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4th Quarter 2008 of JFQ
**Focus on Naval Power: The People’s Liberation Army Navy Challenges to Stability, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter**

**Abstract**

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Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
by Joseph J. Collins

Since 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has contributed to the Project on National Security Reform study of the interagency process. As part of this cooperative effort and in furtherance of the INSS mission to inform the national defense policy debate, INSS is publishing selected analyses on national security reform.

In this case study, Joseph J. Collins outlines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what improvements could be made in that process. Finding that U.S. efforts were hobbled by faulty assumptions, flawed planning, and continuing inability to create adequate security conditions in Iraq, Collins concludes with several recommendations to improve the decisionmaking process for complex contingency operations, such as developing a new planning charter, improving the interagency planning process, and strengthening interagency execution.

43 pages. Available only from NDU Press. Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on this and other publications: <ndupress.ndu.edu>
Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front  By Adam B. Siegel

The Use of Military Force by the President: Defensive Uses Short of War  By James P. Terry

The Case for JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy  By David K. Richardson

An Interview with Admiral James G. Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Why a Conversation with the Country? A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists  By Karl F. Walling

Off the Shelf  By Robert E. Henstrand

Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy  Reviewed by Todd Manyx

Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic  Reviewed by Rizwan Ali

The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq  Reviewed by Andrew Marvin

Joint Doctrine Update

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

About the covers: The front cover shows a composite of three photos (top to bottom): SH-60F approaching for landing aboard USS Wasp (U.S. Navy/James R. Evans); USS Hampton surfaced at North Pole (U.S. Navy/Kevin Elliott); and Navy divers descending into water off coast of St. Croix (U.S. Navy/Glen Hurd). The table of contents shows (left to right): Israeli soldiers training in new IDF Urban Warfare Training Center (Marine Corps Times); Estelle Maersk, one of the world’s largest commercial container ships (Maersk International Shipping); Airman conducting surveillance for enemy snipers in Kirkuk, Iraq (30th Space Wing/Angelique Perez); and U.S. Army UH–60 dropping leaflets over Kirkuk in support of 10th Mountain Division operations (30th Space Wing/Samuel Bendet). The back cover shows (clockwise from left): Texas National Guardsmen decontaminating after hazardous material exercise at U.S. Coast Guard Station, Galveston (U.S. Coast Guard/Adam Eggers); Army and Air National Guardsmen practicing victim extraction during simulated nuclear attack drill (U.S. Army/Russell Lee Klika); Navy damage control seamen taking samples of simulated anthrax during chemical, biological, radiological drill aboard USS John C. Stennis (U.S. Navy/Kyle Stockler); and Fox nuclear, biological, and chemical detection vehicle being transported near Baghdad (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Doti).
During just about every trip I make to the field and to the fleet, I get asked about the challenges I will face leading the military through this upcoming Presidential transition:

“Are you worried about having to work for a new President?”

“What if a Democrat wins? What will that do to the mission in Iraq?”

“Do you think it’s better for one party or another to have the White House?”

And this one, asked of me by a young Marine at Camp Lejeune a few weeks ago:

“Are you endorsing any of the candidates? And if so, which one and why?”

My answer is simple and always the same: the U.S. military must remain apolitical at all times and in all ways. It is and must always be a neutral instrument of the state, no matter which party holds sway.

A professional armed force that stays out of the politics that drive the policies it is sworn to enforce is vital to the preservation of the union and to our way of life.

I am not suggesting that military professionals abandon all personal opinions about modern social or political issues. Nor would I deny them the opportunity to vote or discuss . . . or even to debate those issues among themselves. We are first and foremost citizens of this great country, and as such have a right to participate in the democratic process. As George Washington himself made clear, we did not stop being citizens when we started being Soldiers.

What I am suggesting—indeed, what the Nation expects—is that military personnel will, in the execution of the mission assigned to them, put aside their partisan leanings. Political opinions have no place in cockpit or camp or conference room. We do not wear our politics on our sleeves. Part of the deal we made when we joined up was to willingly subordinate our individual interests to the greater good of protecting vital national interests.

We defend all Americans, everywhere, regardless of their age, race, gender, creed,
and, yes, political affiliation. We may be citizens first, but we are also Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen by oath—a promise we made to defend the Constitution of the United States “against all enemies foreign and domestic.”

We do this by obeying the orders of the Commander in Chief. Obedience to that authority is a military virtue underpinning the very credibility with which we exercise our own command and control.

Now, I know all too well the famous dictum that war is but an extension of politics, and that at the highest levels it is vital for military leaders to understand the political context of national security decisionmaking. But understanding is not advocating. It is not deciding.

“Political factors may exercise a determining influence on military operations,” noted General George Marshall, “therefore they must be given careful consideration. Yet soldiers must not assume to lead or to dictate in such matters.”

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am responsible for providing the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council with my best and most independent military advice. I have an input to policy, as do the other chiefs and the combatant commanders. We get a chance to affect the decisions of our civilian leaders, but we do not make those decisions. And we do not involve ourselves in political debates.

As the Nation prepares to elect a new President, we would all do well to remember the promises we made: to obey civilian authority, to support and defend the Constitution, and to do our duty at all times.

Keeping our politics private is a good first step.

The only things we should be wearing on our sleeves are our military insignia.

MICHAEL G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The National Defense University Foundation

... promoting excellence and innovation in education ...

The National Defense University (NDU) Foundation was pleased to support three writing competitions conducted in 2008 by NDU Press. The Foundation congratulates the contestants and winners of the following:

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition**

In the 27th annual competition, the Chairman challenged students in the Nation’s joint professional military education institutions to think and write creatively about national security strategy.

**The Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Competition**

The Secretary of Defense initiated this competition in 2007 to inspire critical and innovative thinking on how to adapt national security institutions to meet current and future challenges.

**The Joint Force Quarterly Kiley Awards**

In honor of the former Director of NDU Press, Dr. Fred Kiley, the most influential essays from 2007 were selected for recognition. Articles were evaluated for their contributions toward the JFQ mission of continuing joint professional military education and security studies.

The final round of the competitions was held May 20–21, 2008, at Fort Lesley J. McNair, with 24 professors from the joint professional military education colleges serving as judges. The winners have been posted on the NDU Press Web site at:

[www.ndu.edu/inss/press/winners](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/winners)

The next issue of JFQ (Issue 51, October 2008) will include the winning entries from the essay competitions as a Special Feature.

The NDU Foundation promotes excellence and innovation in education by nurturing high standards of scholarship, leadership, and professionalism. The National Defense University depends on the NDU Foundation to support university activities that are not covered by Federal appropriations. Many activities at the heart of a sound university environment—such as endowments, honoraria, competitions, and awards—cannot be paid for by government funds. Thus, the NDU Foundation offers Americans the opportunity to invest in the Nation’s security by supporting these activities.

Research and writing competitions are conducted by NDU Press with the generous financial support of the NDU Foundation. The Foundation is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization established in 1982 to support the National Defense University.

For more information, visit the NDU Foundation Web site at [www.nduf.org/about](http://www.nduf.org/about)
To the Editor: In my experiences as a planner for the joint force air component commander (JFACC) with Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Central Command, I have been encouraged by the ability of action officers in the different functional components to work past Service-centric mindsets to come up with joint, workable solutions to challenging problems.

Seemingly, when we approach similar problems outside of the construct of a joint task force (JTF), we tend to forget the inherent advantages of working closely with our sister Services. As a result, we often end up planning in a relative vacuum, even when we are living next door to one another. I offer a case in point: When I was working as a planner for the joint force air component commander (JFACC) last year, I learned that Pacific Fleet was developing its own operational level headquarters, the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), to provide command and control in the maritime domain. This is an outstanding enhancement for the joint force; having a maritime staff dedicated full-time to operational level planning and execution can only make us better able to predict and respond to events in theater. From my parallel experience in the 13th Air Force ASpOC, I can attest to the advantages of having a functionally oriented staff that can concentrate daily on “force consumer” issues rather than the Service-specific “force provider.”

But I saw a problem in the MOC. Seemingly, the Navy and Air Force were not talking about it with each other, which did not make sense. The ASpOC construct had already reached a relative level of maturity and acceptance in the joint force, and it seemed that the Air Force should be actively helping the Navy and Marines steer around their past mistakes and leapfrog onto its advances. At the very least, we should be making sure we are both evolving command and control systems designed to work together.

But no matter whom I asked in my Air Force chain, no one had any official information about the MOC or could tell me what its implications would be for the command and control of joint airpower. When I asked my action officer contacts in Pacific Fleet, the answers I got were often incomplete or troubling. Based on these discussions, and some Navy O-6 briefings I observed at Third Fleet during an exercise, I started coming to some disconcerting conclusions about the MOC.

It seemed that the Navy was interested in putting the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) firmly in charge of “the Maritime Domain,” including the air above the oceans and littorals, and was going to use the MOC to do it. Rather than allocate excess sorties to the JFACC, the JFMCC would retain control of carrier air, including interdiction sorties, and task them out through a maritime tasking order (MTO). As an advocate of functional components and the centralized control of airpower, I was concerned that we were about to create what amounted to two JFACCs in the same joint operational area. I could easily imagine this opening up operational seams in intelligence, command and control, and common support functions that could be exploited by a canny or even lucky adversary—not unlike the operational disconnects of Leyte Gulf in World War II, but this time in the sky.

Convinced that it was my job to prevent this, I spent countless hours researching the potential issues. I looked up the domain definitions in joint publications. I read historical accounts of airpower command and control disconnects. I prepared bullet background papers and essays about why we should not assign shared domains to single functional or Service components. I prepared a submission for publication to share my views and provoke discussion.

But then, I finally did what I should have done from the start: I called up the folks at the Pacific Fleet MOC and asked them what was going on. Was the MOC being designed to replicate JFACC functions within the JFMCC? Absolutely not. Would the MOC seek to put naval sorties on the MTO instead of the air tasking order? Only outside the joint operational area, not for joint task forces. Was the Navy intentionally hiding its plans from the Air Force? No, it was just trying to get its hands around an enormous task before consulting with the other Services, and it only had a small staff to do it. In less than 15 minutes, I had resolved months of angst, suspicion, and inter-Service competition conspiracy theories that no one I knew could disprove based on firsthand information.

This leads me to a few conclusions. First, it tells me that despite some notable disagreements between the Services on the best way to structure the joint force to protect the Nation, we are still all very much on the same team when it gets down to doing the job. Second, it tells me that when I feel like someone is not communicating, it is probably at least half my fault, and even more so if I do not ask the right question.

Third, it tells me that we should be applying the lessons of the JTF to Phase Zero. Why do we treat steady-state operations differently than other events across the range of military operations? Why do we not have liaisons (not to be confused with joint assignments) between Service headquarters outside of a JTF construct? Why do we not plan Phase Zero activities more collaboratively, rather than execute Phase Zero by Service component? How many opportunities to learn and execute together are we missing by not talking to one another regularly?

The sooner we can bring the JTF teamwork and mindset to our steady-state operations, the sooner we can put ex–conspiracy theorists like me to better uses.

—Major David J. Lyle, USAF
Pacific Air Forces

To the Editor: In his article “A Strategy Based on Faith: The Enduring Appeal of Progressive American Airpower” (Issue 49, 2nd Quarter 2008), Mark Clodfelter correctly points out that the historical record does not match the puffery and, at times, exaggerated advocacy of some airpower strategists. For example, in a recently released White Paper (December 29, 2007) that “charts US Air Force strategy for the next two decades,” Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley asserts, “No modern war has been won without air superiority. No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority.” Really? The North
Koreans and Chinese battled us to a stalemate during the Korean War without air superiority. We lost the Vietnam War even though guerrillas did not own a single aircraft, and the North Vietnamese did not fly south of the demilitarized zone. Moreover, the United States has enjoyed air dominance over Iraq for 17 years, yet the strategic situation in the current conflict is not altogether favorable.

Airpower is not a silver bullet that offers cheap and easy military solutions to foreign policy problems. Nonetheless, fierce and progressive advocacy of airpower serves an incredibly important purpose: to provide policymakers with expanded options. Dr. Clodfelter suggests that Airmen “jettisoning” progressive airpower ideas would stifle strategic debate and limit ideas precisely at a time when the United States is struggling to find the appropriate formula for success in Iraq. Bombing alone may not achieve political goals in unconventional conflicts, but jettisoning progressive ideas would further emasculate Airmen’s inputs on how best to run a campaign.

Dr. Clodfelter’s criticism of airpower in the Balkans campaigns is a red herring. He states that the central premise of progressive airpower is a belief that airpower makes wars quicker, cheaper, and less painful for all sides than a reliance on surface combat. There never was a debate, though, over the relative merits of airpower versus ground power to combat Serbian aggression; the use of ground forces in the Balkans was simply a political nonstarter. Indeed, President Clinton publicly admitted that he was not even considering the use of ground forces early in the conflict. Furthermore, General Wesley Clark, an Army officer who wanted to use airpower in a conventional manner, determined targeting priorities.

—Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. Spinetta, USAF
1st Fighter Wing

Dr. Clodfelter’s response:

I appreciate Lieutenant Colonel Spinetta’s thoughtful response to my article; I hoped that it would engender debate about the merits of progressive airpower. Yet I am not exactly sure what side of the debate he takes. On the one hand, Lieutenant Colonel Spinetta notes that “the historical record does not match the puffery and, at times, exaggerated advocacy of some airpower strategists.” On the other hand, he remarks that “jettisoning progressive ideas would further emasculate Airmen’s inputs on how best to run a campaign.”

In regard to airpower in Kosovo, the jury is still out on whether bombing was the key factor that caused the Serbs to leave the province, or whether it helped trigger the ethnic cleansing that it was designed to prevent. The facts remain that fewer than 19,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled to Albania before Operation Allied Force began; 65,000 more had done so 5 days after the bombing started; and 620,000 were refugees a month later. Ultimately, the Serbs expelled 800,000 Kosovar Albanians—roughly half of the population—before the air campaign ended.

To the Editor: In his article “On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right” (Issue 49, 2nd Quarter 2008), James Corum asserts that “[i]n the Air Force counterinsurgency doctrine, the issue of providing appropriate equipment to Third World allies is not even addressed.” This statement seems to indicate some unfamiliarity with Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, which discusses this issue in some detail, outlining best practices for helping foreign countries field air forces with the right technology for their situations.

Moreover, Dr. Corum seems to hold a pejorative view of the kinetic use of airpower. For instance, he makes the case that “there is a heavy political price to pay when airpower in the form of airstrikes is used,” yet he fails to mention similar, and practically inevitable, consequences of using land power in counterinsurgency, especially when it involves large numbers of American troops in a foreign country. Airpower is among the joint force commander’s most precise, flexible, disciplined, and scrutinized capabilities to apply lethal force. In terms of potential for insurgent propaganda and recruitment, ground force excesses—including indiscriminate counterbattery fire, “terrain denial” strikes, “harassment and interdiction” fires, heavy-handed searches, imprisonment of innocents, inhumane prison conditions, ubiquitous roadblocks, early curfews, escalation of force events, and so forth—also certainly have the potential for creating more insurgents than they eliminate.

One last point to be made is based on my involvement in directing (at the operational level) and flying (at the tactical level) combat air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: the assertion that counterinsurgency tasks cannot be accomplished “from 30,000 feet” is more than simply an inaccurate characterization—it is a blatant cheap shot and misinforms the reader.

—Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF
Commander
LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education

Dr. Corum’s response:

Service doctrine ought to provide useful guidance for the commander and staff planner. On the very important subject of equipping the air forces of less developed nations, the only comment of the U.S. Air Force’s new counterinsurgency doctrine is, “The key to Building Partnership Capacity . . . is not finding high or low-tech answers, but the right mix of technology, training, and support that provides a Partner Nation . . . with affordable, sustainable, and capable airpower” (AFDD 2–3, Irregular Warfare, August 2007, p. 29). Contrast this statement with the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, which lists the basic capabilities needed by a small nation air force in counterinsurgency, provides recent and current examples of the effective use of simple airpower technologies, and then discusses the advantages and disadvantages of modifying transports as aerial gunships (December 2006, pp. E3–E5).

Which of these doctrines provides the better starting point for the counterinsurgency planner?
Executive Summary

Within the United States, public awareness of the role and contribution of the Navy is cursory at best. The maritime strategy and our continuing effort to get out and talk about it have been very worthwhile.

—Admiral Gary Roughead
Chief of Naval Operations

With this 50th issue, Joint Force Quarterly celebrates its 15th anniversary. While much has changed since 1993, the interoperability problems and resistance to greater synergy that inspired General Colin Powell to establish JFQ are strikingly resilient. On April 21, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in speeches at the U.S. Military Academy and the Air War College asserted that the Armed Forces were adapting too slowly to new enemies and that military leaders were “stuck in old ways of doing business.” Two days later, Admiral Michael Mullen addressed the students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College as part of the National Defense University’s Distinguished Lecturer Program. He noted that the combined student bodies included a great many combat-experienced leaders and urged them to think differently about the nature of war and to consider new approaches to national security challenges. The Chairman recommended JFQ as an effective vehicle for professionals to air ideas and outline innovative concepts for securing national security objectives.

In this issue, JFQ supports this mandate by examining elements of naval power and some contemporary challenges that make a strong U.S. Navy as important as ever.

A spirit of cooperation and innovative thinking is undeniably reflected in the scope and manner in which the new U.S. maritime strategy was developed and coordinated between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Before finalizing the selection of manuscripts for this Forum, JFQ sat down with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, in his Pentagon office. He spoke to the importance of the new maritime strategy and the manner in which it was socialized both within and without the three sea Services. Before reading our Forum articles, readers may wish to skip ahead to the last article in this issue (Recall), which addresses the effort to engage the public on naval power and U.S. maritime security. As
with aviation assets, naval vessels are decreasing in number and increasing in unit price, forcing difficult choices in the face of modernization and utilization demands. Despite the reality that the Army, Navy, and Air Force own and operate shipping, the naval power debate bears no resemblance to the ongoing airpower dispute presented in the last issue of JFQ. This is not to say that the issues are less contentious in the realm of naval power; rather, the friction is largely confined to the sea Services and far less exposed to inter-Service or public scrutiny.

Before one can assess the present state of naval power, it is important to define terms, and for this task, JFQ turns to one of its most prolific contributors and reviewers, the Naval War College’s Dr. Milan Vego. Professor Vego begins his survey of contemporary naval power by disabusing readers of the notion that naval power and seapower are synonymous. He then presents the myriad roles of naval power across the spectrum of conflict and Service core competencies. While some may assume that technological advances in airpower have supplanted traditional Navy roles, Dr. Vego makes a convincing case for the persistence and scalability of naval power and how multidimensional military operations place adversaries on the horns of serial dilemmas. He concludes with an assessment of the continuing importance of naval power in realms that include homeland security and deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities abroad. This assessment is reinforced in the fifth and sixth Forum articles.

Our second Forum entry addresses the unfortunate state of contemporary U.S. seapower and warns that the Navy’s large and growing share of the domestic maritime industry does not benefit America’s future as a sea power. Lieutenant Douglas Tastad begins with a historical survey of U.S. commercial shipping, then compares this with its present state and proposes solutions to arrest and reverse the industry’s decline. The author argues that domestic seapower’s current vector prompts questions concerning the Navy’s operational legitimacy and sustainability. In presenting his remedies, Lieutenant Tastad asserts that the Government must overcome its state of denial concerning these problems. He proposes capital investment and owner incentives, new maritime technology research, legislation addressing oversight, and terror insurance. Lieutenant Tastad concludes that “the commercial maritime sector no longer underpins the Navy, rather the Navy is the victim of what industry remains.”

In our third and fourth installments, JFQ again draws upon Naval War College expertise to provide context for the importance of modernizing the U.S. fleet. In addressing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) urgent modernization of its navy, Drs. Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase observe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) focus is primarily on a possible conflict with Taiwan. This said, the PLAN is also concerned with a wider range of missions that include nuclear deterrence and protection of maritime resources. The importance of information in today’s strategic environment, combined with the PRC’s tradition of centralized command, has inspired great emphasis upon command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. PLAN publications connect this technical modernization with the growing importance of joint operations, for which they have little experience and numerous impediments. The authors are unsure whether technological improvements in command and control will lead to the empowerment of junior commanders or if it will simply lead to greater centralization.

The fourth article in the Forum complements the previous one by assessing the implications of PRC naval power modernization for strategy. The Justice Department has noted that technology-focused Chinese espionage is “among the most aggressive” in the United States, as China’s government attempts to secure by theft what an inefficient command economy cannot produce independently. Despite the influential school of thought that predicts the PRC will soon put to sea a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet that approaches the quality and quantity of the U.S. Navy, Drs. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes posit that PLAN technological improvements will reinforce, not undermine, Beijing’s commitment to minimum deterrence. Their article examines the history of China’s SSBN development and attempts to project the size of, and deployment patterns for, its SSBN fleet. The authors expect that technological obstacles and philosophical principles will inspire the PLAN to maintain its minimalist posture well into the next decade, but outline factors that could challenge this logic.

The ballistic missile threat is not a future concern; it is a clear and present danger for which the United States is preparing with a sense of urgency. Our fifth essay outlines the proven and accelerating efforts of the U.S. Navy and its strategic partners to address the proliferation of these weapons and their potential for terrorist use. Admiral Alan Hicks asserts that there is an urgent need for a ballistic missile defense capability and begins his analysis with a review of the emerging threat, noting that a maximum of 30 minutes spans the detection, decision, and action window between launch and impact. For many readers, this will be a first introduction to the Missile Defense Agency and its integration of all missile defense programs and technologies into one Ballistic Missile Defense System. This agency, with significant contributions from U.S. Navy Aegis systems, is joining an allied coalition to form the foundation of international cooperation to deter and defeat this critical transnational threat.

The final article in the Forum is an argument for joint seabasing to compensate for a dramatic reduction in overseas basing rights, secure ports, and airfields. The term seabasing is misunderstood even in the joint military community, referring neither to floating bases nor to an exclusively logistic concept to support a major regional conflict. In brief, joint seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat power from the sea. Douglas King and John Berry observe that seabasing must be viewed as an interdependent and interconnected system of systems—everything from major combatants to inshore patrol craft, from surface and aerial connectors to cargo handling gear, and from command suites to medical centers. The authors contend that joint seabasing must be pursued as a means of deploying and employing sustained joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities from the sea.

In the next issue of Joint Force Quarterly, the Forum will focus on weapons of mass destruction, and the January 2009 edition will focus on land power, completing our review of the traditional approaches to military power through the lens of the operating media: air, sea, and land. The deadline for submissions on innovations in land warfare at the operational to strategic level is September 1, 2008. JFQ

—D.H. Gurney
All too often, the terms naval power and sea power are used interchangeably. But naval power, properly understood, refers to a direct and indirect source of military power at sea. Obviously, the main components of a naval power are the navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore establishment. The term sea power (coined in 1849) originally referred to a nation having a formidable naval strength. Today, this term’s meaning is much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of sea use. Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations.

This scenario is not going to change in the future despite claims to the contrary by some influential thinkers. The threat of major conflict at sea might look distant or even unlikely today. Yet it would be unwise to exclude the possibility altogether. Very often, the fact that naval power might play an important part in conventional deterrence—or, in the case of blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy, in nuclear deterrence—is either overlooked or ignored. Navies, and coast guards in particular, perform important and diverse tasks in peacetime and in operations short of war.

The Threat

The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing. Conventional threats include low-intensity conflict such as insurgencies and the possibility of a high-intensity conflict in various parts of the world, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Strait. In addition, unconventional threats in the maritime domain have dramatically increased in diversity and intensity since the early 1990s. They include transnational terrorism and criminal networks involved in illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Piracy is a growing problem in some parts of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia and off the east and west coasts of Africa. The combination of transnational terrorism and piracy can seriously disrupt the flow of inter-
nation, and national commerce. The potential impact of such threats on world peace and the global economy is enormous. There is also a growing danger to ports/bases and coastal facilities/installations from ballistic missiles fired by a rogue state or even transnational terrorist groups.

The threat to port security has increased significantly in the past few decades due to the proliferation of platforms and weapons that can be used against ships and port facilities/installations. uninterrupted maritime trade is one of the most critical factors for the prosperity of nations. The problem of security against terrorist attack is especially acute at ports located near strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. Large ports are especially vulnerable to various hostile acts because of the difficulties in providing full, around-the-clock protection. Currently, the greatest threat to the security of major ports is from terrorists, operating individually or in groups.

**Operational in Peacetime**

Operations in time of peace encompass routine activities, homeland security, protection of the country’s economic interests at sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In general, routine duties include maritime border laws/customs enforcement, hydrographic surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordinance disposal, and marine pollution control. For the most part, these tasks are the responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting role.

The threats to homeland security from across the sea are increasing in both intensity and sophistication. Specifically, these threats include ballistic missiles, maritime terrorism, illicit fishing, cross-border illegal immigration, criminal activity in ports/harbors and at critical installations/facilities ashore, piracy, and trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons.

The threat of ballistic missiles against ports/airfields and coastal installations/facilities can be countered by creating seabased ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles by physically and electronically attacking bases, launch sites, and associated command and control systems. As part of homeland security, they are intended to provide defense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight.

Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to both civilian and naval vessels. Large commercial ships are easy targets for determined terrorists, and the value of these vessels and cargoes makes them attractive to both regional terrorist groups and international organizations that desire to disrupt the economic lifelines of the industrial world. Compounding the threat is the use of commercial vessels by criminals who are often allied with terrorists. There is also a possibility that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could be used as terrorist weapons.

Protection of ports encompasses a series of related actions and measures regarding safety of incoming ships and their cargo during transit on the high seas, through the 200-nautical-mile (nm) EEZ, in the territorial sea (usually the 12-nm zone offshore), and in ports and their approaches. Hence, in a physical sense, three zones of maritime security exist: the international zone (foreign countries, high seas), the border/coastal zone (territorial sea plus EEZ), and the domestic zone (territorial sea plus ports and their approaches). International law fully applies in the international zone, while the country’s jurisdiction is exercised over all vessels, facilities, and port security in the domestic and border/coastal zones.

Coast guards are largely responsible for protection of their country’s EEZs. This broad task includes monitoring and surveillance of the fisheries, maritime safety, marine pollution reporting, and protection of marine mineral deposits and gas/oil deposits and installations. The navies are primarily responsible for protecting friendly commercial shipping outside of the EEZ.

A navy cannot carry out all the tasks alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard.

A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close to maritime trade chokepoints might attempt to harass shipping, requiring the response of naval forces. Protection of shipping requires coordinated deployment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable command organization both ashore and afloat. In general, protection of shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection of shipping would require the execution of a variety of tasks to protect merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This broad task can be accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships (sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasure ships.

Blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy are sometimes involved in disputes with riparian states regarding the rights of innocent passage through international straits,
or in contesting these states’ excessive claims regarding the extent of territorial waters. This requires the use of naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight. Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial seas; international law, however, establishes the right of innocent passage of ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, freedom of navigation through international airspace for aircraft is a well-established principle of international law. Threats to aircraft through extension of airspace control zones beyond international norms, whether by nations or groups, can be expected to result in use of force acceptable under international law to rectify the situation.

Navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans. Smuggling and trafficking in

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**Table. Spectrum of Conflict at Sea**

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Navy MH-60S Seahawk performs channel guard duty as amphibious assault ship USS *Essex* transits San Bernardino Straits in Philippines.

U.S. Navy (Michael D. Kennedy)
Navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans

Illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Normally, these operations require the employment of both surface and air forces. For example, UN-mandated MIOs were conducted against Iraq by the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners between August 1990 and March 1993.

Naval forces can be employed in support of foreign policy, military (theater) strategy, and peace operations. Navies are an ideal tool for providing support of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do
not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country’s diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy—actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish one’s rights in areas of interest, reassure allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force. Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition-building.

Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution.

Naval forces can be used in conflict prevention, coercive diplomacy, and peace operations. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. The main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively.

Under the UN Charter, conflict prevention should be conducted with strict impartiality because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Aircraft carrier groups and amphibious task forces in particular have a greater chance of success in disputes among nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, the preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless of size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect.

Naval forces are one of the most effective and flexible tools in applying coercive diplomacy (popularly called gunboat diplomacy), which is the use or threat of limited naval force aimed at securing advantage or averting loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state. Coercive diplomacy is conducted both in peacetime and during operations short of war. Methods used are “show the flag,” retaliatory raids, rescue operations, or direct attack to achieve a specific military objective. Visits of warships to foreign ports are one of the most common methods of showing the flag. The aim of such visits can range from demonstrating continuing interest in the area to showing resolve in support of a friendly state against threats by a neighboring state. The ships then act as ambassadors. Normally, the main purpose of such visits is to make a favorable impression on the local populace. The degree to which a show of force can be introduced depends on the political message to be communicated. Sometimes it can be carried out as a warning to leaders or hostile states. At other times, a show of force by ships can act as a sign of reassurance and a token of support.

For example, the United States sent a powerful signal of support to Turkey and Greece by sending the battleship USS Missouri (BB–63) for a visit to Istanbul and Piraeus in April 1946. This was followed by a visit of the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB–42) to Greece in September of the same year. Both countries were under enormous pressure from the aggressive policies of Moscow. The Soviets strongly supported the Greek communists in their civil war and issued demands to Turkey to grant a naval base in the Dodecanese Islands and joint control of the Turkish Straits.

However, in some cases, a show of force has failed to achieve its intended objectives. For example, the employment...
of three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan after the intelligence ship USS Pueblo (AGER–2) with its 83 crew members was captured off Wonsan in January 1968 apparently did not offer a great advantage to the United States in subsequent negotiations. In March 1996, the Chinese carried out extensive missile firings and exercises off the coast of Taiwan. However, that show of force only hardened the Taiwanese posture and forced the United States to move its naval forces in the Taiwan Strait.

Naval forces are most extensively used in support of peace operations, which are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations.

Peacekeeping operations are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the separation of forces.

Peace-enforcement operations involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping operations, peace-enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions involved in a conflict. When used for peace enforcement, naval forces should have at least limited power projection capabilities and be ready to engage in combat.

Naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping operations and can involve over 20,000 personnel. The consent of the sides in the conflict is usually nominal, incomplete, or nonexistent. These operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement, including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Expanded peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations are conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safe-flight or no-fly zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, the operations are likely to draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then have to be either pulled out or committed to full-scale combat.

Blue water navies play a critical role in providing support to national and military (or theater) strategy as a part of nuclear and/or conventional deterrence. Credible nuclear
deterrence is based on adequate capability and the certitude that one nation can and will inflict unacceptable losses on an enemy who uses nuclear weapons first. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable component of the country’s nuclear forces triad. During the Cold War, these submarines conducted extensive patrols in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in readiness to fire their sea-launched ballistic missiles. Seabased nuclear deterrent forces continue to have an important role in the nuclear deterrence posture of the United States, the Russian Federation, Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China.

The use or threatened use of conventional forces is a critical element in conventional deterrence. Naval forces are highly suitable for conventional deterrence because of their high mobility and combat power. For a blue water navy, the main method of exercising conventional deterrence is the forward deployment of its striking forces. Among other things, forward deployed forces can considerably enhance a nation’s influence and prestige in a given sea area. Presence can greatly help coalition-building, enhance stability, and deter hostile actions against one’s interests. It also provides an initial crisis-response capability.

Routine forward presence includes permanently based naval forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval forces in the case of crises, port visits, and participation in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. For example, deployment of powerful U.S. carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups in a certain region, such as the eastern Mediterranean or western Pacific, can send a powerful signal to enemies and friends alike in a crisis. It could prevent the outbreak of conflict, shape the security environment, and serve as a basis for regional peace and stability.

The ability to deploy seabased air and missile defenses forward contributes to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward deployed forces. Forward deployed U.S. naval forces can provide protection against air and missile threats over a large area of a given maritime theater. Also, by engaging enemy ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse stages of flight, homeland security is greatly enhanced.

Forward naval presence also creates prerequisites for obtaining and then maintaining sea control in certain parts of a maritime theater. A blue water navy should deploy sufficiently strong and combat-ready forces in the area of potential conflict. These forces should be concentrated in such numbers as to be capable of quickly achieving superiority over the potential opponent at sea. A coastal navy or a major navy operating within the confines of a narrow sea normally cannot obtain sea control without naval forces operating from a secure base of operations. In practical terms, this means that the degree of basing/deployment area control must ensure full protection of forces from all types of threats.

Navies are extensively used in carrying out diverse tasks as part of security cooperation in a given maritime theater. Security cooperation in general is aimed to build defense relationships with international partners, promote cultural awareness and regional understanding, and enhance strategic access. Cooperative activities include assisting host nations in freeing or protecting their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; assisting in training; combating illegal activities along their coastlines; and protecting economic infrastructure.

**Low-intensity Conflict**

Navies can be employed to carry out diverse tasks in support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency. Duties include blockading the coast to prevent an influx of fighters and material to the insurgents; attacking insurgent concentrations in their operating areas or sanctuaries by using surface combatants and carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire support to friendly troops ashore; and providing close air support, transport of friendly
troops and material, and reconnaissance/surveillance. For example, from 1965 to 1970, the U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of South Vietnam’s 1,200-mile coastline in an effort to stop fighters and supplies from flowing by sea from North Vietnam to South Vietnam (Operation Market Time). As part of that effort, Operation Sea Dragon aimed to intercept and destroy the Vietcong’s waterborne logistics craft. The Navy’s riverine forces conducted Operations Game Warden and Sea Lord.

More recently, naval forces were extensively employed in conducting military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions to defeat insurgencies in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Colombia. For example, the U.S. Navy’s special operations forces, operating from an aircraft carrier, and two Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), operating from amphibious ships, conducted a forcible entry deep into Afghan territory to open access for the joint force.11

High-intensity Conventional Conflict

Navies will play a major role in providing direct and/or indirect support to ground forces in the case of a regional or global conflict. War at sea has almost never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on land and, in the modern era, in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have been an integral part of war’s objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country’s armed forces. In contrast to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are almost generally physical in character. The main strategic or operational objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side tries to achieve sea denial. A relatively strong but initially weaker side at sea aims to obtain sea control for itself. When operating in an enclosed sea theater, a blue water navy would try to obtain chokepoint control, while the weaker side would conduct counter-chokepoint control. Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish, maintain, and, if possible, expand control of their respective basing and deployment areas for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing major operations.

Sea control essentially means the ability of a force to operate with a high degree of freedom in an ocean area, but often for a limited time. In strategic terms, obtaining or losing sea control on the open ocean would normally have an indirect effect on the war situation on land. This effect is far more direct and immediate in enclosed or marginal seas, where in many cases the loss of sea control can lead to the collapse of one’s front on land and thereby considerably affect the outcome of the war. The opposite is also true: obtaining or losing sea control in a marginal sea or enclosed seas is considerably influenced by the course of events in the war on land.12 In contrast to the open ocean, sea control in a typical narrow sea usually cannot be obtained and then maintained without the closest cooperation among all the services. Even when the navy is the principal force, it should be directly or indirectly supported by the other services. Very often, naval forces would have a relatively higher degree of independence in carrying out tasks to obtain sea control.13

Sea control is inextricably linked with armed struggle at sea. In other words, one does not possess control of the sea by virtue of having forces deployed in the proximity of the area of potential conflict or crisis in peacetime. In peacetime, any navy, regardless of its size or combat strength, has almost unlimited access to any sea area. Forward presence is conducted with full respect for international treaties and conventions and without violating the territorial waters of other countries. Yet this does not in any way preclude starting the struggle for sea control in peacetime because prerequisites must be created to quickly attain sea control after the start of hostilities.14

By obtaining sea control, the stronger side would create favorable conditions for carrying out other important tasks at sea. Among other things, sea control would permit the navy to project power on the opposite shore in the littorals or far from the home territory; carry out diverse tasks in support of a friendly army operating on the coast; pose a threat of, and carry out, amphibious assault on the enemy shore; weaken military-economic potential through attack on the enemy’s maritime trade; and protect friendly maritime trade.

In general, sea control and disputed (or contested) sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic sea control pertains to the entire maritime

**navies can carry out diverse tasks in support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency**
Guided missile submarine USS Ohio arrives in Guam during maiden voyage

Theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater represents operational sea control. Tactical control refers to control of a maritime combat sector or zone but sometimes can encompass a maritime area of operations. However, in practical terms, the focus should invariably be on strategic or operational sea control or disputed control, not tactical sea control.

In general, sea control can encompass control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace or of any combination of these three physical media. In the era of sail, command of the sea was limited to command of the surface. After the advent of the submarine and aircraft, the two other dimensions emerged. The degree of overall control of a given sea area depends on the degree of control of each of the three dimensions. However, experience shows that, during war between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible to obtain or maintain control of all three physical media to the same degree or for extended times.

Because of the rather large differences in the size of the physical environment and the proximity of the continental landmass, there is a considerable difference between obtaining sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals. Obtaining sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on the ability to obtain air superiority. Because of the ever-increasing range, endurance, and speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger ocean areas are becoming the areas of employment for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. Today, no part of the littoral is beyond the reach of land-based attack aircraft. Land- or carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control simply cannot be obtained. Depending on capabilities, naval forces can take part in the struggle for air superiority. Yet they are not the main means of accomplishing that objective, especially in the sea areas within effective range of land-based aircraft. If one side at sea possesses air superiority, it can be very difficult for the other side to use some aspects of sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority over a given ocean area can compensate for those aspects of sea control that naval forces failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its value, air superiority cannot replace control of the surface and subsurface.

In practical terms, the focus should invariably be on strategic or operational sea control, not tactical sea control.

In general, sea control cannot be expressed in quantitative terms or various metrics (as the U.S. Navy is trying to do); it can be recognized only in its effects. Sea control is always relative in spatial terms. It pertains to the specific part of the theater in which a certain degree of control must be obtained. Sea control is also relative in terms of the factor of time. It is also relative in terms of the factor of force. The relatively strong enemy always has the ability to dispute the sea control obtained by the stronger side.

Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. When command is in dispute, the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent. The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the theater.

Disputed sea control exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is neither significant change in the ratio of forces nor a change of the initiative to either side. Once disputed control is obtained, the initially weaker side can possibly try to obtain sea control of its own. Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been regarded as the opposite of sea control, but this is an oversimplification. If a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself. Sea control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. For example, sea denial may be conducted to help secure use of the sea, either in the same geographical area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one or more enclosed or marginal seas might opt for, or be forced by circumstances to accomplish, a combination of objectives—general sea control in the enclosed sea theater, and contested control in a semi-enclosed sea or parts of the adjacent oceans.

Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is characterized by an almost-continuous struggle for control of certain ocean areas. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long period, but may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed.

When control is in dispute, both sides usually operate at high risk because their strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each side’s control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In
the littorals, however, contesting sea control is primarily carried out by submarines, small surface combatants, coastal missile/gun batteries, land-based aircraft, and mines.

In general, naval forces can carry out operations aimed to secure control of the sea areas, operations in areas not under command, and operations in the sea areas under command. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control are related but not identical terms; they differ in time and the efforts of naval forces. Sea control is obtained primarily by the employment of maritime forces in the form of major naval operations. In the littorals, these operations will be joint or combined—that is, not only naval forces but also combat arms/branches of other services will take part. The result of sea control should be that forces can carry out the main tasks without significant interference from the opponent. After sea control is obtained, it must be maintained. In operational terms, this phase equates to consolidation of strategic or operational success. The degree of sea control to be obtained and maintained should determine the main tasks assigned to one’s naval forces. Exercising sea control is carried out through a series of operational tasks aimed to exploit strategic or operational success. The successful execution of operational tasks should expand and reinforce the degree of sea control obtained in a certain sea or ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot maintain control of basing and deployment areas. At the same time, actions to obtain sea control are far easier if forces operate from secure basing and deployment areas. This, of course, does not preclude obtaining sea control in an area where control of basing and deployment areas does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of naval forces in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then the basing and deployment area is gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered territories.

One of the most important tasks of any navy is to obtain and maintain basing/deployment area control. Without securing control of a basing and deployment area first, it is difficult if not impossible to prepare and execute major naval operations or naval tactical operations. This objective is especially critical for naval forces operating in an enclosed or semienclosed sea. It is intended to obtain a sufficient degree of security for traffic in coastal waters and road/railroad traffic on the coast.

Optimally, control of basing and deployment areas should be established and maintained in peacetime. The extent of that control is limited only by the maritime interests of other countries. Control of basing and deployment areas must then be maintained in wartime. The physical scope of this control depends on the degree of sea control obtained in a given sea or ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot maintain control of basing and deployment areas. At the same time, actions to obtain sea control are far easier if forces operate from secure basing and deployment areas. This, of course, does not preclude obtaining sea control in an area where control of basing and deployment areas does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of naval forces in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then the basing and deployment area is gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered territories.

As in the past, naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation’s interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and others whose prosperity and economic well-being depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country’s military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are tasks that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power.

**JFQ**

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### Notes

1. Specifically, a sea power encompasses naval power plus all the nonmilitary aspects of the use of the sea, particularly merchant marine, ports/harbors, fisheries, shipyards/ship repair facilities and all maritime-related industries, oil/gas exploration, and marine-related scientific research (for example, oceanographic research, hydrographic survey, and marine biology).


3. Ibid., 22.


9. Ibid., 138.

10. Department of the Navy, 18.

11. Ibid., 13, 20.


13. Ibid., 41, 45.

14. Ibid., 44.

15. Ibid., 42.

16. Ibid., 43.

17. Ibid., 80.


The Navy or *Nothing*

By **DOUGLAS T. TASTAD**

Thomas Hobson, born 1544, kept a livery stable in Cambridge, England. He was not of the "customer-is-always-right school. Gentlemen who showed up at his stable for a horse were required to take either the horse nearest the stable door or none. Thus, "Hobson's choice" became an idiom for no choice at all. Those who work in America's maritime fields are increasingly funneled into such a choice: defense and government work—or none.

The U.S. Navy's growing share of the American maritime industry carries no benefit. In fact, nothing could be more detrimental to America's long-term endurance as the world's greatest seagoing power. If there is one problem vexing the Navy today, it is the difficulty of maintaining a reasonably sized force for a reasonable cost. While there is ample room to improve efficiency within the Navy itself, it would be futile...
to confront this challenge without also developing a plan to improve America’s commercial maritime sector.

American maritime power has traditionally resembled a pyramid, with a vigorous commercial shipping and shipbuilding industry at the base and a powerful Navy at the top. Today, the pyramid is inverted. We have an anemic commercial shipping fleet and virtually no large-scale commercial ship construction—yet we maintain a preeminent naval force. For perspective, this essay first examines the history of the interaction between America’s commercial maritime industries and the Navy; next, it reviews this relationship’s current troubled state; and finally, it ponders some solutions for correcting a 40-year slide toward a spear tip without a shaft.

### The Early Years

Even before the Declaration of Independence, America was becoming a powerhouse of ship construction and the shipping industry. Notwithstanding the mercantile system imposed on the colonies, one-third of all Great Britain’s oceangoing tonnage was built in American yards. As whaling and trade dictated a steady demand for vessels, the craftsmen, sawyers, and laborers in shipyards had reliable employment. The yards themselves spun off business vital to the industrialization of early America.

America’s Revolutionary War Navy began as an improvised organization of a handful of ships and at its peak comprised 64 mostly small vessels. On paper, its strength was insignificant compared to His Majesty’s Service. Nevertheless, it was augmented by a sizable collection of skilled mariners who exchanged their service on merchant vessels engaged in trade for their newly formed country. One of Mahan’s most repeated themes is that sea power “includes not only the military strength afloat . . . but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.”

Contemplating the call for a strong Navy in 1889, Mahan wrote, “Can this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping? It is doubtful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV. . . . Experience showed that his navy was like a growth which having no root soon withers away.”

Mahan’s policies were eventually embraced. From a broad naval buildup and the Great White Fleet to a rise of merchant shipping and the Jones Act of 1920, preventing foreign shippers from engaging in domestic trade, America’s seapower surged. This culminated in perhaps the most important industrial achievement in the modern era: America’s unparalleled production of merchant and combatant shipping in World War II. Between 1939 and 1945, the 100 merchant shipyards overseen by the U.S. Maritime Commission produced 5,777 vessels of over 56 million deadweight tons. Once built, these ships were sailed into harm’s way by a solid corps of well-trained American seamen who delivered the supplies necessary to win the war. This leads to the obvious question: Could we make a similar effort today?

The current state of America’s maritime industry is bleak, and its malaise is negatively impacting the Navy. The lack of American-flagged shipping means that the Navy’s core function of keeping sea lines open has lost some of its legitimacy, if not relevance. Worse, America is now reliant on foreign operators to carry military cargo. On the shipbuilding side, our large-scale industry has deteriorated to the point that it is no longer commercially self-sustaining. Even the lucrative Navy contracts, now accounting for the vast majority of the industry’s revenue, may soon fail to convince yard owners and many of the last remaining component suppliers to stay in business.

Ships construction, component production, and ship registration have now almost completely moved overseas. Foreign firms are leveraging their dominance at sea and in the shipbuilding arena to assume control of shoreside operations in the United States. Unfortunately, even in the midst of this decline, entrenched American interests in both the shipping and shipbuilding industries seem more concerned with defending country. One of Mahan’s most repeated themes is that sea power “includes not only the military strength afloat . . . but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.”

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### Rise and Decline of Maritime America

Alfred Thayer Mahan framed modern American naval and maritime strategy in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Mahan’s thesis is simple: maritime and naval power that can win a decisive engagement is a requirement for a leading and powerful country. One of Mahan’s most repeated

Table 1. The First American Naval Shipbuilding Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS Constitution*</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS United States</td>
<td>Philadelphia, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS President</td>
<td>New York, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Congress</td>
<td>Portsmouth, NH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Constitution</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Chesapeake</td>
<td>Gosport, VA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Oldest commissioned warship afloat in the world

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1. As whaling and trade dictated a steady demand for vessels, the craftsmen, sawyers, and laborers in shipyards had reliable employment. The yards themselves spun off business vital to the industrialization of early America.  
2. America’s Revolutionary War Navy began as an improvised organization of a handful of ships and at its peak comprised 64 mostly small vessels. On paper, its strength was insignificant compared to His Majesty’s Service. Nevertheless, it was augmented by a sizable collection of skilled mariners who exchanged their service on merchant vessels engaged in trade for their newly formed country.  
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Ships construction, component production, and ship registration have now almost completely moved overseas. Foreign firms are leveraging their dominance at sea and in the shipbuilding arena to assume control of shoreside operations in the United States. Unfortunately, even in the midst of this decline, entrenched American interests in both the shipping and shipbuilding industries seem more concerned with defending...
their slice of the status quo than seeking the bold initiatives to reverse the trend. The largest U.S. employer of merchant seaman is no longer a U.S. shipping company; it is the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). In fact, this command nearly outstrips the next largest employer by an order of magnitude. With precious few American commercial vessels plying the oceans today, those civilian mariners who choose to remain employed at sea are increasingly obliged to work for MSC, with a few maintaining Maritime Administration (MARAD) reserve vessels. MSC operates 115 ships while MARAD holds an additional 49. When combined, these figures nearly rival the total privately owned fleet (see table 2).

### Outside of the Four Large Naval Shipyards, There Are Now Only Eight Yards Capable of Producing Oceangoing Vessels in America

#### Outmoded Legislation

The main driver of modern American merchant shipping has been the Jones Act of 1920. To understand the current predicament confronting America in the marine fields, one must have a general knowledge of this law. The Jones Act prevents foreign shippers from engaging in domestic trade. To ship cargo between two American ports, one must use an American-flagged and -crewed vessel owned by Americans, built in America, and receiving major maintenance in American shipyards. Even if a vessel is American-flagged, it can only engage in nondomestic trade if it does not meet all these requirements. The Jones Act legislation has been successful at keeping a large number of coastal-sized ships and barges in the American registry, but the numbers of oceangoing ships continue to dwindle.

The Jones Act has also ensured that over 200 small shipyards in America continue working on commercial fishing boats, tugs, barges, and smaller craft as well as brown water Navy, Coast Guard, Army, and other government contracts. Many of these yards make their way with casual (even work release) labor, bare minimum reinvestment, and niche markets. However, many are also doing quite well, as orders for offshore supply vessels and other small craft are currently strong. The fact remains that these yards are generally not capable of producing the large oceangoing vessels that underpin a nation’s maritime power.

The largest yards have generally ceased relying on commercial work or have gone out of business. Only three commercial oceangoing vessels were produced in America in 2006. Outside of the four large naval shipyards, there are now only eight yards capable of producing oceangoing vessels in America. These yards, six of which are owned by General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, are surviving on government shipbuilding work that accounts for 70 percent of the entire industry’s revenue. Jones Act vessel repair and government programs such as Title XI loan guarantees rounded out the equation. Now, even the Title XI loan program has been scrapped.

It is telling that the domestic shipping company Horizon Lines continues to operate some of the 30- and 40-year-old ships once owned by Sea Land. The fact that some of these vessels are actually powered with relatively inefficient steam plants, and fuel prices are at an all-time high, speaks volumes about the industry. Indeed, Horizon Lines touts itself as America’s largest domestic carrier. Unfortunately, the five new vessels it is adding to its aging fleet cannot engage in domestic trade because they are being produced in South Korean yards.

The crux of the problem is that shipping companies, while vigorously defending the Jones Act when it comes to foreign shippers entering the domestic trade, are trying to wait until there is such a capacity shortage and U.S. yards are in such a lowly state that waivers will be granted for foreign builds. Meanwhile, large U.S. yards are generally not actively seeking ways to become competitive. Rather, they exploit Navy contracts while waiting for...

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**Table 2. U.S.-Flag Privately Owned Oceangoing Fleet, by Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>DWT</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>DWT</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll-on/Roll-off</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Cargo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Ship</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Bulk</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>221</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Table 3. Ships from Above Totals Able to Engage in Jones Act (Purely Domestic) Trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>DWT</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>DWT</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll-on/Roll-off</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Ship</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Bulk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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the legislated culling of single hull tankers and the sheer age of the U.S. fleet to begin forcing Jones Act shippers to come to them.

Foreign companies will continue to take advantage of the current situation. British Aerospace Engineering and Aker Kvaerner (Norway) are now operating several yards in the United States. Aker in Philadelphia is probably the most aggressive American yard on commercial new build projects. Asian and European shipping lines may now control as much as 95 percent of U.S. import/export ocean cargo. In a natural extension, their businesses reach far inland through intermodal logistics networks.

Our commercial competitors have nearly totally usurped American production of cargo vessels and other maritime related equipment. This means that most of the technological developments in vessel design, maritime components, and shipbuilding will occur outside the United States. In America, the Navy will continue to have to chase technological improvements with huge outlays at its in-house and contractor facilities in attempts to stay ahead of the curve.

As our shipbuilding and shipping industries go, so goes the surrounding industrial and service base. Take port management, for example. The irony of the Dubai Ports World saga of 2006 is that there was no competitive American bidder for the British-owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) terminals in America, much less P&O ports in general. Dubai Ports World was bidding against the Port of Singapore Authority for these operations on the East Coast of the United States.

