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Public Diplomacy—Are We on the Right Path

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Strategic Communication, Cultural Exchanges, War of Ideas

UNCLASSIFIED
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY—ARE WE ON THE RIGHT PATH

by

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ABSTRACT

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Diplomacy is commonly understood as private communication between governments. Public diplomacy focuses on ways in which a government communicates with and attempts to influence citizens in other societies. Effective public diplomacy starts from the belief that healthy dialogue, rather than a hollow sales pitch, is key to achieving its foreign policy objectives. This project has two goals—to examine the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy efforts since the terrorist attacks on 9-11 and where current efforts fall short to recommend some new approaches. First, this paper describes US public diplomacy programs after 9-11 by identifying the major players and comparing how resources have been applied to various public diplomacy programs. Second, the project outlines President Bush’s public diplomacy efforts, during his administration, as they relate to his National Security Strategy. Thirdly, the project evaluates US public diplomacy efforts since the terrorist attacks of 9-11 by answering the following questions: Are current programs supporting U.S. national security strategy; is it resourced properly; and is it working based on opinion polls and expert testimony. Finally, based on the findings in the evaluation process, the project recommends new paths America’s strategic leaders can take to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts.
The State Department leads America’s efforts to build relationships with foreign
governments, international organizations, and people in foreign countries. According to
the State Department, the management of all these relationships is called Diplomacy.
Public diplomacy, according to the definition at the University of Southern California
Center on Public Diplomacy, focuses on ways in which a country (or multi-lateral
organization) communicates with citizens in other societies. A government may be
acting deliberately or inadvertently, and through official and unofficial institutions,
programs or individuals.\(^1\) Effective public diplomacy starts from the belief that healthy
dialogue, rather than a hollow sales pitch, is key to achieving its foreign policy
objectives. Since the terrorist attacks on 9-11, the US has been executing a public
diplomacy campaign that is ineffective and has created an environment that allows anti-
U.S. sentiment around the world to continue at historic high levels.

This paper, in the next section, frames the discussion by defining key terms and
comparing and contrasting public diplomacy and strategic communication. Next, this
project takes a historical look at public diplomacy from the forming of the United States
Information Agency (USIA) to the programs of the Bush Administration. Additionally,
this project outlines President Bush’s public diplomacy efforts as they relate to his
National Security Strategy. Using Congressional testimony, State Department
documents, GAO/independent research group reports, and expert testimonies, this
project evaluates U.S. public diplomacy efforts from the terrorist attacks of 9-11 until
today. The evaluation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts will be based on answering the
following questions: does it help or hurt national interest, is it resourced properly and is
it working based on public opinion/expert opinion. Finally, based on the findings in the evaluation process, the project recommends new paths America’s strategic leaders can take to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

**Establishing a Baseline**

Public diplomacy was pushed into the spot light after the attacks on 9-11. It has received an abundance of media, congressional, and academic attention. However, public diplomacy is not a concept developed in the recent past. America has been distributing information through radio broadcasts and building cultural programs since the First World War. The term “public diplomacy” was first used and defined by Edmund Gullion, a former Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. He stated “public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.” This definition has been consistent with most sources and will be the baseline definition for this paper.

It is worth noting that this paper specifically deals with “public diplomacy” and not “strategic communication.” Public diplomacy is an information instrument of national power with the State Department as the lead agency and the Defense Department a supporting agency. There is still confusion about the relationship between strategic communication and public diplomacy. There are three distinct schools of thought on
this relationship. The first school of thought is that public diplomacy is a subset of strategic communication. The Defense Science Board (DSB), which is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense, started using the term strategic communications in the early 2000 and codified it in a report presented to the Secretary of Defense in September 2004. The report stated that strategic communications has four core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting services, and information operations.\(^4\)

The second belief is that strategic communications is a subset of public diplomacy. Joseph Nye, in his book *Soft Power*, defines three dimensions of public diplomacy: explaining domestic and foreign policy decisions; development of strategic communication themes to sell U.S. government (USG) policies; and development of relationships via exchanges, training, seminars, and access to media communications.\(^5\)

The third school of thought is that the terms are interchangeable. Bruce Gregory, Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University, wrote in a paper that he views the two terms as instruments of statecraft with multiple components and purposes and therefore can be used interchangeably.\(^6\) Currently, the State Department views the two terms as equals but not interchangeable. According to the State Department’s government advisor who contributed to the 2008 Defense Science Board, Strategic Communication Task Force, the State Department believes public diplomacy covers a wide range of activities from cultural exchanges to strategic communication.\(^7\) At the same time, the State Department acknowledged the Defense Department’s definition of strategic communication and therefore used both terms when the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, released the first-
ever U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications in May 2007. The document uses both “public diplomacy” and “strategic communication” without defining either term or establishing the relationship between the two terms. The State Department was not ready to agree that strategic communication was the overarching term. Bruce Gregory wrote in his paper: “Naming is part of a struggle over meaning. In naming, we judge as well as describe.”

