’re placed here?

PEHE: I don’t know how many people were worried by that quite frankly. I mean, we talked about the fears and so on, some people felt that we could become a target--but people have thought that already when Iran and North Korea were mentioned and maybe it became more pronounced. On the other hand as [former Czech] President Havel liked to say, everyone knows the system is no threat to Russia because it can intercept five to ten missiles, and Russian has thousands of missiles. So what are the Russians telling us?

They are telling us that they are making us a target because of this small system, they can do that even without a system if they are so eager. So really when you analyze what Russians say you always have to think about posturing and what they do only for the effect, how serious they are, what will they target and when could they use it. They could use it only if some magic conflict started, and then it would not be about targeting, already they are in Brdy, there would be a nuclear war.

I am not sure what it means from them. I think that it’s just a psychological game they are playing, they’re just trying to influence the feebleminded who get scared by this and they think now Russia’s going to attack us.
SCHIN: It’s almost like they couldn’t think of another reason to talk about, when the real reason would be the Americans coming into the near abroad, into their sphere of influence. So the question that led to is, how does a larger American footprint in that traditional Russian sphere of influence change the stability of the region?

PEHE: Well it has changed the balance of power in the region. I don’t know how it changes the stability of the region. Certainly Russia doesn’t take it lightly that the Americans are present in some of the countries that were in the Russian sphere of influence.

On the other hand many people here are of the opinion that it’s the business of each country, that as long as those governments are sovereign governments recognized by the United Nations they have the right to decide whom they want to have an alliance with—whether they want American soldiers there, whether they want American weapons or Russian weapons, so again this is just a slightly misconstrued Russian concept of their global role. You know, someone said here whatever territory the Russians have their foot on they will consider theirs until the end of time. So I wouldn’t really care so much about how it changes the stability, it’s a game, and one thing is certain, the Russians are not going to go into a major war because they think that Americans should not be in, say, Ukraine.

SCHIN: But do you see them perhaps undermining things in smaller ways?

PEHE: They do anyway. That’s what they do all the time, no matter whether there is a radar or not. They have people working busily here on buying parts of Czech energy companies, energy suppliers. They are trying to buy gas companies in Eastern Europe, they are trying to buy Czech Airlines. Their argument is, we are now in a market economy and this is just capitalism so why shouldn’t we get involved, but everyone knows that in Russia things are not as simple as they are in this respect in the West.

It means that if Aeroflot want to buy Czech Airlines it is not like Delta Airlines buying Czech Airlines, for many reasons. So they are here, working busily and this could take me back to what I said before, this is what we have to deal with, what we have to solve, and we should not fall into their hands because the Americans cannot help us anyway. The fact that we have a radar based in Brdy and at the same time we will sell Czech Airlines to Aeroflot will not make us safer. More I should say, the sale will make us less safe.

SCHIN: And I would say there were specific actions that can be tied to specific missile defense related actions, turning off the gas the day after signing the agreement.

PEHE: I know and it was a very interesting development for me, because I thought it argued that being a country in the middle of Europe which is part of NATO and the European Union on the one hand, and wanting to have strong bilateral relations with the United States, we simply cannot escape the fact that security has many different
dimensions. And more geopolitically, as far as who our allies and so on but also issues. And for certain issues we are certainly better protected by the Americans. The military power of America is unmatched, in a straightforward military conflict or whatever of that sort we are certainly better protected by the United States than by the European Union, which is not able to get its act together.

But then you have an issue such as energy security where it turns out that when it happens--and it is a very good illustration, it happened the day after the agreement was signed with [then-U.S. Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice here--what did our politicians do? Did they go to Washington to ask for help? No, they all ran to Brussels to ask for help. So obviously an action that was provoked by a bilateral action between the Czech Republic and the United States which was supposed to give us more security provoked the Russians into something that decreased our security in a different area, that is, energy security. Did we go and ask Washington to send us tankers with oil to protect us from this threat, no, we went to Brussels and begged in Brussels, please, let’s get united and let’s put pressure on Russia. So what I’m saying is that it’s not black and white and that really as a small country in the middle of Europe we have to always play this balancing act, and I’m afraid that some politicians here have not been able to do it very well.

SCHIN: Do you have concerns about how well the system itself works? Speaking specifically about the integration of the radar and the proposed interceptors, because it’s obvious that the radar system is not a problem.

PEHE: This is one thing that quite frankly made me angry when I heard some comments by some Czech politicians. Some politicians on the left who oppose the radar were getting into this kind of thing, is it feasible? “Oh, we know it’s not feasible, we know it’s not technically there, it’s not feasible.” I was always thinking, what do you care? You are not paying a penny for this! You are giving a piece of land to the United States and it’s their business whether it works or not.

Of course, you may argue it attracts all of those security threats to us and at the same time it’s not even working, you know you could argue that, but it was this technical argument by some Czech politicians who were becoming experts on the anti-missile defense arguing, it’s not working, as if they were spending the money.

Yes, I do have doubts, because I have seen a few tests, and they looked successful on the TV screen but I know that they were conducted in a controlled environment. It’s not that suddenly someone somewhere launched a missile and then this system shot it down over Alaska, it was that they knew in advance that the missile would be launched, and they were trying to hit it in exactly the spot that they knew about in advance. So that’s different from a real situation and from that point of view I think we are still miles away from a real functioning system, but that takes me back to what I said in the beginning. I don’t think the Czechs should really worry about it too much. The majority of Czechs who are in favor of the radar want it not because they care about whether it works or not, but because they want an American base here.
SCHIN: But of course a very small percentage overall of the Czechs are in favor of it, the most recent number is 68% against?

PEHE: Maybe two-thirds against, and one-third in favor, yes.

SCHIN: And that stayed pretty constant here in the Czech Republic.

PEHE: It’s very constant, even in Poland in general.

SCHIN: Well in Poland someone at one of the institutes there showed me some numbers where it has fluctuated more in Poland, in particular last August. Last August, the Russian-Georgian conflict actually led to a spike in favor of the system.

PEHE: It was a small movement after the conflict here as well, in favor. But not much. And I simply think that first Czechs do not feel as threatened by Russia so the intensity of that threat is not so strong, and second this is a nation very different from Poland. This is a nation that somehow believes it can always escape from big historical calamities, and we may get occupied or something but it doesn’t mean we actually have to go into war.

SCHIN: So a Good Soldier Švejk kind of thing?

PEHE: Exactly, this is why you have Prague—you were in Poland, you are now here, so you know that Warsaw was completely destroyed and looks like a city that was completely destroyed but here you have this splendid city, why? Because we have not fought in any war for 300 years, we give up. And that is also why I would be very careful if I were any general in the United States to make the Czech Republic an ally that you have to depend on, quite frankly, for anything.

SCHIN: Pulling back a little bit and looking at the overall strategic stability, not just of the region, this system itself is going to have the possibility to change deterrence on its face. If more of these systems are put in place, it could in theory make Russia feel—and apparently it already has made Russia feel—that the United States could sustain a first strike capability without the Russians being able to retaliate. Is that something the Czech people are thinking about when they talk about the pros and cons of this system?

