THESIS

DEFENDING THE AMAZON: CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN BRAZIL

by

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March 2009

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The struggle between development and conservation remains salient with today’s focus on global climate change. This conflict is seen most clearly in the Brazilian Amazon. International, developed nations advocate conservation, while developing nations fight for progress. Conservationists expect international organizations, developed nations, and domestic grassroots organizations to pressure the Brazilian government in conserving the Amazon. Development advocates point to the need to stabilize Brazil’s economy and expand into the Amazon for its untapped resources. To understand the impasse between these two forces, one must look to a third actor: the Brazilian military. This thesis examines the critical role of the military in Amazonian policy. Guaranteeing Brazil’s borders and national security, the military views its infiltration of the Amazon as part of its mission. It also sees development and population increase as tools the government must use to increase sovereignty over the Amazon. This thesis concludes that the military and its concerns must be addressed before development policy in the Amazon can incorporate conservation. The Amazon must be conserved as a global resource, but will continue to be developed until the military’s role and views are changed.
DEFFENDING THE AMAZON: CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT

The struggle between development and conservation remains salient with today’s focus on global climate change. This conflict is seen most clearly in the Brazilian Amazon. International, developed nations advocate conservation, while developing nations fight for progress. Conservationists expect international organizations, developed nations, and domestic grassroots organizations to pressure the Brazilian government in conserving the Amazon. Development advocates point to the need to stabilize Brazil’s economy and expand into the Amazon for its untapped resources. To understand the impasse between these two forces, one must look to a third actor: the Brazilian military. This thesis examines the critical role of the military in Amazonian policy. Guaranteeing Brazil’s borders and national security, the military views its infiltration of the Amazon as part of its mission. It also sees development and population increase as tools the government must use to increase sovereignty over the Amazon. This thesis concludes that the military and its concerns must be addressed before development policy in the Amazon can incorporate conservation. The Amazon must be conserved as a global resource but will continue to be developed until the military’s role and views are changed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE AMAZON: DOMESTIC RESOURCE WITH GLOBAL IMPACT

As the world’s largest rainforest and representing 54 percent of Brazil’s territory, the Amazon is a highly visible stage on which international and domestic actors converge.¹ The United States and other “northern governments” have increased their awareness of environmental concerns since the 1970s and now fund projects in the Amazon to promote sustainable development.² Beginning with the Rio Summit in 1992 and continuing now with growing awareness of climate change, the international community has pressed for reduced deforestation and protection of the Amazon.³ Brazilians, on the other hand, see the Amazon as an untapped region open to exploration, conservation and development: a “ticket to the country of the future.”⁴ Brazil is a rapidly developing country that seeks to use its resources to advance domestic prosperity and international reputation. Faced with “new technologies, population growth, and the extension of new settlements into areas once largely unpopulated,” Brazil’s policies in the Amazon have global implications.⁵ In order to form effective partnerships with this developing power, its views must be considered. How Brazilians characterize concepts like sovereignty, national security, conservation and development are important to understand in order to foster understanding on issues ranging from drug trafficking to environmental protection.

Since the transition to democracy in 1985, Amazonian policy has vacillated between conservation and development, despite steady international environmental

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² Kathryn Hochstetler and Margaret E. Keck, Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in State and Society (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 2-5.
⁴ Hochstetler and Keck, 142.
pressure. Presidential policies, governing styles and interactions with various actors in the Amazon explain this puzzle. Brazilian presidents are often compelled to support development and increase economic growth; however they also react to international conservation pressures. The fate of the Amazon cannot merely be characterized as a battle between these domestic development goals and international conservation efforts. Instead, the variety of actors that affect presidential strategy in the Amazon—conservationists, developers and security forces—must be considered.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE

The environmental literature largely evaluates presidential policies through the lens of international pressures and norms. It seeks to explain theoretical models in which international actors can affect domestic social movements. When the developed North proposes these conservation policies, the developing South is often wary of implementing those measures. The simplistic understanding of the conservation debate—between international and domestic interests—is good to identify relevant policy forces, but it does not fully capture the gradation of development and conservation actors in the Amazon. Keck and Sikkink explain how domestic environmentalists use international connections to pressure state governments into action. According to Keck and Sikkink, the government interacts with international funding institutions for development and reacts to local conservation activists to periodically develop policy in the Amazon. While the work delineates international actors like non-governmental organizations and international funding institutions, the Brazilian government is still treated as a monolithic entity. This focus on international actors is prevalent in environmental literature, but overlooks the important distinctions of domestic conservation actors.

In 2007, Kathryn Hochstetler and Margaret Keck produced a seminal work on domestic environmentalism in Brazil. They analyzed the Brazilian environmental

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movement according to formal and informal institutions, processes and personal network connections. They observe that various levels of government—local, state and federal—either “block” or “enable” progress for environmental change. While Hochstetler and Keck discuss the personal influences and networks of Brazil’s environmental ministers, they surprisingly leave out discussion of key decision makers like the president. Adding depth to environmental literature, Hochstetler and Keck conclude that “transnational and domestic actors and processes have been heavily intertwined in Brazilian environmental politics, to the point where neither can be understood without the other and often the two cannot even be distinguished.” This explanation accounts for international actors, domestic activists and Brazilian democracy, but largely ignores the role the executive plays in shaping policy and the varied face of development in the Amazon.

Development is often described as cooperation between private business and the state that methodically extracts resources and products from a given area and contributes to national economic growth. For example, soybean farmers on the large plains of Mato Grasso are registered landowners who pay taxes and export soybeans that account for 29% of world soybean production. This organized, efficient system does not pervade the Amazon. Illegal mining and logging account for the most destructive type of development that enrages environmental activists. Landless farmers also invade the region for subsistence farming. None of these extractive practices benefit the country’s economy. In fact, these illegal activities detract from government-supported projects for developing the Amazon. They produce insecurity and competition with legally-recognized developers in the region. The lawlessness that these illegal developers bring to the region creates one of many security issues in Amazônia. Presidents must consider

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8 Hochstetler and Keck, 228.
9 Ibid., 230.
10 Presidents are mentioned fewer times than prominent environmental ministers. The military is not listed at all as an actor. Ibid., Index.
the impact of this illegal development on legal landowners, exports and national prosperity. Distinction between development actors is crucial for understanding how a president approaches development in the Amazon.

Violent clashes between legal and illegal developers, fights between indigenous peoples and developers, and the long, porous border are all security issues that shape conservation and development in the Amazon. The range of security forces—federal police, militarized police and state police to name a few—in the Amazon are numerous, but often under-manned, under-resourced and beholden to a variety of local and state bureaucracies. The Brazilian military, as a federal security actor, assumes the role as primary security actor in the Amazon. It often performs police functions along the border. Apart from mitigating domestic clashes between development actors, the military is also charged with protecting the border against incursions from drug-traffickers and guerillas activity that spills over from neighboring countries. In this lightly populated area that abuts five other nations, the military is a representative of state power and sometimes enforces conservation laws, such as bans on logging. ¹² This intermingling of domestic security, law enforcement and protection of international sovereignty makes Amazonian “security” and the military’s involvement a complex issue that has been ignored by the environmental literature.

With ideas and missions for development, expansion into and control of the Amazon developed during the military regime, the military remains a powerful actor. For presidents, the military is a built-in security force that controls lawless actors and aids with government development projects. However, the military’s concepts of national security and sovereignty can create tension with international actors and presidential conservation policies. The military reacts strongly against international actors that violate Brazil’s sovereignty. Since indigenous reserves create pockets of land that are off-limits to the military, the military takes great umbrage with this conservation measure: “the head of the Army’s Amazon command derided the “federal government’s

indigenous policy as ‘regretful and chaotic.’” Presidents can leverage the military as a security force, but must account for its strong security preferences in the Amazon.

C. PRESIDENTIAL GRAND STRATEGY

This thesis offers an alternate explanation for environmental policy changes in the Brazilian Amazon. It focuses on presidential decisions and how those policies drive actors in the region. While the concept of grand strategy was applied by Jorge I. Domínguez to discuss border disputes in Latin America, this concept also explains the complicated world of Amazonian policy. Domínguez refines grand strategy as “a foreign policy designed to identify how specific policies can enhance a country’s ability to mobilize internal and external resources to promote its security and prosperity.” Considering all of the national levers of power—diplomatic, economic, military and political—Brazil is highlighted as the first Latin American country to have a grand strategy, beginning in the early twentieth century. He also notes that grand strategies’ outcomes vary depending on what type of development policy is sought: short-term, long-term, economic or social. This analysis places the responsibility for Amazonian policy squarely with the president. Only he is in a position to balance the various actors in the Amazon to compliment his overall objectives. Presidents enter office with goals to restore economic stability, maintain power and often depend on a variety of actors to accomplish these ends.

Presidential grand strategy encompasses civil-military relations, governing style and complicated balancing of diplomatic, political, military and economic considerations to achieve a fundamental vision. Based on a president’s overall goal for Brazil—

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15 Jorge I. Domínguez et al., 33.

16 Ibid., 34.

economic prosperity, social equality, or world recognition to cite a few—grand strategies come in many forms. This variety of strategies determines how presidents interact with conservation, development and security actors. It also allows for the differing outcomes that one sees in Amazonian policy. The civil-military relations debate is subsumed by this grand strategy approach because presidents must contend with more than the military when considering actors that influence national policy. Brazilian presidents fall into two general categories with this model: those with a grand strategy and those without a grand strategy. For presidents with grand strategies, they use the military’s established security concerns and institutional capacity to contribute to their larger development goals in the Amazon. For presidents thrust unexpectedly into office without a grand strategy, they react to exogenous forces and often look to the military for support of their policies.

There are three reasons why a presidential “grand strategy” approach is better than the existing environmental literature in explaining policy outcomes in the Amazon. The first is that presidents must consider strategic, security issues that range from securing their borders, dealing with the military, and remaining powerful compared to their neighbors. The second is that presidents are not as constrained by electoral factors as legislative politicians. During election cycles, successful presidents form coalitions and appeal to a broad sector of society. Once popular mandate is won, presidents have the rest of their term to enact preferred policies without danger of losing their position (unless criminal charges are brought against them). Presidents are not bound to the same short-term, region-specific electoral concerns as legislators because the entire country is their constituency. Finally, presidents must weigh international actors and reactions when formulating domestic policy. To increase Brazil’s international prestige, presidents must appeal to the international community norms and leverage that influence domestically.

Using grand strategy analysis and drawing from existing civil-military relations literature, this thesis creates a richer understanding of how presidents use grand strategy to leverage the military in the environmentally-sensitive region of the Amazon. Wendy Hunter asserts that politicians exercise control over the military when they have electoral
incentives—sacrificing military interests to their constituencies.\textsuperscript{18} Jorge Zaverucha counters that the military has its own prerogatives and power that must be contested before civilians can exert control.\textsuperscript{19} Borrowing from Zaverucha’s analysis, the grand strategy analysis recognizes the military as a powerful actor with strong preferences in areas like the Amazon. Presidents must contend with a strong military and account for its views when formulating their grand strategies. However, presidents also have incentive to incorporate the military when its preferences coincide with his grand strategy. Strategic presidents balance political incentives to institute civilian control of the military and the military’s preferences when formulating their grand strategies for the Amazon.

\section*{D.\quad \textbf{CHAPTER OUTLINE}}

Chapter II establishes military preferences and historic roles in the Amazon—as they developed during the military regime—before presenting the extreme contrasts between Brazil’s first three president. Both José Sarney (1985-1989) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994) assumed power in the wake of unexpected crises and did not have grand strategies to guide their terms in office. Sarney inherited office with the “untimely death of President-elect Tancredo Neves” in 1985.\textsuperscript{20} Franco, Collor’s Vice President, took office subsequent to Collor’s impeachment. As presidents dealing with economic instability and lacking domestic political support, both Sarney and Franco looked to the military for political support.\textsuperscript{21} This dependence on the armed forces and lack of strategic vision for the Amazon translated into presidential support of existing military prerogatives in the Amazon. Development was controlled by the military and precluded conservation in the Amazon under Sarney and Franco. However, this preference for military-led development was punctuated by President Fernando Collor.


Contrary to the presidents that preceded and followed him, Fernand Collor de Mello (1990-1992) had a grand strategy for neo-liberal reform that shaped his Amazonian policies. With lack of legislative and military support for his economic reforms, he depended on international loans and prestige to enforce his strategy. Collor used conservation-minded international actors as his power base and deliberately chose to enact policies in the Amazon to bolster their support. He did not react to a crisis, as Sarney and Franco did, but proactively strengthens the environmental movement. However, his incomplete presidency—cut short by corruption charges—leaves the question of whether he successfully subdued the military with his conservation policies or if they were left as guardians of the Amazon.

Chapter III outlines the pragmatic and coalitional grand strategy the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) employed in the Amazon. Reacting against the dictatorial governing style of Collor and the two lame duck presidents, Cardoso maintained a balance between development, conservation and security elements in the Amazon. Domestic support for his economic plan allowed him to pursue a grand strategy of solidifying Brazil’s economy and consolidating democratic institutions. In forming his strategy, Cardoso was cognizant of the strong military prerogatives in the Amazon, as both a developer and security force. He used these views to further his grand strategy and effectively instituted civilian control of the military at the same time. His diverse record of security, development and conservation policies in the Amazon attests to Cardoso’s long-term grand strategy. Chapter IV highlights how President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-present) continued the coalition-based, pragmatic approach to the presidency. He kept some aspects of Cardoso’s economic development, but made social inclusion the goal of his grand strategy. His balance of development, conservation and security are still being played out as he completes his second term. Chapter V concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy-makers when engaging with Brazil on multi-faceted Amazonian policies.
II. EXECUTIVE EXTREMES: AMAZON POLICY UNDER SARNEY, COLLOR DE MELLO, AND FRANCO

A. INTRODUCTION

Brazil’s transition to democracy occurred in 1985, but the success of the first three presidents varied wildly. Grand strategy, when employed, enables presidents to set policy and manipulate actors to achieve their policy objectives. This chapter examines how grand strategy was used or ignored by Brazil’s first three presidents. Conservation, development and security in the Amazon are three primary considerations when formulating a Brazilian grand strategy. To provide context for the Amazon’s security dimension, the military’s legacy is discussed first. The armed forces’ perceptions of national security and sovereignty are important considerations for formulating a grand strategy that affects the military. Finally, the administrations and grand strategies for José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco are evaluated with respect to their Amazonian policies.

