A History of Force Management Education at the Command and General Staff Officers Course

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January, 2009
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### The Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) has undergone many changes since its inception in 1881, and its curriculum has changed to reflect the evolving focus of the Army. While tactics, logistics, and history have been mainstay subjects since the beginning, the study of topics relating to the field of force management did not really start to appear until almost 50 years after the college opened and have waxed and waned based on Department of Defense and Fort Leavenworth leaders’ priority areas.
The Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) has undergone many changes since its inception in 1881, and its curriculum has changed to reflect the evolving focus of the Army. While tactics, logistics, and history have been mainstay subjects since the beginning, the study of topics relating to the field of force management did not really start to appear until almost 50 years after the college opened and have waxed and waned based on Department of Defense and Fort Leavenworth leaders’ priority areas. A search of Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library yielded Course Catalogs and Programs of Instruction that contained a listing of each year’s courses, which were then studied (if available) to determine the amount of their force management-related content. Enough material is available since 1933 to ensure the possibility of an accurate trend analysis, with gaps between sample years not exceeding five years. A study of force management-related curriculum shows its susceptibility to the views and personalities of CGSOC and Army leaders, as well as directives, events, and officer development studies mandating the teaching of this type of material.

Force Management (FM) refers to the business of running and managing change in the Army, from developing forces to programming, resourcing, building, and deploying those forces, and everything in between. Nine basic FM topics may be used to simplify a discussion of curriculum focus areas: General Force Management, Force Development (FD), Materiel Development, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), Force Generation, Manning, Total Army Analysis (TAA), Force Integration, and Case Study. Some of these topics did not previously exist in their current state, but similar subjects were covered in past curriculum. For example, PPBE began in the 1960s, but the Army Command Management System of the 1950s was a
precursor to PPBE. Not included in this study are contracting and installation (or unit) financial management. Additionally, from roughly 1970 to 1990, FM topics were combined with those concerning Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA). Where this occurred, the FM portions of the lessons were counted while the ORSA-related material was not. Finally, although the school itself has undergone numerous name changes, it will be referred to as CGSOC regardless of the time period.

Not surprisingly, FM-related instruction at CGSOC in the years prior to World War I was non-existent. Although the need for military preparedness (a properly manned and equipped military) was stressed at the school in the 1880s, and the German General Staff was used as an instructional example in the 1890s, there were no American FM procedures to be taught.\(^1\) Even the painful troop mobilization, equipping, and deployment lessons of the Spanish American War, along with the subsequent reforms enacted by Secretary of War Elihu Root, were not enough to spur the Army to develop any kind of a centralized resource management process. However, these conditions did spur CGSOC to develop an exercise with an FM-like flavor in 1909.\(^2\) Beginning in 1910, repeated pleas by the newly created General Staff to create a Council of National Defense, supply funds, and increase preparedness for war consistently failed to move Congress to act,\(^3\) eventually prompting Representative Gardner of Massachusetts to remark from the floor of the House of Representatives in 1914: “For a dozen years I have sat here like a coward, listening to facts stated by the military authorities and disregarding them.”\(^4\)

The incredible difficulties of mobilizing, organizing, and equipping the massive Army required for operations in World War I prompted extensive changes in how Army
resources were managed. The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act encouraged a more cohesive military program by requiring the various bureaus and executive agencies to report through the President to Congress to obtain funds.\(^5\) FM-related curriculum crept into the coursework and focused on mobilization and the organization of the War Department and the Army.

Unfortunately, the FM-related classes that appear in the course schedules during the 1920s are largely missing from the archives. This situation begins to change in 1930. In Academic Year (AY) 1928-29 CGSOC once again became a two-year course following six years as a single-year course. The greater amount of time allowed for a more in-depth study of Army operations, reflected by the increase in FM-related courses during the second year of instruction. Courses such as “Organization of an Army,” “Economic Preparedness for War,” “Consumption and Waste in Production,” and “Supply System of the AEF” show a clear desire to educate majors on the larger operating principles of their Army. The second-year course of 1933 contained “Mobilization,” Necessity for Planned War Economy,” “Procurement Plans,” and Industrial Mobilization Plans” for a total of seven FM hours. The course was similar in 1935, except that an additional six hours of mobilization instruction and a fifteenth hour mobilization exercise were added. Unfortunately, these additions are not available for study. This year is the high point for FM in the pre-World War II era, as the two-year course ended in 1937, leading to the reduction of FM hours to seven in 1938 and five in 1939, all mobilization related.

