NATIONAL GUARD: JOINT ACTIVITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

BY

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The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2008 recognizes the National Guard Bureau as a Department of Defense Joint Activity. This essay provides recommendations to the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters on methodologies to nominate, select, train, perform, and sustain joint staff assignments and rotations throughout the country. These recommendations are based on comparisons of current National Guard personnel management operations to the other services’ joint personnel operations and doctrine. The pool of joint staff personnel within the Bureau and other interagency partners comes mostly from National Guard states and territories. The future joint personnel management process requires the endorsement or at least consensus support from states Adjutants General. Accordingly, additional evidence is extracted from state-level personnel surveys to support the recommendations. Ultimately, the proposed joint personnel management operations at the state level will improve the overall strategic effectiveness of the entire National Guard, as qualified and experienced joint-qualified National Guard personnel evolve.
There is no actual barrier in law or policy to the Secretary of Defense’s recommending a reserve component officer to the President for appointment as an O-9 in a position of importance and responsibility. Nevertheless, it is arguably unlikely that the Secretary would make such a recommendation if the officer does not meet the joint duty assignment and joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for initial promotion to general and flag officer rank, even though these requirements formally apply only to officers on the active duty list.

—Commission on National Guard and Reserves, March 1, 2007

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2008 elevated the National Guard Bureau’s role to a joint activity within the Department of Defense. Acting quickly to implement their legislation, the U.S. Senate recently approved General Craig McKinley as the first four-star Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). NDAA 2008 is viewed as a revolution of military affairs for the National Guard. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) analyzes implications of the NDAA 2008 on National Guard (NG) joint staff personnel management within the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) of the 54 National Guard states and territories. Specifically, to fully realize the National Guard’s new joint role enacted by NDAA 2008, the NG should institutionalize a joint structure in the states to produce, develop and sustain joint-qualified officers (JQOs). In addition, new joint personnel management methodologies are required for nominating and selecting NG officers for joint assignments. This SRP, overall, addresses the NG structural problem preventing effective joint sustainment. The resistance to move beyond service parochialism continues to extend a joint professional gap with the active duty. Even though the problem appears complex, the NG Military Department now has the support and legitimacy to form a joint structure which trains and cultivates joint
officers. The NDAA 08 coupled with the revised DoDI 1300.19 allow the NG, as an institution, to designate and obtain individual joint qualifications in NG joint assignments. To that end, this project includes the following: Current Joint Personnel Requirements; Joint doctrine / Joint instructions and guidance; Discussion Points; Reviewing input from NG responses to a field survey; Way Ahead; and finally a recommendation which permits a NG Officer to be nominated, selected, trained, perform joint duty and rotate in a predictable fashion. This SRP may enable the states to capitalize on opportunities within the new NG charters (national and state) to contribute to the larger Department of Defense (DoD) joint activity. It is also recognized that an opposing view to a NG joint structure is to simply maintain the current force structure due to parochial interests. This opposing view may persist from personnel in leadership roles who have not received joint training coupled with an actual joint assignment and experiences. (approximately 24 months). If this is the case, then the obvious question is: Is he or she qualified to make future NG joint structural-change decisions?

