THE US ARMY AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE:
ASSESSING THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED
ADVISORY CAPABILITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2009

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# The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability

**Abstract**

The US Army had difficulty initiating and conducting advisory operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the lack of an institutionalized advisory capability. The need to create an advisory capability after the requirement developed, resulted in a three-year delay in Iraqi Security Force development, which threatened mission success in Iraq. This experience shows that the US Army should consider developing an institutionalized advisory capability. Opponents of this idea view the advisory operation in Iraq as an anomaly and believe that the US Army must remain primarily focused on conventional capabilities. Advocates view the advisory operation in Iraq as an indicator of future requirements and believe that the US Army must have an organization that addresses the challenges of advisory operations. This study utilizes three criteria: importance advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory operations to determine if the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability. The criteria evaluation utilizes current US Army doctrine and analysis of past advisory operation experiences in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq. The analysis shows that US Army doctrine anticipates a frequent and essential role for advisory capability in future operations. Analysis of past advisory experiences supports this assessment and identified challenges with developing advisory capability. Based on the anticipated frequent and essential role of advisory operations and the associated developmental difficulties, the US Army should develop an institutionalized advisory capability.

## Subject Terms

Advisory Capability, Security Force Assistance, Force Structure, host nation security forces, doctrine
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

The US Army had difficulty initiating and conducting advisory operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the lack of an institutionalized advisory capability. The need to create an advisory capability after the requirement developed, resulted in a three-year delay in Iraqi Security Force development, which threatened mission success in Iraq. This experience shows that the US Army should consider developing an institutionalized advisory capability. Opponents of this idea view the advisory operation in Iraq as an anomaly and believe that the US Army must remain primarily focused on conventional capabilities. Advocates view the advisory operation in Iraq as an indicator of future requirements and believe that the US Army must have an organization that addresses the challenges of advisory operations. This study utilizes three criteria: importance advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory operations to determine if the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability. The criteria evaluation utilizes current US Army doctrine and analysis of past advisory operation experiences in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq. The analysis shows that US Army doctrine anticipates a frequent and important role for advisory capability in future operations. Analysis of past advisory experiences supports this assessment and identified challenges with developing advisory capability. Based on the anticipated frequent and essential role of advisory operations and the associated developmental difficulties, the US Army should develop an institutionalized advisory capability.
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>CJTF-7</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMATT</td>
<td>Coalition Military Assistance Training Team</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CPATT</td>
<td>Coalition Police Assistance Training Team</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Logistics, Personnel, Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Armed Forces of El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Fairbundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>GNA</td>
<td>Greek National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOES</td>
<td>Government of El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters Department of the Army</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IAG</td>
<td>Iraqi Assistance Group</td>
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<td>IAG (P)</td>
<td>Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICDC</td>
<td>Iraqi Civil Defense Corps</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>JUSMAPG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Assistance and Planning Group in Greece</td>
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<td>KMAG</td>
<td>United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAGV</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>MILGROUP</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Teams</td>
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<td>SATTOC</td>
<td>Security Assistance Team Training and Orientation Course</td>
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<td>TSCP</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Plan</td>
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<td>USAFIK</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in Korea</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Commands</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The entities (the “Dissolved Entities”) listed in the attached Annex are hereby dissolved. Additional entities may be added to this list in the future.
— L. Paul Bremer, 23 May 2003
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities

Twelve days after his appointment as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, in the second order of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer dissolved the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and all of its subordinate organizations, which included the Iraqi Army. While debate on the merits of this decision will continue, the unequivocal outcome was the elimination of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Army consisted of more than just soldiers who no longer reported for duty. It included among other things, basing infrastructure, military equipment, supplies, command and control systems, and administrative and logistics systems. The Iraqi Army ceased to exist as the soldiers and institutional knowledge returned to the general populace and as looting, vandalism, and decay eradicated the physical structure.

During initial war planning, US military and civilian leaders assumed that existing Iraqi security forces would require limited adjustments to serve a new democratic Iraqi government. Planners mistakenly believed support for a new Iraqi Army required minimal effort, accomplishable without additional military personnel or US units. The US military did not anticipate the requirement to build an entirely new army. As a result, when the Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, the US military did not have a plan to support reconstruction of the Iraqi Army.
On 18 August 2003, Bremer issued CPA order 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army.” The CPA envisioned an external security role for the new Iraqi Army with Iraqi police forces responsible for internal security. The CPA order limited Iraqi Army internal responsibilities to infrastructure protection and domestic relief operations. The order provided minimal guidance for the structure of the new Iraqi army and made no provisions for an advisory effort to support development of the new Iraqi Army. The initial CPA plan envisioned an Iraqi Army consisting of one division with three brigades, with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) providing advisory support. However, the failure to provide guidance for advisory operations resulted in an ad-hoc advisory effort supported by a mix of military personnel on loan from US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and contractors. CMATT initially maintained a focus on two main areas, developing an institutional base to support the new Iraqi Army and training of personnel. Nonetheless, “the greatest need appeared to be continued development and mentoring after units completed training.” However, CMATT did not have enough personnel with the necessary training to support a field advisory effort. Without an imminent external threat, there was little urgency in the CPA efforts to develop a new Iraqi Army.

As insurgent activity increased in 2003, an urgent requirement for internal security capability developed. Neither the Iraqi Police nor CMATT’s externally focused Iraqi Army could handle the growing security challenges. Unable to wait for results from CMATT efforts, the military command, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), established a separate program to develop regional and local security forces to meet short-term security requirements. CJTF-7 directed each Brigade Combat Team to create
Iraqi military units collectively known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). A lack of coordination of these efforts resulted in a variety of organizational structures, differing operational concepts, and uneven Iraqi unit effectiveness. Focused solely at the battalion level and below, the ICDC effort did not address larger units or organizational support requirements. CJTF-7 viewed this program as a temporary effort, intending to incorporate ICDC units into CMATT’s new Iraqi Army.\textsuperscript{10}

The disjointed CMATT and CJTF-7 efforts to develop Iraqi security forces proved unable to provide the host nation forces required to address internal security threats.\textsuperscript{11} The CMATT Iraqi Army program and the CJTF-7 ICDC program represented limited advisory efforts. The ICDC program focused on supporting lower level operational units while the new Iraqi Army program focused on developing the institutional base. Though the new Iraqi Army program fielded operational units, CMATT was unable to provide the advisory capability to support these units. Neither program provided a comprehensive effort to support a complete Iraqi military structure from the ministerial level to the tactical level. Developing a new Iraqi Army capable of providing internal security in the face of a growing insurgency, necessitated a comprehensive approach with an expanded advisory effort.

\textbf{Defining a Comprehensive Advisory Effort}

A comprehensive advisory effort coordinates all aspects of host nation security force development into a program to generate a force capable of providing security for the host nation. Comprehensive advisory efforts provide support at the national level, institutional level, and tactical level. National level efforts support development of a defense ministry to provide civilian control and policy for security forces. Institutional
efforts focus on the physical requirements and organizational systems needed to support security forces. Physical requirements include basing infrastructure, training facilities, military equipment, and acquisition of materiel. Organizational system requirements include command and control, personnel, administration, logistics, doctrine development, and training and schools. Tactical level efforts represent the largest component of a comprehensive advisory effort. At the tactical level, advisors work directly with host nation units providing advice and coordinating operations with and support from US or coalition forces. Embedded advisory teams work with host nation unit at all levels based on host nation unit capabilities, the security situation, and US resource availability. In Iraq, this type of advisory effort required the US Army to develop a new organizational structure with equipment and a large number of personnel. However, the large resource requirements of a comprehensive advisory effort in Iraq represented an addition to the demands of ongoing advisory operations in other parts of the world.

**Ongoing Advisory Operations**

Concurrent with the requirement in Iraq, the US Army was resourcing other advisory efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The largest ongoing operation was the comprehensive advisory effort in support of the Afghan National Army, Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, which included a National Guard brigade, and more than a thousand augmentees. Limited advisory efforts included Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), and Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines (OEF-P). In addition, the US Army provided Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams to the combatant commanders to execute Theater
Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) throughout the African continent, Pacific Rim, and South America. Advisory requirements extended across regional commands and the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to insurgency, resulting in an increased requirement for advisory capability. However, US Army doctrine failed to address the role or conduct of advisory operations.

A Lack of Doctrine to Support Advisory Operations

US operations in Iraq suffered from a lack of doctrine to support stability operations. In a 2006 interview on his experiences in Iraq, GEN David Petraeus stated, “Clearly there was recognition that our Army needed doctrine.” Petraeus led the effort to bridge the doctrinal void by developing FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. Building on this manual, the US Army developed doctrine to address stability operations through an update to FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations. FM 3-0 elevated stability operations to a core US Army mission, with FM 3-07 providing doctrine for their conduct. Both manuals recognized “that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat.”

FM 3-07 acknowledged a requirement for a wide range of stability operation capabilities. Any integrated approach to stability operations requires a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum, reflecting the execution of a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational environments.

The manual identified the development of host nation governance capacity, including security sector reform, as a key tenet of stability operations. The new doctrine identified advisory capability as the primary military means to conduct security sector reform and to increase host nation governance capacity. These manuals established
guidance for the conduct of stability operations and advisory efforts. A key question remained; how would the US Army resource the range of advisory efforts required by doctrine and the operational needs in Iraq and the GWOT?

The US Army Lacked an Institutionalized Advisory Capability

FM 3-07 states, “Advising requires specially selected and trained personnel. Trainers and advisors must be capable of dealing with challenges inherent in working with poorly trained and equipped forces.” To meet these challenges FM 3-07 directs that “pre-deployment training focuses on the stresses and ambiguity associated with developing host-nation security forces.” The complexity of working with host nation security forces requires a non-conventional skill set built on extensive mission-focused training. Based on these requirements, the US Army traditionally viewed advisory operations as a US Army Special Forces responsibility.

US Army Special Forces training provides the focus necessary to develop personnel suitable for advisory missions. Furthermore, the Special Forces community nurtures an “out of the box” mindset required for such missions. However, no specific advisory training program exists. Advisory skills are taught as parts of other Special Forces training programs. Additionally, US Army Special Forces does not have specific units dedicated to advisory operations. Special Forces A-Teams consist of special warfare generalists capable of conducting a range of core tasks including tactically-focused foreign internal defense. While this capability has been successful in limited advisory operations, US Army Special Forces structure does not have the capability to advise a host nation military from the ministerial to the tactical level.
Comprehensive advisory operations require a variety of skills and a number of personnel capable of supporting the various levels of a host nation military structure. US Army Special Forces structure does not support the magnitude nor variety of capabilities required for an advisory effort to support an entire army. Compounding the problem, the conventional force does not have a standing capability prepared to conduct this mission. The US Army, therefore, lacks an institutionalized capability for conducting comprehensive advisory operations.

Defining An Institutionalized Advisory Capability

A description of the characteristics of an institutionalized advisory capability helps to understand the extent of resources required. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed DOTMLPF capability review, it does provide an overview of the requirements. An institutionalized advisory capability would provide a permanent organizational structure capable of deploying a trained, manned, and equipped advisory effort to support a host nation security force. FM 3-07 indicates that,

Forces are developed to operate across the spectrum of conflict combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defending against external threats; or serving as coalition partners in other areas. It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to sustain security force assistance gains; host-nation security forces must have the capability to perform required functions across the stability sectors. They must exist in sufficient numbers to have the capacity to perform these functions wherever and whenever required. Finally, they must have the sustainability to perform functions well into the future, long after external forces are no longer engaged. Successful security force assistance involves thorough and continuous assessment and includes the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved.\(^{21}\)

The deployable advisory capability must be scalable for a range of operations from limited efforts to support specific aspects of a host nation security force to comprehensive efforts to support an entire host nation security force.
An institutionalized advisory capability should include both institutional and operational components. Some type of headquarters or command would provide the foundation for the institutional component. The advisory headquarters or command would be responsible for Title X functions including doctrine development, personnel management, equipping, and training. Conduct of these Title X functions would require permanent facilities and assigned personnel. The operational component would consist of a deployable advisory capability. Such capabilities can be achieved through a variety of methods including dedicated advisory units, a cadre of trained personnel that are organized when needed, or by expanding mission essential tasks for existing US Army units to include advisory operations. This study focuses on assessing the need for a deployable capability, not on how to organize forces for advisory operations. Regardless, each of these methods would require the commitment of personnel, equipment, and training resources.

**Difficulty Developing the Required Advisory Capability**

The comprehensive advisory requirement in Iraq has highlighted the challenges the US Army faces in resourcing the spectrum of advisory efforts required by doctrine and ongoing operations. The traditional source for advisory capability, the Special Forces community, proved incapable of supporting these requirements. US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) role as the lead combatant command for the GWOT placed a heavy burden on Special Forces units. Additionally, the size of the advisory requirement in Iraq exceeded the Special Forces capacity. Therefore, as it traditionally has, the US Army utilized conventional forces to resource this advisory capability.
Since the US Army did not have a standing advisory capability, the resources came from existing force structure. Meeting the requirement proved difficult given the size of the advisory operation and the competing resource demands of other operations in Iraq and the GWOT. A lack of advisory doctrine further complicated the development of this capability. Prior to the updates to FM 3-0 and FM 3-07, the September 1994 version of FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations*, and the December 1990 version of FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, provided the only US Army doctrine for advisory operations. Regardless, all of these manuals address operational doctrine, which provides limited insight into advisory force structure or advisor training requirements. Amid these challenges, the Army committed more than 2,500 officers and NCOs to fill advisory teams in Iraq. Additionally, USCENTCOM committed thousands more from units in theater in Iraq. The US Army committed the 1st Infantry Division headquarters to provide administrative support to the teams in the field and more than a brigade combat team to support training at Fort Riley, Kansas.  