Public Diplomacy—A Historical Look

Before discussing future paths for U.S. public diplomacy efforts, one must briefly discuss paths already taken. For a long time, there was one government agency responsible for leading the U.S. public diplomacy efforts. President Dwight Eisenhower established the USIA in 1953 and commissioned the USIA to submit evidence to the people of other nations that the goals and policies of the U.S. are in agreement with their pursuit for a better life and will assist them to achieve freedom, progress and peace. Ten years later, President John Kennedy changed the USIA mission from simply informing and explaining U.S. policies to people in foreign countries to a much more complicated task of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. This is an important change because it now made the USIA an active player in foreign policy efforts. President Kennedy also required USIA to advise the President and his cabinet on the impact of foreign opinion for U.S. policies, programs and official statements.

Under President Reagan, USIA saw a dramatic increase in resources. Charles Wick, the longest service director of the USIA, was able to start new cultural exchange programs and championed using television as a tool for public diplomacy. President
Reagan, a former actor, understood the importance of having a positive image. Despite this understanding, he was unable to resist the need to cut USIA’s budget late in his administration. Funding for public diplomacy programs executed by USIA, except increases for certain new television programming, actually started to decline well before the end of the Cold War. These cuts accelerated after the end of the Cold War.\(^\text{13}\) Between 1989 and 1999, the budget for USIA decreased 10 percent.\(^\text{14}\) Resources for the USIA’s mission in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim nation, were cut in half. Additionally, between 1995 and 2001, academic and cultural exchanges dropped from 49,000 to 29,000 annually and many accessible cultural centers and libraries around the world were closed.\(^\text{15}\) After implementing reductions in 1997, USIA had 6,352 employees, of whom 904 were Foreign Service personnel and 2,521 locally hired Foreign Service nationals overseas. There were 2,927 Civil Service employees based in the U.S., of whom 1,822 worked in international broadcasting and 1,105 were engaged in USIA’s educational and informational programs. This added up to a 15 percent reduction in overall USIA personnel for the time frame of 1995 to the end of fiscal year 1997.\(^\text{16}\)

In Oct 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. With this law, USIA was integrated into the Department of State on October 1, 1999.\(^\text{17}\) The Clinton Administration addressed this merger by saying that the Clinton Administration places a very high priority on public diplomacy with foreign audiences and is firmly committed to integrating public diplomacy more fully into foreign policy. The goal of the merger was to strengthen public diplomacy through its integration into the policy process. When public diplomacy strategies are applied
from the outset as policy is formulated, policy and its articulation will improve and be more persuasive to foreign publics and policy-makers. In addition, the merger created a new position called the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs advises the Secretary of State on public diplomacy and public affairs.

The Under Secretary provides policy oversight for two bureaus dealing with public diplomacy and public affairs, and coordinates such activities in State. Many of the public diplomacy professionals disagreed with the merger with the State Department because USIA professionals viewed themselves as an elite group, with strong operational capabilities, and saw the State Department as primarily focused on policy and analysis. The public diplomacy experts feared they would lose their ability to be flexible and creative in implementing public diplomacy programs. The USIA personnel that agreed with the merger because of the stated goal of integrating public diplomacy into national foreign policy objectives now have regrets because the implementation did not go well. Specifically, one public diplomacy expert, who was present during the merger, said taking research from the public diplomacy experts and putting it in under the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Assistant Secretary has made it difficult to get the information needed to accomplish many public diplomacy activities.

To improve the Bush Administration’s public diplomacy efforts, President Bush, in September 2005, chose Karen Hughes as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This selection excited the public diplomacy community because Karen Hughes had unprecedented access to the President. In addition, Karen Hughes experience as White House Press Secretary gave her a strong understanding of the
importance of shaping your image and communicating your message. Under Secretary Karen Hughes outlined her long term, comprehensive public diplomacy strategy based on three strategic objectives: offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, opportunity and respect for all; isolate and marginalize the violent extremists; and confront their ideology of tyranny and hate.

Karen Hughes made many improvements to America's public diplomacy efforts during her tenure. First, she increased funding for programs that worked and made them more strategic and more effective. For example, exchange programs have been the single most important and most successful public diplomacy tool over the last 50 years. She proposed increases in funding of $70M in the 2006 budget, and another $48M proposed for the 2007 budget. These increases were used to increase the participation in people-to people programs from 24,000 in 2004 to over 40,000 by the end of 2007. Second, she improved the way the U.S. government communicates. She created a rapid response unit. This unit immediately responds to issues in the media around the world as opposed to reacting almost a week later to issues that have already gained steam in the press. In addition, the State Department has cleared the ambassadors around the world to speak out quickly without prior clearance from Washington. Under Secretary Hughes removed the excuse from many ambassadors that they did not engage the media because they could not get clearance from Washington.