**Government Misadventure**

In most marketplaces, an increase in market share is accompanied by the beneficial effects of increased leverage with suppliers in terms of quality, schedule, and price. Government contracting may be the exception that proves the rule. One need only look at Navy shipbuilding from the LCS (littoral combat ship) to the DDX (next generation destroyer) to catch a glimpse of an industry devoid of private sector influence. Work on LCS 3 was halted in 2007 when the first vessel’s price came in at $411 million rather than the $220 million target.\(^\text{12}\)

The excuses for the vessel’s projected cost are proliferating at nearly the same rate as the overruns. The plans were not complete when the vessel was put out for bid, the production schedule was compressed, and an ungainly dual contractor scheme all worked against the program. These factors certainly played a role, but if the contractors had more experience satisfying clients without unlimited resources to cover cost overruns, the outcome would not be so predictable.

Consider the LPD–17, which is the first of the Navy’s new class of helicopter carrier landing ships. After an $804 million cost overrun, the vessel was completed for the astronomical price of $1.76 billion.\(^\text{13}\) What level of quality does this kind of money purchase? One year after Avondale shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, delivered LPD–17, it had to be taken for repairs to its home station of Norfolk. Among the hundreds of systems that were not fully functional, its failed steering system derailed the customary preshipyard sea trials to investigate the extent of repairs necessary.

Even before construction of the first Navy DDX, the program is rife with budget blowouts. “The mission of the DDG 1000 [guided missile destroyer] Zumwalt Class is to provide affordable and credible independent forward presence/deterrence and to operate as an integral part of the Naval, Joint, or Combined Maritime Forces,”\(^\text{14}\) yet in congressional testimony given in 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology projected that the first DDX will cost $3.3 billion with follow-on ships to cost $2.6 billion a copy in fiscal year 2007 dollars.\(^\text{15}\) This amount of money—for a destroyer, no matter how advanced—must be approaching some kind of limit.

The Navy is not the only sea Service that has been having difficulty completing a program on schedule and on budget. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General recently released a blistering audit regarding the Coast Guard’s first two new National Security Cutters. The vessels suffer from lengthy delays, serious quality problems, and a price tag that may well leap to over $500 million a copy.\(^\text{16}\) Once a stimulant within a productive commercial base, government shipbuilding now seems to merely provide fixes to junkies who will not clean up and cannot survive in the global marketplace.

**Solutions?**

Solutions to the quandary confronting America’s maritime industries are not easily found. The first step, as always, is admitting the problem. Yet politicians from both parties and the relevant bureaucracies continue propagating statements to the effect that we have a vital, even growing, maritime sector.

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**once a stimulant within a productive commercial base, government shipbuilding now seems to merely provide fixes to junkies who cannot survive in the global marketplace**

Launched at 1100

**Launching of Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammonition ship USNS Amelia Earhart, April 2008**

U.S. Navy (Steve Vasquez)
Under the Clinton administration, roughly 29,300 small vessels and barges appeared in MARAD's count of the "fleet." This tally begged the question of how small a rowboat-for-hire needed to be before it would make the list—and MARAD was obligated to revise its count. Likewise, the Department of Defense and U.S. citizens concerned about national security must insist on more than just rearranging the proverbial deck chairs. America's maritime sector needs a course correction that will tangibly revitalize America's large-scale shipping and shipbuilding industries. The waypoints for such a correction include a reform of the oversight agency responsible, a reformulation of the Jones Act, personnel and vessel stimuli, a new strategy for the shipbuilding industry, a way to force foreign operators to share cost burdens, and common sense tort reform.

If there is little private sector influence left in America's maritime industry, what government influence there is can only be described as a failure. The Navy has been an enabler of some bad habits, but the oversight agency with responsibility is the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation. It is time for institutional reform of the Maritime Administration and the Federal Maritime Commission, followed by a merger of these two bureaucracies with the licensing and regulatory arm of the Coast Guard.

Recycling a joke about the Department of Agriculture, the number of employees in this bureaucracy should be limited to no more than the number of merchant seaman billets in the fleet they monitor. It may be glib to say so, but the job security of the above three organizations detach them from the success or failure of their mission. The focus of a newly formed entity must be a reinvigorated shipping and shipbuilding base in the United States, and it must be staffed with those who have the vision, creativity, latitude, and funds to achieve the possible.

The Jones Act is a sacred cow for many in the industry, but regardless of whether it has contributed to, or merely presided over, the industry's decline, the industry is in trouble. The act must be reformulated for progress to be made. As it stands now, there is sparse investment in the commercial maritime sector because no company wants to be the last to make an uneconomic investment in either a Jones Act vessel or shipbuilding capacity in a climate where the Jones Act appears to be less and less sustainable.

Both sides have to give up some of their claim to a shrinking market for the stalemate to be broken. Here is a compromise: allow foreign-built ships of over 10,000 deadweight tons to engage in domestic trade, but require American shipyard maintenance for all work except emergency repairs. Some may argue that this would be the death knell for American shipbuilding. However, it must be pointed out that domestic airlines are not required to buy domestically built airplanes, yet Boeing is doing quite well. This approach recognizes that increasing the size of America's merchant fleet is critical to the success of any plan and that stimulating large vessel repair in America is achievable in the short term. While the small number of ships that America might produce over the next decade would probably fall off the order books immediately following this change, increasing the ship repair base holds the prospect of revigorating the infrastructure necessary for ship construction. The reality is that revitalization of new ship construction in America will require a successful process spanning decades.

Much has been written about the impending shortage of seafarers in the United States. Currently, we face the inertia of declining prospects for a full career in the industry leading to fewer applicants. For a prospective sailor, the upfront cost of regulatory fees, union dues, and mandatory pension plans are as expensive as they have ever been. However, the odds against getting on one's first ship as an applicant in a seaman's union, coupled with the odds against sailing long enough draw a retirement, make a sailor's personal investment in a career at sea a long shot at best.

A reformed Maritime Administration might begin by implementing a program of Merchant Marine personnel and vessel incentives:

- a retirement program akin to the Federal Railroad Retirement Program
- removal of state and Federal taxation on revenues of shipping companies and the wages of merchant seaman earned on American-flagged ships in international trade
- a Federal health insurance scheme for seamen to level the cost structure for U.S. vessels employing American seamen.

The shipbuilding subset of problems facing the maritime industry in the United States have not been. However, the odds against getting on one's first ship as an applicant in a seaman's union, coupled with the odds against sailing long enough draw a retirement, make a sailor's personal investment in a career at sea a long shot at best.
States will be the most difficult to address. Asian shipyards now enjoy economies of scale, access to a healthy industrial base, and comparatively inexpensive labor. The high barriers to entry into large shipbuilding coupled with the fact that domestic producers will be at a cost disadvantage are problems that demand government involvement.

Capital investment in new yards and owner incentives should be a priority. However, rather than just subsidizing head-to-head competition with Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese yards over standardized box ships and tankers, the U.S. Government should back programs charted through American shipyards (in exchange for a willingness to accept market reforms) to create propulsion methods for the post-oil economy and other significant new maritime technology that could allow U.S. yards to leapfrog their competition.

Ship operators flying the American flag are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to operating in the global shipping market. International investor drive for returns dictates that ships seek the lowest common denominator of Third World crewing, low taxation, and lax to nonexistent security, safety, and environmental regulation. This outsourcing is not unique to the shipping industry, and neither is it without hidden cost. American consumers and taxpayers are currently paying the lion’s share of increased costs for shipping security following 9/11.

The Maritime Administration should consider requiring a terror insurance policy on all foreign vessels entering American waters starting at $1 billion and increasing with the number of flag-of-convenience (FOC) vessels a shipping line or its partners operate. Currently, the “Wild West” of FOC is what troubles security experts most, yet these operators bear little if any financial liability. Sensible regulation would force these operators to accept some liability for their actions or else move to other jurisdictions. The Maritime Administration should consider requiring a terror insurance policy that could allow U.S. yards to leapfrog their competition.

Ship operators willing to buck the trend and fly an American flag deserve relief from the raised insurance costs, legal fees, and extreme settlements brought on by maritime attorneys seeking injury case clients. Everyone is in favor of protecting American sailors’ rights and welfare—protection of a livelihood, not from a livelihood.

Some may argue that the complexity of building modern Navy vessels so far outstrips commercial shipbuilding that the latter is irrelevant to the former. It may also be said that commercial shipping no longer fully addresses the Navy’s needs for fast, on-call transport. Indeed, it is true that the nature of war has changed since World War II. Even if America had a burgeoning Merchant Marine and a thriving shipbuilding industry, it would still need a military sealift command and solely focused Navy shipyards.

Unfortunately, the American Merchant Marine and the private shipbuilding industry are both a long way from thriving. The truth is that our wartime logistics could be crippled at any time should the foreign shipping companies we rely on refuse to ship our military cargo. Moreover, the depression of America’s commercial ship construction industry now means that even a slight pullback in Navy ship construction leads to shutdowns and job losses. The commercial maritime sector no longer underpins America’s Navy; rather, the Navy is hostage to what industry is left. We are already seeing the Stockholm Syndrome in the Navy’s response to quality control problems, time delays, and cost overruns. The Navy feels compelled to simply keep paying up. The Navy or nothing? This is one choice America can no longer afford. JFQ

NOTES

18 Flag-of-convenience vessels are those registered in countries (Liberia and Panama are prime examples) that provide lax oversight of a vessel’s ownership, environmental, or safety compliance.
In recent years, the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become a high priority for senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and high-ranking military officers. For instance, CCP General Secretary, President, and Central Military Commission Chairman Hu Jintao in a December 2006 speech to PLAN officers underscored the need “to build a powerful People’s navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”1 Similarly, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and Political Commissar Hu Yanlin promoted naval modernization in an authoritative CCP journal. According to Wu and Hu, “Since the reform and open door policy, along with the consistent increase of overall national strength, the oceanic awareness and national defense awareness of the Chinese people have been raised and the desire to build a powerful navy, strengthen modern national defense and realize the great revitalization of China has become stronger than at any other time.”2 Moreover, Wu and Hu contend, “To build a powerful navy is the practical need for maintaining the safety of national sovereignty and maritime rights.”3 Such statements emphasize the importance that China’s civilian and military leaders attach to PLAN modernization.
This growing urgency about modernization is focused largely, but by no means exclusively, on a possible conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, Wu and Hu point out that the navy must be prepared for a wider range of missions, including the protection of maritime resources and energy security issues. These missions drive PLAN requirements, not only for the new platforms China is putting into service with the navy, but also for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.

Within this context, enhancing PLAN information technology and communications capabilities is seen as critical to China’s overall naval modernization program. According to one recent article, “The informatization of shipboard weapons and equipment is the core of maritime joint combat. . . .”[1]The Chinese Navy should vigorously build data links for maritime military actions and fundamentally change the way to carry out tasks in the future,” ultimately creating a “networked fleet.”[6] Reaching this goal hinges on narrowing the gap between the PLAN and the world’s most advanced navies through the development, acquisition, and integration of advanced information technology.

This emphasis on “informatization” derives from the expectation that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must prepare for local wars under informatized conditions, a theme that was underscored at the 17th CCP Congress in October 2007. Specifically, Hu’s report to the Party Congress declared:

“To attain the strategic objective of building computerized armed forces and winning IT [information technology]-based warfare, we will accelerate composite development of mechanization and computerization, carry out military training under IT-based conditions, modernize every aspect of logistics, intensify our efforts to train a new type of high-caliber military personnel in large numbers and change the mode of generating combat capabilities.”[5]

This guidance applies with particular force to the modernization of the PLAN. According to one recent article, for example, “Informatized warfare is the mainstream trend in the development of future maritime wars.”[8]

**PLAN “Informatization”**

The PLAN is undergoing an impressive transformation from what was essentially a coastal defense force to a more offensively oriented force capable of executing a variety of regional missions in support of China’s national security interests. As part of this modernization program, a number of new surface ships and submarines have entered service. New surface ships include Russian-built Sovremenny guided missile destroyers; indigenously developed Luzhou and Luyang I and II guided missile destroyers; Jiangkai I and II guided missile frigates; and the Houbei-class missile-armed, wave-piercing catamarans. Among the new submarines are Kilo-class diesels acquired from Russia and the domestically developed Shang nuclear-powered and Song and Yuan conventional attack submarines. With the addition of these platforms, the navy is improving its surface warfare, undersea warfare, and air defense capabilities.

The PLAN also appears poised to become an increasingly important part of China’s nuclear deterrence posture with the addition of several Type 094 fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will be armed with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. According to the 2006 Defense White Paper, the PLAN “aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.”[7]

China’s leaders perceive their nation to be confronting a strategic environment in which “military competition based on informatization is intensifying.”[4] This view both highlights the growing importance of information technology in military modernization and places a heavy premium on striving for information dominance in any future conflict, especially one with a technologically advanced adversary. Some analysts write about the role of information in a style reminiscent of U.S. publications that emphasize information superiority and extol the virtues of “network-centric warfare.” For example, according to three researchers affiliated with the PLAN’s Dalian Naval Combatant Academy, “in the information age, information has become one of the main sources of combat power.”[9]

**C4ISR Systems**

Given the Chinese military’s C4ISR shortcomings in the 1980s and 1990s, the PLAN’s informatization drive started from a relatively weak position. For years, the entire PLA, including the navy, faced major shortcomings in its C4ISR capabilities. Despite these modest beginnings, C4ISR modernization has been under way since the late 1990s, when the PLA embarked on a massive effort to modernize, upgrade, and expand its communications infrastructure. This ambitious project was bolstered by the rapid development of the civilian IT and telecommunications industries. One of the key results of the upgrade was the construction of a national fiber optics network that provided the PLA with much greater communications capacity, reliability, and security. Beijing also intensified its efforts to improve its space-based C4ISR capabilities. Indeed, China began an ambitious manned space program, started participating in a variety of international partnerships, and moved forward with several military space programs.

Space-based C4ISR developments are particularly crucial for naval informatization, especially given the PLAN’s evolving missions. According to the 2007 Department of Defense (DOD) report on Chinese military power, “China seeks to become a world leader in space development and maintain a leading role in space launch activity.”[13] Navigation and positioning have been other areas of emphasis with implications for military modernization and navy informatization. In addition to using the Global Positioning System and Global Navigation Satellite System and working with the European Union on the Galileo navigation satellite system, China has deployed its own Beidou navigation satellites. Chinese developments in small satellites and maritime observation satellites are also of particular interest from the perspective of naval informatization.
Beyond these improvements in space-based ISR capabilities, the PLA is also making major strides in the construction of its communications networks. Indeed, the expansion of military communications networks is a noteworthy aspect of Chinese military modernization and one that has major implications for PLAN informatization. The PLA reportedly has accelerated the development of its nationwide communications capabilities, devoting particular attention to diversifying the means of communication and enhancing security and anti-jamming capabilities.11

According to one source:

in the coastal military commands, a gigantic optic-cable communication network has been set up, which guarantees the optic-cable communication among the headquarters of each military command. Meanwhile, satellite communication has been applied more widely, which ensures smooth communication between the top commanding organ and the headquarters at different levels of the military commands.12

Chinese research institutes have also “developed a VSAT [Very Small Aperture Terminal] communication system consisting of mobile vehicle-borne components” as well as microwave and troposcatter communication systems, and China is also upgrading some of its traditional communications systems.13

Improving military computer networks and making them available to more units have been particular priorities as the PLA expands its communications networks, another key “informatization” development that has major implications for the PLAN. Recent reports indicate that all navy units at the division level and above are now connected to military computer networks and that current plans focus on extending coverage to lower-level units.14 In addition, the navy is improving the capabilities of its ocean survey and reconnaissance ships, which are responsible for such tasks as surveying, gathering meteorological and hydrographic information, laying and repairing undersea cables, and intelligence collection.

Trends in Research and Development

Further technical improvements are likely over the next decade. According to the 2007 DOD report on Chinese military capabilities:

To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges . . . . One area of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of medium-range ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support infrastructure.15

Beijing is already developing the capability to target U.S. ships with ballistic missiles, such as the medium-range DF–21.16 “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles . . . with radar or [infrared] seekers to provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea,” according to the Office of Naval Intelligence.17 If supplied with accurate real-time target data from China’s growing constellation of ISR satellites or other sources, terminal seekers and maneuvering warheads could threaten targets such as airbases and aircraft carriers.18

Chinese researchers emphasize the importance of linking platforms into an integrated whole, suggesting that this will remain a focus of defense research and development programs. This is considered particularly important for the PLAN. According to one article, “A platform-centric navy cannot bring into full play the potentials of its sensors and weapons,” but “effective networks formed with multiple platforms and multiple sensors can enable the resources of military strength to grow steadily.” Moreover, “resource sharing among various platforms and coordinated allocation of the resources of all operational forces can enable the currently available resources of military strength to be fully utilized.”19 According to another article, “In order to effectively fuse all C4ISR system elements and achieve a seamless connection from sensors to shooters it is necessary to solve the problems of data integration.”20 Such statements suggest that networked sensors and data fusion are also likely to enjoy high priority in the next few years.

Unmanned reconnaissance systems appear to be another area of emphasis in Chinese C4ISR-related research. Indeed, recent technical articles indicate that scientists and engineers are conducting research on various types of unmanned aircraft systems.21 Researchers are also working on unmanned underwater vehicles. For example, PLAN researchers are addressing the sonar capabilities of remotely operated vehicles,22 which could have applications in ISR and other maritime warfare mission areas.

People’s Liberation Army Navy Luhu-class destroyer Qingdao departing Pearl Harbor, 2006
Informed War at Sea

Planners realize that rapid improvements in the PLAN’s hardware will not be fully effective without corresponding increases in the ability of its personnel to operate new systems under combat conditions. This requires the navy to make commensurate improvements in training. In keeping with recent PLA-wide guidance from the General Staff Department that stresses making training more realistic and challenging, the PLAN has emphasized training that simulates the actual battlefield environment as much as possible. Official sources indicate considerable progress in making training more rigorous.

Chinese sources frequently highlight the importance of conducting training under “complex electromagnetic conditions,” so forces will be prepared to conduct operations in an environment characterized by jamming, electronic attacks, reconnaissance, and electronic deception. A June 2007 North Sea Fleet exercise reportedly incorporated several of these challenges. The PLAN is also conducting opposing forces training featuring Blue Force detachments playing the role of enemy units and is making extensive use of modeling and simulation as part of its drive to improve training for future informatized conflicts.

Another area of emphasis reflects the conclusion that the military will have to fight jointly in future conflicts. According to the PLAN’s official newspaper, “As profound changes take place in the form of war, future warfare will be integrated joint operations under informatized conditions. Training is the rehearsal for war, and what kind of a war we fight determines what kind of training we should conduct.” Numerous recent articles highlight the PLAN’s joint training activities. Some of these joint exercises have focused specifically on communications capabilities.

Implications for Jointness

Successful informatization will have major implications for the PLAN’s ability to conduct joint operations and for the future development of its command and control system. PLAN publications consistently emphasize the growing importance of joint operations, which many authors connect to the challenges of informatized operations in a complex battlefield environment. Indeed, joint operations and informatization are expected to play a prominent role in a variety of campaigns in which the navy might be called on to participate. A major PLA doctrinal publication, for instance, emphasizes the need to achieve objectives rapidly in a complex battle environment by jointly implementing an air, maritime, and information blockade. The last entails “actively destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground information installations, disrupt[ing] the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, cut[ting] off the enemy’s submarine cables and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the enemy’s information warfare capability.”

Joint campaigns require joint campaign command structures, which are responsible for coordinating service activities in pursuit of the overall campaign objectives. According to another major PLA doctrinal publication, the command and communications systems of troops under the same command or participating in coordinated operations must be interoperable. Technical interoperability of C4ISR assets is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for the development of joint operational capabilities.

some joint exercises have focused specifically on communications capabilities

The PLAN still faces a variety of problems, many of them bureaucratic and institutional. Perhaps the most important is a highly centralized and hierarchical command structure and organizational culture that is averse to delegating decision-making to lower levels, much less junior and noncommissioned officers. Another potential roadblock is institutional resistance and bureaucratic opposition resulting from the likely tendency of joint campaigns to emphasize the importance of the PLAN, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps, through which supreme headquarters exercises direct command and control over strategic missile forces, and thereby erode the traditional dominance of the army.

Still another challenge is the PLA’s lack of real experience conducting joint operations. The only historical example is the relatively small-scale Yijiangshan campaign in 1955; the rest of the PLA’s wartime experiences were at most combined arms campaigns. As the 2006 DOD report points out, “Although the PLA has devoted considerable effort to developing joint capabilities, it faces a persistent lack of inter-service cooperation and a lack of actual experience in joint operations.” In short, the PLAN will likely encounter a variety of challenges as it moves forward with the development of joint operations capabilities. Nevertheless, it has already made considerable progress and is clearly determined to further enhance its ability to conduct joint operations.

In addition to informatization’s effect on the navy’s ability to conduct joint operations, the introduction and integration of advanced information technology are also likely to influence its approach to command and control. The Chinese military has a tradition of highly centralized command that derives from a variety of sources, including the political system, institutional culture, and organizational structure. Indeed, Chinese scholars argue that the PLA’s general staff organizational structure is conducive to centralized command and control. Moreover, for the PLA, unity of command historically has meant centralization of command. This tradition appears to have considerable staying power. According to Major Generals Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, for example, “All the decision-making power and command authority on issues concerning the overall war situation should be centralized to the strategic commander and the strategic commanding authorities.”

Given the PLA’s long tradition of centralized command, China could choose to use its improved C4ISR capabilities to make centralized command function more efficiently and effectively. Chinese authors have certainly recognized the potential of enhanced communications capabilities to enable higher-echelon decisionmakers to function more effectively. High-bandwidth secure communications, for instance, allow strategic leaders to transmit plans and other operational documents electronically in real-time and hold videoconferences with subordinates instead of traveling to the front for face-to-face meetings. According to Peng and Yao:

Under high-tech conditions and with the aid of the strategic command automation system, the form of assigning strategic tasks orally, realized only face to face in the past, can now be actualized between different places, and assigning strategic tasks in the past by written
operations documents can now be completed through computer networks in real time.\footnote{34}

There are also strong incentives to consider decentralizing authority, at least to some extent. Notwithstanding the strong emphasis on the role of the strategic commander and the centralized command system, PLA writers suggest that strategic decisionmakers should not attempt to micromanage activities at the tactical and operational levels. For one thing, having more information at higher echelons is not necessarily better; huge amounts of data may simply overwhelm strategic commanders. As Peng and Yao argue, “Under the high-tech conditions, the glut and overload of strategic information have increased to a large extent the difficulties of strategic judgment. . . . [I]t's not an easy job to retrieve and pick out valuable strategic information when the total sum of strategic information has greatly increased.”

More broadly, PLA analysts appear to be engaging in a debate about the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized command systems. Some authors claim that conducting complex joint firepower strikes requires centralized command. They argue that there must be centralized and unified planning, organization, control, and coordination to conduct high-efficiency integrated firepower strikes. They point out that command relationships are complex because participating forces belong to different services and branches, and carrying out operational tasks will require temporary partnerships, making organization difficult. Consequently, there must be centralized control of all service and branch firepower strike forces to assure the timeliness, continuity, and coordination of firepower strike operations.\footnote{35}

Other PLA writers appear to favor a command and control system that gives greater autonomy to junior leaders on a more routine basis, not just under emergency conditions that impede communications with higher-level commanders. Indeed, the informatization of the PLAN, especially advances in ISR and communications capabilities, may offer China the opportunity to employ a more flexible and responsive command and control system that relies on “directive control” and “mission type orders” to meet the challenges of joint operations in high-tech regional wars.

**having more information at higher echelons is not necessarily better; huge amounts of data may simply overwhelm strategic commanders**

**Secretary Gates meets with Chinese defense minister in Beijing**
Although adopting such an approach would appear to offer significant operational advantages and complement the PLA’s evolving doctrine, a number of obstacles threaten such a dramatic transformation. The most important of these obstacles are the PLA tradition of highly centralized command and control and an organizational culture that does not appear to encourage junior officers to take the initiative. If these hurdles could be overcome, successful implementation of a more flexible command and control system would require the training and development of junior leaders capable of taking the initiative and seizing fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

How this debate will be resolved remains an open question. To be sure, modern commanders have not always used advances in technology to support the delegation of authority to lower echelons. On the contrary, in many cases, they have sought to use technology to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of centralized command and control. It is entirely plausible that the PLA will pursue this well-trodden path instead of exploiting technological advances to implement a directive control or mission-type orders system, especially given its institutional predispositions. It remains to be seen how the PLA will adapt its command style to changes in doctrine and improvements in information and communications technology. Enhanced IT and C4ISR capabilities could permit the PLA to delegate greater decisionmaking authority to lower-level commanders. At the same time, the modernization of the communications infrastructure could just as easily reinforce strong organizational tendencies to favor highly centralized command and control arrangements, as seems to have happened in some recent U.S. military operations.

These are challenges that the entire PLA must confront, but there are also some service-specific issues that navy commanders will need to resolve. First, command and control of PLAN assets is complicated due to the organizational structure of the People’s Liberation Army. The commanders of the three fleets answer to both PLAN headquarters and regional military commanders. Second, the deployment of SSBNs will present the supreme command and the PLAN with special challenges. Again, the supreme headquarters exercises direct command and control over strategic missile forces through the Second Artillery Corps.36

Presumably, the supreme headquarters would also exercise direct command and control over deployed SSBNs through the General Staff Department or PLAN headquarters.

The navy has been working to achieve secure, reliable SSBN communications for more than two decades. However, the extent to which centralized SSBN command, control, and communications is possible for China across the range of nuclear scenarios remains unclear. This underscores another critical problem for the PLAN: ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an environment in which its command and control system has been degraded.

Important Questions

Clearly, the PLAN is serious about the hardware aspects of naval informatization, but at least three broader questions remain unanswered.

Are Chinese conceptions of informatization unique? The first question is whether there is anything in the Chinese concept of informatization that is radically different from Western characterizations of the role of information in modern warfare. It is not evident from Chinese sources that there is anything unique about how Chinese strategists view the importance of information and information superiority. Some writings are undoubtedly attempts to assimilate and repackage ideas that are familiar to readers of Western writings on “network-centric warfare,” information dominance, and related concepts. Nonetheless, it will be important to watch the trends in PLAN writings and practice to see how these developments play out in both the short and long term. Of perhaps most critical concern would be any evidence of radically different, asymmetric approaches to informatization and the attainment and exploitation of information dominance that could offer China presently unforeseen and potentially disruptive military capabilities.

How informatized does the PLAN really need to be? The second broad question centers on how close the Chinese are to achieving the so-called informatized force. The 2006 Defense White Paper established a goal of being able to fight and win informationized wars by the mid-21st century. This reflects a perceived gap between the Chinese armed forces and the world’s most advanced militaries, which Chinese writers suggest will take decades to overcome. But it also raises the issue of distinguishing between the “ideal” capability the Chinese military seeks for the long term and a “good enough” capability for the relatively near term.

For the most part, Chinese analysts tend to overestimate U.S. and Western capabilities and portray themselves as backward in comparison. Certainly, many Western observers continue to denigrate PLA capabilities and note that even some of the Chinese military’s recent achievements are relatively simplistic by American standards. But one should ask whether a relatively simple system of deconfliction by time or geographic area with disparate platforms might actually be sufficient for the PLA to achieve its objectives under most circumstances. The need for an exquisite C4ISR system should not be overstated. In short, if the PLAN has a different metric for integrated C4ISR than that of the U.S. Navy, it might achieve an employable capability with surprising rapidity, especially if it pursues one that is relatively crude by U.S. standards but that is nonetheless sufficient to meet China’s operational objectives.

of critical concern would be asymmetric approaches to information dominance that could offer China presently unforeseen and potentially disruptive military capabilities

How will the PLAN resolve two critical informatization-related debates? Perhaps most interesting in the Chinese writings examined are the ongoing debates arising from increased informatization. One major debate concerns the offense-defense balance in information warfare. The conceptual goal is obviously full information assurance for one’s own forces and complete information denial to the enemy’s forces. The more likely outcome is some position between the extremes, depending on capabilities and geography. One could posit that information assurance tends to favor short-range operations close to home, where one can rely on land lines and high power line-of-sight communications, while information denial might predominate at long range away from home, where one becomes reliant on satellite communications and long-range signals that might be jammed or geolocated. It will be interesting to follow the progress of this debate
in Chinese writings, especially as strides are made toward creating a more powerful navy, potentially with blue water capabilities.

In this vein, a key possibility that planners must consider is that the PLAN’s continuing development of modern C4ISR capabilities will not only enhance its ability to operate effectively, but also increase its vulnerability to command and control warfare. As the navy becomes more reliant on high-tech C4ISR systems, it must be prepared to contend with electronic, computer network, and kinetic attacks designed to disrupt or deny its ability to use these new capabilities. Indeed, the PLAN—along with the rest of the military—will likely need to devote just as much attention to protecting its own C4ISR capabilities as it will to degrading or destroying those of its potential adversaries. The Chinese appear to be pursuing both efforts with equal vigor, practically and theoretically. PLAN writings do not yet offer a definitive assessment of this problem, but it would seem to be important for future Chinese naval operations, including PLAN power projection.

The second debate concerns the appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization. The conceptual goal for most militaries is centralized planning and decentralized execution—that is, empowering the lowest levels with information so they can leverage superior tactical training and initiative. Certainly, the practical experience in the West does not always match this conceptual goal; often, the reality is that “commanders who can control, do control.” This is an issue that has been raised in Chinese writings—with the proverbial 10,000-mile screwdriver that has been raised in Chinese writings—understanding the potential for command and control vulnerability is perhaps the most salient issue for the PLAN. PLAN writings do not yet offer a definitive assessment of this problem.

The overall implication could be that Beijing is on a path to conduct highly effective centralized operations close to China itself. This may be useful in an access denial role, but it might also be an effective limitation on future power projection, in which information assurance decreases with distance. Clearly, the evolution of the theory and practice of Chinese naval informatization will merit careful observation in coming years.

NOTES


3 Ibid.


6 Liu and Zhui.


8 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


15 DOD, 16.


25 For example, Cha Chunming et al., “From Scene Where PLA Navy Conducts an Informatized Joint Drill,” People’s Navy, September 1, 2006, 14–19.


28 Ibid., 11.


30 Joint campaigns involve the participation of forces from more than one service, while combined arms campaigns involve the participation of multiple branches from a single service. For full definitions, see Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: DOD, April 12, 2001, as amended through September 17, 2006), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddir/jel/index.html>.

31 DOD, 16.

32 Peng and Yao, 253.

33 Ibid., 268.

34 Ibid., 262.


36 Ibid., 255–256.
Over the past few years, Western strategic thinkers have debated what China’s emerging force of fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) portends for Beijing’s overall nuclear strategy. One influential school of thought assumes that the rudimentary land-based missile force that has served Beijing’s needs in the past will continue to do so. Others dispute this static model, pointing to the introduction of next-generation, land-based mobile ballistic missiles and improvements to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine and ballistic missile forces. They predict that China will soon put to sea an SSBN fleet more symmetrical with the U.S. Navy in terms of both quality and quantity. Moreover, it will abandon its traditional stance of “minimum deterrence,” assuming a more assertive nuclear posture better described as “limited deterrence.”

We take issue with both of these projections of Chinese nuclear strategy, doctrine, and undersea capabilities. We assess China’s undersea deterrent purely at the strategic level, leaving aside other important questions such as how Beijing might use fleet submarines to support coercion against Taiwan or in other contingencies. Our chief finding is that a larger, more advanced, more capable flotilla of fleet ballistic missile submarines does not necessarily signal a break with China’s tradition of minimalist nuclear strategy. Indeed, a modest undersea deterrent would reinforce minimum deterrence as Beijing conceives it.1 We first examine historical precedents for Chinese ballistic missile submarine development, revealing some parameters for likely endeavors in this domain. We then attempt to project the likely size and deployment patterns for Chinese SSBNs.

Historical Models

Five countries have deployed undersea nuclear deterrent forces: the United States, the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China. Until now, Chinese shipbuilders and weapons scientists have never managed to construct the reliable fleet ballistic missile submarine the nation needs to furnish an invulnerable second-strike capability.2 By examining the remaining four historical models, we can glimpse possible futures for China’s seabased deterrent. The United States and Soviet Union are obvious choices, given Beijing’s much-discussed rise to great-

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power—perhaps superpower—status. But some China-watchers predict that Beijing will settle for regional power status in Asia, similar to the status the United Kingdom and France enjoy. Similar incentives and disincentives—notably misgivings about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear guarantee during the Cold War—induced London and Paris to develop modest undersea nuclear deterrents of their own. This commends the independent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–European deterrents to our attention.

**United States.** In the early Cold War, successive U.S. administrations concluded that America depended on a large nuclear force structure. The rationale for a substantial arsenal underwent several phases. In the 1950s, this was mostly a matter of offsetting enormous Soviet advantages in geography and manpower, especially in NATO-Europe. The Eisenhower administration briefly flirted with “massive retaliation” against all communist efforts at expansion, however minor. By the Kennedy years, massive retaliation had lost credibility—the notion of using nuclear weapons against a Third World insurgency, for instance, was unpersuasive—and Washington was scrambling to plug the “missile gap” that seemed to have opened with the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s, strategists developed and refined a doctrine of “mutual assured destruction.” Their logic was that no sane leader would risk a nuclear first strike knowing that it would bring an automatic, devastating second strike.

And so the debate went—but “the weapons never left center stage,” notes Lawrence Freedman, whatever the conventional wisdom happened to be at the time. The dominant view was that a large arsenal was essential to counter an adversary that commanded overwhelming conventional supremacy and its own massive nuclear stockpile.

A powerful submarine force formed the core of the U.S. second-strike capability. By the late Cold War, 18 Ohio-class SSBNs armed with Trident II sea-launched ballistic missiles constituted the U.S. undersea deterrent. American submariners are famously close-mouthed about SSBN deployment practices. It is fair to say, nonetheless, that successive U.S. administrations developed elaborate command and control procedures to guard against a mistaken release of nuclear weapons from U.S. strategic submarines.

Yet political and military leaders also seem comfortable allowing individual skip-
waters within the first island chain that runs parallel to the Chinese coastline.  

Britain/France. Britain and France could offer a third model for a China that is content with regional influence and a second-strike capacity far more modest than those of the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia. London and Paris developed independent submarine deterrents out of fears that the U.S. nuclear umbrella would provide only flimsy protection in wartime. That is, Washington might prove unwilling to expose the American homeland to a nuclear counterattack for the sake of NATO-European allies. Preserving the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union—and thereby supplementing the U.S. security guarantee—helped them hedge against possible American waffling. Keeping seabased nuclear forces modest in size was imperative in light of meager budgets and competing military demands in continental Europe.

The United Kingdom and France, then, made do with SSBN forces asymmetrical to those of the superpowers. Numbers aside, their SSBN deployment patterns seemingly resembled those of the U.S. Navy. The entire French SSBN force was based at the Atlantic port of Brest, while submarines based in the British Isles patrolled the Atlantic and the North Sea. Neither government required its submarines to stay within confined geographic regions or within range of supporting land-based military forces. Should China take this approach, it would keep its nuclear arsenal small but permit its submarine commanders to patrol widely in the Pacific, the South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean. Targets for Chinese SSBNs would include U.S. bases in the Pacific; other candidates would include sites in India and the Russian Far East.

**Strategic Considerations**

Judging from these historical cases, several indices are worth taking into account when appraising China’s emerging submarine deterrent.

**Nature of the Regime.** Regimes exhibit distinct strategic and operational preferences. Like their authoritarian counterparts, Western liberal governments possessing nuclear capacity instituted elaborate precautions and stringent command and control arrangements to prevent unauthorized releases of nuclear weapons. They nonetheless evinced a fair degree of comfort with SSBN skippers operating far from their shores, in an offensive manner and beyond land-based support. Deployment patterns reflected this, with U.S., British, and French SSBNs enjoying considerable latitude to cruise independently within range of Soviet targets. By comparison, authoritarian regimes, which place great weight on political loyalty, are ill disposed to keep naval officers this degree of control over strategic assets. As became apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet leaders preferred to keep submarines closer to home, under their watchful gaze. Whether Chinese leaders will incline to one of these approaches or fashion their own remains to be seen.

**Strategic Culture.** During the 1970s, Western strategic thinkers disputed whether there was a peculiarly Soviet way of thinking about and executing nuclear strategy. Accumulating evidence indicated that, contrary to the logic of mutual assured destruction, Moscow was pursuing the capacity to fight and prevail in a nuclear conflict. Scholars and practitioners of nuclear strategy held that the same logic of nuclear deterrence governed decisionmaking in all countries. If such assumptions were false, U.S. and Western nuclear strategy and force structures designed for mutual assured destruction might have been dangerously misguided. Spurred by the debate over Soviet nuclear strategy, strategic thinkers began taking into account the effects of national traditions, history, and culture on the making of policy and strategy.

Acknowledging the cultural factor did not come easy. Holding Soviet SSBNs back and deploying general-purpose naval and land forces to defend them defied offensively minded Western sensibilities. At one briefing in 1981, Admiral Thomas Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, “found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that he expressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such a manner.” But they did. If the Soviet Union and other powers displayed distinctive styles in submarine warfare, the People’s Republic of China probably will, too.

**Threat Perceptions.** How Beijing views a threat will clearly shape its SSBN forces and doctrine. Generally speaking, the historical models surveyed here involved putting to sea submarine forces to counter a single threat. For the most part, the United States and Soviet Union sought to deny their opponent a nuclear advantage that would allow it to wage war without fear of a disastrous counterstrike. Britain and France tried to deter the Soviets by deploying modest but sufficient nuclear forces. China clearly faces a more complex geometry. Beijing must worry about not only a U.S. effort to knock out the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in a Taiwan contingency, but also India, a new nuclear neighbor that China shares a long border and a tumultuous history with. Likewise, Russian sites will almost certainly find themselves on the target list for Chinese submarines, despite Russo-Chinese cooperation in recent years. How these competing considerations will affect the size and operations of the PLAN SSBN force remains to be seen.

**Technology Dependence.** Technology imposed constraints on Cold War SSBN deployment patterns, forcing the great powers to depart from political and culturally derived strategic and operational preferences. The Soviet navy preferred a defensive stance leveraging geographic and land-based defenses. Early on, Soviet SSBNs were nevertheless forced to venture into the Atlantic to meet their objectives. Western submarines, similarly, were compelled to patrol in range of their targets, limiting their liberty of action. Once technological constraints eased, however, strategic and operational preferences grounded in political and strategic culture were reasserted. Soviet boats were limited to geographically defined bastions, while U.S., British, and French boats carried on open-ocean patrols with relative freedom of action.

China will undoubtedly confront similar technical obstacles as it develops its first effective SSBN flotilla. Once it meets these challenges, it too may pursue SSBN operations more in keeping with Chinese strategic traditions and preferences.

**China’s Nuclear Posture**

To test the applicability of the undersea deterrent models postulated above to China, it is necessary to assess the evolution of broader Chinese nuclear doctrine and force posture. Over the past four decades, China has carved out a rather unique niche among the five declared nuclear weapon states. Since China demonstrated its ability to fire ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges in 1980, its nuclear
posture has remained surprisingly modest and remarkably resistant to change. China maintains what many Western analysts call a doctrine of minimum deterrence, which calls for:

- strictly defensive posture
- small arsenal
- pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons
- commitment not to attack or threaten nonnuclear states.

Official Chinese documents have repeatedly reaffirmed these minimalist principles. While there is an ongoing debate in China and the West on the merits of rejecting nuclear minimalism, authorities in Beijing appear committed to existing policy. In the most detailed articulation of Chinese nuclear policy to date, China’s latest Defense White Paper forcefully states:

China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. . . . China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force. . . . It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force.11

Such nuclear minimalism has exerted significant influence on China’s nuclear posture, suppressing the size and readiness of the force structure. According to one analyst: China’s small but effective nuclear counterattacking force . . . is significantly smaller, less diverse, and less ready to conduct actual operations than any of the arsenals maintained by the other four nuclear powers recognized under the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].12

Rather than speculate on a nuclear posture not yet in existence, then, for the purposes of this study, we assume that China will hew closely to its minimalist posture well into the next decade. Such an analytical baseline should at least supply policymakers and analysts with some basis to measure the degree of change if China decides at some future point to depart from minimum deterrence.

It is important to note, however, that minimalism does not equate to immutability. Qualitative and quantitative changes are clearly under way in China’s nuclear posture as Beijing seeks to shape and respond to the dynamic security environment. It is within this context that a new generation of SSBNs (known as Type 094s or Jin-class submarines) has entered into China’s strategic calculus. Successive White Papers, for example, stress the need to improve nuclear deterrence at sea. The latest version envisions the PLAN “enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.”13 Beijing is clearly eyeing a larger role for its undersea deterrent.

Sufficiency Goes to Sea

Defense planners in Beijing face several basic questions regarding the future of undersea deterrence. What types of force structures would Beijing consider viable? What factors might induce leaders to rely more heavily on the PLAN’s nascent fleet of ballistic missile submarines? In short, how much is enough? Sizing the fleet is both an analytical exercise since China demonstrated its ability to fire ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges in 1980, its nuclear posture has remained surprisingly modest and resistant to change.
and an art, not least because of the political ramifications of deploying the most destructive single platform known to mankind. A large SSBN fleet not only would impose a substantial financial burden but also could trigger competitive responses from potential adversaries. Thus, China faces a delicate balancing act that seeks to meet strategic requirements without unduly alarming other great powers.

Some advantages unique to an undersea strategic force magnify the relative importance of SSBNs vis-à-vis land-based missile forces. A ballistic missile submarine distinguishes itself even from a road- or rail-mobile ICBM by its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite possibilities in terms of launch locations. The survivability of SSBNs reduces vulnerability to preemption and thus eases the temptation for Beijing to adopt a destabilizing nuclear posture that undermines crisis stability and escalation control, including through increased dispersion and decentralized command and control.

However, the abstract strategic and operational benefits of an undersea strategic force will not likely convince Chinese leadership to lean decisively in favor of SSBNs. Foremost in the thinking of any political leadership is command and control of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. It is unclear whether Beijing would be willing to delegate operational control of a nuclear-armed submarine to a tactical commander. Like Moscow during the Cold War, Beijing may want to assert closer supervision. Practical considerations such as technical feasibility and steep financial costs, moreover, could impose burdens that China may be unwilling to carry.

In theory, a relatively modest number of survivable SSBNs should reduce the probability that “bean counting” would prompt a competitive response from the United States. In other words, Beijing will likely favor a force configuration that demonstrates restraint in order to maintain a stable deterrent relationship with Washington.

Accurately determining a quantitative ceiling for seabased ballistic missiles that buttresses deterrence while precluding a countervailing U.S. response, however, is a delicate affair. For example, if China possessed 4 Type 094s carrying 12 JL–2 ballistic missiles armed with 3 warheads each, then Beijing’s undersea deterrent would boast 144 warheads. If China deployed 6 SSBNs with 6 multiple warheads atop each JL–2, the number of warheads would jump to 432. These figures exclude the ongoing introduction of land-based intercontinental-range missiles that could also be armed with multiple warheads. Such a dramatic increase would likely raise concerns in Washington, even assuming the United States continues to enjoy commanding quantitative and qualitative advantages over China’s nuclear arsenal. While a classic arms race resembling the Cold War probably would not ensue from such a shift in the nuclear balance, it is unlikely that U.S. defense planners would respond passively to this hypothetical orders-of-magnitude increase in the Chinese nuclear inventory.

At present, the forecast number of Chinese SSBNs remains a subject of contention. The U.S. Intelligence Community and Pentagon project that neither the JL–2 ballistic missiles nor the Jin-class submarine will enter service until the end of the decade. According to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, USA, “the 8,000+ kilometer range JL–2 . . . likely will be ready for deployment later this decade.” The Pentagon’s most recent assessment of Chinese military power speculates that the JL–2 will achieve initial operational capability in the 2007–2010 timeframe. The U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence believes that the Type 094 may enter service as early as 2008 and that “a fleet of probably five Type 094 SSBNs will be built in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence.” The open-source literature provides even more disparate estimates concerning the number of SSBNs that the Chinese plan to, or will be able to, build. Conservations assessments of China’s strategic forces tend to agree with the U.S. Intelligence Community, while other studies have drawn a more alarming picture. Simply put, the future size of the fleet is still anybody’s guess.

Some parameters and assumptions embedded in the historical models set forth previously provide useful guidance for estimating the likely size of China’s future SSBN fleet. First, an underlying principle of minimum deterrence is that as long as the number of surviving retaliatory weapons after a disarming first strike is zero, the posture is credible. As the British and French examples suggest, the threshold for sufficiency might be quite low for China.

Second, the only power with the capacity to inflict a disarming preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear forces on land and at sea simultaneously for the foreseeable future will be the United States. This reduces if not eliminates China’s requirement to conduct deterrent patrols against lesser nuclear powers such as India, and perhaps even Russia. In other

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**a ballistic missile submarine distinguishes itself by its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite possibilities in launch locations**
the blue” to conduct a highly destructive retaliatory strike.

Fourth, Beijing’s high degree of comfort with the ambiguity surrounding the survivability of its nuclear forces, a longstanding hallmark of Chinese nuclear strategy, would further reduce the need for absolute numerical guarantees.

These factors suggest that the lower-range estimates are more accurate for China. The rule of thumb—familiar to U.S. naval planners—is that three aircraft-carrier expeditionary groups are needed to keep one fully operational at sea at any given time. Of the remaining two groups, one will be in an extended maintenance period, probably in a shipyard, while the other will be undergoing training and workups for deployment (and its availability will thus be reduced). Assuming China adopts similar operating procedures, a minimum deterrent posture would not demand too much in terms of quantity. Assuming 50 percent of the at-sea SSBNs fell prey to enemy ASW—a generous estimate in view of the SSBN capacity for concealment and quiet operations—only two Chinese SSBNs would need to be at sea at any given time to ensure that one survived a first strike. Based on the rotating deployment cycle described above, China would need six SSBNs to fulfill the basic demands of minimum deterrence. Depending on the eventual technical quality, reliability, and characteristics of the Type 094, furthermore, Beijing may not need even six boats. If the PLAN adopted an arrangement similar to the U.S. Navy’s Blue and Gold crew system, which alternates crews after each deterrent patrol with a short maintenance period in between, it might even make do with a two-for-one ratio of boats in port to at sea. Four fleet boats would serve China’s needs under these circumstances.

**Potential Deployment Patterns**

Beyond the question of force sizing, Beijing must also consider a range of possible deployment patterns. Recently, speculation concerning the logic of a “bastion strategy” for China has emerged among U.S. analysts.20 The Chinese themselves seem intrigued by the Soviet Union’s experience in this regard.21 China could seek to replicate the Soviet model by turning the geographical features of the Asian coastline to its advantage.22 Beijing could, for instance, concentrate its SSBNs within the protective confines of the Bohai and Yellow Seas. Nuclear attack submarines, shore-based fighter aircraft, and surface combatants could be poised as “palace guards” to respond quickly against hostile forces seeking to hold China’s SSBNs at risk.

The bastion approach would offer sanctuaries within which high-value SSBNs could operate. In theory, sea- and shore-based assets would be able to identify and hold at bay hostile forces operating near or in the Bohai or Yellow Seas. The shallowness and complex acoustic environment of littoral waters, moreover, would pose serious challenges to high-speed American hunter-killer submarines designed for open-ocean operations during the Cold War.

However attractive it seems, a bastion strategy would entail certain risks. Keeping the undersea deterrent in the Bohai area would constrain patrol patterns, thereby increasing the likelihood that the submarines would be detected by enemy forces; forego much of the inherent stealth and mobility of an SSBN; and keep certain targets out of reach due to the longer distances that the missiles must traverse. To overcome such obstacles, China would have to build large, capable naval forces to protect the SSBNs lurking within the bastion and to enable the boats to stage a breakout should hostile forces seek to bottle them up and hunt them down in confined waters. The main risk of such an all-consuming strategy of deterrence is that excessive investment in protecting SSBN forces would detract from broader maritime priorities such as Taiwan-related contingencies, sealane defense, and secure access to overseas energy supplies.

As an alternative to a bastion strategy, the strategic submarines could operate more freely along China’s long coastline under protective cover from naval and land-based aviation forces on the mainland. Recent studies have postulated that China has already embarked on an ambitious plan to create “contested zones” along its maritime periphery. Premised on the concept of sea denial, such zones would allow Beijing to exercise local superiority in waters and skies within the first island chain, which, roughly speaking, stretches from the Japanese archipelago to the northern Philippines. Under this scenario, China might be confident enough to permit SSBN patrols along the Asian mainland, particularly in the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait. Given that it confronts several deterrent relationships in Asia, including India, the presence of SSBNs in the South China Sea would help shore up deterrence on the southern flank should Beijing see the need.23 This sort of “expanded bastion” strategy would clearly open up new options for the People’s Liberation Army, albeit at greater risk.

Most ambitiously, China could deploy its submarines out into the Pacific in forays reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet undersea competition during the Cold War. Some U.S. analysts have speculated that Beijing might base its SSBNs in the South China Sea, enabling them to slip into deeper Pacific waters undetected. Forward deployment would place a much larger number of U.S. targets within the range of the JL–2 missiles. Assuming China manages to develop capable and quiet submarines, it could, for instance, concentrate its SSBNs in the South China Sea, enabling its patrols in the Pacific would pose the greatest challenges to U.S. defenders seeking to detect and track lurking SSBNs. Forward patrols would also force the United States to divert most of its attack boats to shadow Chinese submarines in open waters, thereby diverting American attack submarines that might otherwise be available for a Taiwan contingency or some other flareup.

But the PLAN would incur strategic and operational risks by permitting such free-ranging deployments. From a political standpoint, active patrols within the first island chain or in the Pacific could prove highly provocative to the United States and would almost certainly trigger a competitive response from Washington. U.S. naval planners would likely see China’s entry into Asian waters as a dramatic change in the threat environment, especially given the lack of Russian deterrent patrols in the Pacific since the Cold War. Given that the Xia-class SSBN has failed to conduct a single deterrent patrol,24 even a modestly forward-leaning deployment pattern could signal a sea change in Chinese nuclear strategy that might significantly heighten American threat perceptions.

From an operational standpoint, submarine patrols along the mainland littoral or in Pacific waters would expose PLAN boats to U.S. and allied ASW measures. Throughout the Cold War, the United States developed extensive and highly effective undersea detection networks—most notably the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)—to track the...
location of Soviet submarines. In the Pacific theater, U.S. submarines aided by SOSUS monitored every movement of Soviet SSBNs in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the 1980s, American and Japanese naval forces raised ASW to an art form, working together closely to bottle up Soviet forces operating in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan.

These “legacy” systems and well-developed tactics would lend themselves readily to ASW against Chinese SSBNs. The ability of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to track a Chinese Han-class submarine that had breached Japanese territorial waters reaffirmed that the JMSDF has maintained a high level of ASW readiness. Commenting on the Han incident, a former JMSDF chief of staff boasted that Chinese submarines would be unable to slip into the deep waters of the Pacific through the Ryukyu island chain, to the north or south of Taiwan, or through the Bashi (Luzon) Strait without being detected by U.S. and Japanese antisubmarine forces.

Given such potent risks, China will probably avoid coastal and blue-water patrols for the time being—especially during the initial stages of deployment when training, tactical skills, and doctrine are still immature. Additionally, Beijing simply might not have enough SSBNs to contemplate riskier, more forward-facing options. As noted above, it may content itself with two boats conducting deterrent patrols at any given time. If so, Chinese strategists could view secondary considerations, such as patrols in the South China Sea aimed at India, as a needless distraction from the primary mission of deterring the United States. Unless the range of the JL–2 is sufficient to reach the continental United States from any location within the first island chain, which seems unlikely, operating farther from American shores may be deemed counterproductive.