**Current National Guard Joint Personnel Requirements**

Nearly five years ago, the previous Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General (LTG) Steven H. Blum visualized the Headquarters of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the State Area Commands (STARCs) building a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs) to conduct joint activities. Initially, this vision was viewed as implausible because it challenged a fixed culture developed over centuries of traditional National Guard (NG) functions. In addition, the NG structure was built around the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that resourced the NG as a strategic reserve for the Active Army and Air Service Components (AC), but did not resource joint positions.
LTG Blum’s persuasive strategic communications gained strength with some of the states’ Adjutant Generals (TAGs) who began to share his vision of joint staff in the headquarters. Eventually, both the national and state NG headquarters slowly “self-imposed” joint military personnel activities and functions by internally moving positions. Up to NDAA 08, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not recognize the National Guard as a joint activity. Responding to LTG Blum’s pressures for “jointness”, the NG primary staff within some “Joint Force Headquarters-State” (JFHQ-State) played a “dual-hat” role by designating their primary staffs G3/J3, A1/J1, etc. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) does not include the NG in its mandate for jointness, the states resorted to dual-hatting as an initiative for jointness. GNA had directs that a “significant number”\(^1\) of active duty officers should “develop and utilize knowledge, skills and abilities relevant to the definition of joint matters”\(^2\) by obtaining Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and by carrying out validated joint duty assignments. The GNA only “encouraged” the Reserve Component (United States Army and Air Reserve and the National Guard) to progress to “jointness”. GNA requires an active duty officer desiring to rise to the rank of O7 (Brigadier General), to demonstrate a specified level of JPME and joint experiences. Joint experience credit is obtained only through assignments that are validated by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and are included on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) set forth in the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS).\(^3\) Significantly, current NG resources are allocated by the active component (AC) DoD Secretaries of Army and Air Force, thereby limiting funds to support a joint structure. Therefore, the resources of each service generally preclude the formal resourcing of a NGB joint staff or of
Homeland Defense as separate initiatives. Thus, when NDAA 08 designated the NGB as a joint activity, it triggered a revolution in NG military affairs by formally including the NG in joint officer development and assignment opportunities. In support of the intent of the NDAA 08, NGB and the JFHQ-State must now adapt/change. This adaptation begins with a small joint structure that provides for the qualification, growth and sustainment of NG joint officer. The NG has a great opportunity to take the first step in the right direction by starting out with the end in mind. Building a NG joint activity with formally trained and experienced joint qualified officers should begin with a review of current joint instructions and joint lessons learned from the Active Component (AC) transition to “jointness,” which began over two decades ago.

**Joint Doctrine/ Joint Instructions and Guidance**

Developing a strategy and implementing a sustainable joint personnel management program supported by a consensus of the 54 state and territory Adjutants General may seem too daunting to accomplish. However, the NG could use the lessons learned from the AC struggles to comply with the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the past two decades. Like the NG states, the active duty military services have offered different levels of support to our world-wide joint headquarters. Without trying to identify the most supportive service, it is fair to assert that most services are reluctant to “let go” of their best officers to perform joint duty. Indeed active duty officers designated to “punch his or her joint ticket” often are apprehensive about leaving their service or attending a joint school, where they encounter other services’ cultures. But since NDAA 08 has designed the NGB as a joint activity, the NG, benefitting from the AC transition, can move faster toward formal jointness. This is possible because refined joint doctrine,
guidance, training, and management methods already exist. Three documents nicely provide an overview for the way ahead for the NG: Joint Publication 1.0, Joint Publication 3.33, and the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) number 1300.19 (SUBJECT: DoD Joint Officer Management Program).

JP 1.0 and JP 3.0 offer insight on the recommended NG joint structures. The primary support document for this new structure is the NG Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), which could be the most controversial step in carrying out the NG revolution of military affairs—becoming a joint activity. JP 1.0 offers templates to establish joint constructs. Regardless of which joint template is discussed within JP 1.0, the arbitrariness of the JTD in supporting joint missions will arouse emotions. However, such emotions are not new. Again, we should gain from the lessons learned by our active duty counterparts, who were forced into “jointness” long ago, and move on. As mentioned earlier, the GNA, does not specifically include the RC. However, it mandated that the Secretary of Defense establish policies “similar to the active components for governing reserve component joint education and experience.” The National Guard is deemed a “Military Service” within the Department of Defense (DoD), so it is included in the DoDI 1300.19, which is DoD policy. The DoDI 1300.19 provides the most recent policy for the DoD Joint Officer Management Program. The NGB must frame its joint personnel management actions around this primary document as it moves forward. The most significant points in the DoDI can be gleaned from the “Policy” and “Responsibilities” paragraphs.