Despite this effort, the advisory program remained under-resourced and disjointed. Providing personnel for the advisory teams proved problematic for the US Army due to competing personnel demands and the lack of personnel trained to conduct advisory operations. Many teams deployed into theater undermanned, filled with personnel who failed to meet minimum selection criteria of rank, military occupational specialty, and experience. In less than four years, the training program shifted location four times--Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Riley, Kansas-- with a fifth move to Fort Polk, Louisiana pending. The program of instruction, assigned trainers, and training resources at each location proved unable to develop the
skills required for advisory duty in Iraq. Finally, advisory operations suffered from a lack of advisory doctrine and clear command and control arrangements.  

The Question of Future Advisory Capability Requirements

Eight years into the GWOT, the US Army still grapples with the issues of how to conduct and resource advisory operation requirements. Looking into the future, the US Army must consider how to avoid similar unpreparedness. Consideration of future requirements poses a series of questions for the US Army. First, will the extensive advisory requirements seen in current operations continue? Second, is the comprehensive advisory effort in Iraq a unique one-time requirement or is it indicative of requirements that will reoccur in the future? Third, if comprehensive advisory operations are an integral part of future US Army missions, what are the force structure requirements? Finally, do future operational requirements and current doctrine for advisory operations require the development of an institutionalized advisory capability?

By answering these questions, this study seeks to determine if the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability. The study focuses on three criteria, which are (1) the importance of advisory operations, (2) the difficulty of developing advisory capability, and (3) the frequency of advisory requirements. These qualitative criteria focus on the conceptual question posed by this study, should the US Army have an institutionalized advisory capability. Quantitative criteria such as cost and personnel requirements focus on the applied and practical question, how the US Army should resource advisory requirements, and therefore are not applicable to the scope of this study. This study uses these criteria to examine the US Army’s past experiences, current operational requirements, and anticipated future requirements. An enhanced
understanding of the past, present, and likely future, better prepares the US Army for that future.

1Coalition Provisional Authority--Iraq, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 Dissolution of Entities* (Baghdad, Iraq: CPA, 23 August 2003), 1.


4Ibid.


6 Coalition Provisional Authority--Iraq, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22 Creation of a New Iraqi Army* (Baghdad, Iraq: CPA, 23 August 2003), 3.

7Wright and Reese, 433-437.

8Ibid., 447.

9Ibid., 447-448.

10Ibid., 440.

11Ibid., 446.


13David Petraeus, 17 September 2006, Interview by Aaron Lobel and John Haas, transcript, America Abroad Media, Washington, DC.


15Ibid., 1-3.
16Ibid., 6-1.

17Ibid., 6-14,15.


19The lack of US Army Special Forces advisory training programs is based on research conducted as an HQDA G-35, War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X Military Transition Team (MiTT) sourcing requirements from 2005-2007.


21Ibid.

22Maxwell.

23Advisory operations resourcing information based on personnel experience as a HQDA G-35, War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X Military Transition Team (MiTT) sourcing requirements from 2005-2007 and as an Iraq MiTT leader in 2006.

24All of the challenges identified in this paragraph are based on personnel experience as a HQDA G-35 War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X MiTT sourcing requirements from 2005-2007 and as an Iraq MiTT leader in 2006.
CHAPTER 2

THE CURRENT ADVISORY CAPABILITY DEBATE

Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.

— Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Military history is replete with attempts by defense leaders to anticipate the future national security environment and to develop the doctrine, force structure, and technology required to address the anticipated future battlefield. History shows a high cost for leaders who failed to anticipate correctly those future requirements. Given the rapid pace of change and unexpected events, predicting the future national security environment twenty, ten, or even five years into the future proves difficult. On 10 September 2001, few in the defense community would have accepted a prediction that the US Army would be conducting protracted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan within the next three years. The inability to anticipate future security environments with certainty naturally leads to debate on future requirements. This is clearly the case regarding the development of an institutionalized advisory capability. The difficult force structure decisions required to institutionalize advisory capability has led to debate on this issue.

The US Army force management process does allow for structure changes. “The art of this process is the ability to anticipate future challenges and resource our force structure with those capabilities that posture the Army to meet strategic demands.” These decisions rarely find a basis in fact or certainty but rather in predictive analysis, which complicates force structure decisions. These complications arise from establishing
consensus on the assessment of the future security environment. In most cases, even when there is consensus on the environment, disagreement on the capability requirements still exists. This situation marks the current debate on advisory capability. The defense community has generally accepted the future international security environment identified in US Army doctrine. However, there is wide disagreement within the defense community on the force structure implications for advisory capability.

Before discussing the US Army’s vision of the future international security environment, it is important to understand how that vision was developed. Concepts developed within the Department of Defense (DoD) and Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) provided the intellectual foundation for current US Army doctrine. At the center of these concepts are a set of ideas espoused by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett

Thomas P.M. Barnett: *The Pentagon’s New Map*

Barnett, a prominent national security strategist, has experience within the defense community working as a project manager for a private defense research firm, as a faculty member at the Naval War College for six years, and as the Assistant for Strategic Futures, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.³ While working for Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski in the Office of Force Transformation, Barnett developed a PowerPoint presentation, “The Brief,” to propose a defense strategy for the United States and to predict probable reasons and locations for employment of US military forces.⁴ As of 2004, after more than 500 presentations, Barnett’s concepts reached more than 30,000 government officials, military officers, industry and think tank representatives, and opinion leaders.⁵ His theory on future conflict gained acceptance
from senior defense community leaders and influenced efforts to determine future requirements.

Barnett divided the world into two categories: the functioning core and the non-integrated gap. He defined the functioning core as economically developed or developing countries linked to the global economy and recognizing international rule-sets. Non-integrated gap countries operated outside the global economy and ignored recognized international rule-sets. The economic development and rule-set acceptance that characterizes the functioning core combines to reduce the likelihood of conflict by increasing the costs, due to an increased standard of living, of conflict and by providing ways to resolve disputes in a non-violent manner. In contrast, the limited economic development and the lack of international rule-sets characteristic of the non-integrated gap results in an increased use of violence to resolve both internal and external conflicts. Barnett concluded that the preponderance of violence and conflict would occur within the non-integrated gap. He predicted that the use of US military power would predominantly confront internal instability or threats to regional stability within the non-integrated gap.6

Barnett argued that non-integrated gap countries exhibit similar governance and societal characteristics, which influenced the nature of conflicts within the gap. Governance structures tend towards politically repressive regimes. Gap countries tend to face security challenges from insurgent elements. Chronic conflict results as factions fight for control and power. The societies within the gap tend to be uneducated, impoverished, and organized along tribal and religious lines. These characteristics exacerbate power conflicts by creating a populace and government that is incapable of challenging insurgent efforts and conversely provides support for insurgent factions.
These conditions produce unstable countries prone to conflict manifested by civil wars, insurgencies, or even regional hostilities.\(^7\)

In Barnett’s view, US military involvement in these conflicts would seek to stop the violence and foster stability. However, establishing long-term stability requires capable host nation security forces initially to support stability efforts and eventually to assume responsibility for security. Since, US military involvement in the gap would most likely result from a country’s inability to maintain security or from the requirement to destroy a repressive regimes security structure, there would most likely be host nation security forces incapable of providing security. Therefore, advisory efforts would be required to rebuild or improve host nation security forces.

This visualization of the future national security environment established several key concepts accepted within the defense community. First, globalization and demographics would influence future conflicts. Second, these influences would create common characteristics of governance and society within the non-integrated gap. Finally, these characteristic would produce conflict within the non-integrated gap. Based on these concepts, US military operations in the non-integrated gap would require an advisory effort to develop host nation security forces. Barnett’s concepts were influential in shaping DoD’s vision of the future national security environment and the implications for US Army operations and force structure requirements.

**Persistent Conflict**

Throughout 2007, the US Army experienced a series of force management challenges supporting advisory operations in Iraq. The unanticipated scale produced requirements that stressed the US Army force structure. The stress on the force
compelled a re-evaluation of existing force management plans to ensure the development of the right force for the future. HQDA established a collaborative working group with representatives from G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Operations and Plans, and senior Army leadership to assess future operational requirements. The working group developed an estimate of the most likely future international security environment, the resultant characteristics of conflict, and the operational capability requirements. An Army Chief of Staff (CSA) White Paper, “Persistent Conflict,” summarized the findings of the working group and provided a detailed outline of the anticipated future.8

“Persistent Conflict” anticipates a future with “protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”9 This assessment predicts a future environment in which global terrorism and extremist ideologies attempt to destroy Western concepts of democracy, freedom of religion, and individual rights while promoting specific religious, tribal, and cultural norms.10 Several key trends influence the future strategic environment:

Globalization: Global connectivity, economic, political, cultural
Technology: Information technology, bio-technology, weaponry, increased access to information
Demographic Changes: Population growth, youth bulge, growing middle class
Urbanization: Population shift to cities, unemployment, poverty, overcrowding
Resource Demand: Energy, water, food
Climate Change: Desertification, resource depletion, shift in farming capabilities
Natural Disasters: Greater impact on poorer, denser, under-developed regions
WMD Proliferation: Catastrophic attacks, influence of state and non-state actors
Failed or Failing States: Globalization, resource, population and ideological challenges11

Extremist organizations and states exploit the combined impact of these trends with existing local and regional tensions to achieve regional and global interests.12 These global trends create common operational characteristics for future US Army operations.
While difficult to predict specifically when, where, and why conflicts would arise, predicting the general characteristics of future conflicts is possible. The combination of emerging global trends and of extremist state and non-state actors creates increasingly complex conflicts with several common characteristics.13

**Diminishing Likelihood of State versus State Conflict:** Rise of non-state actors, increased internal conflicts, proxy fights
**Conflict Among the People:** The populace as the source of conflict, non-state actors utilize populace as support network and protection
**Increased Importance of Non-Military Tools:** Diplomatic, informational, economic, social, and cultural
**Asymmetric Tactics:** Counter US military and technological advantage
**Long Duration:** Wars of attrition, slow societal and governance change
**Increased Media Scrutiny:** Information age leveraged instantaneous coverage
**Host Nation Security Force and Governance Development:** Support current operations, framework for long term stability, and support US exit strategy
**Decentralized Leader Centric Operations:** Magnification of individual actions, locally driven operational environment, increased operational pace14

These characteristics indicate that future conflict will require a spectrum of operational capabilities from US Army forces. US Army units cannot simply focus on finding and destroying the enemy, but rather have to focus on simultaneous employment of all the elements of national power--diplomatic, informational, economic and military--to address increasingly agile and asymmetric enemies. US Army units employ these elements of national power while operating in and amongst the populace and while leveraging the capabilities of host nation security forces and governments.15 The CSA White Paper stated:

> If the will of the people to choose the manner in which they will be governed is the object of war among the people, there is no more sure way to ensure their freedom to express their choice than to enable them to choose their own governments and to employ their own security forces to ensure their protection from intimidation and exploitation. In the history of man, no nation has prevailed in an insurgency without the assistance of capable and committed indigenous security forces and governance apparatus.16
The CSA White Paper further noted that in future conflicts US forces will be required to “train, equip, and employ indigenous security forces and to enhance and empower local governance capabilities.”

The anticipated strategic environment and operational characteristics call for a force structure with the following attributes:

- **Versatility and Agility**: Leverage core warfighting proficiency capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict, with the agility to quickly adjust operations as situations change
- **Expeditionary Capability**: Promptly deployable, modular forces capable of operating in austere environments across the full spectrum of conflict
- **Campaign Capability**: Conduct sustained ground operations when necessary
- **Lethality**: With precision and discrimination: limit collateral damage
- **Culturally Astute**: Understand societies within which operations occur
- **Interoperable**: Capable of operating with coalition and host nation partners

The CSA White Paper stated, “To preserve our freedom and our way of life in an era of persistent conflict against forces of global extremism, America needs an Army that is the strength of the Nation--the preeminent landpower of Earth--dominant across the spectrum of challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st Century security environment.” This assessment became the foundation for the doctrinal assessment of the future security environment.

**US Army Doctrinal Assessment of the Future Security Environment**

The US Army is a doctrinally based institution. Doctrine provides the intellectual underpinning that defines how the US Army organizes, trains, equips, and conducts operations. FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-0 serve as the capstone documents of Army doctrine. The February 2008 update to FM 3-0 states that a complex framework of environmental factors shapes the nature and outcome of future operations. “The Army
has analytically looked at the future, and we believe our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of “persistent conflict”—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”23 The assessment of the operational environment contained in the first chapter of FM 3-0 reflects the assessment outlined in the CSA White Paper.

The October 2008 update to FM 3-07 incorporates a similar assessment of the future operational environment. FM 3-07, states “the Nation remains engaged in an era of persistent conflict against enemies intent on limiting American access and influence throughout the world.”24 The description of a “complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century” parallels the concepts outlined in the CSA White Paper.25 The 2006 version of FM 3-24 shares similarities with the concepts outlined in the CSA White Paper. The overview of insurgency includes concepts of failing states, war amongst the populace, globalization, urbanization, media influence, and asymmetric tactics.26 The content of these manuals shows that US Army doctrine considers the concepts identified in the CSA White Paper to be key factors in assessing the future security environment and operational requirements.

**US Army Doctrinal Assessment of Future Capability Requirements**

Based on the assessment of the future security environment discussed above, doctrine unsurprisingly indicates a sustained requirement for advisory efforts. FM 3-0 states that operations across the spectrum of conflict seek to establish conditions conducive to a stable peace.27 An essential element of stable peace is a host nation
governance capability that can maintain security. Therefore, operations across the spectrum of conflict have a potential requirement for advisory efforts to develop host nation security capability. FM 3-0 establishes operational themes as a methodology to group similar operations and to simplify doctrinal guidance. Both the peacetime military engagement and irregular warfare themes require advisory capability. The peacetime military engagement theme specifically identifies security force assistance and JCETs as key operations. The irregular warfare theme identifies a requirement for advisory operations to develop host nation security forces to support counterinsurgency efforts. The third chapter, “Full Spectrum Operations,” of FM 3-0 references the importance of host nation governance and security capability dozens of times. Each reference supports the need for advisory efforts to develop or improve host nation security capability. FM 3-0 directly links US military operations across the spectrum of conflict with host nation governance and security. The increased focus on host nation capabilities correlates to an increased requirement for advisors to develop host nation capabilities.

