State Capacity and Resistance in Afghanistan

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This thesis seeks to explain why current attempts to expand the reach of the Afghan government in Kabul are met with heavy resistance. It examines the historical dichotomy between state capacity and the prevalence of solidarity groups' opposition to central rule in four Afghan regimes: the monarchy of Amir Abdur Rahman, the communist regime of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation, the Taliban's Islamist theocracy, and President Hamid Karzai's democratic Islamic Republic. Charles Tilly's Four State Activities model is used to subjectively determine each regime's relative degree of state capacity in four areas: war making, state-making, protection and extraction. The basis and composition of major resistance groups during each regime are then analyzed. This thesis concludes with a comparative analysis of state capacity and resistance in each of the four regimes in order to draw implications for how the current government of Afghanistan can best expand its reach without creating further revolt and insurgency. These findings are not only important for the Government of Afghanistan, but also hold serious implications for prosecution of the Taliban insurgency, as well as future international state building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to explain why current attempts to expand the reach of the Afghan government in Kabul are met with heavy resistance. It examines the historical dichotomy between state capacity and the prevalence of solidarity groups’ opposition to central rule in four Afghan regimes: the monarchy of Amir Abdur Rahman, the communist regime of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation, the Taliban's Islamist theocracy, and President Hamid Karzai's democratic Islamic Republic. Charles Tilly’s Four State Activities model is used to subjectively determine each regime's relative degree of state capacity in four areas: war making, state-making, protection and extraction. The basis and composition of major resistance groups during each regime are then analyzed. This thesis concludes with a comparative analysis of state capacity and resistance in each of the four regimes in order to draw implications for how the current government of Afghanistan can best expand its reach without creating further revolt and insurgency. These findings are not only important for the Government of Afghanistan, but also hold serious implications for prosecution of the Taliban insurgency, as well as future international state building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S.-led effort to topple the Islamist Taliban regime in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks sparked an initial wave of optimism toward the creation of a new and stable Afghan regime. The Bonn Agreement set a broad agenda for the establishment of a transitional Afghan government and was the central document that directed the international post-conflict state-building effort. Since then, the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) has completed the successful transition from an appointed Transitional Authority to a more inclusive and representative governing body following 2004’s parliamentary elections and 2005's presidential and provincial elections. Yet, despite these advances, international optimism has steadily waned, only to be replaced with pessimism, as coalition forces and the fledgling Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai, struggle to combat a growing insurgency within Afghanistan’s borders. Meanwhile, core Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, have remained elusive, operating from Pakistan’s tribal regions that lie along Afghanistan’s wild eastern periphery. This fact has reinforced the view of many that Afghanistan remains a failed state, with at least one prominent scholar even suggesting that Afghanistan has never constituted a modern nation-state.

1 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘Islamists’ refers to any party that advocates the implementation of the Shari'a (Islamic law) as state law. All Islamists, whether radical or moderate, share this common ideological goal. They differ, however, on how they intend to achieve this goal. Radical Islamists call for (often violent) revolution to overthrow the incumbent regime, while moderate Islamists rely on more traditional power structures and relationships as a means of affecting regime change. These definitional distinctions are adapted from Olivier Roy. The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 259. (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 56-57. The ideology of the Islamists will be studied further in Chapters IV and V.


3 District-level elections have not been held.


A. PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this thesis is to explain why current attempts to expand the rule of the central government beyond Kabul have met with heavy resistance.

One explanation is the historical role of solidarity groups in opposing central government rule at the local level. As this thesis will show, previous Afghan regimes have each been confronted with this very problem: how to expand one’s capacity and authority over the people and country you purport to rule.

In this paper, I will examine the origins and structures of Afghanistan’s tribal relationships and ‘solidarity groups’ in limiting state capacity spanning four Afghan regimes. Specific research questions I intend to answer are how did each regime attempt to expand state capacity and confront tribal and ethnic solidarity that has historically been resistant to central rule? My central hypothesis is that solidarity groups have been present throughout Afghanistan’s history and represent the primary obstacle to state-making and governing capacity in Afghanistan.

While previous theses have similarly sought to explain the dichotomy between Afghan society and the central state, none has taken an approach that examines state activities, structures and organization, or examined the same cases presented here. Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples’ thesis seeks to describe the Taliban’s structure; however, it does so from a largely operational standpoint, intended to draw

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6 See: Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations*. (New York: New York University Press, 2005). Roy defined ‘solidarity groups,’ as those groups that lay outside, in opposition to-, or even undermined the central government. He contends that the traditional institutions and structure of ethnic and tribal solidarity groups in Central Asia played a vital role in state formation of the region. I have applied Roy’s thesis to Afghanistan.


explicit lessons for COIN, without analysis on how these structures affected the Taliban’s ability to govern, as explained herein.⁹

I undertake this historical analysis in order to draw lessons of state-making and governance applicable to the ongoing state-building process in Afghanistan, particularly in light of current failed attempts to extend central government capacity beyond Kabul.

B. IMPORTANCE

This thesis holds important policy implications for the United States, international reconstruction effort, and the Afghan Government for how to best govern this largely rural and tribal society without risking further instability.

U.S. policy in Afghanistan has sought to extend the reach and authority of the central government in Kabul as a means of combating the insurgency.¹⁰ So too, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) top priority has been to strengthen the Afghan government’s capacity by requiring the administration to take charge whenever possible. This strategy was complemented by the UN’s ‘light footprint’ approach that connoted a minimal staff presence in Afghanistan. Finally, coalition counter-terrorism (CT) operations that overshadowed and even negated early reconstruction efforts ultimately contributed to the inability to expand the fledgling government’s capacity beyond Kabul.

Whatever the initial cause(s), it is clear that current attempts to extend the reach of the central government are not working. This fact has led some scholars to charge that “the backbone of the international effort since 2003—extending the reach of the central government—is precisely the wrong strategy,”¹¹ while others suggest that, “the ‘one-size

fits all’ prescriptions…[that] strip the state of its historical context and assume that institutions, state capacity and governance are purely technical, depoliticized entities,” are fantasies. 12

Moreover, limited and conditional donor resources constrain the U.S. and UN mandate, which put in place a process (through the Bonn Agreement), but not the necessary institutions for developing state capacity.13 Finally, expanding state capacity cannot be achieved without the successful dismantling of regional networks and strongmen that compete with the state’s monopoly on violence and resources.14 Ultimately, the task of managing Afghanistan’s post-Taliban reconstruction is necessarily the story of nation building: the attempt to create lasting institutional and state capacity that will ultimately transform this war-weary country.

It is imperative that these efforts do not fail. The consequences of failure would allow Afghanistan to fall into another civil war, or worse still, a period of statelessness in which a resurgent Taliban could reclaim governance. Expanding state capacity in Afghanistan is also imperative for the campaign against violent Islamic extremism and terrorism. A strong Afghan government would be able to deny such groups safe haven in previously “ungoverned spaces.” Finally, a strong Afghan government would finally bring the Afghan people peace and an end to three decades of war and civil conflict.

C. METHODOLOGY

The central methodology I will use to test my hypothesis will be a systematic case study of four Afghan regimes. This design seeks to expel any methodological ‘fantasies’ by restoring the historical context in which each case is examined.

In each of the selected cases, I will examine the state’s capacity to govern in four primary areas. Charles Tilly’s Four State Activities Model (see Figure 1) provides a

concise and utilitarian means by which to qualify and assess the state’s capacity to
govern.15 According to Tilly, effective state administration need be concerned with only
four primary tasks: war making, state-making, extraction of resources and protection.16

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities—war making, state making, and protection</td>
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**Figure 1. Tilly’s Four State Activities Model**

A key methodological purpose of this work, and one that is central to my hypothesis, is to develop Olivier Roy’s proposition further through the identification and examination of ‘solidarity groups’ in opposition to the central power of the state in each of the cases presented. In this endeavor, Tilly’s Four State Activities Model also provides a means by which I can subjectively measure the capacity of the central state, thereby providing an indirect means of further examining the relative strength and propensity of solidarity groups that oppose and resist central rule. I expect to find a direct correlation between the central state’s capacity to govern and the propensity and strength of ‘solidarity groups.’ Key analysis findings derived from this study will endeavor to discern structural and organizational patterns of governance that can either be replicated or avoided in the current regime, thereby, decreasing the likelihood of local resistance and increasing the efficacy of central government rule.

As mentioned above, a critical component of this analysis will be the award of a relative ‘grade’ to each regime studied, as an indicator of its state capacity. While there is general consensus on the need to adopt effective units of measurement in the study of ‘governance,’ a great matter of debate still surrounds the areas of government to be studied and the actual units of measurement employed. Fortunately, the preeminent architects of governance indicators, Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, tell us that no matter how governance is defined, analyzed, ranked and compared, the final ‘indicator’ is

16 Rasler and Thompson, *War and State*, 7.
ultimately the result of a great deal of subjectivity on the part of the expert who compiled the data. The author’s criticisms of the indicators themselves stem from the different definitional views and biases of the experts themselves to the “ideological orientation” of the organization commissioning and presenting the analyses. Although Kaufman and Kray’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), created for and adopted by The World Bank and incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals that guide the current state-building endeavor in Afghanistan are arguably the most comprehensive and extensively employed aggregate indicators of governance, their own composition is fundamentally flawed. The WGI itself is a weighted ‘score’ compiled from 30 other independent but subjective governance indices. In other words, the WGI is merely an aggregate of other indicators, each subject to its own bias and the availability of data. Moreover, as current governance indicators are largely based on local experts and survey data that cannot be replicated for previous Afghan regimes and rarely even exists for the current government in Kabul, the adoption of scores and indicators based on contemporary means is impossible. Consequently, the analysis of state capacity and resistance presented in this thesis is based on my own subjective analysis and grading system.

Using qualitative data for each case, I will explore how the state sought to breakdown and overcome traditional tribal barriers to effective central rule in each of the four state activities. I will then subjectively analyze the relative presence or absence of governing institutions to grade state capacity. To do this, I will first examine whether the state created structural institutions that facilitated the expansion of state capacity, and then whether it actually achieved a degree of state capacity, enabling the conduct of relations and relay of policy between the center state and the local level.

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19 Ibid., 15.
D. **CASE SELECTION**

The four cases selected for study are the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), the era of Communist rule under the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and Soviet occupation (1978-1989), the Taliban (1994-2001), and the government of President Hamid Karzai (2001-present).

These four cases are chosen primarily for their diversity in regime type, spanning an absolute monarchy, communist oligarchy, Islamic theocracy and democratic republic. Selection of these cases, therefore, offers an opportunity for comparative political analysis of state activities over the same society. Moreover, Afghanistan offers a unique case because nowhere else has this particular spectrum of governance been attempted over the same people.

Another significant factor in case selection was the timeframe. Many scholars cite the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan as the origin of the modern Afghan nation-state.21 As all subsequent cases follow Amir Rahman’s rule, all can then be said to be part of the period of modern rule in Afghanistan.

1. **Case One: The Reign of Amir Abdur Rahman**

While there are numerous accounts of Abdur Rahman’s consolidation of power, institutionalized central rule and mechanisms for overcoming tribal resistance, there has been no application of this historical analysis to the challenges facing the current government in Kabul. Credited with strengthening the army, establishing a civil bureaucracy, subduing the mullahs, and breaking the strength and solidarity of the tribes, an historical analysis of the reign of Abdur Rahman, the ‘Iron Amir,’ might provide clues as to how to deal with the inability of the Afghan government to extend the writ into the periphery.

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2. Case Two: Communist Rule

Although scores of sources abound on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, too few have attempted to explore Afghanistan’s communist era and Soviet occupation in terms of state-making and fewer still have one again attempted to relate this to Afghanistan’s current endeavor outside of the obvious comparative operational blunder by a superpower with regard to the ongoing counter-insurgent campaign.22

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the last battlefield in the East-West ideological confrontation,23 directly resulted in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union, and elevated Central Asian geo-strategic politics to the forefront of post-World War II international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the Soviet-Afghan war illustrates the Soviet Union’s inability to extend its communist ideology and centralized government administration over the Afghan people as willfully or systematically as Stalin’s conquest of Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. The tools of administration that worked with relative success in the Central Asian Republics, even contributing to a sense of national identity and a shared national myth, were largely incompatible with—and antithetical to—the very fabric of Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic tribal society and at odds with the state’s narrative of utmost hostility and rebellion toward foreign intervention or direct government interference.

3. Case Three: Taliban Rule

The Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 gained international notoriety for its draconian laws and for its refusal to turn over Osama bin Laden following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. While there are many scholarly and journalistic accounts of the Taliban’s military rise to power, fundamentalist rule, and Islamist genealogy, there has been little to no analysis of the Taliban as a state, of its governing structure and capacity, or resistance to Taliban rule.


23 Roy, The Soviet/Afghan War, 3.
4. Case Four: Democratic Rule

Of all the cases studied, the current regime of President Hamid Karzai is the most important, because it is this government that currently faces the very task of creating state and institutional capacity while faced with fierce and often insurmountable resistance that threatens to once again envelope the Afghan people and topple a regime. It is therefore imperative for the current regime to break with history and adapt new instruments of governance that are built upon, reinforced and legitimated by the Afghan people and traditional sources of solidarity.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION

This thesis is organized into three parts, spanning eight chapters. Part one, consisting of Chapters I and II, provides the analytic foundation on which the thesis is based. Already having introduced the research question and methodology in Chapter I, Chapter II provides a preliminary literature review and relates the importance of solidarity in Afghan society. Part two contains Chapters III through VI, in which each case is presented and analyzed in isolation. The final section offers a comparative case analysis and the presentation of major findings in Chapter VII before concluding with some policy implications and recommendations in Chapter VIII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AFGHAN SOLIDARITY

This chapter builds upon the research question and methodological design introduced in Chapter I. While there is an extensive volume of literature on state and society, from state-formation to comparative governance, a primary task of this chapter is to sort through, synthesize and present those works that bear the most relevance to the research question presented in this thesis in a cogent, concise and representative literature review. I then conclude the chapter with an examination of the structural basis and importance of solidarity in Afghan society, in order to provide a comprehensive primer for the further presentation of individual cases presented in Chapters III through VI.

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

The majority of works presented in this review of literature are of historical, anthropological and sociological nature, although prominent works from the fields of political science, comparative politics and international relations theory provide the basis for discussion of the historical origin of the state. I begin the literature review by first drawing upon relevant works from each of these fields to provide a thorough groundwork in the evolution of political thought and understanding regarding the idea of a modern nation state and state-making as borne from the experience of seventeenth century Europe. Sufficiently grounded by these propositions, I will then offer differing explanations of the nation state and state-making, as it applies to states outside the European experience, particularly in the Third World. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of literature pertinent to Afghanistan’s emergence as an independent empire in the mid-eighteenth century to its birth as a modern state in the early twentieth century. I will also introduce the major historical and anthropological works germane to the discussion of ‘solidarity groups’ with which I frame the research question and comparative case study methodology.
Charles Tilly’s claim that “war makes states” has been widely accepted as a universal proposition of modern comparative politics and international relations theory. However, Tilly’s proposition was made in reference to ‘international’ war and the Western European model of state-making. While his proposition may have been correct with regard to seventeenth century Europe, we need to search for another definition if we are to characterize the Afghan state-building experience. While the successive Marxist, Muslim theocratic and democratic regimes that rose to power in Afghanistan were either preceded by, or pre-empted by conflict, each has struggled with the issues of legitimacy and capacity. The Marxists overthrew Afghanistan’s monarchy, while the Taliban initially rose in opposition to the internationally recognized transitional government that failed to govern Afghanistan’s wild periphery. If we use Max Weber’s oft-quoted definition of a state, there is little doubt that no Afghan regime held “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,” and was faced with challengers both internal and external. Territory administered by the monarchy, communists, and Taliban or Karzai government rarely has extended beyond Kabul.

Each successive regime’s rise to power is also a matter of state-building capacity and governing legitimacy. While able to return some degree of security and rule of law over formerly ‘ungoverned spaces,’ they were ultimately unable to develop the kind of state capacity necessary to increase their legitimacy or whether the external intervention that caused their demise.

Turning to Weber again yields three types of legitimacy necessary for domination of a territory or people: rational (legal), traditional (patriarchal) and charismatic (based on personality). Since both the Communists and Taliban displaced governments

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26 The term ‘ungoverned spaces’ is actually historically inaccurate and misleading. Relevant literature on state and society often confuses non-traditional governance, such as those tribal institutions found in Afghanistan, as being ‘ungoverned.’ As revealed later in this literature review, Afghanistan’s tribal councils, or *jirga*s, more closely resemble classical Greek democracy than most modern institutions. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘ungoverned spaces’ refers to a region “not governed by central authority.” See: Groh, *Ungoverned Spaces*, 1.

recognized by the international community, there was little support for these regimes’ claim to legal legitimacy in the eyes of external forces. However, the Taliban enjoyed relative traditional and charismatic legitimacy as evidenced by general communal support for their rise. Thus, Tilly’s argument is useful for explaining the birth of the ‘western’ nation state in seventeenth century Europe, but lacks applicability to recent attempts at state-making in Afghanistan.

Herman Swartz\(^\text{28}\) and Joel Migdal\(^\text{29}\) examine the relationship between government bureaucracy and administration at the local level. While Migdal’s analysis of the ‘strongman’ has utility in characterizing the role of warlords that have dominated Afghan society since the anti-Soviet jihad, and the inability of the central government to extend its rule to the local level and to the periphery, it falls short of explaining the particular tribal structures and state-society relationships historically prevalent in Afghanistan. These theories also fail to explain how the Taliban rose to prominence in the non-western, multi-ethnic, tribal, Islamic and ‘ungoverned spaces’ of Afghanistan. One reason for this inadequacy is that academics and International Relations theorists have historically approached the concept of state building as Western European “top down phenomenon,” when there may be other factors that explain the Afghan state-building experience.\(^\text{30}\)

Jeffrey Herbst\(^\text{31}\) attempts to differentiate between the state-building experiences of Europe and Africa, but his framework and standard in which to compare African state-building failures is inevitably the European model. The extraction of taxes and development of a “national” identity just may not be central to the debate over state formation outside Western Europe. In a similar vein, James Fearon and David Laitin,\(^\text{32}\)


and Ashutosh Varshney’s examination of the ethnic component of state-building and national identity further fail to explain adequately the Afghan experience. Although rife with internal conflict and insurgency over the past three decades, Fearon and Laitin’s study of insurgency and civil war rules out ethnicity as a factor favoring insurgency, a characteristic repeatedly credited as driving Afghanistan’s upheaval.

Moreover, while Afghanistan's tribal revolts under Amir Abdur Rahman were not insurgent in the modern sense, they were insurgent in their dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime. In each case, revolt was precipitated by the mobilization of a singular ethnic or tribal group against the state because of a specific grievance that threatened the group’s solidarity. The Communist and Taliban regimes are also not considered insurgent. However, when framed as operational constructs of political ideological objectives that deposed the incumbent regime by force without first obtaining the organizational bureaucracy, legitimacy and capacity to govern, one may then begin to view them as insurgencies. Such logic illustrates the flaw inherent in Fearon and Laitin’s characterization and approach to ethnicity.

Varshney’s examination of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India and the prevalence of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic ties at the civic level actually run counter to Afghan government and society. While communal conflict in India historically occurred where civic institutions were weakest, the majority of conflict in Afghanistan has historically occurred at the communal level, where civic ties and communication networks are strongest. Communal conflict in Afghanistan is instead perpetuated by ethnic and tribal mores and social codes, particularly the notions of honor, revenge, and blood feud prevalent in Pashtun society.

What is missing so far from this discourse is an examination and foundation in the issues particular to Afghanistan’s state-making and historical narrative. Available literature on the nature of state-making fails to describe sufficiently the causes of what appears to be a bottom-up occurrence in Afghanistan. While each regime loosely fits the general definition of a state, they are generally not comparable to the western model of a

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nation state on which the paradigm is based. Therefore, in examining the rise of each successive government in Afghanistan it is worth considering abandoning our preconceived western and normative notions of ‘international’ legitimacy and state development as we now endeavor to examine Afghanistan’s particular experiences.

Francis Fukuyama claims “Afghanistan never had a modern state.” He maintains that Afghanistan never met the definition of a nation-state and instead never developed beyond a “tribal confederation” during the entire duration of the monarchy from 1748-1973 due to the state’s inability to extend its direct administration and control beyond the capital in Kabul. Moreover, Fukuyama contends, “The subsequent years of communist misrule and civil war eliminated everything that was left of that already weak state. State-building after the ouster of the Taliban had to begin from the ground up, with resources and guidance provided entirely from the outside.” The lack of any institutional bureaucracy or administrative capability in post-Taliban Afghanistan necessarily complicates and confounds the state-building experience that must rely almost exclusively on foreign donors to create a modern state in its place. The fact that the United States has attempted to install a democratic regime in Kabul further complicates the task, especially if one looks to the growing literature on democratization and state-making. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s quantitative analysis of regime transition and democratization indicate that the very process of democratization increases a nation’s likelihood to go to war. Equally important is Owen’s analysis of Mansfield and Snyder’s 2005 book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
War. Here, Owen suggests that democratizing states, “that develop democratic institutions in the wrong order [are] unlikely to complete the transition to democracy.”

A return to Fukuyama is necessary to frame Afghanistan’s way ahead and lay the methodological structure upon which I will draw implications for the current regime in Kabul in the final chapter of this thesis. Fukuyama advances “three distinct aspects or phases to nation-building.” The first phase, post conflict reconstruction, entails the “short-term provision of stability through infusions of security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance” by outside powers to restore utilities and other essential forms of state infrastructure. The second phase can only occur if there is a “modicum of stability,” that allows for the creation of “self-sustaining state institutions that can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention.” The third aspect overlaps the second and is concerned with strengthening weak state authority to allow the provision of “necessary state functions like the protection of property rights or the provision of basic primary education.” In the final analysis, this thesis must aim to examine and attempt to reconcile Fukuyama’s aspects of nation building with the historical analysis of Roy’s ‘solidarity groups’ as barriers to Afghan nationalism and the creation of a modern Afghan nation-state. This will present a significant task, since the chief architect of Afghanistan’s post-Taliban reconstruction and governance, the United States, was, “unlike most of the old societies of Europe...founded on the basis of an idea.... [That] national identity is civic rather than religious, cultural, racial, or ethnic.”

Given this thorough review of the relevant theoretical, historical and anthropological literature on state-making, it is now necessary to conduct a preliminary overview of the primary methodological sources to be used in the thesis. Olivier Roy’s

40 Owen, *Democratic Peace*.
41 Fukuyama, *State-Building*, 100.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
seminal work on Central Asia\(^{46}\) provides both a framework for the comparison of state development between regime types and an introduction to the concept of solidarity groups that oppose, undermine or directly challenge state authority.

Roy’s examination of Soviet Russia’s subjugation of Central Asia in the 1920s also applies to Afghanistan’s historical context. Through what he describes as a “process of operating a logic of ideological empire,” Roy claims that the Soviets sought to instill in these new socialist republics an “adherence to socialism and respect for ‘nationalities,’ while at the same time keeping them on the sidelines of political power.”\(^{47}\) Moreover, Roy states that the Soviet’s systematic ethnic and linguistic anthropological categorization and division of Central Asia’s indigenous groups “actually established the conditions for the emergence of the nation-states.”\(^{48}\) While such may be argued for the emergence of the Central Asian nation state, Afghanistan has twice more been subjugated to the “logic of ideological empire” since the failed Marxist experiment. The idea of an Afghan nation state is therefore only a recently resurrected idea, attempting to replace the vestiges of the Taliban’s Islamic fundamentalist theology with a new western paradigm that has the hard task of attempting to replace the innate ‘logic of empire’ with a new Afghan ‘national’ identity. This proves a significant task given the need to reconcile Afghanistan’s ideologically and culturally diverse multi-ethnic, Islamic, and tribal society with western concepts of state-making that are still based on the Western European (Westphalian) state-making experience, nationalist ideals based on ethnic solidarity and infused with American idealism that government is civic. Roy claimed that Iran is the only case where “a logic of empire transformed seamlessly into a logic of nation-state,” because the 1979 Revolution affirmed Shiism, long the “ideological foundation of politics” in Persia, as the identity of Iranian nationalism.\(^{49}\) Roy’s ‘logic of empire’ versus the ‘logic of ideology’ finds utility in explaining Afghanistan’s political history and appears complementary to Fukuyama’s claim that Afghanistan never emerged as a modern nation state.


\(^{47}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
Fukuyama’s argument is further strengthened if we briefly return to the definition of a nation-state. Roy defines the nation-state as follows:

The nation-state is integrative: it does not accept indirect administration of society and a preservation of the autonomy of solidarity groups. In the nation state, nationalism is intrinsic: the citizen is defined by a direct relationship to the political community. He is above all a ‘national’. His identity is not a question of ethnology but a matter of political strategy.\(^50\)

While Roy’s examination of Central Asian state formation is necessarily determined to explain “how, under the Soviet system, solidarity groups were simultaneously able to subvert and bypass the system,” this methodology is extrapolated and applied to an analysis of Afghanistan’s political history.\(^51\) Developing Roy’s theory further, this thesis seeks to illustrate that the aim of solidarity groups to oppose or even circumvent central administration is a hallmark of Afghanistan’s political history. This fact has hindered the creation of Afghan nationalism and the ability of the central government to administer at the local level. Therefore, this thesis is intended to illustrate how the presence of autonomous solidarity groups within Afghanistan has prevented the creation of a true Afghan nation-state and instead perpetuated a loose confederation of ethnic and tribal groups within a shared internationally demarcated border.

Thus, a nation state requires “vertical integration” or subordination of the people to “direct state administration.”\(^52\) The existence of autonomous solidarity groups, which lie outside or even in opposition to direct state administration, is therefore antithetical to the development of the nation-state, even a democratic one. Mohammed Ayoob recognizes the need for reconciliation of “the consolidation of state power…between state elites and ethnic and political opponents who would like to curb the power of the central state.”\(^53\)

\(^{50}\) Roy, *New Central Asia*, 11.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
Solidarity groupings are based on infra-ethnic identities and functions in respect to “one’s relationship to the state or to resources.” Relationship in this manner refers to proximity or interaction. In Afghanistan’s traditional communitarian, nomadic and tribal societies, social organization and identification may be based on one or a multiple of ethno-linguistic, tribal, regional, religious, socio-religious (holy, or descendant from the Prophet) or social divisions. However, as Roy notes, while “there exists no system of ‘solidarity groups’… the important thing is to belong to a group,” as the basis for relating to the state. Therefore, the group, not the individual, is the level of relation and interaction with the state. I hypothesize that overcoming this central sociological and anthropological tenant was the central failure of each successive Afghan regime and must become the critical central task of the current state-making experiment in Afghanistan.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARITY AND AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE

Although pastoral nomads lived outside the kinds of tribal structures described in this section, generalizations about traditional Afghan society, tribal structures and communal relationships are necessary. While specific linguistic nomenclature may differ, the tribal-, political-, economic- and social-structures of Afghanistan’s minority ethnic groups contained in historical and anthropological literature, including the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, are generally described in terms of the Pashtun tribal structures presented here.

Broadly defined as “a group united by a norm of solidarity within the group and by competition with parallel groups,” a qawm can refer to any communal identity based on ethnicity and kinship (tribe), region or occupation. In its simplest form, a qawm is

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55 Ibid., 18.
56 Ibid. (Emphasis added).
the fundamental unit of individual Afghan identification, social interaction and group solidarity. Combined with Islam, the qawm has proved the historical basis of political mobilization against the central Afghan government. However, once mobilized, these “organizational principles, whether based on ethnicity, kinship, religion...[are applied] according to the specific political, economic, and historical contexts in which they find themselves.”

That is to say, the qawm becomes the political tool in an attempt to reestablish or reshape the social and political order according to the worldview and mores of the qawm. In essence, the maintenance of Afghan society is the static, and at times dynamic, balancing of competing qawm from the local to national level.