Overall, Karen Hughes, during her time in charge, implemented many of the recommendations from more than 30 studies of U.S. public diplomacy, including the
comprehensive Djerejian report, and developed the first interagency strategic communication plan for the entire U.S. government. When James K. Glassman became the next Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, he promised to keep the momentum going on the improvements made by his predecessor and he would concentrate on marginalizing the radical Muslim extremist. Under Secretary Glassman focused on what he called winning the war of ideas for his short time in the position and did a good job communicating the need to dispel the lies being told by these radical extremist. At the time this project was written, the Obama Administration had not given any clear strategic guidance or priorities on public diplomacy programs. However, the public diplomacy community is buzzing about the possible appointment of Judith McHale, former Chief Executive Officer of Discovery Communications Inc., as the next Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Judith McHale has extensive expertise in the communication field and outstanding leadership abilities. She led the expansion of her company to 100 network television stations reaching 1 billion viewers in over 170 countries. McHale’s cultural knowledge of a variety of countries would be a big advantage in leading America’s public diplomacy efforts.

The Evaluation—Are We on the Right Path?

The previous section laid the foundation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts by putting past Administration’s public diplomacy activities in a historical context. The question that was not answered in the previous chapter is “are the U.S. public diplomacy efforts effective?” When answering this question, this project will focus on the 43rd President’s public diplomacy efforts because President Obama has not articulated his vision of public diplomacy and the Bush administration presided over the
time period of 9-11 to the end of 2008. The best place to start is determining if the Bush
Administration’s public diplomacy efforts help or hurt U.S. foreign policy goals. This
section will evaluate public diplomacy effort against the one foreign policy goal that has
been the centerpiece of the Bush Administration Global War on Terror: winning the war
of ideas.

It became painfully clear after September 11, 2001, that America was losing its
ability to influence audiences and shape public opinion abroad. During the Bush
Administration, President Bush used terms like the “war of ideas” and “battle of ideas” in
his national security documents. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) stated that
the U.S. will wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.30
Additionally, the 2006 NSS declares that “From the beginning,” the war on terror “has
been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and their
murderous ideology.”31 Likewise, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
states that “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of
ideas.”32 These documents solidified terms like “the war of ideas” and “battle of ideas”
in the U.S. national security lexicon and made the winning of the war of ideas a top
priority and put the ideology war on equal footing with the physical war.

The NSS, dated March 2006, admits that the terrorist propaganda has twisted
the war in Iraq and other U.S. policies and used them as a rally cry.33 Dr. Cynthia
Combs, author of "Terrorism in the 21st Century" and contributing editor of "The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism," agrees that because of the policies pursued by the Bush
Administration, like the War in Iraq, the U.S. is creating a whole new group of terrorists
with the potential for the U.S. to be a longer term target for a lot of different groups.34
Ironically, the NSS and Dr. Combs have come to the same conclusion that the terrorists have increased their ability to recruit new members, but disagree on the reasons. The NSS believes the policies are good but America is losing the message battle. Dr. Combs believes the bad policy is making it impossible to win the message battle. Whatever the reason, the terrorist ability to recruit has led to more terrorist attacks. Data from the RAND Corporation shows the rate of terrorist incidents for the 59 months post-9/11 period was 268 percent more than that of the same period prior to and including 11 September 2001. This implies a 167 percent increase in what might be called the average monthly rate of incidents. Even if you remove the incidents from Iraq, the increase in terrorist incidents is 75 percent. Additionally, there were 5,362 deaths from terrorism worldwide between March 2004 and March 2005. That is almost double the total for the same 12-month period before the 2003 U.S. invasion. Finally, a 2007 report from the National Counterterrorism Center stated that the number of terrorist attacks were the same world-wide in 2006 and 2007. However, the number of deaths increased by 9 percent.