These factors suggest that submarine deployment patterns will be rather constrained. Beijing will likely favor protection over effectiveness during the early phases of SSBN deployment and will thus pursue some type of bastion strategy. Over time, if the vessels prove capable of extended patrols well beyond the coasts, Beijing might be willing to relax its protectiveness and permit patrols farther forward.

It is important to note that these deployment options—the bastion strategy, littoral patrols, and open-ocean patrols—are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that the Chinese may keep their options open, alternating among them as security conditions warrant. For example, Beijing may be content to rely on a bastion strategy during peacetime, when no immediate threat is evident. In times of conflict, it may permit more active coastal patrols or slip its SSBNs into open waters to signal resolve or counter nuclear coercion from an adversary. In sum, even a small underwater deterrent would give Beijing multiple options across a spectrum of contingency scenarios.

**Larger Undersea Deterrent**

While a restrained nuclear posture is a more likely outcome at present, it is nevertheless worth exploring how China’s willingness to retain its minimalist posture could come under significant pressure in the future. For at least a decade, the U.S. policy community has speculated about the prospects for a shift in Beijing’s deterrent posture from minimum to limited deterrence. Many Western analysts have predicted that China would make the transition to a more flexible capacity, allowing it to engage in a broader range of nuclear “warfighting” missions. This would require substantial increases in numbers and types of nuclear weapons. So, too, China analysts and policymakers have exhibited greater willingness to reconsider and question the basic merits of minimum deterrence. Although official policy remains firmly rooted in the status quo, three key factors could challenge the logic of minimalism.

First, China’s ongoing refusal to acknowledge that an adversary’s nuclear first-strike option could succeed—a premise central to the concept of minimum deterrence—depends in part on whether the United States wants to submit to the logic of assured (but minimal) retaliation vis-à-vis China. There is evidence that some U.S. strategists have dismissed such a mutual vulnerability, asserting that the United States should direct its ballistic missile defenses specifically to negating China’s deterrent. Reflecting such an attitude, one advocate of missile defense argues that should Beijing continue to exhibit hostile intent toward Washington, particularly with regard to Taiwan, the United States “may simply have no choice” but to build defenses against China. If Washington overtly seeks to deny China a retaliatory option, Beijing will almost certainly respond with a larger and faster buildup that includes its undersea strategic forces.

Second, China’s more leisurely approach to bolstering its nuclear posture could come under strain from unforeseen strategic technological advances or surprises. For instance, more capable missile defense systems deployed by the United States in the coming decades could shake Beijing’s confidence in its retaliatory options. It is conceivable (although highly improbable in the near term) that the advent of space-based lasers and other advanced capabilities could radically reshape China’s outlook. The track record of the U.S. missile defense program to date casts doubt on the prospects of a radical breakthrough over the next decade. Should such a technological leap nevertheless occur, SSBNs might emerge as a strategic trump card for Beijing.

Third, the reconnaissance/precision-strike complex boasted by the U.S. military could alter China’s exclusively retaliatory posture. In July 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu created a sensation when he declared to the foreign press, “If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” He argued that if China faced the prospect of defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, Beijing would have no choice but to conduct a nuclear strike against American cities.

Similarly, in a candid assessment of how Chinese calculations might change, Shen Dingli argues that precision conventional strikes against China’s nuclear forces during a Taiwan contingency could force Beijing to abandon its no-first-use pledge. He asserts that “if China’s conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, rather than use them as true means of deterrence.” In other words, if the effects of conventional U.S. attacks were indistinguishable from those of a
disarming nuclear strike, China’s no-first-use policy would become untenable.\footnote{\cite{2}} Shen’s stark if sensible conclusion seems consistent with China’s longstanding worries about nuclear blackmail. In this context, Beijing might regard a much larger SSBN fleet as its only viable insurance policy against a conventional and/or nuclear disarming first strike.

Clearly, a next-generation undersea deterrent would give Beijing the strategic option to hedge against sudden shifts in the international security environment. However, it is important to acknowledge that SSBNs are not China’s only answer to the strategic dilemmas noted above. Beijing is actively developing an array of alternative countermeasures to firm up the credibility of its deterrent forces. For instance, it boasts a rather comprehensive set of programs designed to defeat U.S. ballistic missile defenses. The January 2007 antisatellite test testified to Beijing’s determination to develop multiple options, ensuring that missile defenses cannot vitiate the nation’s deterrent posture.

This study has demonstrated how China can make significant qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear strategy, forces, and doctrine without fundamentally overturning the type of minimalism (at least at the strategic level) that has characterized its approach to nuclear matters. It appears that Beijing has redefined the parameters of minimalism to conform to the fluid security environment. China will have a more effective and credible nuclear deterrent with the deployment of its Type 094s, despite the elements of nuclear instability introduced by U.S. technical and doctrinal advances. Such a balancing trend should not be surprising for such a rising power, and indeed it augurs well for a more stable nuclear relationship with the United States.

Mutual ambivalence continues to characterize Sino-American ties. As long as Beijing and Washington refuse to embark on a Cold War–style rivalry, however, radical shifts in China’s nuclear posture remain improbable. JFQ

NOTES

1 Terms ascribed to China’s nuclear posture, including minimum deterrence, are highly contended in the West. Moreover, the Chinese policy community does not employ terms and concepts that correspond to the Western lexicon. For clarity, we use the term minimum deterrence loosely, connoting the ability to inflict a modest degree of damage that is nonetheless unacceptable to an adversary with a high degree of confidence.


9 Ibid., 33.

10 See, for example, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, September 1, 2005.


15 For a similar calculation based on the assumption that the Type 094 is equipped with 16 launch tubes, see Zhang Baohui, “The Modernization of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Its Impact on Sino-U.S. Relations,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 92.


19 Office of Naval Intelligence, Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force, unclassified document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen.


As the 21st century dawns, the world presents a precarious mixture of growing challenges. The events of September 11, 2001, clearly revealed that Americans are at risk from terrorist attacks throughout the world, even within the borders of their own country. Earlier terrorist attacks targeted U.S. Government and military personnel and sites, such as the bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole while in port in Yemen. Now, everyday American civilians are at risk. Considering the strategic environment, we face growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of states or nonstate actors.

These threats range from terrorism to ballistic missiles tipped with WMD, intended to intimidate the United States by holding it, its friends, and its allies hostage. Presently, more than 25 nations have developed chemical and biological WMD. More than 30 nations have ballistic missiles in their arsenals. Not only are forward deployed forces at risk from ballistic missiles, but also the U.S. homeland is within range of these threats, which continue to grow in number, range, and complexity. One factor that makes ballistic missiles desirable as a delivery vehicle for WMD is that the United States and its allies have lacked an effective defense against this threat.
Within 30 minutes, an intercontinental ballistic missile could be launched from any location in the world and strike somewhere in the United States. Today, over 200,000 forward deployed American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are at risk from short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles located in North Korea and Iran. On July 4 and 5, 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepo Dong–2. In October of that year, North Korea detonated a nuclear device. During the Great Prophet exercise conducted in November, Iranian state television reported that dozens of ballistic missiles were fired, some capable of striking Israel, Turkey, and American bases in that region. These events demonstrate that ballistic missiles are not a future threat, so there is an urgent need to rapidly deploy a ballistic missile defense capability.

**Deterrence**

The emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires both a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. Today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last resort. These weapons are their means to compensate for U.S. conventional strength, allowing them to pursue their objectives through coercion and intimidation.

To deter such threats, the United States must devalue ballistic missiles as tools of extortion and aggression by fielding defenses. Although missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive response capability, such defenses are a critical dimension of deterrence. Missile defenses will also help to assure U.S. allies and friends and to dissuade countries from pursuing ballistic missiles by undermining their military value.

Fighting and winning wars are the main missions of the U.S. Armed Forces; however, deterring wars, one of our strategic priorities, is always preferable. To ensure credible deterrence across the range of threats in the current strategic environment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has expressed the need for a “New Triad” consisting of improved global strike capability, further developed global missile defense systems, and modernized strategic weapons systems and infrastructure. Also, increased emphasis is needed not only on development of American capabilities but also on building the capacity of partners to counter threats and to promote regional stability.

**Missile Defense Agency**

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was established to integrate all missile defense programs and technologies into one Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), which will provide integrated, multilayered defense to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight.

To develop and field the BMDS, the MDA has instituted an evolutionary, capability-based acquisition approach called spiral development. BMDS fielding opportunities are structured to occur in “blocks.” Each block consists of planned fielded capabilities against specified threats. Block 1, for instance, is defense of the United States from North Korean long-range threats. Block 2 is defense of allies and deployed forces from short- to medium-range threats (in one theater/region, and so on). Blocks 1, 3, and 4 deliver capabilities for long-range defenses, while Blocks 2 and 5 deliver capabilities to address the shorter range threats. These blocks deliver element capabilities that are ready for continued rigorous testing and full BMDS integration. Each block enhances BMDS capabilities that were previously fielded. This approach allows missile defense capabilities to be put in play as soon as technically feasible, but only after a disciplined, robust, technological process and demonstrated success.

Over time, this spiral development approach will integrate all of the segment elements into a layered missile defense system that is capable of defeating ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight.

**Initial BMDS**

With the initial fielding in 2004 of Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), seabased Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) elements, the MDA established a Limited Defensive Capability for the United States against a North Korean long-range missile threat. This is the first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy. Included in this priority is the fielding of protection for deployed forces from shorter range threats with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) batteries and Aegis BMD engagement ships.

To complete the initial BMDS configuration, the Seabased X-band radar (SBX)
completed sea trials and commenced integration testing. The SBX radar is a unique combination of advanced X-band radar with a mobile, ocean-going, semisubmersible platform. The X-band radar tracks and discriminates ballistic missiles and cues other BMDS sensors and weapons systems. The mobility of the platform allows the radar to be repositioned as needed to provide coverage of possible threat ballistic missile launches. The SBX radar is based at Adak, Alaska.

Also, the first Forward Deployable Radar (AN/TPY–2) was stationed in Japan. This transportable, forward-based X-band radar provides early warning, detection, and tracking of ballistic missiles. TPY–2 information is transmitted to other BMDS sensors and weapons systems, via the BMDS command and control system, to facilitate engagement of threats to the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. It is designed to be transportable by ground, air, roll-on/roll-off ship, and rail. The radar consists of a solid-state, phased array antenna supported by electronics and cooling units.

This Block 1 BMDS configuration (for example, GMD, Aegis BMD, C/BMC, SBX, and TPY–2) was put to a real-world test during the North Korean missile firings. As the situation escalated, the BMDS was turned over to warfighters. Aegis BMD long-range surveillance and track (LRS&T) destroyers patrolled the Sea of Japan to provide early warning to the BMDS of a Taepo Dong–2 launch. The positioning of the TPY–2 radar was accelerated to provide more coverage of a possible launch. The SBX radar was stationed off Hawaii for similar purposes. North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepo Dong–2, which spurred a limited operational activation of the BMDS that, according to the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, “demonstrated a credible operational missile defense capability for homeland defense.”

For the first time in U.S. history, we had the capability to defend ourselves from a long-range ballistic missile attack. Since the North Korean missile firings, the MDA has increased the breadth and depth of missile defenses by adding more forward deployed network sensors. 

To fulfill the seabased portion of the initial missile defense capabilities, the MDA, working closely with the Naval Sea Systems Command and other Navy organizations, has brought the Aegis BMD 3.6 Weapon System into service. The Aegis BMD element of the BMDS consists of the Aegis BMD Weapon System armed with the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IA missiles. Aegis BMD 3.6 contributes two major warfighting capabilities to the BMDS. The first warfighting capability provides the engagement of short- to intermediate-range, unitary, and separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with the SM–3 Block IA missiles. This capability is integrated into a weapons system configuration that includes LRS&T. Aegis ships, manned with naval Sailors and officers, have recently completed a series of firing missions to validate the operational capabilities of Aegis BMD against a progressively more complex set of targets and scenarios, compiling a record of 12 successful intercepts in 14 attempts.

The flexibility of this capability was demonstrated by the recent intercept of an errant U.S. satellite. The satellite was higher, faster, and larger than any previous target. Modifications were made to the Aegis BMD Weapon System and the SM–3 missile to accommodate these new target challenges. The USS Lake Erie detected the satellite in its orbit with the AN/SPY–1 radar. A fire control solution was calculated and a SM–3 missile was fired. The missile collided with the target, destroying it with lethal force and therefore rupturing the hydrazine tank. The intercept speed was calculated at approximately 22,000 miles per hour.
At Sea, on Patrol

The USS Curtis Wilbur, equipped with the LRS&T capability, made history when it began the Nation’s first BMD patrol, arriving on station September 30, 2004.\(^4\) Forward deployed ships tracking ballistic missiles and transmitting track data to the BMDS extend the battlespace. Earlier detections enable earlier GMD fire control solutions, winning back critical reaction time. Earlier fire control solutions enable engagements at longer ranges and the opportunity to reengage. Due to their mobility, Aegis ships can quickly maneuver to different locations for surveillance operations. Undoubtedly, the Aegis BMD LRS&T capability significantly complements the initial BMDS and therefore devalues the military value of a long-range ballistic missile system.

The Aegis BMD engagement capability supports forcible entry and protects forward deployed forces, population areas, debarkation ports, amphibious objective areas, expeditionary forces, and coastal airfields from the ballistic missile threat. Stationed close to a launch site, these Aegis ships increase the engagement battlespace with the ascent phase intercept capability. For homeland defense, the engagement capability would protect U.S. coastal cities against an off-shore ballistic missile launch. The MDA, Aegis BMD, and Navy are aggressively moving out to deploy this engagement capability against short- to intermediate-range, unitary, and separating ballistic missiles on more Aegis ships to add to the combatant commanders’ arsenal in times of crisis.

Deployment

The Missile Defense Agency and the Navy are modifying 18 Aegis combatants to conduct ballistic missile defense operations. At the end of 2007, 10 warships could track and destroy ballistic missiles while conducting other tasks simultaneously; another 7 warships were also available to track ballistic missiles in support of BMDS operations. All 18 ships will have the ability to destroy ballistic missiles by the end of 2008. Sixteen of these ships are assigned to the Pacific Fleet. The remaining two ships are assigned to the Atlantic Fleet with the first Aegis destroyer receiving the BMD upgrade in December 2007.

New Maritime Strategy

Maritime BMD is a new capability for preventing wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has shifted emphasis from preparation for a global war to more frequent use of expeditionary forces to contain regional conflicts. The rapid proliferation of ballistic missiles among potential regional adversaries requires a dramatically increased U.S. capability for BMD. National objectives include protection of forward deployed and expeditionary elements of our Armed Forces and the ability to support the defense of friendly forces and allies, including important seaports, airfields, and population centers. The goal is not only actual defense against ballistic missiles but also the strengthening of U.S. security relationships and reassurance for allies.

BMD supports broader political goals because it can help discourage the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and WMD by reducing incentives to develop, acquire, or use these weapons. Furthermore, the ability to extend reliable protection to allies and friends can have a significant mitigating effect on their desire to produce or acquire their own offensive systems as a deterrent against other nations in a region. At the same time, it can encourage the willingness of potential allies to act in concert with the United States during a conflict.

Deploying long-range BMD at sea provides a dramatic deterrent and war-winning capability. Because we can position ships closer to anticipated ballistic missile launch points, our Aegis cruisers and destroyers can provide hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of defended area, encompassing entire geographic regions. The world’s oceans permit this forward positioning at sea, enabling the Navy to achieve ascent phase intercept in just the areas we are most likely to need it (for example, the Sea of Japan, Arabian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea).

Forward deployed BMD ships also provide substantial political and military leverage. Naval forces are mobile. They can arrive on the scene early and sustain themselves for days. In fact, naval forces are normally the first on scene when a crisis is imminent. They provide great operational flexibility. Naval ships project a positive and engaged U.S. image to reassure friends and to encourage regional stability. They are relatively independent of host nation support and can influence political events immediately on arrival. BMD-equipped ships buy time for negotiation and promote the cohesion essential for allied coalitions.

If not already on station, naval ships provide the means to bring initial BMD capability into a theater in a few days with substantial additional forces within 10 days. This greatly eases the demand on airlift and sealift to bring in BMD defenses early to protect the very ports and airfields from which these forces must debark. Aegis BMD ships enable the combatant commander to concentrate available lift on antiarmor, tactical aviation support, tanks, troops, ammunition, and other reinforcements needed to deter or stop the enemy advance in a crisis.

Near-term Capabilities

The deployment of Aegis BMD is only the start of this new Navy core mission; we must be prepared for a variety of ballistic missile threats. Depending on the range of the hostile missile, we may have to engage in the terminal phase instead of the midcourse phase. Longer-range ballistic missiles may be more sophisticated and deploy decoys, and we need to be able to combat these threats to devalue their military use.
Terminal Capability. In 2006, the Navy and MDA successfully intercepted a short-range ballistic missile in the terminal phase with a modified SM-2 Block IV missile. The success of this demonstration, called Phoenix, resulted in a joint Navy-MDA venture to deploy a near-term seabased terminal (SBT) capability. The Navy is funding the modification of existing SM-2 Block IV missiles, and MDA is funding the development, integration, and test of the SBT capability into the Aegis BMD Weapon System. The SBT capability is scheduled to deploy in fiscal year 2009. With the addition of the SBT capability, Aegis BMD has increased its role in the BMDS to include not only midcourse engagement of short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles but also terminal engagement of short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, a significant contribution to the BMDS and deterrence.

THAAD Interface Testing. Aegis BMD has been conducting advanced engineering on exchanging track data with the developmental Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which is a land-based element capable of intercepting ballistic missiles both inside and just outside the atmosphere. It consists of four major components: truck-mounted launchers, interceptors, X-band radar, and fire control/communications. During the 2008–2010 timeframe, engineering and testing efforts will continue to develop and demonstrate THAAD and Aegis BMD engagement coordination.

Over time, more missile defense elements and capability upgrades will be developed and integrated into the BMDS; therefore, the number of engagement opportunities will also increase, enabling layered defense. In the near future, midcourse (Aegis BMD) and terminal missile defense systems (Patriot, THAAD, TPY–2, and Aegis BMD) will coordinate engagements of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Integrated, layered defense will be realized as tracking information is shared among systems, enabling a midcourse engagement opportunity followed by terminal engagements.

Longer-range Threat Set. Longer-range, multistaged ballistic missiles eject a reentry vehicle (RV) or warhead during their midcourse phase of trajectory. The size of the RV is much smaller than the missile or warhead (KW) and improves sensitivity for longer-range targets, high-speed processing for multiple tracks, and robust performance against complex threats. Both of these discrimination capabilities have been tested in earlier flight test missions and will be deployed in the 2010–2011 timeframe.

Missile Improvements. The SM–3 Block IB is the next seabased missile spiral upgrade. The seeker, signal processor, and propulsion system of the SM–3 Block IB missile kinetic warhead (KW) are improved over those of the SM–3 Block IA. These improvements result in sustained high effectiveness against increasingly longer-range and sophisticated ballistic missiles.

Since flight test mission (FTM) 04–1, the design and development of the SM–3 two-color seeker has progressed. Early design telescopes have been built and tested with the results used to iterate preliminary design. The Advanced Signal Processor provides increased capability to support new discrimination algorithms. The SM–3 Block IB Sensor preliminary design review was successfully conducted in February 2007. Proof-of-design telescopes are in fabrication, and the design was finalized at the critical design review in late 2007.

The new propulsion system for the KW is the Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS), which is a proportionally controlled propulsion system with multiple thrusters to maneuver the KW to an intercept. This throttling capability provides robust flexibility. TDACS enables the KW to vary its thrust and operational maneuvering time. The propulsion system is also easier to produce, thus reducing the per unit missile cost. A prototype TDACS successfully completed a ground test simulating space flight in July 2006. A preliminary design review was conducted in April 2007, and a series of component experiments and tests was conducted throughout the summer.

The SM–3 Block IB development effort is scheduled to support a flight test in mid-2010. Delivery of fleet deployment rounds is expected to begin in 2011. This missile upgrade, in combination with the BMD signal processor, provides not only the Aegis BMD but also the BMDS with...
significant capability to identify closely spaced objects and improve the probability of kill against advanced threats.

Future Capability

As MDA proceeds with the spiral development of the BMDS into the next decade, the emphasis will be on a missile defense force structure that features a persistent, real-time global detection, tracking, and fire control capability, as well as upgraded seabased interceptors with increased range and velocity to defeat the long-range ballistic missile threat. In response to the MDA's long-term strategy, Aegis BMD's future capabilities are focused on increasing the seabased missile defense force structure and developing a faster, longer-range, and more agile missile.

Open Architecture. Historically, cruisers and destroyers are decommissioned earlier than their designed service life unless their combat systems are modernized. If ships' combat systems cannot evolve to match projected threats, they are relegated to lesser duties until scrapped. The Aegis cruisers and destroyers are at their designed midservice life. Modernization of these combat systems will maintain their warfighting relevance, continue supportability with new technology, and establish the computing infrastructure and computer program architecture from which additional warfighting capabilities will be implemented with the lowest possible cost and schedule impact.

The Navy and MDA are engaged in a joint effort to integrate the Aegis BMD capability with the Aegis Modernization Program’s Open Architecture (OA) environment. The endstate of this joint program is a more robust, multimission capability fielded in modernized Aegis ships. The Navy gains a modernized fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers and increased operational flexibility enabled by the option to host the BMD capability on any ship within the modernized fleet. The Navy also benefits from streamlined in-service support as a result of the consolidation and reduction in the number of combat system configurations. The Aegis OA program is key to expanding the Aegis BMD capability to the entire fleet of Aegis ships, with a proposed total of 84 ships. The modernization program also provides the foundation for implementing Aegis BMD in 80 allied navy ships.

Higher Velocity, Longer-range Missile. The longer-range missile, SM–3 Block IIA, is being codeveloped with Japan. The upgrade increases the range and velocity of the missile, providing reach, firepower, operational flexibility, and performance—all of which are key warfighting objectives sought in the missile defense mission. With the addition of enhanced sensor performance, more hostile ballistic missiles can be engaged, with a greater probability of kill, which produces an increase in the defended “footprint.” The large missile magazine capacity of Aegis ships allows for multiple engagement opportunities per ballistic missile, again enhancing probability of kill. For a given defended region,
fewer ships are needed to be employed in the BMD role due to the increased reach and firepower of the Aegis BMD SM–3 Block IIA when combined with the BMDS. The SM–3 Block IIA’s performance provides the necessary flyout acceleration to engage intermediate-range ballistic missiles and some intercontinental ballistic missiles.

**International Efforts**

The United States and Japan are working together to build a multilayered regional BMD system. The elements are already in place and operational, awaiting the Block 2 Engagement Sequence Groups, which integrate Aegis BMD, TPY–2 radar, and PAC–3.

In 2006, MDA, in conjunction with U.S. Pacific Command, completed deployment activities for the TPY–2 radar in Japan. Information from the TPY–2 radar will be shared between U.S. and Japanese forces. In 2007, the first PAC–3 battery was deployed.

In June 2006, USS Shiloh participated in FTM–10 and successfully intercepted a medium-range, separating ballistic missile target using the operational Aegis BMD weapon system. Shortly after FTM–10, the Shiloh deployed with the Aegis BMD–certified engagement capability and shifted homeports to Yokosaka, Japan. Meanwhile, the engagement upgrade commenced for Aegis BMD LRShT destroyers. All Aegis BMD LRShT destroyers homeported in Yokosaka have been upgraded to the engagement capability.

The Shiloh and these Aegis BMD engagement destroyers comprise a most capable BMD Surface Action Group. With the TPY–2 radar and PAC–3 batteries stationed in Japan, these BMD assets form a sound foundation for a regional BMDS. Upon fielding the Block 2 Engagement Sequence Groups, the Northwestern Pacific theater will have a robust, multilayered BMDS to provide increased protection to our deployed forces, friends, and allies against short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

**International Participation in Flight Tests.** Using its time wisely while waiting for its first BMD ship to be modified and SM–3 missiles produced, Japan is participating in Aegis BMD flight tests now. In June 2006, the Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Kirishima became the first allied ship to participate in a maritime domain awareness flight mission, FTM–10. With a minor modification to its Aegis Weapon System, JS Kirishima successfully tracked the separating ballistic missile target.

Such international participation continued in the follow-on flight test, FTM–11. In this flight mission, the Royal Netherlands Navy ship HNLSM Tromp tested modifications to its Signal Multi-Beam Acquisition Radar for Tracking–L (SMART–L) system. The ship’s radar searched for, detected, and tracked the ballistic missile. Tracking data were also exchanged with an Aegis BMD destroyer. The Spanish navy Aegis-equipped Frigate Méndez Núñez participated in FTM–12, using the flight test as a training and preparedness activity to assess the future BMD capabilities of their F–100 class.

Again, with a minor modification to its Aegis Weapon System, Méndez Núñez successfully detected and tracked the medium-range, separating ballistic missile target.

As the success of Aegis BMD continues, more allied navies are actively participating in U.S. flight tests as preliminary training, proof of concept, or predecisional test and training feasibility events to assess the potential of a seabased missile defense capability.

**Potential Global Seabased BMD Force.** The Aegis Weapon System—with such major components as the SPY radar, standard missile, and vertical launching system—is the foundation for the Aegis BMD system. In addition to Japan, the Aegis Weapon System has been sold to Australia, Norway, South Korea, and Spain. By their procurement of the basic weapons system, these allied countries are investing in the prerequisites to a possible BMD capability upgrade.

Countries that do not have the Aegis Weapon System are also interested in BMD. The United Kingdom is actively conducting a BMD capability study with the United States, concurrent with a joint research effort of S-band radar technologies. Other countries are investigating the potential of using SM–3 and the vertical launching system with their air search radars. The Netherlands participated in a recent Aegis BMD flight test to determine the BMD potential of its F–124 frigates. More and more nations are expressing interest in cooperative studies to support a seabased BMD capability as a critical mission for their navies.

The ballistic missile is a global weapon. MDA has made substantial progress toward increasing not only missile defense coverage for friends and allies, but also allied participation in developing and deploying missile defense systems. Multilayered defense for the Northwestern Pacific theater will be realized in the near future when Aegis BMD (midcourse and terminal), TPY–2 radar, and PAC–3 are fielded. Allied navies are actively participating in U.S. missile defense flight tests. Joint studies have led to research and now joint development. BMD foreign military sales cases have been established. The potential exists for a global land- and seabased BMD force through a coalition of international cooperation.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense enhances global and regional deterrence, providing an umbrella of protection to forward deployed forces and friends and allies, while performing a strategic role in homeland defense. The Missile Defense Agency, with significant contributions from Aegis BMD, and our allied coalition members are forming the initial foundation of international cooperation to deter and defeat a critical transnational challenge, the proliferation of ballistic missiles. **JFQ**

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**NOTES**

[1] General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement, Testimony before 110th Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 6, 2007.


In the 21st century, information can move almost instantaneously around the world via cyberspace, and people can quickly travel great distances by air. The preponderance of materiel, however, still moves the way it has for millennia. Whenever the United States has committed military power beyond its shores, whether to fight foes or assist friends, the vast majority of the U.S. joint force—its equipment, fuel, ammunition, and sustenance—has been transported by sea.

For previous generations, projecting military forces and the resources necessary to support and sustain them overseas was often a hazardous undertaking. Peer competitors applying their own naval power sought to deny the ocean crossing or, failing that, the landing on the far shore. In the first half of the 20th century, demonstrating considerable foresight and innovation, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leaders developed the capabilities necessary to establish sea control and project power ashore where and when desired. In the latter half of the same century, the importance of these capabilities waned, as the United States enjoyed the luxury of extensive overseas basing rights, including secure ports and airfields.

In recent years, this network of bases has been dramatically reduced, even as the United States is confronted by a variety of strategic challenges and locked in a global struggle for influence. The ability to overcome geographic, political, and military impediments to access has reemerged as a critical necessity for extending U.S. influence and power overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an asymmetric advantage.

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in that endeavor: seapower. The American ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and to remain offshore at a time and place and for a duration of its own choosing cannot be contested today to the degree it was in previous eras. Although small in historical terms—and often stretched thin by current operational commitments—the U.S. Navy is, for the foreseeable future, a navy without peer.

This asymmetric advantage means that the Navy-Marine team can use the sea as both maneuver space and a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access. This seabased force—particularly its aircraft carriers and amphibious ships with embarked Marines—is capable of projecting influence and power ashore without reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area. It can do so in a selectively discrete or overt manner to conduct a range of operations—from conducting security cooperation activities, to providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary, fighting wars. This significant advantage does not extend to the joint force as a whole, however. The sealift that transports the preponderance of joint force materiel is still dependent upon secure infrastructure in a potential objective area. Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy and Marine Corps during the 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and Allied force in World War II, the seabasing initiatives being pursued by the Navy-Marine team today are intended to benefit joint, interagency, and multinational teammates.

Unfortunately, seabasing is surrounded by mythology and misunderstanding, and the resulting confusion has stifled capability development. One myth is that seabasing is exclusively intended as a means of providing logistic support for major combat operations. A second myth is that seabasing is synonymous with a discarded concept for modular floating bases. Another misunderstanding is that seabasing is intended as an overly ambitious replacement for (as opposed to a contributing element to) the global network of U.S. bases. Still another is that one specific program, Maritime Prepositioning Force–Future (MPF–F), will satisfy the entire seabasing requirement. Seeking to alleviate this confusion and to promote joint capability development, this article describes the conceptual origins of seabasing, how the concept has evolved to meet the Nation’s changing security requirements, and the key initiatives that should allow the joint force, as well as interagency and multinational partners, to leverage seabasing in support of diverse operations.

**Conceptual Origins**

By the end of World War II, the United States possessed an unprecedented ability to fight its way across the oceans and then ashore. The major components of this sea control and power projection capability were the fast attack aircraft carrier force, submarine force, amphibious force, and mobile advanced base force. The scope and impact of the carriers and submarines have been well recognized, but the sheer size and key contribution of the latter two components have been less obvious. By 1945, the United States possessed 2,547 amphibious ships comprising 37.6 percent of the fleet. These ships could deliver an attack from the sea by 13 divisions without reliance on forward land bases. Similarly, the mobile base force was extraordinarily capable, providing an unrivaled ability to support the fleet’s movement through underway replenishment, seabased maintenance facilities, and rapid buildup of advanced bases.

At war’s end, however, the United States had vanquished all naval peer competitors, and the role of the Navy and Marine Corps versus the Soviet Union, a nuclear-armed Eurasian land power, was initially unclear. In a frequently quoted 1954 Proceedings article, Samuel P. Huntington championed the utility of the Navy and Marine Corps:

> With its command of the sea it is now possible for the United States Navy to develop the base-characteristics of the world’s oceans to a much greater degree than it has in the past, and to extend significantly the “floating base” system which it originated in World War II. . . . The application of naval power against the land requires of course an entirely different sort of Navy from that which existed during the struggles for sea supremacy. The basic weapons of the new Navy are those which make it possible to project naval power far inland. These appear to take primarily three forms. . . . Carrier aviation is sea based aviation; the Fleet Marine Force is a sea based ground force; the guns and guided missiles of the fleet are sea based artillery.

Huntington’s article was prescient but premature. As the Cold War unfolded, U.S. strategy involved the maintenance of a large nuclear arsenal and the basing of significant Army and Air Force formations overseas to deter the Soviet threat. While a growing Soviet navy highlighted the continued
importance of sea control, especially antisubmarine warfare, the emerging naval missions of deterrence, crisis response, and strategic sealift overshadowed power projection. Faced with the need to reinforce forward-based forces, and blessed with the advantage of secure ports and airfields overseas, the United States invested in strategic sealift as opposed to amphibious and mobile base capabilities—an understandable approach under the circumstances. The amphibious ship inventory, which in 1945 had constituted more than a third of the fleet, continually diminished throughout the Cold War until leveling off to where it stands today: roughly 11 percent of the fleet.

For more than a decade thereafter, the seabasing concept continued to evolve in a number of documents, including the Operational Maneuver from the Sea anthology of concepts published by the Marine Corps in the mid-1990s, followed by Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in 2001, and two editions of Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment, released in 2005 and 2007. Similarly, the Navy published the Sea Power 21 series of concepts in late 2002 and early 2003. In addition to the aforementioned Service concepts, seabasing was prominently featured in unified Navy–Marine Corps documents such as Naval Power 21 in 2002, the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations and Enhanced Networked Seabasing, both published in 2003, and the Naval Operations Concept 2006.

For the most part, these documents described seabasing not as a specific platform—a “thing”—but as an approach for organizing and employing seapower to influence events ashore. The earlier papers touted the advantages of seabased crisis response to provide humanitarian assistance following natural disasters. In later papers, this idea evolved further to advocate seabasing as the means of proactively and discretely projecting soft power. This theme is highlighted in the recently signed maritime strategy, a tri-Service effort among the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Titled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, this strategy can be traced directly back to The Way Ahead and reflects more than 16 years of continuous conceptual development concerning the use of naval power to influence events ashore—seabasing.

This evolution was not without turmoil, and it occasionally generated misperceptions that persist to this day. As an example, for a time the Department of Defense was greatly concerned about its ability to achieve rapid victory in two nearly simultaneous major combat operations. The Joint Staff concluded that U.S. forces should strive to “seize the initiative” within 10 days, accomplish initial “swiftly defeat” objectives against one enemy within 30 days, and then commence “swiftly defeat” operations against a second enemy in another theater within another 30 days. This became known as the “10–30–30” metric and was subsequently formalized in Strategic Planning Guidance. This emphasis on strategic speed to conduct multiple major combat operations diverted intellectual focus away from the blend of capabilities required to conduct a range of joint operations. The promising but as yet unproven capabilities of the Maritime Prepositioning Force–Future appeared to offer the only means of achieving the 10–30–30 criteria, resulting in an almost blind faith emphasis on that program as the embodiment of seabasing. This myopia became so extreme that MPF–F came to be seen in some quarters as a replacement for, as opposed to the complement of, amphibious ships. Even though...
the 10–30–30 criteria proved transitory, the misconception that “MPF–F = seabasing” has proven perniciously enduring.

Another persistent seabasing misunderstanding stems from an initiative once undertaken by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), which explored the feasibility of creating mobile offshore bases (MOB) by assembling semisubmersible modules into a variety of floating bases, to include runways of up to 6,000 feet, as much as 3 million square feet of warehousing, and housing for up to 3,000 troops. The MOB was envisioned as a conduit for resources delivered by strategic sealift and airlift for further transfer ashore by a variety of landing craft. It was determined that the MOB concept was technically feasible but not as cost-effective as existing naval vessels or innovative forms of sealift, such as large medium speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships. The unintended consequence of this laudable but stillborn initiative is the belief by some parties that the term seabasing is synonymous with the MOB.

In spite of these challenges, what began as a naval concept has gained wider Defense Department consensus, formalized with the publication of the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept in 2005. This document defines joint seabasing as:

the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.9

Interestingly, this document has four supporting concepts of operation (CONOPS) covering the spectrum of operations, from humanitarian assistance to major combat. It is the first of the nine joint integrating concepts to be elaborated on by such CONOPS.10

Furthermore, in March 2005, the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America emphasized “the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable.”11 It stated that the United States faced a time of great uncertainty and had to address an array of current and potential adversaries who would likely use a combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods against the United States. The strategy identified the need to enhance eight operational capabilities, many of which appeared to make the case for a seabased approach to a wide range of joint operations:

- strengthening intelligence
- protecting critical bases of operation
- operating from the global commons
- projecting and sustaining forces in distant antiaccess environments
- denying enemies sanctuary
- conducting network-centric operations
- improving proficiency against irregular challenges
- increasing capabilities of international and domestic partners.12

The 2005 National Defense Strategy also espoused the necessity of revising the U.S. overseas force posture through a system of main operating bases, forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and joint seabasing. President George W. Bush noted 2 months later, “We are developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating platforms close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight.”13

Global Fleet Station experiments have been conducted with partners in South America and West Africa and have been deemed highly successful

Implementation Initiatives

The Navy and Marine Corps have been involved in a number of seabasing initiatives, both operational and programmatic, which have expanded into joint endeavors. The creation of Global Fleet Stations (GFS), for example, is an operational initiative designed to increase the capability and capacity for discrete, proactive activities as described in the Naval Operations Concept 2006: “GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations. Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander requirements, the operating environment, and the mission.”14 To date, Global Fleet Station experiments have been conducted with U.S. partners in South America and West Africa and have been deemed highly successful.

The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is a good example of how Service initiatives have expanded to become joint programs. A Navy-led joint acquisition program, the JHSV combines the Navy–Marine Corps High Speed Connector program with the Army Theater Support Vessel program to
produce a unified—and more integrated and cost-effective—solution to the commonly shared requirement for intratheater connectors. A shallow draft vessel that can transport personnel, vehicles, equipment, and supplies over operational distances at up to 45 knots, the JHSV has a helicopter flight deck and a vehicle ramp that allow rapid offloading in austere environments. Four experimental vessels have proven highly successful in a variety of assignments, to include supporting the war on terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, disaster relief operations in Indonesia and the U.S. gulf coast, and security cooperation in the Western Pacific.15

Seabasing initiatives such as these must continue to expand into comprehensive joint and interagency endeavors addressing the spectrum of operations. This will provide a complementary, seagoing component to the system of main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations to overcome challenges to access and better support proactive engagement, crisis response, deterrence, and warfighting. To that end, seabasing must be viewed as an interdependent and interconnected system of systems—everything from major combatants to inshore patrol craft, from surface and aerial connectors to cargo handling gear, and from command suites to medical centers.

Building on the cornerstones provided by amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, the United States must continue to refine its current and emerging platforms to enhance seabasing capability and capacity. Exploration of the MPF–F concept, for example, has identified the ability to conduct at-sea transfer of resources, for both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore purposes, as the key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining joint forces from the sea. Detailed analysis has concluded that this critical capability can be achieved in a variety of sea states through the combined use of LMSR ships and mobile landing platforms. These initiatives, as well as others yet to be envisioned, will be employed in combination to evolve the capabilities necessary to alleviate the joint force’s reliance on shore-based ports and airfields in the objective area.

The Navy-Marine team is already a seabased force capable of conducting a wide spectrum of operations and continues to hone its seabasing capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Although the preponderance of the joint force benefits from the mobility and capacity provided through seaborne deployment, modern challenges to access negate that advantage. These challenges may be physical, as imposed by remote geography or infrastructure that is austere, damaged by natural disasters, or nonexistent to begin with. In other cases, they may be diplomatic, as even longstanding allies sometimes deny access to ports and airfields ashore for specific operations. There may still be scenarios that will require the United States to fight its way ashore, and adversaries, recognizing the joint force’s reliance on secure ports and airfields, will find the scheme of maneuver that much easier to predict and counter. While there is no requirement for the joint team to become as fully seabased as naval forces, the joint team must at least be able to leverage seabasing to reduce reliance on infrastructure ashore and improve access. It is therefore imperative that we pursue joint seabasing as the means of not only deploying but also employing and sustaining select joint—as well as interagency and multinational—capabilities from the sea. JFQ

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5 Soft power refers to a state’s ability to influence the behavior or interests of another state through cultural or ideological means, as opposed to more direct, coercive means (hard power), such as offensive military action. The term was first coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990) and further developed in his Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
6 Work, 120–123.
7 Ibid., 125.
9 Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 1, 2005), 5.
10 The others are combating weapons of mass destruction; joint urban operations; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; joint logistics; network-centric operational environment; command and control; Global Strike; and joint forcible entry operations. The joint integrating concepts are available at <www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm>.
12 Ibid., 12–16.
13 George W. Bush, commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, May 27, 2005.

ADM Henry Ulrich, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and GEN William Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, brief Pentagon reporters
The setting is Iraq, 2008. Picture the following: A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) network has been responsible for several high-casualty attacks on coalition forces and local civilians. But now a cordon is in place, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are overhead. The squad is ready to move in—waiting on the last bit of close target reconnaissance information. The primary target is present, and the squad is cleared to execute. They enter, clear the house, and capture six individuals. While clearing the house, the squad finds two vehicles rigged as car bombs. They quickly question the detainees and exploit the house, jackpot—they get their guy (a Tier 2 target) and develop leads on a new target—someone higher up the chain in the insurgent cell. With minimal coordination and shift of close target reconnaissance assets, they follow up and hit the next target, taking down a VBIED cell leader, financier, and logistician. The squad also finds three more vehicles ready to execute additional bloody attacks. The result is that the back of a major VBIED cell has been broken so it can no longer terrorize the community, and leads on other extremists have been developed.
If the reader thinks this was a special operations forces (SOF) maneuver, he would be wrong. Such operations are happening daily with armor, artillery, and infantry units executing the mission. What enables this SOF-like capability with conventional units is the sudden increase in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), analysis, and exploitation assets delegated down to the brigade combat teams (BCTs).

We have seen a significant metamorphosis of intelligence operations in Iraq. Indeed, we still have much to learn, but we are on the right track. The capacity and capability of our intelligence systems have improved greatly in just 3 years. The successes enjoyed by Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) are clearly demonstrated in the ability to leverage the sophistication of intelligence operations ongoing in Iraq today at the lowest levels of command.

Employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, sets the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed BCT and regimental combat team (RCT) commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight. The robust ISR currently available at the brigade level provides commanders with an unprecedented level of situational awareness. Commanders now have the flexibility to push ISR assets to the lowest tactical echelon, which is one of the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today.

**Paradigm Shift**

The current environment in Iraq is complex and consists of four interacting conflicts: counteroccupation, terrorism, insurgency, and a communal struggle for power and survival. All are occurring in the context of a fragile state. This situation is further complicated by external influences. Each of these four conflicts is in a different stage, depending on which part of Iraq is being considered, and solving only one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse. Hence, there is no silver bullet solution; instead, solutions are as complex as the problem set. To confuse matters further, these conflicts cross unit, provincial, and international boundaries.

As the corps manages simultaneous, multidivision operations fighting a full-spectrum, decentralized counterinsurgency across multiple, disparate operating environments, ISR does not always lend itself to “streamlining.” The nature of the conflict makes it apparent that no single approach to ISR management will apply effectively.

To gain understanding and provide the battlespace owners at all echelons situational awareness, ISR must be robust and dynamic and controlled at the right headquarters in order to get commanders the information and intelligence needed to make decisions on a decentralized COIN battlefield.

Comprehensive coordination between operations and intelligence from the inception of major operations ensures that critical collection requirements are as well forecast and resourced as possible. However, it is important to note that deliberate planning for ISR support of COIN warfare does not alter the fact that more immediate and critical requirements emerge and continually evolve. In fact, the ability to retask assets quickly is an important aspect of exploiting operational and strategic opportunities that present themselves and are in line with the commander’s intent and standing ISR priorities.

**Decentralized Control**

The Iraqi threat environment contains insurgents and militias who at any time might be working with or against each other. Moreover, most are consistently working against coalition forces. The COIN environment’s decentralized nature makes it imperative that ISR asset control, from tactical through theater level, be pushed to the lowest possible echelon, while it is simultaneously managed by the corps to maintain flexibility.

Decentralized control of intelligence assets, including aerial collectors regardless of Service, is a key tenet of COIN doctrine. As stated in Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, “effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their level.” Every BCT and RCT has a different operating environment, and only the commander knows...
how to best integrate ISR. In a transformed military in which BCTs, by doctrine, fight autonomously, the concept of decentralizing control of ISR to the lowest possible level applies across the full spectrum of operations. In today’s environment, a commander must plan operations based on specific ISR systems available, and they are often the sole determining factor in what the unit can or cannot do operationally.

Our commanders must be able to seamlessly and immediately retask the best available asset if it is not actively engaged on a higher priority target to take advantage of often fleeting opportunities. Real-time coordination to facilitate command decisionmaking is crucial. The BCT is the nexus for ISR operations, and success can be directly attributed to the agility possessed by the empowered commanders at the lowest level. MNC–I controls its own ISR assets and those apportioned from higher. The assets are then decentralized, either apportioned or allocated down to the lowest level to support operations. This decentralization of additional ISR enablers at the BCT/RCT levels allows for mission execution across the spectrum of tasks associated with the counterinsurgency fight. The capabilities and ability of conventional forces to conduct sophisticated and other complex operations have improved significantly and now complement, but do not replicate, SOF capabilities. Corps ISR operations run the gamut regarding counter–high value individual targets at differing tiers. The conventional force mission set is broad and must be managed accordingly.

New ISR Model

The current ISR strategy breaks assets into two categories: allocated and apportioned. This provides needed predictability to the major subordinate command (MSC) while ensuring flexibility. Allocated assets are used by the corps to fill emerging high priority requirements in a similar manner to that described above. Apportioned assets, however, are controlled by the MSCs. The divisions write their own target decks and can count on their apportioned assets day after day.

The current ISR strategy is possible because of a recent surge of both theater- and corps-level full motion video (FMV) assets and the commander’s empowerment to division and brigade, along with the division or brigade’s ability to manage them effectively. Previously, ground commanders could not plan operations around ISR availability; instead, they submitted requirements and then waited to find out if they would get echelons above division (EAD) coverage. At best, they would know 72 hours out if they had been allocated an FMV asset; at worst, they would find their asset pulled at the last minute to support a higher priority corps requirement.

Situation routinely arise requiring sustained FMV coverage beyond a given division’s ability to support; the corps provides

allocated assets first, leaving the MSCs with their apportioned platforms. This gives the corps commander flexibility to provide FMV coverage for his main effort while still providing predictable ISR support to subordinate commands. This model is firmly governed by the commander’s priorities, from the initial apportionment of the assets to the creation of the allocated asset targets. Additionally, by using a mix of organic, apportioned, and allocated assets, the MSCs can conduct ISR “soaks,” generate cross-cueing opportunities, and achieve tactical successes on par with unconventional forces.

Evolution of ISR

Today’s division and BCT commanders are benefiting from the decision to balance ISR assets. Spinoffs of early Future Combat System technology and the recognition of the importance of manned and unmanned teaming in the COIN environment, where precision and timeliness are essential, show that one tactical UAV platoon per BCT will not be enough to provide the “unblinking eye” required for success. Therefore, BCTs depend on the allocation of corps- and theater-level systems to help them accomplish their missions.

While still insufficient to meet the demand of the COIN environment, significantly more ISR assets are available to commanders in Iraq today than were available in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since 2003–2004, FMV within the corps has increased tenfold. However, it is not just about numbers; it is also about improved capability. For example, during 2003–2004, the corps/
combined joint task force (CJTF) could count on at most only two UAV systems to meet all corps/CJTF-and-below FMV requirements. Most divisions and BCTs had no capability at all. Today, the corps can count on daily support from at least 12 FMV systems while each BCT has its own organic FMV support.

This increase in ISR capability is most visible at the BCT level. The BCTs of 2003 had little to no ISR capability, no top secret/sensitive compartmented information communications channel, inadequate intelligence analysis capability, limited human intelligence capabilities, and no properly equipped signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoons. Furthermore, the available digital bandwidth was insufficient to synchronize intelligence databases within the BCT and did not meet requirements for reachback to intelligence architectures at echelons above division. In fact, couriers were often sent with Flash drives to various command posts to synchronize intelligence databases. Commanders were rarely allocated more than an hour of FMV a week in the early stages of the war, and this allocation was often underutilized since BCT commanders did not know in advance when they would control the asset. Even when the BCT received FMV coverage, the ground control station or the picture remained at division level.

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Today’s BCT has three times the original analytic capability and twice the human intelligence capability of a 2003 legacy BCT. Additionally, each BCT has an organic tactical UAV platoon that provides 18 hours of FMV coverage a day and can often count on and plan for additional FMV support from a corps asset allocated to support division operations. The BCT SIGINT platoon is equipped to meet today’s battlefield requirement, and Theater has resourced most BCTs with a cryptologic support team and SIGINT terminal guidance teams to augment their organic SIGINT analytic and collection capability, providing the ability to tap into vast national resources.

Most importantly, the BCT has ample bandwidth available to handle internal communications and to provide reachback to division and EAD intelligence architectures. BCT commanders can now truly prosecute a multi-disciplined intelligence fight and use tipping and cueing from all collectors to focus FMV ISR assets better, thereby improving agility and ability to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.

Our biggest challenge today is to synchronize the effectiveness and capabilities of these systems for the mission. The first time that BCT commanders experience the windfall of these assets is often when they assume responsibility over battlespace in Iraq. We must develop appropriate simulations and training scenarios to replicate these assets. This is truly commanders’ business, and they must be trained and focused on these enablers.

The current system in U.S. Central Command is serving us well in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The combatant commander authorizes ISR to subordinate units, including MNF–I and Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I), based on his priorities. MNC–I can then weight the battlefield with a mix of theater- and corps-level systems by allocating ISR assets to subordinate divisions, combined joint special operations task forces, and BCTs/RCTs based on the commander’s priorities. Corps, as the operational headquarters for coalition forces, is really the highest level at which this can be done with a true feel for what is going on at all levels, and MNC–I

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purpose to achieve decisive effect. On any
given day, a conventional BCT commander
might be simultaneously focused on targeting a
cell leader in an IED network, providing secu-
ritv for a very important person convoy, moni-
toring a potentially violent demonstration, or
responding to troops in contact—to name only
a few potential operations. All of these missions
require ISR coverage, and only a commander
on the ground can make the appropriate deci-
sion about how to allocate assets.

Because of the diverse and complex
needs of commanders in a COIN environ-
ment, our BCT commanders need to "own"
not only their organic ISR assets but also
theater- and corps-level systems for given
periods based on the corps commander’s
priorities. External agencies do not have the
perspective, agility, or grasp of the full range
of ISR systems in theater to responsively inte-
grate ISR assets into COIN operations.

A recent combat action in Iraq sup-
ported by a variety of ISR systems enabled
the successful engagement of a mortar team.
A counterfire radar acquired an indirect fire
point of origin and cross-cued a persistent
surveillance platform to maintain contact
with the threat mortar system. Close air
support (CAS) arrived on station rapidly and
provided clear evidence of mortar tubes
being transferred to a second truck. The
AWT engaged and destroyed the target with
CAS lasing. The UAV facilitated immediate
battle damage assessment by verifying target
destruction. Control of ISR, especially the
UAV, at the lowest possible level was the key.

This successful intelligence operation
is directly attributed to the enhanced agility
possessed by commanders at the lowest level,
enabled with corps assets, to orchestrate FMV
assets based on rapid feedback from intel-
ligence analysts supporting the commander
and tipping and cueing from multidiscipline
intelligence sensors.

The Way Ahead

One initiative that has helped tacti-
cal commanders in Iraq integrate theater
ISR assets into their operations is the pres-
ence of Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOOC)/Combined Forces Air Component
Command (CFACC) ISR liaison officers at
division headquarters. Providing these Air
Force subject matter experts as advisors to
division staff sections and as key members of
the intelligence-operations team has been a
combat multiplier. It would also be extremely
helpful to have these experts at BCT level to
provide the CAOC and related organizations
with insight into the operations they support.

Tactics are continuously being refined,
and it is not uncommon to have ISR assets
guide CAS on station and on target to engage
the enemy. It is incredibly difficult for com-
manders to predict when and where units will
be decisively engaged. The ability to acquire
additional UAV support and CAS is an invalu-
able capability that brings large amounts of
firepower to the fight in short order. That said,
there certainly is no shortage of lethal systems
in the air over today’s battlefield. What we
need is more ISR for ground commanders
to employ, not more air support. Although
armed UAVs are a bonus, systems such as the
MQ–9 Reaper should not be designated as
primarily attack platforms until the larger ISR
void is filled.