Historically, the central Afghan state extended its capacity to the local level through the political appointment of wali (provincial governors) and uluswal (district officials). These appointees were the intermediary political agents between the state and the tribe. The tribal structure itself had maintained administrative, judicial and military branches that upheld and carried out the complex socio-political code that governed tribal life. In the Pashtun tribes, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, there is no distinct tribal chief, and tribal matters were decided through a jirga, or consensus-based tribal council composed of all adult males. As Donald Wilber notes, this “tribal tradition had been mostly democratic in a primitive way.”

The jirga is the tribes’ highest political body. Attempts by the state to circumvent the jirga, or interfere with tribal society in general, historically met with fierce opposition and revolt that, if spread, threatened the regime’s survival. Afghan history is replete with examples of tribal revolt, although the uprising that deposed King Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929), in response to his modernization reforms (antithetical to tribal custom) is perhaps the most cited. Because of these revolts, two types of intermediaries were employed at the tribal level, a malik and khan. Maliks are tribal leaders politically appointed by the state while khans are socially recognized by the tribe to speak with the

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59 Shahrani, Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan, 24-25.
60 Ibid., 25.
61 Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1962), 78. However, like 'ungoverned spaces,' one should not equate “primitive” forms of tribal and local governance with the absence of governance.
state on their behalf, although not recognized (within the tribe) as a chieftain per se.\textsuperscript{62} The key political and socio-cultural finding is that the central government had structural institutions to conduct relations and relay policy between the state and the local level, but it left local government to the tribe. The individual Afghan, therefore, never developed any sense of political relationship or loyalty toward the state. Instead, individual solidarity was owed to the qawm or tribe, a relationship perpetuated from antiquity. Moreover, traditional group loyalty was paid to the watan (tribal, ancestral or cultural homeland), and not the state, which never figured prominently in local socio-political affairs. Figure 2 illustrates the tribal unit’s relationship to the state.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{tribal_structure_diagram.png}
\caption{Afghanistan’s Tribal Structure and Relationship to the State}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{62} The use of maliks, predominant developed under the period of the British Raj, is still in use today, primarily in the (autonomous) Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
As depicted in Figure 2, *mullahs*, or religious leaders, were traditionally apolitical and presided outside traditional governing institutions. *Mullahs* were also locally elected, based on their personal piety or knowledge of Islamic texts, as formal Islamic education was not a necessary condition for being termed a *mullah* within the historically illiterate Afghan society. While *mullahs* wielded relative authority over religious affairs, often acting as *qazis* (judges) in matters Islamic law, they might also be asked to deliberate on customary and tribal law if their person was held in high enough esteem by the tribe. *Mullahs* created their own “spiritual hierarchy” and “social distance” within Afghan society through the value placed on their Islamic education and piety, the most powerful of whom wielded “influence enough to be classed with the aristocracy.”

*Mullahs* have only wielded relative political power during a *jihad*.

When Abdur Rahman came to power in 1880, Afghan society was already in open revolt and railing against the British occupation following the conclusion of the second Anglo-Afghan War and subsequent tribal campaigns for succession. Until this point Afghan history was characterized by the rise and fall of charismatic tribal leaders who expanded their empire’s borders before succumbing to the pressures of combating tribal solidarity. Ethnic and tribal solidarity was synonymous with the identity and composition of Afghanistan’s political center and resistance was centered on defending the *watan*, or homeland.

However, all of this changed under the reign of the “Iron Amir.” By placing himself as the head of the Islamic community, the Amir was able to both legitimize his rule, enhancing “the prestige of the crown,” and limit the power of the *mullahs*. This dynamic remained largely in place for a century, until the confluence of several events in the late 1970s and 1980s. Facing increasing oppression, many Afghan Islamist parties moved their operations to Pakistan in the years following Prime Minister Daoud’s 1973 coup. The further establishment of an Islamist regime by General Zia al-Haq in Pakistan allowed the *mullahs* to rise in political prominence, while the subsequent Communist coup and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw a purge of tribal leaders.

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63 Wilber, *Afghanistan*, 78.
64 Ibid.
viewed as an attack against Islam, quickly invoked the call for *jihad* against the Soviets. These events created a ‘perfect storm’ for the redistribution of traditional sources of tribal power in the *mullahs’* favor, and the pretext for a political imbalance that has been waging ever since.
III. CASE 1: THE MONARCHY OF AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN: 1880-1901

A. BACKGROUND

Credited with founding Afghanistan in 1747, what Ahmad Shah Durrani in fact carved out of the Persian Afshahid Empire was his own Afghan empire, which would take another 150 years of transformation to turn into a modern nation-state. Until the emergence of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1880, the Afghan monarchy was constantly under pressure for survival from foreign encroachment as well as tribal elements who challenged the empire both militarily as well as through their own claims of legitimacy to the Afghan throne. Abdur Rahman built up the army and brought the tribes under his rule through repeated military campaigns to suppress and pacify the Afghans. Moreover, the Amir purposefully expanded means of revenue collection and bureaucratic governance to bring in more local elements under his direct control. He also reigned during the last period of foreign expansion, which saw the northern, eastern and southern borders of the Afghan empire morph into the international boundaries that demarcate the modern Afghan nation-state.

When Abdur Rahman came to power in 1880, Afghan society was already in open revolt and railing against the British occupation following the conclusion of the second Anglo-Afghan War and subsequent tribal campaigns for succession. Until this point Afghan history was characterized by the rise and fall of charismatic tribal leaders who expanded their empire’s borders before succumbing to the pressures of combating tribal solidarity. Ethnic and tribal solidarity was synonymous with the identity and composition of Afghanistan’s political center and resistance was centered on defending the watan. However, all of this changed under the reign of the “Iron Amir.” By placing himself as the head of the Islamic community, the Amir was able to both legitimize his rule, enhancing “the prestige of the crown,” and limit the power of the mullahs.

Figure 3 depicts Afghanistan’s borders before and after the Amir’s reign.

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65 Wilber, Afghanistan, 78.
B. WAR MAKING

Abdur Rahman was confirmed as Amir of Afghanistan following the tumultuous second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Almost immediately, the new Amir ceded Afghan sovereignty over its foreign affairs to Britain in exchange for their withdrawal from Afghanistan. He then embarked on a campaign of political consolidation and military pacification over the Afghan countryside.

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67 The British supported Abdur Rahman’s claiming to the Afghan throne following the war. The Amir received an annual salary from the British during his reign, and likely counted on British intervention to deter any challengers.
The creation of a large standing army firmly established the basis for the Amir’s power, and provided the primary vehicle for directing and executing his ambitious strategy. In gaining support from the tribal elders, he initially appealed to their natural xenophobic tendencies, highlighting their recent loss to the British and the need to defend the Afghan homeland against foreign invasion. His true intention was the establishment of a national army intended for the consolidation of “his own dynasty by eliminating his rivals and establishing an absolute government.”

During the initial years of his reign, military service was voluntary until all of the tribes had been pacified and brought under his rule. By 1883, the ‘Iron Amir’ had amassed a regular army of approximately 43,000 men excluding tribal militia, which probably numbered an additional several thousand soldiers. The Amir’s army was instrumental in putting down numerous rebellions and subjugating the Afghan countryside and tribes under his absolute rule. He conducted over forty campaigns during his reign, ranging from suppressing revolts to routing potential challengers to bringing formerly autonomous tribes under central rule. By the time Tsarist Russia began encroaching on Afghanistan’s northern border in 1884, the Amir’s army was already well seasoned.

Russian encroachment had begun almost a decade earlier with the conquest of the Khanate of Kokand, which encompassed most of modern-day Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1876. Having lost to the Tekke Turkomen of southern Central Asia in 1879, the Russians finally defeated the tribesmen in 1881, allowing them to complete their conquest of the Turkomen and advance as far as the Merv Oasis, in modern-day Turkmenistan, by 1884. The Russian advancement constituted an imminent threat to territory viewed as historically within Afghanistan’s sphere. Britain, fearing its Afghan buffer might be lost, threatened confrontation with Russia and stated that further Russian encroachment, particularly toward Herat, would be

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68 Kakar, Government and Society, 96.
69 Ibid., 98.
stipend tantamount to a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{70} However, the Russians failed to heed British warnings and continued to carry their Tsarist expansionism south.

Conflict finally broke out between Russian and Afghan forces on 30 March 1885. Overwhelmed and outnumbered, the Afghan forces retreated, allowing the advancing Russians to occupy Afghan territory in the Panjdeh Oasis. News of the conflict spread internationally causing many to predict the imminent clash of Russian and British forces in Central Asia. The British opted to recognize Russia’s territorial gains post-facto, leaving the Afghans out of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission that demarcated their northern border along the Oxus River. This move angered the Amir, who felt betrayed by British acquiescence and lack of military intervention, and firmly established Afghanistan as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires in Central and South Asia

Eight years later, in 1893, Abdur Rahman ceded over half of the Pashtun homeland to the British through the demarcation of Afghanistan’s eastern and southern border, known as the Durand Line. This boundary, still contested by the Afghans and Pashtuns on both sides of the border, effectively demarcated the borders of the modern Afghan nation-state, as it exists today.

Thus, despite a sizeable army capable of defending Afghanistan’s frontiers against similar fielded tribal forces, the Amir’s national army was incapable of standing up to the modern western Russian and British armies of the nineteenth century. Moreover, without sovereignty over Afghan foreign affairs, Abdur Rahman was powerless to prevent the loss of territory.

C. STATE-MAKING

Known as the ‘Iron Amir’ for his ruthless conduct, Abdur Rahman conducted over forty military campaigns during his twenty-one year reign. A summary of the Amir’s major battles are listed in Table 1. Fought to eliminate potential challengers to the throne, conquer territories independent of his rule, and pacify tribal revolt, the Amir

\textsuperscript{70} Dupree, Afghanistan, 422.
viewed all engagements as necessary in his quest to bring all of Afghanistan under his absolute rule. However, the subjugation and consolidation of the diffuse Afghan tribes appears the Amir’s chief priority.

In his own words, the Amir “had to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cutthroats…this necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule.”71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal Group, Region, or Leader</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sardar Ayub Khan (son of Amir Sher Ali, r.1863-66; 1869-79)</td>
<td>Challenger</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraki Ghilzai</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1881-1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali of Maimana</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mir of Shighnan and Roashan (NE Badakhshan)</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinwari Pashtu</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1882-1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangal-Surmat Pashtun</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1883-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali of Maimana</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1885-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtun</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1886-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardar Mohd. Ishaq Khan (son of Amir Mohammad Azam Khan, r. 1867-69)</td>
<td>Challenger</td>
<td>1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safi Pashtun of Kunar</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>1888-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan of Asmar</td>
<td>Expansion, revolt</td>
<td>1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazarajat</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1891-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafiristan (Nuristan)</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1895-96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Major Campaigns of Amir Abdur Rahman72

Abdur Rahman broke Pashtun tribal strongholds in the southern provinces through a campaign of forced migration in the 1880s and 1890s, transplanting ten thousand73 mostly Ghilzai but some Durrani Pashtuns to non-Pashtun areas north of the Hindu-Kush mountain range. This migration from the Pashtun heartland to areas of mostly Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen majority, depicted in Figure 4, eventually resulted in the intermarriage of Ghilzai males with some of the local Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups with who they were in close proximity.

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71 Wilber, Afghanistan, 19.
72 After Dupree, Afghanistan, 418-419.
Louis Dupree cites this as another instrument that directly resulted in the breakdown of the tribal-based clan system. Specifically, Dupree suggests that this tribal migration and ethnic intermarriage resulted in the dismemberment of the *Pashtun* clan-based kin-political unit and basis of identity (*P’sha* in Pashto; *Khater* in Dari) into a sub lineage *khel*, a group with a name but no residential unity. In some instances, intervillage councils arose as a direct consequence of intermarriage between two groups. Provincial governors also forced the relocation of some extended families between villages. This further eroded the basis of tribal solidarity, but more importantly, it also eliminated the clan-village as the elementary unit of social power and economic utility. Especially in these northern areas, the extended family, and not the village or clan, became the primary unit of social and economic dependence. No migratory pattern would have as fundamental an effect on the Afghan landscape, redefine social and cultural norms, as that which occurred under the Amir.

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**Figure 4.** Areas of Forced Pashtun Migration under Amir Abdur Rahman

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74 Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 183-188. Regional or geographic associations have been the historical basis for identity and solidarity of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan, such as the Panjsheri Tajiks.

Consumed with the unification of Afghanistan, the ‘Iron Amir’ ordered campaigns into previously autonomous territories in order to bring these groups under his absolute rule. His three-year campaign against the Ghilzai and Hazaras were particularly brutal. Although the Amir had declared an anti-Shia *jihad* against the Hazaras, razed their lands and relegated them slave status by the end of 1893, his subjugation of the pagan *Kafirs* is what finally earned him the respect and confidence of the *ulema* (scholarly Islamic community, clergy). The *Kafirs*, ‘unbelievers’ of the Islam, of the Hindu Kush northeast of Kabul were the last non-Muslim Afghans to convert to Islam. Believed to be descendants of Alexander’s Macedonian army because of the incidence of blond hair and blue eyes, the Amir punctuated his conquest of the *Kafirs* of Kafiristan by changing their name to *Nuristanis* (enlightened ones), and the region’s name to Nuristan, land of light. 

While the national army was used most prominently in the pacification and subjugation of Afghanistan’s periphery under Abdur Rahman, its presence was later used to both manipulate tribal rivalries and prevent intertribal warfare that threatened to destabilize to the center. In this way, the monarchy sought to keep other tribes or ethnic groups from obtaining a political or military vantage from which to challenge the state. Moreover, subsidy to tribal elders, especially along the Pakistan border, served to pacify these tribes and lower the risk of revolt through increased dependency on the state. As Wilber notes, “the good will and cooperation of the tribal chiefs are essential to the most vital functions of the government: keeping order, raising revenue, and obtaining troops.”

Abdur Rahman legitimated his rule by co-opting both the ‘Classic Islamic” and “Tribal State” models of the Islamic transmission of power (see Figure 5). 

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77 Wilber, Afghanistan, 145.
78 Olesen, Islam and Politics, 64.
In the classic Islamic model, the legitimization of power to the ruler was transferred from Allah to the ruler through the *ulema*. As the only qualified body to interpret God's will, the *ulema* held ultimate religious power and authority. Abdur Rahman usurped their authority and relegated it under his own by claiming that his rule was directly conferred by Allah. Amir Rahman similarly reduced tribal power. In Afghanistan’s tribal society, the legitimization of power from Allah to the Amir was confirmed through the tribal *jirga*. A *Loya Jirga*, composed of all of the tribal elders, confirmed Ahmad Shah Durrani as the first Afghan monarch and had been historically called to legitimate decisions of national significance.

Abdur Rahman established a National Council and at times convened a *Loya Jirga* to legitimize his decisions. Composed of royal sardars (princes), *khwanin-i-mulki*

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79 After Olesen, *Islam and Politics*, 64.
80 Ibid., 64-72.
81 While the National Council was a permanently-seated body composed of sardars, tribal elders and mullahs representing the ulema who, advised the Amir, the Loya Jirga was only convened three times during his reign: in 1885 prior to the Amir’s state visit to India, in 1888 during the rebellion of Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan (Abdur Rahman’s cousin and a legitimate challenger to the throne), and again after the Durand Boundary Commission agreement in 1893. The Loya Jirga included all of the council members, including members of the royal court, some high ranking military officers and local magnates. Source: Kakar, Government and Society, 25.
(tribal elders or khans) and members of the ulema (qazis, muftis,\textsuperscript{82} and mullahs), the Council (darbar-i-‘aam) assumed the titular functions of a Parliament, although its role was purely advisory and its members wielded no real authority over their departments. The Council was further divided into an upper house (darbar-i-shahi) and lower house (khawanin-i-mulki), although the exact functional distinction between the two houses is not discernable.\textsuperscript{83} Although wazir (department heads) were often equated with Ministerial level posts, no one other than the Amir held or exercised executive power. The position of Prime Minister, which had previously existed under Amir Sher Ali, was eliminated.

The Council and Jirga brought religious and tribal power directly under the center, and were strictly used as a mechanism to legitimize the Amir’s power. Moreover, the council members were forced to reside in Kabul, physically removing the mullahs and tribal elders from their traditional power base. Amir Rahman also instituted ghulambachah, whereby he kept the son(s) of tribal and ethnic leaders in his court, presumably, as hostages should the tribes’ revolt.\textsuperscript{84} These policies were instrumental in breaking the strength and solidarity of the tribes and the ulema. The subordination of the ulema and tribal elders curtailed their economic and doctrinal independence, aided in the Islamization of the state, and co-opted the ulema and tribes into the state apparatus. The subjugation of the mullahs and Islamization of the state under central authority further necessitated a reorganization of the judiciary and offered another means by which to break traditional tribal solidarity.

Figure 6 illustrates the government structure under Amir Abdur Rahman, depicting the subordination of the tribal nation (blue triangle) under the administration of

\textsuperscript{82} Advisers to qazis.

\textsuperscript{83} Although M. Hasan Kakar and Louis Dupree differ in their naming conventions, Dupree preferring the term “court” used by Abdur Rahman himself, and Kakar employing the more widely used “council,” both encompass an institution composed of the royal sardars, tribal leaders and ulema. I will use the more common “council,” in order to make a clear distinction between the composition and function of an advisory Cabinet and the royal Special Court. See: Kakar, Government and Society, 22-25; Dupree, Afghanistan, 461-462.

\textsuperscript{84} Dupree, Afghanistan, 188.
the central government (red triangle) as well as the subordination and direction of the flow of power from Abdur Rahman to the various branches of government and functional departments.

Figure 6. Government Structure under Amir Abdur Rahman

Historically, the qazis and muftis only presided in cities, while criminal, civil and religious disputes in the countryside were settled by tribal jirgas based on rawaj, customary law, and tribal code such as Pashtunwali, vice Islamic law. Local mullahs or other respected officials knowledgeable of Islamic law might otherwise settle local disputes that were a matter of Islamic law or interpretation. Abdur Rahman’s realignment of the ulema under his central rule and proclamation that Sharia law was to be the overarching law of the land actually helped to raise the power and authority of the ulema while undermining tribal independence to enforce its own laws. Although the

85 Olesen, Islam and Politics, 65.
Amir created the position of *Khan-i-ulum* (Chief Justice), he retained for himself the function of supreme arbitrator in all matters of Islamic law including all judgments punishable by death. The Amir appointed all judges, institutionalized the oversight of secular district authorities in district courts and mandated that all matters not covered in specified *Sharia* code be referred to him for guidance. In addition, Amir Rahman ultimately reserved the right to preside over all criminal and political cases, relegating only legal and civil cases to the jurisdiction of the courts.86

Having already relocated the subdued tribal khans and elders to the capital and replaced tribal customary law with the extension of Islamic law, the groundwork was now laid for the administrative takeover of the tribal nation. With their leaders and time-honored customs and structure upset by the Amir’s actions, local villagers and tribesman that composed the traditional basis of tribal solidarity, the *khel*, looked to the provincial government as a surrogate for the tribal nation.87 Abdur Rahman redrew territorial boundaries, creating fourteen provinces that divided tribal homelands (*watan*) across two or more provinces and numerous districts (see Figure 7). This administrative redrawing of boundaries and the appointment of provincial governors was central to the breakdown of the tribal system, erosion of tribal identity and helped establish Afghan nationalism in the early to mid-twentieth century.

The provincial governor was usually a military officer, as were district and local officials, and commanded a provincial army capable of immediately suppressing the first signs of opposition or unrest. Appointed by the Amir himself, the provincial and district governors were responsible for the transmission and implementation of his absolute rule both outward to the periphery and downward to the local level. The governors were the executors of the executive, administrative and military arms of government, commanding the provincial armies, while overseeing the provincial and district administrative bureaucracies such as revenue collection. However, an elaborate system of royal spies

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that reported directly to the Amir provided an executive check on governors and other officials who might overstep their authority or unjustly benefit from their position. Such malfeasance was dealt with swiftly.

Figure 7. Provincial Boundaries Drawn by Abdur Rahaman

The primary administrative body was the diwan. The central or supreme diwan, the diwan-i-a’la, was originally established as the central mechanism for economic activity, particularly the levying and collection of revenues from taxation and customs and also the regulation of government expenditures. Over time, the expansion of territories and revenues necessitated the expansion of the diwan, causing its division into four regional departments (north, south, east, and west) in 1884 and later seeing the addition of new functional departments, such as an auditing office (daftar-i-sanjish) and land survey office (daftar-i-paimash-i-arqazi). The officials in charge of the four regional diwan and heads of the financial departments in each of the provinces were

88 Dupree, Afghanistan, 156.
called daftaris, while the title of sardafhari was given to the heads of main bureaus in the central diwan. Sarrishtadars were mid-level officials subordinate to the sardafhari, while mirzas filled out the junior administrative ranks. In 1890, six mirzas took the initiative to conduct an audit of state revenue, investigating the accounts of government officials who had not paid their taxes. Their findings directly led to the establishment of the auditing office, which “emerged as the most powerful bureau in the diwan.”

D. PROTECTION

Protection and state-making were effectively synonymous during the reign of Abdur Rahman. Above all, the Amir’s divide-and-rule strategy was based on tribal and religious lines, pitting Sunnis against the Shi’a and Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns. Even amongst the Pashtuns he favored Durrani over the Ghilzai and his own Muhammadzai lineage of the Barakzai clan over the Sadozai lineage of the Popalzai clan.

While the Amir did not have any clients per se, even members of his own royal family, including his own sons, were the focus of his suspicion and subject to his persecution. After hosting a dinner, Abdur Rahman’s eldest son and successor, Habibullah, “was chained and imprisoned for a night,” on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the Amir. Rahman himself revealed his overwhelming suspicion to his wife, stating, “I suspect everyone of doing harm to me, and do not consider anyone trustworthy.” Since his rule was absolute, protection of the state was equated with protection of the Amir alone, and he extended that protection to no one.

89 Kakar, Government and Society, 31.
90 Ibid., 10.
91 The Muhammadzai lineage produced the dynasty of rulers from Amir Dost Muhammad Khan in 1834 through President Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978. The lineage was broken momentarily by Bacha-i-Saqqao in 1929. The Popalzai of the Barakzai clan had produced the succession of dynastic rulers from Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747 to Amir Sher Ali in 1868. Afghanistan’s current President, Hamid Karzai, is from the Popalzai clan, while Ahmad Shah Khan, the second son of King Zahir Shah (r. 1933-1973), and is technically the crown prince of the Muhammadzai dynasty.
93 Kakar, Government and Society, 11.
E. EXTRACTION

While a system of land revenue and taxation had existed previously in Afghanistan, it was not equally applied across the provinces and tribes. The Durrani had historically been exempt from paying taxes because of their service to the state cavalry, whereas the Tajiks paid more revenue than the Pashtuns.\footnote{Kakar, Government and Society, 73.} The loss of territory to British India prior to the reign of Abdur Rahman, especially the loss of Kashmir, meant the loss of fertile and lucrative lands. The loss of eastern ‘Pashtunistan’ and Baluchistan in 1893 had even greater psychological and economic impact on the kingdom. The resulting split of the traditional ‘Pashtun belt’ into two halves bordering Afghanistan and British India and loss of access to the Arabian Sea dealt a huge blow to kingdom. The result was the imposition of increased taxation on peoples, particularly the Pashtuns, who had traditionally been either exempt or paid relatively low revenue to the center.

Amir Rahman’s pacification campaigns and expanding bureaucracy necessitated increased state revenue. As early as 1883 the Amir expanded revenue collection by proclaiming his divine command to collect taxes on public property, \textit{bayt al-mal}, and the people’s duty to pay them. Starting in Jalalabad, he ordered the transfer of the existing \textit{jam’bast} system of land revenue to the \textit{kot} system, whereby a fixed quota of revenue was replaced with a specific percentage of the land’s production.\footnote{The \textit{jam’bast} was a fixed quota of revenue assessed on a region or specific tract of land while the \textit{kot} systems imposed a share of production.} The government’s share of revenue was to be equal to one-third of the crop produced. By 1891, persistent resistance from landowners and the government’s inability to evaluate accurately its share of the yield led to a system whereby crops were appraised before they were harvested, arbitrary appraisals, and land surveys to expand the amount of land under cultivation to increase government revenue.\footnote{Kakar, Government and Society, 76-77. An entirely different land revenue system was implemented in Herat, where lands were appraised based on the amount of water available for irrigation.}

While not universally applied, the land revenue system constituted the largest source of revenue under Abdur Rahman and led to a complex system of local government, reliant on \textit{zabits} (tax collector, a military officer), \textit{’amils} (registrar), and
hakims (district administrator) to implement. Provincial offices (diwan, or, daftar) recorded the revenues and reported them to the center. Although the practice was outlawed under Amir Rahman, zabits, hakims, and daftaris (financial officer at a diwan, or daftar) often assessed unofficial fees on taxpayers, sometimes in excess of the actual revenue paid. So lucrative was this source of revenue that by 1898 the Amir had established three revenue departments (tahsils) in each province. Abdur Rahman also increased revenue in other areas, including taxes on cattle, income and customs. While these and many other common taxes predated his rule, the marked increase of taxes levied under the Amir’s rule increased the burden on the peasantry, caused isolated uprisings, as well emigration to Bukhara, Turkestan, and Peshawar.

Military conscription of able-bodied males appeared the norm by 1887, although it took several years to determine an equitable basis for service and level of conscription on the local population. In 1887, 15 percent of the population of Herat was ordered into military service. Neither the available population nor tribal elders supported this amount. Following negotiation a basis of conscription of one in twenty men was decided, while one in six men was set in Kandahar province. Attempts to extract one male from every household in Logar, Ghazni and Ningrahar provinces in 1894 were so unpopular that a universal system of hasht nafari, one out of eight, was eventually arrived at by 1896. This system was also levied upon the tribes, who were additionally required to maintain reserve militias, although it is estimated that the regular army might have approximated close to 100,000 soldiers toward the end of Abdur Rahman’s reign.

F. RESISTANCE

Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign was characterized by brutal suppression and expansionism over the formerly independent tribes of Afghanistan. His successive campaigns to put down revolt and conquer rival or bordering tribes struck at the vital core of traditional Afghan solidarity on which resistance to the Amir’s rule was based. The Amir, whose divine duty was to rule his subjects, tolerated no insurrection from the qawm, and allegiance to none other than himself. Amir Rahman changed the face of
Afghan society and state relations, recognizing, no social divisions, “whether of tribe, ethnicity, religion, or language,” and defining all of his subjects “by either the position they hold … or the tasks they perform.”

To be sure, the pacification of the tribes under the ‘Iron Amir’ created a new social and governing hierarchy, in which the central state (the Writ of the Amir) was not merely able to penetrate local judicial, administrative and military levels of governance, but actually displace and eliminate them. The result of these campaigns was the eventual reordering of Afghan society, and a general internal peace that lasted well after the Amir’s death in 1901.

G. SUMMARY

The reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan offers an invaluable historical framework and precedent upon which to examine current attempts to both extend the capacity of the government in Kabul and overcome tribal and ethnic solidarity. Any attempt to extend the reach of Kabul to the local level is perceived as a direct threat to the qawm and leads to mobilization and revolt. Only through the cooption or incorporation of local tribal structures and governance will the central government be able to extend its capacity while simultaneously creating a permissive environment in which to counter the rising Neo-Taliban insurgent threat.

Amir Abdur Rahman effectively eliminated rivals to the state and pacified the tribes through not only intensive military campaigns and aggressive centralization of administrative and bureaucratic power and control. His appointment of provincial governors weakened his opponents while the basis of a cabinet legitimized his rule. Though he retained absolute executive control, Abdur Rahman’s rule would not have been possible without the cooption and loyalty of the mullahs and tribal chiefs. In addition, he effectively prioritized state activities, creating policies and institutionalizing structures and extracting resources that both expanded his central rule and decreased tribal resistance. As noted previously, it took years of trial and adjustment to establish

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sustainable sources of revenue through taxation and universal military conscription. Overall, the ‘Iron Amir’ created organizational structures and achieved a high degree of capacity in each of the areas examined (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Structure</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Grading Criteria</th>
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<td>+</td>
<td>(+) Structure present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
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<td>(-) Structures absent</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-) No capacity</td>
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Table 2. State Capacity Under Amir Abdur Rahman's Rule

In my final analysis, it can be said that Reign of Amir Abdur Rahman achieved a high degree of state capacity through the establishment of effective organizational structures and institutions in each of the four state activities. Although he did cede territory to both the Russians and British India, he raised a national army and united the tribes under his central rule, a feat never before achieved in Afghanistan’s history. He successfully eliminated potential challengers to the regime and created lasting bureaucratic and administrative institutions that provided a foundation for successive regimes and relative stability through 1978.