Just looking at incidents doesn’t give the total picture. Even more troubling is unfavorable view citizens from foreign nation around the world have towards the U.S. There is no doubt that America has an image problem—the polling shows it. A report from the Pew Research Center, dated December 2008, highlights the depth and breadth of the animus. For the past 7 years, the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude Project has sent out interviewers to poll over 175,000 people from 54 nations and the Palestinian territories to compare and contrast public opinion on a variety of issues and it paints a pretty grim picture. During the Bush Administration, America’s image around
the world has suffered almost everywhere but in particular in the most economically
developed nations. Foreign publics blame U.S. economic policies for the global
financial crisis and U.S. foreign policies for creating security problems around the
world.\textsuperscript{38} Such wide spread anger against U.S. policies provokes the question - Is there
any message spin that can turn this anti-America sentiment around or do we need to
relook at our policies? The most troubling figures came from the “so called” allies of the
U.S. The report showed a 20, 20, 17, and 47 point drop in the favorability numbers from
Britain, France, Spain and Germany respectively.\textsuperscript{39} Even more alarming is a 2004
RAND report that showed responders in Kuwait, a country the U.S. waged war to
liberate a decade earlier, had only a 28 percent favorable view of America.\textsuperscript{40} Overall
surveys conducted since the Iraq invasion show a drop in the U.S. favorable rating in 26
of the 33 countries surveyed in 2002 and 2007.\textsuperscript{41}

Has our public diplomacy message taken root? Despite growing concern over
Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the US presence
in Iraq is cited in 13 of 15 countries as equal to or a greater danger to world peace than
Iran’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{42} Also startling is the growing gap between America and
Muslim perceptions. In a 2006 survey, 51 percent of Americans said removing Saddam
Hussein made the world safer. In five Muslim nations surveyed that number ranged
from 8 to 16 percent.\textsuperscript{43} Even more shocking, more Muslims in 10 countries believe that
Arabs did not commit the attacks on 9-11 than those who do not.\textsuperscript{44} It is clear we are
losing the war of ideas in the Muslim populations. Even the good news amidst the
gloom does not reflect public diplomacy successes. In countries like Lebanon, Jordan,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey support to using suicide bombings as a method of
defending Islam dropped sharply. Additionally, Muslim’s confidence in Osama bin Laden’s leadership has also dropped in the same countries. However, the researchers believe this occurred because the majority of these countries recently experienced devastating terrorist attacks. That makes the drop a tactical error on Al-Qaeda more than the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

These low opinion ratings are having a negative effect on national security. While talking to the press in Australia, Pakistan’s former President Pervez Musharraf complained that the war in Iraq was drawing resources from the battle against Al-Qaeda leaders and their supporters hiding in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The unpopular war made it difficult for President Musharraf to support the U.S. in the War on Terror because President Musharraf’s public opinion from his own people sharply declined because of his support of America’s policies. Many other leaders are finding themselves in the untenable position of either supporting U.S. policies or listening to their citizens who have a very low opinion of America. The RAND report noted that many leaders of countries allied with the U.S. are finding it is convenient and politically advantageous to disparage America. This makes it difficult for the U.S. to promote its foreign policy objectives. The U.S. does not have the leverage it needs to convince allies to support them on issues like global warming, Iran, North Korea, and other vital national interests. This is in direct contradiction to the U.S. national interest of securing the American people at home and abroad. Why have the U.S. public diplomacy efforts been so ineffective in winning the war of ideas and supporting U.S. national interests? Many believe that the problem is not a matter of knowing what to do but knowingly not applying the resources to do it.
Almost every public diplomacy expert, committee or agency agrees that more funding is needed. Even with the funding increases after September 11, public diplomacy programs remain under funded. In 2003, the Bush Administration spent $540 million on broadcasting efforts, $100 million on Middle East Partnerships, and $600 million on traditional public diplomacy programs. Only $25 million was spent on outreach programs. In total, the U.S. spent just over $1 billion in 2003 as compared to $347 billion on defense. This shows the Bush Administration’s priorities. A 2002 report, by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, stated that the U.S. significantly under-invests in public diplomacy programs compared with many other countries that spend proportionately larger percentages of their international affairs budgets on public diplomacy. The U.S. spends only $5 million in public opinion research oversees. That is less than the polling cost of some Senate campaigns. The report goes on to say that the U.S. spends $25 billion on traditional diplomacy and more than $30 billion on counter intelligence initiatives. In comparison, the $1 billion spent to inform audiences in more than 200 missions around the world, many in critical countries with very low U.S. opinion ratings, is obviously insufficient.

In 2004, at a hearing of the House Commerce, Justice, State appropriations subcommittee, which funds the Department of State, Congressmen asked Margaret Tutwiler, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, how to strengthen American public diplomacy in the Muslim world citing recommendations from a report called, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace,” which described public diplomacy efforts in the region as inadequate. Members repeatedly noted the report’s conclusion that public diplomacy funding in the region is “dangerously inadequate”, and hammered
on this point in their comments and questions to Tutwiler. “The Bush budget request does not - and I underline not - contain a significant increase for public diplomacy,” said Chairman Frank Wolf (R-VA). Tutwiler’s reply was that she was going to deal with the budget as it is.52 Tutwiler said she believes that money could be freed up through reprogramming “where there is elasticity and flexibility.”