World War II caused drastic changes for CGSOC, the primary one being that the course was shortened to eight weeks long. There was also a period where three separate
courses were run, each containing specialized instruction aligned with the future assignment of the student. FM topics focused primarily in the areas of Manning (personnel procurement and replacements) and Materiel Development (procurement and planning). A War Department circular from 1946 directed the college to “prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the Division and higher levels.” This directive, along with the decision not to reopen the Army War College after the war, helped to elevate the focus of CGSOC from Division and below to higher level units and headquarters.  

Reflecting the directive, specialized instruction continued post-WWII as a 10-week (282 hour) phase of a year-long CGSOC dedicated to staff training that was focused on the likely future staff assignment of the officer: Personnel, Operations and Training, Intelligence, or Logistics. All of these specializations, except Intelligence, included numerous FM classes. Even though FM was well-represented in the specialization phase, the Core curriculum (that which every student is required to complete) still contained 14 hours of FM topics covering General FM, Materiel Development, Force Generation, and Manning.

This trend towards specialization did not sit well with the Eddy Board of 1949. The board, named after its chair LTG Manton Eddy, was chartered to study the educational system of Army Officers. The board stated that “in the change-over following the war, a very important aspect of military training, i.e. the duties of the…general staff officers of the…Department of the Army, was eliminated.” The specialized instruction outlined above attempted to close this gap, yet among other problems, “the students are given training in only one phase of general staff activities…” The board also frequently talked about the “new field” of business
management and comptrollership: “…the field of business management is somewhat a specialty, but instruction on this subject should be integrated into all schools in the Army system”8 and “To achieve the utmost in efficiency in the discharge of the Army’s responsibilities requires continuous study of methods to apply throughout the service the most modern and scientific business methods of administration…This important aspect of administration must be stressed throughout our schools.”9 Additionally, the board felt that officers needed an understanding of the big picture: “At no place in the Army school system has [the officer] been given an objective view of the entire vast and complex machinery which makes up the Department of the Army.”10 The board recommended that these subjects should receive the “greatest attention in advanced Army schools,” primarily at what they called the “Advanced Course,” or the Army War College (AWC), which reopened in 1950.11

The machinery that made up the Army was changing as the 1950s dawned. Public Law 216 of 1949 decreed performance-type budgeting, which required the relating of all dollars expended to accomplished tasks. It also required a Comptroller in the Military Establishment.12 This comptroller was necessary because Congress was now appropriating funds to the Secretary of the Army as opposed to the technical services or bureau chiefs. An office had to be established to control these resources.13 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 and its subsequent 1956 amendment was the impetus for the Army Command Management System (ACMS), which took the separate management systems of Programming, Budgeting, Accounting, Supply, and Management and put them under one management structure.14 In a 1953 CGSOC lecture by LTG G.H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army, he quoted Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. as
saying: “There is an unglamorous side of the Army too, which requires your personal attention—that of managing the Army.”

In spite of all of these important changes in the Army management systems, the reopening of the AWC caused a migration of FM-related courseware from the CGSOC. The 1951 curriculum was completely rewritten, removing the specialized instruction, leaving at least seven hours of FM classes (or 16—some are not available for study), focused mainly on General FM and PPBE topics. In 1953 that total dropped to four hours, a level that held steady until 1957, when the implementation of a Future Warfare block devoted 42 hours to FM-related topics. The specific impetus for this is unclear, but the block grew to 67 hours in the major 1957-58 curriculum rewrite. One possibility for this new block was the philosophy of two commandants during the 1950s, Major General (MG) Garrison Davidson and MG Lionel McGarr. Davidson sought to modernize the curriculum, and felt the college should play a major role in the development of new doctrine. McGarr didn’t think Davidson’s changes were enough, concluding that the college suffered from “conservatism,” and directed the previously mentioned curriculum rewrite. The 1958-59 Catalog of Courses for CGSOC reflects his philosophy:

While the Army prepares for a fighting war, its cold war commitments in the defense of the Free World call upon its officers for an increasing variety of critical tasks, ranging from…research and development work, to key positions in the “business management” of the immense Army establishment. The Army System of Military Education must contribute to professional qualifications of its officers for such duty…the advent of more complex and costly organizations and equipment has necessitated increased emphasis on educating our leaders in their responsibilities in the “peacetime” management of men and materiel.