PEHE: I don’t think that discussions here are that sophisticated, you know, that people think this far. And what you’ve made is a fairy sophisticated security argument which certainly plays a role in all of this, but I think ordinary people don’t think about it at all. And also I think that common sense would suggest that Russia may be on the surface, on the rhetorical level, afraid of this, but again, for Russia if this should become a threat for Russia, it would have to be much more massive then building a small base in the Czech Republic and in Poland. It would have to be an orchestrated effort to build a network of these sites across Europe and elsewhere to create a wall, it would be on the Arctic Circle, the Russians know that, they know that this is no match and will not be any match for
them for many years to come, as long as they have thousands of missiles. And so I really I’m not really sure that it plays an important role in peoples minds.

SCHIN: Do you see specific positives related to the emplacement of the system, as opposed to some of the negatives we’ve already talked about?

PEHE: Positives, well, of course it makes our ties to the United States stronger. On the other hand of course I’m one of the people who criticized the fact that it should be making our ties with NATO stronger, not with the United States, and this is because there is a certain divisive effect connected to this. A lot of our allies in NATO and the European Union have complained about this, that the Czechs are becoming a Trojan Horse of the United States in the European Union.

And I don’t think this country needs to be in this position because you never know who may help you or whom you may need to help you in the future. It may be that on some issues, as I said, the United States and in some other issues maybe the European Union or some European countries, so one should be more balanced.

But in general of course it strengthens our relationship with the United States, it shows a degree of gratitude which has registered now in Washington--that we are paying back what the United States did for us. For me personally I have not had a problem with placing the system itself here for a very simple reason, which I have articulated with the people who are against it. One of the professors here, Tomas Klvana, was the government spokesman for radar for a period of time. He asked some of us here to help him with his campaign.

My argument was, look, it has all of these bad connotations that you see with it but at the same time, if you live in a dangerous neighborhood and you don’t have enough money, but you have a rich neighbor, and he offers to share an alarm system with you, why would you not accept it? You live in a bad neighborhood which is not safe, you have break-ins all the time into houses in the neighborhood, now you have a neighbor that says I have this alarm system, but because of other considerations, I need an advance element or a segment of it in your house, it will protect you as well, why not? And that was usually the kind of argument that many people didn’t find answers to. Why not? I mean, is the world safe? Do I have an alarm system in my own house? I do! And do I ask my neighbor across the street whether he likes it or not? No I don’t! So why should I ask the Russians if they like it or not. It’s not against them as long as it’s not them who come into my house to steal something, right?

SCHIN: At least not yet. We talked a little bit about theater missile defense, a NATO version of it and something that when I talked to the MOD, they actually emphasized the fact that this bilateral or trilateral U.S.-Czech, U.S.-Polish system is complementary to NATO theater missile defense, they think that it’s an integral part of it, it’s one of the pillars of NATO theater missile defense. Do you share that view?
PEHE: Well I hope it is the case and certainly NATO has made steps towards it. What I find troubling is that the whole thing was not handled in a positive sequence, the sequence of events was not very positive. That is it should have started with negotiations in Brussels between the Americans and NATO and it should have been a NATO project from the beginning, whose first segment is built in the Czech Republic. But to start the whole thing by saying this is a segment of an American system built in the Czech Republic and it eventually may become part of a large NATO system, I think that made a lot of people unhappy, and a lot of our allies in NATO unhappy that we are sort of putting our interests above the interests of the Alliance. So I would certainly be happy if it became part of NATO but the question is whether there is enough will now to go that way.

SCHIN: That is a very good question right now. That’s actually the list of questions that I have, I’m sure we could talk about this for a long time--

PEHE: No, not really, I think I’ve said everything.

SCHIN: Alright, excellent. In that case thanks again, I appreciate it. Any other closing comments?

PEHE: I have a friend who was the vice president of Charles University and also their head of the sociology department. One of his colleagues was an external adjunct who lectured, who was doing a course at Charles University. He came to my friend in the middle of a semester, and he said, I’m finished. And the department head and vice-president of the University said, are you crazy, or what? Finished in the middle of the semester! My friend said, why, what happened? He said, I have nothing else to say to my students.

SCHIN: That’s an appropriate ending for sure.
APPENDIX F.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. OLDŘICH ČERNÝ

The following is a transcript of an interview with Mr. Oldřich Černý, Executive Director, Prague Security Studies Institute, 17 April 2009, in Prague, Czech Republic:

SCHIN: How do you think the agreements for the missile defense system will help or hurt your country’s security?

ČERNÝ: This is a good question. It is important to point out that security is an extremely important issue in this region, but in our debate about greater security, it’s a tough issue. I mean the tough issue is a psychological one. And so this is what the debate was about, I don’t whether you followed it or not, and whether you heard all of the arguments of both sides, but if you followed it closely you would find out the debate was not so much about security but about the practical impact of the installation and about the psychological effects of it. I was always pro-radar, pro-the whole system, radar combined with interceptors in Poland, even though I had doubts that it would really work 100%, because for me it was a psychological issue. So because it would enhance the American presence in Europe, and now we come to security, and therefore enhanced security of this country.

SCHIN: And that’s actually one of the next questions I had, talking about whether you believe in the efficacy of, or how well, the system works, but by the same token how much that really matters.

ČERNÝ: Right, I’m not an expert on radars, I’m not a technician, I’m not an expert on interceptors, I’m sure that the radar, if it would have been installed here in this country it would have worked, I mean radar works everywhere. But I’m not sure how it would work at least at first in combination with this other part in Poland, but judging by past experiences, like for example the American space program and a few other projects, it usually doesn’t work the way the architects of the programs would wish at first but it’s a kind of gradual process and eventually it works out. But as I said it’s a gradual process and you could see it, I follow the tests only very much from a distance and not really very carefully but it sometimes works, sometimes it doesn’t. So it’s getting better but it will take some time. And I realize that there are other variations that it may have, like a space variation, the Aegis variation, and so on.

SCHIN: Now as those systems improve and they lead to a greater chance that we will place the system here, do you see a change in the way the new U.S. Administration is pursuing it, does that change the equation?

ČERNÝ: Yes, certainly, the new Administration is basically saying let’s first make some gestures to the Iranians, let’s talk to the Russians, let’s see how those talks will develop. What will be the conclusions of this? When Obama was here, I couldn’t help notice he
called Iran not Iran like Bush always did, but the Iranian Islamic Republic, which is the official title, and he keeps to it.

So I suppose that the U.S. is developing some efforts to somehow open some kind of dialog with the Iranians. I’m not a great believer that they will succeed. So I’m not sure about the Russians but for proponents of the radar in this country, the tone of the new American administration is a little bit disappointing.

With Bush there was a very strong determination to go through with the project and now a lot of people here think that the U.S. is somehow wavering. So if you read what President Obama said, it was funny how it was interpreted by the Czech political spectrum. The socialists said, well, he confirmed that we were always right about the radar, and the governing right-central coalition said, no, he confirmed that we were always right, and so on down the line on this issue of the position of the new American administration.

SCHIN: How do you view the Russian statements that they’ll target your country?

ČERNÝ: Russia in general has been flexing its muscles for the past five or six years, they got out of the slump they were in for most of the ‘90s. They are again beginning to think in a sort of imperial way, but I view their statements as being directed mostly towards inside Russia, showing the average Russians that we are back on the scene, we are back in the game, and they must deal with us, so this is how I perceive it.