B. THE MILITARY

The Brazilian military, particularly the army, has historically played an important role in the Amazon: establishing the country’s borders and defending its sovereignty. As one of Brazil’s early, capable state actors, the military was charged with pressing into the interior of the nation to establish its sovereignty. In the Amazon, a region that abuts five of Brazil’s neighbors, the military was especially concerned with border security and protecting sovereignty. In order to reach and protect the far borders of Amazônia, it was necessary to develop roads and military bases along the way. For the military, an implicit connection between development and securing the Amazon was formed.

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mission—to protect Brazil’s borders and sovereignty in the Amazon using development—has remained consistent despite the growing tide of concern for conservation. According to the military, pressure from the international conservation community and the preservation of indigenous reservations conflict with development projects and, therefore, maintaining sovereignty. These strong views have been molded throughout Brazil’s history and represent possible tension between civilian policies and military practices, especially in Amazônia.

1. History of the Military’s Presence in the Amazon

From its independence in 1822, the military remained closely attuned to the changes in Brazilian government. The unique transition from a colony to a monarchy was met with little military resistance, a small army contingent in Grão Pará offering token resistance in the Amazon. The military was deployed to the front during the southern boundary wars—including the War of the Triple Alliance—from 1852 to the early 1870s and emerged triumphant in protecting Brazilian interests. These victories resulted in a technically proficient army that saw themselves as the only capable defenders of Brazil, thereby creating a tension with civilian leaders. This tension manifested itself when the military stepped in to abolish the monarchy and create the Brazilian Republic on November 16, 1889. The army prized its role as guardians of the state and a military officer, Hermes de Fonseca, was elected as the first president in 1910 with a penchant for military modernization. During the 19th century and after Brazil’s border disputes were largely settled, the military saw itself take on the mantel of internal security and looked to the Amazon for expansion. However, this internal focus was not

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25 Skidmore and Smith, 150-151.
26 Loveman, 51-52.
27 Skidmore and Smith, 154.
28 Loveman, 92-93.
29 Ibid., 93.
limited to military exploits in the jungle. After General Fonseca’s intervention, the federal army felt it had to save Brazil from ineffective politicians, a motif that would be repeated in the mid-twentieth century.

The military entrenched its role as political guardians, economic developers, and guarantors of national defense during the first half of the 20th century. The military leader turned politician, Getúlio Vargas, retooled the Constitution in 1934 to expand presidential powers and established the Estado Nôvo in 1937. Vargas’ mission to exert control over Brazil’s vast, federal system affected the military as well. He used the army to expand economic development in the country’s interior. Expansion and modernization of the military ranks before World War II meant that a cohesive, federal army had resources to expand into the Amazon as a public works actor. Since the state was primarily concerned with industrialization to the south—to combat shortages caused by the Great Depression and World War II—the military was left to oversee states’ development projects in the Amazon. Rubber production had been a primary Brazilian export to the U.S., especially during WWII, but did not produce enough revenue to attract industrialists to the Amazon. Falling rubber prices near the end of the war and a declining national economy led to monetary shortages and tumultuous politics. The military, fearful of political upheaval, chose to step in and depose Vargas in late 1945 and allow free elections. The military emerged from the Depression and WWII with two important ideas based on their roles in the Amazon and with the federal government: internal security meant tutelage of civilian government and economic development could only succeed with military guidance. These ideas were pursued in earnest during the Second Republic and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.

30 Loveman, 95. “Estado Nôvo” is the “New State” and lasted until the late 1940s.
31 Ibid., 96.
32 Skidmore and Smith, 159.
34 Skidmore and Smith, 172.
Under the Second Republic, 1946 to 1964, the Brazilian military’s doctrines of internal security, development and sovereignty remained untouched by the embroiled civilian government. A series of presidents passed through the executive—challenged by economic crises, IMF limitations and political coalition collapses. The army recognized that successive presidents faced economic turmoil, but was content to maintain its tutelage of civilian government, at first.\(^{35}\) In an attempt to help the flagging economy, the military turned its attention to the Amazon. The army began a “geopolitical maneuver” to connect the far-reaching states of Brazil through infrastructure construction and settlement facilitation.\(^{36}\) It was believed that if the Amazon’s resources could be marshaled, Brazil’s economic crisis would end. The breadth of populating and developing the Amazon required a level of coordination and resources that only the army could muster. Developing and settling Amazon states were projects that directly increased sovereign control over territory and guaranteed national security along Brazil’s borders, both explicit military missions. For awhile, the military was content to focus on development as a panacea for Brazil’s economic and political troubles.

In 1964, the political corruption and ineptitude was too much for the military to bear. As Guardians of Brazil, the military felt compelled to step in and take over the country. Conditioned by a highly cohesive education system, military elites saw the crumbling economy, “the demands of the Left for a constituent assembly, and the growing indiscipline of the enlisted men as signs that Brazil was entering a stage of subversive warfare.”\(^{37}\) The military regime began in 1964, dominated by the army, and attempted to instill military efficiency into the government. However, the military’s foray into political power did not result in a wholesale militarization of the Amazon. Instead, the authoritarian regime was as constrained by limited resources as previous civilian governments.\(^{38}\) The military even tabled its own modernization and acquisition

\(^{35}\) Skidmore and Smith, 174-181.
\(^{36}\) Azevedo, 31-34.
goals to focus on the economic woes of the nation caused by an ever-worsening import substitution industrialization (ISI) economic model.\textsuperscript{39} Although it was predominantly focused on politically and economically rehabilitating the state, the Brazilian armed forces incrementally expanded into the Amazon.

In the late 1960s, the Amazon infrastructure projects originally begun in the late 1950s restarted under the guise of national security: “integrate so as not to disintegrate.”\textsuperscript{40} Seeing the region as filled with subversives, illegal miners and criminals, the military justified development projects as a way to increase their presence in the region and maintain security. The regime began the Polamazônia project in 1975 to industrialize areas of the Amazon, further develop rubber resources and exploit mineral riches; which disregarded environmental concerns and attracted international censure.\textsuperscript{41} The military also took over nuclear program efforts from Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Service) and pursued extensive mining efforts in the Amazon to supply the needed minerals.\textsuperscript{42} Control of the nuclear program, spearheaded by the Navy, was a prerogative that the military retained even after the transition to democracy. In its final years, the mid-1980s, the military regime was focused on maintaining its prerogatives while creating political opening and a gradual transition back to civilian power. The mining, road-building and development projects in the Amazon were put on hold while the military carefully handed the reigns of power back to civilians.

The transition to civilian rule in 1985 allowed the military to resume its traditional role as protectors of the nation and guarantors of national security, freed from the burden of having to run the government during a time of economic crisis. However, instead of retreating to the barracks, the military used their influence during the transition to safeguard a wide range of military prerogatives. Some of the prominent prerogatives included separate ministers for each service; well-developed professional rules that

\textsuperscript{39} Hunter, \textit{Eroding Military Influence in Brazil}, 104.

\textsuperscript{40} Bitencourt, 58. National Security phrase was: \textit{integar para não desintegrar}.

\textsuperscript{41} Hunter, \textit{Eroding Military Influence in Brazil}, 120.

\textsuperscript{42} Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil” (paper presented at CISAC, Stanford University, August 1997), 4-9.
guaranteed individual branch unity (army, air force and navy) and common understanding of national security; control over the intelligence apparatus; and maintenance of a nuclear program. 43 These prerogatives were not inviolate, but they formed the basis for future civil-military contestation. In the Amazon, the military had established itself as a capable development actor. Since the return to democracy in 1985, civilian presidents have either clashed with the military or utilized it as a key development actor in the Amazon.

2. Sovereignty and National Security

The military holds particular views on national security and sovereignty as they exist in the Amazon region. The Brazilian understanding of national security is a nexus of maintaining internal order, securing borders and countering external threats. With difficult terrain and vast reaches of border to secure, the army views national security as critical in this region. 44 Three dominant threats to national security are criminal elements, indigenous reserves and international interests. Narco-traffickers, illegal miners and neighboring guerillas are all seen as criminal threats to internal order and secure borders. 45 Indigenous reserve demarcations create land disputes between Brazilians and represent an affront to the army’s ability to enforce internal order. The proximity of several reserves to international borders also challenges the army’s mission of securing borders—particularly the Yanomami reserve near the Venezuelan border. 46 The last broad attack on sovereignty is intense interest of the “First World” or international environmental community in the Amazon. 47 These three national security threats challenge Brazil’s sovereignty in the Amazon, according to the military.

44 Bitencourt, 61.
The military—and its views on national security and sovereignty—are firmly entrenched as Brazil’s main development actor and state presence in the Amazon. Presidential grand strategies dictate whether the executive will challenge or incorporate this significant actor. Since the military has a history as the primary development actor in the region, it is more likely to agree with federal policies of settlement, mineral extraction and other non-conservation policies. The connection between sovereignty and an occupied Amazon—the military’s ability to exert control over the region—is also well established. These developed areas contribute to the nation’s economic prosperity and to maintaining control over its sovereignty: “the occupation of the Amazon is an inherent obligation of Brazil to achieve its national objectives, strengthen national integration, and continue progress and peace.”48 Presidents must account for a strong, possessive military in the Amazon when formulating their grand strategies.

C. JOSÉ SARNEY: 1985 - 1989

The transition from João B. Figueiredo, who presided over the final six years of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, to civilian rule was supposed to be orderly and predetermined. Tancredo de Almeida Neves was the leader of the opposition party and had been chosen—through the electoral college—as the first democratic president.49 Neves’ untimely death left José Sarney, a member of the military’s government party, as the first democratic president in Brazil since 1964. Since Sarney had not planned to be president, he did not have a grand strategy with which to rule the country. He was also constrained by a still-dominant military that successfully guarded its prerogatives during the long, gradual transition to democracy. Sarney’s lack of grand strategy forced him to deal with political issues as they arose. Economic issues, a looming military that maintained its power and the need to facilitate a new constitution were all forces that Sarney could not control. As his presidency progressed and the economy declined, he had less control over the country’s progress. He grew more dependent on the military for support.50 Sarney’s

48 Pinheiro, 8.
49 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 40.
50 Ibid., 43.
The presidency was overshadowed by extensive military prerogatives and a series of failed economic plans, forcing him to react to crisis instead of capitalize on it.

A series of economic woes plagued President Sarney’s throughout his time in office. He inherited failing ISI system from the military regime. Labor strikes, in the mid-to-late 1980s, presented protracted economic crisis in the industrialized regions that forced him to focus his economic efforts to the south. Since the development focus was south and the army leadership was pre-occupied with maintaining its prerogatives, lawlessness pervaded the Amazon. The region, especially Rondônia, offered exploitable land that was populated without governmental regulation and, therefore, did not significantly improve the country’s economic situation. Landless peasants concerned with subsistence farming formed a large part of this expanding, disorderly frontier. However, neither Sarney nor the military were as concerned with frontier expansion in the Amazon as they were with political issues in the capital. Sarney’s initial economic package—the Cruzado Plan—was weak from the beginning, but utterly failed in December 1986. In the wake of this failure, he lost public support and faced daunting military institutions. These limitations forced him to rely on the military for political strength after 1986.

As a conservative politician, President Sarney was not prepared to attempt the neo-liberal reforms that were needed to salvage Brazil’s economy. Since the military regime depended on the ISI model and state-run industry, conservative and military elements were against neo-liberal reforms that included privatization. To avoid economic issues, Sarney focused attention on drafting a new, civilian constitution. He announced the creation of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to draft a new constitution in May 1986. Sarney declared that the new congress—composed largely of conservative politicians who were beholden to the military and could be influenced by him—would

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52 Hochstetler and Keck, 146-147.
53 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 12.
54 ANC is the acronym for Assembléia Nacional Constituinte. Ibid., 43.
serve as the ANC. The military also sent a large delegation to the ANC to ensure that its interests were maintained. As a result of the controlled transition to democracy, the military had maintained significant power and numerous prerogatives. As Zaverucha discusses, the armed forces had at least fifteen enumerated privileges within the government. Control of the federal military police; separate military courts; autonomous promotion structure (even for generals); ability to sell military land without congressional oversight; and direct participation in the military-industrial complex were some of the critical prerogatives the military sought to protect during the ANC. During the next two years of intense debate, meetings and drafts of the constitution, the military maintained a strong lobby in the ANC to defend these remnants of the authoritarian regime.

Sarney’s lack of grand strategy prevented him from having specific, articulated views on development, conservation or security. Instead, he was “focused on the short-term goal of political survival.” This weakness left actors to pursue their projects in the Amazon. The military immediately initiated plans for Calha Norte—a development project to build bases and roads along the northern Brazilian border—after the transition to democracy. Once plans for this mobilization of a large number of troops in the Amazon were finalized within the military, Calha Norte was presented to Sarney for approval. The president duly authorized extensive land grants in the northern Amazon to facilitate this army-led expansion into the Amazon. Sarney’s support for the project was not reflective of his personal beliefs on development. Instead, it ensured the military would continue to support his tenuous political position. In the face of continued economic decline, Sarney was politically shortsighted and did not have specific intentions for the military’s project in the Amazon. The military, however, had very definite objectives for Calha Norte.

The military’s definite views of national security and sovereignty both contributed to their vision of Calha Norte. One aspect of this garrisoning of the Amazon with bases

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55 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 43.
57 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 122.
was the external threat of political instability. Both Suriname and Peru were security concerns along Brazil’s northern and western Amazon borders—in the form of political unrest and Sendero Luminoso’s guerilla warfare.\(^{58}\) The military also sought to bring order to development in the Amazon and control lawless frontier elements like landless peasants, illegal loggers and unauthorized miners. Since the military still controlled the federal police, they provided internal security for the region. This project fulfilled the army’s notion of maintaining Brazil’s sovereignty and security in the Amazon. Construction of bases and roads to reach the border also contributed to the military’s development capacity. Each of these roles was established under the military regime. *Calha Norte*—born of the military’s attempt to maintain those functions—was not an expansion of the armed forces into uncharted territory, but an exercise of their prerogatives. Sarney’s backing for *Calha Norte* was not manifestation of a particular presidential policy in the Amazon. Instead, it was a short-term solution for maintaining military support. The project kept its momentum until an internationally-recognized crisis forced Sarney to support conservation efforts and inhibit military development in the Amazon.