According to FM 3-07, “stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations.” Stability operations applied across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war, set the conditions for stable peace and transition of responsibility to a host nation government. Development of host nation governance capacity, which includes the military task of security force assistance, represents a key tenet of stability operations. FM 3-07 defines security force assistance as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate
Doctrine thus identifies operational requirements for a spectrum of advisory efforts from limited to comprehensive efforts.\textsuperscript{34} FM 3-24 reinforces the sustained requirement for advisory capability. FM 3-24 states “the primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.”\textsuperscript{35} Host nation support represents one of the imperatives of US counterinsurgency doctrine.\textsuperscript{36} FM 3-24 dedicates an entire chapter to the developing host-nation security forces. The manual stipulates that a range of advisory tasks and force requirements exist depending on the situation.\textsuperscript{37}

The mission of developing HN security forces goes beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training programs today and the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have grown. While FID has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services.\textsuperscript{38}

Advisory requirements span a spectrum from limited to comprehensive advisory efforts. FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24 all establish a doctrinal reliance on advisory operations to develop host nation security forces in order to set the conditions for stable peace.

**Debate on Advisory Capability Requirements**

While indicating a requirement for a range of advisory efforts from limited to comprehensive, current doctrine does not address the frequency of those requirements and most importantly the frequency of comprehensive advisory requirements. Limited advisory operations tend to fall within existing force structure capabilities, while comprehensive advisory efforts tend to exceed existing force structure capabilities. As a result, wide disagreement on advisory capability requirements exists. Should the US Army develop an institutionalized advisory capability or should it continue to rely on
existing force structure to resource advisory requirements? The debate on this question focuses on the anticipated frequency of comprehensive advisory requirements in future operations.

Support for the Status Quo: No Institutionalized Advisory Capability

Many senior US Army leaders, including the Chief of Staff, GEN George W. Casey, and the Vice Chief of Staff, GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, view the comprehensive advisory operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as anomalies, which are not indicative of future operational requirements. They anticipate that the predominance of future advisory requirements will be limited advisory efforts, which fall within the capabilities of US Army Special Forces. Following a 2008 meeting with Gen James N. Mattis (Commander, US Joint Forces Command), Gen James T. Conway (Commandant, US Marine Corps), and ADM Eric T. Olson (Commander, US Special Operations Command) GEN Casey stated:

We . . . asked ourselves if we really think we’re going to build another country’s army and police forces and ministries from the ground up any time soon. And the answer was, probably not. We’ve got several challenges: we’ve got to set ourselves up to do Iraq and Afghanistan for the long haul, and then figure out how we augment Special Forces to do the other engagements that we need. That’s kind of the direction we’re going.

GEN Chiarelli supported this position in a 2007 Military Review article:

I don’t believe it is in the military’s best interest to establish a permanent “Training Corps” in the conventional military to develop other countries’ indigenous security forces. The Special Forces do this mission well on the scale that is normally required for theater security cooperation and other routine foreign internal defense missions.

These senior officers see the experiences in Iraq as a unique event not likely repeated in the future. They advocate that primary responsibility for advisory operations should
return to US Army Special Forces and that the US Army must re-establish it’s conventional warfighting focus.  

Though the senior Army leadership understands the importance of stability operations and advisory efforts, they believe the US Army must maintain a focus on conventional warfare and forces capable of operating across the full spectrum of operations.  

GEN Chiarelli stated:

Because of the complexity of our current wars, some believe we should reorganize our forces into two types of units: those that work only at the high-intensity level of a campaign, and those designated and equipped for the low-intensity fight and classic nation-building. Having done their jobs, the high intensity force would hand off responsibility to the low-intensity force. This solution is both unsustainable and unaffordable: we simply don’t have the resources to divide the military into “combat” and “stability” organizations. Instead we must focus on developing full-spectrum capabilities across all organizations in the armed forces.

LTC Gian Gentile, a former Squadron Commander in Iraq and leading skeptic of the current focus on counterinsurgency operations, provides additional support for this position advocating a conventional warfighting focus for the US Army.

For the moment, the application of counterinsurgency practices embodied in FM 3-24 are being touted as bringing about substantial security progress during the “surge.” However, we may be misreading or seeing too much in the events of the past few months in Iraq, and building a counterinsurgency-only Army that puts our ability to address non-COIN contingencies at risk.

These leaders believe that in rare cases in which advisory requirements exceed Special Forces capability, a full spectrum force can provide the additional advisory capability required. GEN Chiarelli stated:

Rather, we should ensure our conventional forces have the inherent flexibility to transition to indigenous security force support when the mission becomes too large for the Special Forces. If requirements exceed Special Forces capabilities, then training and transition teams should be internally resourced from conventional US or coalition units already operating in the battlespace.
Based on these comments, it appears that these senior US Army leaders are willing to accept risk with advisory capability in order to focus resources on a full spectrum capable conventional force. While not an optimal solution, senior leaders view the process for resourcing the comprehensive advisory requirement in Iraq as good enough. In spite of the resourcing challenges, the advisory effort in Iraq has improved host nation security forces. For these senior US Army leaders, resourcing difficulties remain acceptable as long as the mission is ultimately successful.

These views reinforce the historical basis for US Army military capability development and force sizing which focuses on combat operations to engage and destroy the military forces of other nations. All other operations, such as counterinsurgency, nation-building, and stability operations represent to them lesser included capabilities of a traditional military force.\textsuperscript{47} The 2008 Army Posture Statement identified a list of non-combat capabilities, including advisory capability, required to address current and future operational requirements. However, the strategy for developing these capabilities focuses on expanding the capabilities of existing force structure through modernization. The posture statement contained no mention of additions or changes to the force structure to address these non-combat capability requirements.\textsuperscript{48} The senior US Army leadership does not support establishing an institutionalized advisory capability. GEN Casey stated: “Now there are some folks who say we need an advisory corps. I’d say we have an advisor corps; it’s called Special Forces.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Advocates for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability}

Many senior civilian leaders within the defense community view advisory operations as an essential component of future conflicts. They indicate that the US Army
needs to develop an institutional capability to conduct advisory operations. In an October 2007 speech to the Association of the United States Army, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated:

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police--once the province of Special Forces--is now a key mission for the military as a whole. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.50

Gates’ position draws from DoD Directive 3000.05 which established stability operations, including the task to rebuild indigenous security forces, as a core US military mission of equal importance to combat operations.51 A 2007 House Armed Services Committee, Oversight & Investigations subcommittee report, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” further supported this position with a finding that:

The Department of Defense has recognized that stability operations, including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are a core US military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military advisory capability to meet current, and potential future, requirements for this mission.52

Based on this finding the Oversight & Investigations subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee recommended that:

The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to report on how the department will implement its stability, security, transitions, and reconstruction operations policies for enhancing the role of military advisors within 60 days. The report should include a proposed structure and size of a joint advisory capability.53

While not discounting conventional capability requirements, these civilian leaders recognized a requirement for an institutionalized advisory capability.
Support for an institutionalized advisory capability can be found with senior US Army officers. GEN David H. Petraeus remains one of the most influential advocates for stability operations. A 2007 Washington Post article stated, “Petraeus is almost unique among senior Army leaders in fully embracing both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency.”\textsuperscript{54} GEN Petraeus’ efforts in the development of FM 3-24 and in implementing the doctrine as the Multi National Force-Iraq commander, elevated the role of stability operations and counterinsurgency operations to equal or greater importance than conventional combat operations. “U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sent a subtle but firm message to the Army . . . when he announced that GEN David Petraeus, a staunch counterinsurgency advocate, has been nominated to take the helm of Central Command.”\textsuperscript{55} Driven by the increased importance of stability operations, LTG William B. Caldwell, commander US Army Combined Arms Center, directed the development of proposals to create dedicated advisory units. Caldwell stated:

The concept here is a very specific focus. They do not do direct action; they do not command and control combat forces; they are not a combat force. Their mission is to do security-force assistance.\textsuperscript{56}

The efforts of GEN Petraeus and LTG Caldwell support the requirement for an institutionalized advisory capability.

A growing number of retired military officers and civilian national security strategists view the increased focus on stability and counterinsurgency operations as justification for an institutionalized advisory capability. Dr. John Nagl, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel and leading advocate for advisory capability, believes that the irregular warfare and counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq define what the U.S. military
will do in the future. In a Center for New American Security issue paper, "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Advisor Corps,” Nagl stated:

The counterinsurgency campaigns that are likely to continue to be the face of battle in the 21st century will require that we build a very different US Army than the enormously capable but conventionally focused one we have today. Nagl recommends that the US Army develop a “permanent standing advisor corps of 20,000 combat advisors--men and women organized, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad.”

Dr. Andrew Krepenevich, another retired US Army officer and Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, advocates a similar permanent advisor corps. In a Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments report, “An Army at the Crossroads,” Krepenevich stated:

Given the long expected service life of most of its major assets, the US military force structure, which underlies the concepts of operation that drive the US “way of war,” is still based primarily on the premises and experience of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Arguably much of the current Program of Record remains similarly reflective of that period. Yet the looming strategic challenges look to be significantly different. Thus there is a danger that many of the forces that the Defense Department plans to acquire may prove to be unsuitable for dealing with future threats.

Based on this assessment, Krepenevich believes the US Army should develop a dual surge force, capable of conducting irregular warfare operations and large scale conventional operations. The dual surge force would include permanent security cooperation units and advisory capability to address peacetime stability operations and to build partner capacity.

COL (RET) Robert Killebrew, a former US Army War College professor, supports establishing Military Assistance and Advisory Groups to direct advisory efforts. The concept outlined in an Armed Forces Journal article, “SecDef Has Signaled a
Turning Point in U.S. Defense Thinking,” relies on permanent Military Assistance and Advisory Groups to manage advisory efforts utilizing mobile training teams provided as needed by the current force structure. These advocates for an institutionalized advisory capability view the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as indicators of future requirements. They do not believe full spectrum forces are capable of resourcing anticipated advisory requirements. Based on their assessments of future conflict, many key leaders within the defense community, from the Secretary of Defense down, support the establishment of an institutionalized advisory capability.

**Primary Issue of the Advisory Capability Debate**

Why has the defense community been unable to achieve consensus on advisory capability requirements? Differing views regarding the likelihood of comprehensive advisory operations recurring in the future represents the primary issue of the debate. GEN Casey, GEN Chiarelli, and others view the comprehensive advisory mission in Iraq as an anomaly, not indicative of the future. They support the status quo force structure due to limited resource availability, the uncertainty of future requirements, and the relative success of the advisory operation in Iraq. Conversely, Secretary Gates, GEN Petraeus, LTG Caldwell, and others view comprehensive advisory operations as critical ongoing requirements. They support changes to the current forces structure. However, support for this position proves difficult for the same factors that support the opponent’s argument: limited resource availability, uncertainty of future requirements, and the relative success of the advisory operation in Iraq. Force structure changes require the expenditure of limited resources based on assumptions of future requirements. Allocating resources to develop an institutionalized advisory capability therefore requires
a solid justification. This study seeks to determine if the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability by analyzing the doctrinal view of advisory operations, experiences from past advisory operations, and current operational experiences in Iraq, with regard to comprehensive advisory requirements. The results of the assessment will determine if developing an institutionalized advisory capability is justified.


\[\text{5} \]Barnett, “Biography”.

\[\text{6} \]Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map: Book Proposal”.

\[\text{7} \]Ibid.

\[\text{8} \]The description of the development of “Persistent Conflict” is based on personnel observation of the process as the Executive Officer for the HQDA, G-35 Plans and Policy Directorate, which was one of the lead agencies for the development of Persistent Conflict.

\[\text{9} \]Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7, “Modeling and Simulation in an Era of Persistent Conflict” (Briefing prepared for MG Robert Lennox, Deputy G-3/5/7, April 2008).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), Foreword.


22 FM 3-0, 1-1.

23 Ibid., Foreword.


25 Ibid., 1-2 – 1-3.

26 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1 – 1-3.

27 FM 3-0, 2-2.

28 Ibid., 2-3 – 2-12.

29 Ibid., Chapter 3.

30 FM 3-07, vi.

31 Ibid., 1-3.

33 Ibid., 6-14.
34 Ibid., 6-14 – 6-15.
35 FM 3-24, 1-21.
36 Ibid., 1-26.
37 Ibid., 6-2.
38 Ibid., 6-3.
43 Dreazen.
44 Chiarelli, 8.
46 Chiarelli, 8.
49 Gurney, 17.
50 Gates.

53 Ibid.


55 Raz.


57 Raz.


59 Ibid.


61 Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF ADVISORY CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

These people that keep saying that were never going to do this again – I don’t know where they’re coming from.

— General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

Justification is the establishment of an idea or concept as well founded through the utilization of positive evidence. Therefore, a justification for US Army force structure changes must establish that the resultant benefits rationalize the required resource expenditures. The US Army organizes according to the realities of a finite budget and personnel strength, which limits organizational structure and design. Additional advisory force structure would come at the cost of reducing or eliminating other capabilities. Therefore, a justification for an institutionalized advisory capability must show that capability improvements rationalize the resource expenditures. Examining the doctrinal view of advisory operations, past advisory operation experiences, and current advisory operations using three criteria--operational importance of advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory requirements--provides a basis for assessing whether or not establishing an institutionalized advisory capability in the US Army is justified.

Assessment Criteria

The first criterion, operational importance of advisory operations, determines if advisory operations represent an essential aspect of US military operations. Analysis will focus on whether or not advisory operations are essential to mission accomplishment. A capability essential to mission accomplishment supports the need for an institutionalized
capability, while a non-essential capability does not. The second criterion, difficulty
developing advisory capability, analyzes the process for developing an advisory
capability. Analysis will focus on whether or not establishing an advisory capability is a
difficult and time-consuming process. A difficult development process supports the need
for an institutionalized capability, while an easy process does not. The final criteria,
frequency of advisory requirements, identifies how often advisory capability will be
required in future operations. Analysis will assess the likelihood that there will be a
recurring requirement for advisory capability. A frequently required capability supports
the need for an institutionalized advisory capability, while an infrequent requirement does not.