A. BACKGROUND

Russian expansion toward Afghanistan began to first unfold more than a century before the 1978 communist coup and a half-century before the Bolshevik revolution as part of the nineteenth century “Great Game” between Russia and Great Britain. As the Russian Empire expanded south into Central Asia and the British Raj pushed northwest into the tribal hinterlands, the two empire’s inevitable clash was averted through the conclusion of treaties and agreements between 1871 and 1907 that delineated Afghanistan’s borders, establishing the Pashtun-dominated Afghan state as a ‘buffer’ between the two western powers.98

These treaties were likely reached in haste on England’s part, for Russian expansionism had only recently led to the conquest of Tashkent in 1865 and the annexation of Panjde into the Turkmen Republic in 1885.99 Bukhara, in Uzbekistan, was not formally annexed until 1920, under the Soviets. Guided by the “century-old drive towards ‘warm waters’ and India,” the Soviets were also the first nation to recognize Afghanistan’s independence from Britain in 1919.100

Although the Soviets immediately signed a friendship treaty with Afghanistan in 1921, Stalin’s southerly advance was likely abruptly halted by the fall of King Amanullah in 1929. Although “seen by the Komintern as the gateway to India” throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Afghanistan largely remained both neutral and unscathed through the end of World War Two. However, Russian interest in Afghanistan was reinvigorated with the

98 The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention (also known as the Convention of St. Petersburg) formally established Russian and British spheres of influence while maintaining Afghanistan’s neutrality.

99 The annexation of Panjde in 1885 was also “the first direct encounter between Russian and Afghan troops.” Roy, The Soviet/Afghan War, 9.

100 Ibid., 8. Afghanistan had ceded control over the administration of its foreign policy to Britain at the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879. The Afghan defeat of the British in the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 under King Amanullah resulted in the negotiated return of Afghan sovereignty in 1921 and is largely celebrated as the time when Afghanistan officially gained its independence.
inauguration of the Soviet Union’s Third World ‘forward policy’ and Khrushchev’s visit to Afghanistan in 1955. Over the next decade, Moscow emerged as Kabul’s benefactor, training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and completing public works projects including tapping Afghanistan’s northern gas fields and the monumental construction of the ring highway (completed in 1964) over which Soviet Tanks would roll 15 years later, and the 1.7-mile-long Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush mountains which would ironically prove the principal lifeline for the mujahedeen’s resupply in the northeast during the anti-Soviet jihad.

Yet, during all of this time the Russians, and later the Soviets did not found or foment a communist party as had arisen in Turkey, Iran and India. Only after 1964 and the adoption of a liberal constitution allowing the creation of political parties in Afghanistan did the Soviets seize the opportunity to directly create a communist party with the intention “to influence an Afghan government without directly instigating a socialist revolution.” Afghanistan’s communist upheaval is therefore directly traceable to the formation of the Afghan People’s Democratic Party (PDPA), Hizb-i Democratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, on 1 January 1965, roughly a decade before a coup would end over 200 years of Afghanistan’s dynastic monarchy. The PDPA was not without its own internal squabbles however.

Only two short years after its foundation, in 1967, the party split into two factions, Khalq (The People) under PDPA secretary-general Nur Muhammad Taraki (a Ghilzai Pashtun), and Parcham (The Banner) under the leadership of PDPA deputy secretary general Babrak Karmal.

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102 Ibid.
103 While there were other communist and socialist parties in Afghanistan, the PDPA emerged as the most influential and took a pro-Soviet ideology. Other communist groups included the Maoist Sazman-i Demmocrat-i Nawin-i Afghanistan and the progressive social democratic Hezb-i Democrat-I Mottaraki, while several ethnically-based nationalist movements rounded out the political landscape. See: Gilles Dorronsoro, “Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present,” trans. John King. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 70-1.
104 Karmal’s ethnic background is more hazy. He is believed to be Pashtun on his father’s side, although his mother was a Tajik. See: Babrak Karmal’s GRU dossier. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project. On the web: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2. document&identifier=5034E06B-96B6-175C-968F8CE2919B933E&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan (accessed 19 April, 2008). Many other accounts suggest he was Tajik.
With their strong Soviet roots, the PDPA, along with the Afghan National Army (ANA), provided vehicles through which the Soviet politburo and intelligentsia penetrated the upper echelons of Afghan civil and military affairs. The Khalq was predominantly represented among the ANA’s officer corps, many of whom had been trained directly in Moscow, while the Parcham faction had penetrated the upper administration of the Afghan government, including infiltration of the ministry of the Interior. Through the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s the Soviets quietly steered the direction of the Afghan central government toward a more pro-Soviet relationship. In fact, the Parcham faction’s leverage was instrumental in the July 17, 1973 coup by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan that toppled the regime of his cousin and brother-in-law, Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan. However, Daoud’s turn toward the west (including appeals to the United States and India for military training and hardware) and marginalization of communist party members in his cabinet worried the Soviets, who reunited the two PDPA factions in 1977 despite their internal ideological differences. Daoud’s complete alienation of the communist party was demonstrated with arrest of the three PDPA leaders on 26 April 1978 (Taraki, Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s second in command), that sparked a pronunciamento in which members of the Soviet-stylized ANA stormed the capital on 27 April, killing Daoud and his family in the presidential palace. On 1 May 1978, Taraki announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with himself as President and Amin and Karmal as Deputy Prime Ministers.

It is difficult to determine exactly how the PDPA viewed state capacity, although examples abound on how the party sought to expand its membership and influence both prior to and after the 1978 coup. Of these, the organizational structure the party adopted is most telling, and examination of the PDPA’s Constitution, which likely dates to the party’s inception in January 1965, provides insight into how the party envisioned

105 Roy suggests that the differences between the communist factions were largely “more ethnic and tribal than ideological.” However, he also concedes that Nur Mohammad Taraki’s Khalq faction “advocated an immediate revolution” while Babrak Karmal’s Parcham faction “supported a strategy of infiltrating the establishment,” clearly more demonstrative of Soviet strategic policy at the time. Moreover, the lack of Soviet intervention to prevent the April 1978 coup, combined with the apparent haste in which planning for the December 1979 invasion was drawn, (the composition of invading forces indicated that they were still prepared for conventional warfare), support Roy’s proposition that the “internal dynamics of the revolution outpaced Soviet strategy.” See: Roy, The Soviet/Afghan War, 10-11.
consolidating state capacity. This assessment is important, as it largely contrasts the Soviet (and current) attempt to increase governing capacity by first concentrating power in Kabul and then attempting to extend that power outward to Afghanistan’s periphery, and downward to engulf the peasantry.

As Figure 8 illustrates, the Soviets were never able to ‘govern’ effectively more than ten percent of the Afghan countryside, controlling little outside of Kabul and securing nothing more than a few hundred yards off the side of the ring road in the decade prior to their 1989 departure. This strategy is historically adopted by weak central powers that must rely on a strong security apparatus (both regular army and state security or secret police) to subjugate the will of the people to the force of the state.

However, review of the PDPA Constitution reveals a different theoretical approach and organization was intended, as well as the implicit recognition of existing

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106 After Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 186.
bureaucratic and social strata. Article 10 of the Constitution provided for party organizational divisions at the provincial, city, wulouswali (sub province) and district level.\textsuperscript{107} According to the PDPA Constitution, central authority was vested in the Central Committee, who delegated authority to “make decisions on local problems,” to subordinate party organizations at the local level. This delegation of authority to at least the district level is consistent with historical Afghan political and socio-cultural practice under previous regimes, and tacitly recognizes the need for government representation at that level, but on local terms. Articles 25 through 33 further define and delineate the duties and authority of these local party organizations, although without greater detail and substance. The central tenant however is that there was early recognition of the need to supplant existing levels of governance with those of the party bureaucracy. Although expanding membership was a primary objective of the party, Babrak Karmal confessed in 1985 that the party, “had ‘weak links with the inhabitants’ of the tribal areas and decisions taken… by the government affecting these regions ‘did not have much effect on the state of affairs.’”\textsuperscript{108} This statement came despite the increase of PDPA primary organizations from 1,656 in 1982 to 3,931 in 1985. As Giustozzi concludes, the expansion, which eventually grew by 1987 to over 6,000 organizations penetrating over 1,000 villages, was ineffective in reaching the “maybe 25,000” villages throughout Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{109} In this respect the PDPA was never able to revitalize the vanguard party, of which over half was purged between the coup and the invasion, and trigger a larger socialist revolution from the masses. Instead, the communist policies (especially toward Islam, land reform and the role of women) and Soviet invasion actually fueled political opposition and open revolt.

**B. WAR MAKING**

While the Soviet invasion may have naively been intended to stabilize the government in Kabul and replace Amin with Karmal in an effort to prop up the Soviet

\textsuperscript{107} Full text of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, is contained in Hammond, *Red Flag*, 231-240.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 37.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
ally, the Soviet’s extended occupation ultimately destabilized the region, upsetting Afghanistan’s relations with its regional neighbors in Iran and Pakistan. To the Soviets, the occupation of Shindand base in southwest Afghanistan represented an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ from which Moscow could extend its reach, further threatening Afghanistan’s neighbors and the security of the Persian Gulf. Shindand’s proximity to the Gulf States and the bulk of the world’s proven energy resources had the (unintentional) effect of birthing the Carter Doctrine. Announced on 23 January 1980, the Carter doctrine unambiguously linked the security of Persian Gulf oil to the national security of the United States. Avoiding direct Soviet confrontation with America must have been as predominant an underlying factor in the Soviet domestic politics and prosecution of the war as the reciprocal was true of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) funding and provision of arms to the *mujahedeen* through Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence.\(^{110}\)

However, although they quickly became embroiled in an ideological guerilla insurgency within Afghanistan’s borders, the Soviets still reportedly used “threats and even military force (bombings, aerial violations of borders)...against Pakistan and Iran.”\(^{111}\) While these incidents were likely either isolated or underreported, it is clear that the Soviets, regardless of what is now known about their internal state of political affairs or military acumen, remained intent on at least maintaining the perception that they held the capability to eliminate rivals outside Afghan territory. This perception is repeatedly recounted in CIA dealings with ISI counterparts and through the tactical calculus and strategic caution in which covert U.S. assistance was used to undermine the Soviets without prompting direct retaliation against the U.S. or Pakistan.

Despite their military technological and numerical superiority, Russian domestic support for the occupation waned as the insurgency raged on, with the decision to


“Afghanize” the war and withdraw forces reached as early as October 1985.\textsuperscript{112} It would take another two years to create fully the conditions necessary for a complete withdrawal, although the Soviets redeployed as many as six regiments between April 1985 and January 1987.\textsuperscript{113} In the end, the Afghan army was left bearing the brunt of the mujahedeen assault and, despite continued Soviet financial and logistical support, was unable to defend against the hardware, monies and tactics provided to the mujahedeen by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States.

C. STATE-MAKING

Overall, the PDPA and Soviets were extremely more adept at eliminating or neutralizing rivals inside their own party than they were at winning the war against the mujahedeen, who fought from Pakistan and Afghanistan’s periphery outside direct government control. While the Soviets killed or wounded as many 150-180,000 mujahedeen, Giustozzi suggests “this might amount to as little as 3% of the total manpower of the armed opposition groups.”\textsuperscript{114} Given the losses of the Kabul regime alone, totaling more than 200,000 killed, wounded or missing\textsuperscript{115} in action it is little wonder that many of the party’s rivals targeted for elimination were in fact members of the opposing PDPA faction. State resources and attention were more easily focused internally, within the party apparatus, directly attributing to the elimination of one-third of the party’s pre-revolution cadre in the first year alone, including the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s first two Prime Ministers and the movement’s founding members in Taraki and Amin.

The Khalq’s penetration of the military and the Parcham’s entrenchment within the Ministry of the Interior under President Daoud were not only both instrumental in


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{114} Antonio Giustozzi, \textit{War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992} (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 115. There are no exact figures on mujahedeen losses. Giustozzi’s deduction is representative of most literature and accounts of mujahedeen losses, of which probably 80-100,000 were killed. He notes that Pakistani intelligence puts the figure at around 90,000, with 56,000 killed, but is unlikely representative of mujahedeen parties operating outside Pakistani assistance.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 271. “Table 34. Casualties, Kabul Regime Forces.” Giustozzi estimates PDPA losses at 68,556 killed, 116,589 wounded and 17,245 missing.
bringing about the coup, but also in consolidating state power and eliminating potential rivals immediately following Daoud’s ouster but before Soviet intervention. Unfortunately for the solidarity of the party, each faction was as much the subject of political rivalry and elimination as was the non-communist opposition. In the year immediately after the coup, Parchamis claim as many as 2,000 party members were killed by the Khalq under Taraki and Amin. More alarming is the suggestion that as many as 10,000 PDPA members “appear to have died in 1978-9,” while 6-7,000 were culled from the PDPA’s pre-revolution strength of 18,000.116

While the ranks of the KhAD (Khadamat-e Etela'at-e Dawlati), Afghanistan’s state intelligence agency and secret police, and the Sarandoy (special police of the Ministry of Interior) surged in an effort to extend the State’s central authority and power to the local level, the party’s organizational structure was ineffectual in actually penetrating the countryside as prescribed in the PDPA Constitution. Although the ranks of the Party, Ministry of Defense, KhAD and Sarandoy expanded during the decade of Soviet occupation and communist rule, the quality of recruits remained dubious and the final number of party members rested at probably only around two percent of the total population and had formed communist party organizations in only about 4 percent of the country’s villages.

116 Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 3-4.
Like the previous Afghan regimes under King Zahir Shah (r. 1973-1973) and President Daoud (r. 1973-1978), state power under the PDPA was nominally vested in one central figure, Prime Minister (PM) Nur Muhammad Taraki. To legitimize his authority and give the appearance that the PM was not above the party, Taraki simultaneously held membership in each of the national committees, the Political Bureau, Secretariat and Revolutionary Council, as well as providing executive direction to the sixteen ministries. The Central Committee formed the final governing body, ‘legitimizing’ the actions and carrying out the direction of the other committees, as well as providing the conduit for the promulgation of central directives to party organizations replicated at the lower level. Of the sixteen ministries, only three were integral in establishing and building the state apparatus with which the PDPA and Soviets maintained their death-grip on Afghan society: the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice. Of these, the first two were largely administered the Soviets, while the judiciary was effectively sidestepped as punishments were typically
swift and carried out by the KhAD, Sarandoy or army without trial. The war that ravaged
the countryside created a permissive environment where banditry and marauding
flourished and the rule of law was impenetrable.

D. PROTECTION

Protection and state-making were effectively synonymous during the communist
era. Even prior to the coup, the Khalq and Parcham factions jockeyed within the various
branches of government for power – the Khalq gaining prominence within the military
while the Parcham faction rose to power within the Interior Ministry and security
apparatus. Although the leaders of the two PDPA factions did not move against each
other before the coup, direct confrontation and Soviet machination was tacitly behind
Taraki’s move against Amin (although it was Amin who defeated Taraki), while the full-
scale Soviet invasion was intended as a short-term move to eliminate Amin, facilitating
the imposition of Babrak Karmal as the communist Head of State and bringing
Afghanistan fully within the ideological sphere of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets also ensured political succession within their Afghan client state
through the cultivation of Mohammad Najibullah, who replaced Karmal as President of
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in 1986. Najibullah was head of the
KhAD, modeled after the Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti), under
whom it became directly subordinated after 1979. In this capacity, Najibullah was
directly responsible for the elimination of possibly thousands of political opponents,
thereby proving his ruthlessness to his Soviet benefactors and loyalty to the party.
Moreover, Najibullah’s network of spies and affiliation with the KGB enabled him to
consolidate and maintain central authoritarian power as the Soviets shifted strategy in
preparation for their eventual withdrawal. That Najibullah was able to survive both the
Soviet withdrawal and ensuing civil war was testament to his survivalist acumen,
although he was later hanged after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996.
E. EXTRACTION

More than perhaps any other monolithic force, the Soviet structure and state apparatus was remarkably adept at extracting a multitude of resources from resource-scarce countries such as Afghanistan. Conducted through both the PDPA as well as by Soviet agencies acting directly for Moscow, Soviet extraction of resources in Afghanistan was largely concerned with supporting the war effort and ‘Sovietization’ of Afghanistan, consistent with Tilly’s state activities model.

Conscription of Afghans into the armed forces was one of the Soviet’s top priorities, given the prevalence of desertion and Moscow’s desire to keep the number of deployed Soviet units at a manageable and sustainable level. While many sources abound on the size of the Afghan army prior to the invasion, the most consistent number seems to be somewhere around 125,000 total personnel within the Ministry of Defense and security apparatus, to include the Sarandoy. Of this, around 90,000 were in the army.\textsuperscript{117} The invasion took an immediate toll on the Afghan army, with sources suggesting as much fifty-five percent of its force deserted, leaving only 50,000 regular army to supplement the Soviet force.\textsuperscript{118} Although the Soviets and PDPA waged an aggressive recruitment campaign to refill the ranks, mostly from peasant communities near large urban centers such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif, recruitment was only able to meet between forty to sixty percent of its goals during the first five years of the occupation.\textsuperscript{119} Conscription to fill the ranks of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) never really achieved the levels the Soviets desired, although the MoD did reach a high of 160,000 in 1987, largely the result of the “Afghanization” of the war effort. However, once the imminent Soviet departure was realized, ranks swelled to 165,000 in 1989 and to 220,000 in 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal was complete.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{117} Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 266. “Table 27. Strength of the Afghan Armed Forces.” Giustozzi offers the most comprehensive and detailed figures on army size and recruitment, compiled from Soviet source documents over the course of the occupation.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 289. “Map 1. Main Areas of PDPA Recruitment Among Peasants, 1980-89.”

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 264. “Table 25. Fulfillment of Recruitment Plans Nationwide and at the Provincial Level.”

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 266. “Table 27. Strength of the Afghan Armed Forces.”
One way the Soviets bolstered the numbers of the regular army and Ministry of Defense was through recruitment into the Sarandoy, the heavily armed special policy of the Ministry of the Interior, supplement by the KhAD.

Recruitment into the Sarandoy almost doubled in the first two years of the campaign, reaching 54,000 by 1982; 74,800 by 1983; 79,500 by 1984; 90,200 by 1985; and surpassing 100,000 by 1988, reaching 155,000 by the Soviet withdrawal. Through the Sarandoy, the Soviets and PDPA increased total recruitment into the security sector from approximately 70,000 after the invasion to 329,000 in 1989 and 400,000 in 1990.\textsuperscript{122} Although the extraction of human capital for the war effort was a large component of Soviet strategy, the PDPA also set about to expand party membership and spread the revolution. To this end, it failed miserably, enlisting on average only 35,000 Afghans a year to the party.\textsuperscript{123} Of this, a third or more was recruited after 1987, once again after Moscow had well begun the transition of the war effort and governance back onto Kabul in preparation for the extrication of its forces in 1989. This fact proves salient; suggesting that foreign intervention alone was enough to limit army conscription and party membership, as the PDPA fared better in all manner of recruitment after the Soviet presence was reduced. This reasoning is certainly consistent with the Afghan’s xenophobic history and suggests the PDPA may have had greater success without Moscow’s intervention.

The Soviets also began the extraction of natural gas from Afghanistan, opening a second gas field in 1980, increasing “the value of gas exported to the Soviet Union… by 400 percent over the 1978 figure.”\textsuperscript{124} While little data is available about the exact amount and nature of revenue and resources the Soviets extracted from Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{125} it must have surely paled compared to Soviet military expenditure in Afghanistan, or to the devastating toll the war caused on the Afghan civilian populace, livestock and

\textsuperscript{122} Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 266.

\textsuperscript{123} For a detailed account of PDPA recruitment, see: Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 254.

\textsuperscript{124} Hammond, Red Flag, 179.

\textsuperscript{125} Several authors chronicle the Moscow’s historical economic interest in Afghanistan. Of these, Anthony Arnold provides the most succinct account of Soviet policy and “drive for economic penetration” in the decades after World War II. See: Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: the Soviet Invasion in Perspective, Revised edition (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 24-44.

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countryside upon which the average Afghan depended for livelihood. In this last respect
the occupation was an ecological disaster and the Soviet extraction of resources from the
land never strayed much beyond the recruitment of human capital needed to prosecute the
war.

F. RESISTANCE

When the Communists came to power in 1978, elements of Afghan society were
already in open revolt and the Islamist parties that formed the mujahedeen were already
well established and operating out of Peshawar, Pakistan. As the anti-Soviet jihad waged
on, ethnic fissures widened among the major mujahedeen forces, causing the groups to be
as largely identifiable by their ethno-linguistic composition as their political ideology.
Despite their common struggle against the Soviets, the mujahedeen groups fought as
ethnic and regional units more than as a coordinated or ideologically united opposition
front. While a loosely held common Islamist ideology was the only factor that kept them
from fighting each other during the anti-Soviet jihad, ethnic hatred supplanted this
common bond immediately after the Soviet departure and the parties turned on each
other. As a result of this division, ethnic solidarity became nearly synonymous with the
identity and ethnic composition of Afghanistan’s political parties and resistance groups,
the majority of which had been founded prior to the 1978 communist party coup. As
Barnet Rubin notes, the former King, Zahir Shah, was the only recognized national leader
of Afghanistan and no leader emerged after the Soviet departure that “could validate a
claim to represent a national constituency.”126 Such was the landscape in which the
mujahedeen parties emerged to resist the communists, fight the Soviets and later vie for
national political control.

In Afghanistan, the Soviets failed to replicate the ethnographic studies that aided
Stalin’s division and conquest of Central Asia a half century earlier. Had they done so, or
even reflected upon Russia’s own interventionist history in Afghanistan, the Soviets
might have been able to recognize the basis of Afghan solidarity and mujahedeen
resistance, thereby adjusting its political and military strategy to exploit, or at least

126 Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 192.
suppress, dissention between the mujahedeen parties through co-option of solidarity groups at the local level. That the Soviets never viewed the mujahedeen in other than military terms is evidenced by this depiction of mujahedeen ‘structure, armaments and personnel,’ produced by the Russian General Staff.

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**Figure 10. Soviet View of Mujahedeen Organization**

Soviet shortsightedness and failure to capitalize on Afghan social structure is only made more poignant by the realization that the mujahedeen “lacked a common platform,” besides “their anti-Soviet feelings and irreconcilable enmity to the government.”

Had the Soviets capitalized on these divisions and exploited Afghan social structure and cultural norms, the outcome might have been different. In the end, the Communist ideology and atheist beliefs were antithetical to Afghanistan’s tribal traditions and conservative Islamic mores.

The mujahedeen’s inability (or unwillingness) to reconcile their (negligible) ideological differences and fight from a united front (as five groups later did against the

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Taliban), is likely attributable to the *gawm*’s replacement of Islam as the primary source of solidarity and mobilization within the mujahedeen parties. The inter-factional fighting became one of inter-ethnic conflict and division rather than bridging their common Islamic ideology. After all, the three major Islamist mujahedeen parties were all originally members of the Jamiat-i Islami prior to the party’s split into various factions. Table 3 depicts the major resistance groups during the Communist regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Qawm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat-i Islami</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Rabbani</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Tajiks; Northeast, Panjshir valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-i Islami (Gulbaddin)</td>
<td>Gulbuddin Hekmatyar</td>
<td>Islamist (Fundamentalist)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtuns; Eastern Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-i Islami (Khalis)</td>
<td>Maulvi Younis Khalis</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtuns; Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat Inquilabi-Islami</td>
<td>Maulana Mohhamed Nabi Mihammedi</td>
<td>Islamist (Fundamentalist)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtun; Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahbha-i Najat Milli</td>
<td>Sibghatullah Mujaddedi</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Nagshbandiyah Sufi Order; Pashtun royals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahaz-i Milli Isami</td>
<td>Pir Sayed Amhad Gailani</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Qaderiyah Sufi Order; Pashtun royals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itthad-i Islami bara-yi Azadi</td>
<td>Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf</td>
<td>Islamist (Wahhabi)</td>
<td>Pashtun; foreign Arab fighters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ismaili’s          | Religious: Karim Al Husseini, Āghā Khan IV 
Militia: Sayyid Mansor 
Regional Warlord: Ismail Khan (member of Jamiat-i Islami) | Shi’a (Ismaili) | Ismaili Shi’a; Northeast, Herat & Pakistan NWFP; Tajiks; Pashtuns; Heratis |
| Hisb-i Wahdat      | Abdul Ali Mazari / Karim Khalili | Shi’a (Iranian proxy) | Hazara Shi’a                              |
| Harakat-i Islami-yi | Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Mulisini | Shi’a                     | Non-Hazara Shi’a                         |
| Royalists          | -                             | Restoration monarchy      | Durrani Pashtuns; ethnic minorities; expatriates |

Table 3. Basis of Solidarity of Resistance Groups during the anti-Soviet Jihad

In order to understand the basis for individual identity, group solidarity, social mobilization and political resistance of each of the parties presented, I will now provide a brief explanation of the genealogy of each of the groups listed in Table 3.

Headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Party) is the oldest Islamic party in Afghanistan. Like its namesake, Pakistan’s Jamiat-e-Islami, Rabanni drew his ideology from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, of which he had earlier founded the Afghan chapter. Although Jamiat-i Islami later drew its support mostly from ethnic Tajiks in the northeast, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Younis Khalis were among the party’s founding members before forming their own Islamist factions. An intellectual

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and Tajik, Rabbani advocated the creation of an Islamic state based on reinterpretation of the Koran. Islamist but not fundamentalist, Rabbani borrowed western political concepts in his political ideology, rather than the more pervasive fundamentalist views shared by most ethnic Pashtuns, which relied more heavily on the tradition of the *ulema*, mullahs and tribal leaders. Early Islamists, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud attempted an uprising and coup against Afghan President Mohammed Daoud Kahn in 1975. Unsuccessful, they fled to Pakistan where they were premier among the seven Islamist mujahedeen parties that received CIA and ISI monies after the 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, although Massoud later split with Pakistan intelligence.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar founded Hisb-i Islami (Party of Islam) in 1977 after an ideological split with Burhanuddin Rabbani and Jamiat-e-Islami. Hekmatyar is a fundamentalist, who also seeks the establishment of an Islamic state, but who rejects tribal and other Islamic traditions that have muddied pure Islam and strict adherence to Koran. Hekmatyar received the majority of ISI, CIA, and Saudi funding & support during the anti-Soviet *jihad*. Hekmatyar never reconciled with the other mujahedeen groups, even fighting against them following the Soviet withdrawal and during the Taliban rule. He was not a part of the northern alliance and Hisb-i Islami Gulbuddin remains in opposition to both the current Karzai regime and Neo-Taliban movements. Maulvi Younis Khalis also left Jamiat-e-Islami with Hekmatyar in 1977, but later split with Gulbuddin and founded his own faction of Hisb-i Islami (known as Hisb-i Islami Khalis) in 1979. Popular in southern Afghanistan, particularly near Kandahar where he has tribal ties, Khalis departs with Hekmatyar in his view of the role of the *ulema* in creating an Islamic state. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, was originally a member of Hisb-i Islami Khalis during the Soviet occupation.