I think that there were some honest offers to the Russians and I know that we somehow engaged them in the process, but anti-missile defense showed that these talks would be reopened and we’ll see what happens. Now we are in the waiting stage. So you wait, it’s not in our hands anymore, so to speak. Given the current political situation here, as you know we’re in a government crisis, the most stupid government crisis you can imagine, in the time that we need it the least. And so before President Obama came, I talked to the Washington Post and I said that on the issue of radar, that radar is right now on the shelf, but it’s not out of the story yet. Unfortunately they only quoted the first half of my sentence! There’s nothing you can do about the journalists.

SCHIN: Right, do you think that the Russians are going to make the missile defense an integral part of the negotiations for the next treaty, for the follow-on to START?

ČERNÝ: I think they will. I mean they would be stupid if they did not. Because this is getting quite a great deal of leverage.

SCHIN: Do you think that will cause the negotiations to fail?

ČERNÝ: I don’t know, I think that the most optimistic outcome is probably not going to happen, that they would be engaged into the system, somehow engaged to participate in it. I mean, they have North Korea, they have argument with China.
SCHIN: Do you see that this system could possibly be a provocation by the United States against the Russians?

ČERNÝ: No, I know it was perceived as a provocation, all of those threats about deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, the North Sea area. No, I think that the Russians know that they are not threatened by it. It’s all a matter of psychology, esteem, and so on you know.

SCHIN: What they’re threatened by is the U.S. being in their traditional sphere of influence?

ČERNÝ: Precisely. I don’t know what they are doing about those maneuvers in Georgia. They’re outraged. Russians waged war on Georgian territory, they unitarily declared independence of those two separatist entities and so on and so forth, now they are outraged about the NATO military maneuvers in that country.

SCHIN: And now it seems that they might be pushing it further, I was reading reports yesterday that a Russian fleet is getting close to the Georgian coast, they say they might be going there to ensure the stability of the country because of the riots…that points to perhaps one of the reasons why the radar systems is symbolic of a greater partnership because obviously Georgia’s not part of NATO, not part of the EU, so there was not as much reason to protect them. You have Article 5 protections with NATO, but as we saw with Estonia, just because you have Article 5 protections doesn’t mean you can prevent, say, cyber attacks.

ČERNÝ: Right.

SCHIN: Do you see that coming into any of the decisions, could that possibly be used a wedge?

ČERNÝ: Not at this moment, this is the time when we are waiting. We are waiting, they are waiting, and the new American administration is talking about developing a new initiative. So far nothing much has happened in this regard, these things take time, and they also take time for psychological adjustments. The Russians will have to get used to the fact that they are dealing with new people in Washington, which they didn’t seem to realize when Obama got elected, judging by certain statements that Medvedev made, so they are also going to have to adjust somehow to this new situation.

SCHIN: What specific positives do you see as a result of this system, or the agreement to place the system here?

ČERNÝ: Well, as I said, in my opinion an American military presence on the territory of this country will have a small, it’s not big, impact. A traditional base will enhance the already good existing ties with the U.S. and would serve as a sort of wall for our security,
a safety wall for the security of this country. For me, this is my view, it’s a huge psychological impact. And it’s a very durable security policy with NATO Article 5 and an American military presence.

But I’m saying this because this is something that those who are against it realize and are aware of and this is why they are against it, because it would cement this security situation, certainly it would do that, and that would be it. This is why they’re using this very primitive argument, but somehow it works. I mean the same people who condoned the presence of Russian troops in this country are saying look, we had Russians for 20 years, why should we let the Americans in, we finally got rid of the Russians only to let in the Americans. This is what works and what strikes a chord, this false notion of national pride, this is what works in the pubs, it works in the villages, and so on and so on. And this is the main argument. It’s not a security issue. We are a strange country.

SCHIN: Then do you see any negatives to the agreements?

ČERNÝ: Not really.

SCHIN: Now what about the concept that by putting these systems in--this is a much more sophisticated argument--but by placing the interceptors in Poland and the radar system here, you are decreasing the ability to provide deterrence, and therefore possibly increasing the instability of the region. Is that a possibility? Do you see that as a possible result?

ČERNÝ: No, I don’t think so. I know there is this argument which is often used in debates but it will require certain psychological adjustments on both sides, the Russians would eventually have to get used to it. There is one way to somehow make it more palatable for them and the so-called “NATOization” of the system but so far this is just talk. I organized a little conference about two years ago in Washington in cooperation with the U.S. Atlantic Council and we made use of the opportunity, we made use of the fact that the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg was there as well so we were set to open and I proposed to him, what can we look for in this context of this conference, and he just said please, make those American friends say NATO, at least once! So that was two years ago when so-called “NATOization” on the topic of radar wasn’t part of the agenda, now it is, at least superficially.

SCHIN: That part seems to be one of the big pushes from the Ministry of Defense here as well, that this system will provide one of the pillars for NATO theater missile defense. But I have talked to people both here and in Poland that have said that’s not really true, or this system really isn’t going to be integrated very well.

ČERNÝ: Well I don’t know, I am not an expert on technical things, but, at least it has started the debate on NATO’s corners, whether this debate will be transferred to drawing rules still remains to be seen.
SCHIN: So I would say that it seems most likely the Obama Administration will draw the process out much longer than the Bush Administration wanted to. It seems they’re more concerned with (a), making sure the system actually works before they emplace it instead of doing it concurrently, and (b), the concern with whether or not Iran actually is pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology.

ČERNÝ: This is basically what Obama said here, you know, I could hear him from here, actually.

SCHIN: Do you think that stretching it out like that, would that be advantageous to getting passage of the radar system approved in the Czech parliament’s lower house?

ČERNÝ: No. No, because on both sides are dead set against each other and this is not going to help very much, and the Russian threat will be promoted again by both sides, exaggerated by one side and underestimated by the other side. Everything depends on the outcome of our next general elections. And I’m not very optimistic about it. As you know there is this agreement between the U.S. administration and Czech government signed quite some time ago and actually it was ratified by the Czech Senát but the current government coalition a couple of months ago decided to withdraw the ratification from the parliamentary floor because there was no way it be able to get it approved.

But these efforts will continue, everything will depend on the outcome of the next general elections and if the outcome is even remotely positive I’m sure that this issue will be back in the parliament, no one knows what is going to happen next. The radar, if it’s actually moved from the place in the past year or not, we signed the treaty to at least make a platform out of its ratification by both houses of the parliament. So as I say it may take three, four months, it may take two years, but actually no matter what is going to happen with it, by the time it will be ratified it may be a very curious situation and by the time the treaty is ratified by the Czech parliament the whole concept could be scrapped and replace by something else that has nothing to do with the Czech Republic, or Poland for that matter.

SCHIN: If new elections are held in the fall and if the Social Democrats gain seats and perhaps gain power again, do you see them perhaps changing their views on missile defense again?

ČERNÝ: They could, they could. Should they feel that they somehow can swing public opinion and given the fact that the U.S. administration is giving all the right noises and promises and so on, after all it was the Social Democrats who were so forthcoming with the U.S. when the first negotiations began, when the first representative of the Bush Administration was sort of feeling out the Czechs about it, so I mean the Social Democrats are not a very principled lot.

SCHIN: If the U.S. does decide on their side the treaty’s not important anymore or if they decide not to go forward with the system, there are a couple of reasons why they
might decide to do that. Either it means that either the reason President Obama gave, or
because they’re backing down on Russian demands. So how would you view those
possibilities?

ČERNÝ: Well there is something to that, it’s what’s called realpolitik, you know.