ISR is working in Iraq because tactical
leaders are maximizing the effectiveness of
a limited resource. The optimal use of ISR is
enabled through decentralized control that
provides the greatest flexibility at the lowest
levels within the command.

The Army and Marine Corps need to
develop up-to-date and relevant training
simulations and scenarios that expose com-
manders and their units to the vast complex-
ity of ISR operations as part of predeployment
training. Commanders and their staffs must
know how to fight using all the ISR assets that
will be available to them before arriving in
theater.

B.H. Liddell Hart argued in his book
Strategy that the guerrilla’s most important
capabilities in surviving and acting on the
battlefield were concealment and mobility.
Full-spectrum intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets in the hands of com-
manders closest to the enemy have the best
chance of revealing where to look for and
where to interdict the enemy. On a decentral-
ized battlefield, commanders charged with
responsibilities to achieve successful out-
comes to complex problems should be given
all available means to enable success. Great
commanders have traditionally used recon-
naissance to disperse the fog of war to gain a
view of the enemy for timely decisionmaking
and actions. Intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance are some of the best tools
our ground commanders have in breaking
through that fog. JFQ
Employing ISR
SOF Best Practices

Special operations forces (SOF) victories in the war on terror have driven a transformation in the relationship between operations and intelligence. Today, intelligence is operations. Perhaps the most famous example was the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The airstrike that killed Zarqawi was only a fraction of the effort to find and accurately target him. The true operational art behind that strike was a multidisciplined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) endeavor coupled with agile SOF that patiently laid bare the Zarqawi network and resulted in a find-fix-finish operation. It took more than 600 hours of ISR to track and observe the network that yielded the target.

Airborne ISR was a critical and necessary piece, but it alone was not sufficient to target Zarqawi. Instead, it was focused and directed by a robust all-source intelligence network employing human intelligence (HUMINT), detainee intelligence, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). This collection and intelligence analysis was part of a network of personnel, systems, and mechanisms woven into the daily operations of and directed by a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The Zarqawi strike was merely the most publicized of hundreds of successful counternetwork operations that used the new combined arms team of operations and intelligence, which highlights surveillance and reconnaissance as its most effective tool.

The JSOTF tactics behind this new combined team deserve some scrutiny because they empower tactical-level operations for offensive irregular warfare (IW). This article discusses some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures based on the collective experience with JSOTFs engaged in counterinsurgency and counternetwork operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2004 to 2007. Some of the SOF best practices in using ISR may be applicable and valuable to conventional forces.

The SOF–ISR combination was effective because it unified operations and airborne collections with all other intelligence disciplines under a single commander. The JSOTF employed airborne ISR as an integral part of operations and clearly understood that


 Soldiers advise Iraqi special operations forces during combat operation in Baghdad
intelligence was the primary combat multiplier capability needed to fight the enemy. From this operational framework, some important lessons emerged when employing ISR:

- use the find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze targeting model
- synchronize ISR to all-source intelligence
- pass ISR (weight the main effort)
- conduct ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination as far forward deployed as possible
- emphasize exploitation and analysis
- unify organization.

Low-contrast Enemy

These lessons emerged from trial and error tempered by 6 years of constant contact with an enemy whose nature demanded new approaches. Today’s enemy is a low-contrast foe easily camouflaged among civilian clutter, unlike high-contrast targets such as airfields and warships. The insurgent’s primary strength has always been to hide in complex terrain such as mountainous or urban environments. The global communications revolution has given this insurgent a new complex terrain—an “electronic sanctuary”—in which actions can be hidden among the innumerable civilian signals that constitute daily cell phone and Internet traffic. It is from this new sanctuary that the enemy coordinates activities from dispersed networks in order to self-synchronize, pass information, and transfer funds. In this way, the insurgent has become “networked coalitions of the willing” that come together temporarily and are thus difficult to destroy. Drawing support from their networks, they remain low contrast until time to strike and then quickly blend back into the population.

Use F3EA

An aggressive targeting model known as find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) features massed, persistent ISR cued to a powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence apparatus in order to find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location (see figure). This precision geolocation enables surgical finish operations that emphasize speed to catch a fleeting target. The emphasis on the finish was not only to remove a combatant from the battlefield, but also to take an opportunity to gain more information on the globalized and networked foe. Exploit-analyze is the main effort of F3EA because it provides insight into the enemy network and offers new lines of operations. Exploit-analyze starts the cycle over again by providing leads, or start points, into the network that could be observed and tracked using airborne ISR. A finishing force unified with airborne ISR and an exploit-analyze capability is able to be persistent, surgical, and rapid in operations against the insurgent’s network. Airborne ISR became the pacing item for operations, but it had to be cued by the meticulous work of a robust, all-source, and collaborative intelligence network.

Synchronize ISR

Persistent and high-fidelity intelligence is the key to defeating a foe whose primary strength is denying U.S. forces a target. In contrast to major theater operations where the purpose is to find and destroy ships, tank formations, or infrastructure, the most difficult task in insurgencies is finding the enemy. Airborne ISR has become critical to this war because it offers persistent and low-visibility observation of the enemy as well as an ability to detect, identify, and track him in this low-contrast environment.

An all-source intelligence network must cue airborne ISR. The most effective airborne sensors are full-motion video (FMV) and SIGINT. However, when applied against the low-contrast enemy, these sensors must have a narrow field of view, and that means they are not effective as wide area search tools. As such, airborne ISR requires a start point provided by other sources. HUMINT and SIGINT are prolific providers of start points for airborne collection. The enemy is so well hidden that it takes multiple sources of intelligence to corroborate one another. SIGINT, for example, can locate a target but may not be able to discern who it is. FMV can track but not necessarily identify. HUMINT can provide intent but may not be able to fix a target to a precise location.

Use of Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze (F3EA)

However, these disciplines working together are able to focus the spotlight on low-contrast foes, so they can be captured or killed.

Airborne ISR’s effectiveness grows exponentially when it is cued to and driven by other sources of intelligence rather than operating alone. Without a robust, collaborative intelligence network to guide it, sensors are often used in reactive modes that negate their true power and tend to minimize their full potential. These intelligence disciplines provide...
a start point into the enemy network that can be exploited through persistent and patient observation. With this type of start point, one can mass ISR with confidence that assets are not being wasted.

**Mass ISR**

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are most effective against low-contrast enemies when massed. The insurgent’s ability to hide in plain sight demands persistent collection in order to detect his presence. Persistent collection requires long dwell times and must be focused using multiple sensors on discrete parts of the network in order to achieve the fidelity of information required for targeting.

**when the enemy is massed, ISR can be spread about; when the enemy is dispersed, ISR must be massed**

When the enemy is massed, detection is made simpler and ISR can be spread about; conversely, when the enemy is dispersed, detection potential is reduced and ISR must be massed to be effective.\(^6\)

Inherent in massing is rejecting the commonly held practice of “fair-sharing” ISR among multiple units. Massing implies focus and priority. Selected parts of the enemy’s network receive focus, which should be unwavering for a specified time. This is counterintuitive to those who feel the need to fair-share assets as a way to cover more space and service more priorities. The problem with a low-contrast and fleeting foe, however, is that enemy actions are not easily predictable. Without prediction, the next best things are redundancy and saturation. Piecemeal employment of ISR assets over a large geographic area theoretically allows for efficient targeting but often at the expense of effectiveness. Several tactics can be applied to improve ISR effectiveness against the insurgent.

The *Unblinking Eye* provides an opportunity to learn about the network in action and how it operates. It is long dwell, persistent surveillance directed against known and suspected terrorist sites or individuals. The purpose of this long dwell airborne stakeout is to apply multisensor observation 24/7 to achieve a greater understanding of how the enemy’s network operates by building a pattern of life analysis. This is an important concept and has proven itself time and again with hundreds of examples of successful raids.

**Nodal analysis** is spatially connecting relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life. While the enemy moves from point to point, airborne ISR tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between those sites and persons to the target are built, and nodes in the enemy’s low-contrast network emerge. Nodal analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure for things such as funding, meetings, headquarters, media outlets, and weapons supply points. As a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target. Nodal analysis uses the initial start point to generate additional start points that develop even more lines of operation into the enemy’s network. The payoff of this analysis is huge but requires patience to allow the network’s picture to develop over a long term and accept the accompanying risk of potentially losing the prey.

**Vehicle follow** is tracking vehicle movements from the air. These are important in illustrating the network and generating fix-finish operations. A recent Office of the Secretary of Defense study over a multimonth period found that vehicle follows were important to building pattern of life and nodal analysis.\(^7\) Vehicle follows were surprisingly central to understanding how a network functions. They are also among the most difficult airborne ISR operations to conduct and often require massing of assets to ensure adequate tracking.

Airborne ISR effectiveness increases by an order of magnitude when massed. A single combat air patrol (CAP) of ISR is defined as one platform 24/7 over a target. Use of three CAPs is generally the best practice for massing a target set during the fix and finish phase of the operation. This allows mass not only in space but also in time, which equates to persistence. It is not enough to have several eyes on a target—several eyes are needed on a target for a long period. Three CAPs permit persistent surveillance of a target while simultaneously developing the network’s pattern of life through nodal analysis and vehicle follows. It gives the finishing force commander more options than merely killing or letting an observed enemy go; with sufficient ISR, a ground force commander can demonstrate much greater operational patience, thus allowing a larger insurgent network to emerge.

Massing ISR in time and space has operational results that should not be ignored. The Office of the Secretary of Defense study concluded that massed and persistent collection was an important element of success in SOF operations.\(^8\) Conventional forces tend to cover disparate targets for a shorter period than SOF, which tend to focus collection on a smaller number of targets for much longer. The conventional force approach reveals a desire to service a large number of targets and units instead of developing the pattern of life of an enemy network. The tendency to think of persistence in terms of space rather than time
results in sprinkling assets in multiple areas rather than focusing them on a limited number of locations. This method attempts to support a large number of units, rather than a handful of units, with sufficient collections capability to be effective and operationally potent. This is a difficult paradigm shift to make, but in a scarce ISR environment some units may need to go without to ensure that a smaller number can be effective against the higher priority targets. The alternative is to make all units suboptimal.

**Conduct Forward PED**

A critical enabler in employing ISR was having forward processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) integrated into the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The Air Force has excelled at building state-of-the-art reachback PED nodes. But the speed and intuition required to cross-cue, target, plan, and react amidst multiple streams of intelligence and operations in a highly fluid battlespace require a forward PED presence able to interact in that environment. The reachback nodes simply do not have the situational awareness one gains by physically being forward with supported operations and other intelligence personnel. A certain balance between the efficiency of reachback and the effectiveness of being deployed can be attained by sending small “reach-forward” elements to orchestrate and integrate the overall PED effort. PED became critical and far more effective to fast-moving decisionmaking simply by being forward.

Forward PED became tightly integrated into the operations tempo. The JSOTF and its subordinate task forces dynamically retasked ISR assets as the operational situation developed in order to quickly react to the emergence of fleeting targets. The forward PED element was critical to this. These PED professionals directed the sensor following the target and as the situation changed would confer with operations personnel as to the best response. PED would rewind and review key events on the fly with operators to assess whether a trigger event had been met, while a reachback element kept eyes on the real-time video and communicated updates to the TOC. All the intelligence disciplines conferred and contributed their part to help the operator decide whether to conduct a raid, call an airstrike, bring in another collection asset, or continue to observe. The finishing force conducted real-time face-to-face consultation among operations, collections, and intelligence personnel to exploit opportunities.
to gain greater insight into the network. They have learned that gathering greater fidelity on the network is often more important than a short tactical gain. They allow the target to ripen—and when judgment dictates that they have observed enough, they strike. This flows into the exploitation phase and drives the next steps in the operational campaign against the network. Multiple targets may be struck at once and, in some cases, yield an abundance of highly useful information on the murky enemy. The JSOTF took care to exploit sites properly because they understood that the information derived during the exploit-analyze phase would lead to more targets.

Exploit and Analyze

F3EA differs from other targeting models because of its emphasis on exploit-analyze as the main effort. This recognizes the importance of intelligence in fighting the low-contrast foe and aggressively supplying multisource start points for new ISR collection. More than the other phases, this feeds the intelligence-operations cycle in which intelligence leads to operations that yield more intelligence leading to more operations. The JSOTF emphasis on raids is essential to gather intelligence on the enemy network; simply killing the enemy will not lead to greater effectiveness against their networks. In fact, capturing the enemy for purposes of interrogating is normally the preferred option. The bottom line of exploit-analyze is to gather information and rapidly turn it into operational action by applying it to defeat the enemy’s network.

Target exploitation and document exploitation are important law enforcement–type activities critical to F3EA. Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found on computers and cell phones, can provide clues that analysts need to evaluate enemy organizations, capabilities, and intentions. The enemy’s low-contrast network comes to light a little more clearly by reading his email, financial records, media, and servers. Target and document exploitation help build the picture of the enemy as a system of systems and as such enables counternetwork forces to attack it holistically.

Detainee intelligence is another law enforcement–like function crucial to revealing the enemy’s network. The ability to talk to insurgent leaders, facilitators, and financiers on how the organization functions offers insight on how to take that organization apart. In terms of analysis and developing targeting lines of operation, detainee intelligence is the key to the “slow, deliberate exploitation of leads and opportunities, person-to-person” that drive operations. Intelligence from detainees drives operations, yielding more detainees for additional exploitation and intelligence. A tight connection between interrogators and detainee analysts on one hand and all-source intelligence, collections, and operators on the other is critical to take advantage of raw information.

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Unify Organization

F3EA is best employed under a unity of organization to ensure speed of decision and speed of action. All elements required for success in F3EA were under the single direction of the JSOTF commander. A conscious effort was made to eliminate organizational seams between key functions that drive the F3EA process. Early in the war on terror, an intelligence organization may have led find and fix efforts but had to pass finish to a SOF unit. This represented an “organizational blink” where responsibility for actions on the target had to be passed across a seam to another organization. The time and spin-up required when that seam was crossed slowed the ability to finish the enemy. After the finish and site exploitation, interrogation and follow-on document or media exploitation were conducted by still other units, creating additional blinks in yielding timely intelligence that could be fed back into the targeting cycle. Analysis was another disparate effort, relying on skills and expertise that were mostly geographically dispersed, making face-to-face collaboration difficult. No matter how good the intelligence gain was, requesting support from multiple organizations for these different functions was neither timely nor did it provide the necessary agility.

The JSOTF created a unity of organization by bringing elements of the interagency community behind the F3EA functions into a common Joint Operations Center. The organizational imperative was simple: get the best people and bring them together face to face in a single location collaborating on a target set while orchestrating reachback support to their national offices. This effectively decentralized those national agencies, pushing the needed intelligence to the tactical level where it was most useful. These specialists collaborated and fused in a flattened environment where horizontal communication is favored over the vertical. Airborne ISR crews and operators worked closely with intelligence analysts while ISR PED personnel coordinated with interrogators, all in a fast-moving fused process facilitated by sharing the same physical space. As a result, a fleeting target was not passed around from one organization to another, but moved rapidly “in house” for full analytical, operational, and exploitation impact. The result was that a target could go from observation to action within minutes, providing the agility that counternetwork and counterinsurgency forces require.

Speed of decision was achieved because this unity of organization was under common direction and priority. The commander’s intent was the most important thing driving the intelligence and operations teams on focused common lines of operations that could change as the battlespace changed. This unity created an environment where decisions could be rapidly made, whether to retask ISR assets, conduct a raid, or switch focus based on a critical piece of HUMINT. The JSOTF’s F3EA process was therefore very rapid—its ability to decide and its authorities to act were flattened with no need to seek higher permissions, and this made it fast enough to be effective against the enemy. Unity of organization communicates intent, minimizes friction, drives focus and priority, enhances collaboration, and drives prioritized, persistent, and focused approaches to attack an enemy network. Without it, the agility of striking multiple targets per night or swiftly moving from the patient and methodical find to those moments of madness in fix and finish are beset by too much friction to be feasible.

Recommendations

Counternetwork operations as described here cannot win a counterinsurgency, but they can provide the space and time needed for wider stability operations to enable political solutions. The significance in these tactics is that they not only maintain a rapid operations tempo against the enemy, but also are designed to gather the maximum information possible on the enemy network. Armed with this information, the JSOTF turns up the gain on the low-contrast network and can smartly target
those important and low-redundancy nodes on which the enemy depends. Persistence, speed, and unity are required to be successful.

The tactics described here can be applied at the brigade combat team (BCT) level. National agencies have recognized the power of decentralizing their capabilities and putting them into the hands of those who most need them. Most agencies are pushing their reach-forward teams to the lowest level possible. Decentralized control of airborne ISR at the BCT level also makes sense for those who have the operations-intelligence synergy to accurately point airborne ISR and have the forces poised to take advantage of find and fix. This demands robust air planning and control capability at the brigade level.

Increasing airborne ISR and devolving control requires greater joint integration at lower levels. The brigade aviation element (BAE) provides organic 24-hour operational capability to plan and coordinate full-spectrum aviation operations (including unmanned aerial systems) throughout a BCT’s area of responsibility. It includes the capability for airspace control and tailored intelligence analysis. The Air Force Theater Air Control System (TACS) elements should be increased and linked to the BAE to facilitate planning and integrate control of these decentralized air assets. The new Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare, recognizes the need in some cases to “delegate some aspects of planning and decision making to subordinate Airmen positioned at lower levels within the TACS. … Increasing the role and authority of subordinate Airmen may provide more innovative and effective uses of Air Force capabilities.” Lower-level TACS should include forward PED elements employed and integrated wherever possible. ISR should be allocated more to BCTs that emphasize exploit-analyze, mass ISR, have robust planning and control capability, and weave these elements into a unity of effort that relentlessly drives lines of effort against the enemy network.

Airborne ISR, specifically FMV and SIGINT, is so essential to counterinsurgency and counternetwork operations that it is clear the Services are behind in providing adequate resources to deployed forces. Evidence from the last 6 years of combat operations combined with lessons learned, testimonials, and combat-ant command integrated priority lists should be more than enough evidence that our FMV and SIGINT fleet needs to grow by orders of magnitude. As Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lieutenant General David Deptula related in a speech last year, the “Department of Defense should aspire to put an end to the situation in which sensor systems and the means to interpret . . . are chronically low density/high demand assets.” A good starting point is to enable Air Force Special Operations Command to plan with a robust fleet of airborne ISR. Special Operations Command and the Theater Special Operations Commands alone require at least 30 orbits of dual sensor FMV/SIGINT to meet their war on terror commitments. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, these assets will prove invaluable in IW arenas where “through, by, with” concepts will require U.S. enablers to make host nation counterinsurgency effective. An IW ISR fleet could act as a testbed for new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that could be codified and proliferated throughout the Department of Defense and promote smarter and more precise operations against low-contrast opponents.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) should codify these lessons learned into multi-Service TTPs and force modules. Unit type codes (UTCs) are alphanumeric codes uniquely identifying each type unit of the Armed Forces and represent discrete capabilities that joint planners use as the building blocks for modular, repeatable, and scalable resources for contingency and crisis action plans. ISR UTCs, for example, typically include platforms, pilots, and mechanics. Force modules are groups of UTCs that are functionally aligned and are typically employed together. USJFCOM should craft IW force modules that feature three CAPs of ISR with requisite PED UTCs and combined with operations and intelligence UTCs. Employing a force module in this way will ensure ISR is synchronized with operations and integrated with an all-source intelligence network. Being organized this way for war will cause the units comprising this force module to train together and build habitual relationships among combined arms teams of operations, intelligence, and collections. Thus, it would ensure these best practices would continue from the start of the next campaign rather than having to be learned.

Airborne ISR is most effective when it is massed, synchronized with operations, integrated with all-source intelligence, and employed under a unity of organization. Driven by this analytical and operational imperative, airborne ISR becomes an offensive counternetwork tool that enables a rapid tempo of operations. Without this focus, ISR devolves into a defensive tool conducting “whack-a-mole” tactics. Unlocking airborne ISR’s true power involves employing this new combined arms team as a complete package to provide a more effective response to the type of enemy the war on terror might bring.

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8 Ibid.
17 Goodman, 20.
Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province

The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces

By THOMAS R. SEARLE

During a September 2007 visit to Anbar Province in western Iraq, President George W. Bush stated, “Anbar is a huge province. It was once written off as lost. It is now one of the safest places in Iraq.” The reason for this stunning turnabout was that Anbaris “who once fought side by side with al Qaeda against coalition troops are now fighting side by side with coalition troops against al Qaeda.”

The program that convinced the Anbaris to support the coalition and the Iraqi national government was called tribal engagement, one of the most successful U.S. programs implemented in Iraq. It has been so beneficial that it was extended to other provinces, and through the Concerned Local Citizens program, the same approach has spread to areas where tribal loyalties were weaker than in Anbar.

This article highlights the initial role of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in tribal engagement in Anbar Province and how both Army and Marine Corps forces adopted the engagement strategy and greatly expanded the security environment, altering the political landscape in Anbar and other Iraqi provinces. Conventional U.S. forces have been critical to the success of tribal engagement in Anbar. Indeed, from the start of the initiative, SOF worked in close coordination with the conventional forces that were the “battlespace owners.” Various non–Department of Defense agencies made major contributions to tribal engagement at critical moments. The government of Iraq played a vital role, but most important, the heroes of tribal engagement have been the Iraqi people. In the face of horrifying reprisals, Sunni tribesmen have joined their erstwhile enemies, the U.S. and coalition military, and stood up to the al Qaeda terrorists. Without the...
courage and determination of the tribesmen in Anbar Province, tribal engagement would not have succeeded.

**Initial Planning**

Tribes in Iraq are ancient social organizations that have survived because they have constantly evolved. Economic activity has also changed the tribe, and these changes impacted both the power dynamics within each tribe and intertribal relations. During Saddam's reign, the tribes along the Euphrates River in Anbar Province had a strong tribal structure. Unable to subvert these structures, Saddam's government and the Ba'ath party coexisted uneasily with them.

In spring 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam's regime, U.S. SOF made contact with some tribes in western Iraq, but the collapse of conventional resistance led to the redeployment of the bulk of SOF. The remaining forces were placed under a new headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSTF–AP), on May 1, 2003. As 2003 progressed, however, the ineffective conventional resistance gave way to a much more dangerous insurgency and an incipient terrorist resistance to the U.S. occupation. To meet this threat, additional SOF were alerted for redeployment to increase their presence across Iraq, including in Anbar Province. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), slated to arrive in Anbar in January 2004, began planning during the second half of 2003.

The SOF planners considered various indirect methods to defeat the insurgent groups, led by former regime members and foreign fighters who were starting to coalesce under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi and would later become known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The planners decided to engage Anbar tribes to gain access to the "human and geographic terrain" in the province and thereby deny that terrain to the insurgents and terrorists. In the words of one participant, this was a way to "dry up the lake so you can kill the piranha." SOF planners selected the tribes that Saddam had oppressed and marginalized as the best candidates for initial contact.

Saddam had oppressed these tribes and forced them out of most forms of legitimate commerce. They had to rely on smuggling and the black market to survive. After Saddam's fall, their smuggling networks brought foreign jihadists and weapons into Iraq, but the smuggling tribes were looking to make a profit, not to support religious fanaticism. With the right incentives, the SOF planners reasoned, these tribes would turn on the terrorists. The tribes and SOF teams, with coalition support, could then force the enemy out of the tribal areas. Planners also wanted each tribe to provide a small force to participate in coalition operations and, with training from the special operations teams, develop the capability to conduct unilateral counterterrorist and counterinsurgent operations.

The planners believed they could start small, and when the first few tribes began demonstrating improvements in security and prosperity, other tribes would want to join. This "model city" approach took time, but once it got rolling, the tribes realized they could improve their security and economic prospects by supporting the coalition. Any tribal leader who tolerated insurgent activity was brought into line by denying his tribe access to the economic benefits of supporting the coalition.

**Starting from Scratch**

In 2004, the mainstream Anbar tribes were sitting on the fence or leaning toward the insurgents and terrorists. The SOF teams modified their model city approach with some of the tribes. When they arrived in Anbar, SOF teams approached lower-level tribal sub-shiekhns and found out what they needed in terms of civil affairs (CA) projects. The SOF elements then "under"-promised and "over"-performed on those projects, building trust and respect. Over time, these projects increased the prestige and authority of the sub-shiekhns, thereby undermining the sheikhs above them. The top tribal leaders then realized that it was in their and their tribes' best interests to ask SOF troops for CA projects. This indirect approach took more time than approaching a top sheikh directly, but was more effective because the senior sheikh asked for a meeting with the team rather than the other way around.

Engaging the tribes was not easy in early 2004. The SOF troops ruled out trying to win "hearts and minds" by simply doing nice things for the tribes because the tribes did what was in their long-term best interest. Influencing the tribes meant earning trust and respect through commitment and continuity. At that point, the United States had not yet pursued the strategy of continuity and commitment in Anbar and, accordingly, had not earned much trust or respect there. The SOF troops largely started from scratch.4

On the ground in Anbar, SOF teams soon learned that by managing the CA projects, they were in effect becoming sheikhs, as Iraqi civilians came to them with their problems. Not wanting to assume responsibility for the tribal social and political structures, SOF teams shifted their approach and publicly gave the resources to local sheikhs. In doing so, the teams lost some control over how the resources were used and accepted that some sheikhs would enrich themselves. Because of their cultural awareness, SOF personnel understood the way Iraqi society worked and made use of the

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tribal customs to advance tribal engagement. Empowering the sheikhs had the substantial benefit of reinforcing both the sheikh’s authority and indigenous Iraqi social structures that could be maintained indefinitely. While the sheikh was responsible for running the programs, the SOF teams focused on building indigenous security forces, targeting terrorists and insurgents, and expanding the tribal engagement networks.

The special operators had to be skillful purveyors of “carrots and sticks” to win over the sheikhs. The rewards and punishments ranged from a commitment to reinforce the sheikhs’ forces in the event of an al Qaeda attack, to denying CA support to an uncooperative sheikh, to public gestures of respect and indications of American support. The SOF teams arrived with strong cultural understanding but had to develop the detailed local knowledge necessary to determine whom to influence and how. The teams needed the authority to provide the precise carrot or stick the situation required.

Gaining detailed situational awareness was difficult. Although the tribes are some of the oldest and most stable elements in Iraqi society, they are still dynamic and always evolving. The U.S. invasion, fall of Saddam’s regime, influx of foreign terrorists, and continuing violence all increased the pace of change in Iraq.

The information gap between predeployment intelligence and ground truth had to be bridged. The SOF teams used the individuals and tribes whom they were already in contact with to arrange meetings with other tribal elders. In this manner, SOF expanded the network of people they were engaged with and the area of which they had detailed local knowledge.

Early 2004 was a difficult time in Anbar Province, particularly after four Blackwater contractors were killed in Fallujah in April and their bodies were hanged from a bridge and shown on television around the world. The U.S. Marines, who owned the battlespace in Anbar Province, had arrived with a strong appreciation for the potential benefits of engaging the tribes. The heavy fighting in and around Fallujah and Ramadi occupied the bulk of the Marines’ effort, but they encouraged and supported the SOF tribal engagement efforts. For example, the Marines reinforced each SOF team with 10 or 12 troops, nearly doubling the size of the teams and increasing what each team could do. Additionally, Marine Corps generals met often with tribal leaders brought in by the SOF teams. These meetings significantly enhanced the perceived (and thus real) authority of the tribal leaders and the SOF teams that worked with them.

In addition to the high level of enemy activity in Anbar Province in 2004, after the transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government in late June, U.S. commanders could no longer use Commanders’ Emer-
was that the Desert Protectors would bridge the gap between the government’s forces and tribal militias by creating a government-sanctioned tribal force. The Desert Protectors would provide local intelligence and additional troops to U.S. and Iraqi forces and would help break the cycle of violence between the tribes and the U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Starting around Al Qaim, the Desert Protectors had a rocky beginning, but once it got started, other tribes joined. The program grew to hundreds of troops from several tribes. In November 2005, elements of the Marine 2d Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and Army human intelligence personnel, supported by the Desert Protector forces, conducted a 2-week sweep along the Euphrates River in Anbar. Local cooperation helped apprehend 800 suspected insurgents.

MNC–I and the government later decided to turn the Desert Protectors into scout platoons in the Iraqi army. The tribesmen, however, wanted to serve closer to home and secure their families and villages, and many quit rather than join an army unit that was available for operations anywhere in Iraq. At the very least, the Desert Protectors may have looked like a failure because they seemed to quit rather than transition into the army as planned. In the fall of 2005, an unnamed U.S. officer in Iraq told Inside the Pentagon, “The issue is getting [tribal forces] to fight insurgents outside their tribal area. . . . So far, the tribal engagement strategy from a military standpoint has not [done] what it was advertised [to do].”

This anonymous critic missed the point of tribal engagement, but did identify a key challenge: how to measure its effectiveness. Some felt that tribal engagement was just a way to generate more kinetic strikes and that the measure of success was the number of offensive tactical raids conducted by tribal forces outside their home areas. But tribal engagement was a type of indirect, irregular warfare, important at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic, and a better measure of effectiveness was the improvement in security within the tribes’ areas of influence.

Since 2004, U.S. SOF and conventional forces have trained and worked with tribal forces to build capacity and capabilities. Although the tribal forces’ tactical offensive strikes received much attention, the real power of tribal engagement, and the subsequent Concerned Local Citizens program, was creating local security forces that could, with backup from U.S. and Iraqi forces, defend their local areas against AQI. Their security activities had decisive operational and strategic effects by driving the terrorists and insurgents out of safe havens in Anbar Province. The former Desert Protectors, who returned home, did just that when many joined the local police and continued to enhance local security, though not as part of the army. The tribes best influenced events outside their home areas by setting an example of success that other tribes would want to emulate.

Another measure of success in 2005 was that some tribes started to police themselves. This was an important change from 2004 when tribes would only pass along intelligence and conduct operations against other tribes. The effect was noticeable to the SOF teams because they were working with the same tribal leaders again.

Gaining Momentum

The SOF and conventional forces’ successes with tribal engagement in 2004 and 2005 gained even more momentum in 2006. During 2007, tribal engagement enabled the coalition to drive AQI out of the province by increasing security and prosperity of the tribes that had joined the program earlier, and the publicity given to the tribal engagement program played crucial roles in this turnaround. There were also successful U.S. conventional operations that convinced tribes to abandon AQI and assist the coalition in the fight against the terrorists.

To the tribes in Anbar Province, AQI may have originally appeared to be a valuable ally against the U.S. occupation, but as it gained strength, it imposed its will on the local community. After arriving in Anbar, these terrorists stressed their support of the local tribes in their fight against U.S. forces, but they soon attempted to take control of tribal areas and inflicted their own radical occupation on the tribal people. The organization imposed an extreme Islamic fundamentalism that in time alienated the local populations.4 AQI also forced the tribes to provide local women as wives for the terrorists, and their foreign fighters were often disrespectful toward the sheikhs and murdered those who resisted.6 Their extreme brutality intimidated the population in the short run and created an inevitable backlash. The AQI regime crippled the local economy. The sheikhs saw that the terrorists were trying to destroy the tribal system and their own authority and to replace them with a pan-Islamic fundamentalist theocracy.

Confronted with a brutal AQI occupation, the tribal sheikhs had ample reasons to look for alternatives. By 2006, the U.S. and Iraqi government policy toward the tribes was more sympathetic.10 In late 2005 and early 2006, U.S. conventional forces improved their counterinsurgency operations in several ways. The U.S. military leadership pushed more of their own forces into Anbar Province, which made the coalition more of a viable long-term force that could win against AQI. More important, coalition forces put increased emphasis on providing security for civilians. For example, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, with interagency support, secured cooperation of tribal sheikhs to recruit local police for Ramadi. With the tribes’ overt support, the police force grew from fewer than 200 to 5,000 and was critical to breaking AQI’s hold on the city. Likewise, in July 2006, SOF and the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, combined to carry out the first successful police recruiting drive in the Anbar city of Hit; 150 tribesmen joined the local force as a result.

U.S. conventional and Iraqi forces also fanned out to small outposts in populated areas, where they maintained a presence and backed up the local police. The combination of U.S. military prowess and Iraqi familiarity and ties to the province made them a better long-term bet for the tribes than AQI. Accordingly, support for AQI faded in the province.11

Another major contribution of the conventional forces was engaging tribal leaders outside Iraq. Many large tribes extended into neighboring countries, and when violence rose, some top tribal leaders left Iraq. The SOF elements in Iraq lacked the rank to get the attention of these leaders, but general and flag officers from Multi-National Force–West, MNC–I, and Multi-National Forces–Iraq played critical roles by meeting with key tribal leaders outside Iraq.12

Tribal engagement was also challenging from a public affairs and information operations standpoint. To enlist tribes, the tribal engagement program needed to be well publicized. However, any publicity immediately made the tribes that joined, and the sheikhs...
who led them, high priority targets for AQI. Once Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha decided to support the United States and the Iraqi government, he was tireless in promoting his new cause. He convinced many other sheikhs to side with them as well and gained much publicity for the program. AQI eventually assassinated him, but not before he had substantially strengthened the tribal engagement program.

As tribal engagement gathered momentum and conventional forces in Anbar Province took the lead, SOF shifted to a “connect-the-dots” role of working the seams and pulling together the many local tribal engagement activities across Anbar and in neighboring provinces. To do this, the SOF presence in western Iraq was increased by adding a Naval Special Warfare Task Group of SEALs. The CJSOTF–AP commander drew the boundaries between his elements so that they overlapped the boundaries between conventional forces in order to meet the challenge of closing the seams between conventional forces. This put SOF teams in a position to identify and address enemy efforts to find and exploit the boundaries between conventional forces. Though the new police forces can remain. In late 2007, for instance, the province since 9/11. While tribal engagement may seem like an approach that will only work in a society that still has strong tribal and clan social structures, it is really just an example of the broader concept of societal engagement. Special operations forces are typically among the smaller elements in any given operational area, and as such, they have a particularly acute need to understand their operational environment, including the civilian society.

The basic premise of special operations societal engagement is to accomplish special operations missions (in this case, defeating the terrorists) by engaging the existing social structure (in this case, tribes). The cultural knowledge, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare training that special operations forces bring to the fight make them particularly well suited to perform tribal engagement (and societal engagement more generally), but other U.S. military forces and the broader interagency community have been essential to the success in this area in the past and will continue to be effective, not only in Iraq but also across the war on terror. JFQ

6 Eisenstadt, 28–29.
12 Fadel.
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The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition

The United States is currently embroiled in a difficult situation in Iraq. One key to success will be an effective transition from U.S.-led security force operations to operations planned, led, and executed by Iraqi security forces. Significant gains have been made in the transition, but aviation and aviation support functions have not been properly addressed. This has led to an imbalance in joint military capability that threatens future Iraqi security and leads to undesired risk to Americans.

U.S. security forces in Iraq currently operate jointly, which includes ground forces, aviation and aviation support forces, logistics forces, and command and control forces. While the ground force transition is moving forward at a measured pace, too little is being done to train and transition aviation and aviation support assets to keep pace with the ground transition. The continued reliance on American aviation functions in support of the Iraqi ground force transition will lead to an Iraqi

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ground force trained and conditioned to integrate aviation into their operational construct but completely reliant on American aviation to support that requirement.

This article identifies the strategic environment that predicates a balanced and time-sensitive joint security force transition. It highlights the imperatives for synchronizing various aviation-related functions with the progress of the ground force transition. It also explores the time, training, and equipment challenges of building a relevant aviation enabler for ground forces. Finally, it provides recommendations for synchronizing the Iraqi aviation force transition in critical areas.

Security Transition Strategy and Policy

Some may argue that the initial planning for postconflict security and stabilization in Iraq was poor. Clearly, more could have been done at the strategy and policy level of the U.S. Government to provide a better plan and more assets to transition. Nevertheless, the President and his policy advisors sought to correct that mistake in 2005 by publishing the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. One objective of this strategy is "to develop the Iraqis' capacity to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat terrorists and neutralize the insurgency." Among the expectations is "that our force posture will change over the next year" and that:

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\text{as the political process consolidates and as Iraqi Security Forces grow and gain experience . . . as Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles in most areas . . . [and] while our military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may gather and organize.}
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The national strategy also defines numerous metrics that have been frequently addressed. Specifically, those measures that receive the greatest attention are "the quantity and quality of Iraqi units . . . the percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis alone or with minor Coalition assistance . . . and offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and Coalition forces."

The Iraqi National Security Strategy for 2007 to 2010—a policy document released by the Republic of Iraq—supports the same security objectives as the President's strategy. Some highlights include "Iraq's Joint Forces [focusing] on defeating terrorism and insurgency as their primary mission . . . and Iraq's Joint Forces [achieving] self-reliance such that only minimal external assistance and support are needed for accomplishing the primary mission." Critical aspects identified by the Iraqi strategy are that all Iraqi army divisions must eventually come under the control of the Iraqi government and that part of that self-reliance includes assuming full responsibility for support functions such as "supply stocks, fire support capabilities and the Air Force."

From both nations' strategic documents, it is clear that there is a requirement for eventual transition from an American-led security apparatus to an Iraqi-led one. Both strategies specifically identify security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency as the most important short-term priorities. Both indicate that there will be a certain reliance on specific aspects of coalition power prior to a complete transition to Iraqi security forces. Unfortunately, both are vague on what will constitute reasonable measures. One says "with minor coalition assistance" and the other says "only minimal external assistance and support are needed." This vagueness contributes to the imbalance between the ground forces and the aviation support they receive by providing both nations an excuse to defer the aviation transition to a later time.

Analysis of the Imbalance

Transitioning security responsibility in Iraq is clearly driven by policy that has recently gained urgency at the American national political level. This has led to increased pressure on the operational commanders in Iraq to complete the transition as effectively as possible under the shortest timeline. Since 2005, transition efforts—led by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)—have been broad-based and generally effective. Accounts abound in the press and congressional testimony about the effectiveness of individual Iraqi battalions, brigades, and in some cases divisions.
Published figures indicate growing numbers of Iraqi ground forces (along with the associated battlespace) being taken over and controlled by Iraqi commanders. American teams work at the battalion level and below on a direct and personal basis to train and assist the Iraqi ground forces in assuming responsibility. Unfortunately, while a ground formation controlling its own territory and operations is an important measure of success, it ignores the need for a fully balanced joint force capable of self-reliance. The level of effort given to transitioning Iraqi aviation support—and the ability of the ground forces to leverage aviation support in their counterterror and counterinsurgency fight—have not kept pace.

When measuring joint security forces, ground formations receive priority attention. By the very nature of the task, large numbers of people are needed to operate an effective security force. Division-strength formations require the training and equipping of tens of thousands of people. Once the individuals have been identified, however, they can be trained relatively quickly. Additionally, compared to aviation units, they require less technical and lower-cost equipment. Vast amounts of assets and time are being put toward the issue, resulting in training teams or advisors being assigned down to the lowest levels of the ground formations. Training has been consistent with strategic guidance that focuses the joint Iraqi security forces on security, counterterror, and counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi ability to operate on its own receives much of the attention. Taking nothing away from the huge success of these formations of brave Iraqis, those ground forces are operating “independently” while relying—with rare exceptions—on aviation support that has been planned, coordinated, and controlled by and through American Servicemembers.

The vast majority of aviation airspace control, fire support coordination, terminal attack control, logistics, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is conducted and controlled by specially trained American troops. The Iraqis’ ability to execute these functions is not improving at a pace that would allow successful integration. In stark contrast to ground force training, aviation functions generally require money, technologically advanced equipment, and advanced understanding of specific skill sets not often found in developing countries. Aviation success therefore tends to be measured by the number of “things” in the form of radars, airplanes, and communications equipment. People capable of executing aviation support functions are hard to come by, and the training is costly and time consuming.

Transitioning aviation support for security operations thus becomes a difficult task. That task was admittedly put on a back burner with a vague recognition that it would take time and come later in the game. This approach appears to have provided an excuse to delay what would be a costly and demanding task—with the caveat that American aviation support will be needed past the time when Iraqi ground forces are postured for independent operations. This overextended delay has created an imbalance. While there has been some growth in a small Iraqi air force, the actual amount of people, equipment, and training has been minuscule in comparison to the ground force of the new Iraqi joint force.

As of August 2007, for instance, there were 359,700 ground troops who were trained in Iraq compared to 900 Iraqi air force personnel. The air force operates a handful of small fixed-wing aircraft for ISR and C–130 cargo planes for logistics, and it is receiving 16 Huey helicopters for logistics and troop movement—totaling 45 aircraft in the Iraqi inventory. By comparison, the U.S. Marine Corps, engaged in what has been identified as a “supporting effort” in Anbar Province, operates nearly six full helicopter squadrons, three full jet squadrons, one C–130 squadron, and a full maintenance and command and control system. The Marine aviation contribution supports one division and totals approximately 4,500 Marines and over 130 aircraft. This is a rather large aviation element for only a portion of Iraq—and rather small in comparison to what the other Services add to the theater’s aviation support function. Nine hundred Iraqi air force members and a handful of aircraft pale in comparison.

Successful ground forces ultimately rely on a broad spectrum of aviation support to enable the joint security force operations envisioned by both U.S. and Iraqi policy expectations. The aviation training has not happened. Soon, the chasm between independently operating Iraqi ground forces and a responsive Iraqi aviation support system will grow so wide that a self-reliant joint security force will not be a realistic expectation. This imbalance is due in part to a failure to integrate joint planning, training, and execution into the mantra of the transition—relying on stove-piped development of ground forces separate from aviation forces. This has resulted in half of the equation—aviation—relying heavily on American support and capabilities.

Successful security, counterterror, and counterinsurgency operations require a joint force with responsive capabilities capable of leveraging available assets, quick to communicate changing environments, and certain of conditions on the ground. When successful, aviation support is seamlessly tied to the needs, expectations, and requirements of the ground.
force. In order to enable security operations, aviation support needs to understand what information may be required of a ground commander and how to get it to him. In addition, aviation support must be deconflicted to ensure safety and security of the aviation force, while providing flexible support to the ground force.

While an aviation force that is enabling operations has a responsibility to support the ground force, the ground force has a responsibility to meet a specific level of knowledge and proficiency in using that aviation support. In other words, both sides must come together to increase the synergistic effects of the joint capabilities of the force. The U.S. model for aviation support of joint operations is effective. Ironically, it is not being followed in the transition in Iraq. American advisors are making a huge mistake by managing the responsibility for communicating and controlling the radios used to leverage aviation support. It is past time to force the system to function with Iraqi voices on the radios. Will this initially lead to frustration, confusion, and wasted time? Yes—just like when young lieutenants and sergeants are taught to struggle through similar problems. All involved must realize there will be difficulties in the beginning, and American trainers must stand ready to take back the airwaves if a situation becomes too dangerous. However, the need to relinquish some of that control is necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Without increasing the communication skills of Iraqi ground forces, there will not be a balanced aviation transition.

Aviation-delivered Fires. Based on the current imbalance in transition, an American aviator could eventually deliver fires for an Iraqi commander with no American on the ground to oversee or control the fires. Under what guidance and authority will the American aviator deliver his ordnance? If we are not working toward defining rules of engagement, risks and mitigation, and the effects of improper fires execution with our Iraqi counterparts, we could put Americans at risk and in situations that may result in a negative strategic impact.

In another scenario, in the absence of trained Iraqi controllers, an American terminal attack controller could eventually work for an independent Iraqi ground commander, executing that commander’s desires for fire

Recommendations

There will be a lag between ground force capability for independent operations and aviation force capability to operate and support those ground forces. That lag time, however, is critical. It cannot be wasted waiting for aircraft to be built, systems to be produced, or aviators to be trained. The period must be focused on deliberate functional planning and training at the ground force level and within the immature aviation support arena. American advisors must look at their transition training programs and pursue a more holistic approach based on existing models. It is not good enough that Iraqi squadrons are slowly standing up and executing occasional logistics and surveillance missions. This represents part of the requirement but simply misses the larger capability needed to attain mission success as demonstrated by aviation assets enabling current security, counterterror, and counterinsurgency operations. Greater attention must be focused on developing skills in communications, aviation-delivered fires, airspace management, and formal training.

Communications. Not enough emphasis is being placed on communications skills and equipment. By this stage in the ground force transition, purchasing, distributing, and training with communications equipment should have been as high a priority as purchasing, distributing, and training with weapons; communications skills and equipment knowledge are as critical as integrating strategic and using individual weapons. In a counterterror or counterinsurgency fight, aviation assets become critical eyes and ears for the commanders in the field, as well as a critical link for medical evacuation, logistics, and fires. Without the skill sets and equipment to coordinate and communicate via sophisticated equipment, there is no way a ground commander can leverage the aviation enabler. This aspect of transition is not being executed. Instead, the American team members supporting Iraqi ground forces are communicating with, coordinating, and directing aviation assets. In order for there to be an independently operating ground force, they must be able to communicate and coordinate with their support. In light of both nations’
support with no American in the process to approve targeting, rules of engagement, or risk. This could lead to strategically impacting perceptions that an American is involved in delivering fires in ways that conflict with American policy.

Fires are some of the most challenging combat enablers that aviation assets provide. Aviation-delivered fires are also a huge combat multiplier. Anything that has a major impact on a battlefield also comes with considerable risks if done improperly. This risk is magnified in an urban environment or in a counterinsurgency or counterterror role.

Current Iraqi air force structure is not designed to support ground formations in fires delivered from the air. There was a deliberate decision made “not to equip the Iraqi Air Force with fixed-wing jet fighter or attack (bomber) aircraft. In fact, [MNSTC–I] considers the assets unnecessary and incapable of influencing the counterinsurgency fight”25 This is an interesting conclusion since so many American attack aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopter, are committed to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. Current operations prove the need for the Iraqis to pursue a limited attack aircraft capability.

Assuming the utility of attack aircraft in a counterinsurgency, American doctrine and procedures indicate that it takes years to become proficient in the execution of aviation-delivered fires, particularly those used to counter an insurgent or terror threat. This implies that Americans will be executing the mission for a considerable time.

Americans continue to coordinate and control the delivery of aviation fires even when these fires are in direct support of Iraqi ground forces. Specific American ground force members train for months prior to coming into theater in order to be joint qualified enough to control the delivery of aviation fires. Part of the Iraqi ground force transition to independent operations must include the control and coordination of aviation-delivered fire.

Moreover, time must be spent at the designated training areas, with Iraqi ground force members controlling American aviation assets when these fires are delivered. This would provide much-needed proficiency training for American aviation units in theater and familiarize them with the Iraqi forces they are supporting. American controllers qualified as terminal attack controllers could supervise and train Iraqi ground forces, allowing the Americans to maintain proficiency in the perishable skills of controlling aviation fires. Most importantly, through a deliberate training program modeled after American military schools, Iraqis would be formally trained and qualified to control aviation fires and take one more step toward true independent operations. This type of training should be integrated up the chain of command to introduce and refine the deconfliction of fires, target approval and coordination, battle damage assessment determination, and rules of engagement training.

**Airspace Management.** Deconfliction of airspace is vital to aviation operations. There are many layers to this task, which begins at the highest levels of air tasking, order development, and targeting, and ends with the individual controllers who communicate with and control aircraft that pass through their assigned airspace. While there is occasional reference to the eventual need for Iraqi control and deconfliction of airspace, not enough action is being taken to ensure that capability once the Iraqi air force is ready to assume the role as an independent force. This function requires a
depth of technical knowledge in procedures and equipment that can only come with time and training.

At this point in the transition process, there should be future Iraqi command and control specialists sitting side by side with their American counterparts. These specialists should be completing on-the-job training while observing the process that plans for future aviation needs, puts the orders together to get aviation assets to end users, and then ensures each aircraft launches, flies to, executes, and returns to its airfield under the desired control and with the proper deconfliction. Again, American and Iraqi aircraft should be hearing Iraqi voices on the other end of the radio providing them direction. As with everything else, this would be under the direct supervision of a trained and experienced aviation command and control specialist. Without embedded Iraqi command and control specialists working in American aviation command and control centers, there will not be a balanced transition when the Iraqis assume the aviation role.

**Formal Training Development.** Aviation training and development go well beyond buying a few airplanes and teaching people how to fly and fix them. Creating an effective member of a joint force requires detailed development and training that take months or even years.

The Iraqi air force may not be mature enough to assume the roles and missions expected of a robust joint aviation force, and this is recognized in both nations’ policy documents. However, the conditions and people exist in theater to do much more to ensure those combat-enabling functions associated with aviation support are being developed in a more balanced way. Training and development must be occurring now, particularly in those areas that connect a ground force to the aviation force.

Command and control and fires are two functional areas that have available American resources in theater to begin developing the baseline skills needed for transition in the future. Transitioning aviation support for a joint Iraqi security force must include all facets involved in aviation integration and not only training pilots, maintainers, and airfield operators. The focus has to be on developing a professional cadre of aviation specialists. Developing formal training systems designed to sustain a force and provide for systematic and documented professional development can do this. No better time exists to formalize and execute the needed training, whether at the lowest level of joint terminal attack controllers or at the staff level of air tasking order and air space coordination order development. The models exist, the training templates are there, and the experts are in the theater right now.29

Some may argue that there is not an imbalance in the security force transition. They may point to documentation that indicates that deliberate decisions have established priorities that did not include the requirements identified herein. Deliberately prioritized or not, there is an undeniable lag in transitioning the aviation force in Iraq. Pressure to complete the transition continues to grow. Based on current political pressure for Americans to leave Iraq and the training time required to prepare aviation enablers, it does not appear that the aviation transition is where it needs to be when the United States is eventually forced to turn over responsibility.

Understandably, a lag will exist between the point when Iraqi ground forces are capable of independent operations and the time that Iraqi aviation forces are capable of conducting independent operations. Current practices, however, are not adequate to ensure a proper balance between the transitions of both forces. If not corrected, this imbalance has the potential for severe consequences. **JFQ**

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**NOTES**

3 *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, 4 ibid., 8.
4 ibid., 12.
5 ibid., 12–13.
6 ibid., 8–13.
8 ibid., 26–27.
10 Iraq First, 25.
13 ibid., 30–40.
14 Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 72. This assessment was observed first hand when the author was an aviator during four separate flying tours in Iraq beginning at the start of combat operations and ending in May 2007. His last two tours were as a squadron commander in Anbar Province.
16 Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 72.
17 U.S. House of Representatives, 96–98.
19 Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 72.
21 Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 72.
22 After over 800 hours of combat flying, much in direct support of Iraqi ground forces or police, the author has not once passed information directly to an Iraqi on a radio or been able to communicate immediate intelligence directly to a tactical Iraqi formation maneuvering on the ground.
24 U.S. House of Representatives, 98.
The Influence of Just War Perspectives
Implications for U.S. Central Command

By TYLE R RAUERT

Three quarters of the miseries and misunderstandings in the world would finish if people were to put on the shoes of their adversaries and understood their points of view.

—Mahatma Gandhi

Is terrorism a legitimate method of warfare? Can deliberate attacks on civilians intended to further a just cause ever be justifiable? Can they be morally permissible? Morally required? How else can the weak possibly defeat the strong? These are vital questions to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)—not because of the way the combatant command might answer them but because of the reply they often receive within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

While state actions that intentionally target civilians for violence are almost universally condemned, no corresponding international consensus exists on how to deal with nonstate actors that do the same. Some consider such deeds as crimes, others see them as illegitimate acts of war, and still others view them as necessary and justifiable efforts to repel aggression or occupation. The last perspective is particularly prevalent in the Muslim-majority countries of the Near East where groups such as Hizballah and Hamas,1 widely condemned as terrorist organizations in the West, enjoy considerable popular support as legitimate resistance movements.