The catalog also describes the Future Warfare block, concluding “…to further prepare [the student] to contribute to the modernization of the Army upon graduation.” Whatever the reason, the result was a dramatic increase in FM-related topics.
This increase in FM hours would prove to be short-lived, however, due to the 1958 Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board, known as the Williams Board. Some of the board’s recommendations had major implications for FM education for years to come. The first was that of educating officers for peacetime duty, as espoused by McGarr and the 1958-59 Course Catalog. The Williams Board felt that officer instruction should have a single objective, that of preparing officers to “perform those duties which they may be called upon to perform in war.” The second recommendation addressed the scope and emphasis of CGSOC and AWC education. The board felt that CGSOC should focus on division, corps, army, and theater level logistical command, while the AWC would focus on “army group, theater army headquarters, continental United States agencies, and the Department of the Army, with emphasis on the latter.” The AWC-focus areas contained the vast majority of organizations responsible for the “business” side of the Army, so these recommendations, combined with the emphasis on wartime duties, all but relieved CGSOC from covering FM material.

The Williams Board recommendations are reflected in FM-related courseware during the 1960s. The Future Warfare course dropped from 51 hours in 1959 to 48 in 1960. The block disappeared in 1961, replaced by 35 hours of FD classes—16 of which included guest speakers from the various branches who, according to the POI, were to address Future Developments. FM courses plummeted in 1962 to a mere ten hours, two of which featured a research and development guest speaker. This same year, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system (known today as PPBE) was introduced by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. This system, derived from the ACMS
mentioned previously, sought to synchronize and better plan military programs and expenditures across DOD, and was a monumental step in the “business management” process of our military. Its immediate impact at CGSOC was an increase of 14 FM-related hours in 1963, over half of which involved PPBE. This increase was short-lived, as the total returned to ten in 1965.

In 1966, the Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, known as the Haines Board, would once again change the focus of CGSOC. Among its many findings and recommendations, this board found that training in management subjects at the different levels of officer schooling was not sufficient.21 “Management is not new to the Army; it permeates every echelon and is inherent in varying degrees in all jobs…Demand for Army officers qualified to develop and apply complex management systems at both Army and Defense levels have risen steadily.”22 The board also recommended that CGSOC prepare officers “primarily for duty with the Army in the field, and secondarily for duty with Headquarters, Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, and staffs of major Army commands.”23 There was a clear emphasis from the board on the need for business management-type training, and where (CGSOC) this training needed to be conducted. Subsequently, the board recommended a ten-hour increase of resource utilization topics in the 1967 curriculum. The board also recommended the introduction of electives as a way to introduce specialized instruction to those requiring it for follow-on duties.24 Additionally, the Haines board reversed course on the CGSOC mission outlined by the Williams board:

Traditionally, the C&GSC [CGSOC] mission has focused on preparing officers for duty with the Army in the field. In examining the appropriateness of the mission, the Board has considered the changing military environment in which the
graduates will serve and the fact that the C&GSC is the final stage of professional military schooling for over two-thirds of its graduates. The current military environment includes a wide range of high level commands and organizations that are outside the structure of the Army in the field and that impose growing demands for C&GSC graduates. Many graduates will spend much of the remainder of their careers serving primarily in non-tactical organizations, i.e.: the Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, the Continental United States (CONUS) operating base, and a multitude of new commands and agencies… About one-third of the regular course graduates in 1965 went directly to such assignments, and it can be assumed that the remainder eventually will serve in these or similar organizations. Graduates, therefore, must be versatile and knowledgeable in procedures and concepts that go far beyond the operation of the Army in the field. The C&GSC recognizes the need to broaden its mission beyond the Army in the field and already has expanded the scope of the regular course to include other areas of instruction. In light of the broadened experience and educational base of the student officers, as previously discussed, and the wide range of commands and organizations in which graduates must be prepared to serve, the Board considers that the C&GSC mission should be expanded.25

The recommendations of the Haines Board resulted in 22 hours of FM-related topics in the 1968-69 curriculum. The introduction of electives, combined with the initiation of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), began an era of FM specialization in the 1970s.