It is DoD policy that a “significant number” of personnel obtain progressive joint education, training, and experiences. The obvious objective is to change the culture of
stove-piped services by exposing officers to multi-Service, interagency, international, and non-governmental perspectives. To comply with the DoDI and for accountability purposes, joint credit is obtained by progressing through levels of education, training and assignments, which are broken down within four distinct levels:

- Level I is formal military service training for the officer at the O4 level. Level II is accomplished by completing resident joint professional military education (JPME) at the Joint Combined Warfare School (JCWS), or non-resident Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME), or attending resident only Senior Service Colleges. Once the JPME level II is complete, the officer must earn joint qualification points by performing in joint assignments, as specified within the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Officers have some flexibility in the timing of their joint assignments, but inordinate delays in gaining required experiences can be career-stoppers. Generally speaking, an officer needs between 18 and 36 points obtained from joint experience from the time of graduation of JPME II training. The algorithm within DoDI 1300.19 to accumulate required joint qualification points is calculated through “joint experiences”, which consist of assignment “intensity/environment” and “duration/frequency.” Further, “discretionary” points may be awarded through joint training, exercises, and other education that contribute to the officers’ expertise in joint matters. After accumulating specified joint qualification points the officer is deemed a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) at Level III. Only JQO’s are eligible to be promoted to O7 without a waiver. The final Level, Level IV, is for General or Flag officers. To obtain this level, the General must hold a joint position for at least 24 months (or equivalent) and complete the final training category called CAPSTONE, which is currently for active duty officers only.
The NGB J1 published the first edition of the “The Joint Officer Management Program Handbook” in September 2008. Ultimately, the purpose of the handbook is to provide guidance to the NG Officers to obtain approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to gain “retroactive joint credit” from previous joint experiences and education to obtain the JQO designation. This guidance includes joint a equivalency application process. Due to this publication effort, senior O3’s and new O4’s can understand the next step in obtaining joint qualification utilizing existing joint education and experience systems. DODI 1300.19 allows for retroactive joint credit for joint experiences up to 30 September 2010. The NGB Handbook helps the field in answering several questions. For example, does training, education and actual responses to potential weapons of mass destruction in New York, or any other part of the U.S., by the request of civil authority count for joint experience? Does responding to a hurricane, flood, fire, or other defense support to civil authority count for joint experiences? The NG may respond unequivocally in the affirmative. However, these scenarios should be addressed and properly documented to allow the NGB-J1 to facilitate and obtain retroactive equivalency by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The immediate challenge for NGB is to validate and obtain joint positions within the NG from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the varying NG duty status’s (full-time, 1 weekend a month and two weeks of annual training, etc.) throughout the NG. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness PDUSD(P&R) has the responsibility for policies governing the DoD Joint Officer Management Program. The JFHQ JDAL approval can be obtained only after the organizational mission and functions are determined, by position, to meet the intent of
the joint assignment criteria. Once the organization and function scrub is accomplished, a request for consideration to the USD(P&R) will be considered by the JDAL Validation Board. The first opportunity for the JDAL review is January 2009, with updates every six months thereafter. Whatever the agreed means between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NGB for determining joint assignment positions, the end is to have a new JDAL that integrates NG positions into the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS). These positions will distinguish the joint assignments as “standard joint duty assignments (S-JDA)” from the positions that require previous joint experience, training and education and designate those positions as “critical” S-JDAs for the NG. NGB’s initial task, then, is to request to establish the first NG JDAL and provide guidance to the NG officers. Again, using the active duty experience and lessons learned could expedite the JDAL validation process. In this case, the end is to get into a recurring cycle to ensure JDAMIS includes the NG. JDAMIS is “used to manage, analyze and oversee the Joint Officer Management Program and used to prepare the Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report Annex to the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress.”

Discussion

Joint education and experiences must be planned by the senior leaders today to ensure a newly promoted O4 has knowledge of multi-national, multi-Service, or non-governmental sub-cultures. NG leaders should ensure a personnel structure with management controls that ensure joint personnel systems are in place to properly “track” joint officer education and experiences. These opportunities cannot be a bottom up effort, meaning the NG officer doing it him or herself. Today’s operational
environment has NG officers in and sometimes leading, joint task forces all over the world. Potentially, these task forces have personnel outside his or her own service, whether it is in Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti, or even supporting U.S. citizens in the next disaster in the U.S..