SCHIN: So if it does become clear, and it might not become clear that this would
happen, but if it did become clear that the U.S. decided not to emplace the systems
mainly because of Russian determination against it, what kind of impact would this have?

ČERNÝ: If the U.S. administration decided not to employ the system because the
Russian Administration is against it, I would stop feeling sorry but I would start feeling
afraid. I would start to worry a lot, about the U.S. administration, and its determination
to not to betray us again as President Obama so eloquently said around the corner from
here a few days ago.

SCHIN: It does seem that the words he spoke were definitely interpreted differently be a
lot of people here. Do you think it was pretty much as black and white as the statement
seemed, or do you think there was something to be read between the lines?

ČERNÝ: I think that there was something being read between the lines, yes, right now
the Czechs are trying to develop so many initiatives, so if those initiatives will fail then
we may go back to this history of radar. It’s just a game, but only after, and so on and so
on, and this part of his speech, it’s a very short part of his speech but it was pretty fuzzy.

SCHIN: We talked a little bit about Article 5 already, but in Poland especially, they
really put forth the concept that American troops in the country are a further guarantee
above and beyond Article 5. You kind of mentioned a little bit of the same, but do you
think there’s a point where there are too many U.S. troops, or is there a limit to how
many U.S. troops in the Czech Republic would be helpful, or would increase security?

ČERNÝ: No, I think this U.S. installation, which is operated by U.S. military personnel
as far as I’m concerned, so I just can’t imagine any bigger military base in this country
and I don’t know why, for what strategy, or what geopolitical reasons. There should be
one in here, that’s why this idea of the radar was such a comfortable idea.

SCHIN: Well, one way to look at it would be as the intrusion of the U.S. on the
traditional Russian sphere of influence, to show the U.S. does not believe in the sphere of
influence idea. Do you believe that’s dangerous at all?

ČERNÝ: I wouldn’t call it dangerous, but if you look at the Russian views towards the
enlargement of NATO, in the first stage when it came to Poland and the Czech Republic
and Hungary and the way they eventually went down, and actually, I don’t know these
days. Talk to Schneider, he’s the geopolitical expert.
SCHIN: Right, you know, I talk to him next. How do you see Czech attitudes in general changing towards this program over time? Will the change in U.S. Administrations help these attitudes?

ČERNÝ: As I said it depends on the outcome of the elections, if the right-central coalition is strong hopefully it will learn from its past mistakes, they weren’t able to sell this idea to the people initially, so their propaganda that was far less effective as that of the other side’s. I mean, PSSI did our best, we did this major conference in Washington, we had [U.S. Missile Defense Agency Director Lt Gen Henry] Obering here in Prague a year ago and we were quite active in dealing with the media, but right now you are talking to one-third of the institute.

SCHIN: What impact do you think these agreements have already had on U.S.-Czech relations?

ČERNÝ: Well I think that they more or less prove the Czechs are a good ally, that the Czechs are not as anti-American as some people elsewhere in Europe. Actually this country was extremely pro-American after 1989, one of your Ambassadors, William Cabaniss, who when he first visited the town of Plzen, which was liberated by Patton, and took part in the celebration of liberation, he came back and he told me that Plzen was much more American than some of the American cities he could think of. But the fashion among young people eventually came here, so those are people who are in their early twenties, for whom life under Communism is something very distant, something they can’t imagine. So it’s an era of dinosaurs, and being anti-establishment it also means--in this country--being anti-American. It’s part of the lifestyle. Hopefully Churchill’s dictum about your younger days will eventually be proven true.

SCHIN: If the parliament cannot pass the agreement what impact would that have on U.S.-Czech relations?

ČERNÝ: Well, slightly detrimental. Because it will be a manifestation of the fact that we are not such a good ally after all. There’s an interesting thing by former [Czech] President Havel on this, his position on this is very simple; they’re our friends, we made a commitment, let’s try to keep it, it’s the least we can do for them.

SCHIN: That may be difficult to do, some people would definitely say that a part of the reason for the fall of the government a few weeks ago was the government’s support for the radar. So in that vein, do you think that Jan Fischer will have any kind of impact on this one way or the other?

ČERNÝ: No. I don’t think so. I think they will completely discard this issue for the tenure of their government. It will be a classic caretaker government. Budget will be one of their biggest worries because it’s something that must go on regardless of the political situation. They must at least finish the preparatory stages. They will have to somehow,
in a dignified way, lead us to the end of the Czech Presidency of the EU now and it will be very, very difficult.

I am slightly worried when I look at the composition of the government because the still current Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg was a former chairman of Helsinki Watch before 1989, and he cooperated with people from the Charter 77 movement here, and then he was Havel’s chancellor and he is still one of his closest friends. Actually he’s Havel’s landlord these days because Havel’s office is located in his place downtown. As you can imagine he’s a very benevolent landlord. Havel says he’s paying market price for this but I think he doesn’t know what market price is.

And this man is replaced by a career diplomat who studied in Moscow at this very prestigious, but from our point of view, slightly suspicious, MGIMO--State Institute of International Relations. And the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs goes from Saša Vondra, who was also part of the Charter 77 movement, those are two surviving dissidents in Czech politics. So with Havel not part of the scene anymore, so not with a lot of influence, and this man is replaced by another democratic lightweight, Mr. [Štefan] Füle.

So that gives you get this list of the ministers and both of them were members of the Communist Party, and they did not because of their convictions but they did it for their careers, and there are some other strange people in here, but this is a caretaker government, most of the people with no huge political ambitions, I mean Mr. Fischer made sure before he accepted this offer to become caretaker Prime Minister that when this part of his career is over he will go back to heading this Czech statistical office.

SCHIN: So they won’t have any real impact on the missile defense one way or the other?

ČERNÝ: No.

SCHIN: That gives the U.S. and Russia a few months to work on the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty without maybe this issue coming up here, if like we talked about during those negotiations it comes to where the U.S. takes the system off the table because of the negotiations, would you see then anything here in the Czech Republic, even with a caretaker government, about the U.S. starting a commitment and then pulling out of a commitment, would there be backlash there?

ČERNÝ: I think the U.S. administration would have to explain this to the Czechs in a very detailed and convincing way that this is not the case. It would be quite hard.

SCHIN: But by that same token since something like 68% of the Czech people are against the radar system, do you think that simply because those numbers are so big that any reason for the U.S. to pull out of the agreements would be seen like almost a victory?
ČERNÝ: By these people, by the Russians, yes, and it’s just statistics, 68%, 65% and so on. I’m old enough and I still remember the beginning of the ‘80s, the Russians deployed mid-range missiles and the U.S. decided to make this counter-move and I still remember those huge demonstrations in some West European towns, in London, in West Berlin, and elsewhere protesting about the deployment of the U.S. mid-range missiles and that was the time when English officials, policemen had better wear motorcyclist helmets. There were always calls for the referendum and much of it was orchestrated by the Russians and I think there is a Russian hand in what has been happening here; it would be extremely difficult to pinpoint it and detect it because they are clever, they are doing it from some company registered in, say, Luxembourg. It would be bought somewhere in the Caribbean and so on. And who paid for all those big billboards that lined the main roads of this country some months ago?