The sudden death of Francisco “Chico” Mendes in December 1988 catalyzed the international environmental community and pressed Sarney to adopt limited conservation policies. Chico Mendes was a rubber-tapper, indigenous rights advocate, and active leader in the Worker’s Party (PT) who traveled abroad extensively to advocate indigenous livelihoods (like rubber-tapping, nut harvesting and fishing) in the Amazon.\(^{59}\) When this famous conservationist was murdered, the international outcry was tremendous, even if domestic indignation was minimal.\(^{60}\) Sarney’s lack of grand strategy meant that he responded immediately to the crisis by appeasing the international community with a flurry of conservation efforts—ignoring domestic actors’ views. In short order, a reserve along the Brazil-Venezuela border was created for the Yanomami

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\(^{59}\) Hochstetler and Keck, 164.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 165.
In 1989, he created a new government environmental institution, IBAMA, and solicited the UN to host the “Earth Summit.” International interest in the Amazon, piqued by Mendes’ death, was sustained by incredible rates of deforestation and plagued Sarney’s last full year as president. These measures and appeasement of the international community reflect the complete lack of Sarney’s strategy for dealing with different Amazonian actors and issues. His support for the development-focused *Calha Norte* and reliance on the military for political strength was divergent from his conservation efforts and focus on international approval. Sarney did not try to reconcile these two forces—conservationists and the military—because his remaining time in office was so short.

The lack of popular support for environmental conservation, combined with Sarney’s own political weakness, meant the president had to find legal basis for this headlong shift in policy focus. He used the ratified constitution as a basis for these urgent environmental decisions. The newly minted constitution, signed into force on October 5, 1988, actually contained a provision “designating the Amazon as a national patrimony and requiring that its environment be preserved.” The extensive nature of the constitution is one reason why this language survived conservative and military scrutiny. The other reason is that the military, with its intact prerogatives and ongoing *Calha Norte* program, felt that its role as primary actor in the Amazon was secure. The potential conflict between military development and conservationist reserves was not played out during the president’s last months in office. Instead, Sarney’s non-existent strategy and combination of divergent policies resulted in unresolved tension between the military and conservationists in Amazônia.

D. FERNANDO COLLOR DE MELLO: 1990-1992

President Fernando Afonso Collor de Mello was the first publicly elected president in more than 25 years. Creating a new political party for the election, he

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62 Hochstetler and Keck, 36.
63 Ibid., 163.
narrowly won in the second round against Lula da Silva, the Worker’s Party candidate.\textsuperscript{64} His campaign was based on anti-established parties, military-run intelligence institutions like SNI and SADEN, and distancing himself from Sarney’s economic policies.\textsuperscript{65} Collor’s main objective was to carry out neo-liberal economic reform. Therefore, he developed a grand strategy for dealing with domestic and international actors based on that objective. Although anti-military rhetoric—specifically against SNI—was prominent during his campaign, it did not represent a specific agenda for establishing civilian control of the military. He also did not have specific conservation goals until after he took office. The narrow campaign victory combined with his PRN capturing only seven percent of votes in congress meant that Collor had very limited domestic support for his grand strategy to economically reform Brazil.\textsuperscript{66} These domestic limitations forced him to look to the international community to support his grand strategy.

As a neo-liberal reformer, Collor faced both intense pressure and interesting challenges in pursuing his economic-oriented grand strategy. State-owned enterprises were notoriously inefficient, but efforts to privatize them met with social resistance—from the military and workers who had stake in the ISI system. This societal resistance compounded the legislative resistance (large number of disparate political parties) that Collor had to overcome.\textsuperscript{67} The military was another contentious domestic actor. During the regime, military government embraced ISI and was a supporter of state-owned enterprises. This legacy made them natural opponents to Collor’s plan to privatize and open the economy to international competition. Of the different options to institute reforms, in spite of domestic resistance, Collor chose to look for international recognition and rule with presidential decrees. Across Latin America, neo-liberal reformers relied

\textsuperscript{64} Hunter, \textit{Eroding Military Influence in Brazil}, 17.

\textsuperscript{65} SNI is the abbreviation for Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Intelligence Service). SADEN is the acronym for Secretaria de Assessoramento da Defesa Nacional (Secretariat for National Defense). Both were military-run ministries. Zaverucha, \textit{Frágil democracia}, 60-61.


heavily on the international community for loans and foreign direct investment to affect their economic transitions, but Brazil had something especially tangible to offer the international community: the Amazon. Since international attention was still focused on Amazonian deforestation, Collor leveraged that interest with conservation programs that bought him foreign support. He knew that the military, a key actor in the region, was opposed to his international-based plans in the Amazon. To block the military from interfering with his grand, neo-liberal strategy and efforts in the Amazon, he needed to simultaneously assert control over the military. Collor recognized the important actors that could aid or inhibit his grand strategy of economic reform. In the face of dismal domestic support, he used the Amazon and conservation as a bargaining tool to secure international backing for his neo-liberal plans.

Collor believed that Amazônia should “pay for itself” and support his grand strategy of liberalizing the nation’s economy. 68 Appealing to international conservationist convictions, he instituted debt-for-nature swaps that allowed international actors to purchase Brazil’s foreign debt in exchange for parcels of land that would then be granted to local environmental NGO’s. 69 With Decree 22—issued on April 22, 1991—Collor began extensive demarcation of indigenous reserves beginning with the Yanomami Indian Reserve. 70 Creation of indigenous reserves gained Collor international support from investors concerned with human rights and rainforest preservation. These appeals to increase international involvement in the Amazon were direct affronts to military views of sovereignty. In response to these executive policies, the army general in command of the Amazon “threatened to ‘transform the Amazon into a new Vietnam’ if developed countries continued to ‘internationalize’ the region.” 71 The general who voiced this opposition to the press was quickly replaced: General Antenor de

69 Ibid., 131.
70 Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 69.
Santa Cruz Abreu was relieved by General Carlos Annibal Pacheco.\textsuperscript{72} The swift reaction to this declamation of international involvement in conservation policies was important to establish clear control over the military. Whether they agreed with presidential policies of indigenous reserve creation or debt-for-nature swaps, the military chose not to publicly criticize conservation programs for the remainder of Collor’s administration. Brief reprimand and removal of one general officer was not enough to change some of the military’s ingrained perceptions of the Amazon. This tangential control of the military was incurred when the armed forces threatened international support of Collor’s conservation program.

President Collor effectively stifled the military from publicly contradicting his conservation programs for the next two years, but he received more international attention from two other measures designed to curb military projects. Since the military was opposed to neo-liberal projects in general and privatization of land in the Amazon in particular, Collor’s economic plans required circumventing the military. He took several steps to realize this goal. First, he “announced his decision to demilitarize the Calha Norte project” on March 22, 1990.\textsuperscript{73} Collor cut the military’s Amazon development project as a way to diminish their impact on the Amazon. International conservation groups saw the northern development project as environmentally harmful and contributing to deforestation rates. Since military-controlled land in Amazônia neither contributed to neo-liberal reforms nor helped Brazil’s international image, the Calha Norte program was cut. Collor continued to seek international approval with his demilitarization of the nuclear program. Starting on November 28, 1990 and concluding in 1991 with the Guadalajara Accord, he looked to former rival, Argentina, and pursued nuclear security cooperation in order to undermine Brazil’s strongly institutionalized military.\textsuperscript{74} President Collor’s primary incentives were fostering economic growth


\textsuperscript{73} Zaverucha, \textit{Frágil democracia}, 62.

through neo-liberal reform, currying favor with international backers and remaining in power. Undermining the military’s autonomous, development power in the Amazon region was important to gain foreign allies that funded his economic reform grand strategy.

The clearest example of this power shift was Collor’s establishment of the extensive Yanomami reserve on the border with Venezuela, just one year after he cut funding for Calha Norte development. In preparation for the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, creating indigenous reserves kept Brazilian conservation visible to international actors. Collor did not worry about undermining the military’s vision of border security and sovereignty in the Amazon. Instead, his presidential conservation support fostered the growth of local environmental activism in Brazil and created stronger civilian institutions. Preparations for the Río Summit (UNCED) in 1992 forced disparate and disorganized NGOs to unite and define Brazilian conservation.⁷⁵ His final act to improve Brazil’s conservation image was appointing internationally-renowned environmental activist, José Lutzenberger, as his Environmental Secretary.⁷⁶ All of these conservation actions were used to bolster international financial support for Collor’s economic reforms. Early actions to limit military influence in the Amazon cleared the way for him to focus on the Rio Summit and increasing international support for his presidency.

These machinations of environmental politics for economic gain under President Collor were cut short by impeachment hearings that began on October 2, 1992 and concluded on December 29, 1992.⁷⁷ The potential diplomatic advantages and political capital garnered by the Río Summit went unrealized as Collor faced corruption charges.⁷⁸ It is difficult to predict whether Collor’s multiple methods to minimize the military would have advanced civilian control of the military or resulted in a challenge to his authority.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 129.
⁷⁸ Hochstetler and Keck, 39.
Nonetheless, it is clear to see that President was the first president to have a grand strategy that he pursued by manipulating domestic and international actors. Since he was domestically weak, he chose to use conservation as a platform to gain international funding and legitimacy. This grand strategy appeared effective in bolstering domestic conservation efforts at the expense of military development, but its long-term effectiveness cannot be evaluated. Collor’s corruption scandal and ensuing impeachment created the chaotic rise of Brazil’s third democratic president.

E. ITAMAR FRANCO: 1993 - 1995

Itamar Franco, Collor’s vice president, came to power as an interim president. He was sworn in by the National Congress on December 29, 1992 and then won the 1993 election in the second round. The rapid ascent to power left precluded him from forming a grand strategy for ruling Brazil. His connections with the Collor regime and the corruption scandal handicapped his presidency’s credibility. Franco did not have the charisma or drive to appeal to the international community and continue Collor’s version of neo-liberal reforms. Instead, this caretaker president “tried to strike a balance between permitting the military to expand their mission in Amazônia and keeping international criticism at bay.” The corruption scandal eclipsed any international support connected with the Rio Summit, and Franco was forced to rely on domestic actors to carry out policy. Collor failed to implement any lasting neo-liberal reforms during his short tenure, so Franco was also left with an economy in crisis. “Persistent inflation, combined with severe recession,” marked the first two years of Franco’s term. Reacting to this domestic crisis, Franco announced a war on poverty that used the military to reluctantly

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80 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 133.

81 Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 117.
“distribute food and provide health services” in urban areas.\textsuperscript{82} The military was one of Franco’s primary actors because it was organized, disciplined and had presence throughout the country. As a reactionary president lacking a grand strategy, Franco did not establish a system of balancing important actors against each other to achieve any clear policy objectives. For two years, Franco tried various economic policies and attempted to guarantee the military’s support with a new development project in the Amazon.

The military, while disinherited by Collor, learned that conservation ideas were gaining popularity in Brazil. To remain an important actor in the Amazon, the military had to adjust its development programs from outright environmentally destructive programs to environmentally aware efforts. The military understood that projects with both conservation and development aspects would be more difficult to halt than purely military development like \textit{Calha Norte}. As soon as Franco was elected, military commanders proposed an Amazon protection system that centered on sustainable development: Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia (SIPAM). The proposal was both lofty and all-encompassing:

The [official] goals for SIPAM…include environmental protection, supervision of occupation and use of soil, prevention and disease control, protection of Indian lands, and identification of punishable legal activities (such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and the invasion of borders and Indian settlements).\textsuperscript{83}

SIPAM was meant to protect the Amazon in terms of conservation, internal security (protection of Indian lands) and sovereignty (invasion of borders). Conservation was added to the military’s accepted roles of security and sovereignty. This change in rhetoric was probably driven by domestic popularity of environmentalism leading up to the Rio Summit. However, adopting “environmental protection” and “protection of Indian lands” did not contradict the military’s mandate to protect Brazil’s sovereignty.


\textsuperscript{83} Hunter, \textit{Eroding Military Influence in Brazil}, 134.
The SIPAM system was proposed to keep conservation efforts in the hands of Brazilians and avoid “internationalization of the Amazon.”

This independent program, invented by the military to solidify its long-term role in the region, reasserted the military’s importance in the Amazon.

SIPAM was conceived as a doctrine to control the Amazon, but it needed technical mechanisms to achieve its lofty goals. The Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM) was the supportive system of radars and communication stations that would “extend state control and supervision” over the Amazon. In addition to SIPAMs objectives, SIVAM was advertised as a way to regulate air traffic, detect illegal extraction (deforestation and mining) and deter drug-trafficking in the Amazon. Franco agreed to military recommendations and implemented an eight-year development program costing US$600 to US$800 million in 1993. His decision was not the result of balanced consideration of domestic and international tension over the Amazon’s future, as Hunter asserts. Franco’s lack of grand strategy meant that he had no policy justification for weighing domestic and international opinions on the Amazon. Instead, he supported SIPAM/SIVAM to appease the military’s saber-rattling over low budgets and salaries. Franco had no grander ambitions for the Amazon. He was a reactive, politically weak president who depended on the military for stability and compensated it with a new program to control the Amazon.

Franco’s continuous pursuit of economic stability was finally realized under his finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso, who had served in the foreign ministry (Itamaraty), was an acclaimed scholar of development and advocate for neo-liberal reform. The economic package he developed for Franco worked so well that Cardoso garnered enough public acclaim to win the presidency in 1995. Economic success in the final months of Franco’s presidency did not overshadow the absence of a

85 Ibid., 133.
88 Ibid., 135.
grand strategy. President Franco’s short tenure was a litany of reaction to crisis, mostly economic. He did not exercise control over the military, but appeased it with the SIPAM/SIVAM system. His lack of grand vision for Brazil handicapped his ability to effectively balance domestic and international actors.

F. CONCLUSION

The military regime established a strong hold on the Amazon prior to the transition to democracy. President Collor, with a coherent grand strategy, was able to contest the military’s dominion over the Amazon when it detracted from his larger economic goals. Presidents Sarney and Franco took office without grand strategies and suffered. They were also forced to rely on the military as a dominant actor in the Amazon. The dual transition to democracy and a free-market economy highlighted the numerous international and domestic actors that presidents must balance to carry out policy. If a president is weak and lacks a grand strategy, he reacts to crises and does not leverage actors against each other to affect policy outcome. Presidents who formulate a grand strategy are able to institute policies and balance actors to achieve their desired end state. In Brazil, both types of presidents must contend with an established military presence that controls security and sovereignty in the Amazon. They must also contend with international conservation elements that seek to preserve the region. The presence of a grand strategy determines how the president will leverage the actors in the Amazon and what type of policies he pursues.
III. STUDIED APPROACH TO AMAZON POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT CARDOSO

A. INTRODUCTION

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, more commonly known by his initials FHC, became President of Brazil ten years after the transition to democracy. He entered office with a grand strategy to consolidate democracy. The primary goals of his grand strategy were neo-liberal economic reform to promote growth; civilian control of the military; and increased international prestige. He used coalitional-style rule for domestic goals and diplomacy abroad to achieve his goals. As with any president, FHC faced a variety of actors and pre-existing prerogatives that he had to contend with to carry out his grand strategy. Creation of the hallmarks of civilian control of the military—a National Defense Plan and a civilian Ministry of Defense—was crucial to consolidate democracy. To avoid military resistance to these plans, FHC had to concede to military prerogatives in the Amazon. This required careful balancing of the military against international pressures, domestic conservationists and developers. Cardoso accomplished his grand strategy in the course of two terms by implementing policies that both appeased and balanced a variety of actors.