Even with the minimal increases in public diplomacy funding since 2006, experts say we still need more. A 2008 report from the American Academy of Diplomacy stated that in order to enhance the public diplomacy efforts of the State Department, there should be an increase in U.S. direct-hire staff by 487 and an increase of 369 locally employed staff for Public Diplomacy from FY 2010 to FY 2014. This increase will cost $155 million in FY 2014.53 Certain existing programs in the area of public diplomacy should also be expanded to give the Secretary of State more tools at his or her disposal to conduct public diplomacy around the world. The report recommends a 100 percent funding increase in academic exchange programs, a 50 percent funding increase in foreign visitor grants and a 25 percent funding increase in youth outreach programs from 2010 to 2014. The total cost for these additional programs in FY 2014 is estimated at $455 million. Increases for public diplomacy programs total $610.4 million.54 Many other experts agree.

A 2008 report released by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, challenged the State Department to “get the people part right” as it relates to public diplomacy. Specifically, the report recommends the Department of State make a special effort to recruit individuals into the public diplomacy career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of
communicating with and influencing foreign publics. The Commission also recommends that the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute develop courses, comparable in quality to graduate-level university courses, in the area of communication theory, with special emphasis on political communication/rhetoric, advertising/marketing theory, and public opinion analysis. Finally, the Commission recommends the Department establish a nine-month in-depth public diplomacy course for mid- to senior-level public diplomacy officers. The State Department should not only increase funding for public diplomacy efforts it should ensure what is being spent is effective.

When Mouafac Harb, Washington Bureau Chief, Al Hayat Newspaper, testified before the House Committee on Foreign relations, he stated that the U.S. cannot expect to win the war of ideas with “media carpet bombing.” As a result, the millions of U.S. dollars spent on television programs like “Shared Values” and “The Muslim Life in America” were not effective. According to an article in the New York Times, some diplomats inside the State Department who have lived in Islamic countries criticized the scripts before their release for being patronizing and too simplistic. Additionally, no East or Southeast Asia Muslims appeared in the videos, even though the videos were being introduced in this region. Critics said it was as if the State Department believed Muslims only lived in Arab countries and only those Muslims migrated to America.

With any media, political or advertisement campaign, the real data that matters is how it affects its target audience.

Many cultural experts think the failure of U.S. public diplomacy efforts comes from the fact that America doesn’t understand the Muslim community. Addressing the House Committee on International Relations, Robert Wehling, a retired global marketing
officer for Proctor & Gamble, stated that there is no single message for all the countries in the Middle East and there is no single message for all the people in one country. However, that is how the U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been executed. He also stated that although the message of “Freedom” is great for the U.S. public, this message has a different meaning in Arab countries where they equate the many abuses and excessive consumption on this freedom. With this in mind, it is understandable how the three mass media programs put out by the State Department in 2002 did not get the results desired by Charlotte Bears, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The television program “Shared Values” was released in 2002 with the message that this is not a war on Islam. Many Muslim countries refused to air the programs because they were U.S. government sponsored. In addition, Radio Sawa, controlled by the Broadcast Board of Governors, an agency of the USG and based in Dubai, was intended to reach the younger generation by mixing local U.S. and local pop music with U.S. news and commentary. Reaction was not what the U.S. hoped. Many people said “yes” to the music but turned off the programming.

There is a Better Path

The cornerstone of the Bush Administration’s national security policies was the Global War on Terror. To win the “war of ideas,” the U.S. must defeat the propaganda being used by various terrorist groups to create more terrorists. A variety of diverse groups, with hundreds of years of expertise in the field of public diplomacy, wrote over 30 reports that evaluated the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy programs and provided recommended solutions. The most influential report is the 2003 report by the
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World called Changing Minds Winning Peace. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has written over 11 reports for the past 8 years documenting public diplomacy challenges from the ineffective engagement of Muslim audiences to the inadequate strategic use and coordinating public diplomacy research. Additionally, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress in 1948 to formulate and recommend policies and programs to carry out the public diplomacy functions and to appraise the effectiveness of public diplomacy activities, has completed eight reports evaluating the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts. The Defense Science Board completed three reports, one in 2001, 2004 and 2007, dealing with public diplomacy and strategic communications. Finally, there have been reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, The Heritage Foundation, The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute, the Public Diplomacy Institute, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency. All reports were in basic agreement. From 2000 to 2005, the U.S. public diplomacy efforts were deplorable. Once Karen Hughes took over, she made improvements but there is still a long way to go.