During the 1970-71 Academic Year (AY) students were allowed to take two electives, a number that would soon dramatically increase. OPMS, instituted in the Army in 1971, gave each officer a primary and secondary specialization, with the expectation of maintaining proficiency in both. The primary specialization was almost always the officer’s basic branch (i.e., Infantry), so his normal schooling and career progression would ensure he remain proficient. The secondary specialization was normally not a concern for the officer until after his company command, around the time of promotion to major and subsequent attendance at CGSOC. Electives were seen as a way to enable officers to gain this secondary skill, and as such were broadened in response to OPMS.26

As a vast majority of jobs requiring FM-related skills were covered by non-combat
specialization areas (i.e., secondary specialties), by 1974 the majority of FM-related classes were given as electives. In AY 1973-74 there were 14 hours of FM-related Core curriculum hours, and three 56-hour FM elective courses (PPBE and FD), with an additional 16 FM-related hours covered in an additional elective. Apparently this was still not sufficient, as in December of 1974, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander General William DePuy provided some guidance on CGSOC electives: “There are two areas that need to be highlighted…[second] is the management and allocation of Army resources, to include techniques of conducting staff research and developing conceptual alternatives for military problems.”

Interestingly, this did not lead to an increase in FM-related electives, as they peaked in AY 1973-74 with 184 hours and dropped off from there. In 1975, the Management committee (responsible for the CGSOC management-related curriculum) moved from the Department of Command to the Department of Logistics, which was renamed the Department of Resource Management. This apparent move to focus on the study of resource management did not translate to the curriculum, however, as Core level FM-related hours hovered around 13 for the remainder of the 1970s, hitting a low of ten in AY 1979-80.

The 1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study did little to increase the amount of FM-related Core curriculum, although it did stress heavily the importance of officers knowing how to “manage military forces in peacetime.” The principle outcome of this study was the establishment of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), which began in 1981 and continued until 2004. RETO determined that all officers, regardless of branch, required staff skills and that CAS3 would meet this need. According to RETO, all majors would be sent to this 297-hour
course (an additional 120 hours would be completed at home station prior to attendance), and 20% of them would continue on to CGSOC.\textsuperscript{30} A proposed function of CAS3 was to “manage efficiently the resources of manpower, equipment, money, and time”\textsuperscript{31} and its curriculum was to include 24 hours of Management and Quantitative Concepts training, demonstrating the proclivity of mixing ORSA with FM topics during this era.\textsuperscript{32} Along with CAS3, RETO also proposed that the CGSOC curriculum place more emphasis on Force Development, and include electives that offered more R & D, Materiel Acquisition, Financial Management, and Combat and Doctrine Development.\textsuperscript{33} Although there were FM topics covered at CAS3 (PPBE, ARFORGEN, and Force Integration), it appears to have had little effect on FM-related topics at CGSOC. In AY 1981-82 there were ten hours of FM topics, matching the aforementioned low of AY 1979-80. In AY 1982-83 the amount increased to 14, dropping back to 12 the following year. Apparently the college felt the FM topics were sufficiently covered in the electives.

The viewpoint that FM was covered sufficiently in the electives seems to have changed (briefly) in the mid-1980s. The CGSC 1984/85 Institutional Self-Study stated that the Resource Management Committee (part of the Department for Combat Support) was the proponent for Force Integration doctrine and training, and that “this instruction serves as the capstone for all CGSC instruction and helps the student grasp the Army’s overall operation and management.”\textsuperscript{34} This surprising statement is mirrored by a change in the curriculum in AY 1983-84, when Resource Management became its own course, complete with three sub-courses (Fundamentals of Resource Management, Resource Planning and Allocation, and a Force Modernization Case Study) totaling 63 hours (14 hours of FM related subjects). The majority of this (and later) Resource Management
course was devoted to ORSA-type instruction. Also added was a Mobility and Strategic Mobilization Planning, which included four additional FM hours. The trend continued upward in 1985, with 18 total hours of FM topics in the Core Curriculum. Additionally, in 1983 the college began requiring its students to arrive with a base level of knowledge on various subjects. It did this through the Combat Skills Comprehensive Program, or COMPS requirement, which included non-resident study and resident examinations upon arrival. Part of the COMPS study were modules on DOD, DA, and Major Command Resource Management (PPBE and related material), and Force Development. COMPS continued (under the name Fundamental Studies) until AY 1996-97. The catalyst for this new emphasis on FM is unclear, but the increase in hours proved to be short-lived. By 1988, FM-related instruction hours had decreased to nine.