The Jahbha-I Najat Milli Afghanistan (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan) was headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, who was the head of the prominent Naqshbandiyah Sufi order. Based in Peshawar Pakistan during the anti-Soviet war, Mujaddedi was a fierce critic of the radical Islamic parties and enjoyed a small following of Sunni Afghans loyal to his Sufi order. Mujaddedi became president of the first post-Soviet interim government in 1989 and President of Afghanistan in 1992 before turning
over the office to Rabbani in an agreed transitional administration before the Taliban rose to power. *Pir* Sayed Ahmad Gailani headed the other prominent Sufi order, Qaderiyah, and was related to ex-king Zahir Shah. Also based in Peshawar, his party, Mahaz-i Milli Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) was most closely associated with royalists, who advocated the return of the former King. Mujaddedi and Gailani were the most moderate of the mujahedeen, sidelined by the CIA, ISI, Hekmatyar and later the Taliban. Although politically active, they were not as militant as the other resistance groups against the Taliban. Together, Mujaddedi and Gailani established the Peace and National Unity Party in 1999.130 Gailani was a strong supporter of Hamid Karzai’s election as Afghan President.

Headed by Maulana Mohhamed Nabi Mihammedi, Harakat Inquilabi-Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution) was also popular in southern Afghanistan where they had tribal ties, particularly in the vicinity of Kandahar. Harakat Inquilabi-Islami generally shared Hekmatyar’s more radical and fundamentalist ideology, splitting the Kandahari Pashtuns into two camps; the moderates belonging to Khalis’ Hisb-i Islami faction. Through shared fundamentalist ideologies and Ghilzai Pashtun ethnicity, Hekmatyar was essentially able to spread his base from the eastern provinces where he had his base to the southern provinces, especially Kandahar. Mullah Hassan, former Governor of Kandahar, member of the Taliban’s Supreme *Shura* and Military Chief of Staff, was originally a member of Harakat Inquilabi-Islami during the Soviet occupation. Like Mullah Hassan, many members of Harakat Inquilabi-Islami and Hisb-i Islami Khalis based in Kandahar likely defected, swelling the ranks of the early Taliban, grounded in regional, ethnic, tribal and kin-based relationships of solidarity.

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was an original member of Hekmatyar & Rabbani’s Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s and plotted w/ Hekmatyar & Massoud in the failed coup against President Daoud in 1975. Caught and imprisoned after returning to Afghanistan from Pakistan in 1978, he was later freed by the second president of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Hazifullah Amin, in 1979. Sayyaf founded

Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) as a Saudi proxy in 1980, after the Soviet invasion, and returned to Pakistan. Sayyaf’s group was the primary conduit for foreign fighters entry into Afghanistan for the anti-Soviet jihad and was composed primarily of Arabs although Sayyaf himself was a Ghilzai Pashtun. Sayyaf formed a close personal relationship with Osama bin Laden in the 1980s and founded a training camp attended by Ramzi Yousef, the first World Trade Center bomber. Although Sayyaf committed egregious atrocities against Afghan minorities, especially the Shi’a Hazara, and espoused a radical fundamentalist doctrine that shared many ideological similarities with the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in 1995. Perhaps one of the most dangerous men inside Afghanistan during the Taliban because of his association with bin Laden and private establishment of terrorist training (refugee) camps, including Dawa’a al-Jihad, his Wahhabist agenda was never seconded by any real affinity with the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Sayyaf is alleged to have been complicit in Ahmed Shah Massoud’s assassination on 9 September 2001.131

Shi’a solidarity groups that were also prevalent during Taliban rule were also historically rooted in the anti-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Although predominantly ethnically Hazara, there are a few Shi’a Pashtun tribes, and Tajik clans, especially in the western provinces near Herat. Afghanistan’s Ismailis were historically followers of the Agha Khan and lived in northeast Afghanistan near Tajikistan and in Pakistan’s North West Frontier’s Provinces (NWFP). Due to their geographic distance from the Hazarajat, many Ismaili’s remained independent of Hisb-i Wahdat and were instead loyal to Ismail Khan, who controlled the three western provinces in Herat. The Hisb-i Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) consolidated nine Shi’a factions into one party. The groups' initial leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, died in Taliban custody after appealing to them to end Hazara persecution by other mujahedeen groups, especially Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi and Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami, although even the more ideologically moderate Tajiks from Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami joined in the ethnic atrocities. Karim Khalili assumed leadership of Hisb-i Wahdat, and remained instrumental in opposing the Taliban, largely with strong Iranian support, including shipments of arms flown into the

Hazarajat. The Shi’a Hazara of the Hisb-i Wahdat were also ideologically aligned with Iran, and the establishment of a Shi’ite Islamic regime in Hazarajat based on the Iranian Revolutionary model (rooted in the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini) remained a primary ideological objective, if never a political or military reality.

Afghanistan’s Tajik Shi’a minority was largely represented by Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini’s group Harakat-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan). An Ayatollah who studied at the illustrious center of Shi’i Islam scholarship in Najaf, Iraq, Muhsini’s group was ideologically aligned with Iran. However, Harakat-i-Islami also found ethnic solidarity with its fellow Tajiks, momentarily aligning with Jamiat-i Islami after the Soviet departure from 1993-1995, before joining the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.132

Although originally founded on differences in Islamists ideology, the mujahedeen groups, representative of Afghan society as a whole, grew increasingly identified with qaum-based social divisions and political aspirations as the war progressed. Over time, former mujahedeen groups such as Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbuddin) and Jamiat-i Ilsami had largely moderated their Islamist rhetoric and were more illustrative of an ethno-centric struggle for political dominance between Ghilzai Pashtuns and ethnic minorities (Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras). Moreover, Islamist ideology was no longer a primary factor for solidarity for all but the group’s core leadership or the Sufi orders that were more moderate in their views. In general, Islamists parties were ideologically split over the role of the ulama in governing society and over the degree to which tribal social or modern governing institutions were adopted.

As the mujahedeen parties were well established prior to the PDPA coup and Soviet invasion they had essentially formed parallel governments in exile, developing the military command and control necessary to fight an effective insurgency as well as the political hierarchy and administrative structures required to recruit and finance their operations. Yet, despite their demonstrated tenacity, political will, and call to jihad against the foreign invaders, it took the mujahedeen parties another three years to wrest

control of Kabul from the communist party (who had the backing of the Afghan National Army) after the Soviets departed in 1989. That the communist government under President Najibullah was able to hold out for so long against the mujahedeen is not solely testament to former’s infrastructure, but rather owed largely to the ethnically based inter-factional rivalry and civil war that characterized the period between 1989 and 1992.

G. SUMMARY

In summation, while it is difficult to differentiate between the machinations of the PDPA in Kabul and the Soviet Politburo seated in Moscow, both were ostensibly intertwined and must be evaluated as a single political agent, although differences in strategy certainly existed. My final evaluation of the Communist regime’s capacity to accomplish Tilly’s Four State Activities is presented in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Activity</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Grading Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+) Structure present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-) Structures absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+) Some capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-) No capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. State Capacity Under Communists Rule

The Afghan National Army, buttressed by the strength of the Soviet Army, certainly provided both the structure and maintained the capacity between 1979 and 1989 to conduct military operations, if not a limited conventional war, beyond Afghanistan’s borders. In addition, the Afghan military officer corps was a significant source of party membership, played a prominent role in the revolutionary coup and was historically closely aligned with Soviet doctrine and tactics. Overall, the communist regime under the PDPA had both the structure and capacity for war making. However, while the PDPA implemented an organizational structure that was successful in maintaining power at the national level, its failure to duplicate en masse, or sustain these organizations at the district and village level, ultimately proved failure of the regime to extend its state capacity to the capital and a few major cities. The state did prove more effective at protection, using various state security and intelligence apparatus to eliminate or
neutralize its clients, the majority of whom were party members of the opposing faction. By the time of the Soviet departure, the force strength of the KhAD and Sarandoy rivaled that of the Ministry of Defense, with a combined force of approximately 155,000. However, while demonstrating the capacity to eliminate potential political rivals, I must conclude that the attention placed on eliminating internal dissention, while a hallmark of communist party doctrine, was ill-conceived and misplaced, draining state resources that could have better been served targeting mujahedeen commanders or their foreign benefactors. In addition, while perhaps a relatively resource-poor nation, the PDPA’s reforms and Soviet’s ‘scorched earth’ policy undermined any real effort, however small, to maintain Afghanistan’s economic vitality. Instead, the focus of Soviet extraction was focused initially on gas and human capital needed to fight the war, and when the former waned, it widened conscription requirements on an ad-hoc basis in order to satisfy Moscow’s recruitment quota. In the end, the state had no real organizational mechanism and developed no real capacity for the extraction of human or mineral resources.

133 Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 266. “Table 27. Strength of the Afghan Armed Forces.”

A. BACKGROUND

The Taliban rose to power between 1994 and 1996 following a period in which Afghan society had been ‘fractured’ by a decade of war against the Soviet occupation and five years of bloody civil strife. Ethno-linguistic cleavages permeated society and had replaced Islam, the traditional unifying force, as the dominant basis for the division of Afghan society. Although they ascribed to radical Islamist ideals, the Taliban’s initial mass appeal and widespread legitimacy was predicated on the restoration of basic public security and social justice long abandoned by the mujahedeen’s internecine civil war.

However, once in power, the Taliban essentially equated governing capacity with territorial expansion. This view is consistent with Islamic fundamentalist ideology of conversion/conquest and the establishment of the Islamic state ruled under shari’a law. While the Taliban’s particular creed was not pan-Islamic, their “official goal was the reunification of all Afghans under an Islamic government.”

Never abandoning this aim, the Taliban’s military campaign continued until its ouster in 2001. As a result, the Taliban never truly developed the administrative structure and bureaucracy necessary to effectively implement policy at the local level. Mullah Omar’s decrees, especially governing social conduct such as dress and appearance or the status of women, were enforced at the local level, but with great regional disparity. Although Dorronsoro suggests that the Taliban “established their authority with no reference to tribal institutions,” there does appear to be regional disparity between offenses and punishments. This suggests that such punishments were based on pre-Islamic regional, ethnic or tribal customs rather than acts directed by the central state or explicitly codified in the Koran.

135 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 267.
Direct Taliban administration grew increasingly diffuse in rural areas where peasants were generally left alone. Harsh Taliban rule was felt most in the large cities and urban centers such as Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, where decadence (the product of modernity) was perceived to be more prevalent. However, even in places like Herat and Mazir-i Sharif, (the latter which underwent intense military fighting until the Taliban finally won control in August 1998) Taliban rule was not as strict or pervasive as in the capital, or in the east and south, where the Pashtun ethnic majority is centered.136

B. WAR MAKING

The unification of Afghanistan remained the Taliban’s primary military and political objective. While the Taliban did not take up arms directed at forces outside Afghanistan’s territory, they did capture significant quantities of arms during their military campaigns.137 By the end of 1997 they had a sizeable conventional military force, consisting of 23 fighter jets and 32 helicopters, as well as personnel strength of approximately 50,000.138 Despite these acquisitions, the Taliban’s favored means of armament remained Toyota pickup trucks mounted with Degtyarov-Shpagin (DShK) 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft heavy machine guns and AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic rifles. Ideal for swift movement across rugged terrain, as well as negotiating the roads and alleyways within the larger towns and cities, these tools provided tactical utility in suppressing Afghanistan’s peasant population, but were insufficient to conduct any operation against an external threat.

The Taliban’s initial success fueled regional concerns that the movement would ‘spill’ over into the neighboring Central Asian Republics, prompting General Boris Gromov, the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan, to reassure the Russian Duma that “the Taliban do not have the strength to carry military operations over to the territory of

136 While the ethnic composition of the Taliban’s foot soldiers is rather ethnically diverse, the core leadership is predominantly from the Hotaki Ghilzai Pashtun tribe. See: Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason. “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” *Orbis*, 51, No. 1 (2007): 71-89.

137 By April 1995, the Taliban had reportedly captured 200 tanks, 12 Fighter jets and helicopters. See: Matinuddin, *Taliban Phenomenon*, 49.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.” 139 In fact, the threat of external intervention against the Taliban was more likely than the export of the Taliban’s ideological campaign to Central Asia. Iran almost went to war with Afghanistan in the fall of 1998 after the Taliban killed nine Iranian diplomats and slaughtered thousands of Shi’a Hazaras during the capture of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998. Threatening invasion, Iran deployed approximately 200,000 soldiers to its Afghan border over the next two months while the UN appealed for restraint. The Taliban was reportedly only able to muster 30,000 fighters. 140 Only through direct negotiations between Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, and Mullah Omar was the situation diffused.

C. STATE-MAKING

Upon examination, the Taliban were remarkably more adept at state-making than their communist predecessors or the Tajik-dominated interim government that sat in Kabul between 1992 and 1996. Whether aware of this strategy or not, the Taliban employed a two-tiered campaign to eliminate or neutralize their rivals. The first strategy was the military campaign with the fervent mission of carrying out their fundamentalist agenda of uniting all of Afghanistan under their Islamist ideology. The second was the archetypal Afghan strategy, to neutralize their rivals either through temporary alliances or through assimilation. The administrative structure adopted by the Taliban was effective in carrying out both strategies.

The proposition that the Taliban “lacked a state structure” during its initial rise and conquest of the countryside between 1994-1996 proves false. 141 This assessment may be especially salient given the origins of rival groups, rooted in the establishment of Islamist and mujahedeen parties with well-established political mechanisms, a politico-military hierarchy and well-developed organizational structures that allowed them to

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140 Rashid, Taliban, 231-232.

141 Kamal Matinnudin suggests that the Taliban initially lacked “ministries, departments, bureaucratic machinery, and an organized army or police force.” (See: Matinnudin, Taliban Phenomenon, 42). This statement appears shortsighted given the two-year military campaign from the start of the movement in Kandahar to the conquest of Kabul. Mullah Omar, the Military Shura and the Supreme Shura provided political, judicial and military direction while ministries existed in similar or greater capacity than during the preceding civil war.
operate in a degree of parallel governance to the central authority. The fact that the Taliban did not originate as a political party may be inconsequential, as they rapidly emulated the structures of other systems and elevated the role of the ulema (Islamic scholars) in the political order. Kamal Matinuddin suggests that mujahedeen training camps in Pakistan never closed after the Soviets departed, remaining open for training during the ensuing civil war between 1989-1994. In addition to basic instruction in military tactics and the operation of battlefield equipment, the training camps would have maintained some degree of military organization that facilitated the means for political indoctrination and mobilization.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 11. Nominal Taliban Structure 1994-2001**

As Figure 11 depicts, the central government was embodied in Mullah Omar and decisions were ‘ratified’ and carried out through the administrative mechanisms of the Supreme and Military Shuras, whose senior-most leadership held positions in both
advisory councils and as the regimes first cabinet ministers. The qadis, or judiciary, operated at all levels and took its direction directly from Mullah Omar.

In theory, the Taliban operated as a theocratic oligarchy, but in reality, operated as an Islamist totalitarian autocracy. As noted above, absolute authority was centralized in one charismatic leader, Mullah Omar. The hierarchical state structure facilitated Omar’s personal direction of authority to the regional and local levels, bypassing the weaker and largely symbolic administrative cabal in Kabul. The Taliban was able to expand state capacity to the local level through the patronage of Afghanistan’s traditional kin, tribe, ethnicity or regionally based solidarity groups or alternatively through ideological and military bribery and intimidation.

Mullah Mohammad Omar was the Head of State and the military Commander in Chief, as well as the movement’s supreme spiritual leader. His authority was absolute and his consultation with the supreme or national shura (council of Islamic scholars), who interpreted the shariat as the source of all law and governance, was purely advisory. The shura was composed of ulema chosen primarily for their theological or tribal affiliation with Mullah Omar, and replaced the jirga (tribal council) as the advisory body. After the capture of Kabul, the ministries administered by the Supreme Shura were centralized under the Kabul Shura in 1997 in an effort to re-create the administrative structure that had existed under President Daoud (r. 1973-1978). Moreover, with the exception of the military shura, which directed the ongoing military operations of the Taliban movement, the ministries held by members of the Supreme and Kabul Shuras were largely hollow, with the exception of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice.

The capacity of the shura to govern gradually expanded as the Taliban seized more territory. After 1997, the Kabul shura re-instituted bureaucrats and Kabulis who had not fled Afghanistan and extended its own administration directly to the regional level. At its height, the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of Afghan territory.

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142 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 279.  
143 Many of the ulema had either close personal or kinship ties to Mullah Omar or had trained at madrassas in Kandahar or in Quetta, Pakistan. See: Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending; Rashid, Taliban.  
144 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 281.
(see Figure 12). By way of comparison, the Marxist regime in Kabul during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) never controlled much more territory than a few hundred meters off the side of the road.

![Figure 12. Taliban control of Afghanistan 1996 and 2000](image)

Gilles Dorronsoro suggests that the Taliban extended its authority to the local level by “exploiting its alliances with local solidarity networks.” While this strategy prevented political mobilization based on local ethnic identity, it must have also surely relied on foot soldiers of the same regional or ethno-linguistic identity. Afghan society was so ethnically fragmented after the decade of anti-Soviet jihad and years of civil war that little other than common ethnic or regional affinity would have been able to bridge this divide. The Taliban’s fundamentalist ideology, too extreme for even the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other Islamists, could certainly not have been a unifying factor that bound Afghanistan’s historically conservative, Sufi-influenced peasantry to the government. The Taliban thus exploited historical relations between ethnic groups, such as aligning with local Tajiks in Bamiyan, in the persecution of Shi’a Hazaras.

D. PROTECTION

While the Taliban did not have any clients per se, they gained international notoriety and classification as a pariah state by harboring Osama bin Laden, and allowing

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146 Ibid., 270.
his Al Qaida terrorist training camps to operate in Afghanistan. However, Taliban protection of bin Laden is most likely attributed to two factors. The first is rooted in the Pashtun tribal code (*Pashtunwali*) and the second to bin Laden’s connection to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.147

Upon arriving in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden first stayed with the Eastern Pashtun tribes near Jalalabad, outside Taliban-controlled territory, with whom he had established relations in the 1980s and 1990s. Building upon these past relationships, bin Laden may also have appealed to, or played upon, Pashtun hospitality and honor for protection. However, tribal leaders such as Younis Khalis and Haji Qadir, who had contact with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, may have extended protection to bin Laden based on their own client relationship with ISI.148 The latter is directly implied by Steve Coll, who suggests that the Taliban later protected bin Laden because the Taliban themselves were in fact clients of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.149 Finally, Taliban protection of Osama bin Laden was likely secured with his direct personal financial assistance. After taking Jalalabad, bin Laden reportedly provided the Taliban approximately $3 million. Used to bribe local commanders, the money helped secure the Taliban’s entry into Kabul.150

While such monetary assistance may have waned as the U.S. moved to freeze bin Laden’s assets and the CIA covertly plotted his capture, Taliban intransigence in turning in bin Laden did not. Even long after the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were attributed to bin Laden and his Al Qaida terrorist organization, the Taliban continued to provide him a permissive environment from which to operate. Such protection came at the cost of the international recognition that the Taliban desperately sought, and from a western point of view, a blurring of the lines between Taliban and Al Qaida leadership. The fact that the Taliban did not give up Osama bin Laden, despite the potential international political gains to be had from it, speaks to the strength of the Pashtun tribal code.

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 16.
E. EXTRACTION

As previously stated, the Taliban’s major aim was the consolidation of all of Afghanistan under Islamic rule. To this end, the extraction of state resources largely consisted of human capital. There was no attempt to establish an economy or levy additional taxes. Most of the Taliban’s money was likely derived from zakat, or religious charitable taxes (alms), from madrassas in Pakistan or Muslim sympathizers throughout the Muslim world. It is also unknown how much Osama bin Laden financed Taliban operations, but any such monies were likely to have paled compared to those received through zakat or direct financial support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Taliban recruitment hit a snag soon after the capture of Kandahar in 1994 as the movement spread toward Herat and Kabul, encountering non-Pashtun structural organizations and ethnic groups. The Afghan civil war and collapse of the state following the anti-Soviet jihad “undermined the informal ethnic hierarchy” upon which group relations were organized. With Rabbani and Massoud’s Tajik government in Kabul, General Dostum’s Uzbeks in Mazar-i Sharif to the North, and Ismail Khan (a Tajik) in Herat in the West, the Pashtuns had “lost the leverage of the state.” Initial recruitment was therefore almost solely conducted from among the Pashtuns in the south as well as Pashtun minorities in the north. The movement was also initially heavily reliant on the students, or Taliban, from madrassas in neighboring Pakistan, and would call for an emptying of these madrassas whenever recruitment was low. However, because the movement was founded on an Islamic fundamentalist ideology rather than Pashtun nationalist appeal, the Taliban’s ranks eventually grew to be more representative

150 Coll, Ghost Wars, 332.
151 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 266.
152 Ibid., 268.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., 266-269.
155 Taliban is the Pashto plural for a talib, the Arabic word for a religious student. The Taliban movement itself therefore derives its name from the religious students from the Deobandi and Wahhabi madrassas in Pakistan that initially swelled the movements’ ranks as foot soldiers.
of Afghanistan’s ethnic composition, a significant achievement given the ‘social fragmentation’ that occurred during the preceding decade.\(^{156}\)

F. RESISTANCE

The factions that fought in opposition to the Taliban’s fundamentalist rule were largely the same major mujahedeen leaders and groups that emerged in opposition to the communist regime and Soviet occupation presented in the previous chapter, with two notable additions: former communist party and military officials, and a small and largely quietist group of royalist who were predominantly represented by expatriates living outside of Afghanistan.

Before analyzing these two groups, it is interesting to note that the commanders of the seven major mujahedeen parties, many of whom had held prominent roles in the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan following the fall of Najibullah in 1992 and the rise of the Taliban in 1996, were, like the Taliban, Islamists. Each of these Sunni Islamist groups (the first seven presented in Table 5) should have theoretically supported the overarching ideological goal and achievement of the Taliban’s Islamist regime: the implementation of the *shari’a*. Yet, despite this shared ambition, the Taliban’s fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, equated with the uncompromising public observation of radical Deobandism, proved too harsh and radical compared to the traditionally conservative form of Islam historically practiced throughout Afghanistan.

\(^{156}\) Although the Taliban’s core leadership still remained almost exclusively from the Hotaki Ghilzai Pashtun tribe. (See: Johnson and Mason, *Understanding the Taliban*). However, debate remains within the academic community about the extent of Pashtun composition of the Taliban. For an argument why the Taliban was not a Pashtun solidarity movement, see: Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending*, 267.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Qawm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat-i Islami*</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Rabbani</td>
<td>Islamist (Radical); Anti-Taliban</td>
<td>Tajiks; Northeast, Panjshir valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-i Islami (Gulbaddin)</td>
<td>Gulbuddin Hekmatyar</td>
<td>Islamist (Radical)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtuns; Eastern Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-i Islami (Khalis)</td>
<td>Maulvi Younis Khalis</td>
<td>Islamist (Radical)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtuns; Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat Inquilabi-Islami</td>
<td>Maulana Mohhamed Nabi Mihammedi</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Ghilzai Pashtun; Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahbha-i Najat Milli</td>
<td>Sibghatullah Mujaddedi</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Nagshbandiyah Sufi Order; Pashtun royalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahaz-i Milli Islami</td>
<td>Pir Sayed Amhad Gailani</td>
<td>Islamist (Moderate)</td>
<td>Qaderiyah Sufi Order; Pashtun royalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itthad-i Islami bara-yi Azadi*</td>
<td>Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf</td>
<td>Islamist (Wahhabi fundamentalist)</td>
<td>Pashtun; foreign Arab fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismaili’s</td>
<td>Religious: Karim Al Husseini, Ägã Khan IV Militia: Sayyid Mansor Regional Warlord: Ismail Khan (member of Jamiat-i Islami)</td>
<td>Shi’a (Ismaili)</td>
<td>Ismaili Shi’a; Northeast, Herat &amp; Pakistan NWFP; Tajiks; Pashtuns; Heratis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisb-i Wahdat*</td>
<td>Abdul Ali Mazari / Karim Khalili</td>
<td>Shi’a (Iranian proxy); Anti-Taliban</td>
<td>Hazara Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat-i Islami-yi*</td>
<td>Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini</td>
<td>Shi’a, Anti-Taliban</td>
<td>Non-Hazara Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumbishi-i-Milli Islami*</td>
<td>General Rashid Dostum</td>
<td>Anti-Taliban</td>
<td>Uzbek; former communists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royalists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Anti-Taliban; restore monarchy</td>
<td>Durrani Pashtuns; ethnic minorities; expatriates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan (United Front)</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Rabbani</td>
<td>Anti-Taliban</td>
<td>Umbrella group bridging 5 mujahedeen parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes members of the United Islamic Front, also known as the Northern Alliance.

Table 5. **Ideology and Basis of Solidarity of Resistance Groups during Taliban Rule**

The fact was that by 1994, the Islamist groups that had originally formed and split on matters of operational and ideological principles, had largely become monolithic armies organized on the basis of ethnic, regional and tribal solidarity of which the *qawm* represents the primary basis of group identification, social interaction and mobilization. Ethno-linguistic and regional distinctions increasingly defined and replaced ideology as the source of group solidarity. Like the Taliban, Islamist ideology was not a primary factor for solidarity for all but the group’s core leadership or the Sufi orders that were more moderate in their views. In general, Islamists parties were ideologically split over the role of the *ulema* in governing society and over the degree to which tribal social or modern governing institutions were adopted. Taliban leader Mullah Omar himself was originally a member of Hisb-i Islami Khalis during the anti-Soviet *jihad*, although he did not occupy a prominent position within the party. As noted in the previous chapter, even

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the communist factions split mainly along ethnic and tribal lines, with the largest group emerging among the northern Uzbek’s loyal to General Rashid Dostum.

General Dostum entered the Soviet-stylized Afghan National Army in 1978 and fought alongside the Soviets against the mujahedeen during the decade-long military occupation. Although only a regional commander during the war, his predominantly Uzbek Jowjani militia was extremely loyal, and effectively employed by the Soviets in Kandahar in 1988. Dostum continued to support the Najibullah regime and fight against the mujahedeen long after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Between 1989 and 1992 General Dostum had largely consolidated control of all of northern Afghanistan under his own regional command. However, Dostum dispensed with any former loyalties he may have had for Najibullah following the latter’s resignation on 16 April 1992. Only two days later, the former communist General turned allegiances and aligned with Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-I Islami and his chief military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Dostum switched sides again, aligning with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 1994 before realigning with Rabbani and Massoud in 1996. Although General Dostum played a prominent role in opening a vital western front against the Taliban as part of the United Front (Jabha-yi Mutthahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i) against the Taliban in 2001, he spent much of the intervening years in Turkey, following the fall of Mazar-e Sharif to the Taliban in 1996 and the betrayal of one of his commanders in 1997.

Created in 1996, the United Islamic Front (UIF), or Jabha-yi Mutthahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i, (also known as The Northern Alliance) represented the political-military consolidation of four former mujahedeen groups with Dostum’s Jumbishi-i-Milli Islami (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan). Politically presided over by Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud was the alliance’s Minister of Defense, personally commanding almost one quarter of the UIF’s 40,000-strong army. Other prominent military commanders included the aforementioned General Dostum, but also General Mohammed Fahim and Ismail Khan.

Although reduced to controlling probably no more than ten percent of the country (Figure 12), the UIF continued to receive arms, funding and logistical support from Russia, Iran, India and the bordering Central Asian States. In addition, although there
were other Ghilzai Pashtun groups, such as Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbaddin) and Hizb-i Ilsami (Khalis), who fought the Taliban, the United Front was largely a coalition representative of Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious minorities, giving political and military teeth to the nation’s Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen and Shi’a populations. This last point is especially salient, given Afghanistan’s Pashtun-centric history. After years of neglect by the United States following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it was the Northern Alliance who facilitated the U.S. routing of the Taliban regime, and a cadre of prominent UIF leaders who took lead in shaping the direction, structure and Ministerial posts in the Interim Authority established as the post-Taliban government in December 2001.

G. SUMMARY

As summarized in Table 6, the Taliban achieved a relatively high degree of state capacity during their brief reign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Activity</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Grading Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+) Structure present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-) Structures absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+) Some capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-) No capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. State Capacity Under Taliban Rule

Three major factors contributed to this success. The first was their internal military campaign, the second was the forced public observation of their fundamentalist decrees, and the third was their use of existing local, primarily Pashtun, socio-political structures and identities as a means of control.