What does this difference of opinion on the legitimacy of violence against civilians mean for counterterrorism cooperation
with the United States from the nations of the Middle East and Central Asia? Will cooperation be half-hearted and only grudgingly offered under political pressure? Is where one stands on the issue simply a function of where one sits politically? Not necessarily.

While “fundamentalist” interpretations exist on all sides, there are still shared tenets on the resort to force and the conduct of hostilities that can serve as the foundation on which to build effective counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and the nations of the Near East.

This work first examines the importance of consensus-building to international cooperation. It then draws out how divergent perspectives on shared principles may inhibit international efforts to confront violent non-state actors, including the struggle to combat terrorism. Finally, it suggests methods for USCENTCOM to bridge this gap and increase the effectiveness of counterterrorism cooperation between America and the nations of the region.

International Cooperation

The nature of the international system means that the effectiveness of cooperation on any issue is largely a function of the level of agreement on the norms underpinning it. The customary principles governing conflict between states, for example, are widely followed not only because they are codified in treaties and international conventions, but also because they make practical sense as self-imposed restraints on the use of force. They especially make sense when the use of force is designed to facilitate a return to peace while minimizing losses on all sides without impeding the goals of hostilities. The savagery of war is not reduced by international humanitarian law, but by the voluntary compliance that results from acceptance of the norms that underpin it. The law acts as a guide to implement this basic agreement on the practical necessity to limit violence during warfare and how to do it.

Similarly, today’s threat of global terrorism is such that no international effort to combat it will be effective without the voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation of the peoples of the Middle East and Central Asia.

Shared Principles, Divergent Foci

A basic agreement on the norms that underpin limitations on state-to-state violence allows international humanitarian law to guide state practice in warfare. At the same time, the tolerance and even encouragement of violence by movements such as Hamas and Hizballah, which intentionally target noncombatants, demonstrate a genuine disagreement over such norms by nonstate actors. This incongruity makes the intrinsically motivated cooperation so necessary for states to combat terrorism unattainable. The source of this divergence can be found in the Just War traditions as they developed in the broader Middle East and in the West.

While a historical survey of Just War traditions is beyond the scope of this article, it is worthwhile to note that “every civilization has tried to impose limits on violence, including the institutionalized form of violence we call war. After all, the limitation of violence is the very essence of civilization.” These limits usually include norms regulating the resort to force, the jus ad bellum in the Western tradition, as well as the conduct of hostilities once the use of force is initiated, the jus in bello. An examination of the particular limits on violence in the two traditions is less important here than an understanding of how the two regions approach these limits.

Use of Force in the Broader Middle East.

The Western perception of Just War in the Muslim world is multifaceted. While “most Muslims would agree that international norms of behavior in wartime conform to Islamic injunctions on humane behavior toward the enemy,” and while efforts within the state system to shift international norms closer to regional understandings have at times proven successful, anticolonial sentiments color modern thinking on the just recourse to force and the conduct of hostilities. Whether framed in terms of nationalist arguments or an Islamic idiom, anti-imperialist sentiments predominate in modern discourse on war and peace throughout the broader Middle East. The “Third World context” of much of the Muslim world, where colonial subjugation is bitterly resented, retains echoes of fear of foreign domination. Some even argue that “the fundamentalist attack on Western values is . . . the Muslim version of the attack on ‘neoimperialism’ that characterizes many Third World polemics against the current international order.”

This pervasive anticolonial sentiment has a significant effect on Just War thought in the region that often blends national liberation perspectives with those of Islam. While the majority of medieval writers in the region focused on legitimate means in warfare, modern writers concentrate on the just recourse to force, particularly the justice of the cause, with comparatively little attention to the legitimate conduct of hostilities. “Contemporary discussions of jihad,” for example, “now often assert that wars are justified in Islamic law when they are conducted to end exploitation and oppression by the superpowers or to achieve liberation from the forces of...
imperialism.” The logic holds that if a cause is just, any method necessary to further that cause is also just, especially if the partisans of the just cause operate from a point of comparative military weakness, thus eliminating the need to address considerations of the legitimate means of warfare.

Emphasis on the justice of the cause, as in the Reformation wars of Europe, to the exclusion of the means by which the cause can be justly pursued, ignores the fact that unspeakable atrocities may be carried out in the name of an otherwise worthy end. In the absence of fully developed norms on the limitations on conducting hostilities, support for groups that pursue just causes unjustly will continue to flourish in the Middle East and Central Asia, thus limiting the ability of regional and Western governments to combat terrorism.

Use of Force in Western Nations. While there is a strong emphasis on the justice of the conflict in the Near East, the Western conception of modern Just War theory tends to see conduct in a war as independent of the justice of a war. This perspective, influenced by the post–World War II creation of the United Nations and the decolonization process that followed, seeks to “civilize” just and unjust wars alike by asserting that norms governing the conduct of hostilities are applicable whenever a situation reaches a certain threshold of active belligerency. The underlying causes of the conflict are seen to have no bearing on its proper conduct, and therefore most Western thought on political violence is disproportionately focused on the prosecution of conflict over the legitimacy of conflict initiation.

One might argue that the preponderance of Western thought on Just War during the past century is a refinement and institutionalization of the limitations on the conduct of hostilities within international humanitarian law. While a focus solely on the legitimacy of the recourse to force can lead to an acceptance of terrible atrocities in the name of a just cause, a focus on the just prosecution of conflict to the exclusion of meaningful reflection on the just initiation of violence carries unintentional but nonetheless significant undertones of neoimperialism. Restraints on the conduct of violence seem designed to disarm the weak and entrench the injustice of the strong when they are not accompanied by equally stringent limitations on the prior condition of the just recourse to force.

The limited analysis of constraints on recourse to force that does occur in the West smacks of colonialism to many. Arguments for the legality of humanitarian intervention and preemptive/preventative war can both be seen, rightly or wrongly, as pretexts for the militarily strong to impose their will on the weak. Moreover, the claim that the recourse to force is only justified in self-defense or with Security Council authorization is simply insufficient when it comes to nonstate actors whose causes are widely seen as just within a given population. Many would argue that violent resistance against colonialism or occupation, however broadly those terms are defined, is the paradigmatic Just War—it is self-defense by definition. Others see the UN Security Council not as a tool to bring legitimacy to international collective action but as simply another way for the strong to exercise dominion.

Westerners must ask themselves whether the just recourse to force has been subordinated in practice to the conduct of hostilities. In the zeal to ensure that all belligerents abide by the limitations on the conduct of hostilities regardless of the justice of one’s cause, has the West rendered justice in the resort to force irrelevant? If so, some of the most important partners in the international effort to combat terrorism may view norms regarding the use of force by nonstate actors as hypocritical at best and a threat to their sovereignty at worst. Former European colonies may view the limitations on the methods and means of violence as a way to keep the weak from fighting the perceived unjust initiation of hostilities by the strong, whether through “preemption/prevention” or “humanitarian intervention,” therefore limiting the ability of the two cultures to work together against a common threat: terrorism.

most Western thought on political violence is disproportionately focused on the prosecution of conflict over the legitimacy of conflict initiation.
Americans must also ask themselves whether the relative dearth of constructive discussion of the just recourse to force, particularly by nonstate actors, might give credence to charges of Western double standards. Upon what principle does the United States support or deny the right of nonstate actors to take up arms? Upon what principle does it back particular resistance organizations? Is support based simply on expediency or does it also have to do with the justice of a cause and how that cause is pursued? If it is the latter, the United States is in good stead. If it is the former, we give credibility to those who claim that America only condemns as terrorists those who oppose its interests—that one man’s terrorist truly is another man’s freedom fighter. Such a perception only undermines efforts at cooperation to combat a common threat and must be addressed if the desire to confront the phenomenon of terrorism is sincere.

Harmonizing Norms

It is evident that while the United States and the nations of the Muslim world share basic principles regarding the just use of force, they differ on which components of the various Just War traditions they emphasize, with the broader Middle East generally focusing on the just recourse to force at the expense of the just conduct of hostilities and the United States tending to subordinate the justice of war to justice in war. This divergence results in different conceptions of the justice of the initiation of hostilities and limitations of violence, particularly regarding violence against civilians by nonstate actors in what are perceived to be just causes. These differences, however, are not irreconcilable, and they do not indicate that international cooperation to combat terrorism cannot proceed. They simply mean that there is hard work to be done to increase the effectiveness and compatibility of cooperation.

The divide can be bridged by establishing an international consensus on the norms that characterize the legitimate use of force by nonstate actors that encompasses both the resort to force and the conduct of hostilities. The international community has largely established such a consensus on the norms regarding interstate conflict upon which international humanitarian law is built. That ongoing effort is one of the great success stories of modern civilization and serves as a useful guide for norm-setting regarding nonstate violence. It is, however, incomplete. International humanitarian law is by and large not designed to deal with nonstate actors or the acts of violence they commit, and the fact that there is ambiguity concerning groups such as Hamas and Hizballah testifies to the need to augment existing norms.

The consensus-building process and accompanying international cooperation already exist in many respects. For example, significant agreement is emerging on the need to combat terrorism that is reflected in international conventions and corresponding legislation in individual countries. This emerging international consensus is a focus of study for the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA Center) and its partners. While concrete steps are being taken against terrorist groups whose causes are not widely seen as just in the region and around the world, it is more difficult to collectively combat groups with significant support, whose causes are perceived as just, such as Hizballah and Hamas. This ambiguity undermines overall counterterrorism cooperation even against groups whose causes are not widely seen as just, such as al Qaeda.

To draw out these nascent consensus-building efforts and engender more effective international cooperation to combat the phenomenon of terrorism, statesmen, soldiers, and scholars should encourage a “process of conversation between civilizations, the process of deliberate non-violent adjustment, dialogue and negotiation between competing sources of norms governing violent conflict.” Just War traditions are a good place to start this process; they are dynamic systems of thought and practice that offer the guidance of centuries on the justification for and execution of violence, but they are not fixed dogmas. They did not develop in isolation, and they continue to evolve in concert, more mutually influential than exclusive. They are still evolving and adapting to shifting international realities. Each culture and tradition must critically examine its understanding of its own Just War norms as well as the concerns of the others.

Scholars, statesmen, and bearers of arms in the Middle East and Central Asia will be well served to address limitations on the conduct of hostilities more systematically, even when undertaken in a just cause. While jus in bello considerations do figure into some of the discourse on war and peace in the region, they are dwarfed by jus ad bellum concerns. Moreover, the discussion of the conduct of hostilities that does occur “is usually undertaken by modernists seeking to reinterpret the Qur’an and sunna so that Islamic injunctions correspond to current international practice” rather than seeking
to enter into a dialogue about what norms are or should be shared across civilizations. Regional players may also realize a benefit from devoting attention to whether a just cause is a sufficient reason to commence hostilities or simply one among a number of necessary conditions.

**Moving the Dialogue Forward**

Similarly, Western scholars and statesmen can move the dialogue on shared norms forward by more consciously addressing concerns of the just recourse to force. There is precious little discussion on just recourse in the Western world as opposed to the just conduct of violence, with the notable and often unhelpful exceptions of humanitarian intervention and preemptive/preventative war discussed earlier. Opinion leaders in the West should critically examine whether they would be willing to give up rights they hold dear in the face of a superior opponent they could not defeat by conventional means. Is the survival of a nation, or of democracy, a sufficiently just cause to allow departures from accepted norms limiting the conduct of hostilities?

While the United Nations and similar organizations serve the function of intercultural dialogue well on most issues, USCENTCOM can constructively engage the process of deliberation over the long-term just resort to and conduct of violence in the broader Middle East in a number of ways:

- partnering with DOD’s academic regional centers that already engage relevant players in the USCENTCOM AOR
- strengthening relationships and cooperation between the command and elements of the U.S. Government outside of the Department of Defense
- leveraging international programs
- examining the possibilities generated by such initiatives as the joint venture of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Strategic Command called Sovereign Challenge, a collaborative information-sharing Web portal focused on terrorism-related issues.

Regional centers such as the NESA Center and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies build sustained relationships with opinion leaders and government officials in the USCENTCOM AOR and also build regional cooperation on security issues through an academic environment where issues such as terrorism and the justification for violence are candidly addressed. Combatant command participation in regional center courses and other programs might be increased through guest-speaking roles or course participation to allow USCENTCOM personnel more contact with regional players. These regional centers may also be a vehicle through which the command could host events in the region to focus on these issues at forward locations such as U.S. bases and Embassies as well as regional states’ defense and civilian universities.

USCENTCOM may also consider establishing fellowships at regional centers to allow up-and-coming officers to conduct command-specific research on perceptions of the justification and management of violence in the region or to allow officers returning from duty in the broader Middle East an opportunity to articulate issue-relevant thoughts on their experience. The command might also sponsor a scholar or policymaker from the region as visiting faculty at a regional center to further the exchange of ideas and allow for in-depth understanding.

The command can serve its interest in fostering dialogue that leads to increased cooperation to combat terrorism throughout its AOR by strengthening its collaboration with other elements of national power, particularly with the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). The S/CT Regional and Trans-Regional Affairs Directorate builds political will and capacity to combat terrorism among international partners, making it a natural ally in any effort to engage parties in the broader Middle East on the issues of the justification for and limitations on violence as well as other terrorism-related issues.

U.S. Central Command can stimulate intercultural engagement on the justification and management of violence by leveraging the existing programs on terrorism-related topics conducted by other U.S. Government entities. The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program already goes a long way toward fostering cooperative efforts between U.S. and partner nation law enforcement personnel, but USCENTCOM could also sponsor regional police officers to attend training programs at the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, chiefly through its Counterterrorism Division or International Law Enforcement Academies. The command might also invite the Counterterrorism Section at the Department of Justice or the Homeland Security Center of Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terror (START) to conduct workshops, seminars, and lectures on terrorism-related topics in the region. START already runs a program on intercultural and inter-religious dialogue among U.S. college students. The command might assist in expanding this program to include students from the broader Middle East or sponsor a regional pre- or postdoctoral fellow in the START Fellows Program. The U.S. Institute of Peace is yet another resource on which U.S. Central Command might seek to capitalize.

While collaboration with existing programs in the U.S. Government and government-sponsored and -affiliated entities enables USCENTCOM to engage in the process of deliberation over the just resort to and conduct of violence, they are by no means the only avenues available. The United Nations has initiated an “Alliance of Civilizations,” and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offers multiple opportunities for engagement.

USCENTCOM’s engagement in the process of intercultural deliberation on these issues might also be facilitated by building on the model offered by Sovereign Challenge, which represents the kind of interaction necessary to respond to the disagreement over whether terrorism conducted to further a just cause can ever be justifiable. USCENTCOM could use the Sovereign Challenge Web site as a model for a platform to sustain a network of opinion leaders and officials in the region, encourage visits among players in multiple locations, and facilitate workshops and exercises.

Whatever role the command plays, one of the concrete steps currently being taken to encourage dialogue and negotiation

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**USCENTCOM can stimulate intercultural engagement on the justification and management of violence by leveraging programs conducted by other U.S. Government entities**
among competing sources of norms on violent conflict is taking place in July 2008 at the National Defense University. The NESA Center, along with the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute, will host an event on the legal and moral environment to combat transnational threats such as terrorism in the Near East and South Asia. This event and the edited proceedings to follow should engage the perceptions of the justification and limitation of violence both in the region and in the Western world at length and are a forum where the process of deliberate conversation and nonviolent adjustment can begin.

Addressing the justification for the resort to force by nonstate actors and the limitations on the use of force by these players will not end terrorism, nor will it convince nonstate actors to give up violence. The test of success in this dialogue will not be that one side or another wins the argument over the correct answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this article, but that the differences are acknowledged, examined, and in some way accommodated over time so shared norms can be established to enable the community of nations to work together to combat the common threat of terrorism. Such a process has occurred and continues to occur regarding violence undertaken by states. This gives us reason to believe that the same result can eventually be achieved with nonstate actors. Such a process is in fact already occurring in subtle ways. Our task is to acknowledge this development and constructively engage in it. JFQ

NOTES

1 While Israel and the Palestinian territories do not fall within the USCENTCOM AOR, the conflict there has reverberations across the Arab and Muslim worlds. It critically impacts the nations in the command’s AOR and is crucial to understanding how the peoples of the region understand terrorism.

2 The Middle East and Central Asia includes all the nations of the USCENTCOM AOR, as well as Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Turkey.

3 These customary rules were codified over time in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.


6 See article I of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, which seeks to regulate the use of violence in struggles for self-determination. The protocol extends the protections and responsibilities of international humanitarian law (IHL) to insurgents, militias, and other nonstate actors engaged in armed hostilities against “colonial domination and alien occupation” as well as “racist regimes” that deny the exercise of self-determination. While not adopted by all states, most notably the United States and Israel, Additional Protocol I has profoundly affected the international understanding of just recourse to force and limitations on violence in that it recognizes the legitimacy of nonstate actors to commit acts of violence for political purposes. This instrument was largely the product of actors within the USCENTCOM AOR, Palestinian territories, and other former colonies as well as the Soviet Union. The role of players from the broader Middle East in this IHL development demonstrates the rich and diverse understanding of the justification and limitation of force in the region. Rather than being motivated by Islamic tradition, the formulation of Additional Protocol I was colored primarily by nationalism. See James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 615.


9 Mayer, 205.


In an October 31, 2007, speech at Carnegie Mellon University, retired Army General John Abizaid warned that “we shouldn’t assume for even a minute that in the next 25 or 50 years the American military might be able to come home, relax and take it easy.”1 If General Abizaid’s assessment is even partially accurate, the U.S. military will be engaged in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for a long time to come, probably in some counterinsurgent capacity.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 40 years old in June 2007, may hold lessons for just such a mission. Israel is battling an insurgency that is driven by Islamist and secular nationalist movements. Its experience against the Palestinian insurgency should be valuable to U.S. policymakers and military planners as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Middle East continue.2

This article assumes that the government’s response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government’s response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency’s level of organization and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also played a role. Still, “of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.”3 This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.

**Measuring Israeli COIN Success**

This study uses the frequency of insurgent attacks and the number of fatalities they cause as measures of COIN success. The lower the frequency of attacks and the number of casualties they cause, the greater is counterinsurgent success. This definition is justified inasmuch as the ability to launch a large number of attacks and inflict a large number of fatalities suggests a great deal of operational strength on the part of insurgents. Reducing that strength is the overall objective of COIN operations. With that said, this measure of insurgent strength captures only short-term, tactical COIN success, not long-term, strategic COIN success, which is measured at a more general level and is not amenable to the policy-evaluation approach employed here. So the question this article addresses is what Israeli occupation policies have coincided with tactical success against the Palestinian insurgency.

By this measure of insurgent strength, Israeli policies have coincided with COIN success from the beginning of the occupation.
(1967) until the outbreak of the first intifada (1987) and from about 2005 on, but with relative COIN failure in between. The insurgent push that developed after the 1967 Six-Day War had largely petered out by the mid-1970s. Both the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks decreased measurably after 1975 and so, remaining at a fairly low level for the 1970s and most of the 1980s.

With the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, this success waned. Israel experienced increases in the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks, both in the occupied territories and in Israel proper, increases that were dramatic after 1994 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) returned to the territories in the form of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). During this time, the insurgency used the resources and infrastructure of the PA to plan and execute attacks against Israeli citizens and interests. In addition, in 1994, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) began using a deadly new tactic: suicide bombing.

It is only recently, since the effective end of the second intifada, which began in September 2000—that Israel has succeeded in blunting the effectiveness of the Palestinian insurgency. In the last 3 years, Israel has significantly reduced the lethality of insurgent attacks, especially in the case of Hamas, which has essentially ceased using suicide bombers.

Figure 1 illustrates these trends in relative COIN success and failure during the Israeli occupation. It gives the number of confirmed Palestinian attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as the number of victim fatalities as a result of insurgent attacks, by year. Two points are of note. First, there are significant spikes in the number of fatalities in the mid-1990s, after the creation of the PA, and in the early 2000s, after the beginning of the second intifada, followed by a significant diminution in the number of fatalities in the last few years. These two spikes in fatalities also represent nontrivial increases in the number of incidents and are not the result of a handful of spectacular attacks. There is also a slight, though noticeable, increase in the frequency and deadliness of Palestinian attacks in the late 1980s.

Second, there are increases in fatalities in 1972, 1974, and 1978 that do not represent an increase in the overall number of insurgent attacks. Instead, these spikes are mostly the result of three surprisingly successful attacks, on May 31, 1972; May 15, 1974; and March 11, 1978, resulting in 25, 31, and 43 fatalities, respectively. Given that no other attacks before 1994 resulted in more than 20 fatalities, these spikes should not be taken as representative of a trend in Israeli COIN failure, as the latter attacks should. In short, figure 1 suggests a pattern of Israeli COIN success in the 1970s, followed by insurgent effectiveness that increased marginally in the late 1980s and increased dramatically in the 1990s, and then increasing Israeli COIN success in the last 3 years.

Israel’s occupation policies have been most successful in reducing Palestinian insurgent violence when they have emphasized four elements:

- reducing international support for the Palestinian insurgency
- hindering insurgent ability to operate within the occupied territories
- isolating the insurgency from internal Palestinian support
- restricting Palestinian access to Israeli territory

Reducing International Support

Even in the presence of significant internal popular support, external support is usually critical to insurgent success. Over the 40 years of its occupation, Israel has used two main tactics to isolate the Palestinian insurgency from external support: international diplomacy and control of its borders.

International Diplomacy. Immediately following the Six-Day War, most Arab states were extremely hostile toward Israel. For the most part, the frontline Arab states either continued or increased support for Palestinian insurgents. In addition to this, Soviet diplomatic and moral support for Arab states in general—and the Palestinian cause in particular—remained high during the Cold War.

This state of affairs began to change as the occupation wore on. Of particular importance was Egypt, which expelled Soviet advisors and began to turn toward the West in the early 1970s and which signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978. With this, one of the principal supporters of the Palestinian insurgency retired from the fray. In addition, deepening U.S. political support for Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s blunted support for the Palestinian insurgency in the international community. On top of this, Israel has used international publicity campaigns to excoriate Palestinian attacks and discredit the PLO.

These diplomatic efforts became so effective that, by the end of the second intifada, Israel could cut off external material support for the insurgency nearly at will. For instance, when Hamas was voted into power in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, the international community froze all funds intended for the PA. While Israel initially faced significant hurdles in isolating the Palestinian

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Figure 1. Palestinian Insurgent Strength, 1967–2007

Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Terrorism Knowledge Base.” As of March 31, 2008, the Terrorism Knowledge Base is no longer available. For more information on how to access this information, visit <www.tkb.org>.
insurgency diplomatically, by the early 2000s, Israeli diplomatic efforts had greatly curtailed international support for the insurgents. Israeli diplomacy did not correlate with early success against the Palestinian insurgency, although it has done so in recent years.

**Border Control.** The other tactic that Israel has used to isolate the Palestinian insurgency from external support is its control of international borders. At the occupation’s outset, Israel clamped down on the international borders of the occupied territories. By December 1968, there was a security barrier—consisting of double fences with mines in between—along the Jordan River. Control of the borders not only limited the flow of weapons and insurgents into the territories, but also made cross-border raids by Palestinian insurgents more difficult.11

The reintroduction of the PLO into the territories in 1994, however, complicated Israel’s ability to control the borders. The close relationship between the PA and the insurgency facilitated the circumvention of Israeli border controls. In addition, the Israelis gave partial control over border crossings to the PA as part of the negotiated peace process. Although Israel has tried recently to regain control over the borders, at least in Gaza it has not experienced total success.12 Thus, Israeli border control measures coincided with COIN success at the beginning of the occupation, but have not done so since the mid-1990s.

**Hindering Insurgent Operations**

Israeli efforts at limiting insurgent operations in the territories themselves have met with success. The Palestinian insurgency launched a number of transnational terrorist attacks in the first two decades of the occupation, suggesting that Israeli policies limited their ability to operate inside the territories.13 Three factors have sometimes coincided with COIN success: Israel’s intelligence network, targeted killings, and deportation policies.

**Intelligence Network.** From the beginning of the occupation, Israel developed its intelligence network in the territories.14 The most well-known aspect of this network is Israel’s employment of Palestinian informants to provide information on insurgent activities. Two other elements of this network are the Arabic-speaking Israeli agents implanted in the territories for extended periods and the insurgents who Israel has induced to divulge information about co-insurgents.15 The information this network provides has constituted an important advantage for the government in combating the Palestinian insurgency, inasmuch as Israel has proven able to identify and capture insurgents and—occasionally—to prevent attacks even after insurgents have left their base.

**Targeted Killings.** Israel’s effective intelligence network in the territories has supported its campaign of targeted killings during the last two decades. For example, Israel has been able to target and kill leaders of Hamas in recent years, which has coincided with a dramatic decrease in suicide bombings over the same period. Israel’s policy of targeted killings, which began in earnest in December 2000,16 has correlated with Israeli COIN success since the beginning of the second intifada.

**Deportations.** Until 1992, when the Israeli High Court made the practice illegal, Israel occasionally deported Palestinian insurgent leaders to other Arab countries.17 The trends shown in figure 2 suggest that Israel enjoyed more COIN success when it implemented this policy aggressively. The high level of deportations in the late 1960s and early 1970s correlates with early success against the insurgency. By the same token, Israel’s concerted deportation efforts in the early 1990s (principally against Hamas) coincided with the end of the first intifada: the number and effectiveness of insurgent attacks decreased during these times. So an aggressive deportation policy has correlated with Israeli COIN success, as have an effective intelligence network and the policy of targeted killings.

**Isolating the Insurgency**

Israeli policies designed to drive a wedge between the Palestinian insurgency and the Palestinian population were associated with COIN success in the beginning of the occupation. Israeli policies, however, have been unable to isolate the insurgency from internal support since then, hindering COIN success. Three factors have affected this element of Israeli policies: limiting violence against Palestinian civilians, economic development, and Israeli settlements on occupied land.

**Violence against Palestinians.** Limiting violence against Palestinian civilians denies internal support to the insurgency in two ways. First, by dealing sharply with attacks by Israeli civilians against Palestinians, the government prevents the insurgency from using such attacks as a recruiting tool. Second, by curtailing Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence, the government prevents the insurgency from intimidating the population into supporting it.

In the early years of the occupation, Israel generally dealt firmly with violent acts by Israelis against Palestinian civilians. For example, after a bombing at a bus terminal in September 1968, a mob of Israeli Jews attacked a number of Arabs who had nothing to do with it. The government subsequently

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**Figure 2. Israeli Deportation of Palestinians**

Note: The number of deportations is averaged for 1970 to 1973.

arrested those involved in the mob and, in the newspaper the day following, began a campaign to educate Israelis on how these types of actions bolstered the insurgency.18

Israel’s response to reprisals against Palestinians has been mixed since then, however. Such reprisals were an exception until 1977, but in that year the Likud Party “ushered in an era of regressive COIN policies,”19 creating a permissive atmosphere for reprisals against Palestinians.

The policing of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence has also been mixed over the years. In the first years of the occupation, Israel dealt severely with such violence on the West Bank, investigating and punishing the intimidation and lynching of collaborators. In the Gaza Strip, however, Israel let Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence proceed unchecked, contributing to the poor security situation there compared to the West Bank.20 On the West Bank, street executions of collaborators were nearly unheard of in the early years of the occupation, and the Palestinian population trusted that the government would protect them from insurgent intimidation. Israeli efforts to police Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence coincide with early success against the insurgency.

From the mid-1990s on, however, the lynching of Palestinian collaborators became commonplace, and armed showdowns have raged unabated between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, whence most rocket attacks have originated. Since the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000, 556 Palestinians have died as a result of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence.21 This has facilitated insurgents’ efforts at keeping the population under its control. In short, Israel’s policing of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence was correlated with COIN success early on, but the lack of policing more recently has not met with success.

**Economic Development.** Israel began its occupation of the Palestinian territories with a significant investment in the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but did not maintain this level of investment. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Israeli economic policies in the territories improved the standard of living for Palestinians and “[gave] the people a stake in stability and made them reluctant to support guerrillas and terrorists.”22 Immediately after the Six-Day War, Israel paid $800,000 to stabilize the West Bank economy for a month, conducted an economic survey, and encouraged Palestinian farmers to produce crops that they could market in Israel. West Bank agricultural production rose in value from $12 million to $60 million in only 3 years. Israel also allowed more Palestinians to work in Israel (20,000 were doing so by 1970) and launched vocational training programs in the West Bank. Thereafter, the West Bank became relatively peaceful.23

The economy of the territories has deteriorated significantly since then.24 Unemployment hovers between one-third and one-half of the labor force, and most Palestinians attribute...
the economic situation to Israeli policies. Any COIN success that Israel has enjoyed since the early years of the occupation has probably not come as a result of Israeli economic development policies in the territories.

**Settlements.** Israel’s settlement program has been the single most upsetting occupation policy for the Palestinian population. It has done the most to push the population into the arms of the insurgency. Figure 3 suggests that when settlement activity was in its early, subdued stages, it did not constitute a hindrance to Israeli COIN success. However, the dramatic increase in the number of settlements in the mid-1980s—just before the outbreak of the first intifada—made it difficult for Israel to limit internal support for the insurgency.

The number of Israeli settlements in the West Bank reached a plateau in the 1990s, but that did not make it easier for Israel to deny popular support to insurgents. From 1996 to 2005, the number of Israelis living in West Bank settlements increased by 45 percent.26 Israel has often built settlements on prominent hills and on the best land, which is irksome to Palestinians.26 In fact, Palestinian hatred for the settlements runs so deep—and the economy is so weak and Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence has become so rampant—that any COIN success that Israel has achieved in recent years has likely been in spite of its almost complete inability to win the Palestinian population over from insurgent control.

**Restricting Access**

Another policy associated with COIN success has been restricting Palestinian access to Israeli territory.27 Israel controlled this access most strictly during the first 5 years of the occupation and from the early 1990s on. Israel has been particularly effective at hindering Palestinian access to Israel since 2002, when construction began on the security fence near the border with the West Bank.

**Early Restrictions on Access to Israel.**

From 1967 to 1972, Israel regarded the territories as closed military areas, permitting little movement into or out of them. By December 1, 1968, traffic between the east and west banks of the Jordan River was “nearly eliminated” and Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek had replaced the prewar barriers between East and West Jerusalem, barriers that Israel had removed following its victory the previous June.28 These border control measures coincided with Israeli COIN success in the early years of the occupation.

**Restrictions from the 1970s to the 2000s.**

From 1972 to 1989, Israel allowed Palestinians to enter Israel without a permit as long as they did not stay overnight. Beginning in 1989, in response to the intifada, Israel required Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to have individual permits to cross into Israel, and since then Israel has gradually increased the restrictions on Palestinian movement. In fact, Israel on occasion closes the territories completely, during which time no Palestinian can enter or leave, a policy it has used with increasing frequency from the early 1990s on. As a case in point, for more than one-third of the days during 2005, the Palestinian territories were completely closed. Interestingly enough, restrictive policies on Palestinian access to Israel have correlated with greater COIN success only before 1972 and after 2005. The more permissive policies in place from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s coincided with relative COIN success, and the increasingly restrictive policies begun in 1989 were not followed with decisive COIN success until the end of the second intifada.29

**Security Fence.** In 2002, Israel began constructing a security fence to control the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel. Beyond simply reducing movement out of the West Bank, this barrier has made it possible for Israeli military operations to have a strategic effect. For instance, the fence has hindered the ability of insurgents to rehabilitate cells and infrastructure in the aftermath of Israeli operations. In addition to the security fence, since the 1990s Israel has increasingly made use of checkpoints and roadblocks inside the territories to limit the ability of Palestinians to move. During Operations Defensive Shield and Determined Path in 2002, Israel imposed extended 24-hour curfews on Palestinian cities and large portions of the West Bank. While sometimes condemned in the international community, severely restricting Palestinian access to Israel has occasionally coincided with greater COIN success.

**Lessons Learned**

Israel’s occupation experience holds valuable lessons for U.S. forces based in Iraq and Afghanistan. Keeping in mind that the reasons why particular Israeli policies coincided with COIN success are not entirely clear, four main lessons can be discerned. First, U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to put more emphasis on isolating insurgents from external support. The borders of both countries are relatively porous. Indeed, the Palestinian territories have much shorter borders than Iraq and Afghanistan, but an emphasis on controlling the borders at the very beginning of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may have put insurgents in a much weaker position than they are in today.

Israel has been particularly effective at hindering Palestinian access to Israel since 2002, when construction began on the security fence.

![Figure 3. Israeli Settlements on the West Bank](source: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), “Statistics: Data on Settlements’ Population by year, XLS,” available at <www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Settlement_population.xls>.)
Second, the U.S. military has done an admirable job of hindering insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the most part, U.S. forces have maintained the tactical initiative against insurgent foes, despite limited resources in troops and materiel. Israel has enjoyed greater success when it has aggressively targeted insurgent operations. By the same token, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan experienced COIN success with aggressive operations aimed at blunting the Taliban’s offensive in the spring of 2007, and the U.S. surge in Baghdad has succeeded in pacifying many of the city’s neighborhoods. That said, the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to leave open the possibility of adopting aggressive tactics—targeted killings, for example—that Israelis have used with success.30

Third, at the beginning of operations, U.S. COIN strategies might have placed more emphasis on economic development in Iraq and Afghanistan. Immediately after the Six-Day War, and for a few years thereafter, Israel’s commitment to Palestinian economic development was noticeable. While this commitment waned after the Likud Party came to power in 1977, it was not before economic prosperity in the territories helped give Israel the upper hand against the insurgency.

Finally, U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to focus more on isolating insurgents from internal, popular support. Some among the Palestinian insurgency challenge Israel’s very existence and are close to Israeli territory.31 These are two factors that generate a significant amount of political will in Israel to do what it takes to beat the Palestinian insurgency, resulting in policies that have often had harsh consequences for the Palestinian population. Insurgent opponents of the United States, however, are generally not near to U.S. territory nor do they pose a credible threat to its existence. So whereas the Israeli polity can support policies resulting in harsh conditions for the Palestinian people, the United States cannot do the same without invoking shame abroad and dissent at home. The best alternative may be to counter insurgents’ popular support by protecting citizens from insurgent intimidation and by employing tactics that do not alienate large portions of the population.

Israeli occupation policies have met with tactical counterinsurgency success when they have isolated the Palestinian insurgency from external and internal support, hindered the ability of the insurgency to operate within the occupied territories, and restricted Palestinian access to Israeli territory. That said, simply because these policies have sometimes coincided with counterinsurgency success for Israel does not necessarily mean that U.S. leaders should apply them wholesale. What it does mean is that the United States should remain open to using them. JFQ

NOTES

6. MIPT.
11. Henriksen, 10.
26. See also Paul Maliszewski and Hadley Ross, “Divide and Conquer: The Making of Israel’s Suburban Occupation,” Harper’s Magazine, November 2005, 78, who observe that Israel “annexed East Jerusalem after the 1967 War” and “now seems determined to create a sprawling suburban barri- cade . . . to isolate the city from the rest of Palestin- ian territory.”
27. On the importance to COIN success of controlling the population’s movements, see O’Neill, “Revolutionary Warfare,” 96, 131.
30. See Henriksen, 43–44.
Israel’s Survival Instincts and the Dangers of Nuclear Weapons in Iranian Hands

By Richard L. Russell

The Israeli body politic finds itself in a new and uncertain international security environment as it faces the prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. The American intelligence assessment that suggests Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 has not relieved Israeli fears. Tel Aviv probably worries that American intelligence on Iran’s nuclear weapons program today is just as mistaken as it was on Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program in the run-up to the 2003 war. The Israelis assess that Tehran is pressing ahead in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear power infrastructure.

As Israelis grapple with policy options for dealing with the emerging Iranian threat, they do not like what they see. They find themselves “between a rock and a hard place.”

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses UN General Assembly, September 2005

UnMet/Newsweek/Paul Hillyer
knowing that there is a large gap between Israel’s declarative policy that it will not allow hostile states in the region to acquire nuclear weapons and their military capabilities, which have substantial shortcomings that could impact the ability to hold at risk Iran’s large and widely dispersed nuclear infrastructure, all of which is located a long reach from Israel.

Meanwhile, in debates and discussions in Washington on the creeping crisis over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons aspirations, one periodically hears mention of Tel Aviv’s worries about Tehran. But Israel’s interests and threat perceptions are mentioned merely in passing and generally receive no sustained or deep analysis. The American media, moreover, with their increasingly thin foreign coverage, rarely cover the Israeli dimension of the Iran crisis. In contrast, the threat posed by an Iran armed with nuclear weapons receives heavy coverage in Israeli media and fills the in-boxes of Israeli security officials and diplomats already heavily burdened by terrorism and the conflict with the Palestinians.2

Clearly, a look at the Israeli dimension of the Iran nuclear crisis is in order. How do the Israelis view Iran? What dangers would Iranian nuclear weapons pose to the state of Israel? What are the Israelis doing today? What could they do tomorrow? And what would be the implications and consequences of Israeli security actions for American national security vis-à-vis Iran and the Gulf?

**Israeli Worry about Iran**

Few in the business of foreign affairs have missed the steady stream of bellicose rhetoric coming out of the very loud mouth of Iran’s elected—to use the word extremely generously and loosely—President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He shattered diplomatic decorum at the United Nations (UN) in his first major international address as a world leader in September 2005. As one commentator characterized the speech, “Ahmadinejad delivered what began as a sermon praising the prophets of Islam, Christianity and Judaism and then descended into anti-American vitriol, conspiracy theories and threats. He expressed doubt that the deadly attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, were really carried out by terrorists.”

As if to belabor his ideological zeal, Ahmadinejad in an October 2005 speech to 4,000 students in Iran said that Israel “must be wiped off the map” and that attacks by Palestinians would destroy it. In that oratory, Ahmadinejad elaborated that the "establishment of a Zionist regime was a move by the world oppressor against the Islamic world" and that “skirmishes in the occupied land are part of the war of destiny. The outcome of hundreds of years of war will be defined in Palestinian land.” For those who attributed Ahmadinejad’s UN performance to a slip, they were corrected in December 2005 when he argued in a speech to a conference of Islamic countries in Saudi Arabia that if Europeans established Israel out of guilt over the Nazi reign, then Israel should be carved out of Europe. If that ignorance of history were not enough, Ahmadinejad in another December 2005 speech, this time back in Iran, called the Holocaust’s extermination of 6 million Jews a “myth” that never happened.3

Reasonable people in the West end up scratching their heads pondering the purpose behind Ahmadinejad’s bellicose and anti-Israeli outbursts. Some astute Iranian observers such as Karim Sadjapour and Ray Takeyh suggest that the Iranian president’s behavior is aimed at provoking a crisis and scuttling international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear-related activities, especially enriching uranium, as well as asserting his control over Iran’s state machinery and gaining political influence among the Iranian populace.4

**Some observers suggest that the Iranian president’s behavior is aimed at provoking a crisis and scuttling international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear-related activities**

All the while, a curious depiction has turned up in the Western press of Ahmadinejad’s rival for the presidency, Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom many characterize as a moderate. Rafsanjani, contrary to the popular media view, has been in and around the halls of Tehran’s political power more than anyone else for over 20 years, during which time Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities were shielded from the International Atomic Energy Agency. He presumably has more than a fair share of vested interest in seeing that Iran eventually acquires nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed Iran under a Rafsanjani presidency would give Israel, and the United States for that matter, little comfort. It was Rafsanjani who in 2001 “mused that a single nuclear weapon could obliterate Israel, whereas Israel could ‘only damage’ the world of Islam.”

To make matters worse, the Iranian public, which the Western press is all too eager to depict as a demographic youth bulge born after the 1979 Iranian revolution and eager for liberalization and democratization, is across-the-board supportive of the drive for nuclear power. As Ramita Navai reported from Tehran, “Iran’s right to nuclear energy and defiance of the West over its nuclear ambitions is the first issue since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that has galvanized all political factions, classes and public opinion.”5

With this Iranian internal political landscape, Ahmadinejad’s statements fuel the fire of Israeli fears about Iran. Some dismiss Israeli fears as “overblown,” but as the old quip has it, even paranoids have real enemies—and Iran is such an enemy. The Iranians have been extraordinarily consistent and patient in their sponsorship of Hizballah, which has long waged a guerrilla war against Israel. There can be no gainsaying that Iran has been Hizballah’s godfather and staunchest foreign backer and that the organization has inflicted significant casualties and costs on Israel, not to mention the United States.

The mood in Israel is that Iran is no imaginary threat. To the contrary, as Ephraim Kam, a level-headed and insightful Israeli national security analyst, observes, “Many Israeli leaders regard the Iranian threat as the gravest strategic threat facing Israel, and some regard it as liable to endanger Israel’s very existence in the future.” Kam, peering ahead, adds that “Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons is of major significance to Israel: a new situation would arise whereby for the first time since Israel’s establishment an enemy state has the capability of fatally wounding it.”6

The Israelis, moreover, are gravely concerned that their capabilities to deter regional adversaries are fraying. Their formidable conventional military capabilities have not secured a peace with the Palestinian Hamas—controlled Gaza Strip or a peace in the Fatah-controlled West Bank. And Israeli confidence in its military forces to secure its northern border was seriously threatened by Hizballah rockets fired from Lebanon during the summer 2006 war. The Israelis worry that Hizballah is a proxy for Iran’s belligerent policies and that should Iran get nuclear weapons, Tehran would have license to escalate future cross-border surrogate guerrilla operations.
against Israel. Tehran would no longer fear Israeli military retaliation, which the Iranians could deter with their nuclear weapons.

The Iranians might further calculate that escalating Hizballah—as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad—operations against Israel would play well politically in the Muslim and Arab worlds. Tehran’s stance toward the Jewish state already wins political support at home and in the greater Middle East. This is true even among Iran’s traditional Arab rivals such as Saudi Arabia, which, at least for now, has not vehemently protested Iran’s cage-rattling performances against Israel because the Arab states are deeply frustrated by the Palestinian plight and resent Tel Aviv’s military prowess and for having acquired nuclear weapons before any Arab state.

The Israelis also have a deep insecurity due to geographic vulnerability, an aspect of their national security that should not be underestimated. Israel is only a narrow swath of territory along the sea, and its principal population and government centers are located in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas. Americans need to remember their Cold War fears of the potential for only 30 minutes warning of the launching of Soviet nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles at the United States. That recollection would give Americans a mere whiff of the Israeli worry about the warning time of only minutes inside the Middle East.

Aggravating these acute security concerns is the collective memory of the Holocaust. Israeli society is rightly permeated with the determination to never again allow adversaries to threaten the existence of the Jewish community, which now is most prominently displayed in the state of Israel. The possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranians, or its security policy surrogates in its guerrilla war against Israel, would present just such a concrete and existential threat. The Israelis will have to worry that someday, either by design or mishap, Iranian nuclear weapons might find their way from Iranian Revolutionary Guard arsenals into Hizballah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad hands.

Preemptive Military Action

The Israelis frequently warn that they will not idly stand by as Iran marches toward a nuclear weapons arsenal. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in January 2008 told government officials that “Israel clearly will not reconcile itself to a nuclear Iran” and that “all options [preventing] Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities are legitimate within the context of how to grapple with this matter.”

These words are echoes of the Begin Doctrine, initially articulated by former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which holds that Israel will not wait and watch potentially hostile states acquire nuclear weapons and will opt for preventive military means to stop prospective threats from becoming realities.

The so-called Bush Doctrine of the United States, announced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, shares with the Begin Doctrine a common national security philosophy. Just as the Bush Doctrine appeared to become a reality with the 2003 war against Iraq, the Begin Doctrine became a reality with the Israeli preventive strike on Iraq’s nuclear power reactor, called Osiraq, in 1981. That bold Israeli move has come to epitomize preventive military action against an emerging nuclear threat. Unfortunately, the Israeli strike was only a tactical achievement. Afterward, the Iraqis dispersed their nuclear weapons–related activities to numerous locations to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive military strikes, moves that were uncovered by UN weapons inspections in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.

Tel Aviv recently demonstrated the continued centrality of the Begin Doctrine in Israeli national security strategy by mounting an airstrike in September 2007 against a suspected Syrian nuclear facility. Neither Israel nor Syria has officially acknowledged the strike, but fragmentary and unofficial reporting suggests that Israeli aircraft destroyed a North Korea–supplied nuclear reactor in Syria. Commercial satellite images taken of the suspected site at Tibrnah showed that the Syrians hastily dismantled facilities after the attack in a likely attempt to hide evidence of a partially built nuclear reactor similar to the design used by North Korea. The Israelis probably calculated that no official pronouncements would dampen international political tension that could have spun the limited attack into a broader regional crisis. No doubt, though, the Israelis also sought to send a veiled and credible threat to Tehran that Tel Aviv could do the same to Iran’s nuclear facilities and infrastructure.

For now, Tel Aviv is engaged in a diplomatic effort to keep world attention on Iran...
and its nuclear weapons aspirations. Former Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom in December 2005 told the cabinet that “in pursuing the diplomatic course of trying to get the issue moved to the Security Council, Israel must be careful to ensure that the problem remains an international—not an Israeli—one.”13 Along a similar vein in portraying the Iran crisis as an international one, then–Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz asserted in January 2006 that “Israel is in no rush. The whole world condemns Iran’s actions—it cannot be perceived as an exclusively Israeli problem and should not be treated as one.”14 Israeli intelligence appears to judge that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009 at the earliest and more likely in the 2010–2011 timeframe.15 Israel still has some time to play in the diplomatic arena and to nudge Washington into taking military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to lift the burden from Israeli shoulders.

Daunting Challenges

The application of the Begin Doctrine against Iran—as a replay of Israeli preventive strikes against Syrian and Iraqi nuclear capabilities—would be a profoundly more difficult operational challenge. The Iranians are no one’s fools, and they have no doubt learned from Iraq’s experience in 1981 and Syria’s experience in 2007. From what can be gleaned from public information, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes only F–15I and F–16C/D aircraft from uranium mining, to enrichment, to research and development, to the Bushehr nuclear power plant—are all geographically dispersed in the large land mass that makes up Iran, making them extraordinarily difficult for Israel to strike with one large aircraft package as was done in Iraq and Syria. Iran too might have taken steps to maintain and keep hidden redundant infrastructure, especially for uranium enrichment, in light of the public disclosures, to compound the difficulty for any Israeli military campaign to decisively derail Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

For all its military prowess, Israel would face enormous difficulties in attempting to destroy a large part of Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons infrastructure. The air force must fly a long way to attack far removed Iranian targets. It would have to rely on its inventory of 25 F–15I aircraft, with a range of 4,450 kilometers, as the workhorses for an Iranian strike package.16 These aircraft would have to fly through potentially hostile airspace—possibly Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, not to mention Iran itself—which could consume fuel for evasive maneuvers and reduce the ranges of Israeli airpower projection into Iran. The aircraft also would have to carry external fuel tanks, reducing the amount of ordnance carried. To possibly make matters worse from the Israeli military standpoint, much of the airspace the Israelis would have to fly through to get to Iranian territory—save Syria—is closely monitored and patrolled by American air and naval forces.

There is a chance that the Israelis would give the United States a heads-up on their military plans in order to reduce the chances of coming to air-to-air blows with American forces operating over Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Alternatively, the Israelis might opt not to give Washington advanced notice, fearing that the Americans would object or try to stall the action. As former Deputy National Security Advisor Chuck Freilich notes, Israel might “refrain from placing itself in a potential veto situation much as it did in 1981, when it did not consult or inform the United States prior to attacking the Iraqi reactor at Osiraq.”17

Israel’s security relations with Turkey over the years have given rise to speculation that Tel Aviv could use Turkish air bases, or airspace for air-to-air refueling, for easier and shorter access to Iranian targets. Ankara’s political refusal to allow the United States to use Turkey as a staging ground for the 2003 war against Iraq, however, shows just how little an appetite the Turks have for hosting foreign forces for operations against their southern neighbors. Ankara has polite relations with Tehran and would not want to jeopardize them, especially if Iran is on the cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Israelis might go ahead and transit Turkish airspace for strikes against Iran without Ankara’s permission and risk a major setback to security ties with Turkey, hoping the political backlash would be fleeting.

Ankara has polite relations with Tehran and would not want to jeopardize them, especially if Iran is on the cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons

Even if the Israelis could overcome these substantial operational challenges and mount a large air assault on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they would be even more hard pressed to follow up with the sustained campaigns needed to repeatedly bomb widespread and substantially heavier infrastructure than Iraq had in 1981 or Syria in 2007. As retired Israeli Brigadier General Shlomo Brom assesses, “Based on the past performance of the IAF [Israeli air force], its order of battle that includes only F–15I and F–16C/D aircraft capable of long range strike, and the deployment of its aircraft, it is possible to determine...
that at long ranges (more than 600 km), the IAF is capable of a few surgical strikes, but it is not capable of a sustained air campaign against a full array of targets.\textsuperscript{18} The Israelis mounted such a limited airstrike in 1985 against the Palestine Liberation Organization’s headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, which required aerial refueling of F–15 aircraft and travel of more than 4,000 kilometers.\textsuperscript{19} The Tunis strike, however, was a one-time event against sites specifically known and located.

The Israelis might complement aircraft operations with naval assets, but these options have limitations, too. The Israelis could employ their \textit{Dolphin}-class submarines to launch cruise missiles at Iran from the Arabian Sea and also use special operations forces, but even these efforts would be shy of the payloads needed to level Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

The Israelis also could tap their sophisticated inventory of ballistic missiles to target Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure in combination with fixed-wing aircraft operations. Public information on Israeli stores of Jericho I missiles, with an estimated payload of 450 to 650 kilograms and a range of up to 500 kilometers, and Jericho II missiles, with payloads of 750 to 1,500 kilograms and a range of more than 1,500 kilometers, is hard to come by.\textsuperscript{20} The Congressional Research Service estimates a modest Israeli inventory of about 50 Jericho I and 100 Jericho II missiles.\textsuperscript{21} In January 2008, Israel test fired a Jericho III missile, which caught Iran’s attention.\textsuperscript{22} Tel Aviv no doubt hopes the display will help deter Tehran’s use of ballistic missiles against Israel.

The use of Jericho ballistic missiles in preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would risk depleting delivery systems for Israel’s nuclear weapons deterrent. But Tel Aviv could embark on a clandestine and sizable buildup of its Jericho missile inventories to be able to saturate Iranian targets with ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.

\textbf{Brutal Logic of Deterrence}

The Israelis might throw up their hands and conclude that any military options are simply too hard or risky and offer too limited prospects for success. Tel Aviv could ultimately and reluctantly calculate that the political costs coupled with the slim prospects for entirely eliminating Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure rule out unilaterally moving with military means. The easiest and default policy—one that is not without risks but that perhaps has fewer risks and more rewards than a military showdown with Iran and political fallout with Israel’s security partners—would be to rely on deterrence. The Israelis might calculate that no matter how ideologically motivated Iran’s president and its Revolutionary Guard are, or how warped their perception of reality is, there will be no escaping the brutal logic of massive nuclear retaliation.