This decline in FM hours is simultaneously perplexing and understandable. The 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) repeatedly stressed that officers must be educated on “How the Army Runs” at each level of responsibility.35 Under the “Know” portion of the study’s outline of “Be, Know, Do” attributes for each grade of officer, PDOS stated that “Majors and Lieutenant Colonels also understand ‘How the Army Works’—its functions: structuring, manning, equipping, training, managing mobilizing and deploying, sustaining and managing information.”36 This did not necessarily translate to FM instruction during the CGSOC Core curriculum, however, as the continued evolution of OPMS (to include the establishment of Force Development as a separate Functional Area in 1986) led to more officer specialization.37 In the case of officers requiring FM-related skills for their secondary specialties, this led to the development of specialized courses, such as CGSOC electives, as well as stand-alone
Force Integration Courses of one to three weeks in duration that would qualify the officer as a Force Developer.\textsuperscript{38} These courses, as well as the ability for Fort Leavenworth to award the Force Developer skill-identifier, impacted the number of Core FM hours until their end in 1996.

The decline of Core-curriculum FM hours continued into the 1990s, with eight hours in AY 1989-90, to a low of six in AY 1991-92. In 1993, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Dennis J. Reimer commissioned a FM Functional Area Assessment. This assessment, along with a Force Management Study of the same year, recommended the establishment of the Army Force Management School (AFMS). The school held its first class in October, 1994, and became the primary educational tool for training FM skills.\textsuperscript{39} AFMS’ student throughput was significantly smaller than CGSOC, and targeted those who needed FM skills for their current (or next) assignment, including DA civilians. It was certainly no cure-all for the Army’s need to have officers who understood the business of running the Army. Although FM topics had made a slight comeback to 16 hours in AY 1994-95, GEN Reimer, who became the Army Chief of Staff in 1995, determined that this wasn’t enough. In February 1996, during a visit to the Pre-Command Course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth, he directed the college to add more Force Management topics to the curriculum, and to base the instruction on the framework that was being utilized at AFMS.\textsuperscript{40} Local legend holds that Reimer was unhappy with the lack of FM-related knowledge of the PCC class he had visited and directed the change. If true, one could estimate that the members of that PCC class were attendees of CGSOC in the early and late 1980s, when FM-related courseware was at its lowest. Whatever the case, Reimer’s directive led to a stand-alone Resource Planning and Management course
containing 25 hours of FM topics in AY 1996-97 (a level that would remain fairly steady through 2005), and also signaled the end of ORSA-type education in the Core curriculum.

Reimer’s feelings on the importance of Force Management education were reflected in 1997s OPMS XXI Report:

General Reimer convened the Officer Personnel Management System XXI Task Force in July 1996…He also emphasized that while warfighting must remain the paramount skill of the officer corps, the Army should begin to foster officers who thoroughly understand how the Army works as an institution.41

…the Army must develop officers who can prepare and build the Army of tomorrow by orchestrating complex systems within the Service and across DoD and also by procuring and building future Army systems…42

The second component—building the Army for the future—is equally important. The Army is a complex system of systems providing the institutional base from which the operational force is supported, both today and tomorrow. As such, it requires officers able to perform essential functions that fall outside of the Army’s warfighting role but are absolutely necessary to field an Army that can fight and win. To be performed well, these functions require officers with substantial relevant experience and expertise. Officers engaged in these functions must anticipate the doctrinal, training, and organizational requirements of future operations and prepare the Army to meet them. Accordingly, in addition to being grounded in the operational Army, they must have additional specialty or technical skills that support the Army’s larger systemic needs.43

Upon promotion to Major, OPMS XXI divided officers into Career Fields (CF) known as Operations, Operational Support, Information Operations, and Institutional Support, further specializing the educational requirements for these officers. An additional recommendation that was eventually enacted was for CGSOC to “retool” in order to enable all majors to attend a resident Core curriculum portion prior to attending an additional phase of instruction tailored to their particular career field.44 The Core curriculum portion came to be known as Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and was approximately three months long. This would prove to be a major change for the college,
and would put a premium on Core curriculum hours which further impacted FM education.