Although the Taliban built a marginal conventional military capability, they were none-the-less militarily inferior to the armies of its regional neighbors, especially Iran and Pakistan. Thus, the Taliban amassed no real capacity to wage war beyond its external borders. However, the military capability and organization it employed were adequate to the task of internal pacification and civil warfare required of state-making. Military resources were directed toward the expansion of territory and consolidation of power. While the Taliban’s initial military thrusts were relatively small compared to the
scale of warfare conducted against the Soviets and during the subsequent civil war, the Taliban eventually achieved relative parity in military hardware, organization and tactics as their opposition, employing fighter aircraft and artillery against major targets of resistance such as urban centers in the north.

The enforced public observation of their dogmatic radical interpretation of Islam is what first brought international attention and condemnation. Despite imposing what they viewed as Allah’s will, their swift, harsh and near universal enforcement of Mullah Omar’s decrees aided in the creation of a totalitarian theocracy that facilitated state control and authority through the prevention of any potential resistance in areas under their direct control.

Thirdly, as a mostly Pashtun phenomenon, the Taliban’s use of existing local socio-political structures and identities allowed them to establish legitimacy based on tribal solidarity and religious piety. As the mullah’s had risen in political importance since the Soviet era (prior to which the mullah was apolitical in traditional tribal political hierarchy), they now occupied the top rung on the Pashtun socio-political ladder. This position allowed them to spread, convey and enforce their strict Islamist interpretation through tribal, ethnic and regional solidarity networks rather than through Islam alone. This not only reinforced the basis of traditional Afghan solidarity groups, but also resulted in the alienation of non-Pashtun and Shi’a minorities, even other Islamist, based on group identification alone. That the Taliban often upheld Pashtun tribal customary laws that were antithetical to their fundamentalist views is testament to the paramount importance of the qawm as the fundamental source of Afghan solidarity and mobilization. It would appear that Islam alone is not as sufficient a mobilizing factor against an internal threat as an external threat viewed as an attack on Islam. Although a more simple explanation might be that the Taliban’s strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam was too hostile for the majority conservative Muslim population.

That the Taliban provided a great deal of protection toward their Al Qaeda guests, especially after U.S. demands for bin Laden’s surrender, speaks to the strength of the

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158 Again reference Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban, for an account of the Taliban’s predominant Ghilzai Pashtun composition.
Pashtun tribal code, *Pashtunwali*,159 Yet, the ethnic solidarity of the Taliban perpetuated anti-Taliban antagonism, making the regime more insular and less representative. The protection of internal patrons such as Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were the ultimate cause of the regime’s downfall.

With the exception of opening and securing the major roads and routes to facilitate the lucrative smuggling trade, the Taliban did little else to develop the economy and extract resources. They even banned poppy cultivation, paralyzing Afghanistan’s illicit drug trade. The resurgence of the drug trade after the fall of the Taliban has resulted in a drug trade worth several billion dollars and in 2006 was estimated to produce over 90 percent of the world’s opium.160 The fact that the Taliban did not capitalize on this potentially lucrative trade speaks to their ideological rather than political motivation and the volume of money that must have been available from other sources.

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VI. CASE 4: THE DEMOCRATIC ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: 2001-PRESENT

A. BACKGROUND

The history of the current regime is unavoidably the direct continuation of events from the preceding chapter. Of the other regimes examined so far, there was a period of instability and chaos that preceded that regimes’ rise to power. The period prior to Abdur Rahman and the Taliban was marked by an absence of central authority, while the Communist Party’s coup replaced a weak central government already in decline. Yet, prior to the events of September 11, 2001, no analyst could have foreseen such a swift end to Taliban rule or the establishment of a more representative central government in Kabul, dominated by ethnic minorities from the Northern Alliance.

Less than two months after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban regime, the Bonn Agreement established a new interim Afghan government and provided the mechanism toward the adoption of a new constitution and presidential elections in 2004, and parliamentary elections in 2005. While there is great debate about the Bonn Agreement and events leading up to the current situation in Afghanistan, the following

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chapter is primarily based an analysis of the Karzai government and resistance groups since 2005. The main reason for this is first and foremost to remain relevant to the current situation on the ground.

Although the beginnings of the insurgency can be traced back to 2003, the scale and momentum of the insurgency were not as readily identified or acknowledged as during the radical upswing in violence, especially suicide bombings, noted in 2005-2006.\textsuperscript{162} Moreover, having held presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections by 2005,\textsuperscript{163} the structure and institutions, if not the personalities, have generally remained constant after 2006.

B. WAR MAKING

Rebuilding the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) has been a top priority of the international post-conflict reconstruction and state-building effort. Although the Taliban controlled much of the ANA’s former armaments, including MiG-21 fighter aircraft and tanks, the vast majority of such equipment was obsolete, having been acquired from the Former Soviet Union in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Following decades of strife, the former Soviet-oriented ANA has long since been decimated by factional and ethnic civil warfare. Therefore, the current task of rebuilding Afghanistan’s army and police force has necessarily been a bottom-up approach, cobbling together a ‘modern’ infantry force composed of former Islamist mujahedeen, Soviet-era professional soldiers, Taliban and tribal militia; the latter provided the majority and the former three groups provided the leadership.

According to the Office of President, the role of the ANA is primarily to secure Afghanistan’s borders and to deter external threats.\textsuperscript{164} As the threat or likelihood of interstate war between Afghanistan and any of its regional neighbors such as Iran or


\textsuperscript{163} District-level elections have yet to be held.

Pakistan is highly unlikely, the task of building, training and equipping Afghanistan’s Army has necessarily been concerned with the historic imperative of internal state-making. Thus the three remaining stated roles of the ANA to (2) defeat terrorists, (3) disband, reintegrate, or imprison Illegal Armed Groups, and (4) manage internal security threats with the assistance of the Afghan National Police (ANP), are historically analogous to the task of internal subjugation and pacification conducted required since the reign of Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901).

Given these tasks, short-term (1-2 years) and longer-term (5-10 years) GoA Ministry of Defense strategies are likely to continue to pursue a force structure capable of conducting internal pacification and providing stability vice fielding any credible force aimed at deterring regional aggression. In the short-term, ANA capabilities are structured to counter internal threats and extend the reach of the central government, while priorities for the Air Corps are to provide Presidential and military airlift. American and coalition forces expect to have trained approximately 86,000 Afghan soldiers by the end of 2008 as the ANA takes an increasing operational leadership. However, despite its presence in most provinces and the success of joint ANA and ANP operations such as Operation Maiwand, many officials, including NATO/ISAF commander General McNeill, suggest that the ANA will not reach sufficient capability to allow a drawdown of coalition forces until around 2011.

165 Cheryl Benard et. al., eds, Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead: Findings from an International Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2008).


169 Katzman, Post-War Governance [RL30588], 34-35.
C. STATE-MAKING

State-making is the central critical challenge that lies before the GoA and the international community. Above all other state activities throughout Afghan history, no other has proven more crucial and more difficult than the task of extending the writ of government and the rule of law throughout Afghanistan. Many suggest that President Hamid Karzai is not up to the task and cite weak leadership as the “common denominator in the repetitive failures of governance,” in Afghanistan.\(^{170}\) Although many non-Pashtun challengers wait in the wings for a potential presidential bid in 2009, there currently appears to be no viable Pashtun alternative to Karzai.\(^{171}\) Even during the initial days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in October 2001 many Northern Alliance\(^ {172}\) leaders, such as Dr. Abdullah Abdullah\(^ {173}\) confided that a Pashtun was not only required to lead Afghanistan, but that Karzai was the logical choice.\(^ {174}\)

Most of the criticism from external parties directed at Karzai and his government cite his inability or unwillingness to stand up to strong regional and ethnic interest groups and root out corruption.\(^ {175}\) The majority of political and military leaders that dominate current Afghan politics are the same personalities that dominated both sides of the mujahedeen jihad against the Soviets and from all factional participants in the Afghan


\(^{171}\) Another prominent Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, was initially supported by the United States as a likely post-Taliban Afghan leader. The murder of Haq’s family in 1999 by Taliban agents helped foment Pashtun opposition to the Taliban and solidified Haq’s position as a staunch anti-Taliban leader. Abdul Haq was one of two prominent Pashtun leaders (Hamid Karzai was the other) who led Pashtun resistance to the Taliban. Abdul Haq was executed by the Taliban on 26 October 2001 following his capture in the early stages of OEF. See: Seth Jones. “How to Save Karzai.” *Foreign Policy*, online. On the web: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyid=4392 (accessed 21 July 2008); and, Coll. *Ghost Wars*, 459, 534, 557-558.

\(^{172}\) The official name of the Northern Alliance is the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.

\(^{173}\) Dr. Abdullah is an ethnic Tajik and Pashtun who served as Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance during its brief rein over the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1993. Dr. Abdullah continued to serve in opposition to the Taliban as the Northern Alliance’s “Foreign Minister in exile” under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani and General Ahmed Shah Masud. After Masud’s assassination on 9 October 2001, Dr. Abdullah became one of three prominent leaders of the Northern Alliance, (the other two are General Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Dr. Younis Qanooni), representing the group at the historic Bonn Conference in November 2001. See: “Profile: Abdullah Abdullah.” *BBC News*, 22 March 2006. On the web: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1672882.stm (accessed 19 August 2008).

civil war prior to the rise of the Taliban. The only group conspicuously absent from the current political spectrum are prominent Ghilzai Pashtuns, who compose the core Taliban and insurgent leaders, including Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), one of the main armed insurgent and terrorist groups opposed to the current Afghan regime.

It is generally agreed that President Karzai needs to do more to marginalize and eliminate regional factionalism and warlordism, weed out corruption within the government, particularly as it pertains to the country’s illicit drug trade, and bridge the historic dichotomy between Kabul and Afghanistan’s tribal periphery. The task is not easy, especially because the beneficiaries of decentralized war economies, such as those who trade in narcotics or levy tolls, have historically resisted the state’s central authority and mobilization of resources. This has left Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand to hypothesize that only the central government can acquire the legitimacy and authority required to, “break up violent primitive accumulation…and bring about structural transformation.” However, while most Western approaches view such “structural transformation” as the technical task of extending Kabul’s reach outward and downward, the approach of the GoA has been much more in keeping with prominent Afghan and Islamic scholar Olivier Roy’s requirement to “root democracy into the local political culture.”

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175 See: Seth Jones, How to Save Karzai.
176 Such as Uzbek warlord and former Communist-era General, Rashid Dostum and numerous Northern Alliance notables including Ismail Khan and the aforementioned Burhanuddin Rabbani, Younis Qanooni, General Fahim and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.
177 See: Seth Jones, How to Save Karzai; Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly, 38. For a concise examination of the historical conditions favoring warlordism and the role of warlordism in Afghanistan, see: Kimberly Marten. “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective.” International Security, 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), 41–73. Her conclusion that warlords displaced traditional clan and tribal structures to become de-facto governors is particularly salient to arguments supporting the ouster of regional warlord such as General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan in effort to rebuild local and district-level governance.
178 Cramer and Goodhand, Try Again, Fail Again, 889.
179 Ibid.
180 Prominent Afghan and Islamic scholar Olivier Roy as quoted in Norchi, Real Estate to Nation-State, 26.
Although the overall structural appearance of the current Islamic Republic of Afghanistan bares spatial and institutional similarity to the government structure of the monarchy, several key distinctions must be made. (See Figure 1). First and foremost is the separation of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government. Judicial and legislative independence from executive direction is a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s democratic process. While members of the Supreme Court, Provincial Governors and one-third of the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) are Presidential appointees, formal opposition blocs within the government have placed increasing pressure on the executive to represent popular opinion and force reform.

Of the 29 Interim Administration ministries originally created during the Bonn process in 2001, 25 remain in the present government. Gone are the Ministries of Small Industries, Planning, Irrigation and Air transport and Tourism. Separate Labor and Social Affairs, and Martyrs and Disabled Ministries are now combined in one monolithic...
Ministry. Most of the ministries closely resemble those created under the monarchy and replicated by the Communist and Islamist governments.

The Ministries of National Defense, Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance remain the most prominent cabinet positions, controlling the majority of the central government’s traditional sources of power, prestige, wealth and legitimacy: the Army, the courts, the police, foreign influence and revenue.

Government, security sector and judicial reforms lie at the root of the Karzai regime’s post-conflict reconstruction and state-making effort, aimed at restoring the basic security and rule of law that have been markedly absent for over 30 years.

1. Government Reform

The task of government reform has necessarily been an uphill battle considering the monumental mandate laid out at Bonn in December 2001. Given the historical animosity between the various factions represented at the Bonn negotiations, the timelines for the creation of a constitution and national presidential and parliamentary elections seemed unachievable. Although district-level elections have yet to be held, the signing of a modern constitution and transition to a more representative elected government have been generally heralded as a success. However, the task of eliminating corruption and cronyism, of creating a institutional capacity, and of restoring confidence in government to rural Afghanistan is an even more historically relevant endeavor.

In 2002, the Interim Authority agreed to meet with international donors on an annual basis to coordinate and prioritize developmental objectives. These Afghanistan Development Forums (ADFs), as they became known, have been instrumental in imparting international technical competency toward the achievement of GoA national development goals. In 2006, the newly elected Cabinets began work on their own respective developmental strategies to compliment the overarching Afghan National
Development Strategy (ANDS)\textsuperscript{181} presented in January 2006 at the London Conference of donors by President Karzai. The ANDS goals were adopted and incorporated into the Afghanistan Compact.\textsuperscript{182} A final version of the ANDS was finalized and approved by the GoA in April-May 2008 and implementation begun in July 2008. The ANDS is significant for two reasons. First, it explicitly outlines Afghanistan’s development goals and priorities. Second, it represents a centralized plan and framework for the efficient cooperation and coordination between government agencies, international donors and non-governmental agencies.\textsuperscript{183} Monumental in scope, the ANDS (in addition to the 300-page core document) spans 22 Sector Strategies, 37 Annexes and 35 Provincial Development Plans (Kabul province has both an Urban and a Rural Development Plan).\textsuperscript{184}

Although each Sector Strategy details how the government intends to realize its development goals, the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) are really the key components of the ANDS. The PDPs represent the first step in Kabul’s attempt to extend the presence of government to Afghanistan’s periphery. More importantly, the PDPs prioritize development goals specifically suited for that province, tailoring developmental assistance and reform to the needs of the province, not donor interests. Another document provided as an annex to the ANDS goes even further.

The Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local Governance (IDLG), reads like a confession of all the government’s inadequacies and


\textsuperscript{183} Naithani, \textit{ACBAR’s Guide}, 3.

past transgressions, acknowledging its failure as the “biggest source of corruption and insecurity in major parts of the country.” Elsewhere, the document cites that the “lack of coordination between… ministries as well as PRTs’ independent activity on the ground has prevented the government from being efficient in provision of services to the people,” allowing “anti government forces” to fill the political vacuum. The self-deprecation continues, citing “poor governance capacity” as the root cause for inadequate resources, failure to offer alternatives to poppy agriculture and the overall decrease in the security environment. Finally, the paper lays out its plan of action, calling for the following sub-national (Provincial, District, Municipal and Village) developmental and capacity-building goals to be realized:

**By 20 March 2010:**

- Laws to create District Councils, Municipal Councils and Village Councils, and to establish their powers, responsibilities and fiscal resources.
- Laws to clarify the rules, procedures, functions, relationships and resources of sub-national governments.
- Formulate and implement sub-national government policy.
- Mayoral and District, Municipal and Village Council elections (subsequently to be held every three years).

**By the end 2010:**

- An affirmative action law reserving a percentage of sub-national government seats for women.

**By 20 March 2011:**

- Ensure representation and participation in sub-national governance.
- Build sub-national administrative capabilities to manage basic services.
- Provide a means for youth participation in government.
- Create Provincial Plans and Budgets tied to national plans and budgets

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186 Ibid.

187 Ibid.
By the end 2013:

- Municipal governments will have developed the capacity to manage their own development and deliver services.\(^{188}\)

Another GoA initiative that has already been implemented and that has shown a relative degree of success is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Created in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in cooperation with the World Bank, the NSP has established local governance in over 20,000 villages in all 34 provinces, providing a vital and previously absent link between local and district governance, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and Kabul.\(^{189}\) A bold, resourceful and seemingly successful initiative of the GoA, the NSP has received only a meager $315 million (USD) commitment from the international community. Yet, without U.S., UN or other substantial sources of international donor aid and interference, the NSP and other national programs have been cited as exemplary initiatives that should be replicated elsewhere.\(^{190}\)

While it is opined that such national programs should be combined with other developmental initiatives such as healthcare and education,\(^{191}\) it is imperative to coordinate these programs with the provision of security, restoration of justice, and national reconciliation programs. In order to create a stable environment for these programs to take hold without fear of competition for resources or sabotage in areas where hostilities have not ceased, these initiatives need to stop being implemented in isolation and start being coordinated as part of a national strategy for state-building. (See Appendix 1 for NSP Coverage as of March 2008). This initiative is crucial, because

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\(^{188}\) *Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local Governance*, 4-7.


\(^{191}\) Ibid., 202.
district and local levels of governance encompass the core unit of Afghan tribal and clan-based identity, the *woleswali*, and comprise the basis of Afghan political solidarity and mobilization.192

2. Security Sector Reform

Although Security Sector Reform (SSR) receives the overwhelming preponderance of international assistance, accounting for 70 percent of U.S. spending in Afghanistan193 between 2002-2008 and over 60 percent of the current 2008 budget,194 it is apparent that the current approach to security is not working, or at least working too slowly.195 Of an authorized end-strength of 82,000 national police, approximately 80,000 have already been trained and assigned.196 Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, the ANP are intended to extend the rule of law and maintain a permanent security and government presence at the district level. In addition to ‘routine’ policing duties, the ANP have occasionally supplemented ANA operations and are the primary agency responsible for border security and counter-narcotics.

Of the ANP total force, approximately 22 percent (18,000) are assigned as border police and another five percent (3,800) are tasked with counter-narcotics operations. Although considered less professional and more corrupt than the ANA, the ANP are nevertheless a core component of the government’s SSR strategy. Because of its control of the police, responsibility for securing the borders and combating Afghanistan’s $3.4192

192 Johnson and Mason, *All Counterinsurgency is Local*, 36.


195 See: William Maley. “Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges.” *Policy Brief No. 68: Foreign Policy for the Next President*. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 5. On the web: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/stabilizing_afghanistan.pdf (accessed 19 February 2009). Maley is referring to the “inkspot” security strategy applied in Afghanistan, whereby coalition forces secure a regional center such as a city or town before working outward from that point. As most of Afghanistan’s rural population lives in small villages outside larger centers, the current approach has yet to reach the lives of most Afghans.

196 Katzman. *Post-War Governance* [RL30588], 40.
billion-a-year illicit drug trade, the Interior Minister is viewed as one of the government’s most important cabinet appointments and has been the target of many reforms. Yielding to external U.S. pressure, President Karzai recently reshuffled his cabinet, appointing Muhammad Hanif Atmar, former Education Minister and one-time member of the Soviet-era KhAD (secret police) to the position of Interior Minister in October 2008.¹⁹⁷ This move follows an attempt to curb corruption amongst the police force by raising salaries from $70 to $100 in mid-2007.¹⁹⁸ Although the most visible, the ANA and ANP are not the only aspects of SSR. Rehabilitation programs, legal codes and Afghanistan’s prison system are also in need of substantial reform and have largely been subordinated under the task of judicial reform.

3. Judicial Reform

The establishment of an independent judiciary consisting of a Supreme Court and a legal code consistent with “Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions,” was one of the main goals envisioned in the Bonn Agreement.¹⁹⁹ However, the task of reconciling modern criminal, civil and family law with Afghanistan’s traditionally conservative tribal customary law and the state’s official observation of Islamic shari’a law remains one of the most complex and challenging of needed government reforms.

Draft Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court strategies, developed under the direction of the ANDS, established specific development goals and an implementation strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of judicial sector capacity and resource constraints.²⁰⁰ Besides capital, the training of judges in modern jurisprudence and integration of the legal code remain prominent obstacles to rapid judicial sector reform.


¹⁹⁸ Katzman. Post-War Governance [RL30588], 40.

¹⁹⁹ Bonn Agreement, 4.

At the beginning of 2007, 20 percent of the population of judges had no formal education beyond high school and another 16 percent had received their judicial qualifications and education outside university settings such as through private education and Madrassas. Moreover, another 40 percent had not completed Judicial Stage training, required to train a pool of qualified judge candidates. A shortfall identified in 2007, the judicial system has created a formal system intended to “train, educate, monitor, and discipline judges and court staff.” The 52-week long program combines a 36-week education program with a 16-week practicum. The education program, taught by qualified judges and prominent scholars, attempts to provide a uniform education in judicial matters ranging from civil and commercial law to taxation to counter narcotics law and administration.

Although the Ministry of Justice plans to construct offices in each of Afghanistan’s 364 districts, financial constraints remain the largest barrier to the Ministry’s goals. In 2006 the Ministry’s budget was approximately $12.8 million USD, of which more than 70 percent (almost $9 million) went toward operating Afghanistan’s prisons. According to the 2008 Budget, $341.4 million USD (2.6 percent of the Total Budget) was prioritized for ‘good governance and rule of law.’ Of that, only $69 million or 0.5 percent of the budget is directed toward ‘justice and rule of law,’ while the majority is earmarked for ‘Public Administration,’ including $21 million for the Election Commission and $154 million for the Civil Service Commission. Of the $60 million for justice and rule of law, the Ministry of Justice received $50 million, the Supreme Court $10 million, and the Attorney General $9 million. There was no budgetary provision for the Commission of Anti Corruption. Thus, even with a substantially enlarged 2008 budget, it is difficult to envision how the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court will achieve their targeted development goals by 2010. Like other domestic government and

202 Ibid.
203 Ibid., 3.
204 Ibid., 4.
security sector reforms, budgetary constraints appear to be a critical factor in guaranteeing the availability of resources which in turn define the pace and scope of needed reforms.

While no GoA, foreign government or NGO has provided a cogent framework for how to reconcile Afghanistan’s competing tribal, Islamic and civil legal codes, the best concept for an integrated approach comes from an academic, Dr. Ali Wardak. (See Figure 14, an Integrated Model for a District Level Justice System).

Dr. Wardak’s construct best approaches the integrated solution envisioned in the Bonn Agreement and Afghan National Development Strategies. His approach combines the standards of international human rights with traditional tribal customary law, state civil and criminal law with shari’a law as historically practiced in Afghanistan. Civil incidents and minor criminal can still be referred to jirga or shura (councils), the traditional vehicle for conflict resolution at the village and tribal level.\footnote{Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” \textit{Crime, Law & Social Change}, 41 (2004): 326-327.} Civil incidents or serious crimes are tried under civil criminal state and Islamic law in a Court of Justice, while reports of human rights violations would be referred to a special Human Rights Unit (H.R. Unit) for investigation and resolution. Any unsatisfactory resolution from either a tribal jirga or H.R. Unit could be referred to a state Court of Justice.\footnote{Ibid., 335-338.} Whatever form judicial reform takes, a key measure of its success will be how this balance is struck, adheres to international standards of human rights, and maintains its independence from the executive branch.
The delicate balance of *shari’a* law, international standards of justice, and judicial independence was tested as recently as January 2008 following the award of the death sentence to a 23-year-old journalist. Accused of blasphemy for allegedly circulating literature on women’s rights under Islam, journalist Perwiz Kambakhsh was sentenced to death under Islamic law by a regional court in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. President Karzai, facing mounting international pressure and condemnation from the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and human rights groups, voiced

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initial caution about executive intervention in the case, but stated that justice would be
done, despite some support among religious and tribal conservatives for the sentence to
be upheld.210

D. PROTECTION

Corruption and nepotism are akin to protection in the Afghan government, and
factional politics threaten to slow any substantial development and reform. Although
President Karzai used his 2004 Presidential (re-) election as a mandate to strengthen
Pashtun representation in Parliament and decrease the influence of the Tajik-dominated
Northern Alliance bloc,211 he has been incapable of marginalizing other national political
figures such as General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, who still command significant
regional political, social, economic and military power.212 Credited with reducing the
influence of minor partisan politicians however, Karzai has nonetheless had to contend
with various degrees of factional nepotism and corruption in the interest of maintaining
accord. Thus, many of his prominent cabinet and gubernatorial appointments have been
as much to appease internal interest groups and preserve domestic harmony, as they have
been to satisfy external audiences, leverage bureaucratic expertise or provide meaningful
institutional reform. Yet, despite strong U.S. support, President Karzai himself is not
without controversy or fault.

co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7204341.stm (accessed 19 August 2008); “European Parliament Resolution
(accessed 19 August 2008); Frances Harrison. “Karzai Reassurance on Journalist,” 7 February 2008. BBC

211 The Ministries of Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs are viewed as three of the most
prominent and powerful positions in the Afghan cabinet. During the Interim Government (2001-2001),
these Ministerial positions were each held by prominent Tajik Northern Alliance figures Mohammad
Qaseem Fahim, Younis Qanooni, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, respectively. Although the three maintained
their positions during the Afghan Transitional Authority (2002-2005), Karzai dismissed Younis Qanooni in
2004 and none currently hold Ministerial-level positions, although Qanooni is Speaker of the Lower House.

212 Katzman, Government Formation and Performance [RS21922], 4. An ethnic Uzbek, General
Dostum commands a sizeable militia in Afghanistan’s Uzbek dominated northern provinces where Mazar-i
Sharif, one of the country’s largest commercial centers, is located. Ismail Khan is an ethnic Tajik and
former long-time governor of Herat in western Afghanistan. Together, Dostum and Khan control all
commercial routes north into Central Asia and west into Iran, maintain sizeable regional militias, and
mobilize ethnic and regionally based opposition to Karzai’s regime.
Abdul Jabbar Sabit was fired from his position as Attorney General in July 2008, allegedly for his intention to run against Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections. There have been similar politically motivated moves by President Karzai, such as the December 2004 dismissal of Education Minister Younis Qanooni, who had challenged Karzai during the October 2004 presidential elections. However, the dismissal of Sabit is of particular intrigue, because of his alleged knowledge and investigation of widespread corruption within the Karzai government. According to Sabit, he was ordered (by President Karzai) not to pursue the prosecution of more than 20 allegedly corrupt politicians, many of whom he suggested were tied to Afghanistan’s lucrative narcotics trade. President Karzai has also been linked to the drug trade. His brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai has long been accused of trafficking narcotics and Shaida Mohammad, one of President Karzai’s aides, has also been implicated in counter-narcotics investigations.

Widely corrupt by ‘Western’ standards of political accountability and public toleration of its officials, such practices barely raise alarms in Afghan domestic politics are can be viewed as necessary practices for conducting business and politics in post-war Afghanistan, where civil government has been largely non-existent for over 35 years. Viewed in a different light, Afghanistan’s government can been regarded as an example of democratic freedom and transparent governance compared to its northern Central Asian neighbors, who have enjoyed independence and relative internal stability (the Tajik civil war not withstanding) for 17 years.