Given the difficulties associated with developing force permanent force structure,
all three criteria must support establishing an institutionalized advisory capability in order
to justify doing so. If only two of the three criteria support establishing an
institutionalized advisory capability then the required force structure actions cannot be
justified. First, if the analysis determines that advisory capability is not important, then
institutionalization cannot be justified regardless of the frequency or developmental
difficulty. If analysis determines that advisory capability is frequently required and
important, but easily developed when needed, then institutionalization cannot be justified.
If analysis determines that advisory capability is difficult to develop and important, but
not frequently needed, then institutionalization cannot be justified.

Force structure decisions, by their nature, are based on an assessment of future
requirements. The resource requirements and extended developmental timelines dictate
that force structure decisions posture the US Army to fight the next war. Therefore,
evaluation of the future need for advisory forces structure should focus mainly on the anticipated operational requirements of the future security environment. Doctrine, which identifies the US Army’s vision of future requirements, provides the primary basis for evaluating the need for advisory force structure. However, past and present advisory operation experiences can provide insights into future requirements. Doctrine identifies general trends that will most likely shape future conflicts and the most likely characteristics of conflict, which result from those trends. Advisory operations conducted in conflicts with similar characteristics can provide useful insight into anticipated future operational requirements. Analysis of applicable past and present US advisory operations can provide supporting evidence for conclusions about future advisory capability requirements.

**Review of Selected Advisory Experiences**

Selection of advisory experiences focuses exclusively on post-World War II advisory efforts to provide examples more likely applicable to future operational requirements. Advisory experiences are further restricted to US Army operations, which provide the best insight into US Army capability requirements. Finally, this analysis will only examine US Army operations that involved comprehensive advisory efforts. Limited advisory efforts routinely fall within existing US Army Special Forces capability, thus presenting few resourcing challenges. The current advisory capability resourcing challenges resulted primarily from the comprehensive advisory effort in Iraq. Future resourcing challenges will most likely result from similar situations requiring comprehensive advisory requirements. Therefore, past and present advisory operations that required comprehensive advisory efforts provide the most applicable analysis.
Selection of advisory experiences based on these delimitations identifies examples of past and present US Army advisory operations, which can provide useful insight for this analysis.

Exclusion of US Army operations that did not include comprehensive advisory efforts does not invalidate conclusions drawn from the selected experiences. The third criterion addresses frequent utilization not universal utilization. Numerous operations have not required an advisory effort or required only a limited effort. However, these cases do not invalidate operations that required a comprehensive effort.

Based on the delimitations, this analysis utilizes five advisory experiences: the Greek Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, El Salvador, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. US operations in each case study utilized a comprehensive advisory effort. In each case, the US Army had to build new organizational structures to resource advisory requirements. These advisory experiences present characteristics of conflict similar to the characteristics of future conflicts anticipated by doctrine. While the specifics of each experience vary, they can identify general trends associated with advisory operations and inform future requirements. Appendix A provides an overview of each experience, which identifies the context of the associated conflict, provides an overview of the associated advisory effort, and establishes the applicability of the advisory experience to doctrinally anticipated future requirements.

**Criterion 1: Operational Importance of Advisory Operations**

Evaluation of the first criterion, operational importance of advisory operations, focuses primarily on the doctrinal assessment of future requirements. Analysis of the anticipated future security environment and resultant capability requirements identifies
the Army’s vision of the role of advisory capability in future conflicts. The selected past and present advisory experiences provide supporting evidence by analyzing the importance of advisory capability in previous conflicts.

Doctrinal Assessment

US Army doctrine establishes the importance of advisory operations by linking the anticipated international security environment to the capabilities required to address the resultant challenges. FM 3-0 identifies the anticipated international security environment and outlines the US Army’s operational approach to addressing the identified challenges. Based on FM 3-0, FM 3-07 addresses the conduct of stability operations and the role of advisory operations in future conflicts. FM 3-0 anticipates a complex operational environment driven by trends including globalization, technological advances, urbanization, and failing states. The combined impact of these trends will result in an environment of instability and persistent conflict. State and non-state actors will exploit the instability through violent means to achieve political and ideological ends. These actors will seek to “challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare.” The enemy threat will utilize a combination of traditional military operations, irregular warfare, catastrophic WMD, and disruptive operations to achieve desired end states. Adversaries seek to leverage the combined impact of these capabilities to “create advantageous conditions by quickly changing the nature of the conflict and moving to employ capabilities for which the US is least prepared.”

The anticipated global trends and enemy threats combine to produce conflicts with challenging characteristics that drive a requirement for advisory capability. FM 3-0
envisions future conflicts that are more likely to be fought amongst the populace rather than around the populace.6 Adversaries will utilize the populace as a recruiting base, support infrastructure, and for protection against US forces. Irregular warfare including terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare, will represent a primary tactic of enemy threats. Doctrine anticipates the use of economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives as the chief means to attack US influence.7 The enemy threat “will seek to take on state-like qualities using the media and technology and their position within a state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage.”8 Failing states provide the enemy threat with the most advantageous conditions for future conflicts. These states face challenges in providing basic security, economic prosperity, basic services, and stable governance for their populace. Unable to maintain control, failing states are likely to cede control over populations and territory to preserve their hold on power.9 If failed states represent the most likely venue of conflict for future US military operations, the characteristics of conflict within these failed states establishes the need for a comprehensive advisory capability. Developing host nation security capabilities within these states contributes to increased security and reduction of violence.

FM 3-0 states that all US Army operations focus on “reducing the violence level and creating conditions that advance U.S. national strategic goals. Commanders conduct a series of operations intended to establish conditions conducive to a stable peace.”10 FM 3-0 directs that US Army forces combine offense, defense, and stability operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive and defensive operations defeat enemy forces, while stability operations simultaneously interact with the populace and civil authority.11 However, within the context of the anticipated operational environment,
stability operations are likely to be as important, if not more important, than offense and defense.12 FM 3-0 indicates that stability operations provide an essential capability across the spectrum of conflict from unstable peace to general war.13 Within operations involving, failed or failing states, stability operations provide an essential means to challenge insurgent capability and power.

FM 3-07 provides the overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations. “Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.”14 Stability operations focus primarily on developing host nation governance capacity. FM 3-07 identifies establishing or supporting civil security as the primary military task for US Army forces.

National defense and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of law, and sustained economic development. For a state recovering from the effects of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other events that threaten the integrity of the central government, an effective security sector fosters development, encourages foreign investment, and helps reduce poverty.15

Security sector reform serves as a key aspect in establishing long-term civil security. “Security sector reform is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”16 Host nation security forces represent a key pillar of a nation’s ability to provide security. Therefore, developing host nation security forces through security force assistance represents an essential element of stability operations. “Security force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security
forces in support of a legitimate authority." A comprehensive advisory capability provides the most effective method to accomplish security force assistance. Developing effective host nation security forces requires an advisory force structure capable of providing assistance from the institutional to tactical level, which doctrine clearly identifies as an essential element of future operations.

US Army Advisory Operation Experiences

US Army advisory operation experiences support the doctrinally assessed importance of comprehensive advisory capability. The selected advisory experiences represent two scenarios for the use of advisory capability: independent advisory efforts and advisory efforts in support of larger military operations. US operations in Greece and El Salvador represent the independent use of advisory capability. Additionally, the initial operations in Korea and Vietnam also represented the independent use of advisory efforts. Later operations in Korea and Vietnam and operations in Iraq utilized advisory efforts in support of larger military operations. Regardless of the scenario, advisory operations provided essential support to host nation security capabilities and to achieving US interests.

Greek Civil War

The US conducted advisory operations during the Greek Civil War independent of other US military operations. Political considerations precluded the use of US combat forces, leading to the exclusive use of advisory capability organized as the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG). The defeat of Communist guerillas resulted from the combined impact of diminishing communist
support for the guerillas, changes in guerilla tactics, Greek economic and social developments, and US economic and military assistance programs. While not the only factor, JUSMAPG represented an essential element of US strategy. Advisory operations improved Greek National Army (GNA) combat capability, allowing the GNA to continue operations and reverse the early tactical dominance of guerilla forces. GNA operations provided the Greek government with the time and space required to enact economic and social changes that shifted popular support away from the guerillas. JUSMAPG represented the entirety of US military operations in Greece and US resolve through application of the Truman Doctrine, which compelled Stalin to pressure the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians to wind down the war. Advisory operations proved essential to the US strategy, which brought about the resolution of the Greek Civil War on terms agreeable to the US.

**Korean War**

US advisory operations during the Korean War were conducted both independent of other US military operations and in support of major combat operations. US occupation of Korea in 1945 sought to set the conditions for an independent Korean state. Security force assistance represented a key element of this strategy. The US planned to withdraw military forces following the establishment of a stable government and economy. However, as US forces withdrew in 1948 the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) was incapable of providing independent internal and external security. As a result, the US established an advisory capability, which ultimately became the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), to remain in Korea and continue development of the ROKA.
KMAG represented the only US Army force in Korea at the time of North Korean attack in 1950. KMAG served two vital purposes for the US following the North Korean attack. First, KMAG provided intelligence and situational awareness to Eighth Army. Second, KMAG coordinated the limited ROKA resistance which helped to create the time and space required to establish the Pusan perimeter. After initial ROKA defeats, KMAG advisors reorganized ROKA units and its headquarters to fight in support of US forces. “Had KMAG advisors not employed such measures in the time of crisis, the US aid from Japan and the United States might well have arrived too late to have saved South Korea.”

Following stabilization of the Pusan perimeter, KMAG reorganized as a major subordinate element under Eighth Army. KMAG assumed responsibility for reconstituting decimated ROKA forces and advising ROKA field operations as part of the UN coalition. KMAG supported the development of one of the largest combat experienced armies in the world. KMAG constituted a comprehensive advisory effort to develop and support host nation security forces essential to the conduct of the war and long-term legitimacy and governance capability of the Republic of Korea.

Vietnam War

US advisory operations during the Vietnam War were also conducted both independent of other US military operations and in support of major combat operations. The first eleven years of direct US involvement in Vietnam, from 1954 to 1965, focused primarily on a comprehensive advisory effort under the United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV), which developed into the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in 1962. Advisory and assistance operations presented a
politically acceptable option to pursue national interests in the region. US strategy sought to develop and support Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) capable of maintaining civil security and supporting Republic of Vietnam (RVN) governance capability. However, the US failed to properly resource advisory force structure and develop an effective strategy to develop RVN security forces. By 1965, the RVNAF remained incapable of providing civil security and the US introduced combat forces to sustain the RVN. A properly resourced and conceived strategy to develop security forces could have developed a capable RVNAF and precluded the requirement for US combat forces.

During the major combat operations period from 1965-1968, advisory operations remained an essential element of US operations. MACV advisory force structure grew from about 3000 personnel to almost 12,000 personnel. RVNAF, supported by MACV, contributed to both major combat operations and the pacification strategy through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. MACV efforts during this period proved effective with the 1968 Tet offensive.

South Vietnamese units, including the territorial forces, stood firm and worked side by side with U.S. units to throw the enemy out of his objective areas. Far from weakening the government of Vietnam, the Tet attacks gave it a new unity and sense of purpose. It had suffered the enemy's worst attacks and survived.

Following the Tet offensive, the US implemented the Vietnamization strategy, which refocused military operations back to the developing RVN security forces. MACV advisory continued an expansion to a strength of over 14,000 personnel and represented the largest advisory operation in the history of the US Army. As US combat forces withdrew in 1969, the advisory effort continued to develop and support the RVNAF. A series of offensive operations in Laos and Cambodia and the 1972 North
Vietnamese Easter offensive exhibited improved RVNAF capabilities. “The commendable performance on the part of the South Vietnamese Army and the territorial forces was ample evidence that US effort had not failed.” However, the political decision to withdraw remaining US advisory and materiel support in 1973, precipitated the fall of the RVN in 1975. The advisory mission proved essential to sustaining both the RVNAF and the RVN, representing an essential element of US operations.

El Salvador

The US conducted advisory operations in El Salvador independent of other US military operations. The US sought to challenge Communist expansion in Latin America by providing support to the Government of El Salvador (GOES). However, in the shadow of the Vietnam War, committing combat troops into another foreign war did not present a politically acceptable course of action. As a result, US involvement in El Salvador remained limited to a comprehensive advisory effort under the United States Military Group in El Salvador (MILGROUP). US strategy in El Salvador provided “a besieged ally with weapons, ammunition, and other equipment, economic aid, intelligence support, strategic counsel, and tactical training – while preserving the principle that the war remains ultimately theirs to win or lose.” The MILGROUP represented the totality of US military presence in El Salvador.

The US stability operation in El Salvador proved successful. US efforts maintained the GOES, neutralized the insurgent threat, and ended communist expansion in Central America. Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF) ability to control the threat from insurgents, sustained the GOES until the peace accord in 1992. “Without MILGROUP training, equipment, and advice, the ESAF would have failed.”
Operation Iraqi Freedom

The US conducted advisory operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom to provide host nation security forces to support larger US military operations. The invasion of Iraq sought to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime and establish a new democratically elected government to provide stability and security for the Iraqi people. The strategy assumed that host nation security forces could provide security and stability for the populace and new government. However, the dissolution of the prior regime army left Iraq without a security capability. “As the full blown insurgency emerged in the fall of 2003, the creation of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had arguably become the single most important operation in the Coalition’s campaign.”35 In response, the coalition assembled a comprehensive advisory effort to develop and provide operational support for the ISF.