The Iranians would have to realize that, notwithstanding the geographic vulnerability of Israel, they would never be able to achieve a strategic surprise and launch barrages of nuclear weapons loaded on ballistic missiles to decapitate Israeli leadership in order to prevent Israel from launching its own nuclear-tipped Jericho missiles to wipe out Tehran. The Israelis could impress upon the Iranians this cold-blooded logic—informed by Cold War history—via thinly veiled public pronouncements that stop short of acknowledging Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities.

Tel Aviv also could use a variety of behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence channels to privately, quietly, confidentially, and authoritatively convey the same message to Iran’s Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, Revolutionary Guard, and regime advisors to ensure that Israeli “red lines” for Iran’s handling of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in a crisis, as well as the dangers should Tehran be tempted to transfer nuclear weapons to a transnational group such as Hizballah, are understood by Iranian leadership. The problem from the Israeli standpoint is that the regime in Tehran more nearly resembles a circus-like contest for political power than a unitary, contemplative, deliberative decisionmaking body.

Some strategists point to Saddam Hussein’s restraint in not firing biological and chemical weapons–tipped ballistic missiles at Israel during the 1991 Gulf War as evidence that nuclear deterrence is robust. The late national security expert Ze’ev Schiff put the problem from the Israeli standpoint is that the regime in Tehran more nearly resembles a circus-like contest for political power than a unitary decisionmaking body.

Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Islamic Republic of Iran

http://www.sajed.ir
common Israeli lesson of the 1991 war this way: “The fact that Saddam did not use chemical weapons against Israel even when he was under great stress from attacking forces shows that he understood there are some things Israel simply could not tolerate, even if Washington was opposed to any Israeli response.”

But if Saddam simply withheld the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Israel during the 1991 war because coalition forces were not marching on Baghdad and directly threatening his regime, then any Israeli confidence in their ability to deter a nuclear-armed Iran would be misplaced.

The “Sadat” Military Option

Israel’s military operations offer no panacea or easy solution to the Iranian nuclear threat, but that does not rule out the limited military options that the Israelis do have. Falling back onto the logic of deterrence would still leave Israelis insecure vis-à-vis an Iran moving closer and closer to a nuclear weapons stockpile. Security could be further undermined should Ahmadinejad or his successors grow in their bellicosity and recklessness as they approach their nuclear weapons goal. A more confident and aggressive Iranian foreign policy could jeopardize Tel Aviv’s confidence in its ability to work out red lines and “rules of the road” for governing deterrence in a Israeli-Iranian nuclear rivalry.

In such desperate straits, the Israelis might reluctantly conclude that they need to resort to a military move—if only symbolically—to reawaken and force renewed political attention and pressure on Iran from the United States, Europe, and the world community. The Israelis, in coming to such a conclusion, might have as their model former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s masterful use of the 1973 war for seizing political leverage. In ordering the Egyptian attack on Israel, Sadat harbored no illusion of militarily defeating Israel, but he aimed at profoundly changing the international political climate to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel on honorable terms for Egypt. The Israelis might find themselves with their backs against the wall and thrash out to destroy a piece of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and then settle back into a defensive crouch to watch international reactions and to guard against Iranian retaliation.

This is not a fanciful scenario if one remembers the great uncertainty about the prospects of preventively attacking Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. Israeli military planners were far from confident that the strike would be worth the risks, but they undertook the mission even though they lacked a clear picture of its impact, according to a leaked air force research paper. In the final analysis, Tel Aviv calculated that it needed to take the risks associated with its poor information picture of Iraq’s program, given the grave threat emerging in Baghdad. If Tel Aviv was willing to run these military risks and uncertainties then, it could do it again against Iran, even if the mission is more demanding and risky.

The Israelis might calculate that the threats posed by Iranian retaliation would be manageable; they sustained numerous Iraqi ballistic missile strikes during the 1991 Gulf War and could bet on riding out some Iranian retaliatory strikes with their Shahab ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads. They might also calculate that they could weather the international political opprobrium for attacking Iran. Israel has long been accustomed to suffering the slings and arrows of political and diplomatic blowback from controversial decisions such as the 1981 attack on Iraq, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and the 2006 war in Lebanon, and daily regional criticisms that Tel Aviv, and not current and past failures of Palestinian leadership, is responsible for the tragic plight of the Palestinian people.

Bleak Diplomatic Prospects

Israeli diplomacy will press the Americans as well as the Europeans with all its strength for a diplomatic settlement to the Iranian crisis. The diplomatic threat and imposition of more international sanctions on Iran would be all well and good, but the Tehran regime probably would not feel the full bite of economic sanctions for a long time. The international community has already economically and politically isolated Tehran, and more of the same would have only marginal impact. In the short term, the regime would wear economic and political sanctions as badges of honor for standing in defiance of the international community, enhancing Iran’s self-image and shoring up political support for Ahmadinejad’s regime with Iranian nationalism. The economic sanction that would hurt Iran the most would be an economic embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil, but the economic and political blowback on the Europeans and Americans in a high petroleum demand environment would likely be too bitter a pill to swallow.

By the same token, the Israelis are well aware of the dangers of Iran using diplomacy to play for time as their clandestine work toward nuclear weapons proceeds. The Iranians, for their part, know well that the cocktail of public denials, avoidance of incontrovertible or “smoking gun” evidence of nuclear weapons aspirations, and diplomacy that plays along with the International Atomic Energy Agency all allowed North Korea to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Tehran today is likely following in Pyongyang’s footsteps. The Israelis will probably come to the conclusion, if they have not already, that a credible threat of American force is needed to backstop European-American diplomatic efforts and to prevent Tehran from going the North Korean route. The threat of American force is needed to put Tehran into a fix in which it cannot indefinitely stall while working to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities and its stocks of enriched uranium.

Some observers caution against an American or Israeli military option against Iran and point to the Libyan surrender of its WMD and ballistic programs as a case that shows economic sanctions can bring dramatic changes in regime calculus over the costs and benefits of having these programs. To be sure, the international political and economic isolation of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime was a critical pressure that changed his calculus. But the straw that broke the camel’s back probably was Qadhafi’s fear in 2003 that after Iraq, the United States would be prepared to wield military force against Tripoli for its nuclear weapons program, which was internationally exposed by the interception of the BBC China cargo ship. The combination of political and economic isolation took a decade to hurt the Libyan regime, and the specter of military force against Tripoli tipped the balance toward a surrender of its WMD and ballistic missiles.

One way for the Israelis to slip out of their “rock and a hard place” predicament is to press the United States to shoulder the burden. Tel Aviv might even threaten exercising a “Sadat option” to induce the Americans to move militarily against Iran in lieu of Israeli military action. Washington would have to worry that an Israeli attack against Iran would risk a public opinion backlash in the Muslim world, including Arab capitals, which would threaten to reignite the Israel-Arab conflict and further reduce the already bleak prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The Israelis could become frustrated with Tehran’s diplomatic obstruction and U.S. and European diplomatic passivity and unwillingness to threaten force. Thus, the Israelis could strike out militarily with no illusion of severely damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but with every intention of shocking the international community via the Sadat option into substantially greater diplomatic, political, economic, and military pressure on Iran.

An Israeli military strike against Iran could also be precipitated by more bellicose threats and reckless actions from Ahmadinejad’s regime. Tehran, for example, could encourage and operationally support fresh waves of Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad attacks against Israeli interests. In Israeli eyes, escalated Iranian-sponsored attacks would “prove” that Iran is hostile and that its leadership lacks prudent restraint. They would also demonstrate the “undeterable” nature of the Tehran regime. Such attacks might be reminiscent of, or even more spectacular than, Iran’s sponsorship—according to former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh—of the Saudi Hizballah attack against the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 that killed 19 American Servicemen or the Iran-Hizballah bombings in the 1990s against the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Argentina, which together killed 110 people.25

Whether or not the Israelis confer in advance with the Americans about military operations against Iran, Washington should be prepared for retaliation. The Iranians, along with much of the Muslim world, are going to believe that the Americans encouraged and approved the mission. Ahmadinejad blustered in January 2008 that that “Zionist regime . . . would not dare attack Iran. . . .” It knows that any attack on Iranian territories would prompt a fierce response.26 The deputy commander of Iran’s air force warned in January 2008 that “Zionist forces, especially in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, would prompt a fierce response.”27

special operations against Gulf shipping; more aggressive military, financial, and logistic support for Hizballah; and Iranian intelligence bombing operations against worldwide Israeli and American diplomatic and military positions. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, warned in April 2006 that if “the U.S. ventured into any aggression on Iran, Iran will retaliate by damaging U.S. interests worldwide twice as much as the U.S. may inflict on Iran.”28 The Iranians too could take American Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and diplomats hostage, much as they did with 15 British sailors and marines in March 2007. Iran also could aid and abet al Qaeda operations against the United States. In short, the Israeli “Sadat” scenario is one for which American policymakers and military commanders need to plan in order to be ready for Iranian retaliatory measures, especially in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

NOTES

2 This observation is based on conversations the author had with a number of Israeli security officials during a January 2006 visit to Israel.
8 Quoted in “Misreading Iran: It Wants More Than Reassurance,” The Economist, January 14, 2006, 16.
10 Ephraim Kam, “Curb ing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option,” Strategic Assessment 7, no. 3 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, December 2004), 3.

27  For background, see Louis J. Freeh, “Remember Khobar Towers,” Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2003. By the former FBI director’s account of the Khobar attack, “the entire operation was planned, funded and coordinated by Iran’s security services . . . acting on orders from the highest levels of the regime in Tehran.”
The United States and its coalition partners commenced combat operations in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility in October 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom. Today, well into the seventh year of operations, over 180,000 U.S. and 39,000 coalition troops from 68 nations remain engaged in security and stability operations as participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I) in Iraq, Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) in Djibouti. This multinational contingent is the primary instrument USCENTCOM uses to carry out its stated mission of working with national and international partners to promote development and cooperation among nations, respond to crises, and deter or defeat state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability.

American multinational military operations go as far back as the Revolutionary War. It can be argued that the American coalition with France during the revolution may have been the deciding factor for victory when France prevented Lord Cornwallis from escaping by sea while American land forces surrounded his army at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781.
Since that event, the United States has fought within a multinational context in nearly every major conflict in which it has been involved. Alliances and coalitions, and their advantages and disadvantages, are part of U.S. operations now and will be in the future. Since 2001, USCENTCOM has relied heavily on coalition partners for prosecution of the war on terror, and this support is paramount to the command’s success as it continues to execute multiple operations within its area of responsibility (AOR).

Since the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom, the responsibility of integrating the coalition with U.S. forces has rested with the USCENTCOM Coalition Coordination Center (CCC) located at command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. The CCC supports the strategic objectives of the commander by coordinating the identification, development, and movement of coalition resources necessary to satisfy force capability requirements within the command’s AOR.

This article provides a brief history of the CCC, introduces the processes and myriad organizations involved in sustaining the coalition, identifies recent coalition integration examples, and makes recommendations to improve the management of coalition issues.

**CCC History**

Following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991, planners recognized the need to establish an organization capable of supporting and integrating coalition nations into the planning and operations process and of serving as the focal point for all issues related to the coalition. The USCENTCOM CCJ5 (Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate) conceived and planned this organization, and implemented these plans following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. By mid-October 2001, the Coalition Coordination Cell was established with a staff of four U.S. personnel, and it was soon designated a center as it expanded in size and responsibility. To accommodate the coalition liaison teams arriving in Tampa, USCENTCOM erected Coalition Village in a parking lot outside of the main Headquarters. Shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom began, a separate organization, the Iraqi CCC (IC'), was created, which supported coalition liaison teams that were sent to Tampa by nations planning operations in Iraq.

In January 2003, the Friendly Forces Coordination Center (FFC'), created to serve as the forward headquarters for coalition-related issues, deployed with USCENTCOM’s main body to Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, to begin operations out of the contingency forward headquarters (CFH). The FFC' functioned primarily as the IC' forward headquarters, while the IC' remained in Tampa to perform the rear headquarters function. The CCC continued to operate out of Coalition Village in Tampa to focus on Enduring Freedom.

In May 2003, USCENTCOM’s command and control function, as well as the main body, shifted back to Tampa from the CFH. The FFC' followed suit by returning to Tampa in June 2003, where it merged back into the IC'. The CCC (Enduring Freedom focus) and IC' (Iraqi Freedom focus) operated as separate organizations until January 2004, when they combined to become a single CCC.

This single organization remains intact today. Supporting approximately 180 coalition personnel from 63 nations represented in Tampa, the CCC operates as the primary coordination office between USCENTCOM and coalition militaries. The center is also the conduit for information exchange regarding the coalition between Washington (including the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], Joint Staff, and Department of State) and the AOR. Communications run the gamut from strategic to tactical, with the primary objective of ensuring that coalition forces are prepared to perform their assigned missions upon arrival in the USCENTCOM theater of operations.

There are currently 42 U.S. personnel from all Services assigned to the CCC. Originally conceived as a temporary organization, the CCC is staffed entirely by Active and Reserve Component personnel assigned to the CCC as separate organizations until January 2004, when they combined to become a single CCC.

One of the most intensely debated issues in our country today is the ongoing call for the return of our troops. Although there is no timeline for the withdrawal of forces from either Iraq or Afghanistan, it is likely that a substantial American troop presence will remain until security and stability are established in each country, and each government demonstrates the capability to maintain a stable environment for its population. A substantial long-term coalition troop presence is needed as well. While conditions on the ground continue to improve in Iraq and Afghanistan, achieving the desired endstate in each country will likely take many years. The force level requirements necessary to establish

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**Figure 1. Coalition Coordination Center**

![Diagram of CCC structure](chart.png)

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the appropriate conditions are constantly evaluated by commanders on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, USCENTCOM Headquarters, the Joint Staff, and OSD and scrutinized by the political leadership in Washington.

The issues being debated in the United States are under equally intense deliberation in the governments and populations of its coalition partners. Because of a variety of circumstances, including established laws, financial considerations, public opposition, domestic security concerns, and a reluctance to support U.S. policy objectives in the region, many countries are averse to contributing forces. These factors also influence the level of troop and equipment contributions these nations are willing to provide and the caveats they place on their troops, which dictate the missions the troops are authorized to perform. Before many nations can even consider a commitment of troops or equipment, the overwhelming majority of our partners require NATO involvement or the endorsement of the United Nations (UN) in the form of a UN Security Council Resolution. NATO involvement and/or the existence of a resolution impart international legitimacy to the ongoing operations and provide the political top-cover that coalition governments need to participate.

In view of these complications, the United States must continue to maintain a long-term view of requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan and to use a multilevel engagements approach to sustain coalition involvement over the long haul. This multilevel approach requires representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), OSD, the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and commanders in the field to speak with one voice when engaging coalition partners about sustaining or increasing their contributions.

Developing Countries

It is also necessary for the United States to eliminate the financial barriers that would otherwise prevent many countries from participating in coalition operations. The term developing country describes partners that require U.S. funding to participate in ongoing operations and the war on terror. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s fiscal year 2008 budget request states that DOD programs for supporting our coalition partners and building partner military capacity enable coalition partners to participate in U.S. operations and conduct counterterrorist operations when they otherwise lack the financial means to do so. Their participation reduces the stress on U.S. forces operating in the [war on terror].

Funding these programs ensures the continued support of many important coalition partners and helps maximize participation by developing countries that perform missions that would otherwise have to be performed by U.S. personnel.

Multilevel Engagements

The steps of the multilevel engagements process and the participants involved are shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. As a general rule, consequential discussions with coalition partners regarding potential troop contributions begin with senior-level bilateral meetings involving representatives from the OSD-Policy (OSD–P), the resident U.S. Ambassador, and senior-level country representatives including the minister of defense (MOD), chief of defense (CHOD), and other government leaders. The bilateral meetings provide an ideal forum for the United States to formally request military force contributions. Participants evaluate the experience and readiness of the country’s military forces, identify potential missions suited to their capabilities, and negotiate funding requirements, commitment durations (for example, two 6-month deployments), and the types of missions the country is willing to perform.

If the MODs/CHODs participating in the bilateral meetings indicate a willingness to contribute forces, the final decision to deploy troops customarily requires the consent/approval of their nation’s legislative body (for example, parliament, assembly, house of representatives), which normally occurs within 2 to 4 months.

The CCC’s role is analogous to that of U.S. military Service chiefs. Although it does not actually train, equip, and deploy the coalition forces, the CCC is responsible for coordinating with the organizations performing those missions. Upon notification of a country’s interest in contributing forces, the CCC engages that country’s senior national representative (SNR), the U.S. Defense Attaché (DATT) assigned to that nation, and the coalition operations offices of the operational commander to coordinate and facilitate the deployment of coalition troops. It is common for the CCC to provide the contributing nation, through the SNR or DATT, with information requested by his legislative body to support the decision to deploy forces.

Once the contributing government formally approves the deployment of forces,
formal military-to-military (mil-to-mil) discussions are conducted. The discussions are normally hosted by USCENTCOM or the contributing nation and attended by a small contingent from the theater command (Multi-National Force–Iraq [MNF–I] or Combined Joint Task Force–82), the DATT, the regional combatant command serving the contributing nation, and the CCC. By the conclusion of these discussions, the following details regarding the deployment of the coalition forces are usually finalized:

- mission
- caveats
- location
- relieve in place/transfer of authority dates
- equipment requirements
- training
- funding requirements
- transportation.

Case Studies of Coalition Integration

Perfecting the integration process for coalition partners to operate with U.S. forces is a never-ending task. Considering that it is highly unlikely that the United States will ever go to war again without a coalition, the current tasks are well worth the work. The following examples demonstrate the realities of coalition warfare.

Failure to Communicate. An event in the fall of 2007 illustrates the need to keep coalition partners involved and informed when making decisions about forces. A coalition unit of 50 personnel was in the process of boarding an aircraft to begin a 6-month rotation when it was informed that deployment had been put on hold. The unit’s government had ordered this delay after learning the mission and deployment location differed from the agreed mission and location. U.S. commanders on the ground made the decision based on operational requirements. When formulating their decision, they factored in that the adjustments did not increase the level of risk the coalition troops would encounter. Following weeks of discussions with senior U.S. officials and assurances that the mission and deployment locations would not be altered, the contributing government agreed to send its forces. The unit eventually deployed 30 days after originally scheduled.

Multilevel Engagements Process.

Shortly after President George W. Bush announced the plan to surge additional forces into Iraq in 2007, one of our largest coalition partners agreed to more than double its troop contribution. Its forces had already been performing superbly in Iraq, and one of the conditions of the increase dictated by the president of the contributing nation was that his troops be assigned a more aggressive mission in their own battlespace.

After the country’s intentions were announced, representatives from the contributing nation, the associated U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation and U.S. Embassy, the USCENTCOM CCC, MNF–I, and Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) conducted mil-to-mil discussions to decide on a mission
Numerous courses of action were considered, and the participants eventually agreed that the coalition troops would be based near the border of a neighboring country and assigned the mission of deterring the flow of smuggled weapons into Iraq. At the time, U.S. and coalition forces were taking heavy casualties that were attributed to these smuggled weapons, and the mission was (and still is) considered critical to prevent the future loss of life. With the location and mission determined, the participants laid out the funding, equipment, training, and ammunition requirements to support the eventual deployment of the forces.

Over the next 6 months, the mil-to-mil participants, various coalition partners, and other organizations pulled together to make the deployment a reality. The all-important funding requirements were arranged and coordinated by OSD–P. The CCC brokered donations of weapons and equipment from three separate coalition partners. The Office of Defense Cooperation, which was intimately familiar with the readiness of the coalition forces, formulated the training requirements in conjunction with MNF–I. The deploying forces were trained in country by a mobile training team from U.S. European Command, and additional training was conducted by Task Force Gator when the forces arrived in Kuwait. MNC–I made major improvements to the camp where the additional troops would be housed and fed, and MNC–I also constructed six smaller satellite camps to help interdict the arms flow and establish a firmer footprint in the battlespace.

The deployment was arranged by the CCC, USCENTCOM C3 (Operations Directorate) and C4 (Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate), and the U.S. Transportation Command. After their arrival, the troops were slowly spread out to the outlying camps. The original troops have rotated out and been replaced, and discussions to keep the forces through 2008, and possibly beyond, are ongoing.

**Sustaining Coalition Relationships.**

The military experience and capabilities of most “developing country” coalition partners are not at the same level as their American counterparts. While it is understandable that operational commanders want and expect the most competent and experienced troops available to perform current missions, it is also essential for the United States to forge relationships with a focus toward future operations. The experience gained by developing nations in today’s conflicts will improve their troops’ professionalism, efficiency, and confidence, preparing them to fight in the conflicts of tomorrow. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, the countries’ value as coalition partners will increase as well. Their experience also improves their nations’ domestic security capabilities and creates coalition partners that the United States can depend on in future conflicts.

Building, sustaining, and improving the coalition are evolving processes. Having our partners involved in them is the most effective and lasting method to achieve buy-in and permanency. The Combined Planning Group (CPG) was one of the initial coalition-manned organizations created in USCENTCOM. A part of the J5 Directorate, the CPG consists of U.S., allied, and hand-selected coalition members tasked with advising the USCENTCOM commander with strategic- to operational-level plans and assessments, and political-military and civil-military analysis in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. A less formal entity that contributes to the USCENTCOM mission is the coalition-led working group. A current example deals with the ongoing effort to ensure the consistency and interoperability of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.

Interoperability between the 25 PRTs in Afghanistan and ISAF forces is critical to their efficient operation. With 13 different nations in charge of PRTs, however, procedures, practices, and budgets vary, leading to less-than-optimal tactical-level actions in support of strategic lines of operation. To help alleviate this deficiency, coalition SNRs assigned to USCENTCOM developed a plan of attack. They set up lessons learned/best practice briefings by all countries leading PRTs in Afghanistan. After each lead country briefs the practices and procedures of its particular PRT, a working group made up of SNRs of...
each lead PRT country determines best practices. Where differences in achieving interoperability exist, the working group decides the best way ahead and makes a recommendation. This evolution not only assesses multiple ways to get things done in a PRT and provide the best procedures across the spectrum but also ensures better coalition partner buy-in of the recommended procedures. Enabling partners to take on an issue, come up with a solution, and own the outcome strengthens the coalition while achieving the desired results.

In a March 2006 speech, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that while there are significant differences between the war on terror and the Cold War, there are enough similarities to provide useful lessons:

*Both required our nation to gird for a long, sustained struggle, punctuated by periods of military conflict. . . . Both require the use of all elements of national power to defeat the enemy. Both required a transition from arrangements that were successful in the previous war to arrangements that were much better suited for this new and different era. And above all, both required perseverance by the American people and by their leadership to be sure.*

Rumsfeld noted that there was no timeframe for when the war on terror might end, but that it could last “a good many years” and would require “patience and courage” to see through.1

With this long-term vision, the United States must continuously pursue the support of coalition partners to sustain the fight and explore methods that integrate the strengths of the partners’ capabilities to fill the gaps within our military’s operations.

In 2007, the RAND Arroyo Center published a report for the Army entitled *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations*, which states:

*Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army’s capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and DOD strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner army capabilities that support joint requirements. To do this, the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DOD and other U.S. government agencies provides the solution and also enables the development of partner capacity.*

The reality today is that the United States embraces any and all countries willing to support the coalition, whether they are contributing a platoon or a brigade, one aircraft or a squadron, a single ship or multiple vessels. Every mission accomplished by our coalition partners is one the United States will not need to perform. However, the Army’s “capability gap” approach is effective and should be followed throughout the Department of Defense. A particular coalition partner agreeing to become an expert for a particular niche requirement for missions in future conflicts will pay off in the long run.

Integration of coalition forces to support the U.S. Central Command mission is resource intensive, at times tedious, but always enlightening. The full cooperation and close coordination of the entire military community are essential to coalition development and sustenance. Including coalition partners in planning and decisionmaking at the command by integrating the staff and keeping communication flowing both ways is the only way to ensure partner nation buy-in and the continued strength of this coalition or any other. Indeed, the war on terror demands the cooperation of all nations striving for stability and prosperity in the world. Strong, integrated, military coalitions will continue to play a large role in this effort. JFQ

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**NOTES**


BATTLING MISPERCEPTIONS

Challenges to U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia

By ROGER D. KANGAS

The far northern region of U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of responsibility—the five states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—is removed from the current main centers of attention, Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan thus overlooks the security reality in the rest of the command’s area of responsibility. When issues concerning Central Asia are addressed, it is often in the context of the region being a crossroads or transit area. Whether one focuses on energy reserves and export routes or the stability of supply lines to forces in Afghanistan, there is a tendency to view Central Asia as a part of the world over which states compete.

It is in this context that nearly two decades of active U.S. engagement in the Eurasian region have been viewed. In American parlance, this territory has often been cast as “former Soviet colonies,” the “Muslim

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south,” the “Near Abroad” (borrowing from the Russian portrayal of the region), “the ‘stans,” or simply as conduits for engagement in Afghanistan. In each instance, the Central Asian states are defined in relation to Russia or to the Middle and Near East. Perhaps as fallout from this confusion, the United States has had to deal with misperceptions, suspicions, and fears that it desires to enter this area and dominate it, setting the terms for political, economic, and even cultural development.

Over the years, official statements and newspaper articles from these states have pointed to an increasingly negative perception of the United States and its role. For American officials, this trend ought to be viewed as an opportunity to present the United States in a more favorable light, given that any U.S. presence in the region could in theory be contrasted to Russian, Chinese, or Iranian “threats of regional hegemony,” as well as with an abysmal Soviet legacy that has been cast as a period of “colonial occupation.” Yet this healthier portrayal of Washington and its interests has not been achieved. The current situation thus raises the question of how the United States found itself in a relatively weak position in the region. More important, how did the current perceptions come about?

U.S. Policy in Transition

Much has been written on U.S. policy toward Central Asia, with a few recent publications focusing on the important issue of security cooperation. These works have carefully laid out the various programs, events, and funding levels since the U.S. Government began such engagement in the 1990s. Moreover, they note how specific security cooperation efforts have been part of a broader regional policy. Given that American policy has shifted over time and priorities have not been as clearly stated as the regional powers might have wanted, it is not surprising that there is uncertainty as to the intent and success of such programs. In this light, some basic trends can be noted.

First, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was not an immediate rush to recognize all of the successor states as independent entities. Would the Soviet Union re-unite? Would these “states” end up as confederated appendages to the Russian government? When it was clear that Washington was looking at separate countries, it relied on a policy of “Russia first,” which meant that U.S.-Russian relations were deemed more important than bilateral ties with other post-Soviet states. As relations changed, so did this policy, but for at least 5 years or so, Central Asia was considered part of Moscow’s sphere of influence. The most significant consequence was the conduct of the civil war in Tajikistan. The United States supported Russia taking the lead on peace negotiations and conflict resolution in that country. Tajikistan was simply more important for Russia than for America.

Second, during most of the 1990s, non-governmental organizations, supported with U.S. Government funding, came to be significant actors in carrying out American goals. This allowed such entities to expand, often resulting in Central Asian officials concluding that they actually represented official U.S. policy. At this stage, programs focusing on democratization, economic liberalization, and human rights dominated U.S. engagement, with scant attention to security cooperation.

Third, as U.S. relations with Russia deteriorated, there was a renewed interest in Central Asia—as a region to pry away from Russia. Whether one looked at the Silk Road Legislation coming out of the U.S. Congress or an increased discussion on energy pipelines that could circumvent Russia, energy became the buzzword for the region. The only time Central Asia and the Caspian Region were mentioned in the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy was with respect to energy security. In this instance, energy security was related to the open access to energy deposits in the region by outside companies and countries. Specifically, could American companies participate in the exploitation of energy reserves in the region? Would the United States or its allies be beneficiaries of energy derived from the region?

In this context, it could easily be overstated that America was, and is, solely interested in the energy resources of Central Asia.

Fourth, one could claim that the single issue dominating U.S. Central Asian policy after September 11, 2001, was no longer energy, but security. At the time, many believed that the Central Asian states could provide bases for military operations and fly-over rights for aircraft. The United States quickly drew up Status of Forces Agreements with each of the Central Asian states, as well as the Russian Federation, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In some instances, this was simply permission to use airspace and the possibility of using an airport in an emergency. In other instances, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz...
Republic, it included the right to station forces in the country. The resources devoted to the area because of this exercise were tremendous and exceeded past assistance to the region. In the eyes of some analysts, this was a moment when the United States could have made a real difference in Central Asia. At the same time, it was not surprising to hear criticisms that the economic liberalization. Other goals, such as democracy-building or in the eyes of the United States overshadowed it was not surprising to hear criticisms that the

Shifting priorities and changing levels of importance have underscored U.S. engagement in Central Asia. For the U.S. side, these phases can be explained by looking at the evolution of security policy and foreign relations in general, especially in light of significant international crises such as the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and the war in Iraq. For the Central Asian partners, acceptance of that rationale is less than forthcoming. One sees either a lack of understanding in what the United States would like to do or a belief that America might not be as committed to the region as it has stated.

**Problematic Perceptions**

It would be naïve to think that engagement in the region would be accepted without question and cynical to assume that it is always received with feigned interest. Those who have worked security cooperation programs since the 1990s note a regular enthusiasm for seminars, training opportunities, international military education and training programs, and the like. Central Asians who have participated in foreign exchange programs (training in the United States or elsewhere) often maintain ties with their newfound colleagues and speak highly of their American interlocutors. U.S. military representatives in the respective countries likewise have been able to forge positive relations and advance U.S. policy quite effectively, while often working with constrained budgets and staffing.

Over time, practical limitations have been consistently noted. The modest number of participants and the continual change in personnel who engage in cooperative programs mean there still is a familiarization process taking place. Not surprisingly, from the U.S. side, there is a constant stream of new faces; personnel rotations dictate that within 2 to 3 years, those engaged with Central Asian programs will have to move on. Central Asian officers are therefore not sure they even can cooperate with their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, participants noted that during training exercises, U.S. troops tended to be stationed apart from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) units, and the language barrier sometimes prevented real bonding.

Central Asian units are familiar with the Russian training approaches, military culture, and tactics. Even in U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-backed exercises, the Central Asians will conclude the day with their Russian counterparts. As one officer involved in an early exercise noted, “We’re of the same school. We know each other.” Likewise, during U.S.-sponsored conferences and programs that take place in the region, U.S. participants often keep to the main hotel and regularly dine with their fellow Americans, rarely venturing out to socialize with their local hosts. One area of continuity has been partnerships with National Guard units under the auspices of USCENTCOM cooperative programming. Today, there is a bit more familiarity, but the cohesiveness found in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises is not necessarily replicated in Western-dominated drills.

As the sides get to know each other, some things have begun to change. For example, there has been a military culture mismatch revolving around how much responsibility is given to different ranks. Central Asian officers have critically commented that “when you send trainers, you send sergeants, not officers, to train our officers. Is this a sign of disrespect for our military?” What they do not realize is that the U.S. military requires a cadre of well-trained professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted personnel—a tradition not found in many post-Soviet armies—and thus “non-officers” carry out the work that post-Soviet officers would normally do. Such a reaction is to be expected from a region where the military tradition does not include a professional NCO corps. As this aspect of
the U.S. military is now better known, such contrasting views are not as prevalent.

On a broader level, the strategic significance of the region for the United States is repeatedly questioned. Comparisons between U.S. action in Southeast Europe versus a relatively inactive policy in Tajikistan and even Afghanistan prior to 2001 are inevitable. For example, during the Central Asian Battalion exercise in 1997, Central Asian officials thought the presence of the 82d Airborne Division suggested that the Americans would assist in securing the southern border of the region. Given the American unit’s mandate during the exercise, this was viewed as inconceivable. Consequently, when U.S. troops did appear in 2001, the actions were seen as benefiting the United States more than regional actors. American units, the 82d among them, are engaged in counterterrorism and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, which have a positive effect on Central Asian security and even address the concerns raised prior to 2001. However, the regional security connection is often not made in the Central Asian media and in public statements. In reality, the Central Asian region does not score well in the U.S. National Security Strategy, nor does it place high on the priority lists of USCENTCOM. Even departmental reorganizations have been cast in this light. With the shift away from fellow Eurasian states to offices that include Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is clear that the Central Asian countries will almost always receive little attention compared to these states with high security concerns. Thus, for understandable reasons, there is a healthy dose of skepticism on U.S. intent in the region.

Much of the skepticism has been articulated by participants from Central Asia in seminar exercises at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. To evaluate the relative long-term importance of U.S. security cooperation, it was vital to compare this cooperation to the presence of other “outside” actors. When asked to rank the most significant external actors in the security and economic realms, Central Asian officials reflected a striking pattern. With regard to security, Russia was consistently placed first. In over 8 years, rare was the individual, let alone the country delegation or course group, who considered Russia to be anything less than “most important.” Second and third places shifted over time. In the late 1990s, one saw the presence of Turkey, Iran, or the United States. After a strong showing by the United States early in this decade, the second spot is now usually reserved for China. This is not to say that China is viewed positively. On the contrary, concern is consistently expressed that China is “hard to understand” and could easily have designs on Central Asia. While not perhaps desiring to physically take over the countries of Central Asia, China is viewed especially by those from bordering countries (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan) as wanting to be the primary actor in the region.

Likewise, in the realm of economic relations, Russia plays a leading role. Again, the subsequent positions have rotated—with even the European Union present in some years. However, after 2005, China moved up to second place as well. In this category, America is often left out completely, although one could look at foreign direct investment and U.S. Government assistance programs and still see significant numbers. The logic is rather straightforward: regardless of actual numbers, programs, and intentions, U.S. engagement policies are not viewed at face value. This is the concern one should have in hearing such criticisms of the U.S. engagement agenda. That the dollar amounts are lower than expectations is understandable. The problem arises when such figures, which are high relative to those of other countries, are deemed ineffective.

Part of the answer lies in how the assistance is couched. Use of Western language and concepts often translates into apprehension of American motivations on the part of officials in Central Asia. Terms such as democratization, civilian control of the military, colored revolutions, human rights, and even East-West corridors conjure up images of an America attempting to interfere within the domestic political arenas in the region. Naturally, democratization programs ought to focus on providing assistance to potential political actors in a given country, and, of course, governments in power would be reluctant to give up their share. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Central Asian media and officials were quick to parrot criticisms formulated in Russia and China. While not articulating the “adventurism” arguments expressed in the countries’ media, Central Asians fixated on the issues of “regime change,” “preemption,” and “challenging Iraqi national sovereignty” as points of departure from their traditional acceptance of the U.S. strategy. This translated into a greater questioning of, and resistance to, security cooperation. Ulterior motives and hidden agendas—always part of debates on regional geopolitics—became more prominent in discussions. In short, the United States has been viewed as an outside player that might interfere in domestic politics and will not be able to forge lasting and consistent policies.

Such language was put to the test vis-à-vis Uzbekistan in the early part of this decade. When the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship was deemed a “strategic partnership” in 2002, the reading from the Uzbek side was quite clear: the United States is a friend who will work with us to achieve our primary goals of stability and security. In actuality, the document signed by both parties stated obligations and commitments that were realistic. It was the perception within Uzbekistan—especially as it felt confident enough to break away from Russia, the CIS, and other regional structures—that perhaps it read too much into the rhetoric that accompanied the “strategic partnership.” That the events of May 2005 in Andijon, Uzbekistan, were considered such a threat ran counter to the U.S. (and international) accusations that it was a human rights tragedy on par with the June 1989 massacre on Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

The challenge of perception can be illustrated by considering what took place after...
the events in Andijon. In the first week of May 2005, I was in the city of Andijon, among other cities in the Fergana Valley, lecturing to alumni from U.S. Government-sponsored programs. Two weeks later, and immediately after the violence, I was back in Tashkent. Within this short timeframe, the discussions surrounding Andijon among Uzbek officials and the general population focused on the instability that such uprisings might cause in the country. Information was limited, and the initial government estimates of casualties and causes were vague. Those with access to the initial government estimates of casualties in the country. Information was limited, and the initial government estimates of casualties and causes were vague. Those with access to international media had already been exposed to reports by the BBC, in particular, that gave more graphic and horrific accounts of what took place. How did this play out in Uzbekistan? Initially, as noted, there was confusion as to the actual events. Moreover, at no time was this seen as anything more than a local event perpetrated by members of the so-called Akromiya group with probable support from a web of international terrorist cells that had been working in Central Asia.

Shirin Akiner, a renowned expert on Central Asia, reported on her experience in Andijon shortly after the violence. As this report questioned the claims of the Western news media and provided some explanation as to the Uzbek actions, she was pilloried by other Westerners. However, in Uzbekistan, she offered what was deemed a middle-of-the-road approach to addressing the problem. Once again, reports originating from Russian media found traction in Central Asia. Moreover, the Uzbek government—now distanced from the West—began to address more sinister aspects of the events, including some outlandish scenarios that suggested Western compliance as a precursor to a “colored revolution.” As has been well reported and debated, U.S.-Uzbek relations quickly collapsed, and the base at Karshi-Khanabad, which was already tenuously supported, closed down later that year. In the region, this was cast as an American failure to support our strategic ally in a time of great need. At the same time, China and Russia did declare their support for Uzbekistan, to the point of even comparing their views with those of the United States.

While this event never obtained the level of attention of other acts of violence in the world, it became a watershed moment for those working Central Asian issues. Particularly after President Islam Karimov refused to meet with a delegation of U.S. Senators in late May, the U.S. Government stepped up its criticism of the Uzbek government. For all intents and purposes, the strategic partnership between America and Uzbekistan was over. Adding insult to injury, these criticisms were less of the individuals and more of the message. The fact that such conditions were not perceived to be placed on other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and China, the most often cited comparisons, usually resulted in discussion of double standards—an accusation commonly raised by officials from the region.

The previously mentioned Central Asian groups at the Marshall Center reflected this transition. In the summer of 2005, most acknowledged that the Andijon violence was unfortunate and either preferred not to discuss it or put the blame on an overly zealous Uzbek security force. As Uzbeks had stopped attending Marshall Center courses that year, discussions could take place without Uzbeks, thus dispensing with the common courtesy of not speaking ill of a neighbor who is present. Within a year, however, the tenor of the comments changed. Even officials from the Kyrgyz Republic became critical of the West’s approach to Uzbekistan. The 400+ Uzbek citizens who had crossed the border in May 2005 went from “refugees” to “questionable people,” with the concern that they had not been properly screened and were now loose outside of Uzbekistan’s grasp. There was a belief that some of the refugees were not innocent citizens of Andijon, but the perpetrators of the violence itself, contradicting the U.S. position.

Thus, it is not surprising that as the United States has begun to lavish attention on Kazakhstan, one starts to hear concerns raised by Central Asians. The shift to Kazakhstan as the primary country with which to engage has included the same lan-

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So What Does This Mean?

If the United States were to pull up stakes and leave, the region would plod ahead. Engagement in Central Asia and security cooperation more specifically are not existential challenges to America. However, by ignoring opportunities for positive and mutually beneficial relationships, Washington is missing an opportunity to address key

Kazakhstani performers ride at opening of multinational peacekeeping and relief exercise

Photograph courtesy of Shoemake (Jeremy T. Lock)

most acknowledged that the Andijon violence was unfortunate and either preferred not to discuss it or put the blame on an overly zealous Uzbek security force
transnational threats and help foster stability in a region that needs it. The irony is that most of this has been said in past years. As early as the late 1990s, analysts were lamenting the uneven nature of U.S. security engagement in Central Asia and were offering proposals to fix it. Fred Starr, for example, advocated a policy that engaged Uzbekistan and focused on a slow, deliberate policy of reform.14 Sylvia Babus and Judith Yaphe articulated the reason for avoiding false expectations and understanding the broader neighborhood.15 These views, and those expressed by other experts, generally emphasized a need to understand the context within which the Central Asian states operated. Nearly a decade later, these lessons seem to have not been fully learned. Indeed, the engagement challenges today are hauntingly similar to those of past years, even factoring in the current situation in Afghanistan, which itself has gone on for some time.

Oddly, one could list the key security concerns of all five Central Asian states and find them strikingly similar to U.S. concerns. Afghanistan is foremost on their mind as a security challenge, but there are also the issues of economic development and global integration. From the Central Asian side, a key obstacle to accepting additional U.S. assistance is simply that Washington is deemed to be unreliable, mercurial, and meddling. Altering these views does not require that America shifts its focus completely, but that it simply returns to basics, fulfills promises, and continues to engage with these states as openly as possible. If the United States addressed the perceptions and concerns of the region in a constructive manner, then advantages for both sides could be seen.

Kazakhstan is currently deemed the most important partner in the region and the one with the best chance to more fully integrate with the West. From the Kazakhstani side, however, the United States is one of several outside powers that must be balanced. As expressed in the “multi-vector security policy,” Kazakhstani officials note that their national interests are best served by cooperating with all sides. If there is a strategic partnership with the United States, it is seen in a more utilitarian light and not as an expression of a true alliance. In contrast, while the notion of strategic partnership has receded from U.S.-Uzbekistan discourse, recent actions, including former USCENTCOM commander Admiral William Fallon’s visit to Uzbekistan in January 2008 and the limited basing rights allowed at Termez in March 2008, suggest that a more modest and realistic approach is being worked out between the two countries. The problem is that the Uzbeks do not play by U.S. rules and continue to ignore calls for loosening controls on civil society.

The base at Manas dominates U.S. relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, and counternarcotics assistance dominates relations with Tajikistan. Short of those, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are not significant to broader U.S. security interests and, unfortunately, will be given less attention unless and until violence occurs and instability results in these countries. It is this reactive nature of U.S. engagement with countries considered less vital that precludes the possibility of truly developing and sustaining an active security cooperation program. Even though the United States has global commitments, it does not have to be so unpredictable.

by assessing U.S. security cooperation initiatives over time, the decision to continue or adjust programs can be more intelligently made

Efforts at USCENTCOM over the past 2 years to coordinate security cooperation in a longer-term and strategic manner has resulted in a better understanding of what the United States can and ought to do. Moreover, by assessing U.S. security cooperation initiatives over time, the decision to continue or adjust programs can be more intelligently made. However, if funding levels continue to drop for engagement in Central Asia, these well-articulated plans will be wasted.

Whether or not we think they are valid and properly reflect U.S. intentions, these perceived “realities” in American policy toward the region are common knowledge among the security officials of the respective countries. While one can still hear accounts of “American grand strategies” toward the region, for the most part, the common line of argument is that the United States came in with a bang, promised much, and delivered little. Whether the delivery shortfall was a result of changing policies, the limitations inherent in foreign assistance, and the difficulties in distribution (including the siphoning off of aid by government officials) is irrelevant. After years of developing relationships in the region, the United States still has much to learn. However, modest steps that include concrete and long-term planning—with consistent funding—are a promising way to ensure that America can engage Central Asia. After all, a Washington that is willing to remain active in the region in specified areas can still play a constructive role.

It is imperative that, in this continued engagement, we seek to monitor how our message is being perceived. On the one hand, questionnaires filled out by participants at the end of training courses or programs tend to be positive, but that can be a function of the individual writing what he thinks he ought to say, as the notion of an “anonymous survey” is looked on with great skepticism. At the other extreme, one can rely on a handful of anecdotes (positive or negative) and draw generalized conclusions about entire engagement programs. A constant study of these approaches, plus the inclusion of public statements by officials and the media (which reflect official views for the most part) can offer at least a sampling of perceptions of both specific engagement programs and the broader strategic environment with which they are placed. Moreover, we must be mindful that while we often operate under an implicit sense that they want to think and act like us, mirror-imaging can result in the sort of misperceptions that have arisen in past years.

As for the information that surveys gather on the United States and the regions closer to home, how these questions are addressed is shaped by the countries’ cultural and historical processes, as well as the information readily available. While the U.S. Government continually debates funding for Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty offices that broadcast in Central Asian languages, Russian programming is all-pervasive and accessible. The modest costs associated with supporting American information efforts can make a difference and, in turn, create a more positive environment for security cooperation in Central Asia. After all, changing perceptions of the United States in general and of U.S. security cooperation in particular has no magic bullet.

The United States must stop believing that it can reorient the states of Central Asia to the West, at the expense of their other links and identities. This is not to abandon any hope of engagement, but rather to put our presence in the region in a proper perspective that is equally intelligible within Central Asia. As much as we wish that people in these countries will want
to be like us, create democratic regimes with market economies, and see the United States in a positive light with the best intentions, the reality is different. None of the states is so malleable that it can quickly alter past patterns and current interests. It is much better to understand that the Central Asian countries have multiple identities.20 To assume that we must somehow limit their access to officials from outside of the West is a mistaken and short-sighted policy. In the context of Department of Defense regional centers, it is a positive sign that Central Asian officials can participate in programs at the Marshall Center, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies—given that these countries must have a better understanding of, and relations with, neighboring states in all directions.

Integral to a successful solution is patience. A generation that is deeply mired in a Soviet-like mindset cannot change. Even how they perceive threats to their respective countries is articulated in Soviet-style language.21 They can be partners in cooperative efforts, especially if national security interests correspond, but one should not expect to see a radical shift in outlook. Indeed, the next generation—the young officers and government officials currently in place—has already accepted certain truisms about the United States. However, with constant, transparent engagement, there will be a change. This change will not be subject to “measures of effectiveness.” After all, to not fixate on immediate change requires more than patience. It also calls for a true belief that one’s approach is correct. In the 1990s, many outsiders exhibited a euphoria that the Russian/Soviet influence was over and that the Central Asian states would “naturally” bond with the West—be it the United States, Turkey (considered our “proxy”), or Europe—but this did not happen. For deep-rooted ideas about the West and about America in particular to be truly challenged, one must be prepared to keep engaging and working on these ideas for some time to come. This does not bode well for those interested in instantly measurable results, but it is more in line with the situation on the ground.

In the fall of 2005, there was a sense that the United States somehow “lost Uzbekistan.” In the years since, the relationships with the other Central Asian states have also been cast in the light of ownership and control. In reality, Washington is not “losing” the region or finding itself irrelevant to its future. Rather, to better engage, the United States ought to reexamine claims of past officials who have worked in the region to realize that the answers are already present.22 True security cooperation is a dialogue that requires a better understanding of how our partners view things that we assume to be clear. JFQ

NOTES


7 An active and effective information campaign was carried out by groups such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House—both organizations that annually reported on human rights abuses in the Central Asian countries. A particular focus was placed on Uzbekistan, especially as it was deemed a close U.S. ally and “strategic partner.” See Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance after September 11, Human Rights Watch Report 14, no. 1 (G), February 2002. Also see Nations in Transit by Freedom House, which is published annually, for analysis on the domestic environment in the Central Asian states.

8 For an official view, see Richard Boucher, “U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities,” address delivered to the House International Relations Committee, April 26, 2006.

9 Central Asian Battalion exercise participant comment to author, July 1999.

10 Participant response during NATO School mobile education and training team in 2003. Similar reactions were seen during a visit on a U.S. Coast Guard ship in New York harbor in spring 2002. The ship was largely manned by an enlisted crew. While other countries send their senior NCOs to courses designed for those ranks, such as at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the Central Asian militaries are still reluctant to make these changes.

11 From 1992 to the present, the U.S. Government provided nearly $1.4 billion in assistance to all five states, with Kazakhstan receiving 55 percent of the total, Uzbekistan 25 percent, and the remaining three countries the other 20 percent combined. U.S. Department of State figures.


14 The program developed by the U.S. Public Diplomacy office included visits to Tashkent, Fergana, Namangan, and Andijon, May 2005.


17 One of the more bizarre scenarios suggested that U.S. forces in Afghanistan actually provided lift capabilities to insurgents who worked their way from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan.


20 Brenda Shaffer, ed., The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006).

21 For an illuminating account of the 1999 Tashkent bombings and the Soviet “spin” on them, see Oleg Yakubow, The Pack of Wolves: The Blood Trail of Terror (Moscow: Veche, 2000).

22 One of the clearest assessments of U.S. policy in Central Asia was delivered by Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 13, 2001.
The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA Center) is the preeminent U.S. Government institution for building relationships and understanding in the region. Approved by the Secretary of Defense in 2000, the center was formally launched in October of that year. The youngest of the Department of Defense (DOD) regional centers, it covers one of the most diverse and volatile areas of the world, stretching from the western end of North Africa to the Himalayas—from Marrakech to Bangladesh. The region includes that part of the world where the United States has the greatest number of combat troops deployed—more than 250,000 military and civilian personnel in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) countries alone.

Many look at the NESA region and see a confusing sea of ethnic and sectarian conflict sitting atop oil reserves and wonder how the United States can play a positive role. The NESA Center has a clear answer: through dialogue, building relationships, and constant communication and engagement, just as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in his confirmation hearing. These are the bedrock principles of the center and are reflected in everything we do—from seminars and workshops, to sustaining engagement with current and former participants, to strategic communication and outreach efforts.

NESA Center participating countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya (new in 2006), Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Our region includes 57 percent of USCENTCOM’s countries, and 54 percent of our alumni come from this area of responsibility (AOR). The center also recently began collaborating with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies to interface with the Central Asian states. We truly are USCENTCOM’s regional center and will likely have an office in its AOR in the coming year.

The original concept of the NESA Center was both simple and controversial. It was based on the premise that Arabs and Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians, and other rival parties would come together to discuss their national security issues in a neutral setting for mutually beneficial dialogue. We must build and sustain long-term relationships with key regional players to bring this about and thus protect and enhance U.S. vital interests.

As both the dynamics of our region and our guidance from the Secretary of Defense changed after 9/11, the NESA Center expanded its programs and activities. New programs on countering ideological support for terrorism, increasing and improving strategic communication and outreach to the region, and supporting other strategic goals have been implemented, with more coming.

In April 2006, Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), was appointed the

John D. Lawrence is Acting Chief of Outreach in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

**Why Focus on the NESA Region?**

- a region with more than 1.8 billion people—nearly 30 percent of the world’s population
- a region that is the birthplace of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism
- a region with a majority of the world’s oil reserves
- a region that stretches from the Sahara to the Himalayas
- a region with four nations that have, or are suspected of developing, nuclear weapons capabilities and that have frictional relationships with some of their neighbors
- a region rife with ongoing, violent border disputes for the past half-century
- a region with two state sponsors of terrorism (Syria and Iran) as well as transnational terrorist threats such as al Qaeda
- a region where U.S. and coalition partners have toppled two repressive regimes in the past 6 years
- a region that produces an overwhelming majority of the world’s opium and heroin
- a region where the United States has deployed more than 250,000 military and civilian personnel
- a region at the strategic crossroads and major trade routes of Europe, Asia, and Africa
NESA Center’s Director. As the first general officer to lead the center—having been the commander of Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (2003–2005) and of Task Force Warrior, which trained free Iraqi forces in Hungary (2003)—he brought new vision. Some of the changes we have instituted are detailed below. What has not changed is the center’s affiliation with the National Defense University (NDU), one of the world’s premier professional military education institutions. The NESA Center is collocated with NDU, and both institutions are committed to providing a world-class academic environment for students.

In his Director’s Message for 2008, General Barno stated that “sustaining a strong personal connection to our alumni will remain a cornerstone of the NESA experience.” And it is our alumni who are the true resource for the center and for any U.S. Government personnel who attend. As of late 2007, our more than 1,500 alumni included the following senior military officers: 12 at the three- to four-star level; 47 two-stars, and 145 one-stars. These figures do not include civilian equivalents for these ranks, let alone distinguished U.S. alumni such as General Victor Renuart, USAF (commander, U.S. Strategic Command), and Vice Admiral David Nichols, USN (Ret.) (former deputy commander, USCENTCOM).