The Bush Administration envisioned waging a comprehensive war to win the battle of ideas after 9-11. The numerous reports mentioned above all identified many public diplomacy challenges that prevented the U.S. from winning the war of ideas. Despite their differences, the reports agreed on three key areas for improvement: Process, Priority, and Political Will. The process of public diplomacy covers the lexicon and organizational structure. Public diplomacy must be executed across the entire United States Government (USG). Although the State Department is the lead agency,
all of the departments and agencies conduct activities that can contribute to the USG overall public diplomacy effort. For that reason, there must be an agreed upon language to avoid confusion and redundancy. The Defense Science Board, with State Department cooperation, had it right in the 2004 report. Strategic Communication should be the overarching term that includes public diplomacy (State Department), information operations (Defense Department), public affairs (each agency has this responsibility), and international broadcasting services (Broadcast Board of Governors). The departments in the parenthesis denote who is the lead agency. The National Security Council (NSC) should be the lead for Strategic Communications. This should be ratified by Presidential Directive for implementation throughout the USG.

Additionally, many experts agree that there is a critical need to reinvigorate the tone and language of public diplomacy. In a recent interview a senior public diplomacy expert said that we need to eliminate terms such as “battle for hearts and minds” and “war of ideas,” both of which suggest a model of conflict, with the goal of “victory”, rather than a longer term process of understanding and influencing perceptions. There is no dispute that we are fighting a small faction - those irreconcilables that can only be captured or killed. However, true success comes when America can communicate its message more effectively to those we are fighting for (the sympathizers) than those we are fighting with (the terrorist). Many members of the foreign press and officials of foreign governments don’t see the wisdom in calling America’s public diplomacy efforts a war or a battle. Muslims around the world are already predisposed to the notion that the U.S. is trying to destroy the religion of Islam like in the days of the crusades. Using terms like the “war of ideas” and “battle of
ideas,” plays right into this misperception. Instead of winning the war of ideas, America’s goal should be to “achieve mutual understanding and respect.”

“Achieving mutual understanding and respect” is more than a slogan. It is America’s way of saying we want to send more than a message—we want to start a conversation. Martin Davidson, Chief Executive for the British Council on Foreign Relations, said when people among foreign nations are in a conversation they feel the other participant values their opinion and this helps achieve a country’s foreign policy objectives. In addition, it is an acknowledgement that both sides can win if we just understand each other’s goals and aspirations and find common interest. There should be no debate - who could question liberty over force; mutual love, charity, respect, over enmity - yet we still are ineffective in ensuring both sides understand these mutual goals. America must be much clearer in our effort to communicate what we stand for, and to expose what our enemy stands for to America’s true target audience—the potential supporters and sympathizers of terrorist around the world. Agreement on terms should be matched with the right organizational structure.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy endorsed the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department. The commission agreed with the stated goal of the Clinton Administration and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Jesse Helms of putting public diplomacy “at the heart” of the U.S. foreign policy. All of the reports mentioned above agreed that public diplomacy considerations should be integrated into the national policy decision making apparatus at the highest levels. One of the greatest attributes of USIA was being a field-driven, program-orientated organization that put together public diplomacy programs for all USG agencies. This
ability to gain unity of effort across the USG was one of the reasons experts says public
diplomacy was so effective during the Cold War. Two senior public diplomacy experts,
who worked at USIA during the merger, both agreed that the State Department should
get back to operational-focused public diplomacy programs like in the USIA era but
don’t think it would be productive to try to go back to a USIA structure.69 The results of
this project’s evaluation of America’s public diplomacy efforts lead to a similar
conclusion articulated by the DSB. The Secretary of State must give the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs the mandate for advising the
Secretary, the Departments, and Chiefs of Mission on the public diplomacy implications
on foreign policy decisions. Additionally, the Under Secretary should be the manager of
all public diplomacy assets in the State Department to include the public diplomacy
professional in the field at the Bureaus. A senior public diplomacy expert, in the Office
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, said the State Department has been looking into
giving the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs the power to
promote and assign public diplomacy professionals in the State Department. With the
new responsibility, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs could
manage the careers of public diplomacy professionals and have more influence while
they are assigned at the embassies. This would mean a considerable increase in staff
and funding and would mean a change in priority.70

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James Glassman
stated in July 2008 that over the next six months he intended to help build a public
diplomacy program endowed with both adequate resources and with intellectual
seriousness.71 Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the case. Public diplomacy in
America is still not a top priority as was the stated goal when President Clinton merged the USIA into the State Department. There needs to be a significant increase in resources. For example, the 2009 budget request asks for $522 million for educational and cultural exchange programs. This is only a 4 percent increase from 2008. The DSB report believes that current funding levels, of the traditional public diplomacy programs under the State Department, should be tripled.