The advisory effort continues today as an essential element of US operations in Iraq. The 2008 Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander’s Counter-insurgency Guidance reaffirms the importance of the advisory effort. The guidance identifies “develop the capability and legitimacy of the ISF” and “conducting operations by, with, and through our Iraqi partners” as essential elements of US strategy in Iraq.36 “As Iraqi security forces stand on their own, coalition forces will increasingly enable from overwatch.”37 Currently, ISF capability assessments drive the withdrawal timeline for US combat forces. However, US forces will not remain in Iraq indefinitely. The Iraqi government will eventually fail if the advisory effort does not develop an ISF capable of operating independently.
Summary

Current US Army doctrine identifies advisory operations as an essential element of future US military operations. US Army advisory operation experiences reinforce this assessment. In each example, the analysis identified advisory capability as an essential element of military operations. Additionally, each example represented a comprehensive advisory effort. Due to the similarities between the advisory operation experiences and the future conflicts anticipated by doctrine, the examples indicate why an advisory capability is important. However, importance alone does not justify developing an institutionalized advisory capability.

Criterion 2: Difficulty Developing Advisory Capability

Evaluation of the second criterion, difficulty developing advisory capability, relies solely on analysis of past and present US Army advisory operations. Doctrine does not address force management decisions and therefore provides no insight into future capability resourcing issues. Evaluation of this criterion assesses the impact of maintaining the status quo and not developing an institutionalized advisory capability. The US Army has never had an institutionalized advisory capability. Therefore, the experiences of past and present operations provide the only insight into resourcing challenges.

US Army Advisory Operation Experiences

While the specific circumstances of each operation differed, all of advisory operations analyzed exhibited similar problems related to developing advisory capability. These similarities indicate that the problems are systemic to advisory operations and not
due to specific US Army organizational issues in each example. The lack of advisory doctrine contributed to the resourcing challenges experienced in each advisory operation examined. Guidance on fundamental issues such as organizational structure, advisor training requirements, command and control relationships, support requirements, and operational employment did not exist. Ambassador Pickering, the Ambassador to El Salvador from 1983 to 1985 stated the problem very well:

We discovered a combination of not knowing the lessons we should have learned from past experience on the one hand and having to adapt ourselves to somewhat different and new situations on the other. It was a tragedy that there was no respectable body of doctrine to be drawn on, that we were thrown back onto pragmatism. We had no respectable organizational approach to deal with this.\textsuperscript{38}

Lack of doctrine is the root cause of past and present challenges in developing advisor capability. Without doctrine, everything has to be learned through trial and error.

**Greek Civil War**

While ultimately successful, the advisory mission in Greece experienced difficulties that influenced effectiveness of the mission. The US Army did not have a standing advisory capability available in 1947. In a matter of months, the US Army fielded an advisory group without adequate training, personnel, or equipment. The challenges delayed development of the GNA and increased the possibility of success for the Communist guerillas. JUSMAPG challenges focused primarily on personnel and training issues.

JUSMAPG personnel problems spanned from the commander to enlisted support personnel. As JUSMAPG rushed into service in December 1947, the Joint Chiefs appointed MG William Livesay as the commander based more on availability in theater than experience or training. By February 1948 GEN Marshall was pushing for a “more
impressive personality” to head the advisory group and appointed LTG James Van Fleet to replace Livesay. Personnel shortages resulting from the post-World War II drawdown also affected the advisory effort in Greece. “Initially the lack of enlisted clerical and communication personnel hampered the operation of the new headquarters.” In August 1949, JUSMAPG had 70 percent personnel strength and by December 1949 had fallen to 47 percent personnel strength. The personnel shortages meant that JUSMAPG was only able to field six of the planned thirteen field advisory teams in August 1949.

A combination of limited training and operational guidance complicated the personnel problems. The initial contingents of personnel arrived in December 1947, received a country orientation, and were assigned to duties within two weeks. The US Army did not have a training program for advisory personnel. The advisory mission also lacked clear guidance for the conduct of field operations. In a briefing to the first field advisory teams, MG Livesay provided seemingly contradictory and puzzling guidance.

“Go out among the troops and see what is going on.” Above All, “neither your actions nor your talk” should leave the impression that you are acting as a “combatant.” This would not be easy. “You carry no arms. Your conduct, if you are caught in an operation, is more or less entirely up to you. The thing for you to do is to take cover. You are not armed and you take the best cover you can and see what you can but don’t get involved in the combat.” This was “rather a large order,” Livesay admitted, and yet he proceeded to add another difficult command: “If you get ambushed without arms and take off down the road you will lose prestige among the Greeks. So don’t give the Greeks the idea you are afraid when you take cover.” In still another curious statement, he declared, “you are not armed and that is your protection.”

Attempts by policymakers in Washington to draw a fine line between a combatant and an advisor contributed to MG Livesay’s confusing guidance. Predictably, within a month the first reports of US advisors participating in combat appeared in the news.
The challenges experienced by JUSMAPG delayed the development of the GNA. An established advisory capability with doctrine to guide its actions, could have avoided the problems experienced and more effectively developed the GNA. By the end of the war, JUSMAPG resolved many of the challenges and generated lessons learned. A former member of the American aid mission to Greece asserted that the experience had, “lessons for the administrators of a future Greece, Korea, or any other war-plagued nation that might need, in a hurry, to be saved from Communism.” Unfortunately, these lessons were not captured in doctrine.

**Korean War**

During the five-year pre-war period from 1945 to 1950, the advisory mission did not produce a ROKA capable of providing security for the Republic of Korea. The North Korean attack routed the ROKA and precipitated a retreat that did not end until the establishment of the Pusan perimeter. Conversely, during a three year period from 1950 to 1953 KMAG reconstituted an effective ROKA force that performed adequately in combat and provided a credible deterrent to maintain the armistice. The disparity in effectiveness resulted from differences in the advisory efforts organization, personnel, and training.

Prior to 1950, KMAG did not have the organizational structure to provide a comprehensive advisory effort to support the ROKA. Prior to the establishment of KMAG, the US Army resourced the initial advisory effort to establish constabulary regiments in January 1946 with only 18 lieutenants. This under-resourced effort attempted the daunting task of recruiting, training, and building infrastructure to support regiments in each province with limited success. Prior to 1950, KMAG never achieved
comprehensive coverage of the ROKA. The force structure provided advisors for only six of the eight ROKA divisions and did not provide advisors for the ROKA schools system.48 “KMAG advisors frequently had to divide their services between several units instead of concentrating on one, and the dilution of their over-all efforts could not fail to be reflected in the lower training status of the ROKA.”49 From 1950 to 1953, KMAG experienced a six-fold strength increase from 472 to 2,866 personnel.50 Following the personnel increase, KMAG efforts improved and the “ROKA steadily improved and assumed an increasingly important role in the defense of its country.”51 Regardless, failure to provide enough personnel for the advisory effort delayed development of ROKA capability.

The US Army failed to provide adequate personnel for the advisory effort. The US Army did not attempt to qualify personnel for advisory duty in Korea.52 The expansion of the advisory effort in April 1949 illustrates the problem. The personnel selection process limited candidates to personnel in theater and repeatedly lowered rank, longevity, and experience standards to fill advisory positions. Predictably, the process selected many officers who were not conducive to advisory duty.53 The US Army compounded the problem, by enacting personnel policies, which adversely affected advisor morale, performance, and selection. Perceived inequities for awards, promotions, rest and relaxation and rotation policies between advisors and officers in tactical units lowered advisor moral and performance and made advisory duty undesirable.54

A lack of training and preparation further complicated the personnel problems. A 1953 study concluded that, “a tour as a MAAG advisor is sufficiently unique and important duty to justify special preparation.”55 Prior to 1953, the typical KMAG
advisor received no advisory or language training, at best a one day orientation at KMAG headquarters, and a limited or nonexistent overlap and break-in period at the unit level. A typical advisor reported for duty with little knowledge of his mission or duties, operating conditions, guidance, or support structures. While the US Army never enacted a formal training program, by 1953 KMAG resolved many of these issues by developing a formalized orientation and integration process.

The US Army experienced significant problems organizing KMAG and providing trained personnel, which adversely affected the capabilities and performance of the advisory mission in Korea. The problems resulted in delayed development of the ROKA and increased US involvement in Korea. Given sufficient time and resources, “KMAG might well have produced an Army that could have withstood and turned back the North Korean attack.”

**Vietnam War**

By the late 1960s, the advisory effort in Vietnam developed into a relatively effective operation. The organizational structure adequately supported the RVNAF and the US Army provided qualified and trained advisory personnel. However, the improvements resulted from more than 12 years of operational experience. Prior to this point, the advisory effort in Vietnam experienced organizational, personnel and training challenges that delayed development of an effective advisory capability.

Development of advisory organizational structure began in 1954 and continued for sixteen years until MACV achieved peak strength in excess of 14,000 personnel in 1970. In 1954, the Geneva accords capped the US advisory effort at 342 personnel. However, by 1956 the expanding mission required additional personnel. Over the next
eight years, the US Army expanded the size and scope of MACV reaching a strength of 3,150 personnel in 1964. However, the 3,150 personnel proved inadequate to support an RVNAF of almost 600,000 soldiers. After 1965, MACV expanded rapidly achieving a strength of 11,596 personnel by 1968 and a peak strength of more 14,332 in 1970. Throughout the organizational development, MACV continued to add new advisory structure and change existing structure. Due to organizational limitations prior to 1965, MACV proved unable to employ the required advisory structure. Earlier, expansion of the advisory effort could have developed a more capable RVNAF and potentially precluded the requirement for US combat forces in 1965.

Personnel challenges compounded the organizational problems. A 1965 RAND study on advisors in Vietnam identified problems with selection of advisory personnel; recommending selection criteria to ensure selection of personnel compatible with the demands of advisory operations. Through 1960, selection criteria remained limited to rank, MOS, and vulnerability to an overseas tour. However, even these limited criteria were frequently violated to fill required billets. As an example, at one point only 80 of the 487 Mobile Advisory Teams senior advisors positions were filled with the required captains. Policies and procedures to attract well-qualified personnel to the advisory effort did not change until late in the war. In 1967, the CSA approved personnel policies to reward advisory duty and provide written guidance to promotion boards regarding evaluation of advisory duty. As with organizational structure, the US Army did not establish effective personnel policies until late in the war.

Training presented an additional challenge for selected personnel. Prior to 1962, advisors received little to no training before assuming advisory duties. The extent of
training for incoming advisors consisted of a general orientation upon arrival in country.\textsuperscript{68} Training significantly improved with the creation of the Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course in 1962. The course provided a six-week program continually updated to changing conditions in theater. The US Army further expanded advisory training by establishing the Military Assistance Security Advisor (MASA) Course in 1971 which provided an advanced twelve-week course with an additional eight weeks of language training.\textsuperscript{69} A 1965 RAND study identified that advisors lacked the specific knowledge or the skills required to serve effectively as an advisor.\textsuperscript{70} Later in the war, the Army developed relatively effective training and preparation programs for assigned advisory personnel. However, as stated earlier, these programs did not develop until eight years into the Vietnam War.

Efforts to develop advisory capability between 1954 and 1962 experienced significant shortcomings. These shortcomings delayed the creation of an effective advisory capability and adversely affected the development of the RVNAF. An institutionalized advisory capability with trained personnel, mature doctrine, and effective organizational structure could have alleviated many of these problems.

\textbf{El Salvador}

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the US Army abandoned counterinsurgency doctrine, determined that there would be “no more Vietnams.” Perversely, this attitude ensured that the Army did not have the tools it would require to fight the “next war” in El Salvador.\textsuperscript{71} The decision to deploy advisors to El Salvador in January 1981 required the development of the advisory capability after the need arose. The resultant organizational,
personnel, and training problems negatively affected the performance of the MILGROUP.

For political reasons the organizational structure of the MILGROUP was capped at 55 personnel. Though most advisors in El Salvador felt that a cap was a good idea, the number “was the product of impulse rather than analysis and imposed an impractical ceiling.” The limited number of personnel quickly proved inadequate and the US Army expanded advisory capability with in-country temporary duty personnel and training of ESAF units and personnel outside the country. The personnel limitations delayed development of an effective field advisory structure. Prior to 1984 the majority of MILGROUP personnel worked national level issues. ESAF battalions received training from mobile training teams that departed country once training ended. The MILGROUP began employing three-man Operations, Plans, and Training Teams (OPATT) at the brigade level starting in 1984. The Congressional personnel cap limited in-country advisory capability and delayed development of effective advisory structure. While many MILGROUP personnel argued that the personnel limitations were a good thing, the actual number was an arbitrary decision with little analytical basis. If the US Army had an institutionalized advisory capability with mature advisory doctrine, the US Army would have had the tools necessary to establish a realistic ceiling for advisory personnel.

A former CINCSOUTH, in reference to the mission in El Salvador, stated that “you don’t need a lot of people to fight these wars, but the few you get have to be good ones.” The Army proved successful in selecting a series of exceptionally qualified colonels to serve as MILGROUP commanders. However, personnel selection for the rest of the MILGROUP proved less successful. A former MILGROUP member stated, “we
had the third team here.” Though perhaps too harsh, the statement contains a grain of truth. Although, many outstanding officers served in El Salvador, the US Army assigned lesser-qualified personnel in surprising numbers. 

Virtually nonexistent training and preparation compounded the personnel selection issues. Preparation for the MILGROUP advisors consisted of a two and one-half day Security Assistance Team Training and Orientation Course (SATTOC) and a brief in country orientation. SATTOC did not address advisor duties or El Salvador specific information. One student described SATTOC as “very close to completely useless.” The in country orientation provided little more, with accounts indicating the orientation consisted of a perfunctory review of policies focused more on what not to do, not what to do. The learning curve required for new members of the MILGROUP limited the effectiveness of the MILGROUP and the development of the ESAF.