But anyway back to this question of public opinion, so public opinion in the West was usually against this American move to counter the Soviet move and if the Western politicians gave up on this or caved in you and I would not likely be sitting here today, you know, most likely. The Cold War would have developed in a slightly different way, it would probably be longer, the U.S. would not out-arm the Soviets, good luck in the East, so when it comes to important security issues you know the popular referendum is absolute nonsense.

SCHIN: Do you see that Russian hand in other more explicit Russian activities, in shutting off the gas the day after the agreement was signed, other problems of that nature, do you see those kinds of actions increasing if the system gets emplaced?

ČERNÝ: Yes, they’re definitely using this gas situation as a very effective leverage. There were actually some stoppages in supply and they very strangely coincided on that day of the year so yes.

SCHIN: If so, do you think that that has potential to cause enough trouble to make the Czech government even more unstable?

ČERNÝ: It could lead to that, yes. I mean, this energy dependence on the Russians, we are not 100% dependent on the Russians, at least we have the pipeline connecting this country to Ingolstadt in Germany [the Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvínov pipeline]. I mean it’s still Russian oil but at least the taps are controlled by some other people and 25% of our natural gas comes from Norway. It should be even more diversified, but still it would have an impact. And people tend to think differently when they are cold, freezing, and in the dark.

SCHIN: Right. With that said, is there a potential from that side for the system to hurt your country’s security? Would the presence of this system outweigh the possibility?
ČERNÝ: I don’t think that such a thing would happen but it’s not exactly unimaginable.

SCHIN: That’s all of my questions. Thanks a lot, I appreciate your time.
APPENDIX G.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JIŘÍ SCHNEIDER

The following is a transcript of an interview with Mr. Jiří Schneider, Program Director, Prague Security Studies Institute, 17 April 2009, in Prague, Czech Republic:

SCHIN: I’ll start out with the overall question, we’ll probably get back to this numerous times, but how do you feel that the agreements that the U.S. and the Czech Republic have signed have impacted the strategic stability or the stability of the Czech Republic?

SCHNEIDER: You mean in Europe or internal?

SCHIN: Let’s say specific to Central Europe.

SCHNEIDER: Yes, the strategic stability of Central Europe. Well, I think there are two levels. One is the psychological level or symbolic level and the other one is the factual capability level. It’s no doubt that on the capability level, first of all the treaty isn’t being implemented yet, but even if they are implemented, they wouldn’t mean anything in terms of capability changing, in terms of strategic balance, in answer to Europe as a whole.

But on the political, psychological level, of course, it has shaken the balance, because the U.S., the Pentagon, and the whole administration were trying to sell this to the Russians. They didn’t succeed and they didn’t prevent Russia using it as a pretext for some quite adventurous posturing. And I mean this posturing of course has impact on the strategic situation in the region. And that was basically the aim of Russia, to challenge what has been achieved--the strategic shift in recent years. So briefly this is my answer to that. I would divide it into these two levels.

SCHIN: And we’ll explore that more, but do you think with that said, is this system a provocation by the United States against Russia? That it was designed to provoke some reaction?

SCHNEIDER: No, not at all. That’s why I think it was managed carefully, so to say. And there are a lot of possibilities to do it in a more intelligent way, which would prevent the Russians from rejecting it straightforwardly. There were several offers and several proposals from both sides, from the U.S. and from Russia, also, to do things together. Especially around and after 9/11, around debates about the ABM Treaty, the SORT-of Treaty--it’s SORT, but people call it SORT-of Treaty--I mean, 2002, 2003, you know, there was a chance.

But at this time the administration didn’t have enough attention and capability because of Iraq. And everything was focused on Iraq. And they were not attentive to manage this in a proper way. I mean it’s just about playing games in a more sophisticated way.
Accepting an offer by [then-Russian President Vladimir] Putin and saying let’s go into that and then it would be much more difficult for the Russians to say this is not leading anywhere, I mean the ball would be on their side, and now to change completely the framework. So yeah, at that time, I’m not wise, at that time we didn’t realize it either—that in order to prepare the productive atmosphere with Russia that should have been done. But we hadn’t realized it either.

SCHIN: So with that said, how has the system either helped or hurt your country’s security?

SCHNEIDER: Well, I think there is a political impact, but I wouldn’t say security is in question. These were threats, and they hadn’t moved any system closer to us, this was just rhetorical posturing. So even the damage it has caused is on a political level and not on a hard security level. So there was no immediate damage to the security.

However, it has challenged the status of Poland and the Czech Republic as really full-fledged NATO members and it has undermined this notion of people’s security and all member countries successfully. Because driving the wedge between old and new member countries is especially offensive because it undermines the status of these countries and of our allies. There are plenty of U.S. installations all over Europe and they’re just unnoticed. There’s this connection, as if this is a kind of precedent which is so dangerous. So I think this has been lost and the damage was a political one, not a security one.

SCHIN: And overall you’re right the rhetoric has been very strong from the Russians however it wasn’t backed up by a lot of action. But there have been a few actions, for example, when the Czech Republic signed the agreement, the next day they shut off the gas. Do you see incidents like that increasing as the missile defense system moves forward? Do you see that the Russians might try to use even more overt means that can impact your country?

SCHNEIDER: I think for Russia this is just one element of the game. They would like to exert their influence in Europe. The new member countries, the former part of the Soviet Empire, they are the easiest prey. So missile defense is a wonderful pretext for that. But there are a lot of other areas and arenas where they are trying to--I wouldn’t call it infiltrate, but to exert their influence in various areas. So it’s just one of these.

And they will keep doing that, because contrary to what they say about the European Union, they are very much dependent on it and they know how much they are dependent on the European Union. So they are trying to develop the interest space and promote their interests. So they’re trying to participate in acquisitions, mergers, economic influence, not only in the energy field, but they have a separate strategy for the energy regardless of what’s going on at the strategic level. So they will keep doing that and it was just done in an ambiguous way, I mean they actually maintain this right to decline
that it has anything to do with political level, it’s not basically threatening and it’s a
technical issue, legal stuff.

SCHIN: You talked about the difference between old and new Europe. Do you think
that Article 5 is being applied differently, or could be applied differently in the future,
between old and new Europe?

SCHNEIDER: I think Georgia was a wake-up call. And it caused enormous concerns
for military planners. Because there was no contingency plan for the Baltic states, and
you know that. There was an uproar, I would say, they realized—and still the plans are
not there—but they realized, aha, there is a problem. So it was more about Georgia than
about this thing, but obviously the Poles—especially Poland—keeps saying Article 5, does
it go beyond the political level? NATO is a political-military thing, so, back to core
missions, unless we will be safe with Article 5 we’ll not be ready to go on out of area
missions.

These kinds of arguments, they are just strengthened by this missile defense debate as
well. Because basically the missile defense debate is about the same security for old
European allies and it’s one of the key elements of that. And it’s also one of the weakest
points because these two installations are not covering the whole of Europe so it’s about a
multi-layered system, which will in the end provide defense for all member states. So
yes, it is part of the events or issues which are invoking this debate about Article 5.

SCHIN: And one of the concerns that I heard in Poland is that Article 5 isn’t as strong as
it could be because it doesn’t take into account situations such as Estonia, when you had
the cyber attacks and the undermining of the Estonian government—but not in an overt
military way, not in a way that could trigger an Article 5 defense. Do you think that by
having a U.S. installation here, or by having U.S. troops here, does that increase your
country’s security outside of Article 5 provisions? Is it a way to hedge against Russian
influence in a different way?