The quality of NG personnel will improve by embracing the joint environment. To make this point, accept two key conceptual premises: view that the JFHQ-State is an operational level headquarters (versus strategic), and equally envision the Adjutant General as a geographical Combatant Commander (CCDR) with multiple counties/parishes in the area of responsibility. As a CCDR, the Adjutant General has two distinct geographical missions. They are: 1) to support the Title 10 functions of manning, training and equipping to support high tempo rotations within the operational task forces throughout the world; and 2) maintain an effective, trained, and organized structure to support the civilian interagency during Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) requests during times of crises inside the particular state or in support of another state through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). In the past, the states focused on the equip, man, and train mission and performed the DSCA mission on an as needed basis, with no real evaluated collective training and even less, individual joint training to understand and support the civilian/interagency operations. This revolution in NG affairs allows for a clear organizational construct with distinctive roles, missions, and responsibilities of the JFHQ to support these two primary CCDR missions. Such an organization needs to quickly develop formal processes which ensure the development and availability of joint officers.
The following example illustrates the real need for the NG to have a formal structure to perform joint DSCA missions. This example focuses on critical individual and unit-level responsibilities. During times of a state or national crisis, the NG forms temporary, ad hoc Joint Task Forces (JTFs) (consisting of 2 or more services) to assist and support requests from the civilian State Emergency Management Operations Center (SEOC). The State Coordinating Officer (usually a Colonel), within the NG Director of Military Support office, serves as the primary link between the civilian SEOC and the NG operations center. This officer must understand the National Response Plan/Framework which revolves around the specific Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) within the SEOC. If the civilian disaster or event is large, another NG O6 or O7 becomes involved to maintain NG situational awareness which allows consistent communications with external agencies by articulating the role of the NG forces in support of civil authority. The NG J3 publishes operational orders to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTF CDR) near the disaster area. The ground DSCA task force commander is usually a Brigade Commander, with the rank of Colonel. Once the military joint operations center receives a DSCA support request, the senior officer present ensures the state Adjutant General stays informed with appropriate details which have “state-level” or “Governor-level” implications. Up to this point in NG history, all of these senior NG officers would not have had any formal joint training and only discretionary joint experience. The more effective joint qualified officers of the future will have an understanding of the dynamics of the DSCA, in a field environment, which not only include the local U.S. citizens, but different civilian agencies and other military services that are in support of the civilian legal authority. The NG leaders must
remember who or what is being supported, and who is being led and/or influenced by actions. Joint qualified personnel should be the rule, not the exception. The NG should strive for joint educational qualifications prior to being put in a position that is required to issue written or verbal fragmented orders to the DSCA disaster task force commander on the ground with multiple civilian agencies and other military services. There is no question the ground task force establishes operations for DSCA disasters similar to a combat theater of operations on the battlefield. However, the task force commander quickly modifies the field tactical operations center (TOC) to accommodate and adapt to support multiple agency/multi-service emergency scenarios. In support of DSCA operations, the TOC typically becomes the logistical center of gravity for the civil authority relief effort because of its capability to effectively organize, communicate and operate in a harsh field environment. In a large civilian disaster, the TF CDR’s main effort begins with isolation, then civilian evacuation from the disaster area while setting up and manning relief areas and logistical nodes to support these efforts. Thus, the NG TF CDR effectively leads a joint coalition of the willing by having the most resources outside the civilian agencies on the ground of the disaster area. The TF CDR usually deploys with an Air Guard colonel or lieutenant colonel to work in the TF TOC to coordinate air lift support for the main effort. This example details NG organizational efforts to provide defense support to civil authority (DSCA). The expectation of the U.S. population is that the NG will efficiently and effectively be there in times of crisis. However, the NG continues to view this mission as a secondary effort that can be accomplished as a bi-product of manning, training, and equipping for war.
The NG is commonly viewed within the DoD as an operational reserve. However, the battlefield engagements today are typically fought by Joint Task Forces with National Guard individual augmentation to the joint staff. This one fact is enough to support the need to embrace habitual joint personnel constructs within the JFHQ. Having a consistent and logical structure for a Captain (O3) to develop joint experience and be able to be the next JTF Commander or staff officer is common sense, and should be accomplished through formal joint education and joint assignments. Even though the NG has accomplished everything it has been asked to do with the resources given, the point is the NG has a legitimate purpose to formally resource a joint personnel management structure and ease the pain and lack of creditability of those not joint qualified. This perception can be supported by reflecting the actions of the active duty sending a JTF to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina on top of NG efforts.