Many of the reports agree that public diplomacy staffing should be significantly increased from current levels. As noted by a senior public diplomacy expert, funding for public diplomacy programs would be useful only if there is a concomitant increase in public diplomacy personnel. The conduct of public diplomacy requires careful "hand-tooling" of programs and careful analysis of goals and results. Extra money without extra staff to handle the increased resources will not yield the benefits the USG expects. Therefore, the State Department should make a focused effort in significantly increasing the number of public diplomacy professionals to boaster the staff of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and distributed to the Regional Bureaus and Country Missions. Even more importantly, public diplomacy needs to be elevated to a top skill required by FSOs. A 2008 report from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy stated in order to get the people part of public diplomacy right, the State must make a top priority of recruiting public diplomacy professionals, changing the FSO exam to test for public diplomacy skills, and improving personnel training and evaluations to reflect the value of public diplomacy expertise. Once the State Department gets the people and programs right, they still need to know are current diplomacy programs accomplishing its goals.
To truly move public diplomacy to the heart of the U.S. foreign policy, The State Department must find an analytical way to determine the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts. In battle, commanders place a high priority on having the ability to determine if a desired effect was achieved based on an action taken. The National Security apparatus spend billions in air, space and cyber assets to ensure we have this capability. Likewise, the State Department should spend the time, money and personnel to ensure public diplomacy activities are achieving the desired effect of their public diplomacy efforts. This goes way beyond just gathering surveys. This will entail identifying potential target audiences for specifically tailored programs. Surveyors must first establish a baseline for a targeted group. Next, the surveyors must expose the targeted group to public diplomacy activities, and then assess the effect of those activities on the targeted group. This effort will take time and will be very costly to reach audiences in some of the more hostile countries. It will require a conglomerate of tools and resources from the public and private sectors. Although difficult to obtain, detailed information is needed to focus the public diplomacy efforts where it will be most effective. The State Department has recognized this fact. In 2008, the State Department tracked a select group of individuals who participated in exchange programs in seven countries. These individuals were surveyed before and after participating in the program to determine what was the effect on the individual’s opinion of America. Despite being costly, this effort must be expanded to more countries and to other public diplomacy programs. The difficulty of raising the priority of public diplomacy programs, as compared to other defense programs, will be great. However, the State Department must have the political will to change the priority.
Many State Department officials cite the Department’s lack of a solid constituency as one reason the State Department is unable to get the budget and resources needed to fully fulfill its mission, including public diplomacy activities. Unlike the Department of Defense, the State Department has no powerful and organized groups to lobby Congress. Millions of people and millions of dollars are brought to bear to lobby Congress on behalf of the Defense Department. Military members and their families, veteran organizations, the massive military industrial complex all ensure their voices are heard in Congress which usually translates into funding. Who lobbies for the State Department? That is why it will take strong political will from the leadership of the State Department to bring to the public view the problems associated with public diplomacy programs. The State Department will need public support to get the resources needed to execute their responsibilities and implement the improvements that have been identified by dozens of organizations for decades.

It will also take political will to realize that sometimes it not the message but the policy that is the real problem. President Bush in a joint session of Congress in September 2001 asked, “Why do they hate us?” In his answer, one can find a partial reason for the failure of US public diplomacy efforts. The former administration began its public diplomacy programs believing people around the world hate the US because “they don’t understand us.” It is a common thread in all U.S. strategic documents, like the NSS, that all of the U.S. policies are correct and it is a matter of explaining them to the foreign audiences. Unfortunately, polling has shown that specific policies have created the anti-American sentiment and has become a great recruiting tool for terrorist. The Pew Center report stated that opposition to key parts of U.S. foreign policy is
widespread in Western Europe, and the favorable ratings of U.S. have declined steeply among many of America’s longtime European allies. In Muslim nations, the war in Iraq has driven negative ratings nearly off the charts. By no means is this paper advocating that the U.S. foreign policy should be determined by opinion polls. However, the strategic leaders must consider how our actions, although winning the battle in the short term, could lose the “war of ideas” in the long term.