SCHNEIDER: Clearly the motivation which was behind accepting this at the beginning
of these talks, accepting this offer to start talking about it, was a clear notion that Article
5 is very general commitment, and it very much depends on the real planning. And in a
way it’s much more difficult for a most important ally like the United States to insist on a
loose interpretation of Article 5 if they have soldiers which are hosted by an ally.

So there was a clear pragmatic awareness that in principle Article 5 is for all member
states but there are some who are more equal than others because of having U.S.
installations. Which on one hand makes a country vulnerable, or it becomes a target
eventually, but at the same time because of that it would be very difficult for the United
States to neglect any development within that country. So it’s a kind of physical
assurance—not only a commitment—but it’s a physical assurance that this is true. And
also what was behind this thinking was that nobody was pressing, after the entry to
NATO in 1999, to have NATO installations on the territory of new member states.
First of all there was an understanding with Russia that because of this dual-track with Russia approach, trying to have a partnership with Russia, there was no hurry. And there was no reason to give Russia any pretext to feel that this is really against them. But then at the same time, there was a feeling that once there will be a need to do something which will be another Cold War deployment, but deployment because of new challenges and new threats, it will be wise to accept this as an opportunity to actually foster the alliance.

It was exactly this kind of thinking that, once the Americans ask for something, we should consider it very seriously because this is a chance, this is an opportunity. But before that there’s no reason to do anything, no reason to be overly enthusiastic about something--no way that was seen as a chance. So we are coming back to your original question, yes, okay, membership in NATO is fine, Article 5 is fine, but let’s try to cement it. So this concern about how to cement membership in the Alliance and to keep the Alliance physically working is very much there.

SCHIN: Do you see concessions being made by either the U.S. or Russian sides on this issue, do you see that the U.S. might need to make some concessions to Russia to take care of some of the fears that they have?

SCHNEIDER: Yes, definitely. And it seems to me that now it’s become a bargaining chip. And I hope the U.S. is not going to call this off completely but just put it on the back burner for a while and use it as a bargaining chip. Wait, see what will evolve, what the Russian reaction will be. Are you going to get something for exchange or just some less rhetoric, that would be enough.

And my assessment is that it’s not going to work sufficiently, Iran’s not going to be stopped by the Russians. The Russians don’t have an incentive, this is definitely not an incentive for the Russians to do that. You will not have enough incentives to make the Russians aggressively stop the Iranian program. They are fine with the current ambiguity. And indeed, although they might be afraid of the Iranian nuclear program, they’re still very much in the old deterrence mentality.

So for them, they feel superior in their deterrence to anybody smaller than the United States in their strategic arsenals so why they should be concerned about it? They just take note of that, and they feel that their deterrence is sufficient. They don’t have these moral problems with striking back. No. No way. So I expect it’s going to come back and that’s a problem for those who invested a lot politically in the first ratification and implementation of that. They’re hurt, but in the long term, I think that it’s fine, it’s being concluded, and maybe it’s going to be modified but my sense is that it is less about the modifications, maybe more about the Polish interceptors side than the radar, which is sort of flexible and it’s about what kind of mission this radar will have. It’s there, and it’s a kind of backup for, I would say, unpleasant developments. And there’s still time, you can deploy it quite quickly, so we’re not in a hurry about that. So that’s my feeling.
SCHIN: So as the timeline stretches out because of either of President Obama’s conditions—we’re going to make sure it works first and we’re going to see what Iran is doing.--does that help or hurt the ratification chances in the Parliament here?

SCHNEIDER: Of course right now, there is a group of MPs who are not happy about this but they understand that--maybe they have the sense of statesmen--kind of responsibility and so their position is, if the U.S. really would ask us to do it, we would do that with certain qualifications. We will insist that it won’t be only bilateral, but we should have it in NATO. Because there is this concern we shouldn’t build special bilateral relations with the U.S. but we should promote the security of our European allies. For those, I think if Obama says okay it’s on hold, there’s no reason for them to ratify this.

So I think the chances of a speedy ratification are low and as far as I understand, the reservations in Congress about the program are not involved with the ratification. They are not waiting for ratification to go through but the major concerns are financial and technical feasibility, testing, so it’s not about that. So if the Congress will decide to move forward with that and they will have more clear vision on what to do with that, a political signal of, okay, let’s go forward--which I expect will be not earlier than in two year’s time--then it’s going to be put on ratification.

SCHIN: Do you think that the follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is going to have an impact on this? In the negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, will this be used by both sides as a bargaining chip?

SCHNEIDER: Yes. But on the other hand, I think it’s going to lead to certain arrangements, of which there are several possibilities. The maximum desire is that there will be an agreement on the joint building of missile defense. It might be sensitive, it may be applauded by some Europeans, but then some other Europeans will ask to be a part of this, not to be outside of it, they would be happy to have this U.S.-Russian arrangement in something. France especially would be very keen to be part of this technology, the French defense industry is keen to develop at least some layers of missile defense, I think they’re very keen to be part of this. Germans will definitely politically welcome any participation of Russia. So everything depends on how far we can proceed with Russia.

And if that would be really ground-breaking, then of course there may be a system of not only verification of the radar in Brdy but maybe data sharing or confidence building measures to show this is not really against Russia. It will be much, much deeper than in other cases. And that’s why there is no hurry with that because everybody is more concerned now about the new START treaty and a new grand bargain with the Russians. Definitely the Russians would like to get as much as possible from it. But this time I would try to keep that part apart from these talks. And in the end, there’s one important element, this is what will happen in Iran. And there is still some space, according to the
estimates which are published and if we discount the catastrophic scenarios painted by some Israelis, for doing this political accommodation with Russia.

SCHIN: What do specific positives do you see coming from the emplacement of the system here in the Czech Republic?

SCHNEIDER: Well, politically, military-wise, what do you mean?

SCHIN: Sure, all of the above. Obviously there are going to be both positives and negatives on the political side—and also militarily. I guess the gist of it is, do the positives that will result from this outweigh the negatives, as in, increased Russian provocations, increased interference by the Russians in Czech affairs, is that outweighed by the positives that you’ll get?

SCHNEIDER: I think it was clear that to get the technology, to get this, is so big. I think that we are going to be part of it and we will have some benefits, having industry contributing or becoming a part of this specific project on missile defense. That’s why the government decided to do it. It was a different set of tactics by the Polish and Czech governments. Poles were much more keen about getting something in return, whereas the Czechs also wanted to get something in return, but not in terms of military assistance.

Instead it’s opening some doors for cooperation in broader areas, so that’s why the scientific cooperation agreement has been done and the thinking behind it was, let’s use it as an opening for new opportunities. But I think that the problem is that if the radar ratification will be put on hold—‘it’s not going to be shelved, but put on hold—the big problem would be if this cooperation would also be frozen. Which was a very important political element because it was showing to the Czech public that we are going to get something for it, and not necessarily in the military area. So it was sort of de-militarizing the whole issue and putting it in a broader perspective. And we’ve got already something in return, this visa program, which is something very palpable for people.

SCHIN: And it’s something that the Poles haven’t been able to get yet.

SCHNEIDER: Yeah, they didn’t get it, they didn’t get anything so far.

SCHIN: Well, the Patriot battery, depending on the SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] ratification, that’s something that a lot of people there are looking at.

SCHNEIDER: Yes, it may be deployed very quickly.