As a result of the internal jockeying for power during the 2004-2005 electoral process that oversaw the evolution of the appointed Transitional Authority to a fully representative elected government, factions actually aided in the creation of democratic pluralism through the creation of official opposition parties. Through their initial marginalization, prominent political figures including Younis Qanooni and Burhanuddin Rabbani successfully created an opposition bloc that now boasts the membership of each of President Karzai’s Vice President’s, Ahmad Zia Massoud and Mohammad Karim Khalili.217 The opposition bloc has been successful in challenging Karzai’s executive power since 2006, compelling the President to overhaul the composition of the Supreme Court and forcing individual confirmation of his cabinet appointees. The bloc also seeks to check executive power through a constitutional amendment that would allow provincial election of provincial governors, vice presidential appointment.218

E. EXTRACTION

The extraction of resources, particularly of capital, has proven a significant challenge to the Karzai government. As Barnett Rubin noted as recently as 2006, “economic resources from public services in Afghanistan have almost entirely come from international assistance, rather than from domestic capital accumulation and resource mobilization.”219 Such international aid, while certainly desperately needed, helped create what former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani described as a ‘beggar state.’220 However, the massive influx and expenditure of donor aid outside the control and direction of the Afghan government has diminished both the authority and capacity of the Karzai regime. Because the central government has been unable to both generate legitimate and robust sources of capital and apportion donor expenditures, the Ministry of Finance initially had little capacity to manage a national budget. Current international expenditures in Afghanistan, of which the United States is the largest donor, far exceed

217 Katzman, Government Formation and Performance [RS21922], 2.
218 Ibid.
219 Rubin, Peace Building and State-Building, 179.
220 Not a direct quote of Ashraf Ghani. Simon Chesterman paraphrased Ghani’s determination “not to allow Afghanistan to become a beggar state, dependent on international aid,” in Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building, 41.
the nation’s current capacity for capital accumulation through taxation, customs revenue, or from the country’s devastated agricultural, industrial and service sectors. Figure 15 depicts the shortfall between Afghanistan’s domestic revenue and operating expenditures as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

![Figure 15. Afghanistan Domestic Revenue and Operating Budget (% GDP)](image)

There is a plan, however, to address this shortfall.

1. **The Budget and Fiscal Reform**

   In the short-to-mid-term, the Karzai government realizes the need for continued donor assistance if it is to complete the structural reforms and meet the development goals of the Afghanistan Compact, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

   Facing these self-imposed (internal) and international (external) constraints, budget and revenue projections over the next five years illustrate a concerted endeavor to

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boost domestic revenues to cover recurring operating expenditures. As illustrated in Figure 16, the Afghan government aims to cover its operating costs through domestic capital accumulation by the year 2012, where the lines converge. Although no strategic economic plan is forecast past 2013, it is evident that Afghanistan will need to maintain an upward trajectory for domestic revenue accumulation if it is to wean itself off foreign aid as a major source of capital.

![Figure 16. Operating Budget versus Domestic Revenue, FY 2004-2013](image)

In an effort to address the majority of donor aid outside the direct control of the government, Afghanistan’s National Budget is divided into two parts: the Core (Operating) Budget and the External Budget. The Core Budget captures all monies flowing through government’s accounts, such as revenues and external grants and loans. The External Budget accounts for all funds that do not pass through government accounts, such as Non-Governmental Organization and private foreign direct investment. Illustrative of the scale of foreign investment in Afghanistan that falls outside

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government control, the External Budget overshadowed the Core Budget almost ten to one for Fiscal Year (FY) 1386\(^{225}\) (2008). (See Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Budget Total</td>
<td>US$ 10,221,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Budget Total</td>
<td>US$ 1,096,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. External Budget versus Core Budget, FY 1386 (2008)\(^{226}\)

Government spending is classified as either Operating or Development Expenditures. Operating Expenditures are primarily recurrent costs necessary for government operations such as wages and pensions. Development Expenditures are primarily for public works projects and capital goods but includes provisions for technical assistance, training and health services. Government grants such as those for the National Solidarity Program are also included in the Development Expenditures budget.\(^{227}\)

The Total Budget is the sum of the Core and External Budgets. The Total Budget for FY 2008, just over $13 billion USD, is depicted in Table 8.\(^{228}\)

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\(^{225}\) Afghanistan follows the Iranian Solar Hejri calendar year for its fiscal cycle. As the Hejri year usually begins on March 21 of the Gregorian calendar, Afghanistan’s fiscal year runs from 21 March to 20 March. Thus the current Afghan fiscal year, 1386, corresponds with 21 March 2008 through 20 March 2009 on the Gregorian calendar.


\(^{228}\) The total budget for was $13,114,000,000 USD. Source: Total Budget (Core & External), Op. Cit.
2. Revenue and Capital Accumulation

While Afghanistan’s total domestic revenues as a percent of GDP rose between 2004 and 2008, the government’s domestic income still needs to more than double over the next three years if it is to fully finance its Operating Budget by 2012 as depicted in Figure 3. Table 9 depicts Afghanistan’s domestic revenue from 2004 through 2008, and projected revenue accumulation through 2013.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Domestic Revenue (Millions US$)</th>
<th>Domestic Revenue (% GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011*</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012*</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013*</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Projected Revenue years 2009 to 2013

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229 From Ops vs. Revenue Graph, Op. Cit.
To this end, the GoA is undertaking a comprehensive campaign to raise capital through taxation and customs duties as well as trying to boost its agricultural and industrial sectors.

The Ministry of Finance’s Revenue Department is charged with generating income in each of two primary areas: customs levied on the import and export of commodity goods, and domestic taxation. Of these, the Revenue Department has primarily concerned itself with the collection of customs revenue, and left the enforcement of taxation to the Ministry.

The Ministry of Finance has implemented a broad taxation scheme that seeks to collect revenue from numerous sources ranging from income taxes and vehicle registration to a physician’s tax, Miller’s tax (the operation of sawmills), toll roads and an airport departure fee.

Seemingly substantial on paper, enforcement of income and other personal taxes will bear the true litmus test of the Ministry’s revenue scheme and prove to be the major obstacle in meeting projected budgetary needs. Afghans have historically resisted taxation from the center and imposing a universal income tax and business taxes would necessarily require a national census to register all prospective taxpayers. Such an endeavor would be politically sensitive itself, as the current Pashtun population could see its majority challenged by a significant rise in ethnic Tajik registration.

Pakistan and India represent the most common destinations for Afghan exports in terms of customs value, accounting for just over 55 percent of all commercial goods.

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231 From *Ops vs. Revenue Graph, Op. Cit.*


Tajikistan and Iran each share around 4-5 percent of Afghanistan’s export market with the remainder equally divided among nearby regional markets. Pakistan and China are Afghanistan’s largest import markets, claiming a 22 percent and 21 percent share respectively. Regional markets make up the rest of the top ten import markets, with the exception of Japan, which comes in at number 5, accounting for nearly 6 percent of imports. The United States is Afghanistan’s seventeenth largest import market in terms of customs value.235

3. Commercial Sector Reform

While posing a challenging task, rebuilding Afghanistan’s agricultural and industrial commercial sectors also offers a lucrative and sustainable source of government revenue while combining the added benefits of generating employment, poverty reduction and expanding government support to the periphery.

With the assistance of the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (completed in 2006), the Ministry of Agriculture has reclaimed much of Afghanistan’s arable land and has reestablished regional export markets. These developments have positioned Afghanistan’s return as a potential net exporter of food.236 By 2006, cash crops such as fruits and vegetables had already accounted for as much as 42 percent of Afghanistan’s agricultural output. Road repairs and the installation of refrigeration stations along transportation corridors further increased access to markets while reducing spoilage as goods awaited shipment.237 Agriculture and rural development also share a significant proportion of the budget (9


236 Afghanistan was a net exporter of food prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion. See: Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 76.

percent, or 1182.8 million USD), although the Ministry of Agriculture and Food itself only receives about 1.7 percent of the budget, or 220 million USD.238

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) oversees International Trade and Transportation as well as Private Sector Development (PSD) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).239 In addition to working to reduce international barriers to trade, the Ministry’s PSD Directorate is tasked with reducing domestic barriers for foreign investment, streamlining the regulatory process, formalization of the market economy and creating an environment for the establishment of competitive business opportunities and investment. The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency is a subdivision of the MoCI that encourages FDI in six priority areas: agriculture, manufacturing, telecommunications, transportation, construction, and the energy sector (mining, power and water).240 Despite partnership with international organizations including the United Nations Development Program, few relevant figures are available to estimate the extent of FDI in Afghanistan’s private economic and commercial sectors. According to one World Bank report from 2005, investment accounted for nearly 22 percent of GDP, although it conceded that as high as 90 percent may have been financed as international aid.241 These numbers appear a little exaggerated, but offer the only insight into private sector investment. The report also cites informal business practices, access to land and electricity, corruption, access to transportation and security as the primary obstacles to courting private investment in Afghanistan.242 However, review of Afghanistan’s budget indicates that economic governance and PSD are still woefully underfunded, accounting

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238 *Mid Term Budget Framework - English.*


242 Ibid., 6-10.
for only 1.3 percent (166.6 million USD) of the FY 2008 Total Budget. Of this, the MoCI was allotted 57 million USD, the Ministry of Economy 5 million USD, and the Ministry of Finance 105 million USD.\textsuperscript{243}

F. RESISTANCE

Resistance to the current government in Kabul is expressed in two main forms, political and insurgent. Of these, political resistance to the Karzai government as primarily expressed through an official opposition party lead by former Northern Alliance members, particularly Younis Qanooni and other prominent Tajiks, has already been presented. The second domain is that of the armed insurgency, which poses a vastly more dire, urgent, and widespread concern for three main reasons. First, is the insurgency’s violent nature, the use of terror and guerilla tactics to target and undermine the government’s legitimacy and ability to provide basic security and services. The second reason is that it operates outside the domain of political recourse. By adopting armed insurgent tactics, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have placed themselves outside the realm of meaningful political discourse, conflict resolution and reconciliation. This may be in part due to an Islamist view of the current government as illegitimate or that of a defensive \textit{jihad} against foreign occupation. However, armed revolt has historically been the form of resistance adopted by Afghan resistance groups. The third reason why the insurgency poses a more dire and urgent threat to the Afghan government and coalition forces is its widespread appeal amongst various, mostly Pashtun, elements. With the exception of foreign fighters and criminal elements, the majority of resistance groups are bound on the basis of ethnic, regional and tribal affiliation.

Thus the insurgent opposition more closely resembles the kind of armed resistance to the government examined in previous chapters. According to Seth Jones of RAND, the insurgency is largely composed of six main groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters including Al Qaeda, tribal elements and criminal groups.\textsuperscript{244} Of these, the first four are the most prominent,

\textsuperscript{243} Mid Term Budget Framework - English.
\textsuperscript{244} Seth G. Jones, \textit{Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 37.
although the latter two still represent significant challenges to the state’s ability to provide security and justice, cornerstones of the government’s capacity building efforts. Moreover, with the exception of foreign fighters, each group is generally ethnically and tribally homogenous, but even groups such as Al Qaeda rely on extensive social and kin-based relationships, as well as tribal customary law, as a means of protection, organization and mobilization. Figure 17 depicts the insurgency’s “three fronts.”

![Figure 17. The Afghan Insurgent Front](image)

As illustrated on the map, a resurgent Taliban poses the largest threat to the current government in Kabul.

1. **The Taliban**

The Taliban insurgency started about 18 months after its ouster by U.S.-led coalition forces with the aid of the Northern Alliance. Fleeing across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the Taliban settled in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province and among the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that are home Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes.

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245 Both Seth Jones and Ahmed Rashid depict the insurgency as being waged along a Northern, Central, and Southern front. See: Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 38; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Viking Press, 2008), XXII.

246 Jones, “Figure 4.1. The Afghan Insurgent Front,” in *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 39.
Reconstituted within Pakistan, the Taliban then launched a successful insurgent campaign against the government, which it saw as being a puppet of the west dominated by ethnic minorities, especially the Tajiks, and in which they had no representation. Since 2003, the Taliban has increasingly exerted its influence to most areas with no or little government and coalition presence.

Although the exact area of Taliban influence and control is the subject of debate, mostly between politicians and nonpartisan academics and government observers, it is widely acknowledged that at least Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, the traditional Pashtun homelands, are under Taliban control. At least one think tank estimates that of the extent of Taliban control is even greater, directly controlling as much as 72 percent of the Afghan landmass and a substantial presence in another 21 percent. (See Figure

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248 See for example: Johnson, *the Big Muddy*, 97-98.
If accurate, then the Taliban already control the same amount of territory, if not more, than during their tenure as ruler of Afghanistan in the 1990s.

However, today’s Taliban is not the same organization as the Islamist theocratic regime examined in Chapter V. To be sure, while Taliban leader Mullah Omar still remains at large and administers the movement through a *shura* in Quetta, Pakistan, the Taliban en-mass is not as ideologically fervent as it once was. While the core leadership of the Taliban may still subscribe to its Islamic fundamentalist ideology, the movement has relied on other “local grievances…from poppy eradication…to civilian casualties, to high levels of unemployment and chronic underdevelopment” as a means of gaining widespread influence and “sympathy beyond its traditional support base.”

The extent to which the Taliban has successfully leveraged these grievances is illustrated in Canadian journalist Graeme Smith’s interviews of 42 Taliban. Of those interviewed, the majority expressed little understanding of Afghanistan’s geopolitical situation or Mullah Omar’s ideological ambitions, while most cited other reasons, such as poverty or coalition bombing campaigns, as the main reason for joining the Taliban. Viewed in this regard, the Taliban are much more representative of a far-reaching indigenous insurgent movement, based on the government’s inability to deliver basic security and services and an overly kinetic COIN strategy on the part of coalition forces, than an overall ideological struggle. This is good news for the coalition’s COIN strategy, as it supposes the ability to quell the insurgency through the provision of these basic, but essential, government services. If an ideological struggle, then there are deeper implications for the Afghan government and coalition forces that draw a more inextricable link to the war on terror and jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Haji Omar, the Taliban’s military leader in Southern Waziristan, draws such a link. Omar has called the insurgency a *jihad*. It is unknown whether this terminology is used in order to stir up anti-coalition sentiment among the wildly independent Waziris

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in Pakistan’s FATA, gain currency with foreign fighters operating out of neighboring Northern Waziristan, or whether the declaration of *jihad* has actually been made by Taliban leader Mullah Omar. If so, then the labeling of the conflict as a *jihad* could align the strategic goals of the Taliban (re-conquest of Afghanistan) and Al Qaeda (establish a pan-Islamic caliphate) beyond mere operational objectives (target Afghan and coalition forces). Such a declaration could win broader support within the Muslim community and cause a swell in the ranks of foreign jihadists on the Afghan battlefield, analogous to the anti-Soviet *jihad*. That there is not a larger contingent of foreign fighters in Afghanistan speaks to the probability that such an appeal has not been made, and that Haji Omar’s rhetoric is intended to whip up support among local audiences rather than be representative of official Taliban ideology.

2. **Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)**

Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s mujahedeen Hezb-i-Islami party remains a major insurgent threat to the Afghan government and coalition COIN and CT operations. Operating a ‘northern front’ in the northeastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Nurestan, Kunar, Nangarhar and Laghman, Hekmatyar has openly expressed support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda,\(^{252}\) but denied direct links to them.\(^{253}\) Like the Taliban and other Afghan Islamist and insurgent groups, HIG was at least initially based on Ghilzai Pashtun solidarity and a shared Islamist ideology (see Table 3, Chapter IV). Hekmatyar is himself a Ghilzai Pashtun from the northern province of Kunduz, although from a less politically powerful subtribe than other groups that dominate his area of operations, such as Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HIK).\(^{254}\) HIG’s northeast area of operations is a mixture Nuristanis, Safi Pashtuns, Mohmand Pashtuns, Shinwari Pashtuns, Ghilzai Pashtuns and Pashai.\(^{255}\) Thus, HIG must necessarily appeal to and mobilize wider Pashtun ethnic

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\(^{252}\) Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 41.


sentiment in order to achieve freedom of movement to conduct operations in the northeast. Finally, although placed on the U.S. terrorist list in 2003 and widely disruptive of coalition CT operations in the east, Hekmatyar’s group does not affect an area of operations on the scale as that of Jalaluddin Haqqani or the Taliban.

3. The Haqqani Network

Jalaluddin Haqqani and his oldest son, Sirajuddin, have emerged as one of the most brutal and audacious challengers to the Karzai regime and coalition CT operations in Afghanistan’s contested eastern provinces. A former mujahedeen commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of the main ties linking Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to the Taliban, and uniting the eastern and southern Pashtun tribes.\(^{256}\) Having received significant assistance from the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence during the anti-Soviet jihad, Haqqani hosted bin Laden’s first Al Qaeda camps in the late 1980s.\(^ {257}\) Haqqani later served as Minister of Tribal Affairs for the Taliban in the 1990s and is now head of the Taliban in North Waziristan province in Pakistan’s FATA, an area host to many foreign jihadists including Al Qaeda. Under the military direction of his son, the Haqqani Network has launched fierce operations into Khost, Paktika, Paktia and Nangarhar provinces, is credited with introducing suicide bombing to Afghanistan,\(^ {258}\) and has claimed responsibility for the April 2008 assassination attempt on President Karzai.\(^ {259}\) Alarmingly, the network is alleged to still leverage ties within Pakistan’s ISI,


\(^{258}\) Ibid.

\(^{259}\) Dupee, *The Haqqani Network*. 
which is accused of providing intelligence and material assistance to Haqqani operatives in support of a July 2008 attack against the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 41 and wounded 150.260

4. Foreign Fighters Including Al Qaeda

Afghanistan’s foreign fighters are mostly Central Asian and Arab Islamists who settled along the Afghan-Pakistan border following the jihad against the Soviets or sought refuge from their own regimes during the 1990s. Of these, prominent Arabs such as Saudi Arabia’s Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri from Egypt form the core of Al Qaeda’s leadership and pose the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and international community, if not directly targeting the Afghan government. This fact had initially relegated the task of rebuilding Afghan governing capacity a distant second to the immediate post-9/11 task of waging direct action CT operations against Al Qaeda, whose objectives were broader than HIG and the Taliban.261

5. Tribal Elements and Criminal Groups

As noted previously, each armed insurgent group, including Al Qaeda’s foreign jihadists, rely on an extensive network of socio-political connections based on ethnic, regional and tribal kin-based identities and local customary law. Forged during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, foreign fighters and criminal groups have relied on this extensive patronage system as both a source of protection and as a conduit for directing insurgent, terrorist and criminal operations against the Karzai government and coalition forces.

G. SUMMARY

If anything, the current nation-building exercise in Afghanistan has shown that it can take several years for a state to even create the technical expertise, institutions and

261 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 44.
revenues required for governance and on which to develop state capacity. Comparative analysis of other governments has the added benefit of time, often decades or even centuries, in which the state slowly expanded its capacity through trial and error, often with significant or even disastrous setbacks. The impatience with which the international community monitors and prods Afghanistan’s development should not be overlooked. After decades of mal-governance and internecine warfare, and seven years after the toppling of the Taliban regime, the GoA has only recently completed a comprehensive strategy for creating good governance and developing capacity for war making, state-making and extraction.

Overall, the Afghan National Development Strategy, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and the National Solidarity Program (NSP) aim to build the kinds of institutional capacities the international community expects as well as to reestablish the basic security and rule of law that local Afghans demand. Although development and training of the ANP lags behind the ANA by perhaps as much as two years, there is still reasonable expectation that the police can be every-bit as non-partisan, professional and well-trained as the army. Moreover, for the first time in Afghan history national initiatives such as IDLG and NSP actually seek to bridge, rather than co-opt, crush or circumvent the conventional divide between the central government in Kabul and traditional sub-national tribal and clan-based governance through Village, Municipal, District and Provincial Councils. However, expectation is not reality.

Widespread corruption, nepotism, warlordism and Afghanistan’s rampant illicit narcotics trade all still need to be effectively combated and eliminated. In each of these areas, the international community must bring solutions and resources in addition to political pressure. Anti-narcotics efforts have not been adequately or effectively addressed or funded for fear of political backlash. Poppy eradication must be combined with resources and training to provide alternate-livelihoods for farmers or provide crop substitution and subsidies until farmers can bring new crops to market. Warlords such as General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan must be forced to relinquish their hold on regional politics and dismantle age-old patronage networks, war economies and local militias. Failure to do so should risk losing all, including imprisonment. The creation of
an official government opposition party by former Northern Alliance leaders including Rabbani, Qanooni, Fahim and Dr. Abdullah illustrate the opportunity for equal and representative democratic political participation and a means of holding the government accountable, but more must be done than the mere pledge of donor resources or drafting of lofty strategies. Significant investment must be made in Afghanistan’s private and public sectors to restore and develop markets, encourage FDI and generate a sustainable domestic economy that can lift Afghans out of poverty and provide a source of revenue for Afghanistan’s continued development and post-conflict reconstruction.

In my final analysis, the current GoA has developed basic institutional structures for war making, state-making, protection and extraction, but has failed to develop any real capacity in any of these areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Activity</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Grading Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+) Structure present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-) Structures absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+) Some capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-) No capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. State Capacity under President Hamid Karzai

While blame may be placed on the initial subordination of governance to the U.S.-led CT campaign, the inadequacy of international funding for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, or shortsightedness in the inability to foresee, stave-off and combat the insurgency while in its infancy, the real challenge now is how best to prioritize and target each of these seemingly competing challenges.

The Taliban, aided by Al Qaeda and former mujahdeen Islamist parties, has already established a significant presence throughout most of Afghanistan, entrenched in local communities based on traditional solidarity networks and social grievances. The inability of the Afghan government and coalition forces to mount a successful COIN and CT strategy based on these historical and sociological facts has rendered the prospect of achieving any of the government’s development objectives outlined in the ANDS or Millennium Development Goals a vacant illusion. The fact is that each of these dimensions, increasing state capacity and combating the insurgency, must be met
immediately and simultaneously, with overwhelming resources committed to each task. To do any less would be to condemn the Afghan people to another era of violent misrule and be tantamount to granting our enemy’s victory.
VII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Having presented each case in isolation in Chapters III - VI, this chapter endeavors to conduct a comparative analysis of Tilly's four state activities, as well as the basis of resistance and solidarity, across all four regimes. This analysis is conducted on two levels. First, the cases are compared based on their form of government and nature of their rule. This macro-level of analysis follows a more traditional comparative political methodology, and is intended to develop general typologies and trends that are characteristic of successful Afghan rule. The second level of analysis is intended to provide a more in-depth understanding of each regime's relative degree of capacity attained in each of the four state activities, as well as the basis of resistance encountered by each regime. A major task of this level of analysis, conducted under the subheading "Grading State Capacity," is the assignment of a number grade ranking the relative level of capacity developed by each regime, in each of the four state activities.

This comparative analysis is conducted in an effort to identify key distinctions and trends that may yield insight into how best to extend the reach of the government in Kabul and increase state capacity without alienating the fundamental basis of rural Afghan solidarity or inciting further revolt. The findings of this analysis are presented later in this chapter.

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASES

The cases presented in Chapters II–VI span almost 130 years in which Afghanistan saw a period of absolute monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman, a decade of communist rule under the PDPA and Soviet occupation, a totalitarian Islamist theocracy under the Taliban, as well as the current democratic Republic presided by Hamid Karzai.

From the perspective of a political scientist, these four regimes represent a diverse basis for comparison that appears unwieldy. However, as each of these regimes helped shape Afghanistan's rich political and cultural landscape, they represent a rich milieu
from which the examination of an Afghan's basis of identity, relationship to the state, and reason for political mobilization cannot be divorced.

When compared, a cursory analysis of all four cases yields information about the regime type, the nature of their rule, the role of Islam in each regime, whether the regime had a peaceful or abrupt and violent transition, and the basis of resistance in each regime (see Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Government</th>
<th>Nature of Rule</th>
<th>Role of Islam</th>
<th>Regime Transition</th>
<th>Basis of Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Ousted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Democracy†</td>
<td>Ousted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Comparative Analysis of Four Afghan Regimes

As noted in the very introduction of this thesis, an intriguing element of Afghanistan's political history has been its setting for four very diverse forms of government over the past 120 years. These regimes span the political spectrum. Starting from the political Left is the more moderate democratic Islamic Republic, followed by Communism espoused by the PDPA and Soviets, while Abdur Rahman's illiberal monarchy and the Taliban's Islamic Theocracy are to the radical and revolutionary Right of the political spectrum.

(*) Although the monarchy underwent a peaceful transition from Abdur Rahman Khan to his son and heir, Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919), the dynasty came to an end after his grandson, Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929), was deposed by tribal revolt in 1929 following his attempted introduction of modernizing reforms that offended conservative Islamic and tribal customs. Although another dynastic monarchy replaced the usurpers by the end of the year, the monarchy as an institution was itself finally ended through a coup in 1973.

(†) Both Amir Abdur Rahman and the Taliban's Mullah Omar used Islam as a means of legitimating their rule. Amir Rahman gained the implicit support of the ulama (religious scholars) and umma (Islamic community) by imposing himself as leader of the Islamic community (in Afghanistan), a mandate imposed by the will of Allah. Mullah Omar gained similar legitimacy by symbolically donning the 'cloak of the Prophet' in front of a tribal jirga. A key distinction between the two however is that Amir Rahman still enjoyed traditional legitimacy based upon the monarchy as an institution and his clan-based lineage, whereas Mullah Omar was of prominent or 'noble' hereditary stock. However, both leaders also enjoyed charismatic legitimacy.

‡ Although President Hamid Karzai is viewed by the west as a secular leader, the current government of Afghanistan is officially an Islamic Republic, and many prominent members of parliament are former mujahedeen commanders and Islamists. The government must still find a way to balance Islamic Shari'a law with modern western civil and criminal laws and human rights. Afghanistan's current leaders do not claim divine legitimacy, but instead represent a secular government within an Islamic society.
Although three of the four regimes were authoritarian by nature, the Monarchy, Communists and Taliban, only two were entirely home-grown forms of government, the monarchy and Taliban, while the Communist and democratic Islamic Republic are of external origin, and relied on significant foreign intervention to sustain their rule.

These same regime pairs, the monarchy and Taliban and the Communists and the democratic Republic, also share common relations to Islam, whose position as a guarantor of political legitimacy or source of mobilization and resistance in Afghanistan is well documented.263

In summary, this initial cursory analysis of the four Afghan regimes suggests only a nuanced correlation between the form of government and the role of Islam, with each indigenous form of government, the monarchy and the Taliban, each using Islam as a means of legitimating their rule. Alternatively, Islam was also used as a source of political mobilization and resistance against the foreign, non-Islamic governments imposed by the Communists and current democratic Islamic Republic.

B. GRADING STATE CAPACITY

The following section is a comparative analysis of state capacity across all four cases. Table 12 summarizes each regime's development of governing structures and relative state capacity based on the nominal scale employed in Chapters III-VI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Activity</th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (+) Structure present (-) Structures absent (+) Some capacity (-) No capacity

Table 12. Comparative Analysis of State Capacity Under Four Afghan Regimes

However, in order to produce more gradated results, I will now apply a simple ordinal scale to each regime, in each of Charles Tilly's four state activities presented. The objective of this endeavor is to increase analytical nuance by ranking the different regimes' ability to develop governing capacity. The following scale is used to rank each regime's relative state capacity on a scale of one to five:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Little capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Some capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Much capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>High capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Ordinal Scale Used to Grade State Activities

1. War Making

Comparative analysis of each regime suggests that War Making, the capability to neutralize enemies outside one's national borders, is not a historically necessary state activity for the development and consolidation of the Afghan state. With the exception of threatened Iranian action against the Taliban, Afghanistan has not faced the prospect of war from its neighbors during the modern era. Thus, the development of a national army has not historically been a state necessity based on the need to defend against an external threat, but rather been used as a key security apparatus of the central government in the state-making process.

Abdur Rahman created a national army for the internal pacification of Afghanistan, while tribal armies (lashkar) and militias (arbokai) were left to defend against Russian encroachment to the north. Having successfully broken tribal resistance by 1896, the army was subsequently restructured over the next several decades, although largely as an example of Afghanistan's relative modernity more than military necessity. Having become a Soviet patron during the Cold War, the Afghan National Army was organized and equipped for the purpose of Afghanistan's defense against foreign aggression by the 1970s.
As it turned out, the force structure and capability of the Soviet force, (the overreliance on mechanized infantry, armor and airpower) was ill suited for the kind of unconventional guerilla warfare mounted by the mujahedeen resistance following the Soviet invasion. I.e. a national army had historically been used only in support of state-making, not war making activities. Until such a time as state-making is attained, as it was by the end of Abdur Rahman's rule, the requirement for a modern Afghan conventional army need not be a priority, except as required for internal pacification. As the nature and tactics of Afghan resistance has not changed, the capability requirement of a national army force structure connotes the need to be able to fight a counter-insurgent style of guerilla warfare in uneven an often inaccessible terrain, and the ability to politically as well as physically isolate the insurgent from his traditional support base, the qawm. This last task itself connotes a strong state mechanism that has sufficient capacity to penetrate levels of local solidarity.