In a 1992 after action report, a previous OPATT chief stated that he did not believe “our doctrinal approach to the advisory business should be based on luck. If the job is worth doing, it is worth doing right and requires planning, organization, and systematic solutions.” He further stated, “The fact is that nobody is adequately trained for the work that makes a complex job.” While the advisory mission played a clear role in setting the conditions for the peace accord, resourcing challenges detracted from the advisory capability of the MILGROUP and the development of ESAF.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

“No American military leader entered Iraq in 2003 expecting to train, equip, or advise the entire body of security forces in a new Iraq on a multiyear basis, and to do so in the midst of an intense insurgency.” As a result, the coalition did not have a detailed
or coordinated plan for the reconstruction of the ISF.\textsuperscript{83} The magnitude of the advisory requirement in Iraq in conjunction with GWOT advisory requirements created further complications. As a result, the advisory effort in Iraq experienced significant organizational, personnel, and training challenges.

The lack of organizational doctrine presented significant challenges. The first advisory organization, the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), consisted of an ad hoc mix of assigned personnel, temporary duty personnel, and contractors. CMATT took four months to determine organizational requirements and submit a Joint Manning Document request for personnel.\textsuperscript{84} CJTF-7 provided no guidance for the organization of the ICDC advisory effort, resulting in disparate solutions depending on the specific unit. Almost a year later the separate advisory efforts were reorganized under Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and advisory responsibility shifted from the CPA to MNF-I. Development continued over the next year through a series of personnel requests that culminated with a consolidated request for forces, which established the current advisory structure. Developing an effective and stable organizational structure required more than two years. The inefficiency and turmoil during this period limited the effectiveness of the advisory effort and the development of the ISF.

Personnel problems compounded the organizational challenges. Every advisor position represented an addition to existing force structure requirements. The US Army did not have a ready pool of personnel to resource advisory requirements. Therefore, the personnel for each advisor position had to be taken from other organizations. Existing requirement for individual augmentees to support other non-doctrinal organizations
further strained the personnel system. As a result, the US Army progressed through a series of personnel resourcing methods including reserve units, the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System, and taskings to the major commands with limited success. These systems failed to provide personnel with the experience or skillsets required for advisory duty. The personnel provided by these systems routinely violated HQDA guidance including problems with rank, MOS, gender, disqualifying medical conditions, pending retirement, and retiree recalls. These systems also failed to provide enough personnel, with advisory teams frequently deploying undermanned. The transition of the personnel selection process to Army Human Resources Command and the regular assignment system in 2007 resolved most of the personnel issues. However, the US Army required almost four years to implement an effective system, further hindering the advisory effort and development of the ISF.

Compounding the personnel selection problems, the selected personnel lacked proper training and preparation for advisory duty. The US Army did not have a training or preparation program for the first year and a half of the advisory effort. Initially run by US Army Reserve training divisions, stateside training did not start until early 2005. The training divisions are designed to provide basic institutional training for mobilizing US Army Reserve and National Guard units, not advanced training for combat advisory operations in a foreign country. As a result, the program focused primarily on basic skills training with little advisory or Iraq-specific training. In November 2005, advisors received only two hours of Arabic language training, one day of cultural training, and no counterinsurgency or advisory skills training. Relocation of the course three times in
just over a year further diminished the consistency and effectiveness of the training program.\textsuperscript{89}

MNSTC-I established the Phoenix Academy, in Iraq, in early 2005 to provide counterinsurgency and advisory training for incoming personnel. Though an improvement, the program failed to provide adequate instructors. Through 2006, the Phoenix Academy relied primarily on taskings to advisory teams in country to provide instructors for the course. Predictably, tasked teams sent their un-needed and usually least qualified personnel. Though the curriculum was well conceived, the Phoenix academy failed to provide instructors capable of delivering the course material.\textsuperscript{90}

Transfer of the training program to Fort Riley and the 1st Infantry Division in May 2006, improved many of the training issues. At Fort Riley, the program expanded to 60 days and increased language, cultural, counterinsurgency and advisory skills training. 1st Infantry Division provided better instructors and increased training resources. In-country training at the Phoenix Academy improved with an expansion of the program and by providing assigned instructors. The Army required three and a half years to develop a training and preparation program for advisors.

In a brief to incoming advisors at the Phoenix Academy in 2006, GEN Casey stated, “Our overall strategy in Iraq, as you’ve heard the President say many times, is that we’re going to stand up the Iraqi Security Forces--and as they do, we’ll stand down. This transition team concept is an integral part of our entire strategy.”\textsuperscript{91} However, the US Army failed to resource the advisory effort as an “integral part” of the strategy until 2007. The US Army did not have the organizations, personnel, training systems, or doctrine to support the advisory requirement in 2003. The result was a three-year delay in fielding a
capable advisory effort and an equivalent delay in the development of the ISF. Amidst growing domestic and international pressure to end the war in Iraq, a three-year delay could mean the difference between success and failure.

Summary

All five advisory experiences analyzed above indicate a difficult ad-hoc advisory capability development process. The examples show that an advisory capability cannot be quickly developed and employed when needed. Developing an advisory capability is a time-consuming process with that requires commitment of institutional resources. Past and present advisory operations experienced doctrinal, organizational, personnel, and training challenges. Unfortunately, the lessons learned from one advisory experience were rarely passed on to the next.

Each time the US military response to advisory requirements was an ad hoc, secondary endeavor. Each time results were expected. Each time advisors tried their best. Each time results were mixed. Each time the experience was forgotten --relegated to that lesser important, not-to-be-done-again-anytime-soon pile of military tasks.92

Future advisory operations will experience similar developmental difficulties and operational challenges without a standing advisory capability.

Criterion 3: Frequency of Advisory Requirements

Evaluation of the final criterion, frequency of advisory requirements, builds off the evaluation of the first criterion. Analysis of the anticipated role of advisory capability identifies how often the US Army expects to utilize advisory capability in future conflicts. A review of past advisory operations provides supporting evidence by identifying how often advisory capability was utilized in past operations.
Doctrinal Assessment

FM 3-07 indicates that advisory operations represent an essential element of host nation governance capacity development and stability operations. FM 3-0 states that all US military operations seek to establish conditions conducive to stable peace.93 Furthermore, FM 3-0 anticipates an era of persistent conflict in which the US Army will frequently conduct stability and advisory operations, some of which will be protracted efforts. Therefore, doctrine anticipates a frequent requirement for advisory capability in future operations.

Ongoing Advisory Operation Experiences

FM 3-0 states, “Our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of persistent conflict.” Current GWOT operations represent the opening actions of the era of persistent conflict and therefore provide an applicable model for future conflict.

Currently, the US Army conducts a wide range of advisory operations. In many cases, such as the Philippines, Colombia, and Africa, advisory operations provide the primary means of applying military power. In other cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan, advisory operations emerged as unforeseen requirements driven by tactical and operational conditions common to the unconventional warfare that emerged in those countries.

Current operations establish a paradigm in which advisory capability is not only utilized as a planned asset but also develops unexpectedly out of other operations. Current operations support the likelihood of frequent advisory requirements in future operations.
Past Advisory Operation Experiences

The Army’s post-World War II operational experiences further support the likelihood of frequent advisory efforts in future conflicts. The US has an extensive history of utilizing advisory capability in conflicts similar to doctrinally anticipated future conflicts. Past advisory operations include Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.94 Common threads between these historical conflicts and predicted future conflicts include failed or failing states, insurgencies, civil war, demographic changes, resource conflicts, and importance of host nation security capability. While the international security environment and specifics of each conflict vary, a similar nature of conflict and the resultant use of advisory capability remains.

Summary

Doctrine identifies advisory capability as a frequent requirement for future US operations. A review of past and present advisory operations reinforces this assessment. The review of current operations identified a large number of advisory operations including both limited and comprehensive advisory requirements. Additionally, a review of post-World War II military operations indicate the extensive use of advisory capability in the past. Based on the established similarities between the past and present advisory operations and doctrinally anticipated future conflicts, the analysis indicates a frequent role for advisory capability.
Summary of Criteria Assessment

According to the assessment of criterion 1, importance of advisory operations, and criterion 3, frequency of advisory requirements, it is apparent that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential requirement in many future US military operations. Both the doctrinal assessment and the analysis of advisory operation experiences support the anticipated requirement for advisory operations. However, the analysis of criterion 2, difficulty developmental advisory capability, indicates significant difficulties in developing advisory capability. The review of past and present advisory operations indicates that advisory capability development is challenging and time-consuming. With all three assessment criteria showing that there is justification for establishing an institutionalized advisory capability, the implications for US Army force structure are clear.

3Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-1.
4Ibid., 1-4.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 1-5.
7Ibid., 1-4.
8Ibid., 1-5.
9Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-9 – 1-10.
16 FM 3-0, 2-2.
17 Ibid., viii.
19 Ibid., 223.
20 Ibid., 224-225.
21 Ibid.
24 Sawyer, 140.
25 Ibid., 141-145.
28 Ibid., 47-52. Collins identifies the expansion of advisory efforts to the district and subsector levels after the introduction of combat forces in 1965. Additionally, the US expanded advisory efforts at the battalion level in 1967. Collins also identifies a series of studies in 1967 which identified problems with the existing advisory effort and provided recommendations which improved the advisory effort. Collins asserts that the
expansion of advisory efforts and the organizational changes resulted in an improved advisory effort from 1965 to 1968. The advisory effort prior to 1965 had deficiencies that were not corrected until after the introduction of US combat forces in 1965. If the identified improvements had been enacted earlier and as a result RVNAF capability had been improved earlier, the requirement for US Combat forces in 1965 could have been precluded.

29Ibid., 86.
30Ibid.
31Ramsey, 32.
32Collins, 122.
34Ramsey, 103.
37Ibid.
39Howard 136.
41Ibid., 23.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., 3.
44 Howard, 128.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 233.

47 Sawyer, 15-17.

48 Ibid., 58.

49 Ibid., 186.


51 Sawyer, 188.

52 Ramsey, 11.

53 Sawyer, 42-44.

54 Ramsey, 11-12; Hausrath, 87-107.

55 Hausrath, 46.

56 Ibid., 37-40.

57 Ramsey, 13.

58 Sawyer, 187.

59 Ramsey, 27.

60 Collins, 7.

61 See Ramsey, 28 for advisor strength. See Collins, 33 for RVNAF strength.

62 Ramsey, 30 and 32.

63 Ibid., 32-34.


65 Ramsey, 37-38.
66 Ibid., 31.
67 Ibid., 39.
68 Ibid., 40.
69 Ibid., 41.
70 Hickey.
71 Bacevich, 14
72 Ramsey, 84.
73 Bacevich, 22
74 Ibid., 5.
75 Ramsey, 87-88.
76 Bacevich, 16.
77 Ibid., 17.
78 Ibid., 16.
79 Ramsey, 91.
80 Ibid., 91.
81 Ibid., 101.
82 Wright, 475.
83 Ibid., 427.
84 Ibid., 435-437.

85 The 98th Division (Institutional Training), used to man MNSTC-I in 2004, provided personnel capable of conducting the institutional training of Iraqi forces but less capable to support a combat advisory role. See Wright, 461. WIAS selection criteria were limited to rank and MOS. The system did not have the mechanisms or personnel to conduct more effective screening to select the appropriate personnel. The MACOM tasking system shifted the selection of personnel to the providing unit. Units tended to send available or unneeded personnel not the most qualified. MACOM selectees frequently violated the associated sourcing guidance.
All of the advisory operations sourcing challenges identified in this paragraph are based on personnel experience as a HQDA G-35 War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X advisor sourcing requirements from 2005-2007 and as an Iraq advisory team leader in 2006.

The initial CMATT personnel received no training and in most cases were assigned with little warning from troops already in theater. The establishment of MNSTC-I in 2004 did not change the training situation. The 98th Division, assigned to source MNSTC-I, received no advisory specific training prior to deployment into theater. The division was trained and prepared to conduct basic institutional training, but was not prepared to serve in an operational or combat advisory role.

Based on personnel attendance at the 30 day training program at FT Carson, 29 October 2005 - 30 November 2005.

The Advisory training moved from FT Bliss to FT Carson in early 2005, FT Carson to FT Hood in January 2006, and FT Hood to FT Riley in May 2006.

Based on personnel attendance at the Phoenix Academy in December 2005 and anecdotal reports from other advisors that went through the program.


Ramsey, 107.

FM 3-0, 2-2.

CHAPTER 4

THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED ADVISORY CAPABILITY

The alternative is to build the Army our country needs now, and will need far more urgently in years to come—an Army that includes a standing Advisor Corps organized, designed, trained, and equipped to develop professional host nation security forces that can build freedom abroad.

— Dr. John Nagl

Justification

FM 3-0 states, “America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society.” The enemy threat “will focus on creating conditions of instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, and employ global networks to expand local operations.” The US Army will employ stability operations and advisory capability to develop host nation governance capacity and establish the conditions for a stable peace to challenge the primary goals of enemy threats. Doctrine indicates that the use of advisory operations will be frequent and will represent an essential element of future operations.

Current experiences in the GWOT and past operational experiences since the end of World War II support the doctrinal assessment. Additionally, more than six decades of operational experience with advisory operations indicates the cost of not being prepared to meet advisory capability requirements. Current operations in Iraq provide an example of the problems created by unpreparedness. Developing an advisory capability is a difficult, time-consuming process not easily accomplished after the operational need arises. The US Army has a choice to either maintain an advisory capability prepared to
conduct operations or maintain the status quo accepting the diminished capability and delay in the development of host nation security forces as the US Army develops the required advisory capability.

Current operations in Iraq highlight the problems with developing an advisory capability after the need arises. The long-term viability of the Iraqi government hinges on the ability of the ISF to maintain security. However, the US Army spent more than three years developing an advisory capability. Given the growing domestic and international pressure to end the war in Iraq, a finite operational timeline exists. The United States will most likely draw down forces in Iraq regardless of the capability of the ISF. Three additional years of effective advisory operations would have placed the Iraqi government and the ISF in a more advantageous position. The ultimate success or failure of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi government may rest on the three-year delay in developing a capable advisory capability.