SCHIN: That’s something that they feel is very important. Do you see the Czech attitudes shifting towards this project, perhaps even with the new change in Administration?
SCHNEIDER: I don’t know. So far, there’s no change. And I’ve seen the recent polls, there’s no change. I think they had been done before Obama’s visit to Prague but I wouldn’t say that he actually turned the public opinion upside down. I wouldn’t expect that. The key problem is that it’s becoming a lightning rod for many, many historical resentments, and a kind of substitute issue for many other issues.

So I wouldn’t think that we may expect a radical change, but rather a cooling off, putting this a little bit down on the agenda. Take it out of becoming the key issue in public discourse, and then have an accommodation process, and a less ideological debate, and a more realistic debate. I expect if we’re talking about a one or two year period, if it’s going to be put up for ratification I think that if this strategy is used or if this will stay out of the high political agenda then you may be 50-50 [in public opinion]. Now it’s 70-30 [against the system], and so then it will be fine and then I would expect even more accommodation with this--look, NATO didn’t have so much support when we entered. And now it’s almost 70% support for NATO membership.

And why was that? Because our entrance ticket to NATO was a political campaign and it was so controversial, and then Iraq, and other things, even though they had nothing to do with NATO--and now this is fading away. And their more sober, rational thinking comes into play. So I would say that the enthusiastic campaign by the government which was trying to actually promote this was counter-productive. It was ill conceived and it didn’t help, because it created it as the big issue, and both government and opposition jumped on it. They simply loved it because it so simplified the political battle here. And it was something which didn’t hurt anyone and at the same time it was a visible lightning rod for these frustrations and whatever.

SCHIN: And so the new Jan Fischer government, you don’t see them taking any part in this?

SCHNEIDER: Absolutely. Absolutely. We talked about this, there is one scenario which doesn’t make me happy, but it’s a possible scenario that we may end up with basically three strong parties--Communists, Socialists, and ODS--in the parliament, and Socialist being the strongest. And there are several options. If they will forge a grand coalition or a minority Socialist government supported by ODS, which I think is the option which has some support within the Social Democrats, more so than being supported by the Communists. If this would be the arrangement, I think there will be some agreement.

They’ll put it up for ratification, especially if [Jiri] Paroubek is going to be the Prime Minister, it’s very down to Earth this argument, he’s going to get the red carpet treatment in the White House and President Obama will praise him and say we know you’re a bold leader and blah blah blah, he’s going to get it, he’s going to easily press for ratification. He may ask for something in return, but maybe in the economic field or something like that which is in the mutual interest, it doesn’t hurt anyone, I can imagine this kind of scenario.
But there is another scenario: That we will have a leftist government and the Communists will put their shoe in the door and say, no, this is our condition to support the government. But then probably it’s not going to hurt, even the Missile Defense Agency will not be hurt. It can be easily substituted by the sea-based program, and from my view, we’re losing the negotiating position. It’s not America.

Because you have alternatives to choose from, there are other parts of the defense industry, to change the platform and go for sea-based, it’s just more proven, more efficient, it doesn’t bring the nitty-gritty political things with the hosting country, and it doesn’t imply the big problem with the space-based thing, which I guess the Democrats will be cautious about. So, then, so what? Go for Aegis, and it’s fine, try to modernize it and to hell with these unreliable partners who are in there making trouble--be it with the ratification or being very pushy to get something for it, as the Poles.

SCHIN: With that said, what impact would that have on U.S.-Czech relations?

SCHNEIDER: Well, this wouldn’t probably have so bad of an impact. Worse will be if the U.S. will say, okay, finally, we decided to go forward but listen, it’s not going to be that cheap. You’re not going to get it for free. Because why in the hell should the U.S. taxpayer pay for it, when it’s going to provide defense for you! So the question is the other way now, what are you going to offer in return? And this would be the most painful scenario. Because then the Czechs will say, okay, is it worth it? So I’m a bit afraid of this new framing of the bargain.

And it won’t be necessarily just for the Czechs, it may be generally, in this framework, saying to the Europeans, you’re not helping us enough in Afghanistan. And now you’re making troubles with the missile defense, do you really want this missile defense? If you do, then what are you going to pay for it? I mean you should, this is a real thing, Europeans should pay for the integration of an American system to other systems. It should be integrated. This is what this feasibility study from 2002 is about! It’s not cost-free.

And of course some people argue, okay, this is of the cost of one tank. Look how difficult it is to get the European politicians to pay for one tank. For the U.S. it may sound ridiculous but for Europeans it’s not ridiculous. But this is a worrisome scenario to me, that we’re not ready for that. Probably we need some launch of a missile directed at Europe--and hopefully falling into the Mediterranean--and that will be the wake-up call for Europeans. But I don’t see any chance they can be convinced before that.

SCHIN: Since Russia increased their rhetoric and really started to make a lot of noise about this, do you have concerns about their ability to declare a victory if the Czechs do not ratify this? How do you see that unfolding?
SCHNEIDER: Of course the major victory will be if there is a failed ratification. If there will be no ratification at all, then it’s no reason for triumph--but of course they would appreciate it.

SCHIN: President Obama laid out a couple of reasons why we will go forward with missile defense--as long as Iran continues to be a threat and as long as we’ve proven that the system works. Across the political spectrum people here interpreted that in different ways. What do you think he was driving at with these things, how do you interpret them?

SCHNEIDER: Well, it’s obvious that each camp is trying to interpret this favorably for their own case. So this is my explanation why there are readings of that. In my view, it was a cautious statement, actually just repeating the arguments which have been articulated a year before during the campaign. For those who were reading carefully there were people from Obama’s team who were writing exactly what they had been writing a year before. A careful listen to [California Congresswoman] Ellen Tauscher, and all others who are coming here and there, they were saying exactly the same thing. So my reading is he’s not naïve, people around him are not naïve, they just said what has to be said because they really want to test Russian cooperativeness in this and they really want to send the ball on the Tehran court.

This is to remove any notion that they are rushing into something which is anti-Iranian. That was expected. I expected this. At the same time, it wasn’t renounced completely as a wrong ill-conceived program which will not be implemented. Nobody, and I keep telling this here because people they tend to read the new administration through the lens of the third site only, but nobody mentioned that this program, I mean the U.S. part of the program, will be bounded.

Nobody is thinking about stopping the Alaska installations, the California installations, and especially after this launch of a North Korean missile, I mean of course. It’s like under [former U.S. President Bill] Clinton, the U.S. Administration and U.S. Congress will not allow abandoning this idea of missile defense for the U.S.. What is in question is how Europe fits into that.

And this is another thing, the gestures toward Europe are positive, there is none of this kind of thinking that okay, Europe was last century now this is the Asian century and in the end we should look more to Asia than to Europe; it’s time for Europeans to grow up to these challenges of their own, and why should we provide security for Europe, it’s not there. So in the end it might be costly for Europeans, there would be more burden-sharing and more financial contributions needed for this but again I didn’t find anything worse on this. It wasn’t renounced, it was just postponed, as for this third site installation. And it was postponed because of understandable reasons. And for us it plays well because we didn’t have a secure majority for ratification. We’d be more in trouble if there would be a call for urgent ratification.
SCHIN: Right, a lot of people would say that a small part the reason the government fell was its support for missile defense. Would you agree?

SCHNEIDER: No.