This chapter analyzes the actors and issues in the Amazon that President Cardoso had to contend with while carrying out his grand strategy. First, the formulation and content of Cardoso’s grand strategy for Brazil will be discussed. Then, the existing environmental policies will be explained before discussing the impact of the military’s SIVAM project on Cardoso’s initial strategy in the Amazon. Next, Decree 1775 and its impact on a variety of domestic and international actors will be discussed. The chapter will conclude with analysis of Cardoso’s two civil-military reforms: the National Defense Policy and the Ministry of Defense. The goal of this chapter is to prove that application of a grand strategy to Cardoso’s presidency resulted in the successful balance of strategic actors in the Amazon.
B. FHC’S GRAND STRATEGY

Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s early accomplishments were as a highly recognized academic who published numerous books on sociology and economic analysis. However, aspirations for tenure at University of São Paulo were interrupted by the military coup in 1964, and Cardoso fled first to Santiago, Chile and later to Paris, France. During his time in exile, FHC continued to write and published Dependency and Development in Latin America in 1969. His academic interest in democracy and economic development continued—even after his return to Brazil during the military regime—when he helped to create the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Research (CEBRAP) in 1970. This endeavor enabled him to create contacts with the American Ford Foundation while maintaining ties with academia in São Paulo. Since the military regime prevented him from remaining in the university system, CEBRAP offered an alternative venue for him to continue work on dependency, urban issues, and democratic consolidation.

Cardoso’s intensive academic background and focus on political issues were good foundations for his transition to political life as a senator in the opposition party under the military regime.

As a senator, FHC continued to establish the groundwork of political strategy that later developed into his grand strategy. He was active first in the Democratic Movement (MDB) and then transitioned easily to the centrist Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) after 1985. Participating in the National Constituent Assembly (Assembléia Nacional Constituinte or ANC) to rewrite the Constitution, FHC had his first official conflict with the military. The initial draft, heavily influenced by Deputy Bernardo Cabral and FHC, limited domestic military roles to those “expressly” authorized by the civilian authorities. The military chafed at this strong wording and a compromise was reached that included both the military’s vision of self-determined internal roles and a modicum

89 Ted G. Goertz, *Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Reinventing Democracy in Brazil* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 11-44.
90 Ibid., 54-56.
of civilian control. The 1988 Constitution clearly established the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and included detailed environmental language, but did not significantly change the military’s self-described role as defenders of the nation. FHC had both made his personal preference for civilian control of the military known and achieved compromise with army lobbyists over the language in the Constitution. These actions foreshadowed what he would later do as president: accommodate the military’s rhetoric to achieve the more important political victory.

Emerging from the ANC as a recognized figure, he attempted to reform the PMDB from a patronage, catch-all party to a progressive party. He failed to convince the leadership that change was necessary, so he formed his own party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) in 1988. In 1992, he transitioned from senator to minister and accepted a variety of postings in the Itamar Franco administration that culminated in his appointment as Minister of Finance in 1993. He was charged with implementing a policy that would curb hyperinflation and solve the economic crisis afflicting Brazil. He developed the Plano Real: a combination of national fiscal austerity measures and state-level budget accountability. The plan consolidated financial responsibility in the federal government and was introduced in February 1994, in conjunction with his candidacy for President. Immediate reduction of inflation and an improvement in the national economy assured that “he won handily, even avoiding a second-round runoff.” This popular support allowed him to pursue his strategic plan of democratic consolidation without much resistance from domestic actors.

FHC did not rely on his presidential mandate—as Collor had done—but deliberately built coalitions with domestic actors. Cardoso had to build support in congress for his economic reforms, civil-military policies, and efforts to amend the constitution (with a re-election clause). While Collor was forced to issue decrees and

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96 Ibid., 181.
look to the international community to enforce policy, FHC appealed to domestic actors to carry out his grand strategy. Inaugurated on January 1, 1995, FHC began his project of consolidating the government. Although he issued 143 provisional presidential decrees “in the first three months of his administration alone” to enact short-term financial changes and agency reorganizations, he consulted extensively with Congress for long-term economic reforms.97 He also used the military to break a national oil-workers’ strike in May 1995.98 Cardoso reached out to these key actors—congress and the military—early in his presidency while the tide of economic growth was still strong. In addition to these critical domestic forces, FHC traveled abroad extensively to build Brazil’s reputation and encourage international investment.99 Well on his way to instituting the economic and international aspects of his grand strategy, he was forced engage with Amazonian issues before he could advance his civil-military aims.

C. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

As a strategic president, President Cardoso had to deal with existing environmental actors while forging his own Amazon policies that supported his larger ambition. His resulting environmental record was “mixed at best.”100 As an academic, he co-wrote Amazônia: Expansion of Capitalism with Geraldo Müller in 1977. This work analyzed the cycles of development in the Amazon that centered on the rubber boom of the late eighteenth century, but did not advocate particular development or conservationist policies.101 Indicative of his coalitional style, “Cardoso [was] not opposed to all economic development, but advocated a balanced and planned approach. Although the region had been opened up by [military] government policy, much of the life was lawless.”102 This early analysis became critical in FHCs later determination to control security in the region and establish controlled development in the Amazon.

97 Samuels, 182-185.
98 Goertzel, 133.
99 Ibid., 143-144.
100 Espach, 12.
101 Goertzel, 63-64.
102 Ibid., 65.
Cardoso maintained concern for the Amazon during his tenure as a senator: supporting the Yanomami indigenous cause and creation of reserves mandated by the 1988 constitution.\(^{103}\) He even highlighted his maternal connection to Amazonas during the 1994 presidential election.\(^{104}\) FHC understood that he had to appeal to conservationist—along with other actors in the Amazon—in order to even have the chance to affect change as president.

Once in office, Cardoso’s minimized the indigenous conservation issues he previously supported. He silently allowed many of the environmental programs of his predecessors continue—including Planafloro, Pilot Project for the Amazon (PPG-7), and Pronabio.\(^{105}\) Besides, these programs did not directly impact Cardoso’s grand strategy because they linked international funding to Brazilian NGOs through government bureaucracy, and barely involved the office of the president. Instead, Cardoso had to grapple with the policies—sovereign indigenous reserves—he inherited from Collor. Demarcation of indigenous reserves was mandated by the 1988 constitution, but political support for demarcation was limited. It impeded national development and did not have support from conservative politicians or the military. In 1991, Collor used presidential Decree 22 to elevate indigenous land preservation over competing commercial, state and other interests.\(^{106}\) Local politicians, miners, loggers and cattle ranchers, regularly “opposed the restrictions that this legislation placed upon both development and the extraction of natural resources within indigenous areas.”\(^ {107}\) The military also felt “Brazil was pressed by the international community to form indigenous nations,” that represented


\(^{104}\) “His mother came from Amazonas and had Indian ancestry.” Goertzel, 121.


\(^{107}\) Moore and Lemos, 451.
potential threats to sovereignty. This mix of dissatisfaction with existing environmental policy would have to wait until FHC dealt directly with the military and gained their support.

D. SIVAM PROJECT

The military was wary of FHC with his reputation as a progressive academic. In August 1995, shortly after President Cardoso’s first election, the military conducted extensive maneuvers in Amazônia to prove their extensive capability in the region. Operation Tarauaca was “the largest military operation ever held in Amazônia”—involving six thousand troops from the army, navy, and air force on three fronts in the states of Acre and Amazonas.” Cooperation between traditionally independent and divergent military branches, this exercise was seen as an overt display of military power. The military meant to intimidate FHC into granting them de facto control of the Amazon. However, this position of strength was undermined when the Brazilian Air Force (FAB)—and one of Cardoso’s personal ministers—unintentionally created a scandal that FHC had to resolve. The Brazilian Air Force was the only organization that had maintained interest in the SIVAM program during the severe recession at the end of Franco’s presidency: even signing a contract with Raytheon Corporation to begin construction on SIVAM in 1994. The Raytheon contract did not immediately result in new equipment for the FAB, but became “the Cardoso administration’s first scandal” in November 1995. In order to avoid corruption allegations that would cripple his ability to carry out his grand strategy, FHC supported the Raytheon contract as both military modernization and as an environmental measure.

110 FAB is the acronym for Força Aérea Brasileira (Brazilian Air Force).
112 Goertzel, 139-140.
The larger, civilian SIPAM project was originally conceived under President Collor to coordinate state agencies and conservationist NGOs in the Amazon. SIVAM was the technical system of radars, aircraft and communication centers that would support SIPAM. These initiatives were established in preparation for the 1992 Rio Summit, but were forgotten in the wake of Collor’s corruption scandal and impeachment proceedings. The SIPAM program was entrusted to the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE), while the SIVAM project was kept by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB)—under the auspices of the Ministry of Space and Technology. Using SIVAM as justification, FAB autonomously entered into a contract with Raytheon to modernize their aircraft and build radar systems in the Amazon. The Brazilian government was supposed to pay Raytheon 15 percent of the total cost, but the project was bankrolled by Raytheon Credit Facility Company instead. Construction was scheduled to start in 1994, but bureaucracy, economic crisis and impending elections all precluded joint U.S.-Brazilian radar construction in the Amazon. The Raytheon scandal involved one of FHC advisors claiming that bribes had been paid to begin construction on SIVAM. FHC distanced himself from the advisor, but also knew he had to support the military who had just demonstrated their prowess in the Amazon. With pressure to appease the military and ensure their long-term support, he gave the FAB-initiated deal his presidential support and pushed for congressional support (funding).

After avoiding fallout from the November 1995 Raytheon scandal, Cardoso needed to build support for the program in congress. SIVAM was billed to congress and the public as a system to monitor the environment and standardize civilian air traffic control. The funding for this military modernization program was passed in 1996, financially “restructured in 1997—and the letters of credit—which total US$1.4 billion—


115 Goertz, 140.

went into effect in July 1997. In 1999, SIVAM acquired its first equipment and made its first installments in the region.”117 Not surprisingly, FHC announced his National Defense Policy shortly after funding for SIVAM was approved. Three years later, when SIVAM installation began, the first civilian Minister of Defense was sworn in. FHC transformed SIVAM from a liability at the outset of his presidency into a long-term project that bought military support when he needed to pass civil-military reforms. Cardoso pushed the project through the doldrums of the legislative process and past the “cloud of wrongdoing” when it benefited his strategy of instituting civilian control of the military.118

FHC’s explicit support for the military facet of an Amazon-protection system is not accidental. The successful funding and implementation of SIVAM was mirrored by the “failure of SIPAM and migration of civilian coordination to Defense Ministry.”119 SIPAM was supposed to be the overarching project to protect the Amazon, but took a back-seat to SIVAM construction. Envisioned as a coalition of federal, state, and local government bodies that would liaison with international NGO’s, this idea competed with funding for a plethora of other Brazilian environmental agencies.120 Since the domestic environmental movement was not a cohesive actor that could sway votes or provide political support, SIPAM did not figure into Cardoso’s grand strategy. The lack of backing meant that SIPAM received no Congressional funding. International support for SIPAM was also non-existent, so SIVAM became the government’s primary Amazon policy under FHC.121 The elevation of a military-led project over a civilian-centric program is demonstrative of the influence the military held regarding Amazonian matters. Cardoso supported an embattled military contract to construct new radars, update aircraft and give the Brazilian Air Force a role in the Amazon. The army maintained their

118 Guedes da Costa, 100.
119 Ibid., 109.
120 Hochstetler and Keck, 32-34.
121 Brigagão, 120.
position as frontier defenders and primary land-owners and welcomed the FABs efforts to build a comprehensive communication system in the Amazon. Therefore, construction of airstrips and military outposts—in support of SIVAM—contributed to both FHC and the military’s strategic mission of developing and occupying the region.

After dealing with the SIVAM scandal, initially appeasing the military and setting it into congress’ hands, FHC returned his attention to balancing the conservationists and development factions in the Amazon in early 1996. To undercut the indigenous reserve policies enacted by Collor and left untouched by Franco, he needed to relate the concept of “extractive reserves” to the preserves created under Decree 22. Allowing for limited development in these areas would avoid internal political turmoil with Amazônia politicians and the military, who were both set on development. The environmental community, specifically Mary Allegretti, had already linked the two ideas in 1992.122 In the wake of the Rio Summit, “extractive reserves” were meant to allow indigenous harvests and industry. By early 1996, both Brazilian NGOs and IFIs involved with the PPG-7 project encouraged sustainable development like rubber tapping and indigenous harvesting as key activities within indigenous extractive reserves.123 Yet, Cardoso needed to either open these extractive reserves to development actors or minimize their size in order to maintain popular support. Decree 1775 solved the problem of maintaining support for indigenous rights—as guaranteed by the constitution—and appealing to development interests.

E. DECREE 1775

In January 1996, President Cardoso issued Decree 1775 that allowed third parties to contest indigenous reserve demarcation. It was advertised as “necessary to ensure the constitutionality of protecting indigenous people’s lands in the face of future development projects.”124 In actuality, it allowed development projects to proliferate on indigenous lands. Since most reserves were still in the extensive process of registration

122 Hochstetler and Keck, 162.
123 Ibid., 167-169.
124 Moore and Lemos, 462.
with FUNAI, developers and even state governments contested the boundaries and pressed farther into previously-designated indigenous areas.\textsuperscript{125} Brazilians also saw this decree as federal authorization to invade indigenous lands and begin mining, logging and ranching while interminable court proceedings were underway.\textsuperscript{126} FHC placed the onus of determining extractive rights and land ownership on the justice system, but the domestic and international backlash were focused on him.