The future effectiveness of the NG officer is enhanced by embracing the overall joint experience through formal joint training; education and monitored rotations through validated joint duty assignments. The JQO has the ability to work with other organizations to get the job done, which already compliments normal practices and lifestyles of the citizen soldier. However, formal joint training and actual joint assignments within a functional joint activity supported by a JDAL will better develop NG personnel. Once a stand-alone joint structure is established and sustained, the joint NG officer will understand why sub-cultures resist certain courses of action developed by one service or component. Qualified joint officers will certainly be less stressed and perform more effectively in both NG missions. The development of a NG joint personnel management system affects not only the DSCA response mission, but also, the overall effectiveness
of the operational reserve mission of the AC outside the U.S.. Three critical actions must occur to foster the NG to fully embrace and sustain the joint qualification officer: The JFHQ must build a joint organization like the SJFHQ [CE] and specify the functions to support both the Homeland Defense mission and the AC operational reserve mission; The Adjutants General in the JFHQs must support the cultivation, nomination, selection, training, assignment, and fair rotation of quality officers through joint assignments; and individual NG officers must have incentives to be a joint qualified officer. Consider the deliberate priority of these critical actions: is it very likely that individual officers will not seek a joint assignment without clear organization structure and purpose? Indeed they probably did not join the NG to be a joint officer, so they need institutional incentive to be attracted to gain qualification. They joined the NG to be a part of the NG culture and to learn a selected military trade (branch/specialty). Methodically selecting only “above center mass” or “exceptional” officers to serve on the joint staff could be incentive enough to exert the extra effort required to work and respect other services and civilian agencies and deviate from one’s original goals. These type officers traditionally enjoy performing as part of an elite-type organization and pride themselves as potentially the next generation of General Officers. As a result, we should look at a combination of doctrine, real-life experiences and the traditional NG culture to provide a recommendation for joint success.

To extend the early geographical CCDR example, JP 1.0 describes a viable “composition of a Joint Task Force Headquarters” called the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ [CE])

24. For example, an AC regional Combatant Command (CCDR) establishes a small, but joint SJFHQ [CE] within the command. This
element provides subject matter experts within the area of geographical responsibility (AOR). These area specialists analyze the region’s different governments, culture, and local civilian leaders, to support implementation of the CCDR’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). In times of crisis within the AOR, the experts within the SJFHQ’s core element deploy first, capitalizing on existing relationships from previous work. This small standing joint headquarters thus provides valuable initial situational awareness and advice to the CCDR. The active duty SJFHQ [CE] may advise on the kind of force structure required to stabilize the situation; they may be the CCDR’s first responders to the crisis; they may orient arriving modular units and provide initial operation command for the joint operational area (JOA). Similarly the TAG, like a geographical CCDR, could organize, man, equip, and train a SJFHQ [CE]-State to serve as the initial modular crisis response element for DSCA functions. Then, the SJFHQ would plan a phased crisis response based on the subject matter expertise within the state’s SJFHQ [CE]. The phased capabilities would begin with a small Manning document to work on pre-disaster planning, joint outreach programs, joint personnel initiatives, pre-packaged logistic requirements, and even a disaster time-phased force deployment list (TFPDL) to support the potential sizes of varying state disaster scenarios. This dedicated SJFHQ [CE] would not affect the Title 10 service requirements of manning, equipping and training of the AC operational reserve mission within the NG states because these roles are service specific. The NG Army and Air services should completely focus on supporting the AC operational reserve mission and the small SJFHQ focus on the joint DSCA mission. If these assumptions are acceptable, the first building block beyond the doctrinal structure of the SJFHQ [CE] is
the joint qualified officer (JQOs). The Texas National Guard formed a Defense Support to Civil Authorities Joint Interagency Task Force or DSCA JIATF. Regardless of the name of the organization, "the domestic mission, including the continual development and refinement of doctrine to protect the homeland and its citizens, justifies at least as much emphasis as overseas military operations." 