The past advisory operations analyzed in this study highlight the problems with developing an advisory capability after the need arises. As with Iraq, the viability of the Republic of Vietnam hinged on the RVNAF capability to maintain security. After the withdrawal of US forces in 1973, the RVNAF proved incapable of providing security and the Republic of Vietnam fell in 1975. Changes to the advisory effort such as the addition of a formal advisor training program, the MATA course, in 1962 and the expansion of the advisory force structure from 1965 to 1968 improved the advisory effort and resulted in a more capable RVNAF. Earlier implementation of these improvements, with an institutionalized advisory capability, would have placed the RVNAF and the Republic of Vietnam in a more advantageous position. US operations in Korea further emphasize the
cost of not having an institutionalized advisory capability. The US Army did not field an advisory capability with the force structure required to advise the entire ROKA, including the schools system and units down to the battalion level, until after the North Korean Attack in 1950. If the US Army had employed an advisory capability that equaled the capability that existed in 1953 prior to the North Korean attack in 1950, the advisory effort could have developed a ROKA capable of deterring or defeating a North Korean attack, precluding the escalation of the war and the large commitment of US forces.

While the US operations in Greece and El Salvador were ultimately successful, the difficulties experienced developing the required advisory capability threatened the success of each operation and at a minimum extended the length and costs of each conflict. Opponents to an institutionalized advisory capability argue that the status quo is good enough; however, past and present operational experiences indicate otherwise.

Given the expected frequency and importance of advisory capability in an era of persistent conflict, the US Army must have a standing advisory capability prepared to conduct advisory operations. The US Army must develop an institutionalized advisory capability prepared to address the full range of advisory requirements from limited to comprehensive. An institutionalized advisory capability must establish the doctrine, organization, personnel management policies, and training base to support quickly the conduct of advisory operations. A quickly deployable and effective advisory capability is essential to US operations and national interests in an era of persistent conflict.

The Continuing Debate

Senior Army leaders, including the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, believe that while stability operations and the associated advisory operations are important, the
US Army must maintain its focus on conventional warfare and conventional forces that are capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations. These leaders see the situation in Iraq as anomaly and not indicative of future conflicts. They believe the current requirement for conventional forces to support comprehensive advisory operations will end with Iraq and the advisory mission will return to the Special Forces community. GEN Casey stated, “I’m just not convinced that anytime in the near future we’re going to decide to build someone else’s army from the ground up.” He further stated, “And to me, the advisory corps is our Special Forces – that’s what they do.”

Other senior leaders in the national security community, including Secretary Gates, members of the House Armed Services Committee, the commander of US Central Command, and the Combined Arms Center Commander see stability operations and the associated advisory operations as the defining characteristics of future conflicts. They do not discount conventional capability requirements, but believe that the Army must also develop institutional capabilities, including an advisory capability, specifically designed for irregular warfare. Capturing the viewpoint of advisory capability advocates, Nagl stated, “the most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us.”

The deciding point in this debate is the determination of future operational requirements. If Iraq and Afghanistan are anomalies, then the US Army does not need an institutional advisory capability. However, if Iraq and Afghanistan are indicative of future requirements then the US Army needs an institutional advisory capability. Resolution of this debate relies on developing a consensus on the future operating environment and resultant capability requirements.
Building Support for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability

Institutionalizing an advisory capability requires the commitment of limited resources to include organizational structure, personnel, equipment, funding, and intellectual capital. Force structure change cannot occur without the support of senior US Army leadership. A consensus must exist on the anticipated increase in advisory operations as well as the requirement for advisory force structure capable of supporting the spectrum of advisory requirements from limited to comprehensive. The allocation of resources to develop and field an institutional advisory capability cannot occur without the implicit support of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army.

In the 1990s two US Army officers, LTC Douglas Macgregor and MAJ Donald Vandergriff, emerged as advocates for fundamental changes to the US Army force structure and policies. Both officers published books outlining their concepts and briefed key leaders throughout the defense community. Their concepts gained acceptance amongst the Army community. However, senior Army leadership did not accept or support the proposed force structure changes. Without broad based support, including senior leadership, the recommended changes were dismissed as fringe ideas. Almost a decade later the concepts advocated by Macgregor and Vandergriff influenced the conceptual basis for the modularity force structure changes. The initial failure to implement their ideas resulted primarily from the lack of senior leader support for the proposed change. Once senior Army leaders accepted the need for force structure changes, the US Army committed the required resources to implement the changes. The current debate on an institutionalized advisory capability mirrors these early debates on modularity. While many have recognized the importance of stability operations and
advisory operations, the US Army remains focused on combat operations and general-purpose forces. Advocates for an institutional advisory capability have gotten ahead of the debate and focused on how to change force structure without effectively justifying the need for change. Without gaining key leader support, dismissal of advisory force structure concepts will continue. Advocates must present a justification capable of persuading senior Army leaders to support an institutional advisory capability. Until the Chief of Staff and senior leaders accept a requirement for an institutionalized advisory capability, no action will be taken.

Future Research--How to Institutionalize an Advisory Capability

This analysis focused on the conceptual question of does the US Army need an institutionalized advisory capability. Based on the need established in this study, future research should focus next on the applied question of what characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. Determination of the required characteristics should look to both doctrine and the conceptual proposals of advisory advocates such as Nagl, Krepenevich, and Killebrew. Once the requirements have been determined, future research must ultimately address the practical question of how to institutionalize an advisory capability. Determination of how to institutionalize an advisory capability must address a wide range of considerations to include doctrine, force structure, personnel policies, political considerations, and Army cultural considerations. The practical analysis should develop a detailed DOTMLPF strategy for implementing an institutionalized advisory capability. Having established the link between past, present
and future operations, the lessons learned can be utilized to inform the development of future advisory organizations.


2FM 3-0, vii.

3Ibid., 1-5.


5Ibid.

6Nagl.


8The recent expansion of the Army was limited to traditional combat forces that could be used across the full spectrum of conflict. The Future Combat System and Network Centric Warfare is based on the use of technology to decrease the operational footprint, establish protection through standoff distance and precision strike capability, and allow quick decisive operations. Unconventional warfare, by its nature, requires large amounts of manpower, operations in and amongst the population and enemy, and is usually a protracted operation.
APPENDIX A

REVIEW OF SELECTED ADVISORY EXPERIENCES

A brief review of each advisory experience provides the context of the associated conflict, an overview of the associated advisory effort and establishes a doctrinal link. The first section provides a brief overview of the conflict to establish the context in which the advisory effort was conducted. The second section provides a review of the advisory effort by focusing on doctrine, general organization, personnel, equipment and training. The review also addresses the effectiveness of the advisory effort. The third section establishes the doctrinal link, which validates the applicability of conclusion drawn from the case study.

Greek Civil War--1947 to 1950

Soviet Union action in Germany, Korea and Eastern Europe quickly frustrated hopes for unity amongst the great powers after World War II. In early 1946, Winston Churchill warned that the Soviet Union had lowered an “Iron Curtain” across the European continent resulting in communist control of most of Eastern Europe. The Truman administration did not see an end to Soviet expansion and viewed each gain as a stepping-stone for the next. In the aftermath of World War II, the Greek Civil War represented one of the opening acts of the Cold War.

After liberation from Nazi Germany in 1944, British forces occupied Greece to support the newly established Greek government. By the end of 1944 a communist insurgency developed, challenging the Greek government for control of the country. Unable to handle the developing insurgency, the GNA required military assistance and
advisory support provided by British occupation forces. However, by 1946 political and economic challenges in Great Britain threatened the continuation of British military presence in Greece. The Truman administration considered the loss of Greece to communist expansion unacceptable and committed the US to support Greece.

**US Advisory Effort**

Initial US support for Greece included military and economic assistance coordinated by a State Department led advisory and assistance group. By the end of 1947, significant gains by communist guerillas indicated that the GNA required additional military support. US political considerations precluded commitment of combat forces, but allowed the commitment of an advisory effort. As a result, the US established JUSMAPG to support the GNA. “The mission of JUSMAPG was to assist the Greek Armed Forces in achieving internal security in Greece at the earliest possible date by providing to the Greek National Army including the National Defense Corps, Royal Hellenic Navy, and Royal Hellenic Air Force stimulating and aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical advice.” At its height, JUSMAPG consisted of 527 personnel providing advisory teams to support the Greek Armed Forces Staff and military units down to the brigade level. JUSMAPG was a comprehensive advisory effort that restored the GNA training program, shaped organizational and personnel policy, provided logistics and operational planning assistance, and advised the conduct of field operations.

After defeats in August of 1949, the Greek Civil war ended with a communist guerilla announced cease-fire on 16 October 1949. “In the aftermath of the Greek War, General Van Fleet declared that the United States had experienced an “obvious measure
of success” in halting Communist advances into Western Europe and the Mediterranean. The multifaceted strategy of economic, political, diplomatic, and military efforts succeeded in defeating communist expansion and supporting an early ally in the Cold War. GNA organizational and operational improvements contributed significantly to the defeat of the communist guerillas and the success of the Greek Government.

Doctrinal Link

In 1949, a New York Times correspondent in Athens “observed that the Truman Doctrine had involved the United States in “a new kind of war” against communist-led guerillas in Greece.” The nature of conflict in the Greek Civil War differed greatly from the experiences in World War I and World War II.

The Conflict was dark and murky, a war in the shadows characterized by enemies difficult to define or even see, and by a search for victory not measurable in territorial terms or human and material loss. The enemy rarely wore uniforms, often fought with confiscated weapons, usually relied upon non-conventional warfare, and nearly always received supplies and shelter from neighboring communist countries. Battlefronts seldom existed, for the guerillas preferred the terrorist tactics of raiding, pillaging, sniping, and abducting villagers and townspeople into their small but effective force. Communist propagandists kept the atmosphere tense by attacking America for pursuing imperial interests and opposing the popular will.

The conflicts characteristics share similarities with the anticipated nature of future conflict in FM 3-0.

The first US military action of the Cold War was a counterinsurgency effort against a non-state actor, not state versus state conflict. The conflict centered on a failing state unable to handle an internal non-state security threat supported by external communist regimes. US strategy addressed the social, political, economic, and military
dimensions of the situation. As FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 now direct, military operations in Greece focused on developing host nation governance and security capability.\textsuperscript{18}

The Korean War

Concurrent with the conflict in Greece, the next act in the Cold War developed in Korea. Soviet Union attacks on Japanese forces in North Korea threatened Soviet domination of the Korean peninsula and US access and influence in Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{19} The US entered Korea in September 1945 to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of the peninsula. An agreement split occupational control at the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel specifying return of Korean independence after the establishment of a stable government and economy. However, the Soviet Union regarded the 38th parallel as a dividing line with no intention of supporting independence and reunification.\textsuperscript{20}

US Advisory Effort

Removal of Japanese forces left South Korea without an organized security capability. United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) quickly established the Korean National Police, providing material, training, and advisory assistance.\textsuperscript{21} However, growing internal disturbances and border concerns indicated that South Korea required more than a police force. In response, USAFIK formed the Korean Constabulary Force to serve as a police reserve during national emergencies.\textsuperscript{22} The US Army provided a comprehensive advisory effort including materiel, training, organization, and advisory assistance. In coordination with Korean counterparts, US Army advisory teams directed the formation of a light infantry based constabulary force consisting of 50,000 soldiers by March 1948.\textsuperscript{23}
The advisory effort reorganized as the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) with the establishment of South Korean independence in 1948. PMAG grew to 241 personnel, but remained under-strength given the breadth of the mission requirements. As US forces withdrew from Korea in 1948, Korean forces required continued advisory assistance. With the departure of USAFIK headquarters in July 1949, the re-designated KMAG remained under direct control of the Ambassador and the American Mission in Korea.

The KMAG mission was “to develop the security forces of the Republic of Korea within the limitations of the Korean economy by advising and assisting the Republic of Korea in the organization administration and training of such forces, including the Army, Coast Guard, and the National Police Force, and by insuring the effective utilization of any United States military assistance by those forces.” KMAG constituted a comprehensive advisory effort to build and support the entire Korean military structure. Although authorized strength increased to 500 personnel, KMAG remained under-strength to advise a Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), which expanded to over 100,000 soldiers, without US approval, by June 1950. A combination of limited resources and complications from a communist insurgency resulted in a ROKA unprepared to defend its borders.