In line with his grand strategy of planned, balanced development in the Amazon, Cardoso attempted to focus international and environmental actors on the importance of sustainable development that Decree 1775 allowed. He failed to successfully win over conservationists. Environmentalists supported the concept of indigenous extractive reserves, but they did not condone invasion and decimation of legal indigenous lands. The assault on the Indigenous Area Raposa Serra do Sol (RSS) in Roraima was equated to the Yanomami plight under Sarney and earned international sympathies. The World Wildlife Fund added to environmentalist pressure when they lobbied for a federal agreement to “conserve 10 percent of the Amazon forest” in 1997.\textsuperscript{127} FHC agreed to the WWFs proposal and was forced to issue another decree on December 11, 1998—after his re-election—that specifically demarked Macuxi land in RSS.\textsuperscript{128} These two environmental concessions did not outweigh the political damage done to indigenous reserves by Decree 1775. Nor did they outweigh FHCs support from domestic developers who continued to contest indigenous reservation boundaries in court.

Cardoso lost some face with the international and environmental communities when he issued Decree 1775 in early 1996. However, the pursuit of his strategic goals for development and civil-military control were more important than immediately winning back conservationist approval. After successfully instilling a Ministry of Defense in 1999, he re-engaged with the environmental arena and appointed Mary Allegretti—an accomplished Brazilian environmentalist—as secretary for Amazônia in

\textsuperscript{125} FUNAI is the acronym for Fundação Nacional do Índio that is responsible for indigenous affairs.

\textsuperscript{126} Moore and Lemos, 454.


\textsuperscript{128} Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 508-509.
the Ministry of the Environment in 1999. She was charged with implementing the WWFs 10 percent proposal, with approval from state politicians. Allegretti, not Cardoso, bargained with governors to enforce the 1965 Forest Code and agree on protection areas that would satisfy international environmentalists.\textsuperscript{129} Agreements on conservation areas reached between the Ministry of the Environment and individual governors would be forwarded to the national congress for approval. Cardoso had successfully distanced himself from environmental criticism and mitigated the impact of that mistake on his grand strategy.

While the international and domestic conservationists were outraged, the military was supportive of FHCs Decree 1775 because it enabled challenges of indigenous “sovereignty.” The military’s perception of indigenous people and partitioned areas had to be considered when presidents approach Amazonian policy. According to the army, indigenous people want to be included in national efforts to defend sovereignty and Brazilian national security. The Batalhão de Infantaria de Selva (BIS) is the Jungle Infantry Battalion comprised of primarily indigenous soldiers that serves as the quick reaction force, in cooperation with the Brazilian Navy and FAB, for responding to illegal mining, drug interdictions, and possible FARC attacks.\textsuperscript{130} Natives fighting against those illegal elements—in defense of their individual reserves—challenges military authority in the Amazon. The military believes that indigenous people should only defend their portion of the Amazon as part of a sanctioned military force; otherwise, they represent a threat to security. These views echo efforts during the military regime to integrate indigenous peoples into the regular population. FHC was shrewd in recognizing the military’s disapproval of indigenous reserves—on security grounds—and gained a modicum of support with his decree to limit that sovereignty.

President Cardoso also realized the military’s fear of internationalization of the Amazon when he issued Decree 1775. Creation of indigenous reserves as part of “the indigenous peoples project, despite being the result of negotiations between the

\textsuperscript{129} The Forest Code was passed in 1965 and required landowners in the legal Amazon to maintain forest on 50 to 80 percent of their land. Hochstetler and Keck, 149.

\textsuperscript{130} Carlos Lorch, Jungle Warriors: Defenders of the Amazon (Hong Kong: Action Editora Ltda: 1992), 56-64.
government, indigenous peoples, and advocacy organizations, remains unacceptable to many sectors within the government (namely, the military and the Ministry of External Affairs).”

The military’s objection to indigenous reserves was longstanding fear of internationalization in the Amazon. Some military analysts believed that these reserves “drew attention from the international community and enhanced its special vulnerability to foreign intervention.” As previously discussed, foreign involvement in the Amazon was seen as a breach of sovereignty. Since these anxieties existed before FHC was elected, it was important for him to deal with the military’s disapproval of indigenous reserves before he could issue the National Defense Policy (PDN). While influential Amazon politicians and developers clamored for this decree, it is important to realize that it provided FHC additional credibility with the military, one of the most powerful actors in the Amazon. With the military’s support for his indigenous policy issued in January 1996, Cardoso moved on to establishing the first hallmark of civilian control: the National Defense Policy.

F. NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY (NOVEMBER 1996)

To ensure lasting success of his first civil-military reform, Cardoso took a series of steps to ensure military backing of a National Defense Policy. After appealing to legal developers and the military with Decree 1775 in January and advocating SIVAM before congress in mid-1996, he also proposed salary increases in March 1996. It is important to note that two of these appeasement measures dealt with the Amazon. This demonstrates that FHC understood the military’s captivation with the region. Only after he secured the military’s support was FHC ready to implement his first civil-military reform. Almost two years after his inauguration on November 7, 1996, he fulfilled one of his campaign promises: to publish a national defense policy (PDN). Instead of

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131 Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 504.
134 PDN is the acronym for Política de Defensa Nacional. Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 222.
provoking the military, the PDN reaffirmed traditional military ideas of development and their presence in the Amazon. However, as “the first document of its type since 1985, it was innovative only in its timidity.”135 The PDN framed development of the Amazon as a national security issue in rhetoric synonymous with military discourse—having been “discussed and proposed by the chief officers responsible for strategic planning in the military.”136 He issued the PDN as part of a defense policy that was “dominated by the single purpose of avoiding any hint of a conflict with the military in the interests of bolstering economic policy formation.”137 In support of Cardoso’s grand strategy, it served three crucial purposes: outlining modernization for the military, reinforcing military notions of sovereignty in the Amazon, and establishing the groundwork for a Ministry of Defense.

From the military’s perspective, the PDN promised force modernization and reasserted its roles of defending sovereignty and national security. Under previous presidents, the military had maintained its autonomy. Fitch characterizes this kind of autonomy—a military that “choose its missions, define the threats to national security, [and] formulate its own defense policies”—as a failure of civil-military relations.138 Before Cardoso’s PDN, the only institutionalized civilian control was Congress’ control of the military budget. The austerity of Cardoso’s Plano Real worsened the shrinking military allotment. Modernization that had been on hold during the military regime, and only modestly realized with the Calha Norte program under Sarney, was in danger of being cut. FHC managed to define modernization as a national security interest in the PDN, thus ensuring the armed forces financial security. The military’s “deterrent strategic posture” was crucial and had to be reinforced by “scientific and technological development [that allows] the Armed Forces to attain greater strategic autonomy and

135 PDN is the acronym for Política de Defensa Nacional. Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 222.
better operational capabilities.” This modernization was implicitly tied with the armed forces’ reinvigorated responsibility for protecting national borders and sovereignty in the Amazon.

The PDN also solved an “identity crisis” for the military that developed at the end of the Cold War. The “restive military, concerned about two things: money (meaning both salary and the overall defense budget) and their future role” had the President’s backing for the first issue. FHC provided his guidance on the second when he named “protecting the Brazilian Amazon; and give[ing] priority to development and reinvigoration of the strip of land along Brazil’s borders, especially in the northern and central western regions” as important defense directives. Cardoso also explicitly tasked the army with internal, public safety roles when the police were not sufficient—a task that was written into the 1988 constitution. However, the intermittent police actions authorized in the constitution did not have the same role-defining language as the PDN. Instead, the National Security Doctrine stressed that a dedicated military presence in the Amazon was crucial to protecting the “territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Brazil. This document made national defense of the Amazon a priority.

FHCs strategic style of governing is seen when he charges both the military and society with defense of the Amazon. “The mission for defending the [Amazon] had been the exclusive responsibility of the Armed Forces” since the military regime. The National Defense Policy entrenched that role, but included societal support of the military’s efforts. In concert with other landowners—of which the army is the largest

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142 Jorge Zaverucha, FHC, forças armadas e policia: entre o autoritarismo e a democracia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2005), 67.
143 “Brazilian National Defense Policy,” §3.3.a.
144 Pereira, 1.
landholder in Amazônia— and developers, the military embraced the charge to control the Amazon. In addition to this encouragement to develop, the PDN defined “armed groups in neighboring countries and international organized crime” as foci for the military. The army—as authorized by the PDN—continued to embrace defense of the Amazon as a primary responsibility. However, society as a whole was also tasked with defending the nation’s economic resources, international prestige and “heritage and interests.” The army saw its charge as maintaining security of society-at-large that was trusted with populating and developing the region.

The PDN reified Cardoso’s ability to strategically employ a key actor, the military, in support of his grand strategy of domestic development. While large soybean farmers, “politically connected landowners” and industrial miners hold more political influence over state and local government policies in Amazônia than the military, the army is seen as a defender of these interests against international and non-state threats. FHC sided with the military against international critics during the Roraima forest fires in 1998. While foreign actors criticized Brazil for its “inability to control the fires,” Cardoso reiterated his “confidence in the national armed forces’ ability to protect Brazil’s sovereignty.” The impact of these fires was two-fold. Not only did Cardoso secure the military’s support for upcoming elections, but international criticism also fueled the Army’s traditional paranoia of global actors (NGOs). As one military officer supposed, “Indians and rubber tappers, supported by foreign countries, will be able to claim autonomy and self-government inside the Amazon.” Cardoso allowed the continued animosity between the military and international actors because it did not directly impact his re-election or his grand strategy.

146 Espach, 21.
148 Ibid., §3.3.
149 Espach, 20.
150 Ibid., 24.
151 Pereira, 8.
The creation of the Ministry of Defense was the second cornerstone of civil-military reform that Cardoso sought as part of his grand strategy. While it was a campaign promise during his first election, FHC was preoccupied with strategically balancing actors in the Amazon during his first two years in power. After the PDN was passed, he spent the last half of his first term focusing on passage of the constitutional amendment for presidential re-election. An event that momentarily broke that focus was Argentina’s acceptance as the United States’ non-NATO ally. To maintain the international prestige aspect of his grand strategy, FHC used an August 1997 speech in Asunción, Bolivia to an audience of neighboring heads of state to announce the creation of a civilian Ministry of Defense. However, the passage of a re-election amendment was more important than immediate institution of a Ministry of Defense. In order to fulfill his grand strategy, Cardoso needed a second term. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense project was deferred until his second term.

Of note, Cardoso had implemented the token position of a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Emfa) in September 1995. He appointed General Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel to the post as his liaison with the armed forces. Despite this position being filled by a military officer, the Emfa did not command troops and was therefore weaker than the service chiefs who were initially opposed to the creation of a Ministry of Defense (MD). No centralization of the services was actually pursued by the Emfa. Service chiefs remained in control of their branches and blocked any attempts to unify the services. This position was further undermined when the SIVAM scandal broke out

152 Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 214 and 224.


155 Emfa is the acronym for “Estado-Maior da Forças Armadas” or Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 206.

156 MD is the abbreviation for Ministério da Defesa. Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 207.
shortly after its creation. Even though Cardoso created the position as a forerunner to the Minister of Defense, it did not represent civilian control of the military—only reorganization of the military branches. The position also lost its strategic importance when the SIVAM scandal broke and Cardoso was forced to deal with the military directly as a strategic actor.

Creation of the Ministry of Defense was so protracted that it was not seen as a threat to established military prerogatives. However, just as with the PDN, President Cardoso wanted to ensure absolute military support. “In May 1998, a formal project to equip and modernize the armed forces was announced as the result of the projected creation of the new Ministry of Defense.”157 This modernization plan bought the military’s support because it was enacted before the actual creation of the Ministry and promised monetary support to each of the branches independently. President Cardoso did not attempt reform of the military structure until shortly after his October 1998 re-election. Winning in the first round election, FHC’s grand strategy was publicly reaffirmed. Now that he was guaranteed another four years to achieve the economic growth and international prestige aspects of his grand strategy, FHC could turn his attention to his final measure of civilian control over the military. On November 19, 1998—a month after his re-election--Cardoso finally proposed a constitutional amendment to Congress that would change the “organization, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces” to create a Ministry of Defense—headed by a civilian minister—and remove the service chiefs from their cabinet positions.158

After congressional approval, the former Senator Élcio Álvares was sworn in as Defense Minister on June 10, 1999.159 The Minister faced some resistance from the service chiefs, but “each of the services continu[ed] to develop their respective strategies” and was assuaged by presidential support for modernization.160 Cardoso received some


158 This constitutional amendment, Proposta de Emenda Constitucional, was known by its acronym PEC. Zaverucha, *Frágil democracia*, 287-288.

159 Zaverucha, "The fragility of the Brazilian Defense Ministry," 111.

160 Pereira, 12.
domestic criticism because “the Defense Minister would be but a decorative item, for power would, in fact, remain in the hands of the military.” However, the initial weakness of the Minister of Defense was purposeful to reduce friction with the military. The service commanders were replaced by the Minister of Defense on the president’s cabinet, but remained equal with the Minister with regard to military decisions. FHC had successfully implemented the keystone of civil-military relations without visibly impinging on the military’s perceived roles. President Cardoso effectively balanced assertion of civilian control over the military with programs that appeased the armed forces. The creation of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense did not cause military backlash because it was built with incremental steps that were punctuated by concessions to the military: salary increases and modernization plans. To the international community, he was seen as a democratic consolidator.

H. CONCLUSION

Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the first Brazilian president since the transition to democracy to successfully apply a grand strategy that balanced complex domestic and international agendas. He entered office with significant popularity that enabled him to pursue the economic reform aspects of his grand strategy. He was a shrewd politician who knew the importance of both the domestic audience and international support when balancing civil-military reforms, domestic development and international conservation. Many of the actors affected by his grand strategy had strong interests in the Amazon. FHC successfully leveraged them against each other to achieve his goals for the duration of his two terms.

Civil-military relation scholars evaluate Cardoso’s tenure in terms of military prerogatives he was able to diminish. Environmental scholars look to the large international conservation programs he facilitated. They also criticize his Decree 1775 as a set-back to indigenous rights. Neither of these groups account for FHC’s grand strategy


162 Zaverucha, FHC, forças armadas e policia: entre o autoritarismo e a democracia, 240-241.
or the military’s influence on his Amazonian policies. SIVAM and Decree 1775 both supported development, but were aligned with military interests to facilitate passage of the National Defense Policy. He successfully leveraged a variety of actors in the Amazon to contribute to his grand strategy goals of economic growth and civil-military reforms. FHCs sparse policies on conservation were combined with record economic growth to achieve his goal of increased international prestige. Fernando Henrique Cardoso managed to successfully apply a grand strategy that balanced conservation, development and security in the Amazon.
IV. INDUSTRIOUS PRAGMATISM IN THE AMAZON UNDER PRESIDENT LULA

A. INTRODUCTION

President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva was elected president in October 2002 from the Worker’s Party (PT). As a leftist, labor president, he was expected to diminish military programs in favor of social reforms. However, he won the election based on a moderation of his social-change rhetoric and promised to uphold FHCs free market reforms. He had popular support and inherited a relatively strong economy, which benefited from the commodity boom of the era. This stability allowed him to approach the military and international community from a position of strength. As a popular, progressive and pragmatic president, Lula realized military strength in the Amazon. He used this key actor and its views on sovereignty and development to promote his sustainable development agenda in the region. This chapter examines Lula’s rise to power and his early association with environmentalists through the Worker’s Party. Next, it evaluates his overall environmental policies through examination of sustainable development projects, environmental ministers, and indigenous reserve creation. Finally, the chapter will evaluate the military’s impact on Lula’s grand strategy during his first and second terms.