Responsive to Priorities: Jointness

The NESA Center is expanding and enhancing its programs. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD officials, we have focused on strengthening strategic communication and outreach efforts while at the same time adhering to the academic standards that have made the center such a well-known and respected institution. For example, we established a separate Outreach Office that handles issues ranging from communication with alumni to outreach with government stakeholders.

Moreover, we have held programs dedicated to the war on terror and have contributed to countering ideological support for terrorism. The center conducts a strategic listening post war on terror workshop with senior military, police, civilian officials, and critical opinion makers from the NESA region on issues related to combating extremism. The 2-day workshop involves intensive discussions on lessons learned on the ground in combating terror and countering insurgency, focusing on practical concerns, regional perceptions, and how radical organizations recruit and train.

We work closely with the combatant commands and in particular with USCENTCOM. Our work with and for the command has included:

- direct support for the annual Eagle Resolve and Bright Star exercises
- issue-specific roundtables with experts from both the government and private sector
- direct support of commander’s conferences beginning in 2002
- focused workshops with USCENTCOM on health security, border security, nonproliferation, and other issues
- outreach to the senior national representatives at Coalition Village.

Due to the geography of our region, we also work with U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command and have begun to forge better ties with U.S. Special Operations Command. We will also support U.S. Africa Command when it is fully operational. In addition, we participate with our combatant commands in their theater security cooperation planning as well as their annual training program management reviews.

The NESA Center is strengthening ties with the Department of State and other agencies as we become a “test bed for interagency jointness.” This includes not only reaching out across the Government to inform agencies about the center and to share with them our backbriefs from trips and seminars, but also actively seeking more U.S. participants from a broader spectrum of the Government. For example, in coordination with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), we held a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) orientation in spring 2006, solely for State/USAID/DOD officials deploying on PRTs. This was the center’s first U.S. Government–only event. At our August 2006 combating terrorism seminar, we welcomed three U.S. Government participants, all from the State Department (another first).

alumni are the true resource for the center and for any U.S. Government personnel who attend

The Secretary of Defense instructed the five regional centers to increase coordination and cooperation. Although the centers’ responsibilities cover the globe and their headquarters stretch across 8,000 miles and many time zones, our work together increases constantly. Since fall of 2005, for example, the regional centers’ strategic communication and public affairs officers have repeatedly met to discuss efforts and to exchange ideas and lessons learned. In addition, all the centers are working to implement the Regional International Outreach system, which will facilitate communication among the centers and, ultimately, with alumni across the world.

Core Programs

Since its inception, the NESA Center’s core programs have provided the foundation upon which we have built and enhanced our mission. We hold 3½-week executive seminars for the O–5 to O–7 level and 2-week senior executive seminars for flag/general officers, as well as minister and Ambassador-level participants. In response to our participants’ suggestions, the length of both seminars was extended in 2007. Topics include the American national security structure and process, the current and future regional strategic environment, counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and disaster management.

These off-the-record, not-for-attribution seminars encourage a frank exchange of views primarily on issues facing the NESA.
region in the next 5 to 10 years when these midcareer officials will rise to senior levels. Participants are reminded when they arrive that they should speak candidly rather than use their government talking points. Seminars generally contain 35 to 40 participants from 19 to 23 countries, including the United States. Plenary sessions bring in outside speakers—senior U.S. Government officials, specialists from think tanks, and academics—to help frame broad issues and generate thinking and discussion. The real magic happens, however, in the breakout groups. These faculty-led, open discussions draw out the participants in a way that cannot happen in larger groups.

During seminars, participant site visits include the Pentagon, State Department, and Capitol Hill. On the visits, participants meet with senior officials, Members of Congress, Hill staffers, and others to learn their roles in policy formulation. In particular, the Capitol Hill visit is popular; not only do participants go to the floor of the House of Representatives to learn about congressional procedures, but they also meet lobbyists, many encountering the concept of professional advocacy for the first time. Participants are surprised to find that these lobbyists, despite their infamous reputation in the NESA region, are simply people advocating for causes in which they believe. Specifically relevant to the NESA region, participants hear from advocates for Israel, Arab countries, and India.

Terrorism is a concern to all, particularly in our region. The center conducts two 2-week combating terrorism seminars annually that bring together regional counterterrorism practitioners. These seminars take a strategic perspective, highlighting how terrorism is part of a broad network of transnational threats. Responding to popular demand, the center will add a third course in fiscal year (FY) 2009. To make progress in countering support for terrorism, we need to look at causes rather than just specific attacks. The role of the NESA Center and the other regional centers is not to tell those in the kinetic world how to do their job. As General John Abizaid, USA, former commander of U.S. Central Command, stated, the fight against terrorism and extremism should be 85 percent nonkinetic, but at the present time, it is 85 percent kinetic. The center’s role is to help policymakers understand how to change this dynamic.

The NESA Center not only focuses on its region but also takes advantage of its Washington, DC, location to interface with embassies from the region. Center alumni fill senior embassy positions, but our programs also reach out to the broader embassy community. In 2005, for instance, we inaugurated a monthly Washington seminar series where we bring senior government speakers to discuss NESA region strategic issues with the diplomatic community, affording them access to officials they might not otherwise meet.

Expanding In-region Programs

One major change of the past 2 years is a significant increase in the number of NESA Center programs held in the region and overseas. Although these programs stretch budgets, we made a strategic decision to hold more events. The center’s FY08 in-region and overseas programs represented a 61 percent increase over FY07 and a more than 90 percent increase over FY06. These programs can be short, such as a workshop on Iraq’s border security held in Jordan, or a seminar on South Asian security, co-hosted with the Asia-Pacific Center, in Sri Lanka in 2006. We also conduct multiday bilateral programs in countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Yemen.

Alumni Symposium. Our biggest event in the region thus far was our 5-year reunion in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 2005, which brought together more than 100 former participants. For 3 intense days, we discussed recent policy developments (including the Amman Hotel bombings that happened less than a week before we met) and caught up with old friends. This was a first for the NESA Center, and we plan to repeat the event regularly by reuniting alumni from a specific year, professional field, or subregion.

Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centers. Working with counterpart institutions, the NESA Center established a regional network of strategic studies centers, whose goal is to expand strategic dialogue and collaborative research on common security challenges. The network initiative is cosponsored by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research, and Analysis (Pakistan); the Center for Strategic Research (Turkey); and the National Center for Strategic Studies (Jordan). The network of 30+ regional studies centers conducts business through working groups and virtual activities and seeks to foster writing that reflects viewpoints from across the region. The working groups focus on combating terrorism, nontraditional security issues, and democracy and governance, among others.

NESA Center Director, LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.)
**Combatant Command Support Events.** These programs include a wide variety of events in support of the three combatant commands in the NESA Center region—U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command. Events may be focused geographically by subregion or country or by functional topic and are usually 3- to 5-day workshops. The center has executed such events with USCENTCOM annually from 2002 to 2004, regularly supports the Eagle Resolve exercise, and will hold a health security workshop in Jordan this August that will be the culmination of 18 months of discussion with USCENTCOM and other participants.

**Track II.** These unofficial programs are organized and conducted by a U.S. nongovernmental organization with NESA Center involvement. One program brings together senior military officers from most countries in the Middle East and the United States for semiannual nonattributable discussions on strategic issues and military concerns. The other program meets three times a year and brings together approximately 300 Middle East officials and nonofficials for intense working group sessions dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Gulf security, Mediterranean security, economic development, democracy and culture, cooperative technology measures, and women’s issues. By gathering generally the same group of participants over several years—including many NESA Center alumni—the program generates a group not replicable in one-off seminars and keeps alumni engaged with the center. Besides facilitating critical regional communications, both series have resulted in actionable policy recommendations.

**Strategic Communication and Outreach**

Shortly after DOD stated that strategic communication and outreach should be key regional center priorities, the NESA Center established an Office for External and Strategic Communications. Now called simply Outreach, this office handles all communication with:

- alumni after they leave our seminars
- U.S. Government stakeholders in Washington and overseas
- points of contact in U.S. Embassies overseas, as well as foreign embassies in Washington
- interagency strategic communication community
- media, both domestic and regional
- our network of 30+ strategic studies centers across our region.

The center generates a dialogue that begins with the programs and continues after the participants leave. Participants communicate with us as much as we do with them. In addition, we produce short, nonattributed backbriefs after seminars and trips that we circulate on a limited basis to senior government stakeholders. These reports contain key/new facts or opinions gleaned from discussions with participants that help senior policymakers stay informed of views to which they would not otherwise be exposed. Our backbriefs generate responses on a routine basis from the three- and four-star level, sometimes resulting in staff action.

**Participants**

The NESA Center’s ability to generate programs that bring NESA region participants together is due in large part to participating countries, whose commitment to the center is demonstrated in every seminar when they send us their best and brightest. Importantly, participants are almost equally divided between military and civilians with more military than civilians in our USCENTCOM AOR alumni. In addition to our core region, we invite several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries to send participants, as our region is of vital concern to them as well.

The NESA Center also arranges separate meetings outside of the seminar. For example, counterterrorism specialists attend meetings with the Pentagon J3 office dealing with the war on terror. A deputy spokesman for a NATO country foreign ministry spoke with the Rapid Reaction Unit in the office of former Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes. Also, a one-star participant met with a Congressman to whom he had been introduced while the latter toured the Middle East. While our participants are here, we stress the benefits of technology. We loan each one a laptop computer for their time in Washington, provide computer instruction during lunch breaks, and have NDU librarians give detailed training on how to use library online resources, which are available to our participants for the rest of their lives. In addition, students receive training on Blackboard (the NDU Web site interface) and the NESA Center alumni Web site, which has a document library in multiple languages.

**Alumni Community Chapters**

In direct support of the National Security Strategy, DOD, and State Department policy, the NESA Center has launched its community chapter program, which will foster stronger civil-military relations and promote regional cooperation among senior-level NESA region leaders. In support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s strategic communication policy guidance, the community chapters will serve simultaneously as outreach activities and increase our already extensive two-way communication with the region. Active participation in these chapters will allow community members to network with U.S. officials as well as colleagues in their country and region.

Programs initiated by these chapters will continue to advance U.S. security policy, strengthen relationships in local governments, and enhance regional cooperation. They also will provide a means for the center to maintain contact with its alumni community, communicate up-to-date U.S. policy on the Near East and South Asia, and share information about activities and promotions of other community members and chapters. We are looking into linking our alumni chapters to the regional network of strategic studies centers wherever possible.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated, “How we stay engaged around the world, which we must do, how we build and maintain partnerships, which we must do, will largely determine our ability over the long term to do for the nation all that it expects of us.” Moreover, in February 2006, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, made it clear that the regional centers should “focus on improving networks and alumni outreach efforts . . . to communicate better.” The NESA Center encapsulates these very ideas in its daily activities in the United States, its region, and around the world. JFQ

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**NOTE**

Thinking **Total Cost** Requires 
Thinking Up Front

*By A D A M B . S I E G E L*

America has developed a 99-cent shopping obsession that has turned Benjamin Franklin’s adage “a penny saved is a penny earned” on its head. A price of $100 gives us pause, but $99.99 seems like a bargain. Combined with easy access to revolving credit and a disposal culture, our focus on purchase price overshadows the total cost of many of our purchase decisions. We tend to focus on the “cost to buy” rather than the “cost to own.” More often than we care to admit, we are—to trot out another axiom, which predates Franklin—“penny wise and pound foolish.”

This is true, for example, when it comes to U.S. Navy shipbuilding where, despite the best intentions, the process seems focused on sticker price and today’s bill (the *cost to buy*) rather than the full-system cost (the Navy’s and Nation’s *cost to own*). The most intense public scrutiny is given to the sticker price, even though most ships conceal the vast majority of their cost in the post-purchase phase: in operations, maintenance, and modernization.

**Realities of Cost**

The Navy’s planned shipbuilding program seeks to increase capabilities while trying to lower—or at least manage and contain—the true (long-term) cost to the Nation of the fleet and its capabilities.

To achieve lower total ownership cost (TOC) often requires investing more dollars up front in areas such as:

- additional decision support analysis
- higher quality materials and construction
- technology to reduce manning requirements.

Adam B. Siegel is a Senior Analyst in the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center.

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**U.S. Navy (Erik N. Hoffman)**

**USS San Antonio** speeds to last known location of missing fishing vessel off North Carolina, March 2008
Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front

These can contribute to higher upfront costs even while fostering much lower TOC.

Additional decision support up front can raise tradeoffs between capability requirements, acquisition costs, and life cycle costs. For example, in net present value terms, does it make sense to invest in computing technology to reduce the number of Sailors required to man engine rooms, understanding that the computing technology will have to be sustained through its life cycle? This more intense analysis to help frame a better long-term result, by definition, creates a higher upfront cost.

When buying a television or refrigerator, we can run to the nearest store and listen to the salesperson and walk out with a new appliance, or we can read Consumer Reports and take time to make a reasoned choice based on price comparisons combined with understanding preferred features, repair history, and energy use. The first certainly takes less upfront investment (time) while the second is more likely to have a longer-term positive result.

Higher quality construction also can contribute to higher procurement costs through designing for the incorporation of future technology upgrades less expensively and using higher quality materials to lower future maintenance requirements.

Investment in technologies (frequently, information technologies) enables reducing manning requirements. For most Navy ships, the 30, 40, or 50 years of manning are the largest single life cycle cost. Each Sailor taken off a ship represents roughly $150,000 in lowered costs every year.

When buying a home, it would be less expensive not to have a washing machine or dishwasher. But considering the adage “time is money,” those acquisition savings would quickly be eaten up by either the time and cost for buying all these systems or the cost of time and water for washing clothing by hand. But how do we value our time against the capital and operating cost of automatic washing? There was a tremendous impact from such labor-saving devices in American society. Many suggest that the washing machine was one of the key inventions that enabled the move of women from the home workplace to the salaried one. The labor-saving device thus opened opportunities for transformational change.

What, then, are the potential nonmonetary gains of freeing Sailors from doing tasks that technology can perform at a lower cost? If it does not take a Sailor off the ship, might it free time for him to train, pursue education, or otherwise become more valuable to the Navy?

In addition to other reasons for ship-cost growth (such as reduced procurement numbers and ever-expanding capability requirements), these paths toward reducing TOC contribute to increased sticker prices that affect the debate over what and how many ships to buy.

The 21st-century Challenge

The cost-to-buy versus cost-to-own challenge has existed from the first days of the U.S. Navy. For that Service, the challenge today is particularly difficult: how to pay for tomorrow’s force while paying the costs of fighting the war on terror. More extensively, this represents the challenge of developing transformational systems, with leap-ahead capabilities effective across the warfighting spectrum as part of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century (from chasing down al Qaeda suspects in a speedboat in the Indonesian archipelago to fighting a major war). These systems should be able to grow, adapt, and transform at an affordable price through their decades of service. They should also be able to further the acquisition of scalable, flexible, and adaptable 21st-century warfighting systems while conducting and paying for today’s fight.

While balancing today with tomorrow is always difficult, this challenge is heightened by a number of issues:

- Budgetary pressures suggest overall limitations to discretionary government spending, including within the Department of Defense (DOD).
- Within DOD, a number of external factors, such as mounting health care and fuel costs, increase fiscal pressure.
- The Nation is at war, which requires resources.
- Recapitalization requirements continue to increase.2

Thus, there are real requirements for increased procurement funding at a time when such funding will be increasingly difficult to secure.

Efforts to reduce total operating/life cycle costs, as per the above, can contribute to increased “purchase/acquisition prices even as the Navy is expressing sticker shock at increased platform costs. Thus, the Navy and the Nation have choices in seeking to address that shock while lowering long-term costs.
Answering the Challenge

One track might be to seek procurement of “cheap” ships, a path toward building ship numbers through less capable, seemingly less expensive ships. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) somewhat represents this track. Another approach might seek to cut platform costs through stripping capabilities from platforms as they develop to deal with program cost growth. A third path might be to de-emphasize the implications of future costs while taking steps to lower today’s prices. All of these tracks respond to the system’s focus on sticker price—on today’s bill rather than the full system cost and long-term implications of today’s decisions.

Tomorrow’s operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses are by far the higher cost. While the acquisition community understands this and works to include future cost as part of the life cycle cost/TOC portions of acquisition work, decisionmaking often does not fully address all implications of tomorrow’s costs. For example, personnel costs have consistently outpaced inflation since the introduction of the all-volunteer force, yet future costs are typically set, in procurement decisions, at today’s costs. Similarly, energy costs have been rising sharply, and most analysts suggest that future liquid fuel costs will keep growing (which will drive ever-higher costs as oil production peaks and declines in the face of ever-higher demands for it). Related to the liquid fuel challenge, DOD has included the “crude” rather than fully burdened fuel in procurement decisions, which understates the full cost of fuel use by the acquired platform. Not fully involving these costs in decisionmaking risks—hobbling tomorrow’s fleet with unaffordable operating costs and fostering an ever-worsening death spiral of today’s costs inhibiting investment in tomorrow’s capabilities as avoidable O&M costs—robs investment accounts.

There are no easy answers as we seek to solve multiple issues at the same time: procuring transformational systems at affordable costs while lowering tomorrow’s O&M bills...
through sensible investment today. Yet there are programs that have seriously worked

The CVN–21 Ford-class program, for example, has striven to enable best decision-

taking to which upfront investments make sense for reducing the full total ownership cost. In comparison to Nimitz-class carriers, the Ford-class’ light-emitting diode lights might cost more than incandescent light bulbs up front but will use far less electricity and possibly outlive the five decades the carriers will serve the Nation. Phased Array Radars cost more than rotating radars up front but require less maintenance while also improving capability. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch system costs more to acquire than a steam catapult but will demand far less manpower while providing improved capability (such as by enabling more precise launch power settings by aircraft and more flexibility in aircraft launch patterns). And due to the upfront investment in understanding and developing improved industrial processes, Ford-class ships will be less expensive to procure than Nimitz-class carriers due to better procurement processes and design improvements.

With the Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)–17 San Antonio-class, better materials are being used throughout the ship that will enhance warfighting capabilities and reduce maintenance requirements. For example, LPD–17s have composite decking material rather than wood on the sides of the well deck area. This composite will not rot or contribute to rusting of the hull, nor will it splinter and injure Sailors. The San Antonio composite antenna mast enclosure will lead to more reliable radar systems and reduce radar cross section and maintenance requirements. Just in the LPD–17, there are many other examples of procurement investment to lower TOC, from titanium seawater pipes and high-solids paint in ballast tanks to eliminate huge implications of rusting to use of composite hatches and bulwarks topsides (which lowers signature but also greatly reduces maintenance/repair requirements).

Thus, there are cases where life cycle cost implications have driven decisions to pay more money up front to lower TOC. These decisions, however, face the barrier of Americans’ tendency to look at the 99-cent sticker price and concerns that something is “too expensive.” But it is clear that sensible invest-

There is no magic wand we can wave to guarantee optimal total ownership cost decisionmaking, whether for refrigerators in our homes or the future Navy’s ships. One ameliorative path might be if the Navy would even more forthrightly discuss the need to invest today to lower tomorrow’s operating costs as part of its conversation with the Nation and with Congress when it discusses shipbuilding issues. JFQ

NOTES

1 Note that increasing attention to “quality processes” (Lean/Six Sigma) and design for produc-

ability, which is “quality construction,” serves to reduce (or at least constrain growth in) ship costs. For example, within the DDG–1000 program, there is larger space assigned for each deck that provides additional space between decks for wiring, pipes, and other infrastructure. This will both lower the manpower for wiring the ship and enable lower costs for any future work in those spaces because it will be an easier space to work in.

2 Much of the Navy’s force structure dates from the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In shipbuilding terms, these ships are approaching the end of their active service life. Thus, procurement growth must occur, or Navy force structure will continue to shrink.

3 These costs have often not been fully loaded (counting recruitment, training, and retirement costs). Analysis of fully burdened personnel costs has become more sophisticated in recent years. For example, the CVN(X) (now CVN–21) program did detailed analysis of Sailor cost (including indirect costs such as training infrastructure) to support Navy decisionmaking as to investments to reduce manning requirements in the new aircraft carrier costs.


5 Due to dismantling of the Nimitz-class industrial base, even the first CVN–21 will cost less to build than it would cost to return to building Nimitz-class carriers. Thus, the Ford-class will have a lower acquisition cost, as well as lower TOC, than the ships it will replace.
Current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan follow a long pattern in U.S. history and practice. Congress has exercised its prerogative and declared war as provided in the Constitution on only five occasions: the War of 1812; the War with Mexico in 1846; the 1898 Spanish-American War; World War I in 1917; and World War II in December 1941. In all other military engagements, including our current conflicts, the President has exercised his independent executive responsibility as Commander in Chief pursuant to the authority set forth in Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution to deploy military force on behalf of this nation and in its defense.

While the President has often sought congressional authorization to ensure a consistent funding stream, no congressional declaration of war was requested by the Commander in Chief in the more than 200 military responses the U.S. Armed Forces have made beyond the 5 mentioned above. In this period of terrorist violence, we can expect this trend to continue, as the necessity of immediate action in response to terrorist planning often requires preemptive measures that cannot await the outcome of congressional debate. It is to that Presidential authority, its history, its development, its present use, and the efforts by Congress to rein in this power that this article is addressed.

**Uses of Force**

Under the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare war. It is the President, however, who is recognized as the authority within the executive branch to respond to imminent threats to the United States and its citizens as Commander in Chief of all U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, most constitutional scholars recognize the

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President’s broad power to use the military without formal authorization from Congress in defense of national interests short of all-out war. As Edward Corwin has stated:

Under the constitutional scheme, the President needed no specific authorization to use force to defend against a military threat to the United States or to faithfully execute the laws or treaties of the nation in circumstances under which the law of nations would not require a formal declaration.1

Therefore, if the President considered military action essential for the enforcement of an act of Congress, or to ensure adherence to a treaty, or to protect citizens and territory of the United States from a foreign adversary, he would be obliged by the Constitution to use his power as Commander in Chief to direct our military forces to that end. As this duty rests in the Constitution, it cannot be removed or abridged by an act of Congress. President William Howard Taft made that point succinctly:

*The President is made Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy by the Constitution for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country against invasion, to suppress insurrection and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the army for any of these purposes, the action would be void.*

In practice, then, the President’s discretion to authorize the use of military force is exceedingly broad. Unique opportunities have presented themselves throughout this nation’s history for expansion and refinement of this authority. These were notably evident not only in the declared wars identified above, but also in the Presidential determinations to use force in defense of U.S. interests. The status of the United States as a world power and guarantor of the peace has also operated to expand the powers of the President and to diminish congressional powers in the foreign relations arena. Thus, President Harry Truman never sought congressional authorization before dispatching troops to the Korean Peninsula (believing the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was enough); President Dwight Eisenhower likewise acted on his own in putting troops in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic; and most significantly, President John Kennedy eschewed asking for any guidance in sending thousands of “advisors” into Vietnam in 1962, although President Lyndon Johnson did secure passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 before introducing significant ground forces.

The doctrine of inherent Presidential powers to use troops abroad outside the narrow scope traditionally accorded those powers is actually more vibrant than many realize. President Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained Truman’s decision not to seek congressional authorization to send troops into Korea:

*His great office was to him a sacred and temporary trust, which he was determined to pass on unimpaired by the slightest loss of power or prestige. This attitude would incline him strongly against any attempt to divert criticism from himself by action that might establish a precedent in derogation of presidential power.*

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3. Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained Truman’s decision not to seek congressional authorization to send troops into Korea: *His great office was to him a sacred and temporary trust, which he was determined to pass on unimpaired by the slightest loss of power or prestige. This attitude would incline him strongly against any attempt to divert criticism from himself by action that might establish a precedent in derogation of presidential power.*

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*in practice, the President’s discretion to authorize the use of military force is exceedingly broad*
to send our forces into battle. The memorandum that we prepared listed eighty-seven instances in the past century in which his predecessors had done this. And thus another decision was made.3

An even more extensive list of military interventions where the President had not invoked congressional authority was detailed in a 1967 study by the Department of State.4 In that review, the majority of the instances in which the President acted without congressional authority involved the policing of piracy, landings of small naval contingents to protect commerce, and dispatch of forces across the Mexican border to control banditry. Some incidents, however, involved the significant exercise of Presidential power. Three are of considerable historic interest: President James Polk’s use of troops to precipitate war with Mexico in 1846, President Ulysses Grant’s attempt to annex the Dominican Republic, and President William McKinley’s dispatch of forces into China during the Boxer Rebellion.5

Similarly, the early years of the 20th century witnessed repeated U.S. incursions, authorized by the President, in Central and South America. This was done . . . notably in Operation Just Cause.

In each of the instances above, the Federal courts largely upheld the expansive nature of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. In fact, it has been the courts that have carefully shaped the President’s authority with respect to the nature and scope of that power under Article II, both in terms of the President’s inherent authority and the authority to wage and fund armed conflicts, which are interests shared with Congress. For example, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the President possesses all the power and authority accorded by customary international law to a supreme commander in the field: “He may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States.”6 He may establish and prescribe the jurisdiction of military commissions, unless limited by the Congress, in territory occupied by American forces.7 He may insert covert agents behind enemy lines and obtain valuable information on troop dispositions and strength, planning, and resources.8 Within the theater of operations, he may requisition property and compel services from American citizens and friendly foreigners, although the United States is required to provide “just compensation.”9 He may also bring an armed conflict to a conclusion through an armistice and stipulate conditions of the armistice. The President, however, may not acquire territory for the United States through occupation,10 although he may govern recently acquired territory until Congress provides a more permanent governing regime.11

In addressing direct threats to the United States, then, there has been little historical opposition to the President’s unilateral decisionmaking, and, in fact, it has been recognized as essential. As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story stated in the early 1800s:

Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power. Even the coupling of the authority of an executive council with him, in the exercise of such powers, enfeebles the system, divides the responsibility, and not unfrequently [sic] defeats every energetic measure.12

**Political-military Crisis**

It is in the realm of the political-military crisis, where foreign policy and national defense are intertwined in a decision to use military force, that Congress has exercised its prerogative most effectively vis-à-vis the President’s authority. That has not always been the case, however. In fact, the traditional power of the President to use U.S. forces without consulting Congress was the subject of debate on the Senate floor in 1945. Senator Tom Connally (D–TX) remarked:

The historical instances in which the President has directed armed forces to go to other countries have not been confined to domestic or internal instances at all. Senator [William] Milliken pointed out that in many cases the President has sent troops into a foreign country to protect our foreign policy . . . notably in Central and South America. This was done . . . in order to keep foreign countries out of there. [It] was not aimed at protecting any particular American citizen. It was aimed at protecting our foreign policy.13

This view that the President could exercise his constitutional authority to deploy forces absent congressional blessing continued even after our ratification of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Despite the fact it could be argued that after ratification it is in the realm of the political-military crisis that Congress has exercised its prerogative most effectively vis-à-vis the President’s authority

This view that the UN Charter provisions did become our foreign policy, this was clearly not the view of the U.S. Senate, which continued to espouse an independent authority resident in the President to enforce the laws and found his constitutional power to be impaired in no way. Senator Alexander Wiley (R–WI) stated the position:

But outside of these agreements, there is the power in our Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the “supreme laws” are faithfully executed. When we become a party to this Charter, and define our responsibilities by the agreement or agreements, there can be no question of the power of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation to international policing. His constitutional power, however, is in no manner impaired.14

This was buttressed by the statement of Senator Warren Austin (R–VT):

So I have no doubt of the authority of the President in the past, and his authority in the future, to enforce peace. I am bound to say that I feel that the President is the officer under our Constitution in whom there is exclusively vested the responsibility for maintenance of peace.15

It is with respect to this inherent power in the Executive that President Eisenhower sought to engage Congress and gain its support, not because he needed it but because the political will resident in a united front with that body would be persuasive to any adversary in removing any doubt concerning our readiness to fight. The President was nevertheless careful to point out that “authority for the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority
of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress can act I would not hesitate, so far as my Constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the United States."18

President Eisenhower believed the Chinese government would be influenced by a united Presidential-congressional initiative clearly indicating our intent to defend Formosa (now Taiwan) from Chinese aggression. In the joint congressional resolution that followed, Congress gave the President authority "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack."19 Eisenhower followed the same process in addressing the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, and President Kennedy did the same during the Cuban Missile Crisis.20

While congressional legislation has operated to augment Presidential powers in the foreign affairs field much more frequently than it has to curtail them, dislusionment with Presidential policy in the context of the Vietnamese conflict led Congress to legislate restrictions, not only with respect to the discretion of the President to use troops abroad in the absence of a declaration of war, but also limiting his economic and political powers through curbs on his authority to declare national emergencies.

Power of the Purse

One of the major factors shaping and restricting Presidential decisionmaking with respect to the commitment of forces abroad has been congressional power and authority to fund military activities under Article I of the Constitution. It is for this pragmatic reason that Presidents have sought to keep Congress engaged and involved with the Executive in joint decisions to commit forces to combat. In Vietnam, for example, President Johnson gained congressional approval and funding for the war through the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,21 which was approved unanimously (414–0) by the House and by a margin of 88 to 2 in the Senate.22 Coupled with this congressional imprimatur was parallel funding for the war—$400 million initially, although Johnson only requested $125 million to implement the resolution.23

As criticism of the war in Vietnam grew, however, the Johnson administration, concerned that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution could be rescinded at any time, argued that the President had full authority to authorize "the actions of the United States currently undertaken in Vietnam."24 The administration also claimed a second prong of authority to respond to the threat to Saigon:

"It is not necessary to rely on the Constitution alone as the source of the President’s authority, since the [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] treaty—advised and consented to by the Senate and forming part of the law of the land—sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Vietnam against armed attack, and since the Congress—in the Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964, and in the authorization and appropriation acts for support of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam—has given its approval and support to the President’s actions.25"

In December 1972, a bombing campaign north of the 17th parallel was initiated by President Richard Nixon to drive the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. It was successful, and on January 23, 1973, the President announced the signing of the Paris Peace Accords to end U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. When attacks by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia continued, however, the United States responded by a resumption of bombing in that nation, arguing that it had to retain freedom of action if it was to preclude the North Vietnamese or its communist allies from violating the accords.26

Despite the President’s strong opposition, Congress, after the resumption of bombing in Cambodia, passed amendments to pending Defense Department funding legislation that had the effect of cutting off funds, after August 15, 1973, for any combat activities by U.S. military forces in, over, or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.27 With no American forces to contend with, the North Vietnamese then sent their entire army—absent one division reserved to protect Hanoi—into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. During the next 2-year period, in which Hanoi’s forces established military and political control over previously noncommunist Indochina, more people were killed by the new communist regimes in these three countries than in the entire period of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.
The congressional actions vis-à-vis Southeast Asia were followed in 1974 when Congress placed restrictions on U.S. funding provisions of the 1972 Trade Agreement with the former Soviet Union, leading to Soviet disavowal of the agreement. This was followed in 1976 by congressional curtailment of funds (the Clark Amendment) for Angolan factions fighting Cuban troops supported by Soviet training and equipment. In 1983, Congress limited President Ronald Reagan’s authority to fund intelligence activities in support of the anti-Sandinistas, and in 1987, after the Central American governments signed a peace accord, it cut off all military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.

These lessons were not lost on President George H.W. Bush when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Although his advisors urged that he was not required to obtain congressional authorization to assist the United Nations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 678, which called upon member states to use all necessary means to implement prior Security Council resolutions, President Bush formally requested a resolution of approval from Congress to support the UN call for assistance. In January 1991, the Senate, by the narrow and highly partisan vote of 52 to 47, gave the President that authority.28 In doing so, however, Congress refused to authorize President Bush to use force beyond ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The other provisions of UNSC 678, which U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick and the administration had supported in order “to restore international peace and security in the area,” were not supported in the joint resolution that passed Congress, and thus President Bush was limited solely to actions designed to restore the status quo ante in Kuwait.

President Bill Clinton was even more harshly treated by the Congress in 1993, when the loss of Pakistani lives in Somalia in June 1993 and then the further loss of 18 U.S. lives in Mogadishu in October 1993 delivered the death knell to U.S. support for UN peace operations (unless led by U.S. officers and with a preponderance of U.S. forces). In passing the Byrd amendment to the fiscal year (FY) 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress sent a strong message that the President’s enhanced authorities to deploy forces without congressional approval in circumstances where no vital national interest is implicated were not unlimited. Using the power of the purse, Congress was quick to restrict Defense funding where it determined U.S. interests were not well served. When the Byrd legislation lapsed on September 30, 1994, Congress quickly passed the Kempthorne amendment to the FY95 Defense Authorization Act, which continued funding limitations.

Congress likewise showed itself entirely willing to dictate to President Clinton when it considered that he was not doing enough in a peace enforcement effort. Senator Robert Dole (R–KS), leading the charge, attempted to legislatively compel U.S. actions to lift the arms embargo unilaterally for the Bosnian Muslims in early 1994 and thus vitiate the UN resolution establishing the embargo. Senators Sam Nunn and George Mitchell, attempting to moderate this effort through compromise, drafted the Nunn-Mitchell amendment to the FY95 Defense Authorization Act. This provision, which was enacted, did not lift the arms embargo unilaterally, but rather precluded enforcement against the Bosnian Muslims while continuing U.S. obligations as they related to the other parties to the conflict. Even though not as severe as Senator Dole’s proposal, this amendment undoubtedly contributed to an earlier-than-planned withdrawal from Bosnia by the UN Protection Force.

Two other initiatives in 1994, both of which failed passage, were efforts by Congress to interject itself into military affairs long thought the sole province of the President. In S. 5, the Peace Powers Act, and in H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, Congress attempted to restrict the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and limit U.S. involvement in future peace operations.

In the Peace Powers Act, Senator Dole’s initiative would have prohibited U.S. forces from serving under foreign operational control, even where it might be in the U.S. interest, as in Operation Desert Storm. Similarly, in the National Security Revitalization Act, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s bill would have limited the use of Defense funds for peacekeeping activities and would have restricted the sharing of intelligence with the United Nations. In each case, had these measures passed, the President’s constitutional prerogatives would have been severely impacted. Despite the failure of passage of these measures, there remained a bipartisan concern in the Congress after the United Nations Operation in Somalia II that the President (and succeeding Presidents) had to exercise greater stewardship with regard to operations managed by the United Nations.

The Threat of Terrorism

The attacks by al Qaeda terrorists on the World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, presented new challenges to the Presidency and the effective exercise of Commander in Chief powers. Because these attacks or threats of attack are often inchoate and depart significantly from traditional warfare between states adhering to the law of armed conflict, the sharing of information with Congress and the American people must sometimes be delayed as the release of information prematurely may preclude the effective response to an impending threat.

In light of the significant threat to democratic values represented by this form of nontraditional warfare, several Presidents, most recently President Bush in late 2003, have articulated a right to respond “preemptively” when evidence exists of an imminent threat of terrorist violence.29 This suggests that prior consultation with congressional leadership may be limited in such circumstances.

The Reagan administration issued the seminal “preemption” doctrine in 1984. In the words of former Defense Department official Noel Koch, President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, issued April 3, 1984, "represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that pro-active steps [were] needed.”30 Although NSDD 138 remains classified to this day, Robert McFarlane suggested at the Defense Strategy Forum on March 25, 1985, that it included the following key elements: The practice of terrorism under all circumstances is a threat to the national security of the United States; the practice of international terrorism must be resisted by all legal means; the United States has the...
responsible to take protective measures whenever there is evidence that terrorism is about to be committed; and the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and justifies acts in self-defense.31

While moral justification for this U.S. policy may be obvious, the more difficult problem is defining which state support or linkage warrants a President’s military response, which legal framework supports such a proactive policy, and which reasonable force alternatives are responsive to the threat. It is the link between the terrorist and the sponsoring state that is crucial to providing the President with the justification for response against a violating state. Covert intelligence operatives are necessary for identifying and targeting terrorist training camps and bases and for providing an effective warning of impending terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, as noted by former Secretary of State George Shultz in 1984, “we may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law.”32

The question, then, from several perspectives, is how much information is enough. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has underscored the very real and practical difficulties military planners face in attempting to apply a relatively small quantum of force, over great distance, with uncertain intelligence. He has accurately noted the difficulty of ensuring success without accurate information and has echoed the relationship between public support and demonstrable evidence of culpability in any resort to force by the United States in defending against terrorist attacks.33

Although no U.S. President has been able to define adequately “how much evidence is enough,” the demand for probative, or court-sustainable, evidence affirming the complicity of a specific sponsoring state is an impractical standard that contributed to the impression—prior to the articulation of NSDD 138 in 1984—that the United States was inhibited from responding meaningfully to terrorist outrages. This view was certainly reinforced in 1979 when the U.S. Government allowed 52 American citizens to remain hostage to Iranian militants for more than 400 days. As Hugh Tovar has noted, “There is a very real danger that the pursuit of more and better intelligence may become an excuse for non-action, which in itself might do more harm than action based on plausible though incomplete intelligence.”34

An examination of authorized responses to state-sponsored terrorism available to a President requires an understanding that terrorism is a strategy that does not follow traditional military patterns. In fact, a fundamental characteristic of terrorism is its violation of established norms. The conduct of warfare is governed by carefully defined norms that survive despite their frequent violation. The sole norm for terrorism is effectiveness. International law requires that belligerent forces identify themselves, carry arms openly, and observe the laws of war. Principal among the laws of war are the principles of discrimination (or noncombatant immunity) and proportion. Terrorists, however, do not distinguish between the innocent (noncombatants) and the armed forces of the country in which the attack is directed.

Other considerations in addressing terrorist violence include the fact that the real-time relationship between threat and threat recognition is often compressed in the terrorist conflict arena. Strategy development is thus limited with respect to the preattack, nonmilitary initiatives that must always be the President’s option of choice. Traditional means of conflict resolution, authorized by law and customary practice, are precluded because terrorism by definition is covert in execution, unacknowledged by its state sponsor, and practiced with violent effectiveness. Thus, diplomacy and conciliation may be of little utility in responding to a state whose actions are denied and whose practices are ultimately designed to eliminate normal, lawful intercourse between nations.

In a democratic society, then, the range of options open to a President desiring to protect the Nation’s citizens and resources from terrorism is limited. One of the best things a democratic government can do is educate the public and its military about the realistic options available in any crisis. Professor Abraham Miller suggests:

> The image of an invincible and omnipotent America that can rescue hostages under any circumstance is patently unrealistic. It is a mindset that comes from a failure to realize how lucky the Israelis were at Entebbe and from the charges and countercharges of the 1980 election campaign, during which the Iranian hostage crisis was played to the hilt.35

These valid concerns underscore the need to weigh other long-term values, besides countering the immediate terrorist threat, when determining an appropriate policy. George Shultz was correct when he stated that our policy “must be unambiguous. It must be clearly and unequivocally the policy of the United States to fight back—to resist challenges, to defend our interests, and to support those who put their lives on the line in a common cause.”36

While the President should use military power only if conditions justify it and other means are not available, there will be instances, as occurred after September 11, 2001, when the use of force is his only alternative. In that circumstance, President Bush’s actions were fully justified as necessary defensive measures to eliminate a continuing threat to the United States.
ages. The perpetrators of the September 11 violence, al-Qaeda, were protected and given safe haven in Afghanistan by the Pashtun Taliban militia.

Nor was September 11 the first time the United States had been subjected to attack by terrorists so clearly linked to a state sponsor. The 1979 attacks on the American Embassy in Tehran and the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz occurred just 1 week after the Shah came to the United States for medical treatment. On November 4, 1979, approximately 300 demonstrators overran the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran and took 52 U.S. citizens hostage for 444 days.

As in most developing countries, there were few internal constraints—whether from opposition parties, a critical press, or an enlightened public—to pressure Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader, into upholding the law. In the atmosphere of fervent nationalism that accompanied Khomeini’s sweep to power, forces for moderation were depicted as tools of foreign interests. In such an atmosphere, the militant supporters of the clerical leadership fomented domestic pressure to violate other recognized norms as well—in areas such as property ownership, religious freedom, and judicial protection. This combination of revolution and nationalism yielded explosive results—a reordering of both Iranian domestic society and its approach to foreign affairs. Unfortunately, the situation in Iran has not greatly improved.

President Reagan’s pledge upon taking office of “swift and effective retribution” in case of further threats to Americans abroad was clearly meant to deter future attacks as well as reassure a concerned Nation. Given the profusion of incidents throughout the world since (to include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the attacks of September 11), however, it is clear that President Reagan’s warnings have not turned back the tide of disorder.

It is clear that the painful lessons of the Iranian hostage crisis have spurred subsequent administrations to review the entire range of alternatives available for protecting limited—but highly visible—national interests, such as the safety of American diplomatic personnel and property. For example, NSDD 62 and 63, approved in the Clinton administration, clearly identified specific U.S. interests and critical infrastructure for protection in a more defined way. The Bush administration, after the September 11 attacks, established the Department of Homeland Security to address these threats on an institutional basis. From these actions, it is obvious that there is a more heightened sensitivity and increased alertness to the possibility of terrorism against Americans in 2008 than in 1979. These actions will go far in preparing our Presidents to more effectively address future attacks, while at the same time promoting responsive contingency planning.

Observations

The elements of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief under Article II and the successful exercise of this authority in periods short of declared war have clearly been affected by a continuum of congressional and public influence, dictated by the immediacy of the threat to national security. The intensity of the political, legal, and funding debate concerning a President’s decision to commit forces has been directly related to the actual threat to the Nation or its people and, conversely, by the level of political discretion the President has sought to inject into the decision to use the military instrument.

When the threat to the United States is clear and immediate, Congress has expressed no objection to decisive action by the President and has placed few restrictions on his use of public funds and the commitment of military forces. It is important to note that actions taken where the Nation has been directly subjected to attack, such as after September 11 in Afghanistan, have provided the President the greatest latitude and freedom of action, while those in which a strong policy interest or lesser or more attenuated defensive requirement, such as in Iraq, have offered the President a much narrower opportunity to exercise his discretion as Commander in Chief. The debate in the House and Senate on the situation in Iraq in February 2007 clearly put the President on notice that continued funding was tied to performance in the war on the insurgents, political effectiveness of the Nouri al-Maliki government, and the ability of the Iraqi armed forces to exercise greater responsibility in the fight.

Where Congress has determined that the use of the Nation’s military power no longer reflects the interests of its constituents, it has not been reluctant to terminate that funding. In Vietnam in 1973, Congress cut off all funding not only for Vietnam but also for Cambodia and Laos. This was followed in 1976 by the Clark amendment cutting off funds for support to forces fighting Cuban troops, supported by the Soviet Union, in Angola. In 1983, funding was cut for the anti-Sandinistas, and in 1987, all support for the Nicaraguan Contras was eliminated. It is likely that Congress, in light of the debate on Iraq in February 2007 in both houses, will seek to do the same for Iraq after the elections in 2008. The impact of this use of the authority of the purse has forced Presidents to be mindful of congressional interests in each case and recognize that a protracted conflict quickly wears thin with both the American people and their representatives.

The complexity of addressing the terrorist threat to the United States adds another layer of intelligence, training, equipment, and logistic concerns for the President, as Commander in Chief, in considering when and how the military instrument should be used. Clearly, military response to terrorist violence against our citizens and our nation has traditionally been strongly supported by Congress and the American people. Because of the inordinate risk to our forces in these more recent conflicts, however, where the terrorist threat does not directly impact vital national interests, this support, monetary and political, will likely be more difficult to obtain and maintain.

The role of the President as Commander in Chief is the most loosely defined section within Article II of the Constitution. In wartime, Congress has gladly delegated its responsibilities to the President. In periods of conflict or terrorist threats short of declared war, it has retained that level of control, through funding restrictions and other legislative enactments, necessary to ensure that our vital national interests are reflected in the actions of the Commander in Chief.

NOTES


3 See discussion in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the National Commit-ments Resolution, S. Rept. No. 91–129, 91st Cong., 1st
The Case for JPME Phase Zero

Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy

By David K. Richardson

In the two decades since the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986, each military Service has charted a different course in implementing joint concepts within its respective culture. One of the most significant challenges created by Goldwater-Nichols was the need to expand joint professional military education (JPME) programs. The Services, charged with educating and training their officer corps in both Service-specific and joint matters, continue to struggle with this crucial task of developing the “total officer.” This is especially true for the U.S. Navy.

Congressman Ike Skelton (D–MO) observed over a decade ago that the Navy is the “service that traditionally has been most resistant to change. ”1 From not sending its best officers to war colleges, to emphasizing Navy-centric and command tours over joint qualifications, the Navy certainly does not have the best track record of setting a joint course over the last 20 years. That said, the current Navy leadership has openly admitted that a change is needed to address the importance of jointness. In his March 2007 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then–Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen stated, “Our path is designed to create a change in Navy culture so that it values jointness and therefore systematically develops a group of Navy leaders who are strategically minded, capable of critical thinking, and skilled in naval and joint warfare.”2

Changing a culture is a tough and nebulous endeavor. It no doubt requires patience and, in the words of Peter Schwartz, the “art of the long view.” Today, changes in joint requirements and education are ongoing as all the Services implement the Vision for Joint Officer Development set forth in November 2005 by then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. It is in this climate, ripe for change and innovation, that the Navy finds itself with a unique opportunity to change its culture and firmly center itself on the joint path.

The key question then becomes how the Navy makes this course change with the long view in sight. This article proposes the creation of a new phase of joint professional military education: JPME Phase Zero. This new program, a combination of formal classroom instruction and summer training, will ensure every naval officer is educated in basic joint matters prior to commissioning.

By aggressively instituting JPME Phase Zero in the next few years, the Navy can change its culture to value jointness from the ground up and establish itself as the model Service in joint education and officer development.

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CDR Dave Adams, USN, takes command of Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost at Forward Operating Base Chapman

U.S. Navy
A Long and Unhappy Engagement

What an organization does every day matters. In a very basic sense, daily tasks play a large role over time in defining a culture. The Navy has always had a strong culture that clearly sets it apart from the other Services. This culture has been shaped by the Navy’s unique operating environment and traditional values such as independent action and initiative.2

Over the last two centuries, the Navy’s culture of independence has emerged as a result of forces that are arguably diametrically opposed to the concept of jointness. While the other Services tend to train and fight as teams of combined arms to accomplish missions on land, the Navy throughout its history has spent significant time operating independently in the middle of vast oceans. In naval terms, joint operations often meant working with another ship or within a task force at sea. In many cases, integration with forces from other Services did not occur until ships operated near land. Until recently, this integration was hardly considered an operational way of life for ships outside the amphibious warfare community.

On top of this fact, parochialism has always played a major role in the evolution of joint relationships. Services not working together or trusting each other can negatively impact operations. Service cooperation perhaps reached a low point in 1899 in the Philippines, when Navy Commodore George Dewey “went so far as to warn General Otis, U.S. Army Commander in the Philippines, that he planned to sink the U.S. Army’s three river gunboats operating on the Pasig River if they entered Dewey’s zone of influence a second time.”4

This is not to say that the Navy has always operated alone and far out to sea with no regard to others. To be fair, at certain important points in its history, the Navy emerged as a model of joint cooperation. Throughout World War II in the Pacific, and again in Korea, Navy operational commanders and staffs displayed a high level of proficiency in joint operations. This expertise, resident in the Navy’s amphibious warfare community, reached its apex in the 1940s and early 1950s with the highly successful island hopping campaign and the amphibious landing at Inchon.5

Unfortunately, with the emergence of the Cold War, this expertise took a back seat and remained dormant for decades. The resultant Navy culture in the 1980s had a tough time adjusting to sweeping changes in the joint world. The watershed event in this process occurred with the fight over the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Although every Service argued against its passage, the Navy’s reaction was particularly vehement. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman argued that the act would destroy the core strengths of the American military establishment.6 And in a telling episode, the Navy set up a “crisis management center,” the “purported mission” of which “was to defeat the [Goldwater-Nichols] legislation, an activity of questionable legality.”7

Since the end of the Goldwater-Nichols fight, the Navy’s position has strongly supported the concept of the joint force. In practice, however, it has taken a long time to integrate policies that support this public stance. This is particularly true with regard to personnel policies that impact joint education and joint qualification. The history of the Naval War College, the Navy’s premier institution for educating naval officers in joint matters, clearly highlights this fact. Twelve years after Goldwater-Nichols, an article in Joint Force Quarterly painted a grim picture when it reported that “naval colleges still suffer from the conviction of their leaders that their best and brightest have no time to attend . . . it sends few of its top officers to its own war college.”8

In writing about the Navy in the century before World War II, retired Vice Admiral James Calvert observed that “the marriage of American industrial power and the Navy was preceded by a long and fitfully unhappy engagement; we were slow in developing the steel-and-steam warship in our Navy.”9 The dramatic culture shift from sail to steam took a long time to work itself out, but in the end, American industrial might produced the naval forces that destroyed the Japanese fleet and won the war in the Pacific. The Navy’s culture at the time, cemented in tradition, finally embraced the changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution and emerged as the world’s premier naval force.

The culture shift that joint warfare represents to the modern Navy is no less significant than the shift from sail to steam. There are indications in the last few years that the Navy’s “long and unhappy engagement” with the joint world that began with Goldwater-Nichols has turned a corner. A prime example of this shift is the surface warfare community’s recent overhaul of the officer career pipeline. This dramatic change, a policy called “XO–CO Fleet Up,” allows for more flexibility in joint education and completion of multiple joint tours. Aligned with the Joint Staff’s 2005 Vision for Joint Officer Development, this new career path ensures that surface warfare officers “are
better able to excel in the joint arena while meeting all career milestones.\textsuperscript{10}

The bottom line behind this overhaul was that the surface warfare community was consistently failing to meet its quota of senior representation on joint and combatant commander staffs. This situation developed due to many years of neglect with respect to joint officer development. Eventually, something had to be done to correct the shortfall. While the recent shift in policy is a step in the right direction, it will be years before this initiative bears fruit and corrects this portion of the joint manning deficiency.

In many ways, this corrective action illustrates the reactive nature of the Navy’s leadership in addressing shortcomings in the joint world. More importantly, the example involving the surface force is only one part of a larger “joint marriage” involving the entire Service. The Navy has come a long way since Commodore Dewey’s words to General Otis over a century ago, but there is still a long way to go.

**No Officer Left Behind**

It is important to understand that the issue of joint professional military education is only part of a larger and very complex framework. Each Service must develop its officers through Service-specific professional military education, in addition to the requirements for JPME. In the 2005 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the Services “must mentor all officers toward the Joint Officer Development objective...” To achieve this vision, the crucial task of integrating professional military education (PME) with JPME presents a significant challenge.

Leaving it to each Service to address Service-specific PME, the Joint Staff has aggressively coordinated and improved cohesion among the formalized JPME programs. A cornerstone of this effort is the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), which is chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff. Meeting annually with representatives from every JPME institution, the purpose of the council is “to address key educational issues of interest to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member institutions, and coordinate joint education initiatives.”\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the MECC, the Joint Staff oversees the formal Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), during which teams visit all JPME institutions on a periodic basis for inspection and assessment. Reporting directly to the Chairman, the PAJE serves as the accreditation authority and plays a critical role in ensuring that joint education is standardized across various joint educational institutions. The PAJE, coupled with the MECC process, has made significant strides in the last decade in strengthening the JPME Phase I and II programs and the institutions that administer to them. Due to this focus and aggressive oversight by the Joint Staff, joint education as a whole has improved substantially since Goldwater-Nichols.