Of each regime's war making capacity, the monarchy under Amir Rahman and the Soviet's achieved some capacity to wage war outside Afghanistan's external borders. The distinction is that they had the capacity, not an overwhelming force by which to conquer neighboring lands. While the Afghans had fought wars along its northern and eastern frontiers for decades before Abdur Rahman became Amir, local tribes spanning the areas of foreign encroachment had largely fought such wars. By both subduing and nominally uniting the tribes under his divine leadership, Amir Rahman amassed a national army capable of campaigning outside traditional tribal boundaries.

The Afghan National Army had a similar capability by the 1970s, having begun the process of modernization with Soviet equipment and training since the 1950s. The combined arms of the ANA and Soviet Army were certainly sufficient to have fought conventional wars throughout the region, which might have been preferred to the insurgent guerilla warfare encountered in Afghanistan.

In contrast, the current Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, like the Taliban, has neither sufficient troop strength nor weapons to conduct a military campaign against Afghanistan's neighbors, principally Iran or Pakistan, who have substantial standing armies and sophisticated military hardware. Thus, while the following grades are
ascribed to each regime's relative capacity for war making, (see Table 14), the principal use of the military in each case examined has been for the internal consolidation of the state, i.e., state-making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Grading Relative Capacity for War Making

2. State-making

In real terms, each successive Afghan regime has necessarily had to concern itself with state-making as its primary task, predicated on the need to eliminate or neutralize enemies within its territory that challenge state authority or threaten regime survival. The singular exception in the modern era is the monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman, whose lengthy and brutal campaigns to subdue the tribes succeeded in not only establishing the modern state of Afghanistan, but in fundamentally eradicating the means of tribal resistance for a generation. The peace that the Amir created lasted for seventy years, although shortly interrupted by the Tajik revolt against King Amanullah in 1929. Despite this momentary lapse, the monarchy's security apparatus, including the army, were never mobilized for internal pacification to the degree under the 'Iron Amir's' rule, or prior to the communist coup and Soviet invasion. In addition, the governing structures and institutions created by Abdur Rahman were so effective that they have been largely replicated (or the attempted replication) by successive regimes.

Unable to advance their revolution beyond the vanguard party and rife with internal ethnically based partisan conflict (a hallmark of Afghan rule), the Soviet invasion was intended to bolster the PDPA and prevent an Islamist revolution in Afghanistan. While the PDPA was never able to ignite a grassroots revolution, the Soviet invasion itself ignited widespread insurgency predicated on their foreign intervention, whose un-Islamic banner only further alienated the regime from a historically key source of state legitimacy, Islam. This fact was only further exacerbated by the call of jihad against the

264 An Islamist regime had come to power in neighboring Iran earlier that year, in April 1979.
Soviets, a necessary political strategy by which: (1) religious figures (mullah's and other mujahedeen commanders) could obtain political authority, and (2) lashkar (tribal armies) could operate beyond their traditional boundaries. Ultimately, the communists were unable to translate their centralized executive and administrative apparatchik into any meaningful source of popular control and authority. Moreover, the misuse of military and security apparatuses led to the state's defeat on two fronts. Militarily and numerically superior, the Soviet Red Army and ANA were never able to adapt to the kind of asymmetrical insurgent warfare waged by the mujahedeen. Meanwhile the expenditure of vast resources on internal security services such as the KhAD, led to the purge and elimination of as many party members as mujahedeen fighters killed in battle. Fueled by ethnic and ideological differences, this fundamental misdirection of effort directly facilitated in the erosion and collapse of the PDPA from within.

Alternatively, the Taliban, who did derive political legitimacy from Islam, still alienated the majority of Afghans with the strict enforcement of their radical fundamentalist dogma. However, the Taliban's decentralized bottom-up approach to state-making and extensive use of existing local kin-based tribal, ethnic and regional political structures enabled them to establish a significant presence at the district and village levels. In the majority of areas where Islamic belief was not enough to subjugate and rule the population, the Taliban relied on familial relationships or resorted to intimidation and coercion to implement their decentralized rule.

In contrast, the current Afghan regime under President Hamid Karzai has not been adept at all in either establishing centralized authority or decentralized control of Afghanistan. While much media attention is paid to the blame-game, citing either the International Community or President Karzai as the chief bearer of fault for the failure to extend the reach of Kabul, the fact is that both are responsible. However, whatever the reasons for the bureaucratic ineptitude and Taliban resurgence, the challenge now rests squarely on the shoulders of Afghanistan's elected representatives, particularly Karzai.

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265 It is no coincidence that each of the seven major mujahedeen parties were commanded by a religious figure that boasted Islamist credentials.
Although a Durrani Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe, President Karzai never held the kind of legitimacy predicated upon by previous Afghan regimes. Karzai holds neither the traditional legitimacy of previous monarchs, including Abdur Rahman and the late Zahir Shah, or legitimacy derived from Islam. Nor has he turned out to be a particularly charismatic leader, able to circumvent other sources of legitimacy based on his own character and ability. Instead, President Karzai lies at the center of blame for the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, characterized by either his undesirability or inability to act. On the one hand is the personal nepotism bestowed upon his brother and other members of the regime he has created, while he has demonstrated time and again a negligent inability to counteract against regional warlords such as Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan and Gul Agha Shirzai who command regional *lashkar*, divert state resources, and generally undermine the authority of the center.

Although the Government of Afghanistan has attained many accomplishments over the past seven years, from the creation of a constitution to the holding of presidential and provincial elections, the fact remains that previous regimes were able to achieve more with less. State-making was the principal activity of both Abdur Rahman and the Taliban, but remains only a secondary objective of the current government, whose primary motive appears to be the protection of those in power and the privileged.

Table 15 depicts each regime's relative capacity for state-making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Grading Relative Capacity for State-making

As presented, Amir Rahman and the Taliban developed sufficient capacity for state-making. This is in contrast to the communists and current regime, whose authority is not felt beyond the capital or regional strongholds from which security forces operate. Although presented in a little greater detail later in this chapter, a key distinction between the Amir and the Taliban regime was the nature of their rule, the Amir favoring a state-centric top-down approach while the Taliban was more of a bottom-up phenomenon.
3. Protection

As noted in Table 12, protection appears to be a necessary condition for achieving a relatively high degree of state capacity, as the efficacy of networks intended to inform and protect the state are an integral component of regime survival. To this end, the co-option (coercion, bribing) of local solidarity groups is a necessary means of obtaining local support without committing forces necessary to crush local solidarity groups which would likely only generate more resistance against the state. This passive penetration of and use of solidarity groups, helps to neutralize or isolate potential state adversaries and allow effective consolidation of forces toward state-making.

Having neutralized the tribes, Abdur Rahman relied on a vast network of spies and informants intended to apprise the monarch of any intrigue directed against him, while the Soviet's over reliance on state security agencies actually undermined consolidation of the state. Instead of focusing on creating divisions within the mujahedeen parties, who were equally eager to fight each other as fight Soviets, the rival PDPA factions relied on an over abundance of secret police and intelligence services which not only culled the ranks of potential adversaries and usurpers but also able-bodied technocrats and intelligentsia who compose the core of any bureaucracy. Thus, the diligence and exuberance with which these services carried out their primary task undercut the very ability of the Party and Politbureau to develop lasting and meaningful institutions.

With the exception of Al Qaeda, and outside the observation of some Pashtun tribal customary laws codified in Pashtunwali, the Taliban offered little formal protection to anyone who did not share their same fundamentalist beliefs. However, the decentralized nature of Taliban rule, in part due to the increasing reclusiveness of Mullah Omar from direct administration, allowed the various shura who oversaw the government's administration and the local foot soldiers who implemented the Taliban's harsh edicts to offer a form of local protection akin to that implemented by the mafia.

Perhaps a legacy of the ethnic and political fragmentation that occurred under the Soviets, protection under the Karzai regime is possibly at its worst more than at any other
time in Afghanistan's political history. Although the state-directed security and intelligence services are not as vast as under communist rule, the level of state protection afforded corrupt officials and other prominent persons is at a historical high, and has just as readily undermined the credibility and capacity of the center as under the Soviets. The reason for this is that the current Karzai regime is dominated by powerful individuals and groups in competition for state resources and positions of relative absolute power and authority. In other words, the state is dominated by strongmen, whose extensive personal patronage and protection hinders and undermines the very writ of the state they purport to represent and serve. However, unlike the extensive protection and patronage network employed by Abdur Rahman, which earns a higher grade based on its semi-formal status as a state institution, extensive protectionism under the Soviets and Karzai regime undermined the state's capacity for state-making, whereas they complemented it during the Amir's reign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Grading Relative Capacity for Protection

4. Extraction

Of the cases examined, only the monarchy developed sufficient structures and capacity for the extraction of resources required to sustain and expand the state. Developed under Abdur Rahman, these mechanisms went largely unchanged until the monarchy was abolished in 1973. Reasons for subsequent regimes' inability to establish structures adequate for the extraction of human resources and capital may be in part or combination due to their short-lived nature or heavy reliance on foreign patronage.

The communist PDPA never had a large indigenous support base as evidenced by their inability to spread their communist revolution beyond the vanguard party down to the grassroots level. (This may be largely in part to the inability to operationalize Marxist ideology, whose call for a proletariat revolution was incompatible with the largely rural and agrarian Afghan population). Moreover, the subsequent Soviet invasion led to the
prompt subordination of the government in Kabul and the ANA under Moscow's
direction, negating the former's ability to extract resources from the Afghan masses while
making the Soviet Union (especially the Central Asian Republics) the primary source of
recruits, labor, capital, food and other materiel required to sustain the war effort. The
Soviets destroyed Afghanistan's agricultural and commercial infrastructure, a legacy that
the current regime is still trying to fix.

Although the Taliban never established formal means of extraction beyond local
recruitment and a crackdown on some forms of banditry, their diffuse and local level of
operations did not require the kind of resources needed by larger bureaucracies. There
were ample arms left over from the Soviet occupation and civil war, while the daily
pattern of Afghan life had returned to means of local subsistence in the absence of central
governance and a national economy. Moreover, the Taliban was able to subsidize its
operations largely through funds obtained from madrassas throughout the Muslim world,
but mostly from neighboring Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as the personal coffers of
Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.

Finally, the challenge of extraction is especially salient for the current regime, as
the Democratic form of government connotes a deep and layered bureaucracy requiring
vast resources for combating the insurgency and the establishment of governance at the
federal, provincial and district levels. This task is especially difficult following three
decades of civil warfare in which the means and mechanisms of extraction were all
obliterated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Grading Relative Capacity for Extraction

C RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY

The basis of resistance is re-examined in the next section in order to determine
any historical patterns and linkages between the state and solidarity groups that could
yield important insight into how best extend the writ of the state. This approach seeks to
determine key indicators and trends relative to the state's ability to create necessary institutions and develop sufficient governing capacity.

With the exception of the monarchy under Abdur Rahman, who successfully eliminated tribal resistance by the end of his reign, each major resistance group succeeded in toppling the regime it opposed, albeit with external help.

With the establishment of the PDPA in 1964, the communists quickly established themselves in political opposition to the monarchy. Although the coup that would eventually topple the monarchy a decade later came from within the royal family, Prince Daoud, the PDPA aspired to be the vanguard of their own communist revolution, finally deposing the Daoud regime in 1978. Had the communists (who commanded major elements of the military) not struck, Daoud might have been ousted by any number of the Islamist parties, such as Hizb-e Islami, who were unsuccessful in their earlier attempts to secure his removal and had taken up residence in Pakistan. These same Islamist parties constituted the bulk of the mujahedeen resistance to the subsequent Soviet invasion that bolstered the communist regime. Failing to reconcile their ideological and ethnic sectarian differences in the U.N.-brokered Afghan Interim Government following the Soviet withdrawal and fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, the mujahedeen parties then allowed the Taliban to sweep to power four years later.

Militarily weakened but undefeated, former mujahedeen parties still constituted the major political and military resistance to the Taliban with the United Islamic Front (UIF) promptly occupying Kabul following the U.S.-led invasion in October 2001, and UIF leadership taking key posts in the new interim government. In a fateful (but not unprecedented) reversal of fortune, an undefeated Taliban now mount the largest opposition against the incumbent regime of President Hamid Karzai.

Although not every successive Afghan regime since Abdur Rahman is presented in this thesis, a basic pattern of rule and resistance has none-the-less emerged. Unless completely defeated, the prevailing resistance groups during each administration have
been largely successful in deposing the incumbent government and establishing a new Afghan regime. The cyclical pattern between regime and resistance is depicted in Table 18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy (1880-1901)</td>
<td>Tribal – successfully defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy (After 1964)</td>
<td>Communist &amp; Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist (1978-1992)</td>
<td>Islamist mujahedeen factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban (1996-2001)</td>
<td>Former mujahedeen Islamists (mostly UIF) and some Pashtuns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIF/Pashtun (2001 – Present)</td>
<td>Taliban; former mujahedeen Islamists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18. Afghanistan's Regime-Resistance Historical Cycle

Another salient point of this analysis therefore is to determine the basis for resistance so that this cycle may be broken, allowing for the establishment of a stable and lasting central government to reestablish the writ of the state to the local level.

As advanced in Chapter I, the basic unit of Afghan identity and interaction with the state is through local solidarity groups, known as qawm. The basis of a qawm is based on common tribal (kin), ethnic, or regional relations. Throughout Afghanistan's history, the qawm has remained the fundamental basis of local solidarity and state interaction.

In all four of the cases examined, the core constituency of each major challenger to the state has consolidated around tribal, ethnic or regional ties, despite the adoption of a universal political ideology.

This is especially true when comparing the three most recent cases, in which an espoused Islamist ideology has been both the basis for resistance and for governance. That the major mujahedeen parties were, and remain largely divided along ethnic and regional lines is testament to the strength of the qawm over an ideology as a basis for solidarity. For the government, this connotes the proposition that no universal set of principles, whether based on Islamic law or rooted in western democratic ideals, will appeal to everyone. In contrary, a better way to look at ideology as a mobilizing factor in Afghanistan is not to promote some foreign creed around which you inspire to rally the
masses to the government (such as communism or Deobandism), but to instead avoid the official adoption of a creed around which normally divisive groups find common cause to resist. By doing so, there will be no ideological grounds on which to mount resistance.

In addition, the government needs to be inclusive and representative of tribal, ethnic and regional elements. As Table 19 indicates, the primary basis of resistance to the central government during each regime has been based on identification with a qawm, whether tribal, ethnic or regional solidarity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qawm identity</th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. Comparative Analysis of Resistance Group's Basis of Solidarity

Thus the success of each regime, as measured by its relative ability to develop state capacity, is directly related to that regime's ability to penetrate or dismantle local traditional governing structures, undermine the basis of individual Afghan solidarity, and redirect an individual's fealty toward the state instead toward the qawm.

Employing the same simple Likert scale used to grade state capacity, Table 20 depicts each regime's relative ability to penetrate local solidarity groups in effort to extend the reach of the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Islamists</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Regimes’ Ability to Penetrate Local Solidarity Groups

As previous analysis and discussion has proven, Amir Rahman and the Taliban were both successful in penetrating local solidarity groups as a means of extending the writ of the state to the local level. The 'Iron Amir' achieved the highest level of local penetration, crushing existing tribal institutions and replacing traditional networks with his own state apparatus. As evidenced in Chapter III, his rule was both ruthless and

266 Here, the term “penetrate” refers to any means by which the government uses, crushes, coerces, co-opts, disrupts, or otherwise replaces local level governance with the writ of the central state.
absolute, and resulted in the eventual pacification of all Afghan tribes under his rule by 1896. So effective was the totality of the Amir's endeavor that tribal dynamics played little historical political significance for nearly seven decades. Only during the intra-faction squabbles of the communist PDPA in the 1960s did tribal dynamics carry a modicum of weight on the political stage. It took another full decade of brutal civil war under the Soviets to fragment Afghan society, driving some of the remains to realign along their traditional tribal basis of solidarity.

In my final analysis, there appears to be some direct correlation between a regime's ability to develop a high degree of state capacity with that regime's ability to penetrate or co-opt local governing structures that are the basis of individual Afghan solidarity. Ultimately, this task has been proven to be achieved through the establishment of sufficient governing institutions and structures in Tilly's 'state-making' activity, necessarily requiring the singular task of eliminating threats within the state's borders.

In all cases examined, the state's institutions for war making, principally a large standing army, have been primarily employed for the exclusive purpose of state-making and regime consolidation. This historical fact suggests that the Government of Afghanistan need not field an army with sufficient capacity for combating external adversaries, but must instead organize, equip and field a force that is capable of maintaining the state's monopoly on violence and the prevention of armed revolt.

The Soviets were conventionally militarily superior to the forces of Afghanistan and its neighbors, but failed to subdue the Afghans. Alternatively, the Taliban were militarily inferior to both Iran and Pakistan, but fielded a light and responsive guerilla force that was largely successful in pacifying 90 percent of the Afghan countryside.

D. SUMMARY: STATE CAPACITY AND RESISTANCE

Table 21 summarizes each regime's relative capacity in each of Tilly's four state activities, as well as its ability to penetrate local solidarity groups that pose the primary means of resistance to central authority and rule. For each regime, an overall grade for
state capacity is provided, representing the sum of individual grades awarded each regime in each area of the four state activities analyzed, as well as its ability to penetrate local solidarity groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Activity</th>
<th>Monarchy Capacity</th>
<th>Communists Capacity</th>
<th>Islamists Capacity</th>
<th>Democracy Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-making</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetrate Local Solidarity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21. Relative State Capacity of Four Afghan Regimes

The basis for the overall grade is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 5</td>
<td>No capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 10</td>
<td>Little capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 15</td>
<td>Some capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 – 20</td>
<td>Much capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 25</td>
<td>High capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Ordinal Scale Used to Grade Overall State Capacity

As Table 21 notes, the monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman developed a relatively high degree of state capacity, while the Taliban's Islamist theocracy achieved a degree of state capacity in the median of the scale. The Communists and the current Islamic Republic generated only little overall capacity.

In these two latter cases, the Soviet's war machine accounted for a significant portion of the Communist regime's score, owing to the potential war making capacity that the Soviets could have brought to bear against Afghanistan's neighbors. Similarly, the Communists and the current GoA both have extensive protection networks, although the Soviet's tended to be more formal and the Karzai regimes' informal. Although they both scored relatively heavily on the individual scale for the 'protection' state activity, the protectionism observed in both cases worked to extensively undermine, delegitimize, and
fracture the state from within, instead of working to consolidate and centralize its rule. Requiring an increasing amount of time and resources to manage, these protection networks detracted from what should have been the primary task of eliminating state enemies. Moreover, given the overall inability of both regimes to expand its rule beyond the immediate capital and a handful of large urban centers and operating bases, the overall capacity grade awarded each regime should have appeared much lower, indicating 'No capacity' instead of 'Little capacity.'

Apart from this analysis of the protection state activity, not other major correlation is apparent, apart from the overwhelming correlation between the state-making activity, which is the ultimate task of each regime analyzed, and each regimes' ability to penetrate local solidarity groups. This result is hardly surprising if viewed simplistically: that the more successful regimes were more successful in their ability to crush their opposition. This is hardly surprising, recalling Max Weber's axiom regarding a state's monopoly on violence. However, what is of utmost interest to this thesis is how this was achieved. After all, neither the Soviets nor a U.S.-led coalition of international military and security forces, with all their military and technological might, has been successful in routing and defeating an Afghan insurgency. Therefore, the means by which Abdur Rahman and the Taliban both ruled and dealt with their foes are the seminal findings of this thesis from which broader implications for state building are derived.

E. FINDINGS

Based on the previous analysis of state capacity and resistance among the four Afghan regimes examined, several key findings emerge. The task, however, is not merely to offer superficial evidence as to why the regimes of Abdur Rahman and the Taliban achieved a higher degree of state capacity and why the Soviets and current Karzai regime did not, but to uncover a deeper understanding of Afghan rule, challenges to that rule, and how different Afghan regimes met those challenges. These findings are largely divisible into characteristics of successful Afghan regimes (those that achieved relatively high state capacity) and characteristics of Afghan resistance (that impede state capacity).
1. Characteristics of Successful Afghan Regimes

a. External Support

In each case examined, all relied on external support either to come to power or in attempt to remain in power.

With the exception of the PDPA, who deposed the authoritarian regime of Mohammad Daoud without immediate external support, all of the other regimes came to power with either direct or indirect support from a major regional power. The British helped secure Amir Rahman's claim to the Afghan monarchy, ending years of internecine struggle for the throne, while the Taliban received logistical support in the way of money, arms and vehicles from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The current embattled regime would also not have obviously come to power without the will and support of the U.S. to overthrow the Taliban. Returning to the PDPA, the Soviet's December 1979 intervention in Afghanistan was an obvious - if not fatal – effort to sustain the communist revolution and prop up the regime.

A key distinction of the external support afforded each regime, however, is that in cases where the regime was more successful in establishing rule and generating state capacity, namely under Abdur Rahman and the Taliban, external support generally ended with monies (and other military support in the case of the Taliban), and did not devolve in an attempt to influence or take over direct administration of rule as was the case of the Soviet intervention or is the view of Afghans alienated by the Karzai regime.

Both Abdur Rahman and the Taliban were able to maintain independent rule with external support while the PDPA and current Government of Afghanistan are perceived to be the puppets of their foreign patrons, and therefore derive no legitimacy for their rule.

b. Legitimacy

Legitimacy is important to any ruler, for without it, they would quickly be deposed by the masses they claim to govern. The Afghan state has historically centered
around a single charismatic leader in whom absolute power is consolidated, and who has derived legitimacy based on traditional, charismatic or legal authority.\textsuperscript{267}

Of the regimes presented, each regime was characterized by one, or more, charismatic leaders whose legitimacy was based on personal ability. Abdur Rahman's rule was rooted in all three sources of legitimacy. He had traditional legitimacy based on kin-based clan relations to previous Afghan monarchs, while his charismatic legitimacy was based largely on his personal ability, but also his claim to divine rule. Finally, the 'Iron Amir' established a legal basis for his authority, as well as the hereditary succession of the monarchy, through public and written proclamations. No other Afghan rule obtained legitimacy based on all three sources. The only other legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, presented in this thesis, was the Taliban's Mullah Omar, who was ordained with divine charismatic legitimacy when he donned the Cloak of Mohammed.

Alternatively, none of the communist leaders (Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin or Mohammad Najibullah) or President Karzai rule based on any sources of legitimacy. While it was widely expected by the international community, particularly the U.S., that Karzai's Popalzai Durrani heritage could be translated into a source of traditional authority, such assumptions proved ill-conceived, especially given that the last Afghan monarch, Zahir Shah, was still alive at the time\textsuperscript{268} and there was a substantial Afghan contingent that pushed for his restoration, even if only ceremonial.

Following the establishment of legitimacy, another key finding based on the comparative analysis of regimes is that indigenous rule is necessary to maintain legitimacy. Legitimacy could have theoretically been lost if rule was conferred to an external power. Although this proposition can only be inferred from the discussion of


\textsuperscript{268} King Zahir Shah died in 2007.
external support and legitimacy, the fact that indigenous systems of rule prevailed in Afghanistan speaks to the dichotomy between foreign support, foreign rule and legitimacy.

c. Indigenous Rule

As implied in the previous section, regimes whose government is based on indigenous forms administration, whether monarch or Islamist, have been perceived as more legitimate and therefore more adept at developing state capacity than regimes whose rule is perceived as alien. Both the Soviets in the 1980s and the United States presently are perceived to have installed puppet governments in Kabul whose rule was founded upon a non-Islamic ideology, external legitimacy, and whose statute was administered by an alien form of bureaucracy.

The changes brought by these western powers were radical and abrupt, attempting to bring sweeping reform on the heels of foreign invasion and occupation. Thus, the promotion of human rights and the equality of women were anathema to the Afghan people as much for their rapid top-down mandate from the center, as for their liberal ideals, that alienated Afghans traditionally conservative customs and values, as well as sought to abolish historically patriarchal (and exclusivistic) local governing structures.

In addition, the Afghan National Army and police forces were styled after their foreign benefactors, relying on western chains' of command, armaments and tactics for use against their own fellow citizens. Alternatively, Abdur Rahman built his national army out of conquered tribes while the Taliban relied on local, mostly Pashtun, tribal militias. That the Amir and the Taliban's "armies" were largely drawn from-, organized around-, and fought as tribal arbokai and lashkar is of importance also, connoting a composition that was largely of the same solidarity group and not of as mixed allegiance as the western-stylized ANA.

The indigenous nature of rule, as well as the organization and composition of security forces, helped legitimate the Amir and the Taliban's rule. Rooted in legitimate forms of Afghan rule, and without overt external support to subvert their authority, these
same regimes were then free to employ totalitarian means to further subjugate and control the Afghan population in effort to stay in power and prevent a reversion to pre-modern forms of tribal rule.

d. **Totalitarian Rule**

Afghans have historically respected and looked toward a strong leader. It is therefore of little surprise that the most successful rulers of the Afghan state, Amir Rahman and the Taliban, have ruled by relatively brutal means over often inaccessible and inhospitable terrain, and over a warrior culture that has devoured many of the greatest armies amassed since antiquity.

In each successful case, both the 'Iron Amir' and the Taliban employed extensive intelligence and patronage networks as a means of both keeping informed, but in also promulgating edicts that sought to direct the totality of Afghan life. The Iron Amir associated crime with direct disobedience to his divine and direct rule, while the Taliban directed everything from beard length to the banning of music and kite flying.

While Abdur Rahman and the Taliban achieved the highest relative degree of state capacity through often-despotic totalitarian rule, another key component of their success was their relative ability to defeat major opponents who directly challenged their authority and rule. Thus, totalitarian rule can be seen as a political application necessary to subdue the passive majority while the major state-making effort was focused on campaigns against minority challengers to the regime.

e. **Defeat Opponents**

The total military defeat of the regime's chief political opposition is an historical imperative of the Afghan regimes presented in this thesis. As noted in Table 17, the inability of an incumbent regime to annihilate its opposition eventually led to that regime's downfall. I.e. In all cases where the opposition was not defeated, it was eventually able to challenge and depose the incumbent regime, and establish itself as the basis of a new government. Only the 'Iron Amir' succeeded in overcoming all of his challengers.
Achieving total peace five years prior to his death, Amir Rahman established an environment that allowed him to pass the monarchy on to his son, Habibullah, who reigned in relative domestic peace.

In addition to military superiority, successful Afghan regimes have been able to achieve a relative monopoly on violence through the direct control or subversion of traditional means of administration at the local level.

f. Centralized Control, Decentralized Authority

Since Afghan resistance is historically a primarily bottom-up, grass-roots phenomenon, regimes that have successfully met this resistance and gone on to create a relatively high degree of state capacity, were those in which absolute control was vested in the center, historically a charismatic autocrat, but whose authority was decentralized and executed at the lowest possible level.

While this is the primary objective to be achieved by all regimes, and the primary challenge facing the present Afghan government and its international backers, the ability to utilize, usurp or co-opt existing local governing structures has been a particular hallmark of successful Afghan regimes, and one to be emulated.