North Korean Attack

The North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 overwhelmed the unprepared ROKA, precipitating a retreat that did not end until the establishment of the Pusan perimeter. As the only US military capability on the peninsula until US forces from Japan arrived, KMAG provided situational awareness and helped coordinate the limited ROKA
resistance that contributed to delaying North Korean forces long enough for UN forces to establish the Pusan perimeter.\textsuperscript{29} Decimated ROKA forces lost over 50 percent of personnel and more than 70 percent of equipment and supplies.\textsuperscript{30} Tasked to reconstitute the ROKA, KMAG returned to military control as a major subordinate command of Eighth Army. Over the next three years, KMAG grew to 2,866 personnel and directed the reconstitution and expansion of the ROKA to a force of more than 590,000 personnel by July 1953.\textsuperscript{31} KMAG efforts contributed to an improved ROKA capability essential to the conduct of the war and maintenance of the armistice with North Korea.\textsuperscript{32}

Doctrinal Link

US involvement in Korea resulted primarily from limited Republic of Korea (ROK) governance and security capability. The ROK required governance, economic and military support from liberation in 1945 well into the post-armistice 1950s. FM 3-0 anticipates a similar future operating environment in which state and non-state actors seek to exploit the limited capabilities of weakened or failing states.\textsuperscript{33} The ROK faced an enemy threat consisting of an irregular insurgency threat and a conventional North Korean Army threat. Communist-backed guerillas conducted insurgency operations during the pre-war period from 1946 to 1950 and augmented conventional operations after 1950.\textsuperscript{34} Once again, FM 3-0 anticipates an enemy threat that utilizes a combination of irregular and conventional tactics to create instability and defeat security forces.\textsuperscript{35} Based on these conditions, US forces utilized the full spectrum of operations to address the communist North Korean threat. US operations in Korea included nation-building, advisory effort, counter-insurgency and conventional warfare to support a partner nation.
Similarly, current doctrine prescribes stability operations, including advisory efforts, as a key element of US operational design.\textsuperscript{36}

**The Vietnam War--1954 to 1973**

During World War II, the Viet Minh emerged as an anti-Japanese resistance group providing intelligence to Allied forces and assisting downed Allied pilots.\textsuperscript{37} However, France’s colonial interests in Indochina led to conflict with the Communist Viet Minh revolutionary movement.\textsuperscript{38} Amidst increasing ideological and military confrontations between communist and western powers, the Viet Minh presented one more pressure point of communist expansion in Asia.\textsuperscript{39} In response, President Truman announced an aid package for the French in Indochina on 1 May 1950, initiating twenty-three years of US involvement in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{40}

**US Advisory Effort**

Indirect US involvement in Indochina began in 1950 with the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina which provided support for French and anti-communist forces. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the US increased advisory and assistance efforts to fill the vacuum left by the French. In 1954, MAAG Indochina split into two groups for Cambodia and Vietnam, with MAAGV providing materiel assistance and advisory support for development of the RVNAF.\textsuperscript{41} MAAGV expanded to an authorized strength of 685 personnel and initiated a comprehensive advisory effort to build an RVNAF that was capable of defeating a conventional attack.\textsuperscript{42} However, North Vietnamese efforts focused on insurgency operations. By 1959, the insurgency constituted a greater threat than the conventional
threat and MAAGV shifted advisory efforts to develop an RVNAF counterinsurgency capability.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1961, the Kennedy administration expanded the advisory effort to almost 3,000 personnel, introduced combat support units, and established the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam to oversee all US military operations. The comprehensive advisory effort expanded operational assistance, revised training programs, made organizational changes, developed combat support forces, and provided materiel aid which improved RVNAF capabilities.\textsuperscript{44} However, the tactical situation drastically reversed in 1963. The RVN verged on collapse due to political turmoil following the death of RVN President Diem and increased Viet Cong strength and activity.\textsuperscript{45} In 1965, the US introduced combat forces to defeat enemy forces and maintain the RVN. MACV focus shifted from host nation support to US combat operations.\textsuperscript{46}

Though a secondary focus, the advisory effort expanded to an authorized strength of 11,596 personnel by the end of 1968.\textsuperscript{47} The personnel expansion permitted extensive advisory coverage across the South Vietnamese force structure including regular forces and regional forces/popular forces (RF/PF). Despite the vast personnel commitment, the focus on US combat operations negatively affected the quality of assigned advisory personnel, available materiel assistance for Vietnamese forces, and the morale and confidence of the RVNAF.\textsuperscript{48}

The 1968 Tet Offensive marked a turning point in the war and US policy in Vietnam. Political and domestic pressure in the US to withdraw US forces led to the policy of Vietnamization.\textsuperscript{49} MACV focus shifted back to host nation development and the advisory effort expanded to a peak strength of 14,332 personnel in 1970. Withdrawal
of US combat forces shifted tactical responsibility to the RVNAF and the advisory focus to combat support coordination. The RVNAF forces continued to improve, but still relied on US advisory and materiel support. Increasing domestic pressure to end the war led to the withdrawal of all US military assistance in 1973. Without US assistance, Saigon and the RVN fell to communist forces on 30 April 1975.

Doctrinal Link

US involvement in Vietnam focused on supporting a partner nation against an anti-western Communist threat. The South Vietnamese government constituted a failing state, unable to provide governance or security without US assistance. The enemy utilized a combination of insurgent and conventional forces to create instability and conduct offensive operations. US experiences in Vietnam spanned the spectrum of conflict from unstable peace to general war; with US forces utilizing the full spectrum of operations including offense, defense and stability operations. Stability operations and host nation governance and security force development represented the dominate focus of US efforts. The war represented a protracted conflict, conducted amongst the populace, utilizing asymmetric tactics, with heavy media influence, sharing significant similarities with the FM 3-0 assessments of the operational environment, enemy threat, characteristics of conflict and operational strategies.

El Salvador--1979 to 1993

Prior to 1979, El Salvador presented little regional or international security concerns for the US. An oligarchic government, supported by the ESAF ruled with relative stability, since the end of the Spanish colonial rule. However, US interest
awakened with the July 1979 Marxist revolution in Nicaragua. The US viewed the Sandinista government in Nicaragua as a threat to regional stability and US interests. The Reagan administration formulated a regional strategy focused on preventing the further spread of communist revolution. US strategy in Central America continued the anti-communist containment policy that shaped Cold War intervention since establishment of the Truman doctrine in 1947.

Following an ESAF-led coup in October 1979, El Salvador progressed through a series of failed governments and a period of instability. Amidst the turmoil, communist insurgent groups coalesced into the Fairbundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) with backing from Cuba, Nicaragua, and other communist countries. The FMLN viewed instability as an opportunity and launched an offensive in January 1981 expecting support from an uprising of the people. The popular uprising did not occur and the ESAF defeated the offensive, forcing the FMLN to retreat. However, the FMLN maintained strong regional and international communist support and presented a continued threat to the GOES. Concerned with the continued communist threat in El Salvador, the Reagan administration restored military aid and assistance.

US Advisory Effort

After the restoration of military aid, the US immediately deployed advisory teams to assist ESAF. By March 1981, the MILGROUP operated within congressional restrictions that limited personnel to 55 trainers and forbade direct involvement in combat operations. In September 1981, a Military Strategy Assistance Team led by BG Fred F. Woerner worked with ESAF to develop a national military strategy for El Salvador and outline a security assistance program. The teams report recommended a comprehensive
The advisory effort to expand, re-equip and retrain ESAF and support an offensive military strategy to destroy the insurgent will and ability to fight.58

The 55-man MILGROUP constituted the core of the advisory effort. However, utilization of temporary duty personnel expanded in country strength to an average of 100 to 150 personnel.59 Training of ESAF battalions at Fort Bragg and a Regional Military Training Center in Honduras further supported advisory efforts.60 ESAF personnel received training at the School of the Americas and other US military schools. The advisory effort expanded well beyond the official 55-man advisory team.

The MILGROUP supported a five-fold expansion of ESAF to a strength of 56,000 and significant improvement of ESAF military capability.61 From 1981 to 1985, the ESAF achieved increasing success against FMLN forces fighting along conventional lines. However, after 1985 FMLN changed tactics to small-scale guerilla operations.62 Unable to develop a force capable of defeating the insurgency, a stalemate ensued from 1987 until the termination of the war with the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992.

Doctrinal Link

US involvement in El Salvador focused on supporting a partner nation against a communist insurgent threat. The GOES developed as a series of failed states unable to provide governance and stability to El Salvador without external assistance. The communist threat sought to exploit the instability to gain control of the country from a democratic leaning government. Regional and international communist powers viewed El Salvador as an opportunity to expand the communist sphere of influence and provided materiel and training assistance. The US response represented a unified action employing all elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, economic,
and military to develop host nation governance capacity. Military operations focused exclusively on stability operations and development of host nation security capability. El Salvador represented a protracted conflict, conducted amongst the populace, utilizing asymmetric tactics, with heavy media influence sharing similarities with the FM 3-0 assessment of the operational environment, enemy threat, characteristics of conflict and operational strategies.

**Iraq--2003 to Present**

Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the final US action in a long series of events dealing with Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein. The US supported Iraq as a counter-balance to Iran and communist influence in the region. Continued growth of Hussein’s power and ambition throughout the 1980s culminated with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A US led coalition responded with Operation Desert Storm, defeating the Iraqi Army and restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. Over the next decade international community contained Iraqi aggression and nuclear ambitions with enforcement of no-fly zones, punitive attacks, UN resolutions, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and restrictions, and economic sanctions, which Iraq continually challenged. In the context of the post 9/11 era and the ongoing GWOT, the Bush administration identified the Hussein regime and its perceived nuclear ambition as a threat to global security. Through a series of UN resolutions and disagreements over IAEA findings, the US led the international community down a road to war that culminated with the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom on 20 March 2003. The US led coalition quickly defeated the Iraqi Army and the Hussein regime collapsed by April 2003.
Quickly after the fall of Baghdad, the CPA established a transitional government to support establishment of a new Iraqi government and transition of power. Relative stability throughout the remainder of 2003 indicated a peaceful transition to Iraqi control. However, by the spring of 2004 a multi-faceted insurgency developed involving Al Qaeda, Sunni protectionist groups, Iran, and Shia militias, all with differing agendas to challenge the emerging Iraqi government and coalition occupation. The situation worsened through the remainder of 2004 and 2005. Iraq sat on the verge of full-blown civil war after the Samarra Mosque bombing in February 2006. The increasing levels of violence and discontent posed a grave threat to the Coalition operations and the fledgling Iraqi government.

US Advisory Effort

On 23 May 2003, the CPA dissolved the prior regime army, leaving Iraq without a security force. As the insurgency grew in 2004, the requirement for host nation security became clear. The CPA retained initial responsibility for development of ISF, establishing the CMATT and the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) to direct this effort. Simultaneously, CJTF-7 developed the ICDC to address local and regional security concerns. The efforts progressed independently until consolidated under MNF-I control with the establishment of MNSTC-I in June 2004.65

Initial advisory operations constituted a disjointed and ad-hoc effort not tied to a holistic plan. CJTF-7 tasked ICDC development directly to combat forces. “Some commanders embraced the idea while others saw it as a distraction.” 66 Initial CMATT personnel consisted of a small cadre of officers and NCOs on loan from Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). CMATT employed contractors to augment military personnel and
support training efforts. In October 2003, CMATT submitted an RFF for 311 personnel to support the advisory effort including embedded Military Assistance Teams (MATs). The RFF represented the first attempt to establish a standard for an advisory team. However, a series of disjointed RFFs submitted by CMATT and MNSTC-I created a hodgepodge of embedded training teams, Iraqi schools advisors, and training base advisors.

Increased Iraqi Army combat operations indicated a split between ISF development and operational requirements. MNF-I established the Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional) (IAG (P)) in May 2005 to manage the field advisory effort. Recognizing the disjointed advisory effort, IAG (P) worked with CENTCOM and HQDA to consolidated advisory requirements under a single RFF. The RFF standardized the composition of the MiTT, provided teams for every Iraqi security force unit down to the battalion level, and shifted the majority of the embedded advisory burden to externally sourced teams. The RFF expanded the advisory effort to over 2,400 personnel supporting more than 230 MiTTs. US combat units continued to support advisory efforts with approximately 40 internally sourced teams and thousands of augmentees to support the external advisory teams. In early 2006 the Iraqi Assistance Group became a full subordinate command under the operational headquarters, MNC-I. IAG advised ISF field operations and MNSTC-I advised the institutional resourcing functions.

Doctrinal Link

The conflict in Iraq represents one of the opening acts of the era of persistent conflict identified in FM 3-0. US involvement in Iraq resulted from concerns over WMD proliferation and international terrorism. The Hussein regime represented a
traditional and irregular threat that challenged international stability and the sovereignty of neighboring states. The Hussein regime utilized a combination of traditional and irregular capabilities to challenge Coalition military efforts. US operations utilized a combination of offense and stability operations to defeat the Hussein regime. The invasion resulted in a failed state unable to provide governance and security without Coalition assistance. The enemy threat developed into a multi-faceted insurgency utilizing asymmetric tactics. The US response represented a unified action utilizing all elements of national power. US military efforts focused on stability operations to defeat the insurgency and develop host nation security capacity. The insurgent groups utilized the populace for recruiting, support, and protection. Media coverage and information operations affected the conduct of the war as exhibited by the incidents at Abu Ghraib and Haditha. Iraq represents a protracted conflict, conducted amongst the populace, utilizing asymmetric tactics, with heavy media influence. Operation Iraqi Freedom shares significant similarities with FM 3-0 assessments of the future operational environment, enemy threat, characteristics of conflict and operational strategies.

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2Ibid., 207.

3Ibid.


6Ibid., 63.
7 Wittner, 64-69.
8 Jones, 70.
9 Ibid., 90-91.
10 Ibid., 94.
12 Ibid., 8-15.
13 Jones, 232
14 Ibid., 236.
15 Ibid., 222-224.
16 Ibid., 3.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 236.
19 Stewart, 206.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 22.
23 Ibid., 12-17.
24 Ibid., 34-35.
25 Ibid., 45.
27 Sawyer, 57-59.

29Sawyer, 140.

30Ibid., 141.


32Sawyer, 188.

33Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-3.


35FM 3-0, 1-4.


38Stewart, 285.

39Ibid.

40Collins, 1.

41Ibid., 2-4.

42Ibid., 12.

43Ibid.

44Ibid., 127.


46Ramsey, 29.
Ibid., 30.

Collins, 128.

Ibid., 86.

Ramsey, 31-32.


Basevich, 3-4.

Coates, Global Security.

Ramsey, 84.

BG Woerner quoted in Manwarring, 115.


Basevich, 5. In 1984, more than 100 United States personnel were in country and by 1987 personnel in country had increased to more than 150.

Pico Iyer, Ricardo Chavira, and David DeVoss, “Some Reluctant Friends,” Time Magazine, July 16 1984. A 180 man cadre supported training at Fort Bragg and a 160 man cadre and a rotation of Army combat units to support training and joint exercises supported training at the RMTC.

Basevich, 5.

Ramsey, 86.

John D. Waghelstein quoted in Manwarring, 105.
Coates. Media scrutiny of human rights abuses by GOES and ESAF repeatedly impacted military aid levels, MILGROUP operational parameters, and external training of ESAF.


Ibid., 438-439.

Ibid., 447.


Based on personnel experience as the lead HQDA G-35 planner for the implementation of the RFF.

The core MiTT did not have the personnel to conduct all assigned advisory tasks and required augmentation to provide additional advisory capability, security support, and administrative and logistical support. There was no standard or formal requirement for augmentation from MNC-I. Resultantly, augmentation levels varied throughout Iraq based on local requirements and what each BCT commander was willing to provide to the advisory teams. The actual number of augmentees provided to support MiTTs will probably never be known.

FM 3-0, 1-1.

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