B. LULA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Lula’s long history in the ideological and disciplined PT party shaped his views on development and conservation. He was also an important leader when the PT party shifted to “vote-maximizing strategies” after the 1998 elections to increase the number of legislative members, governors and political representatives. Lula’s pragmatism, ability to win coalitional support and goal of social development are all aspects of his...
grand strategy. He maintained political power as opposition party leader under the military regime, through four elections, and during his re-election in 2006. This political resiliency can be attributed to a consistent grand strategy that is focused on social reform and development. While his support base and particular ideologies have expanded—and shifted—over time, Lula’s ability to pragmatically balance various domestic actors in pursuit of his central goals of social development strengthens his grand strategy.

1. **Lula’s Roots: The Worker’s Party**

The Worker’s Party (PT) was formed in 1980—during the military regime—and united labor with socialist thinkers to create “the only Brazilian party to have truly formed through societal mobilization rather than through elite politics.” Transition to democracy allowed the PT to officially participate in elections and they gained a small, but loyal following. This disciplined party “espoused radical democracy, direct participation, and grassroots organization.” Lula, a former lathe operator and metalworker in São Paulo, rose to prominence as a union leader and a key figure in the PT. He was the perennial PT presidential candidate in 1989, 1994, 1998 and in 2002; and represented a stark alternative to FHC. After his loss in the 1998 election, Lula and the PT realized that they needed to appeal to a broader audience and form political alliances to succeed in the 2002 election. As Hunter notes, “the domestic effects of stabilization and global economic restructuring, which were recognized and digested only with time, led pragmatic leaders to set aside the PT’s historic project and replace social transformation with the pursuit of power.” For the Worker’s Party to gain popularity for the 2002 presidential election, it needed to temper its rhetoric, ally with other political parties, and appeal to grassroots organizations like environmentalists.

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After 1998, the PT began to moderate itself to achieve mass appeal. The party formed ties with various sectors of Brazilian society: including environmentalists and evangelicals. The environmentalists were attracted by the PTs history of grassroots, social mobilization and growing popularity. The 1992 Rio Conference united conservationists, but since then they had fragmented and lost political clout under the Franco and FHC administrations. The PT party’s rise to power seemed to promise a break with neo-liberal development policies that harmed conservation efforts. As a labor-based party, the Worker’s Party appealed to those environmentalists concerned with urban pollution problems more than those concerned with Amazon preservation. However, this minor differentiation did not affect the overall support that Brazilian conservationists gave the PT during the 2002 election campaign.

2. Lula’s Election and Environmental Disappointment

The Worker’s Party (PT) and Lula campaigned on a socially, environmentally responsible platform that was well-received by Brazil at large. The PT managed to moderate its social rhetoric and even assured wealthy, conservative Brazilians that Lula would continue Cardoso’s successful neo-liberal economic policies. He emphasized the importance of paying off the national debt and implementing social programs for the poor.169 Convincing media campaigns and promises for moderation won Lula the election in the second round of voting in October 2002. He failed to sweep the populous, southern, and industrialized states of the south, but carried the poorer regions of the north. Lula did not come into office with the same popularity as FHC, but immediately started with his socially-responsible development programs. The creation of the Council of Social and Economic Development (CDES) in February 2003—one month after inauguration—“intended to give civil society, especially business, broader access to and participation in the policy-making process.”170 The council itself—still functioning as of

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Lula’s second term—is an advisory board for the president on economic, development and social matters that is dominated by business leaders and southern industrialists. This executive council was one of Lula’s first initiatives and focused on economic development; not an encouraging start for conservationists.

From the outset of Lula’s first term, Lula’s bias for socialized development—stemming from his party’s ideological roots—was clear. He allowed road programs and development projects in the Amazon that were begun under Cardoso’s Avança Brasil project to continue. This support of development infuriated conservationists. “In October 2003, more than 500 NGOs and social movements sent Lula a letter criticizing his environmental policies in the strongest possible terms.”171 Most of these NGOs were Amazon-centric and were running up against the “divided soul of the Workers Party [whose] core of support—and much of its leadership—comes from the machine-shop floor.”172 The ideology and hopeful environmental promises of the election had been replaced with the pragmatism of running Brazil and strengthening the economy through development. The diversity of environmental groups had contributed their wide support to his election, but did carry the political weight of other interest groups like business, land developers and the military. He would need conservationist support in three years—for the next election—but sacrificed their good opinion to the challenge of developing the economy and the country.

C. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

From his initial election in 2002 until the present, Lula’s grand strategy towards the Amazon has been challenged twice. His preference for a sustainable development policy in the Amazon is a reflection of his industrial roots. At the same time, Lula is responsive to domestic and international conservation criticisms. Domestically, he appoints renowned environmental activists as his Environmental Ministers. These progressive ministers are staunch advocates for environmental conservation in the

Amazon. Responding to international conservation, Lula created indigenous reserves after the murder of a U.S. environmental activist. A pending Supreme Court case involving the Raposa Serra do Sol keeps international attention on the Amazon during Lula’s second term. While Lula’s environmental policies are often reactionary (creation of reserves after crisis), the appointment of environmental ministers and support for existing indigenous reserves proves that he successfully balances environmental actors against development and military interests in the Amazon.

1. **Priority to Development**

Lula, in support of his grand strategy of sustainable development, pursued infrastructure projects begun by FHC. Road-building in Amazon is a primary project that “continu[es] on the potentially disastrous course set by the Cardoso administration’s ambitious Avança Brasil (Brazil Advances) program for the region and promis[es] to increase accessibility—and thus probable deforestation—of some of the most remote areas.”

Hydro-electricity development is the other development that infuriates conservationists. On the Madeira River, “two hydro-electric generating plants are to be built against fierce resistance from indigenous and environmental groups. Mr Lula da Silva irritated Ms Silva [Environmental Minister] by commenting that Brazil’s economic development was being held up ‘for the sake of a few fish’.”

Lula’s comment refers to the lengthy environmental permit process that the Ministry of Environment requires for development projects throughout Brazil. The tension between Lula’s support of infrastructure projects in the Amazon and environmental concerns would cost him the support of two, notable environmental ministers.

Agribusiness is the other area of development that conflicts with conservation. Lula supports increased farming because of both domestic and international pressures. MST lobbies for small parcels of arable land—often with illegal settlement and protests. Large landowners pressure Lula for more land to raise soybeans and cattle. As

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173 Hochstetler and Keck, 180.
Greenpeace’s Brazil affiliate, Frank Guggenheim notes: “Lula is paying his bills with the export of soy and meat. So he is absolutely ready to compromise on everything [relating to conservation].”

Brazil’s soybean and energy exports are domestically-driven policies to diversify the economy and provide stability. Since soybean exports bring in foreign currency, contribute to economic growth and provide Brazil with currency reserves, agribusiness is critical to continued growth. However, these large soybean and cattle plantations contribute to deforestation rates and conflict with conservationist ideas for the Amazon. These agribusiness and infrastructure developments encroach on the region and are sources of tension between Lula’s development strategy and his environmental ministers.

2. Environmental Ministers

As discussed earlier, conservationists were glad when the PT won in 2002: “Lula’s Worker’s Party had been a powerful friend in Brazil’s congress and after his victory Lula appointed an internationally respected rainforest activist as his environmental minister.” He appointed Marina Silva, an activist from the Amazônica state of Acre, as his overall Minister of the Environment. Mary Allegretti—appointed by FHC—kept her position as the secretary for the Amazon, working directly for Silva. Rising from poverty in Acre, Silva formed early connections with the prominent environmental activist Chico Mendes and became a local Worker’s Party political candidate. This seemingly robust connection to conservation was challenged by ministerial politics—competition with the Ministry for Strategic Affairs—and bureaucratic inefficiencies that kept the Environmental Ministry from effectively carrying out conservation in the Amazon. These difficulties and limited resources led the Mary

175 Morton, 16.
177 Morton, 14.
178 Hochstetler and Keck, 178.
179 Ibid., 179.
Allegretti, specifically charged with Amazon policy, to resign in 2004. With her departure, the secretariat of the Amazon position was diminished and conservationists lost a strong environmental advocate. Allegretti’s frustrated departure foreshadowed Marina Silva’s—Lula’s Environmental Minister—resignation four years later.

Economic development and social programs created tension, but not outright conflict, with Environmental Ministry programs during Lula’s first term. This dynamic changed in 2008 when the Environmental Ministry lost its environmental oversight role over a development project in the Amazon. The Ministry for Strategic Affairs was in charge of infrastructure development and pushed for construction of hydro-electric plants on the Madeira River to contribute to Brazil’s increasing power needs. The project was being held up by the permits, studies and environmental impact assessments the Environmental Ministry required for all development projects. This battle between the two ministries was resolved by Lula when he awarded responsibility for “sustainable development in the Amazon” to the Minister for Strategic Affairs, Robert Mangabeira Unger. Marina Silva resigned as Environmental Minister later that evening. By siding with development, Lula reinforced his strategic commitment to a developmental grand strategy. Even though Silva was a noted activist, her departure did not impact any major domestic or international actors in the Amazon. The bureaucratic tension between ministries mirrored the real struggle between conservation and development in the Amazon. Two environmentalists resigned in the face of the administration’s development policies, but these resignations did not shift the balance of conservation and development in the Amazon. Therefore, Lula’s grand strategy was largely unaffected. He continued the pattern of appointing noted activists as Environmental Minister with Silva’s replacement.

Carlos Minc, founder of Brazil’s Green Party, took over Silva’s position in May 2008. He agrees with Minister Ungar’s ideas of “sustainable development” in the Amazon. Unlike his predecessors, Minc is not a vocal opponent of road construction and

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181 Wheatley, 2.
hydro-electric projects being completed in the Amazon. In December, he “announced a plan to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half to 5,850 square kilometers per year by 2017.” This goal is ambitious and the mechanisms for enforcing it are not yet clear. The close work between Ungar and Minc seems to suggest that Polícia Federal will be used to prevent illegal loggers and ranchers from expanding into the Amazon. However, land ownership in the Amazon is traditionally hard to prove—as seen with the myriad land disputes over indigenous lands. Distinguishing between legal development and illegal deforestation is a lofty goal considering the overlapping jurisdictions—federal, state and local—and various agencies that grant permits to harvest timber and raise cattle. The diminished resources and political clout of the Environmental Ministry that drove Silva to resign is likely to limit Minc from effectively meeting his goal of diminishing deforestation.

3. International Pressure

Pressure to enforce environmental programs is not only the result of ardent domestic Environmental Ministers, but also from abroad. Lula deals with the same international attention on the Amazon that every Brazilian president since Collor faced. International loans are still tied to conservation, the U.S. providing an average of eight million dollars a year for the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative. In March 2006, Lula balanced domestic business interests with these international restrictions and “signed the Public Forest Management Law, which allows companies access to 3% of the Amazon on the condition that they carry out sustainable operations.” This law, while technically requiring conservation, allows for greater development of the region. Combined with other development projects in the Amazon, this law establishes a clear pattern of Lula’s acknowledgement of conservation pressure from abroad while

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183 Brazil-U.S. Relations, 20.
184 Ibid., 10-20.
supporting economic interests. Since the military supports developmental policies and incorporation of the Amazon with the rest of Brazil, Lula’s record seems to upset only the conservationists, both domestically and abroad.

Creation of indigenous reserves arises two times during Lula’s administrations. During the first term, Dorothy Stang’s death was the catalyst for immediate action to create additional reserves. In early 2005, Dorothy Stang—a foreign missionary and noted environmentalist—was killed by illegal loggers. The international outcry resembled the uproar after Chico Mendes’ death in 1989. A short two days after her death, Lula announced creation of five new indigenous reserves.185 This shift in environmental policy was an anomaly and the struggle “between environment and development continued within the administration” after the immediacy of Stang’s death passed.186 Indigenous reserves were advocated as a polemic solution to deforestation. Prior to Stang’s murder in Pára, “the Environmental Ministry had already prepared decrees that President Lula issued almost immediately, creating conservation units in Southern Pára alongside what was to become a major highway through the region, BR-163.”187 As Marina Silva notes, demarcation of these reserves was meant to “curb ‘violence and impunity associated with the illegal occupation of lands and deforestation’ in the Amazon.”188 The international community was appeased by Lula’s action, even though the additional decree did not change his fundamental strategy of development in the Amazon.

Lula’s second term conservation confrontation coincided with a federal Supreme Court decision regarding the Raposa Serra do Sol (RSS) reserve. This issue was a holdover from FHCs demarcation of the RSS in 1993 and his 1775 Decree. Landowners immediately challenged the RSS demarcation under FHC and the case was referred to the Brazilian court system. Fifteen years after the reserve was created, the Supreme Court

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185 Morton, 15.
186 Hochstetler and Keck, 181.
187 Ibid., 227.
finally heard one of the many RSS contestation cases. Lula, like FHC, officially declared
the RSS as indigenous land (immediately following Stang’s murder). However, Decree
1775 was still in effect and allowed contestation of reserve boundaries. Most of the land
disputes between indigenous people and developers were resolved in state court, but a
group of illegal rice farmers pressed their case farther. Conflict between the indigenous
Macuxi and these rice farmers escalated to violence and the Polícia Federal were called in
to enforce the RSS borders. The rice farmers took their case to court and pursued it to the
highest levels. While the majority of Supreme Court justices upheld the demarcation of
RSS and the eviction of non-indigenous farmers from the area on December 10, 2008, the
decision has yet to be finalized with the opinions of all the Supreme Court justices.189
Eight of ten Supreme Court judges decided in favor of upholding the boundaries of RSS
and sided with indigenous interests over developers. The ruling, however, was not final
because one of the judges requested additional time to review the case.190 The written
decision of the RSS case has not been released, as of March 2009. International interest
remains high in this court case and sides with indigenous interests—pressuring the court
to decide in favor of sovereign reserves. The RSS reserve remains especially problematic
for military because it lies along the border with Venezuela and invites violation of
Brazilian sovereignty. The court’s ruling is important for two reasons: it will determine
whether the court system believes that Indians can have sovereign nations inside Brazil’s
borders; and it will decide whether the military is allowed to enter the indigenous
reserves to preserve national security.