Finally, the top leaders at the State Department must educate the American public on the importance of using public diplomacy as a proactive tool to help the U.S achieve its national security objectives. To do this, the State Department must break down the false barriers it imposes on itself citing restrictions from the Smith Mundt Act. The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402), popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act, put in place the foundations of U.S. cultural, educational, and information engagement programs that we now call “public diplomacy.” Michael Armstrong, a public diplomacy expert, believes that the State Department is interpreting the prohibition on disseminating information on U.S. public diplomacy efforts incorrectly. He said “modern analysis of Smith-Mundt tends to be informed by modern perceptions in disregard of the historical record. The prohibition was not intended to be prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears, but to be a non-competition agreement to protect private media.” 76

As mentioned earlier in the paper, the National Security Strategy has put the war of ideas on equal footing with the war using bombs and bullets. The State Department must inform the American people on the importance of public diplomacy to elevate this important tool of national security to the level of tools used in the Department of
Defense. The State Department must lead the way in changing the dialogue about public diplomacy throughout the nation. It is time to relook at Smith-Mundt and get an appreciation of its intended purpose. Invoking Smith-Mundt to censor the government simply limits America’s ability to engage in the global media environment and inform the American public. Michael Armstrong stated “If preventing government advocacy and influence on the American people is the goal, then no government official from any agency should appear on the Sunday talk show circuit. Weak American information and outreach programs are not just a liability but a strategic vulnerability in our national security.”

Another public diplomacy expert offers a different reason why the State Department is reluctant to engage the American people directly to convince them to elevate public diplomacy programs to the level of defense programs. The State Department has a cultural aversion on seeking assistance. The ambassadors are on an island and report to the President so they are not used to lobbying Congress and that mentality translates into the State Department’s difficulty in self promotion.

Regardless of the reason, the State Department must engage the American public to raise the importance of public diplomacy in the nation’s conscious.

**Conclusion**

This paper began with the premise that the U.S., since the terrorist attacks on 9-11, has been executing a public diplomacy campaign that is ineffective and has created an environment that allows anti-U.S. sentiment around the world to continue at historic high levels. The cornerstone of President Bush’s national security policies was the global war on terrorism. To win the “war of ideas,” the U.S. must defeat the propaganda being used by various terrorist groups to create more terrorists. The reality is the U.S.
is losing this battle of ideas. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public diplomacy, various experts in testimony before Congress or in the media and State Department officials agree that the U.S. under-invests in its public diplomacy programs. Other experts stated that even the scarce funding the State Department devoted to the programs did not yield the desired effects. Additionally, there is no mistaking the hard data that shows that in almost every region of the world that foreign publics have an unfavorable opinion about the U.S. This anti-sentiment has grown not only in countries that traditionally hated the U.S. but even Western allies. The question remains “is there anything the U.S. can do to improve its failed public diplomacy program?” The answer is yes.

First, public diplomacy must be fully integrated into the foreign policy decision making. This is why President Clinton merged the USIA into the State Department in 1999. If the reaction from foreign publics can be predicted, then remedies can be put in place to mitigate the damage from the reactions or the decision can be made that the political action is not worth the cost to U.S. long term foreign policy goals. This will be done by ensuring we have the right tone, lexicon and structure in place. Second, public diplomacy must be viewed as a strategic tool and therefore the appropriate priority must be placed on public diplomacy programs so they are postured for success in the long term. Funding must be increased across the board for public diplomacy. This paper recognizes that money alone won’t solve the problem. However, the current funding levels falls extremely short to accomplish the daunting task of turning around America’s damaged image the world.
Third, America must have the political will to present a clear and consistent message to audiences abroad and at home. Because the U.S. is promoting democracy for all, the U.S. believes this message is universal and can be shared by all if explained correctly. However, what the U.S. fails to acknowledge is that the democracy message is neither clear nor consistent. Many people believe the US government is hypocritical. While the Bush Administration promotes democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq, America is allied with non democracies and monarchies when it suits our interest. Also, the U.S. must place a higher priority on public diplomacy and the State Department must do a better job of educating Congress and the American people on the importance of public diplomacy in order to receive the correct funding and resources.

Finally, the U.S. must understand the limits of public diplomacy. It is not the “magic bean” that when used correctly will instantly stop the massive anti-U.S. sentiment. Instead, public diplomacy should be looked at as a powerful tool that when used correctly can open a two-way dialogue between the U.S. government and foreign publics around the globe to promote a mutual understanding of the U.S. policies and the foreign public’s opinions regarding U.S. policy. The U.S. values of liberty, democracy and freedom are good and strong values that can be shared by everyone. The U.S. must focus on being clear and consistent in its policy and its message. These actions will speak louder than any advertisement or official statement.

Endnotes

2 Portions of this SRP derive from an unpublished manuscript by the author. The manuscript, which is in the author’s possession, is titled: Public Diplomacy—Are We on the Right Path, June 26, 2006.


8 Gregory, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms, 6.


10 Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1990), 27.

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15 Ibid, 6.


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.


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33 Ibid.


39 Ibid, 3.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid, 4.

44 Ibid.


47 Wolf and Rosen, Public Diplomacy; How to Think About and Improve It, 1.

48 Nye, Soft Power, 124.


50 Ibid, 10.

51 Ibid.


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63 Ibid.


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77 Ibid, 18.