Although Amir Rahman set out to crush and decapitate tribal resistance, he left in its place a contrived but sophisticated administrative structure that essentially replaced local governing bodies with loyal functionaries and civil servants who transmitted and executed the Amir's authority down to the peasantry. Similarly, the Taliban initially centralized control under Mullah Omar, who retained 'spiritual' control of the movement, but later delegated political and military control to various shura in Kandahar and Kabul. However, the Taliban still relied on an extensive network of foot soldiers and local level officials, including uluswal (district officials first employed by Amir Rahman). The very fact that local tribal forms of governance were eradicated and displaced connoted the need for the establishment of a strong provincial and district presence in their stead of national solidarity was to be maintained. Henceforth, the vestiges of local government, as manifested in tribal, ethnic and regional solidarity groups, have reappeared during times of political weakness and upheaval at the center.
Such is the present case, where marginalized solidarity groups, principally represented in an undefeated Taliban, tribal and criminal groups, have re-established traditional kin-based ties as a basis of providing rudimentary local governance in the absence of a strong center whose authority is dominant at the local level.

g. Local Administration is Key

The ability to control and project authority at the local level has been a hallmark of successful Afghan regimes and is the desired end state for the current Government of Afghanistan and its international backers. Ultimately, with the exception of legitimacy, each of the previous characteristics of successful Afghan regimes who achieved relatively high degrees of state capacity, external support, indigenous totalitarian rule, the defeat of opponents and centralized control, decentralized authority, were all an ends to the fundamental task of placing local peoples and structures within the writ of the central state. I.e. Afghanistan's historical political narrative has necessarily been one of the competition for local control between the modern central state and solidarity groups who held sway over pre-modern local institutions. Thus, control and administration at the local level has been critical to preventing the reconstitution of these traditional governing structures that are the historical basis for Afghan resistance.

While Abdur Rahman and the Taliban were both largely able to administer at the local level, they employed different means to achieve this end.

Abdur Rahman replaced traditional tribal bodies with new executive and administrative structures that bridged the historic divide between the central state and local level governance. This was particularly evidenced at the district level, where the Amir appointed district governors ('alaqadar) and other officials (uluswal; hakim) as direct conduits for his centralized administration. These new district level posts facilitated the transmission of the Amir's writ down to the tribal level.

While the Taliban were more apt to use existing vestigial tribal structures as a means for promulgating their rule and denying the expression of dissent and freedom of movement for opposition forces at the local level, they still relied on permanent district-level structures to maintain a local governing presence. Instead of district
governors, the Taliban instead relied on regional *shura* as administrative and executive intermediary between the central state and provincial governors, and district officials and local foot soldiers.

Although the Taliban's authority was more diffuse relative than that of the Amir, the result was the same in that each used executive, administrative, judicial and military arms of government to exert control and implement their authority at the local level. Although the Amir employed local level tax collectors, district-level officials were common to both regimes, and, combined with other means of separating and controlling the population, allowed for the successful administration at the local level.

The Soviets recognized the need for district-level development, a key component for the expansion of their communist manifesto and COIN strategy.\(^{269}\) So too, the Karzai regime and the United States have recognized the need for an increased local presence, but current resources are insufficient.\(^{270}\)

The critical failure of the current state-building effort in Afghanistan has not been one of insufficient resources, although the commitment of additional international security forces and monies would surely help, but one of priorities. Getting off to a slow start following almost two years of relative subordination to the U.S. counterterrorism effort, the central aim of the current state-building effort is focused on buttressing the central government in Kabul and to develop and maintain a primarily military foothold at the provincial level. This strategy is derived from a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict and Afghanistan's political history, as well as ill-conceived donor priorities whose funds are directed by international public interest on often-wasteful projects instead of the critical task of creating institutional capacity and establishing security at the district and local level. Nowhere else has this chief incompetence been illustrated than in a reluctance to: (1) eliminate corruption and nepotism within the central government, (2) remove regional warlords and other wielders of authority, (3) establish a permanent civil government and security presence at the

\(^{269}\) Kakar, Government and Society, 193.

\(^{270}\) For example, Thomas H. Johnson notes the fundamental inadequacy of international security forces in Afghanistan compared to previous international peacekeeping operations. See: *The Big Muddy*, 107.
district level, such as the establishment of District Reconstruction Teams, (4) hold district-level elections, (5) fund initiatives that seek to establish and develop grassroots democratic ideals and institutions at the local level, such as the National Solidarity Program.

In closing, it is remarkable how similar the maps of Amir Rahman's nation (Figure 3) and the extent of Taliban control (Figure 12) look, when compared to maps illustrating the extent of Soviets military control (Figure 8) and that of the present Government of Afghanistan (Figure 18).271

2. Characteristics of Afghan Resistance

a. Insurgent, Guerilla Warfare

Afghan history is replete with examples of Afghan tribes' dismemberment of 'superior' invading armies through guerilla warfare and insurgent tactics. From Alexander the Great to the British Empire and Soviet Red Army, the Afghan tribes, particularly the Pashtun hill tribes that inhabit the Bolan and Khyber passes, have defended their ancestral homeland (*watan*) with unmatched fervor.

Rudyard Kipling encapsulated the British experience in Afghanistan, common among all foreign forages into 'the Land of Bones,' in his oft-quoted poem, *The Young British Soldier*.

> When you're wounded an' left on Afghanistan's plains,  
> An' the women come out to cut up your remains,  
> Just roll to your rifle an' blow out your brains,  
> An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.272

Although this thesis reveals a significant ethnic and religious component to Afghan resistance, factors whose propensity for insurgency are discounted by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin's 2003 analysis of “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”

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271 Although Figure 18 is a map depicting the extent of Taliban control in November 2008, it is by implication a graphical depiction of the lack of control by the current government.

Afghanistan is still historically saturated in three of the four conditions the same authors conclude favor insurgency, namely: poverty, political instability, and rough terrain.273

However, despite the seeming disparity between Kipling's lament of the horrors of war and Fearon and Laitin's clinical analysis of insurgency, warfare in Afghanistan has been historically fought on a local basis, although the scale has often engulfed the entire nation. In this, solidarity groups have consistently been the basis around which local tribal armies (lashkar) and militias (arbokai) have mobilized in defense of their homeland (watan).

b. **Prime Importance of Solidarity Groups**

In all cases examined, the composition of Afghan resistance has repeatedly been divided along traditional sources of Afghan identity: kin, tribe, clan, ethnicity and region, despite any ideological association of different resistance groups.

Even after Afghanistan's unification and emergence as a modern nation-state, solidarity groups have remained the prevalent basis of Afghan unity and identity, more so than any nationalistic identification as an Afghan, which is a term historically synonymous with the Pashtun tribes.

During the time of Abdur Rahman, kin-based tribal and clan identity was the very basis of resistance to the Amir's rule and the target of extensive campaigns to consolidate his empire. As noted in Table 1, the majority of his campaigns were directed against the tribes themselves, resulting in the decapitation of traditional tribal political and organization hierarchy. However, although subdued, these basic structures continued to be the basis for identity, mobilization, and resistance under subsequent regimes, indicating their endemic centrality to Afghan ethos.

Thus, although resurgent tribal identities were again 'fractured' during the anti-Soviet jihad, wider ethnic and regional solidarity became the principal basis for resistance, even when the overarching ideological struggle and operational objectives were the same and connoted a cry for Afghan nationalism. What was seen instead was

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273 A large population is the fourth condition. See: Fearon and Laitin, *Insurgency and Civil War*, 88.
primarily a surge in ethnic Pashtun nationalism, sparking irredentist claims to a wider Pashtun homeland, *Pashtunistan*, on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

This claim has largely been abandoned, although ethnicity and regional identity continued to be the non-ideological basis of identity and resistance during Taliban rule. Even now, tribe, ethnicity, and regional solidarity remain central to the various factions both within, and external to, the Afghan government, as well as the composition of both political and insurgent resistance to the current Afghan regime. Yet, the role of Islam in Afghan society and politics is another important element of Afghan resistance.

c. **Role of Islam**

As noted earlier, Islam has historically provided a source of political legitimacy for successful Afghan rulers. Yet, Islam need not be of the radical, puritanical ilk prescribed by the Taliban or mandate a strict adherence to Islamic Shari’a law out of some Islamic compulsion. In contrast, legitimate governments must embody and preserve the kind of conservative Islamic traditions practiced throughout Afghanistan. Therefore, a leader needs to be an upright Muslim, but need not be devout or a learned member of the ulema (community of religious scholars).

This is an important point, because as noted throughout my analysis, mullahs have not historically wielded political power either within the traditional Afghan tribal structure or as supreme heads of state. Instead, Islam, particularly the invocation of *jihad*, has provided the primary mechanism for mobilizing armed forces beyond their immediate traditional tribal borders. Thus it is of little surprise that major insurgent revolts against successive Afghan rulers and foreign invaders, including British forages into the Afghan frontiers in the 18th to 20th centuries and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, were mostly inspired by the declaration of *jihad* and led by mullahs and other pious religious figures.

Consequently, the threat of foreign invasion has accordingly been a common factor in facilitating the call for jihad, inciting wider tribal mobilization and insurgency.
d. **Unite Around Foreign Threat**

Historically, the threat of foreign invasion has galvanized Afghan resistance into temporarily sidelining domestic factional feuds and uniting against the singular common enemy. Although this tendency has been attributed to a kind of Afghan cultural xenophobia, it is a natural tendency to defend one's homeland against foreign aggression, whether embodied as a western foreign power or a rival tribe or ethnic group. The key distinction to be made here is on use of the term "foreign," which has a widely used nation-centric connotation. However, taken at its most basic meaning, the term 'foreign' can be conferred on anything different from oneself. Thus, Afghan xenophobia or resistance to foreign rule or invasion is easily ascribed to the basis of Afghanistan's traditional solidarity groups; i.e., Not of one's own kin, tribe, clan, ethnic group or region.

However, the Soviets & current democratic government of Hamid Karzai have historically experienced the most widespread, virulent and systemic resistance. While this is in part owed to the foreign (exogenous; external to national borders) nature of the threat, it may also be in part to the aforementioned perceived threat these non-Muslim invaders pose toward Islam. Both are salient factors for mobilization.

Ultimately, however, the primary reason for mobilization and resistance against what constitutes the Afghan state, whether of exogenous or indigenous origin, is the threat that the central state poses, by virtue of a nationalist agenda, toward the unity and historic self-determination of solidarity groups.

Thus, despite the dismemberment of tribal political institutions and the establishment of a modern nation-state under Amir Rahman, the basis of individual Afghan identity, predominantly in rural areas, has remained deeply rooted in pre-modern conceptions of group association and loyalty. These ideas are antithetical to the very idea of a modern nation-state attributed to the kind enlightened political ideals stemming from the American and French Revolutions from which the very idea of nationalism were borne.
e. Will Reconstitute, Unless Defeated

A final note on the nature of Afghan political opposition and resistance is not only its aptitude for guerilla warfare, but also its willingness to wage a protracted tactical campaign, able to withstand considerable state pressure and readiness to reconstitute unless totally defeated.

The critical importance of Pakistan's Pashtun tribes, who have maintained unbroken and unchallenged political autonomy and ethnic sovereignty relative to their Afghan neighbors, is of utmost import to the Taliban resurgence, reconstitution of Al Qaeda, and overall Afghan resistance. As noted, with the exception of Abdur Rahman, the incumbent regimes' governing structure and institutions did not survive the ouster of the regime’s leader, which historically marked the regime's defeat. The political space for political opposition created during the last decade of the monarchy contributed to the regime's fall and the ultimate ouster of the Daoud regime by the communist factions. Similarly, the Soviet's inability to vanquish the Islamist parties led to their own departure in 1989, as well as the fall of the communist government in 1992. The United Front, although weakened by the Taliban, was instrumental in the latter's ouster, but not their defeat. Unless the current U.S.-led CT and ISAF effort succeeds in definitively routing and defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as the Pakistan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Hisb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Al Qaeda and various criminal networks, the regime-resistance cycle is set to repeat itself.

Routed but undefeated, the Taliban have relied on the same traditional kin-based tribal relationships, local governing structures and basis of group identity and solidarity within Pakistan's NWFP and FATA as had existed in Afghanistan prior to decades of internecine warfare and civil strife. These relationships enabled the Taliban to reestablish a parallel governing structure within Pakistan, working within an impenetrable kin-based network that provides freedom of movement for operations against the Government of Afghanistan from within the sovereign sanctity of Pakistan. The environment in which the Taliban and other insurgent groups now operate is both politically and operationally ideal for a sustained campaign against the Karzai regime.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the historical analysis and research conducted in the previous five chapters, this chapter endeavors to draw some key implications for the current Government of Afghanistan and its coalition partners in their attempt to expand the reach of Kabul to the local level. These implications will not only bear significance for the current state-building effort, but also yield important insight into how to best counteract the Taliban insurgency, as well as deal with future state-building endeavors. Although I make candid recommendations for state building in Afghanistan in my concluding remarks, I completely acknowledge that the ultimate the task of building state and institutional capacity is up to the Afghan government, through the strategies it formulates, tasks it prioritizes, policies it implements and goals it realizes.

While implications for expanding state capacity are necessarily drawn from the historical analysis presented in the preceding chapters, any policy recommendations contained herein are guided by relevant discourse from the study of Post Conflict Reconstruction.

Synonymous with post-Cold War state-building experiences in Somalia, East Timor, Kosovo, and most recently, Afghanistan, Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) seeks to establish a sustainable civil government through concerted development efforts in four overlapping areas. These “Four Pillars” of Post Conflict Reconstruction are security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation.274

Each of these pillars is critical to the development of state capacity in Afghanistan, and represents the main areas where the GoA and international community are focusing their development efforts as reflected in the ANDS. However, the inequitable distribution of resources assigned each of these pillars, with security consuming the overwhelming majority of development spending, is illustrative of a flawed development strategy. Justice, economic development and governance, arguably

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more important for the development of state capacity and long term viability of the government, receive less than 40 percent of total budget expenditures combined.\footnote{275} If anything this historical analysis has proven, it’s that security alone was not enough to overcome Afghan insurgent forces or build state capacity. Successful regimes have relied on a combination of all of these pillars, particularly governance and social justice being the key to breaking traditional sources of Afghan resistance at the local. Thus, the cornerstone of my policy recommendations urge a return to a more equitable strategy for Afghanistan’s development aimed at creating a viable and sustainable government and not solely aimed at ineffectively combating a rural insurgency.

These recommendations are guided by the “Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development”:

1. **Ownership.** Afghanistan must set its own development needs and priorities.
2. **Capacity building.** Involves the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to individuals and institutions so that they acquire the long-term ability to establish effective policies and deliver competent public services.
3. **Sustainability.** A program’s impact should be designed to endure beyond the end of the project.
4. **Selectivity.** Resource allocation based on need and policy goals.
5. **Assessment.** Based on careful research, design reconstruction plans for local conditions.
6. **Results.** Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives.
7. **Partnership.** Collaborate with governments, communities, donors and others.
8. **Flexibility.** Adapt to changing conditions and take advantage of opportunities.
9. **Accountability.** Fight corruption. Ensure programs are transparent and accountable.\footnote{276}

Although not individually addressed in-turn, these principles inform the basis of the following implications and recommendations for how to best extend the reach of the government of Kabul.

\footnote{275 Mid Term Budget Framework – English.}
A. IMPLICATIONS

The current Afghan government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai faces the same obstacles in establishing effective control and governing capacity today as that faced by the other regimes examined. The rule of past regimes that were largely successful in subduing insurgency and generating a relative degree of state capacity, the monarchy under Amir Rahman and the Taliban, were predicated on legitimate authority, even though their rule was totalitarian and brutal. This historical trend poses a major problem for the current Government of Afghanistan, whose rule is based on rational (legal) sources of legitimacy, which has no historical basis for singularly legitimizing Afghan rule.

President Karzai could go a long way to exercise his executive authority in attempt to obtain the loyalty and obedience of his parliament and provincial governors. His government is in need of reform into order to end the widespread corruption and nepotism that dominate Afghan politics. President Karzai’s own brother is alleged to be one of Afghanistan’s biggest drug warlords. Moreover, some provincial governors and influential members of parliament, including Cabinet Ministers, are criminals, warlords and military commanders from former regimes, many of whom still maintain strong private armies and who rule their provinces like their own personal fiefdoms, using their government position to protect them in their illicit activities.

The authority of the current government in Kabul is additionally undermined by foreign military forces and advisers, whose mere presence serves to delegitimize the government and provide a strong source for political mobilization and resistance. Yet, overcoming the fundamental issue of political legitimacy is just one facet of the many challenges facing this government and coalition forces. The central task remains one of extending the government's reach to the local level, amidst an insurgency that has not only engulfed over ninety percent of the countryside, but has exponentially escalated in the number and severity of attacks against coalition forces and government representatives over the past three years.
Backed by the external power of the British, the 'Iron Amir' was faced with establishing his own legitimacy and authority over an occupied territory populated by the ethnically diverse and independent tribes within his borders. This situation is analogous to the conditions under which Hamid Karzai assumed Presidency of the interim Afghan government in December 2001, following the U.S.-led military coalition that toppled the Islamist Taliban regime. American and NATO forces continue to conduct security, reconstruction and counter-terrorism operations within Afghanistan’s borders, effectively performing many of the state-making tasks undertaken by the Amir over century ago. These military operations should alleviate some of the logistical burden on the Karzai regime, who should place increased focus on extending bureaucratic and administrative consolidation and control of the government.

As Afghanistan's last monarch, Zahir Shah, died in 2007, the opportunity is past for reviving the monarchy under his eldest surviving son, Crown Prince Ahmad Shah. However, even the ceremonial re-establishment of the monarchy may prove an important source of legitimacy and nationalism reconciliation for the Afghan people, who hold a nostalgic view of the monarchy. In this way, a new Afghan monarch could potentially confer some political legitimacy upon an elected ruler, and provide a legitimate source of stability and inspiration, such as how England and Japan's monarchs are still revered. The symbolic value of the monarchy as a source of political legitimacy should not be discounted out-of-hand, as the current regime faces a terrible crisis of legitimacy, and is unlikely to develop such authority on its own, without significant changes in behavior, policy and composition.

Judicial reform provides another avenue by which the current democratic government can gain inroads toward the development of legitimate authority. The government needs to be perceived as amenable toward, and not in opposition against traditional conservative Islamic customs. Judicial reform that integrates aspects of Islamic Shari'a law with modern criminal and civil law could go a long way toward promoting a virtuous image for the secular government, who could translate such a move into political capital as both the defender of Islamic values and dispenser of Islamic justice, claims that have resided for too long in the domain of radical Islamists and
terrorists, instead of the government. This last aspect is key, as the application of the Shari'a would be respectful of human rights and largely compatible with international law, as long as no strict or puritanical interpretation of the Shari'a or adoption of the Hadith (punishments) are adopted. Judicial reform may look something like the Integrated Model for a District-level Justice System depicted in Figure 14, or take on different structure. The critical importance is to restore public confidence in the justice system, based on the equitable implementation of a legal code amenable to Islam, tribal customary law and international norms and laws concerning human rights.

National reconciliation must be another critical component of any strategy intended to extend the writ of the state to the local level. Only after grievances held by the losing side, in this case the Taliban, are reconciled, can the nation move forward. While this author concedes that the radical Islamist worldviews of many insurgent elements, particularly Taliban hard-liners and members of HIG, are irreconcilable with the idea of a democratic and secular Afghan state, moderate elements of all insurgent factions must be brought into the political process.

Such an endeavor, as with all political reforms and military campaigns, connotes the need for a comprehensive and targeted information operations campaign. Such a campaign need not come from the U.S. or NATO, or ISAF Headquarters, but from the government of Afghanistan itself, ideally from the Office of the President in coordination with the responsible ministry (Justice, Interior, etc.). This campaign must not focus on the efforts of coalition forces attempt to win 'hearts and minds,' but present a single, consistent and recurring message aimed at discrediting the Islamists heretical worldviews and undermining the very basis of civil disenfranchisement, alienation and insurgent mobilization that provides the permissive environment in which these elements operate. That Taliban insurgents and criminal elements now have freedom of movement in parts of Kabul is indicative of the magnitude of the insurgency and the urgency with which Afghan and coalition forces must move to re-liberate besieged provinces, districts, urban centers and rural villages.

Thus, the establishment of a permanent government presence at the local level is imperative. This can be achieved through the inclusion and participation, not exclusion or
direction, of local solidarity groups in local civic decisions of governance. This endeavor connotes the need for massive assistance and protection from the center, as well from the international community, that has been want to direct development spending on its own parochial objectives.

An increased security and government presence is also conducive to counterinsurgent strategy aimed at separating insurgent activities from the civilian populace, thereby aiding in their elimination. For this to work, the central state and its security apparatus must be the single guarantor of peace, security and relative economic prosperity, wielding not only a Weberian monopoly on violence, but equally important, a monopoly on social livelihood and welfare.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

To gain legitimacy, develop local governance, curb the insurgency, and ultimately extend the reach of Kabul, I advocate the establishment of something akin to District Reconstruction Teams (DRTs), replicating the Provincial Reconstruction Team construct at the district level. Advocating this idea is not something new or unique, but it is rooted firmly in the historical dichotomy between Afghan State and tribe. In addition, the establishment of DRTs offers a construct for combining local level security and civic governance based on something both familiar and in wide use, thereby making it easy to replicate. Finally, DRTs offer the same marriage between Afghan civilian government and security forces and international military forces and advisers that has been the model for Provincial level development, to the district level where it is woefully missing and most urgently (and historically) needed.

These DRTs need not be large, but they do need to be visible, providing basic security and public services while communicating and implementing the government’s National Development Plan. Key departments and programs, such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and the National Solidarity Program, whose sole task is the establishment and strengthening of local governing structures such as Community

277 Thomas H. Johnson, research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California, has advocated the need for a DRT construct in many of his seminars and lectures. Professor Johnson is also Senior Research Associate for NPS’ Center for Contemporary Conflict.
Development Councils, need to be integrated into the DRT construct, whose information campaign should be to put an overwhelmingly Afghan face on security operations, reconstruction, and local governance. In addition, these local government programs need as much exposure, funding and support from the central government and international community security, which currently monopolizes political discourse and media attention, but only to the profit of the Taliban.

Established in the immediate\textsuperscript{278} wake of a counterinsurgent offensive to recapture district capitals and villages, DRTs need to be created in combination with a massive information operations campaign, not only aimed at discrediting the Taliban, but on promoting national values, common ideals, and on strengthening the central government’s support and commitment to local government and development.

Once in place, DRTs need to facilitate district elections as soon as feasible, preferably within weeks of set up. District elections need not immediately occur nationwide, but must be held as individual districts are liberated and DRTs are put in place. Electoral terms may initially be short, such as only six months, until such a time as all districts in a province have been liberated and elections can be held province-wide.

This approach may be analogous to the attempted creation of “strategic hamlets” in the southern Republic of Vietnam in the 1960s, with the primary distinction being the forced relocation of government to the people, not the other way around. The desired result; decreased insurgent violence, the establishment of local governance, and creation of civil-political and economic ties between the central government and local populace, should be achievable as part of this all-encompassing framework.

In this last task, reclaiming local territory and sources of livelihood from insurgent and criminal groups, security forces and government officials must not be risk averse. The establishment of district and local level presence must be centrally coordinated and implemented in unison by international security forces and the civilian government. In areas of heavy insurgent, terrorist and criminal activity, the establishment of district reconstruction centers and district elections may not come at the

\textsuperscript{278} District Reconstruction Teams and relief supplies should be imbedded in second echelon forces, establishing government presence as part of COIN security operations, and not arrive days or weeks later.
same time for the entire country or even the same province. The territory lost to the Taliban and other insurgent forces, illustrated in Figure 18, is indicative of the amount of territory that needs to be retaken, by force, so that governance and security can be restored in these areas. The risk assumed by military and civilian personnel in COIN operations aimed at the restoration of district-level governance must not limit or prevent these objectives. However, national strategy and operational prudence should of course dictate the timing and coordination of such operations.

In much of the south and east, the systematic retaking of insurgent strongholds must be accompanied with universal poppy eradication, but not before sufficient economic means are provided the civilian populace to lift them out of immediate subsistence living or indentured farming and service to criminal organizations. This endeavor in itself connotes massive expenditure, and a plan for immediate but sustained agricultural development that would educate, supervise and subsidize farmer’s transition to alternative crops, and facilitate their delivery to market. An alternative strategy aimed at undermining Afghanistan’s illicit drug trade may be to legalize and regulate poppy production for the international medicinal market, as Turkey does. Although controversial, this avenue may create the opportunity for pharmaceutical companies' investment in Afghanistan, and a source of employment and the future development of a science and technology industry.

As with the composition of DRTs themselves, the monies and supplies needed for the immediate humanitarian relief of the local populace must be acquired and staged before the commencement of operations so that they can flow into district centers as part of the liberation campaign, once the main thrust of military forces have routed the insurgents. In all cases, the 'liberation' of district centers, towns and villages must be met with direct, overwhelming and permanent state institutions. In many places, this may only connote a small constabulary, or the re-armament and utilization of traditional tribal militias such as *arbokai*, which are akin to a neighborhood watch. In all cases, the free-flow of information between the center, provincial capitals, district centers and villages is critical to both maintaining vigilance (as village elders can point out who the insurgents
are, and more importantly, where they are) as well as meeting the provision of local needs, whether it be food subsidies, water, roads or other basic services and public works projects.

Part of the tragedy of Afghanistan is that many of these recommendations and development goals are already outlined in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and targeted for implementation over the next five years. However, there appears to be no concerted effort on the part of the international community to either adequately fund these development projects or align greater COIN strategy and ISAF military operations in cooperation with the ANDS. The two are still not largely viewed as mutually inclusive, although many top military leaders in Afghanistan have made the realization that military means alone is not going to win the war. Only by coordinating the GoA’s development strategy with the international community’s COIN strategy would the government be able to achieve a relative capacity for state-making, the historical imperative of each Afghan regime. That these two strategies are not being implemented in concert, and are being attempted on the cheap, at the wrong level of government (provincial), and with risk adversity dictating the scope, scale and area of operations, there is little basis for hoping that the development goals outlined in the 35 Provincial-, 22 Sector-, and 37 Sector Annexes of the ANDS will be met. Therefore, the direction and scope of the coalition’s COIN campaign and international development effort must be met with the same responsiveness toward the achievement of deliberate government development goals that the ANDS aims to accomplish on an ambitious, but not unachievable, timeline.

C. CONCLUSION

Past attempts to extend the reach of Kabul outward have all been met with heavy resistance. A primary reason for this is the existence of solidarity groups, which are the root cause of Afghan political mobilization and resistance. Known as a qawm, these local tribal-, ethnic-, and regional social relationships remain the fundamental basis of individual Afghan identification and relations with the central state. Afghan political power and legitimate authority resides in these solidarity groups, at the local level.
In order to extend the reach of government to the local level, a fundamental shift in thinking is required, although not by leaders in Kabul, but by leaders in the west, who continue to view the creation of government as a top-down phenomenon. What this historical analysis has shown, and of what Afghan leaders must already certainly be keenly aware, is that governance, political power and legitimacy in Afghanistan are a bottom-up phenomenon.\textsuperscript{279} The desired methodology then, is the establishment of strong representative and participatory civic local municipal and district governance, as a means of extending government upward to the center, not the other way around.

This will require the difficult, but necessary, reprioritization of international developmental assistance and its subordination to the Government of Afghanistan, in order to distribute more equitably, resources based on the development goals outlined in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS is, after all, the embodiment of the very kind of prioritized master development plan that the international community sought, reconciling the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals under the development priorities and capabilities of the Afghan government. However, such a shift in focus and commitment has not been realized, and the international community continues to place security at the forefront of any development strategy, as evidenced by the overwhelming preponderance of spending on security, vice governance and infrastructure. While an obviously essential component of state-making, the provision of security, as history has shown, should not be the only, or even primary, means of combating rural Afghan insurgency.

While each Afghan regime has had to contend with substantial armed resistance and tribal revolt, successful rulers, those who achieved a relatively high degree of state capacity, each did so not solely by militarily eliminating state opponents, but also by establishing effective government rule at the local level. Therefore, for an Afghan government to be effective it needs to establish strong centralized control at the center, but decentralize its authority down to the local level where solidarity groups reside. Historically, the establishment of local governing structures, whether eliminating,

\footnote{279 Hence, the Government of Afghanistan's focus on the creation of District and Municipal-level governance through programs such as the Independent Directorate for Local Governance and National Solidarity Program.}
displacing, co-opting, or using pre-existing structures, has been synonymous with Afghan
counterinsurgency efforts and the creation of a strong central government. Only this way
can the central government in Kabul hope to quell the insurgency and expand governing
capacity.
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