D. MILITARY AND THE AMAZON, 2002-2006

Although Lula faced conservative and military resistance during the 2001
presidential campaign, he understood that both groups were critical actors that could
support his development grand strategy. Unlike Collor’s reaction to military presence in
the Amazon, Lula supported its development-oriented programs like SIVAM. The

189 News on Rights and Tenure, "Indigenous Peoples of Raposa Serra do Sol await final decision on
historic land struggle,” Rights and Resources Initiative,
190 Ibid.
momentum that SIVAM gained under Cardoso was continued by Lula. Recently, President Lula authorized the reinstatement of the *Calha Norte* program. Developing the Amazon is integral to Lula’s grand strategy. The military provides a continuing development presence in the region that Lula can incorporate into his larger developmental agenda. The president has the option for using civilian development agents, but chooses the military to maintain orderly development in the Amazon.

1. **SIVAM**

Cardoso inaugurated the control facility at Manaus, but Lula’s first term saw the system finally operational. The advanced system of radars, air traffic control stations, communication outposts and on-call aircraft was billed as a multipurpose system when it was conceived. Now, SIVAM had to prove that it could coordinate civilian air traffic over the Amazon; prevent drug traffickers from flying with impunity; and provide early warning of deforestation (by both illegal logging and natural fires). The first task was accomplished with alacrity, as the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) efficiently managed flight operations in the Amazon region. FAB maintains dominance over civilian air traffic coordination beyond the Amazon, running the nation’s civilian air network. The National Civilian Aviation Agency (ANAC) remains subordinate to FAB.  

This growing tension between FAB and ANAC for control of the civilian aviation sector is a larger issue that remains unresolved. Despite this tension, the SIVAM system allowed successful coordination of civilian air traffic over the Amazon, which allowed FAB to differentiate authorized aircraft from those used by drug traffickers.

The effectiveness of the aerial-focused SIVAM system has had unintended consequences for drug trafficking in the Amazon. SIVAM detects unauthorized aircraft and FAB fighters intercept and ground the drug-laden planes. Working in conjunction with the Polícia Federal (PF) and SIVAM, the army has shut down innumerable illegal airstrips. By successfully denying drug traffickers the use of airstrips in the Amazon, the military has deterred air-based drug trafficking. However, the battle against drugs is not

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so easily won and the trafficking has become water-borne: “because of SIVAM, the traffickers have to avoid the radars. That makes it more difficult for them to come by air.”\textsuperscript{192} This shift to rivers as a primary means of transporting drugs places the onus of controlling trafficking back with the army, and increasingly the navy. “The Armed Forces want to step up their operations in the [Amazon] region more and more so as to become more familiar with it. The Army is carrying out Operação Poraquê in the Amazon Region this week.”\textsuperscript{193} While SIVAM worked to deter airborne drug trafficking, it pushed the problem back on the army. On a positive note, the PF and the army are cooperating to combat the drug problem. The armed forces have police powers in the border zone and incorporate the under-manned PF on drug interdiction missions. The unexpected dynamic between SIVAMs success and the shift to ground-based drug trafficking does not lessen the importance of maintaining SIVAM. Indeed, the FAB must continue its mission over the Amazon to keep drug traffickers from returning to the skies.

SIVAM has yet to prove that it can deter illegal deforestation or detect natural forest fires in enough time to adequately respond, however it will continue to receive funding and priority under President Lula because it fulfills other roles. After proving a deterrent against drug trafficking, SIVAM was enlisted for scientific purposes and finding the best mining areas in the Amazon. In the spirit of development, it “provide[s] basic geological information for exploration programs in the Amazon, an area known for its high mineral potential and lack of geologic information.”\textsuperscript{194} As a tool that monitors and maps the Amazon, SIVAM has the potential to track and deter deforestation, but the civilian institutional capacity is barely developed enough to effectively use it for conservation. Aside from scientific endeavors—for both mining exploration and attempts at base-lining forest size—SIVAM fills the “the need left by the physical


\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.

absence of the forces along the entire border area.”¹⁹⁵ Lula is dedicated to modernizing the military, but has neither the resources nor the inclination to increase the military’s size. SIVAM serves as an early warning against potential invasions of the Amazon and allows the military to strategically respond to threats without being garrisoned along the entire border. These roles ensure that SIVAM will remain an important part of the military’s plans to secure the Amazon.

**2. Calha Norte Reactivated**

The *Calha Norte* project was begun by Sarney to guarantee military support. Collor quickly undermined the program by cutting all funding and support for military garrisons along the border. Calha Norte is translated as “Northern Path” or “Northern Channel;” both of which have been used to describe a resurgence of troops along Brazil’s border during President Lula’s tenure. As early as 2004, Colonel Alvaro Pinheiro briefly mentions the reactivation of the Calha Norte program as one of the premiere strategies in “securing” the Amazon:

The Calha Norte Project is located to the north of the Solimões and Amazon rivers and covers 4,100 miles of border that separates Brazil from the Guyanas, Suriname, Venezuela and Colombia. The Project involves a 100 mile-wide strip along those borders, or an area of 700,000 square miles; this is equivalent to a quarter of Brazilian Amazon and about 15 percent of Brazil’s territory.¹⁹⁶

Establishing a border zone that allows the military freedom to enforce sovereignty and security in the Amazon is reminiscent of the goals of during the military regime: a need to populate, develop and integrate the Amazon region in order to secure it. This brief, yet detailed mention of the Calha Norte project was reinforced by Martins Filho. He describes major army operations in the Amazon during Lula’s first two years in office: Operation Timbó (June 2003 and 2004) and Operation Ajuricaba III (November

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¹⁹⁶ Pinheiro, 10.
While these maneuvers may have been part of the military’s regular training, the timing of these massive operations coincides with Lula’s first years in office. The military also asserted its presence in the Amazon in the first few months of FHCs presidency. This pattern establishes that the military seeks to remind civilian leaders of their presence in the Amazon, even if the operations do not directly contest civilian control of the military.

Unofficial support for increased military presence along the border began during Lula’s first term. However, official mention of the Calha Norte program does not come until December 18, 2008 when Lula endorses the Strategic Defense Plan. President Lula reassures the military that its projects in the Amazon would continue: “General Enzo, you can rest assured that the Army will continue building our highways, our bridges, because we have no interest in stopping any project.” He also played up the Navy’s importance as part of his Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC) in bringing humanitarian aide to river communities in the Amazon. Ten days after these comments, Lula signed the Strategic Defense Plan that mentions “promotion of actions emphasizing the presence of the State in the Amazonia, especially by strengthening the defense aspect of the North Channel Program.” The scarce official mention of this northern program is difficult to understand, given the broadly publicized military modernization efforts. If this was a policy originated by Lula’s administration, it should receive as much press as the military budget increases. Instead, the Calha Norte program seems to indicate a resurgence of the military’s role in quietly dictating Amazonian policy.

The shift in Lula’s defense policy in the Amazon may be explained by the ascension of Defense Minister Nelson Jobim. He was appointed in July 2007 after
Waldir Pires was forced to resign in the wake of an airplane crash. Since FAB controls civil aviation in Brazil, Lula fired his Defense Minister to assuage public outrage. It is unclear whether Pires was a strong minister or conceded to military prerogatives in the Amazon. However, Jobim’s intentions are clear. He advocates the increased “participation of government, military and civilian agencies in the plan to enliven and develop the Amazon frontier strip, by using the strategy of maintaining a presence.” He also explicitly authorizes the army to “exercise police powers in border zones.” As of February 2009, Lula has ratified both of these policies and fully supports his Minister of Defense. Minister Jobim, in turn, completely supports the increased presence of the military in the Amazon. While the term “Calha Norte” is seldom officially used by the Lula administration, the garrisoning of the border is evident.

E. MILITARY AND THE AMAZON, 2006-PRESENT

Lula’s military policies during his second administration represent original programs, not merely continuation of predecessors’ policies. After he was re-elected and domestic social programs were in place, his attention shifted to both Brazil’s international prestige and the military. The economy was growing, trade and development were diversified and new energy reserves were found off Brazil’s coast. This stability allowed Lula to re-examine the role of the military and implement new policies. Since orderly development in the Amazon is critical to fulfill Lula’s grand strategy, the military secured promises for modernization that would help them carry out that mandate. President Lula also implemented a National Defense Strategy that bridged the gap between FHCs National Defense Policy and existing military defense strategies. Lula’s defense strategy promised increased social support of the military and reaffirmed its importance in the Amazon.

203 Nelson Jobim, interview.
1. Military Modernization

Modernization of the military, in terms of new equipment, did not really begin until Lula’s second term. Lula used most of his political capital during his first term to support social projects, enhance the economy, and deal with the MST landless movement.\footnote{MST is an abbreviation for Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra. This movement began in 1985 and is composed of peasants who want land redistribution in Brazil. “About the MST,” Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement, http://www.mstbrazil.org/?q=about (accessed February 24, 2009).} Although it is important that Lula allowed SIVAM to continue to completion, the program was pre-determined by budgets that were finalized under Cardoso. The Calha Norte project marked border territory that would be the army’s responsibility, but did not provide explicit funds for modernization. The fiscal austerity under FHC had precluded large-scale modernization. By Lula’s second term, a commodity boom—in soybeans, ethanol and other products—permitted the increased defense spending necessary to establish Brazil as an emerging world power. In December 2008, Lula spoke with the defense minister and the commanders of each service, assuring them that it was time to modernize: “Brazil became an economically more equitable nation, Brazil became a more [internationally] politically respected nation. Our economy is growing and we are thinking of restructuring that which is the guarantor of our country: the Armed Forces.”\footnote{President Lula, “Addressing Generals on the Economic Crisis and the Armed Forces.”.} These modernization plans were announced at the same time as a Strategic Defense Plan that reorganized the military was revealed. Cardoso, a neo-liberal academic, won the military over with SIVAM plans even as the National Defense Plan was announced. Lula, a labor worker, won the military over with modernization plans as he announced a Strategic Defense Plan.

These modernization efforts constitute the largest state-investment since the military regime and total approximately six billion reais (Brazilian currency) between 2008 and 2010, according to Defense minister Nelson Jobim.\footnote{Nelson Jobim interview.} A large part of that, US$540 million will be used to build a Brazilian nuclear submarine and another nuclear power plant.\footnote{Brazil-U.S. Relations, 13.} “Far from being merely an aspiration of the military, the program for
reequipping the Armed Forces has broad support in the Lula government, Congress, and a well-oiled pro-domestic industry lobbying machine.” 208 While the modernization highlights the nuclear program, it also impacts the Amazon. Funding will continue for SIVAM and an increased army presence along the Amazon border. Interestingly, these modernization announcements came just months after the crisis between the Environmental Ministry and the Strategic Affairs Ministry was resolved in favor of sustainable development. Since the military is a development actor, it is important to ensure they are capable of supporting development efforts with the latest equipment. The fact that Roberto Unger, the Minister for Strategic Affairs, helped author Lula’s National Defense Strategy lends credence to the important connection between military and civilian development in the Amazon. Even though the civilian development sector is growing under Lula, the military remains the strategic development actor in the Amazon.


The Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END), focused on setting military priorities, establishing a robust domestic military industry, outlining personnel issues for three services, and justifying compulsory service. It took effect on December 18, 2008 and “fills the gap between the existing National Defense Policy (PDN), with which it is harmonized, and the Military Defense Strategy [Estratégia Militar de Defesa (EMD)], which must be revised to conform to the END.” 209 The document was co-authored by the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and Defense Minister Jobim. According to the wording of these two documents, the PDN encouraged society to occupy and develop the Amazon; while the END places more emphasis on the military to control the region. The navy would increase its presence in the Amazon River; the army would position its strategic reserves in the center of the country so they could deploy in any direction; and the FAB would provide early warning for the army and


maintain its vigilance over the Amazon with SIVAM. Each service must devote itself to “the defense of Amazônia [that] calls for a sustainable development undertaking and draws on the triad of monitoring / control, mobility, and presence.” If the Calha Norte programs has actually been resurrected, it would align perfectly with the goals of Lula’s Strategic Plan.

Sovereignty and challenges to Brazil’s interest in the Amazon are also specifically addressed using language that reinforces military beliefs. Resistance against external meddling is now spelled out as part of the national defense strategy:

Brazil will be vigilant in the unconditional reaffirmation of its sovereignty over Brazil’s Amazônia. Through implementing development and defense activities, it will repudiate any attempt to oversight its decisions with respect to the preservation, development, and defense of the Amazônia. It will not allow organizations or individuals to serve as instruments for foreign - political or economic - interests that may wish to infringe upon Brazilian sovereignty. Brazil is the one that watches over its Amazonia to serve mankind and itself.

Each branch is charged with resisting foreign intervention in its own way. The navy will establish a “multi-use naval base, comparable to the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro in terms of capacity and capability” at the mouth of the Amazon. The army will “station along the borders, [and] will act as advance vigilance and deterrence detachments.” The FAB will continue to run SIVAM—incorporating more civilians—so that it can also develop new space technologies. Based on the END, the military is responsible for repelling foreign incursions into the Amazon. Using sustainable development as “an instrument for national defense,” the military will be ready to contend with any force that challenges the “unconditional Brazilian sovereignty…under the pretext of advancing the

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211 Ibid., §1.10.
212 Ibid., §1.10.
213 Ibid., §2.9.
214 Ibid., §3.3.
215 Ibid., §4-4.5.
presumed interests of humanity.”216 The Strategic Plan aligns the military to defend the Amazon against internationalism, an ingrained military fear since Collor’s administration.

The language concerning defense of the Amazon is very strong in Lula’s Strategic Plan. It compliments the two other strong purposes of the document: to reinforce modernization intentions and explain personnel restructuring for all services. The navy’s modernization, as outlined in the Strategic Plan, is heavily invested in a nuclear submarine. This ambition required a new round of talks between Brazil and Argentina to reassure compliance with their joint non-proliferation treaty.217 The FAB’s expansion into space technology will no doubt provoke reactions from northern nations. The army’s continually increasing presence in the Amazon will likely increase tension between development agents and conservationists. Despite the potential for foreign (and domestic) disagreement with the END, it has the full backing of the President and the Ministry of Defense.