Survey on Joint Staff Concepts

A field survey to the states entitled "Strategic Joint Manning Questionnaire" provided sampling inputs to this essay. The intent of the questionnaire was to determine if the current J1’s in the states would validate or nullify this project’s views. Nearly 15% of the states responded with feedback to the questionnaire. Even though this is a small sample, it still provides adequate discourse and validation. Emphasis was noted where responses were 70% or greater to the positive or negative to a question. The following questions and answers assisted in the development of the recommendation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Survey Question</th>
<th>State Response</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being the best), how do you rate the current Joint Personnel Management system pertaining to the process for nomination, selection, training, performance and rotations within the National Guard?</td>
<td>85% response (below average)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are your thoughts on the following idea to allow manage joint training and experiences: The states commit to rotate and fill the same percentage of officers to the NGB Joint staff as the size of their Guard: For Example: State x is the 15th largest Guard in the country, therefore nominates and rotates the same percentage of personnel to the NGB Joint Manning Document on an on-going basis.</td>
<td>71% Favor this example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Survey Question</td>
<td>State Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think the joint staff should be organized like a separate Standing Joint</td>
<td>86% agreed with this example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Headquarters (Core Element) versus dual hat positions as described in JP 1.0?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(For example a separate joint staff of 22 joint personnel (a mix of full time and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional guard members) work directly under the Director of Joint Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the joint officers tasked and evaluated by a joint staff chain of command or by</td>
<td>85% are evaluated by their own service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their specific service?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the state know what joint personnel vacancies exist within the NGB Joint</td>
<td>85% word of mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning Document? i.e., a Web site, announcements only, word of mouth, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By the NGB being a Joint Activity, do you believe there is more incentive for</td>
<td>85% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officers to be designated as a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which service (Army or Air) appears to be most interested to volunteer for a joint</td>
<td>85% Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assignment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.

Way Ahead

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the TAG’s must decide on a feasible structure that is acceptable and suitable for their state or territory to meet the two NG dominant missions: Title 10 (equip, man, train) as an operational reserve and DSCA support. JP 1.0 provides an effective process for the active component to nominate, select, train, and rotate JQOs. The NG does not need to re-invent this wheel: It should adopt this process to its own needs and situation. The AC also understands the SJFHQ (CE) structure, which facilitates a modular approach to pre-event engagements and post event growth depending on the size of the disaster. Defining the two mission roles and responsibilities can be accomplishment by embracing two distinct roles of the NG.
The most mature or traditional mission is the Title 10 mission to sustain an operational reserve. The real opportunity in front of the NG is committing to a joint structure that focuses resources on enduring programs such as OCONUS Joint Staff assignments as well as the preparation and response in support of DSCA operations. Shaping the NG future involvement in DSCA should emit from a pre-planned and well understood phased-based approach in support of any disaster. The establishment and sustainment of a SJFHQ [CE] will not only provide a methodical approach to DSCA, but will also educationally qualify officers and provide joint experiences that can be utilized on future Title 10 missions as well.

Figure 1 graphically depicts a NG Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ [CE]) template which includes enduring state programs that are already joint in nature. The structure allows pre-disaster preparation and an organization that will serve as the initial DSCA response force. This recommended template does not add to or increase the JFHQ Manning document, and consists of a mix of Army and Air Guard personnel, both full-time and traditional personnel. Given the current mixture of full time leadership in the states as well as the NG JOC and Civil Support Team (CST) full-time resources, all JFHQ’s in the 54 states and territories can respond to a DSCA request in a maximum of 3 hours, 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week. The organization and functions are similarly designed to support the AC Geographical Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) missions. This template is effectively agile and supports the modular approach to varying sizes of disaster responses. The SJFHQ [CE] structure allows NG officers to initially obtain Standard Joint Duty Assignments (S-JDA) credit, and thus move to
acquire Critical Joint Duty Assignments (C-JDA) credit through structural experiences within the Joint Officer Management Continuum. (See Figure 2)

Figure 1. Standing Joint Force Headquarters [Core Element] within the JFHQ-State

Figure 2 is a potential timeline template of the future JQO career path. Figure 2 visually depicts DoDI 1300.19 JQO requirements. This figure offers possible time rotations within the NG SJFHQ [CE] to demonstrate that the NG Director of Joint Staff can methodically manage the process of designating NG JQOs.
Recommendation