ILE was eventually implemented in AY 2003-04, and had some impact on FM education, as the hours went from 33 in AY 2001-02 to 24 in AY 2004-05. An attempt was made in the initial year of ILE to implement a “COMPS-like” distance learning prerequisite for the Force Management Course (renamed from the Resource Planning and Management course) containing lessons on Reserve Mobilization, Organizational Force Development, DOD and DA Resource Management, Equipment Distribution, and Installation and Tactical Financial Management. This requirement was dropped after the initial year. In AY 2005-06, competition for Core hours, a desire to include Middle-Eastern studies and cultural awareness into ILE, and differing viewpoints on what every major in the Army needed to know about FM caused then-CGSOC Commandant Brigadier General Volney Warner to direct a 1/3 reduction in hours of the Force Management Course to 16, the same level it currently holds in AY 2008-09.45

This final reduction in FM hours confirms that FM education at CGSOC has been incredibly inconsistent. As chart one clearly shows, coverage of FM-related topics since 1949 has been wholly subject to the focus of the college’s leadership and directives from the numerous officer educational studies and reforms that have occurred since the school’s inception. Chart two attempts to link every major turn in the amount of FM-related hours to an external event or directive, providing a pictorial accompaniment to the history outlined above. Knowing the total number of FM-related hours per year is somewhat meaningless without knowing how that amount relates to the total number of hours in the course. Therefore, chart three shows both the percentage of the total number
of Core hours dedicated to FM-related topics and the total number of Core hours themselves. The initiation of electives and the start of Intermediate Level Education caused a significant decrease in the number of Core hours, which explains why a smaller number of FM-related hours yields a higher percentage of the total.

As the hours of FM courseware fluctuated, so did the topics that were covered. Chart four shows how coverage of the nine basic FM topics introduced above varied over the years. A look across a sampling of 19 non-consecutive years from 1949 to 2008 shows that Force Development (how and why our Army is designed) topics dominated, primarily due to the modernization emphasis at the college in the mid- to late-fifties. PPBE, or how the Army prioritizes and resources its requirements, was regularly stressed following the Army’s development of the Army Command Management System and McNamara’s introduction of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system in the mid-fifties and early sixties. Materiel Development, the physical process of developing or acquiring equipment for the Army, was present in every year in the sample except two. Force Generation, how the Army raises and deploys units, has been a regular topic since the earliest days of the school, as mobilization education and exercises have appeared in the curriculum since at least 1920.

In spite of the emphasis of numerous officer education studies on the importance of the study of business management, the level of FM education at CGSOC has fluctuated dramatically since the 1930s. Changes in leadership, focus, priorities, and programs have all contributed to the incredible inconsistency in the coverage of this topic since the college’s inception, and will no doubt continue to impact FM-related curriculum
for years to come. It is somewhat ironic that so much change has surrounded a topic that is itself about managing change.

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2 ibid., 54.
4 Ibid., 36.
8 ibid., 4.
9 ibid., 40.
10 ibid., 38.
11 ibid., 40.
13 CGSC, *Comparative Staff Systems* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: the College, 1961), 114.
18 ibid., 12.
20 ibid., 121.
22 ibid., 577.
23 ibid., 76.
24 ibid., 55.
25 ibid., 468.
27 ibid., 98.
28 ibid., 104.
30 ibid., Vol I, IV-3.
31 ibid., Vol II, E-3-2.
32 ibid., Vol II, E-3-II-1.
33 ibid., Vol II, E-4-2.


36 ibid., Vol I, 63.


40 David I. Drummond, "CGSC RM Division Memorandum Addressing Directed Change to C430 Course (a.k.a. Reimer Memo)" (Memorandum, 1996).


42 ibid., ix.

43 ibid., 4-2.

44 ibid., xvi.


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Plan Script for a course in the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


FM-related Core hours

Chart One

MAJ E Hollister
DLRO, CGSC, 2009
Chart Four

MAJ E Hollister
DLRO, CGSC, 2009