3. Military Maintains the Hard-line on Indigenous Reserves

Since it is accepted that “the problem in the Amazon has never been the lack of laws, but the lack of resources to enforce them,” the military—as an enforcing agent and directly impacted by reserve creation—becomes important when discussing indigenous reserves.218 Indigenous reserves remain a salient threat to the military’s view of the Amazon. Representing both enclaves for international interests and an impediment to progressive development, indigenous reserves are contrary to the military’s ideas of sovereignty. In 2004, Pinheiro voiced a pervasive military view: “Brazil can’t renounce its obligation and right to develop those natural resources. Foreign ‘tutelage’ or political impositions [in the form of indigenous reserves] are absolutely unacceptable.”219

218 Morton, 14.
219 Pinheiro, 8.
same fear is expressed by former commander of the Army General Staff School, Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva as recently as February 2009—in response to the pending Supreme Court ruling on indigenous reserves: “there is a tacit long-range international strategy for applying successive measures to impose shared sovereignty in the Amazon Region.”

To protect against this threat of foreign subversion and involvement in the indigenous reserves, the army feels it must occupy the Amazon and promote “preservation, sustainable development, and integration of the native population and the region into the country.” These views were supported by FHC because the National Defense Plan (PDN) called for society to occupy the Amazon and practice sustainable development. Lula’s END reinforces these views of protecting the Amazon against intrusion.

Fundamentally, the military still questions the validity of reserves and the sovereignty of indigenous peoples. International pressure forces the federal government to designate reserve areas that it would not otherwise create. These “Trojan horses” challenge Brazilian sovereignty, create pockets of land that are technically off-limits to the military, and elevate Indians over other Brazilians. However, the Brazilian public is led to believe that there is genuine cooperation between indigenous people and the armed forces against the illegal miners and loggers. Demarcation of indigenous reserves legally prohibits any non-indigenous people from violating these areas. However, this legal restriction directly conflicts with the military’s charge to ensure security in the Amazon. Therefore, the military justifies its incursions into reserves as protection of indigenous people (just as they protect Brazilian citizens).

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220 Paiva, 3.
221 Ibid., 5.
222 Ibid, 1.
This view is so pervasive that the latest Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim asserts:

There is no Indian territory in Brazil. What we have in Brazil is land belonging to the Union but assigned to Indian usufruct. And it is important that the Federal Supreme Court, now that it is deciding the Raposa-Serra do Sol case, is upholding the demarcation made by the government…even the president of the republic has issued a decree saying that we are going to establish border posts and military organizations on all the Indian lands precisely to prevent anything that is not Indian—not native. No Indian wants to stop being Brazilian.224

These strong, public statements put inordinate pressure on the Supreme Court for ruling against the Macuxi in the RSS case. The fact that one judge is delaying the official ruling to review evidence—despite eight other judges ruling in favor of the Macuxi—could be a result of these overt military contentions. The military is opposed to the RSS case because they are opposed to anything that detracts from Brazilian sovereignty as they see it. Large tracts of indigenous land along the border potentially facilitate drug trafficking, illegal logging, mining and farming that all threaten national security and stability. The military was charged by the PDN formulated under President Cardoso to protect all Brazilian citizens and all Brazilian property. As Lula’s latest endeavor to rectify the military’s perceived role in the Amazon with official policy, he approved the National Defense Strategy in December 2008. Instead of resolving how indigenous reserves should be protected, it outlined a restructuring of the military.

F. CONCLUSION

Although Lula came to the presidency with popular support and a relatively stable economy, he did not attempt to dislodge the military from the Amazon. In fact, he supported its presence and codified its developmental role in his 2008 National Defense Strategy. The military’s control in the Amazon provides security that allows Lula to pursue his socially-based, sustainable development strategy. It also serves as a resident development actor that augments civilian developers: building roads, assisting with hydro-electric projects and irrigation systems. The flood of unorganized, often illegal, Brazilian citizens surging into the Amazon to develop it is countered by the military.

224 Nelson Jobim interview with author and date.
inability of state institutions and the Polícia Federal to adequately control the influx of legal and illegal developers forces the federal government to depend on the military. Lula recognizes that the existing military presence is politically easier to bolster than replace with civilian institutions that keep the peace and promote development. As a pragmatic politician, he is taking advantage of a capable, resourceful, organized force that supports his development agenda for the Amazon.

Lula’s commitment to development arises from the need to support economic growth and to contribute to Brazil’s international ascendancy. The military is critical actor in carrying out Lula’s grand strategy in the Amazon. With the completion and relative success of SIVAM, Lula is shifting the FAB’s focus to space technology and domestic aircraft development. The navy is not only increasing its presence along the Amazonas River, but it is also developing domestic nuclear submarine technology. The army’s primacy in the Amazon persists as fighting drug trafficking and guaranteeing Brazilian sovereignty. Lula is using two of the services to develop Brazil’s international prestige and capability. He uses the army’s self-defined mission of defending the Amazon to maintain orderly development in the region. Lula is following the same trend as FHC: issuing national defense policies that reinforce the military’s role in the Amazon while remaining vague about the military’s presence on indigenous lands. As long as the military continues to contribute to Lula’s grand strategy, he will use them as an important actor in Amazônia.
V. CONCLUSION

A. BRAZILIAN CONSIDERATIONS

The days of military rule and unstable democracy are over in Brazil. The last two presidents have been strong-willed, pragmatic leaders who come to office with specific agendas and grand strategies to fulfill those plans. Unlike past presidents who solely react to crisis, these strategic chief executives balance domestic and international actors to achieve their interests. The Amazon, as a vast and largely untapped resource, is a crucial arena in which Brazilian presidential grand strategies are tested. Domestic development, conservation (domestic and internationally-driven), and security are three areas of concern in Amazônia that must be addressed when formulating presidential policies. The future for each of these three areas depends on how they amplify the grand strategies of future Brazilian presidents.

1. Conservation

The domestic conservation movement represents such a diversified group that it does not regularly influence policy. This motley crew of individual organizations is focused on environmental issues ranging from urban pollution to forest protection to indigenous rights. A broad coalition is only catalyzed when a major event, like a notable murder or international summit, happens. Otherwise, it becomes such a fragmented and internally-competitive group that it cannot hope to influence Brazilian development policy in the Amazon. This weak domestic political actor can be strengthened by international support, but attempts to gain external support can be seen as direct threats to sovereignty by the military. It should be noted that traditional ideas of development have been somewhat moderated into “sustainable development” in the Brazilian lexicon. However, this new term does not guarantee that its results are environmentally-friendly or supported by conservationists.

Despite notable activists being named as Environmental Ministers under several presidents—Lutzenberger, Allegretti, Silva, and Minc—this office carries less political
clout than either the Ministry of Strategic Affairs (Internal Development) or the Defense Ministry. In fact, the Strategic Affairs Minister and Defense Minister cooperated to produce the National Defense Strategy (END) under President Lula. The lack of resources and political weakness of environmental ministers means that Amazonian conservationists must continue to rely on international pressure to moderate development. This external help is becoming more difficult as Brazil’s importance in the international community increases and other nations are less likely to challenge its domestic policies. Brazilian conservationists must find new ways to tap into international conservation groups and resources that minimize confrontation with domestic development and security concerns.

2. Development

Development rhetoric has slowly changed so that projects now constitute “sustainable development.” This change in phrase does not stop road construction, logging and farming (both legal and illegal). Since the original Forest Code in 1934, preservation has always been mentioned in conjunction with development. Farmers, ranchers and landowners must keep a certain percentage of forest on their land but are allowed to develop the remainder. This percentage has varied over time, but the presence of developers has only grown. FHC's Decree 1775 and Lula's "Public Forest Management Law" both allow development on preserved forest. The preference for development over conservation is natural for Brazil as its economy grows and its population expands. Global trade places more value on soybeans, timber and cattle than on the preservation of the Amazon. As long as it is cheaper to develop agribusiness in northern Brazil than it is to develop industry in the highly populated south, the Amazon will continue to be threatened.

Strategic presidents realize that controlled development leads to economic growth and increased international importance. Despite having diverse personal backgrounds, both FHC and Lula advocate development in the Amazon. The mineral wealth in the region contributes to Brazil’s domestic industry. Increasing numbers of farms and agribusiness in the southern Amazon make Brazil an international supplier of soybeans.
In both cases, development leads to increased economic growth: a critical factor for every president. Brazil’s stability during the recent global recession proves that its international importance is growing, largely based on its diverse development policies. As Brazil continues to grow economically, it will depend on increased development in the Amazon. A major contributor to development in this region is the military.

3. Military

With the lack of conventional threats, the military looks to define its role in defending Brazil. It has found new importance in defending the sovereignty and national borders in the Amazon. According to the military’s definition of sovereignty, it sees both the international community and indigenous reserves as dangerous. The international community—supporting NGOs and native populations—is seen as a threat because they usurp Brazilian land that could be developed. Indigenous peoples are also problematic for the military because they should want to be Brazilian, not their own sovereign people. They should not create unrest and security problems in the middle of the Amazon when fights with illegal loggers, miners, drug traffickers and landless farmers erupt. In the army’s view, the federal government has been pressured by the international community to create these reserves against its better judgment. The language in FHC’s PDN and Lula’s END affirms this view by elevating the military as the supreme entity in the Amazon. Any group that wants to preclude development, violate sovereignty or threaten national security will be dealt with by the army in Amazônia.

The military is also a built-in developer that can maintain the peace in this expanding region. The flood of Brazilians into the Amazon—including miners, loggers, ranchers, and landless peasants—creates a dangerous frontier atmosphere rife with instability. The federal police do not have the resources to control the violence that results from land disputes and crime in the Amazon. The military does have the resources. It also has the institutional capacity to conduct large-scale development like highway construction. Brazil’s development depends on securing its resources, so the military’s role is inextricably linked with development in the Amazon. Hypothetically, if the military were not involved in the Amazon, development of the region would devolve
into a race for resources between legal and illegal development forces. Massive insecurity would erupt and the government would not benefit from resources ransacked from the area. The military’s traditional security role in the region prevents this kind of rampant, uncontrollable development from happening. Political leaders continue to empower the military in the Amazon because it is the only truly powerful, coordinated state actor in the region.

B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Brazil is a nation “where democratic institutions are still consolidating, experience with citizenship is limited, and rights are poorly secured.” However, the recent political literature has focused on social inequality and the quality of democracy in Brazil, not civilian control of the military. It is clear that civilian control of the military exists through a civilian Ministry of Defense, an over-arching National Defense Plan (PDN) and a military-centric National Defense Strategy (END). However, these instruments of civilian control mask the fact that the military has maintained the same relative missions in the Amazon that it had during the military regime. The END even grants the military supremacy in Amazônia to integrate indigenous peoples, oversee civilian institutions and guard against international interference. Civilian defense ministers in the last thirteen years have consistently supported military dominance in the Amazon, at the expense of conservation efforts. The military remains the dominant actor in civil-military relations as long as it can convince civilian leaders that its self-prescribed missions are immutable and should be supported, not challenged.

The military maintains this autonomy largely because of its indispensable domestic role. As a whole, “the Brazilian Armed Forces never forg[o]t its permanent mission ‘to sew the seam of national unit[y],’ directly participating in the country’s development efforts and, through the soldier’s presence in all regions, maintaining (sic)

226 Nelson Jobim interview and the "Brazilian National Defense Strategy date."
national cohesion, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The air force ties the country with control of Brazil’s civil aviation. In the Amazon, they support that national aerial integration with SIVAM. The navy protects the coastline and newly-found Atlantic gas reserves. They also have a significant humanitarian and security role along Amazonian waterways. The army—the dominant armed force in the Amazon—maintains the national border against drug traffickers, foreign guerillas and other illegal developers. Imbued with police powers along the border, the army takes over the domestic security function that Polícia Federal and state police should retain. It also builds highways and hydro-projects that facilitate further development in the Amazon. Currently, all of these functions can only be accomplished by the institutionalized military. Instead of developing civilian institutions to take over some of these duties, presidents find it easier to rely on the military.

Jorge Zaverucha asserts that the state of civil-military relations remains tenuous in Brazil. As long as strategic presidents rely on the military to carry out policy in the Amazon, civil-military relations remain incomplete in Brazil. However, since Cardoso’s administration, it is difficult to measure the fragility of civilian control through formal, political prerogatives. The military has relinquished many of its political privileges by accepting the civilian Defense Ministry and the national security policies. No longer does it openly threaten the legislative process. Instead, the military’s power has shifted to its developmental role in the Amazon and the defense industry (for the air force and navy). As the federal government gives more land, influence and responsibility in Amazônia to the military, the harder it will be for conservationist or even civilian developers to affect direct change in the Amazon. The military’s primacy in the region also blocks civilian institutions—like domestic NGOs, state police and even government development agencies—from building capacity in the Amazon. With civilian institutions interminably subordinate to military presence, it demonstrates that civilian policymakers have not completely asserted civilian control over the military.

227 Pinheiro, 9.
C. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Brazil is a prime example of a state that remains economically strong despite recent downturn in the world economy. The diversity of its exports, its growing energy sector (newly discovered Atlantic gas fields), and its policy of domestic industrial development all contribute to its growth. While it is still listed as a developing nation, Brazil is becoming an important world leader. To maintain the economic and international ascendancy, Brazil is securing its resources. FHC and Lula both used the military to defend its resources. Garrisoning troops and building roads to secure the Amazon’s development against drug traffickers, indigenous people, and international meddlers means that the forest is sacrificed to economic growth. As a result of this economic growth, Brazil is re-emerging as formidable regional leader.

U.S.-Brazil relations will become increasingly important in the coming years as the two dominant countries in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. cannot afford to make uninformed policies towards Brazil, especially environmental policies towards the Amazon. It is important for U.S. policy-makers to understand the strategic goals of Brazilian presidents and to consider the complex relationships between conservation, development and security in the Amazon. This administration has taken its first steps to recognize these dynamics. Admiral Mullen—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior ranking U.S. military member—recently traveled to the Amazon to prove that America recognizes various Brazilian concerns including security for the region. He traveled to Manaus, Brazil—in the heart of the Amazon—to gain understanding of Brazil’s “military capabilities and the challenges of defending areas such as the Amazon Basin.”228 This visit was an important step in realizing the impact of U.S. policies on conservation and civil-military relations in Brazil. Instead of being seen as a threatening outsider that covets the Amazon, it is crucial—for continued U.S.-Brazil relations—for America to engage with Brazil’s pragmatic presidents and understand the multiple fronts of conservation, sustainable development and security in the Amazon.

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