Currently, no formal process exists to fill NG joint positions or manage joint officer career progression. For example, the NGB joint positions are predominately filled by word-of-mouth. To sustain the future SJFHQ [CE] DSCA missions and the NGB Joint activities, the nomination of potential JQOs should be accomplished by state-level joint boards, with a NGB J1 representative on the board. Even though there is little incentive for an officer to perform duty as a joint officer, a consistent and creditable process fosters quality officer interest and a sense of pride in belonging to a group of high achievers. Therefore, the boards’ decisions should weigh heavily on officer potential for joint service; the boards should review only exceptional officer evaluation reports. They should not put much weight on an officer’s personal desire to be assigned to the SJFHQ. To enhance visibility of JQO opportunities, the NG should provide real-time joint vacancy data on a secure web-site. Likewise, candidates should be able to apply on-line, and the status of their candidacy should be accessible at all times. The final joint board nominations should go back through the Director of Joint
Staff of the SJFHQ’s to the appropriate Assistant Adjutants General for the Army or Air services in the state. The final selection of the nominees would be transacted within their service headquarters.

This structure permits accurate training quota projections years out due to the stable rotational continuum. (See figure 2) Resident versus non-resident training of the selected individuals can be negotiated by individual and the gaining section within the SJFHQs leadership. However, resident or non-resident training preferences should not be a discriminatory factor for an assignment. The National Guard Bureau should accept only personnel from the JFHQ’s joint officer nominations and selections process. The joint staff at the NGB level ideally will rotate to and from the states. A fair and consistent nominations, selections and rotations process can be facilitated by automation support similar to the AC Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS).

One of the critical functions to sustain joint personnel operations is making personnel assignments a priority. We should be prepared to answer the following question: What if the state or the national level cannot fill the joint structure? One solution is the NG Directors of Joint Staff agree to cross-border support. Once the NG joint personnel automation software consolidates the NG JDAL vacancies and the state joint boards occur, the sense of urgency to fill the vacancies will subside. At that point, the funding of Permanent Changes of Station (PCS), and coordination for administrative support functions must be in place. As suggested in the state survey, with favorable response, the NG “CCDR’s” must commit to support the national level requirements to fill the NG Joint Table of Distribution out of the current structure. NGB can determine
each State’s requirement based on the total strength of the state’s force structure compared to the joint NG vacancies. For example, State-X has 4,000 guard personnel therefore, will provide half as many officers as State Y which has 8,000 guard personnel. This will not only guarantee a fill rate for the organizations, but will provide predictability for the joint officer due to consistent rotation times throughout the nation. The potential shortfall at the state level could be filled by cross-leveling NG officers between states, and even from the United States Army Reserve. Again, the secure web-site provides the conduit to allow for an out-of-state officer to view the vacancies and submit a nomination form with attached scanned evaluations for consideration. If adopted, the JFHQ-State will clearly define roles and responsibilities: Army and Air staff focuses on equipping, pre/post deployment training management and manning their service. This function includes full-time manning support and re-deployment integration and the specific service family support. The SJFHQ [CE] staff should focus on DSCA local engagement (relationship building), pre-planning DSCA response (TPFDL/Joint Exercises), actually providing for initial DSCA response, and maintaining DSCA Lessons Learned. NGB must provide policy (by funding stream responsibilities) as to what staff office in the states should be the lead to programs such as Youth programs, Partnership for Peace, Employer Support Group for Guard and Reserve and even Family Readiness programs without regard to service specific funding.

If the recommendations are enacted, the JFHQ-State will have Army and Air Guard service-specific responsibilities and the SJFHQ [CE] focused on DSCA response and developing joint qualified personnel. Over a short period of time the NG will eliminate leadership role confusion in the states which will lead to more effective DSCA
responses and better prepare the officer corps for OCONUS joint assignments as part of the operational reserve mission and meet the intent of the NG.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 19


5 DoDI 1300.19, 30

6 Ibid., 2

7 Ibid., 1

8 Ibid., 2

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 16

12 Ibid., 18

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 17


16 DoDI 1300.19, 28

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 3

19 Lt Col Julie Small, Staff Officer NGB J-1, Interview by author, Crystal City, VA, October 30, 2008
Ibid.

DoDI 1300.19, 22

Ibid., 11


US Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: Joint Chief of Staff, October 2006), IV-1.


Ibid., 77