SCHIN: You don’t think that had anything to do with it?

SCHNEIDER: Well, I would suggest maybe a small part, I think there’s another thing, the government made a mistake. They linked missile defense with the Lisbon Treaty. And in my view it’s the completely wrong equation. And the reaction of Social Democrats was that they made their quid pro quo. And it was even less equal and incomparable because they put it on the equation with fees in health care and the mission to Afghanistan. It’s a completely stupid thing.

And it was even after they knew there’s a Social Democratic president in the White House, a president we simply admire because he’s from our own camp, and it didn’t prevent them from trying to sink this Afghanistan thing which is a flagship for Obama. So this shows that this wasn’t just missile defense, it was an atmosphere where incomparable things, foreign policy was linked with internal policy in a way which actually increased the tensions. And it contributed to the fall of the government but there were other issues.

SCHIN: Alright, pulling back a little bit more, looking at one of the things we talked about very briefly at the beginning. When we talk about the third site here and we talk about missile defense in general, we’re talking about a change in deterrence, from the Russian point of view. They see this as the first step in the U.S. being able to perhaps launch a first strike without fear of retaliation because of the missile defense system that would one day be in place. Do you think that is a reasonable interpretation of the Russian view? And if so, do you think that it’s a reasonable view for them to hold?

SCHNEIDER: Well, that brings us back to how Russian or at that time Soviet generals perceived U.S. posture during the Cold War. And there was a surprise, I’ve read some of the studies that were done at the beginning of the ‘90s at the military academies in the United States and they had done interviews with their counterparts, asking, how did you understand our step? And the findings were that there was a complete disconnect between the Russian perception and the idea in America or how they perceive us. A complete disconnection of that. So it’s very difficult and it’s very tricky but it’s important.

The Cold War is over so it’s possible to talk about this and definitely it’s a necessity to talk about this. I’ve read or heard an opinion, which I think there is a bit of truth in, and maybe even more than a bit. It’s that Russians think, okay, if the U.S. is investing a lot of money into this program, it must be against us. Because we are the former enemy, we are on par with them, there is no other reason why they would invest such money than us. So to defuse this notion I think it takes some time and effort.
At the same time, they don’t buy the rationale of the missile defense. Look at their concept. They have missile defense in Moscow, but it’s completely different. It’s a completely different mindset. At the same time, they are very much interested, especially the professionals in their army, to get access to this technology. Because they know that their technology is last century. And they would like to become a part of this. But they are concerned about their southern flank, from China, India, Pakistan, you name it. So of course they should have this, if they are not to rely on retaliation only. The question is whether they are ready to abandon this strategy of retaliation.

So if this is true then they definitely think that the U.S. strategy is as follows. It’s a clever one. Develop a missile defense capability which is aimed at really low numbers. Then lure Russia, with the help of world opinion, to disarm to a lower level. And then, they can be vulnerable to these capabilities. This is the concept. So the only way is to make them credible again, understand that this is not a trump.

SCHIN: Well that is a hard part that I think everyone is struggling with, how to even do that or even how it’s possible to bring them on board without really compromising the integrity of this system.

SCHNEIDER: Right, well, they should be much more concerned about Alaskan installations because they should ask for the same level of verification and confidence building in all U.S. installations of missile defense. And the U.S. should offer it to Russia. Because in the end, their arsenals are much more vulnerable to Alaskan installations because of the trajectories. And it would be also much better accepted here--because if the U.S. would offer inspections to the Russians only in Europe, it doesn’t make sense, it’s just a political concession, and it only deepens this notion that we are a second class ally. Because here they can inspect, there not. Although it should be vice-versa, because there it is a problem.

SCHIN: I agree that the Alaskan systems are much more capable to actually do something against Russia.

SCHNEIDER: And the Russians know that.

SCHIN: But the fact that the Russians haven’t said anything about that points to a different rationale for why they actually making noise about these systems.

SCHNEIDER: Yes, absolutely. But the political strategy should be to put it on an equal footing and say okay, this is the same system, there should be the same rationale. We don’t buy your concerns about the third site unless you raise the same concerns about this one, because in the end it’s still one system, and we are open to confidence building about this, because we understand your concerns. But be fair in your concerns.
And I can understand a grand deal with the Russians saying okay, we cap at 1000 or something like that, in the end we understand it’s much because of cost, there is an economic crisis, you cannot uphold your arsenals, by the way. But don’t speak to that, let’s keep this nice, peaceful talk for folks around the world, and okay let’s agree on 1000, we understand that 1000, it’s much more vulnerable to upgraded capabilities and of course we can upgrade it, it’s feasible to upgrade it from dozens interceptors to hundreds of interceptors, we understand that, we understand this concern so let’s make an arrangement and tell us what you offer in return.

And I would take initiative on that. Because this is an advantage of the change of administrations and the change of tone. I would keep this and go to extremes because the disadvantage was that those were Russians who were taking the initiative. They always do something and then they say okay, if we get something in return we may put it back.

SCHIN: Yes, that’s a very good description of their Iskander promise. Now we’ve talked about the subject in quite a bit of depth, I should see if you have any final thoughts on the subject, any other points of view on how this going to change stability of the region here?

SCHNEIDER: I would say this question should be always confronted with another question--would not going forward, or not pursuing this installations wouldn’t that cause more instability?

SCHIN: Right, and that right there is one of the things I’m looking at, that is exactly what I’m looking at right there. Now that we’ve entered into these agreements, they haven’t been ratified completely, so what effect have we already had on the region’s stability, just by having the agreements at this level, and then if the agreements are completed, what happens, and if they’re not completed what happens.

SCHNEIDER: I think there is a way out of it. The most damage would be done if it will be renounced and said this was completely wrong, because the notion would be it was because of Russian pressure.

SCHIN: I agree.

SCHNEIDER: But I understand there may be reasons not to deploy. I think the relatively cheap financially, and relatively cheap politically, option would be to go forward with preparing a facility. So ratification, preparing a facility, and then--the Russians are great at this, they call it a moratorium--put on hold the final installation, so at a certain point just phasing it. It’s not 0, 1. So let’s wait. Now let’s wait for one year. What happens with Iran?

If it will be worse than the Balkans in Iran, with the Russians not cooperating, then go forward with ratification and start preparing the site. But leave the [radar] ball where it is, because in the end you can move it and install it in weeks. Play with this ambiguity,
and then do whatever is needed, invite the Russians to inspect the site. And invite them to do something, be active on that. Not too much, there could be damage of course but first you have to realize whether you are serious with all of this. I mean the Administration should be frank and the review is not done on that.

Do we really mean that this is still on the table? Maybe as not a last resort but as a certain step, a certain phase in our strategy. Do we really mean it? If yes, then I will go into this phasing. It wouldn’t be a shame if in a certain phase you get the change of attitude of Iran and then this site will be abandoned. Of course some money will be spent there, but in the end, varied sorts of radars in the center of Europe may be a useful thing. And you have a legal framework for that in place. So I would keep that open. Because the damage wouldn’t be that big, I mean the political damage.

SCHIN: The biggest question of course is always going to be just what level the Russians are going to take their opposition to. Their rhetoric has been really over the top.

SCHNEIDER: Yes.

SCHIN: Really, and they only have done a few actions, but I think the real question remains just to what level will they actually take things. We’re just going to have to wait and see. Once again thanks for your time, this was very helpful.
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