However, the JPME Phase I and II programs focus only on intermediate- and senior-level joint education. The intermediate phase focuses on majors and lieutenant commanders with over 10 years of commissioned service. The senior level phase focuses on officers with over 15 years of service. Strengthening the intermediate and senior levels of JPME education is vital to educating the joint force, but this only goes so far. Many would argue that it leaves out the most important part of joint education—the portion received in the first half of an officer’s career.

In describing the vision of a “continuum of joint education,” the Joint Chiefs instruction states that “officers receive JPME from pre-commissioning through the general/flag officer level.”\textsuperscript{12} This policy implements the finding of a previous Joint Staff effort in 1998, called JPME 2010. The JPME 2010 requirements team “confirmed that a seamless, flexible JPME system is needed for officers from pre-commissioning to the general/flag level.”\textsuperscript{13} The problem is that although we are over 20 years removed from Goldwater-Nichols, this vision is not yet a reality.

Describing the importance of getting lifelong joint education right, the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development suggests that “schoolhouses are the petri dishes for organizational culture.”\textsuperscript{14} To this point in time, the
Chairman has left the implementation of the first two phases of the joint education continuum, the precommissioning phase and the primary phase, up to the Services. Except for a report by each Service chief to the Chairman every 3 years describing the nature of these programs, no oversight or inspection of this level of joint education is conducted. These programs are not standardized across the Services. Furthermore, they are not included in either the MECC or PAJE process.

This lack of attention to initial joint education is surprising because it allows joint culture to begin to grow in Service-specific "petri dishes" without the same rigorous oversight given to the dish 10 years down the road. It is time for this to change.

Establish Navy-wide JPME Phase Zero for all naval officers during the precommissioning phase of training. JPME Phase Zero will fill the current void in the precommissioning and primary levels of joint education and, in the process, build the foundation for all future JPME. Simply put, it will set the stage for and enhance JPME Phase I and II programs currently in place. The goal of Phase Zero is not to create joint qualified officers at commissioning, but simply to meet the Chairman’s vision of the endstate of the precommissioning and primary phases of JPME. Stressing the basics only, this includes “an introduction to their respective Service . . . knowledge of the basic U.S. defense structure, roles and missions of other Military Services, the combatant command structure . . . and the nature of American military power and joint warfare.”

To achieve this endstate, the proposal for JPME Phase Zero consists of the following programs:

**Joint Military Operations (JMO) basic course of instruction.** In the spirit of the JMO course currently taught at the Naval War College for JPME Phase I, it is proposed that this course be taught in the second-class (junior) year for all midshipmen. This basic instruction could be structured as a 3-hour class with no lab time (3–0–3). The objective for this formalized course will be to teach midshipmen the basics of joint warfare to give them a framework on which to build throughout their careers. It will fulfill all joint learning areas and objectives for precommissioning level and primary-level programs as outlined in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01C). Textbooks would include The Armed Forces Officer; Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; and Joint Publication 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces.

**Joint midsummer training.** Classroom instruction can only go so far. Summer training, where midshipmen visit the fleet and get hands-on experience, "provides some of the most enjoyable, most professionally enriching, most memorable experiences at the Academy." Building on the current Professional Training for Midshipmen program, where midshipmen spend 1 week with each warfare specialty before their junior year (naval aviation, submarines, Marines), a new program called Joint-MID could expose midshipmen to a joint warfare command (U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Central Command, and so forth) for 2 weeks during their first-class (senior) summer. This summer experience should be structured to give midshipmen a first-hand appreciation for current challenges in the joint world, as well as a reinforcement of the concepts presented in the JMO course of instruction they received the previous academic year.

**Create a JMO Department at the Naval Academy.** To execute and teach JPME Phase Zero, a new JMO Department should be created and staffed by a joint faculty. Smaller but similar in construct to current war college faculties, the staff should include instructors from all the Services who are senior officers with considerable joint experience. Staffing this department would undoubtedly be a significant challenge, but several options are available. As many have observed, "It has taken nearly a generation to grow a cadre of joint officers and a body of joint knowledge." But after 20 years of the Goldwater-Nichols joint force, that knowledge and experience do exist. Faculty in this department should be a mix of retired and Active duty personnel. Active duty officers on the JMO Department faculty should be incorporated into the Navy’s current Permanent Military Professor program to ensure the longevity and consistency of instructors. Finally, the chairman of this department should be an officer of significant stature. This could take the form of a distinguished chair and could be a retired flag or general officer with the experience of multiple joint commands.

The new JMO Department at the Naval Academy should fall under the Division of Professional Development in Luce Hall (see figure). This would place the department in the same academic division as the Department of Professional Programs, which coordinates midshipman summer training programs and service assignments. This would allow fluid coordination between the JMO basic academic course taught by the faculty and the Joint-MID summer program to be executed by the Department of Professional Programs. A cadre of JMO faculty should liaise directly with Professional Programs to lead the Joint-MID summer program.

With JPME Phase Zero set up in this manner, the Naval Academy’s JMO Department...
could execute JPME Phase Zero for Officer Candidate School (OCS)/Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) graduates as well. Most naval officers are commissioned through these two programs, so developing a program that does not include these officers makes little sense. Therefore, it is proposed that all OCS/NROTC graduates spend 1 month in temporary duty at the Naval Academy in the summer immediately following their commissioning and prior to reporting to their first duty station.

In an intense summer school experience taught by the JMO faculty, these new officers will receive instruction in the JMO basic course while living on the Naval Academy grounds. During the summer months, several wings of the Naval Academy’s dormitory, Bancroft Hall, are left vacant as midshipmen participate in summer programs. The cost savings of berthing and messing OCS/NROTC officers at the academy is an obvious advantage to this proposal. Additionally, by living in Bancroft Hall and receiving in-residence instruction at the Naval Academy, all commissioned officers would receive the same standardized training prior to reporting to the Fleet. This program could create a bond between every naval officer and the institution that is the “soul of the United States Navy.”

**Once established, include Naval Academy JPME Phase Zero leadership in the MECC process.** The Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program should be integrated into the Joint Staff’s PAJE process to ensure that this pilot program is given the proper oversight and is aligned fully with the Chairman’s vision. Creating a program that simply “checks the box” would, in the end, do more harm than good. Therefore, it is imperative that initial certification and accreditation be rigorous. Lessons learned must be properly documented for future application in the potential expansion of the program to other Service academies. Implementation and certification of the Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program should occur no later than 2012. Accreditation should occur no later than 2014.

**Zero Sum Game**

The creation of a JPME Phase Zero program in the Navy has many advantages.

First and foremost, it aggressively pursues the vision of developing joint officers by attempting to get out in front on the issue of early joint education. A second strength of the proposal is that it standardizes the first joint exposure and initial joint education of all naval officers. This program could reap huge benefits down the line, lay the positive foundation for a Service-wide joint culture, and enhance JPME Phase I and II education. But the opposite is also true, and there are many arguments for why this program would simply not work as proposed.

Congressman Skelton observed that “service expertise comes first” and that “finding time for both service and joint training is difficult.”6 This is no doubt the case. Tactical proficiency and Service-specific knowledge are vital building blocks to understanding joint concepts. Taking this one step further, the argument can easily be made that joint education does not make sense at all until basic tactical proficiency is achieved.

In addition to the issue of tactical proficiency, early training and education are a zero sum game. If JPME Phase Zero is established at the Naval Academy, something over the 4-year program must be removed or modified. This is a contentious subject with passionate arguments on every side. One only has to look at the intense battles in the last 50 years over the Naval Academy’s curriculum to see that this is a lightning rod issue.

The case could also be made that the current Naval Academy curriculum does not need to be modified because it already meets the spirit of what is required for joint training. Midshipmen are introduced to the basics of the other Services throughout initial indoctrination, including their ranks, rates, organization, and platforms. This is reinforced during lectures within the curriculum in the Department of Professional Development.

Additionally, joint culture is promoted through the Service Academy Exchange Program (SAEP). Dating back to 1949, SAEP permits a select few midshipmen and cadets from each Service academy to spend an entire semester at another academy as exchange students. This program, intended to increase “the understanding and good relations between the service academies and the four services,”7 is a prime example of early promotion of joint culture currently in place.

But does the present level of joint instruction and programs such as SAEP go far enough in building a joint culture within the Navy? The answer can certainly be debated, but two key
points bring the shortcomings in the current system to light. First, only a handful of midshipmen participate in SAEP, so this hardly qualifies as a program that develops a joint culture for every future naval officer. Second, the current placement and nature of instruction in joint concepts are not comprehensive enough to highlight its importance. A few lectures scattered throughout courses in naval warfare, leadership, seamanship, and navigation cannot possibly impress upon midshipmen the significance of joint warfare and joint education. This is especially true when these lectures are conducted by junior officers with little or no joint experience. The issues with Naval Academy curriculum instruction aside, there is the predominant belief that early joint education can best be accomplished through less formal means. Even the Chairman’s vision discusses a proposal for online distance education via a Joint Learning Portal, the intent of which is to fill the current void and assist junior officers in receiving joint education before they reach JPME Phase I programs as lieutenant commanders and majors.22

The cost savings of this approach alone is hard to discount. In the end, the determining factor in sorting out these approaches boils down to measures of effectiveness. But measuring the jointness of a culture, and the various effects of certain programs on that culture, is a tough if not impossible task. This could take decades, which we do not have. The time to act is now.

Predisposition to Jointness

The rapidly changing environment in the post–Cold War and post-9/11 world overshadows the arguments against JPME Phase Zero. The military’s operating environment is becoming more complex with the addition of various government agencies and nongovernmental organizations working alongside our forces. Calls for an “interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act” are increasing. In this environment, an early grasp of basic joint concepts is more essential than ever for junior officers. Retired Army Lieutenant General Dick Chilcoat, a former President of National Defense University, foreshadowed this fact in 1999: “A strong sense of jointness will be even more important tomorrow. The synchronization of joint combat power is occurring at lower levels—brigades, ships, and squadrons . . . moreover, future military operations will increasingly include the integration of interagency and multi-national participants.”23

Given the increased importance of understanding joint concepts immediately upon commissioning, early joint education is too important to trust to computer-based methods. The mere notion of junior officers learning about joint warfare and what it means to work together in their profession by sitting alone at a computer console is, in and of itself, a contradiction. This proposal also goes against lessons learned from decades of JPME Phase I and II instruction at war colleges. Some of the most important parts of joint education lie in the social aspects of the education and the interaction between officers of different Services. Imagine the benefit of having a JPME Phase Zero course taught in a seminar format by an experienced, dynamic, and joint qualified Air Force colonel instead having of midshipmen sitting at their computers in Bancroft Hall flipping through slides with no human interaction.

Numerous studies and articles in the last 20 years have highlighted various issues with educating the joint force in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols. Many experts, including retired Admiral William Owens, have identified shortfalls and urged action in addressing early joint education at Service academies and other precommissioning programs. Extensive studies by renowned think tanks have called for the development of “synergy between service academies and training programs, such as Officer Candidate Schools and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.”24 But few of these studies have outlined a detailed plan for achieving this goal. Joint professional military education Phase Zero, beginning with the Navy as the pilot program, does just that.

In the end, Phase Zero will be a small step forward in a much larger journey. Success of this program will not be measured for years to come, and even then it will be hard to quantify. But investment in education is never a mistake. By trusting in the long view, and proactively addressing the shortfall in precommissioning and primary joint education, the Navy can “shift the rudder” on decades of counterproductive and reactive policies. In the process, Phase Zero will give every naval officer a predisposition to jointness, change the Navy’s culture from the ground up, and set the course for the lifelong education of the future joint force. JFQ

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7. Ibid., 42.


11. Peter Pace, CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2005), 9.


15. Pace, 5.


22. Pace, 5.


JFQ: Many elements of the much-heralded reorganization of U.S. Southern Command Headquarters seem to have close parallels in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. In fact, the majority of the issues addressed in the new naval strategy strike readers as the traditional focus areas of your command. Is there a relationship between these two developments?

Admiral Stavridis: First, I would argue that there is great momentum across the entire Department of Defense [DOD] to confront today’s diverse security challenges through integration and coordination of efforts—be they military, interagency, multinational, or private sector efforts. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is just one of many parallel efforts. For the first time, we have integrated our maritime forces under a unified cooperative strategy—a strategy that recognizes not only the obvious benefits of an overarching maritime partnership for U.S. forces but also the important role of international partners in 21st-century security.

Second, the maritime strategy rightly emphasizes the need to foster and sustain these international partnerships over time, building trust and capability for steady-state security cooperation as a matter of course, and the desire to respond together in the case of crisis. So it is no coincidence that the new maritime strategy runs in confluence with U.S. Southern Command’s vision for the future of security in this part of the world. We clearly embrace the need to build...
the capability and capacity of our neighbors to address the difficult security challenges we share together. As for the maritime role in our hemisphere, a simple look at geography highlights the importance of the maritime domain, since all but two of the nations of the Americas have borders with access to the sea—with a significant portion of their population densities within 100 miles of the coast. A flexible, scalable, and persistent maritime engagement capability is a welcomed and essential part of our security cooperation toolset.

Third, as part of DOD transformation priorities, U.S. Southern Command is reorganizing to become more of an interagency operation. Our reorganization efforts include multinational and even limited private sector collaboration that will enhance our understanding of regional dynamics and magnify the benefits of our cooperation activities. Our new organizational structure and diverse representation will allow us to partner proactively with the U.S. Government interagency community and with the sovereign countries in the region—ultimately improving our collective response to regional and transnational security challenges. We lay out our approach in a document called “Command Strategy 2016,” which is well grounded not only in the Navy’s future vision but also in that of the rest of the Services.

JFQ: Please address the most significant changes that will be effected in your command’s reorganization and the contextual demands that inspired them.

Admiral Stavridis: The most significant change to our organization is a change in our cultural mindset. A reorganized structure is just one tool in our overall rethinking of U.S. Southern Command and its ultimate transformation for the future. This new thinking will take us from a culture of war to a culture of war and peace, from a culture of moving people and materiel to one of moving ideas. From a rigid, traditional staff structure (J1, J2, J3, and so forth) optimized purely for warfighting to new internal structures designed for integration, collaboration, and understanding—all designed to compete in today’s instant strategic messaging market.

Now, changing mindsets is very difficult for any large, complex organization—perhaps it is even traumatic. As we proceed, we must respect and develop military Service cultures, shape and prepare our civilian workforce for new roles, convince our interagency partners of the benefit to their respective missions, and reassure our multinational partners of our continued commitment to partnering with them. Fortunately, U.S. Southern Command is well suited for this change.

As of this interview, we are already in our new provisional structure—a structure that is flatter and more responsive. We have a dual deputy-to-the-commander system, one military and one civilian. We are no longer organized in stovepiped J-codes, but now have six directorates—three mission directorates and three enabling or functional directorates. Interagency representatives are integrated throughout the new structure, their number and focus varying according to the function of the directorate, with many in key senior leadership roles. We have a fledgling partnering center, where international, academic, and private sector partners can plug into the organization’s current operations and collaborate on mutually beneficial initiatives, programs, and exercises.

In concert with our reorganization, we have instituted a new method for strategic planning that allows us to widen our focus and enables cultural change. This strategic planning process is an integral component in the new organization and provides the corporate structure to focus all command activities, prioritize critical resource requirements, and measure progress toward achieving our mission.

Of course, inherent in the new structure is our ability to conduct military operations with an unbroken and capable military chain of command and authority.

Admiral Stavridis: There are many similarities that all geographic combatant commands share as we focus on today’s security challenges within this century’s strategic environment. We all clearly benefit from a unique regional perspective and the ability to build cooperative partnerships and regional solutions to transnational problems. The establishment of U.S. Africa Command, with its specific focus on a region previously divided between three commands, will allow improved bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and will foster long-term beneficial relationships. Having essentially the entire African continent as a single focus region will allow General [William] Ward to combine the efforts of regional experts, both from DOD and various other agencies, and to use them in a coordinated manner with our partners in Africa.

All that being said, yes, there has been a mutually beneficial interaction between our two commands as U.S. Southern Command reorganizes and U.S. Africa Command organizes. From numerous staff visits and regular staff video teleconferences led by our chiefs of staff, to U.S. Joint Forces Command’s efforts to synchronize best practices and highlight areas for improved efficiencies, we are traveling similar paths and learning from each other. Of course, although similar in some respects, the different natures of our respective regions have naturally led to some variations in our structures and approaches, but I would say the similarities between our commands are in the majority.

JFQ: Given the emphasis of U.S. Southern Command on the “soft power” elements of national security, how does your reorganization incorporate interagency partners?

Admiral Stavridis: Although our reorganization will certainly take advantage of the soft power elements of national secu-
Security, U.S. Southern Command will remain a DOD geographic combatant command, with the majority of personnel and funding sourced by DOD. And our fundamental mission remains unchanged. However, through expanded interagency integration, we hope to improve our regional understanding and situational awareness in order to execute our mission more effectively. Ultimately, our new approach will position us to have an impact that is more lasting in all that we do with our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Essentially, I think it is really not about soft power or hard power, but rather what some have called “smart power,” which is the ability to dial between the poles of hard and soft. After all, life is a rheostat, not an on-off switch, and we are trying to shape our organization along those lines. I strongly recommend reading the “Smart Power” study recently released by CSIS [the Center for Strategic and International Studies], headed up by [Richard] Armitage and [Joseph] Nye; it lays out a compelling view of this concept.²

As for how we incorporate interagency partners, right now, we already have a sizeable interagency presence, with 17 departments and agencies represented. These personnel are integrated into our mission directorates based upon the needs of our interagency partners and the best use of their functions and specialties. One of our task forces, Joint Interagency Task Force—South, is a model of interagency and multinational integration and serves as a powerful example of the benefits of expanded cooperation. As U.S. Southern Command’s interagency partnerships grow and as our new cultural mindset and processes mature, we will continue to work with our interagency counterparts to ensure their integration at the command promotes their personnel’s professional development and increased capacity; that their inclusion is in consonance with their resource objectives; and that their efforts advance the achievement of their core missions and supporting activities.

I am sure that just about every commander throughout history has said, “These are exciting times of change and opportunity.” When it comes to U.S. Southern Command, the change this past year has been real and profound. We are operating with a transformed structure and a new cultural mindset to meet the security demands of a new world reality. The opportunities ahead of us seem more numerous and potentially more fruitful from our new perspective.

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1 Available at <www.southcom.mil>, under Mission page.
2 Available at <www.csis.org/smartpower>.

 There has been a mutually beneficial interaction between our commands as U.S. Southern Command reorganizes and U.S. Africa Command organizes.
Why a 
CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNTRY?

A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists

By K A R L F. W A L L I N G

For over a year now, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have engaged in a “Conversation with the Country” to enlighten public opinion about the need for a new maritime strategy for the 21st century. Professor Walling’s address surveys three previous conversations about maritime strategy at decisive moments in American history and explains why it is urgent to engage the country in such conversations today.
Why do we need a new maritime strategy? Why do we need a conversation with the country about it? The simplest answer to the first question is that the world is changing. Other possible conflicts loom on the horizon 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now. Whatever happens in current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Navy and other maritime Services must look ahead, lest their current strategies prove obsolete, even dangerous to the American people.

Granted, the world is changing—we all know that because sometimes the only people who can figure out how to operate those fancy electronic gadgets in our homes are teenage children or grandchildren. The big question is what will remain the same. How can we make future plans without something stable and predictable to rely upon?

There is some good news or some bad news here, depending on how we look at it. Both the fundamental problems of strategy in general and the unique problems of maritime strategy in particular remain the same. Strategy is about matching means to ends to achieve objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk. Note that strategy need not be simply military or maritime. A coherent strategy necessarily involves all tools of diplomacy, information and intelligence, economic power, and what we today call soft power, too. Indeed, one of the best ways to evaluate a strategy is by how well it integrates all these different tools of power and influence. This never changes.

Strategy is not simply about war. Indeed, to paraphrase the British strategist Basil Liddell Hart, the aim of strategy is a better state of peace, if only from our own point of view. A responsible strategy not only hedges against the worst-case contingencies, such as war, but also strives to make the best-case scenarios, such as peaceful cooperation among nations, possible and durable. Preparing only for the worst case risks turning potential friends into enemies; focusing only on the best case risks ignoring potential enemies until it is too late to deal with them peacefully. So engaging old friends and potential new ones is as important to prudent strategy as deterring potential and defeating actual enemies. This too never changes.

Throughout history, three problems have proved paramount in maritime strategy, which is not simply naval strategy. It necessarily involves the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, numerous civilian agencies, merchant marine, a host of businesses with interests linked to the sea, and—not to be forgotten—our allies. These problems are:

- to build a moat to provide for homeland security
- to guarantee free use of the ocean, the global commons for trade, fishing, and other goods, usually through control of the sea and denial of its use to likely enemies
- to use the ocean as a highway, paved by ships, to project power from sea to land in order to deter or defeat rivals on their home turfs.

In that sense, a maritime strategy is no less important for preventing wars whenever possible than for winning them whenever necessary.

Given the durability of these three problems, it should come as no surprise that this is not the first time the country has had a conversation—a national discussion—about maritime strategy, which almost by definition must be forward-looking. Somewhat paradoxically, however, I look backward at some forward-thinking maritime strategists in order to explain why it is only natural, indeed inevitable in a free society such as our own, that we have conversations about maritime strategy.

**Building the Moat**

The first conversation was about homeland security primarily, so I will call it *building the moat*. It occurred during the founding era from 1776 to 1825, between the followers of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton’s followers, the Federalists, were often veterans of the American War for Independence. Hamilton himself was General George Washington’s right-hand man throughout the war and until Washington’s death in 1798. These veterans remembered that on July 2, 1776, 2 days before Congress declared independence, the British sent the largest maritime expedition

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in history thus far to capture New York City, with 10 British ships-of-the-line (the aircraft carriers of their age), 20 frigates, and over 100 transports carrying an army about twice the size of the one Washington had to defend the city. So no one should be surprised that Washington, who had no navy, was unable to confront the British invasion at sea. Outnumbered on land, he lost more than half of his army to the British invaders on Long Island and Manhattan and had to abandon the city to the British, who occupied it until the end of the war. No one is quite sure how, but a fire started as the British moved in, and over 60 percent of the city burned to the ground. For these veterans, this was their 9/11, the burning of New York City.

These veterans also remembered that Washington’s greatest victory, at Yorktown, Virginia, occurred because France, which became an ally of the United States in 1778, lent the United States a navy that defeated a British squadron on the Chesapeake Bay. The French then blockaded a British garrison of over 6,000 troops under General Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown. The French also brought an army larger than the force of Continental soldiers that Washington sent to Yorktown. In addition, they moved up the Chesapeake to Delaware, where they picked up much of Washington’s artillery for the siege of Yorktown, where Washington was able to bombard and starve the British into surrender. News of the surrender shocked the British government so much that it granted Americans independence—so the British could get out of the quagmire in North America and go back what they did best, fighting the French!

The veterans knew that Americans almost lost the War for Independence because they lacked a navy to secure the moat and were able to win perhaps only because France lent them its navy to enable them to get local control of the sea and project ground forces to Yorktown, thus reminding us today of the vital importance of allies, even and especially occasionally difficult ones, for our security from the beginning of U.S. history.

Hamilton built on the experience of the war to develop an extremely ambitious maritime strategy that, not coincidentally, played a significant role in the debate over ratifying the Constitution. That strategy can be summed up in a single Latin phrase, *E Pluribus Unum* (out of many, one), a bold experiment in what we today call “cooperative security.” That experiment began when Congress adopted the “Unanimous Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America” in 1776 and called on the states to unite in resistance against England under what became the Articles of Confederation in 1781. However, Congress’ inability to raise taxes under the Articles undermined the foundation of Americans’ cooperative strategy, and they were scrapped in favor of a new, stronger Constitution in 1787. Hamilton’s chief priority was a durable union, so foreign powers could not play the states against each other to reestablish their empires in North America. Union and a maritime strategy, he believed, were essential to secure American liberty by guaranteeing American independence. He also recognized that the United States was already a commercial nation that depended on free use of the sea for its prosperity, but that lacked a navy to protect its merchant fleet from great powers, such as England, France, and Spain.

Rather than confront the great powers directly while the American Union was weak, Hamilton proposed a small but formidable ocean-going navy capable of tilting the balance of power among the Europeans not where they were strongest, in Europe, but where they were much weaker, the sugar islands in the Caribbean—their most valuable possessions at a time when sugar played a role in the world economy analogous to oil today. Whenever one of the great powers appeared too menacing, the United States would threaten to side with other European powers against it in the New World. In the best case, this would prevent war by deterring it; in the worst case, it would enable the United States to cooperate with great powers to win such wars. Rather than risk war with the United States, each of the great powers would set a price on American neutrality, open its ports to American trade, and leave American shipping unmolested. Through such a maritime strategy, the United States could grow strong, whichever way the winds of war blew in Europe and its colonies.

But Hamilton always thought big. He proposed that, decades hence, the United States should lead the countries of the Western Hemisphere, each of which he believed had a right to be independent of its colonial masters, in erecting a coalition of the New World against the Old World. This
Jefferson worried that Hamilton’s ambitious government. As a believer in states’ rights, undue concentration of power in the national sequence of Hamilton’s strategy would be an “big government.” They warned that the followers—exploited the settlers’ fears of rivals—Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their naval bases. Moreover, Hamilton’s great produce down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans, which was under the control of Spain, and through the Gulf of Mexico, where the Europeans had their colonies and naval bases. Moreover, Hamilton’s great rivals—Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their followers—exploited the settlers’ fears of “big government.” They warned that the consequence of Hamilton’s strategy would be an undue concentration of power in the national government. As a believer in states’ rights, Jefferson worried that Hamilton’s ambitious plans, including his maritime strategy, would become a threat to liberty at home, but what was the alternative? That is always the question for strategists.

Jefferson’s alternative had two key assumptions: first, that the Europeans were so dependent on trade with America that economic sanctions (that is, American boycotts and embargoes of trade with Europe) would supply a “peaceful means of coercing” them; and second, that coastal fortresses and a fleet of gunboats, or what we today would call a coast guard, would suffice to protect the homeland from foreign navies. In theory, sanctions would deter war or, if war came, enable the United States to bring the Europeans to their knees while coastal defenses kept them away from American shores.

When Jefferson became President in 1801, he put his maritime strategy into practice, but there were many unintended consequences. Despite initial successes against what we today might call terrorists (the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, who gave the Marines the right to sing the National March), his maritime strategy almost destroyed the Union, and with it, the Republic in its infancy.

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Destruction of Spanish Fleet off Santiago de Cuba, 1898

Marine Corps
States should do if the Europeans intervened to recover their colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Henceforth, they said, the Western Hemisphere would be off limits for further European colonization, a principle that promised peace and cooperation with Latin America, since both the United States and the newly independent Latin American nations had a strong common interest in preserving their political independence.

The problem was that the United States had virtually no navy to enforce Monroe's doctrine. So Adams and Monroe might seem a bit silly to have declared a moat around the Western Hemisphere when they developed no means to defend it. But they had solid intelligence that England wanted the former colonies in Latin America to remain independent, so it could continue to trade freely with them. Thus was born a tacit form of strategic cooperation that lasted throughout much of the 19th century. Americans would stand for the principle of non-intervention in Latin American affairs, and the Royal Navy, our worst enemy in 1776 and 1812, would enforce it—a sweet deal if one can pull it off!

Is there a moral to this story? Perhaps Jefferson paid so much attention to what the country wanted (and feared) that he failed to frame the maritime strategy it needed. Perhaps Hamilton paid so little attention to national sentiments that he rejected the maritime strategy the Nation needed most to avoid the disasters of the War of 1812. Those responsible for framing our maritime strategy today must learn from the mistakes of both Hamilton and Jefferson. They must convince the country to want what it needs, but they will never do that effectively without understanding what the country wants, which is an important reason to talk with the country.

Moreover, although today we tend to see the 19th century as the great period of American isolation, the reality is much more complicated. Our political union was devised to enable the original 13 states to cooperate in the common defense. Building our political union was the fundamental problem of North American interstate relations until the end of the Civil War. Even then, we relied on the silent strategic cooperation of our former enemy, England, to secure the moat required for our internal growth as well as that of our neighbors in South America. From this perspective, what Hamilton and Jefferson, indeed all Americans would stand for the principle of non-intervention in Latin American affairs, and the Royal Navy, our worst enemy in 1776 and 1812, would enforce it.

Clockwise from above: U.S. troops embark for France, 1917; Commodore Perry defeats British fleet on Lake Erie, September 10, 1813; wooden ship built in 1918 for U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to help revitalize merchant fleet.
the Founders, had in common is far more important than their differences. They understood that the United States had a powerful interest in preserving and expanding a new kind of international system that is captured in another Latin phrase found on the back of every American dollar bill: a *Novus Ordo Seclorum* (a new order of the ages), or what President George H.W. Bush called a new world order, based on such fundamental principles as national independence, sovereignty, freedom of the seas, and peaceful commercial exchange, first in North America, then in the Western Hemisphere, and potentially throughout the world. Just as no individual is perfect, no country ever lives up to its principles completely; but this is the system to which we became dedicated when Monroe proclaimed his doctrine, and the system we have been committed to defend ever since.

**Commanding the Commons**

The second national conversation to which I would draw attention is about securing free use of the global maritime commons and sea control. It began in the 1890s under the leadership of another forward-thinking maritime strategist, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan of the Naval War College. Mahan was an evangelist—some even say a propagandist—for the Navy. He believed that commerce was the source of military power, especially in the industrial age. Since most commerce in his time moved by sea, he also believed that whoever controlled the sea would control commerce and with it the foundations of military power. Silent strategic cooperation between the United States and England had enabled the former to become a great industrial nation by the end of the 19th century, but could Americans rely forever on the British? What if England became an adversary? What if England went into strategic decline? What if other powers arose who were less concerned with preserving than with overturning the increasingly liberal international system that had resulted, in part, from de facto Anglo-American strategic cooperation?

In all these contingencies, the United States would need to enter the ranks of the great maritime powers, but how? In the best case, as Mahan’s friend and admirer Theodore Roosevelt would suggest, the United States might “speak softly,” that is, cooperate with such powers against what we today call rogue and failed states. Thus, more than 100 years before our maritime Services announced their current cooperative security strategy, Mahan called for the United States to work as part of a maritime coalition in what he called a “naval consortium” to keep the sea lanes open. In the worst case, however, Mahan was as aware as Roosevelt that the United States would need a “big stick” to secure free use of the sea on its own with a navy capable of establishing control of the sea.

In Mahan’s view, the key to sea control was a big battleship fleet able to risk all to win all. It would defeat enemy battleship fleets on the high seas, chase their navies and merchant shipping from the ocean, protect our own commerce, and deny trade to enemies, who would be blockaded into surrender. Mahan was so successful at shaping public opinion that not only key American leaders, such as Theodore Roosevelt, but also leaders abroad bought his strategy hook, line, and sinker. He became an international celebrity, with honors from Oxford and Cambridge in England, where

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**when the United States entered World War I, it had the wrong navy**

...he seemed to have explained how Britannia came to rule the waves. Kaiser Wilhelm in Germany read his book and demanded that Germany build a Mahanian battleship navy. So did leaders in Japan, eager as they were to found an empire of their own.

Mahan had his critics, however. Some worried that he was encouraging Americans to catch the imperial disease—that is, to become like their worst enemies almost a century before. Others wondered whether the best use of a navy was to fight the big battle on the sea; perhaps it would be better for navies to project power from the sea to the shore and further inland. Still others wondered whether battleships, like aircraft carriers today, might be too expensive to lose. Perhaps attacking an enemy’s commerce with submarines and other raiders was a better strategy.

But Mahan was so successful at generating public support for his strategy that his critics were generally ignored, at least in America. The result was that when the United States entered World War I, it had the wrong navy. There were no decisive fleet engagements in that war, only might-have-beens, like the Battle of Jutland. This was not a war to be won through decisive battles, but attrition, with the U-boat threat coming close to winning the war for Germany. When the United States entered the war, it
had many battleships but few destroyers to convoy merchant, supply, and troop ships across the ocean. It also had the wrong strategy to win the war, but fortunately it had just enough spare industrial capacity to adapt quickly and enable the Allies to win by transporting over 2 million American doughboys to fight in France. So ironically, the future war that Mahan had expected to win in fleet engagements on the sea was won on land by using the ocean as a highway to project American ground forces to Europe.

Is there a moral to this story, too? Public support is clearly essential to sustain a maritime strategy, but sometimes even the greatest strategists—and Mahan was a great one—get it wrong. Mahan and his country could have benefited greatly from something as American as apple pie, if not more so. They needed more dissent and the ability to listen to it, which is another reason to discuss these matters with the country. Moreover, as Russia succumbed to the German war machine and England and France struggled to survive its onslaught, it became increasingly clear that it was no longer possible for the United States to exempt itself from the burdens of world leadership. Although we had benefited more than we usually acknowledged from tacit strategic cooperation in the 19th century, our freeriding, isolationist mentality meant that we had a credibility problem. If we wanted other nations to cooperate with us both for defensive purposes and to produce a more prosperous peace, we had to put our money where our mouths were; that is, we had to invest the financial and other capital required to get fence-sitters to believe we were serious. This is what Woodrow Wilson meant when he said the noble (but tragically flawed) experiment in strategic cooperation embodied in the League of Nations was about extending the Monroe Doctrine to the world.

But what is the world? Nearly three-quarters of it is covered by water. Ninety percent of its trade, the lifeblood of modern economies, moves by sea. The majority of its population lives within a few hundred miles of the coasts. In such a world, the kind of leadership that would result in political, military, and economic cooperation rather than military competition was inherently dependent upon maritime strategy.

Power Projection

The third national conversation to which I would draw attention concerns using the ocean as a highway to project American power abroad in the air, on the land, and through space, including cybersecurity. It began under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt (who had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I) and Congressman Carl Vinson (D–GA) in the years immediately before American entry into World War II and has continued ever since.

After World War I, Americans were gung ho for naval arms control agreements, both because they believed arms races caused wars and because they were expensive. The result of the arms control agreements in the 1920s and early 1930s, as well as unwillingness to enforce the Versailles Treaty limiting German rearmament, however, was that Americans reduced the size of their navy while Germany and Japan increased theirs. In this isolationist period, with the country on its knees in the Great Depression, no one could convince Americans to want or plan for much more than homeland security based on securing Fortress America with a giant moat around the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps only the fall of France in 1940, while Japan was expanding in China and Indo-China, with England standing alone and its fleet vulnerable to capture or destruction by the Germans, led American leaders to call for a different kind of maritime strategy and a different kind of navy.

Planners realized they did not have a navy big enough to fight either Germany or Japan and that once again they had the wrong navy for the war about to come. Germany could not be defeated through battleships, nor could Japan be defeated in one decisive battle at sea. The nature of the war was again a struggle of attrition. Germany had to be defeated first by gaining control of the Atlantic Ocean—that is, by defeating the German submarine fleet. Japan had to be defeated bit by bit, one island at a time, by leapfrogging ground and air forces across the Pacific, with the Navy supplying a highway paved by ships to enable U.S. forces to reach the Japanese homeland. So gradually from 1936 to 1940, always making sure not to get too far ahead of public opinion, President Franklin Roosevelt and Congressman Carl Vinson called for a decisive change in maritime strategy, for a two-ocean navy capable of winning in both the Atlantic and Pacific, with a diversified fleet designed to win against U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Moreover, they wanted to use our own submarines to cut Japan off from supplies and to gain control of the sea originally through battleship task forces and later through carrier task forces, so American ground and air forces could be sustained abroad, and to land such forces in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and across the Pacific. This integrated, or joint, combination of Army, Navy, Air Force, and other Services has been the foundation of American military strategy ever since, but that strategy has always been a maritime.
strategic at its core. We are not simply a continental power blessed with no serious enemies capable of threatening us on land. We are also a maritime nation with interests, allies, and enemies linked to us by sea around the globe.

Here I must say something about what we call globalization today, a phenomenon that owes much to how Franklin Roosevelt planned to promote peace and escape another Great Depression after World War II. Provisionally, let us define globalization as the increasingly rapid exchange of goods, services, people, information, and ideas around the globe. When did globalization begin? I would say in 1492, when Columbus sailed the ocean blue, in the Niña, Pinta, and Santa Maria. He sailed west in the hope not so much of proving the world was round as of opening trade with the East; but he accidentally discovered a new world, the Western Hemisphere, thus laying the foundations for our global trading system.

Several hundred years later, in 1776 in fact, Adam Smith published his great economic treatise, Wealth of Nations, the purpose of which, in part, was to describe the consequences and foundations of a globalized economy. Said Smith, if each

Roosevelt and Vinson called for a two-ocean navy capable of winning in both the Atlantic and Pacific, with a diversified fleet designed to win against U-boats in the Atlantic.

Periscope view of Japanese destroyer torpedoed by U.S. submarine, 1942
nation eliminated trade barriers and focused on its comparative advantages, then free-market competition would lead all by an invisible hand to unprecedented economic prosperity—as what was once expensive to produce at home became cheaper to buy from abroad and what was best produced at home began to command markets abroad. Often forgotten, however, is that there is a very visible hand in Smith’s vision of a global free trading system, namely the Royal Navy, which helped keep the sea lanes open in the 18th and 19th centuries.

After 1945, when England was bankrupt, the United States came to play much the same role as guarantor of last resort for a globalized economy by using its navy and those of its allies to keep the sea lanes open. In that sense, the role of our maritime Services is analogous to that of the Federal Reserve in the monetary system. By preserving confidence that the global trading system will not collapse, both the maritime Services and Federal Reserve increase the willingness of nations to cooperate to preserve the system rather than compete to destroy it. I cannot think of a better reason to take maritime strategy seriously than the fact that the invisible hand guiding globalization today depends on the visible hand of maritime power, which, in the last resort, is American maritime power.

Is there a moral to this story, too? Roosevelt and Vinson adapted American maritime strategy just in time to avoid disaster in World War II. We might not be so lucky or wise—or both—again. Absent a clear threat from the Axis powers, it is not certain they could have adapted in time, or carried public opinion along with them. How to match strategic needs to public wants is thus often an urgent question. It must be done in time to make an effective difference, but how? Should we focus on securing our moat? What is a moat in the age of nuclear missiles, and how could a navy supply such a moat today? What kind of moat is required in an age of international terrorism and illegal immigration? Or should we focus on free use of the global commons? What does that mean in the age of space and cyberspace warfare? Or should we focus on projecting power from...
the sea as far as necessary to defeat a distant enemy, such as al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Perhaps we must do all of the above. Fine, but how do we diversify our strategic portfolio so that we can protect our most vital interests without becoming overextended militarily, economically, and politically? What roles might a variety of allies, both formal and informal, play as we hedge our bets against the worst case while striving to achieve better cases? These are just the tip of the iceberg of the questions we must address to have a viable strategy in the future.

The new maritime strategy is an effort to answer these and other questions. It is entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Whereas I have spoken mainly about the past, the new maritime strategy is focused on the future, so let me call attention to the television and film projects, Star Trek and Star Wars, both of which are vital elements of American soft power, understood as the attractiveness not only of our way of life, but also of our preferred way of resolving international problems. We ought not to forget that we call spacecraft “spaceships,” and that by analogy we see outer space as a vast ocean with an infinite archipelago of bright stars. In Star Trek, a federation, or coalition, of planets seeks to provide for its members’ security while upholding a principle of nonintervention, or sovereignty, which is the “prime directive” in intergalactic affairs. The republic is also a multicultural federation of “diverse intelligent life forms” striving to preserve some form of freedom under law from those who had turned to the dark side of the force—from those who meant to base authority on naked power.

If we reflect on the future envisioned in these internationally popular cultural icons, we can see that it is emphatically not going where none has gone before. We are clearly back to the future because the cooperative approach of the new maritime strategy is as old as Ben Franklin’s remark before signing the Declaration of Independence that we had better hang together, lest we hang separately. A strategy of cooperative security, in other words, is a reflection of our national character and some of our oldest traditions. While no maritime strategy can receive sustained public support unless it is consistent with our national character, the new maritime strategy emphasizes the elements of our national character most likely to prove attractive to old friends and new. JFQ
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the first post–Cold War revision of U.S. naval strategy, reminds us of the criticality of the Navy’s mission to national security: “70% of the world is water, 80% of the world lives on or near the coastline and 90% of our commerce sails across it.” Secure seas and free-flowing maritime commerce are enduring, vital national security interests. As we enter the seventh year of the war on terror, the U.S. Navy now recognizes that conflict prevention is on par with warfighting and seeks to achieve conflict prevention “through collective maritime security efforts that focus on common threats (proliferation, smuggling, piracy, terrorism, etc.) and mutual interests.” The following two books offer insight into what the Navy does daily and some of the challenges it faces now and will face in the near future as it endeavors to achieve “collective maritime security” among our allies and competitors in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is not often that we get the chance to delve into the personal diaries of our commanding officers, let alone a sitting U.S. combatant commander. Yet this is exactly the opportunity that Admiral James Stavridis has given us by publishing the journal he kept from 1993 to 1995, during his command of the USS Barry, an Arleigh Burke–class Aegis guided-missile destroyer. He commanded the ship on multiple training exercises and deployments in support of operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and the Persian Gulf.

This book is not your run-of-the-mill autobiography. Writing in first-person and present tense, and offering introspective and sometimes self-deprecating insights, Stavridis shares his successes, challenges, concerns, and, best of all, personal stories and lessons of successful leadership. For example, in the opening pages, a jaunty Commander Stavridis recounts how after over 20 years of preparing to command his first ship, he approaches the Barry for the first time and suddenly feels “a curious shortness of breath, for my heart was beating high, and I had difficulty in swallowing. . . . Am I afraid?” (p. 9). Anyone who has taken command or begun a daunting assignment can identify with these feelings, and young officers can benefit from reading about how Commander Stavridis met his challenges and succeeded.

Despite being an account from 15 years ago, its lessons remain relevant to the contemporary operating environment. Admiral Stavridis commanded the Barry at a time when the Navy was downsizing, and the operational tempo was picking up. By his own account, he and his crew spent nearly 75 percent of the 27 months he was in command away from port. Officers in today’s operating environment should thus be able to identify with such observations as, “To sail in a modern ship of war is not unlike walking into a desert with a few companions. Everywhere around you is nothing but the sky and distant horizon. There is little outside input and an endless cycle of work and sleep” (p. 108). This window into the thoughts and feelings of one of the Navy’s most successful officers of the era makes this a captivating read and is one of the most valuable aspects of the book. Every military officer and member of the joint and interagency warfighting team will gain precious insight into what it is really like commanding a U.S. Navy ship and leading Sailors. This book will surely become required reading in the Navy but should also be read by all joint warfighters. Unless you are one of the fortunate few non-Navy people to have served at sea aboard a Navy vessel, you may never come closer to learning what the Navy is really about.

The Asia-Pacific is an inherently maritime region that encompasses as many vital U.S. security interests today as ever—perhaps, in our globalized world, more. The interests of our allies and competitors, as well as challenges to them, will impact national security, and the U.S. Navy will most likely find itself in the lead on these issues in the Asia-Pacific.

This volume is a collection of essays published by Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, which researches and develops comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking in areas related to Singapore’s interests. The contributors are maritime security experts from such regional players as Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, and the United States. The fact that the essays are not written from a U.S. perspective recommends this work to national security planners and decisionmakers to inform and assist the implementation of the Navy’s strategy of collective maritime security.

The book begins with an introduction (effectively an executive summary) provocatively entitled “Cooperation or Competition in the Maritime Asia-Pacific?” The author observes that “with the arrival of new powers [that is, India and China], traditional regional powers may need to reevaluate their strategies in light of the new environment.” In answering the “cooperation or competition” question, the author concludes that a balance of hard and soft power might be the best prospect for enhancing stability in the region (pp. 13–14). The bulk of the book is organized into four sections dealing with “Issues, Trends, and Paradigms in Maritime Asia-Pacific”; “National Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities”; “The Maritime Aspects of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defenses”; and a concluding section containing two essays. This book is particularly useful for its analysis of maritime strategy, emergent doctrines, naval orders of battle, the role of nuclear naval power in the Asia-Pacific, and the implications and impact of nuclear weapons.

The essays reinforce U.S. understanding of trends in the region, such as China’s modernization and expansion of naval capabilities to eventually have a viable blue water force (chapter 4), and present new considerations about emerging naval powers such as India, which is
determined to "leapfrog capability development, challenge the status quo, and alter the relative balance of power to its favor" (p. 113). Timely and relevant, this thought-provoking volume will serve U.S. national security planners well.

Other recently published titles recommended for reading:


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**Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy**

by Colin S. Gray


186 pp. $39.95

ISBN: 0-275-99131-8

Reviewed by TODD MANYX

At first glance, one might think that Fighting Talk could just as easily have been titled Strategy for Dummies: Restatements of the Obvious. However, that would be a mistake. Gray, a professional with over 40 years of experience in strategy and defense policy, has made a concerted effort to capture the basic truths that serve as an “invisible hand” in guiding strategists in their daily efforts and to distill those truths to their essence. One of Gray’s specific goals “is to make explicit the assumptions that…are hidden behind political rhetoric and the jargon of experts” (p. 17). Ultimately, he seeks to increase everyone’s “understanding of the nature of war, peace, and strategy” (pp. xiii). The study of strategy requires knowledge and consideration of a variety of topics that the author has gathered into five general sections: “War and Peace,” “Strategy,” “Military Power and Warfare,” “Security and Insecurity,” and “History and the Future.” Each section is composed of short essays that begin and end with quotations used to reinforce the topic at hand.

“War and Peace” (maxims 1–10) examines the nature of war and its relationship with peace. Specifically, Gray notes the differences between the practical perspectives (those of politicians and military members) and the theoretical perspectives (those of strategists) of war and peace. In Gray’s opinion, everyone, to include people who formulate and execute policy, seeks shortcuts. The role of the strategist is to help politicians understand why some shortcuts, or analytical leaps, should be taken with caution. Gray clearly states that culture influences a strategist’s perceptions and that the strategist is meant to emphasize the role of cultural matters in both analysis and decisionmaking. A particularly interesting lesson is drawn from maxim 2 (“War is about peace, and peace can be about war”) and its discussion on the cyclical nature of war. The lesson is that while it is admittedly irregular in nature, the proven cycle of war/peace warfare demonstrates that idealists are incorrect in believing war only creates more war. Likewise, those who posit that peace only generates more peace are advocating an ideal, not reality.

“Strategy” (maxims 11–21), the book’s lengthiest section, deals with the practical aspects of strategic power in which political will is converted to military action. It is within this section that the author emphasizes his belief that the works of Clausewitz (On War), Sun Tzu (Art of War), and Thucydides (Peloponnesian War) capture the essence of strategic thought and that “people cannot be regarded as educated in strategy unless they are familiar, and more, with these books” (p. 58). To wit, see maxim 14: “If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying.” Gray’s point is not necessarily that the best way to get a new idea is to read an old book, but rather that the matters that most affect strategy have remained constant for centuries and that, ultimately, “strategy is all about correlating military means with political ends” (p. 87).

“Military Power and Warfare” (maxims 22–28) highlights the influence that the outcome of operational and tactical level military execution has on strategy. The concept behind this section is disarmingly simple: military actions influence strategy. However, the points covered delve into more profound concepts that can be uncomfortable to deal with. For example, one of Gray’s key points is that military excellence is relative, a simple truth at face value in that not everyone can be the best at everything. However, the ability to make an honest assessment of one’s available resources can have a sobering impact on formulating a realistic strategy. After all, what politician is likely to publicly declare that his military is not up to the task? The author uses a quotation from General Rupert Smith to point out how relative excellence is a constant concern for potential adversaries: “Armies do not prepare for the last war, they frequently prepare for the wrong one . . . [because] governments will usually fund only against the anticipated primary threat as opposed to risk, and the adversary will usually play to his opponents’ weakness rather than strength” (p. 103).

In “Security and Insecurity” (maxims 29–35), Gray reminds us that strategy is important because there is always someone out there who seeks to do us harm, and therefore it is necessary to have a plan for how to deal with the threat. The problem, as alluded to by General Smith, is anticipating who the next enemy will be. Fortunately, Thucydides provides assistance when he notes that wars tend to be about one of “three principal very broad reasons: fear, honor, and interest” (p. 122).

“History and the Future” (maxims 36–40) is directed toward helping strategists understand the process of change and how understanding the proper historical lessons
can aid their day-to-day focus. The most relevant points are examples of how historical lessons have been twisted to fit the political heat of the moment, often to the detriment of those required to execute policy.

In summary, Gray’s attempt to shed light on the nature of war, peace, and strategy is a great success. Fighting Talk serves as a primer on topics relating to strategic policy that will help interested parties at all levels understand that behind political jargon and rhetoric, more than an invisible hand is guiding a strategist’s counsel.

JFQ

Major Todd Manyx, USMC, is an Intelligence Officer with over 22 years of experience, most recently with a deployment to Anbar Province in Iraq.

Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic
by Ray Takeyh
272 pp. $25.00

Reviewed by
RIZWAN ALI

Iran is an ancient civilization full of stark paradoxes. It eschews the West at the same time that it seeks integration into the international system. It persists in sponsoring terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, while its foreign policy has been progressively more realpolitik than Islamist. These contradictions have complicated the formulation of a foreign policy toward Iran for each President since Jimmy Carter. According to Ray Takeyh, Washington’s strategy has been awkward at best and self-defeating at worst because American leaders and strategists have consistently misread the internal politics of Iran.

Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is one of the most pragmatic Middle East experts in America. His book sheds light on the inner political structure of Iran, its own perception of its role in the Middle East, and the forces that are driving it toward developing a nuclear bomb. He dismisses the portrayals of Iran by a succession of American leaders and the media as simplistic and often harmful to the cause of the progressives and reformers in the Iranian political system.

Takeyh also asserts that contrary to U.S. popular opinion, Iran’s government is remarkably stable and has elements that want to fully participate in the international system.

Takeyh’s main argument in Hidden Iran is that in order to understand the country, one must study its internal factions and their political debates. Only by deciphering this “hidden Iran” can we see the real challenges the country poses. To offer a full appreciation of the political struggles there, Takeyh begins with a thorough analysis of the legacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who took control after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Takeyh’s brilliant portrayal sheds new light on Khomeini’s legacy and shows how his worldview continues to shape political debates and decisions in Iran.

Among the many unique aspects that Takeyh identifies about Iran is that it has always had multiple political movements. Despite Khomeini’s attempts to eliminate dissent, the internal political and theocratic divisions survived and have found ways to operate within the framework of the Islamic Republic. These factions have taken turns at leading Iran since the revolution. Regardless of who has been in power in Washington or Tehran, however, the United States and Iran have been unable to mend strained relations. Takeyh notes pointedly that the confrontational rhetoric employed by not only the current American administration but also previous ones works to strengthen the power base of the Iranian conservatives at the expense of reform-minded politicians. But because these more pragmatic politicians have not been squelched and continue to operate in the legislature and through other government bodies, Takeyh holds out hope for change.

The two timeliest sections of Hidden Iran explain how the United States can deal with Iran on the issues of its nuclear ambitions and stability in Iraq. Takeyh observes that the public debate in Iran about nuclear weapons mirrors the discussions in China, India, and Israel before those nations developed their nuclear weapons. These exchanges revolve around nuclear prestige, great power hypocrisy, and the need for a viable deterrent. Takeyh peels back the layers to show that this internal debate has not reached the point of no return and that the United States can still effect change in Iran’s nuclear path by decoupling the nuclear issue from other points of contention. Takeyh also tackles the thorny issue of Iran’s involvement in Iraq, noting that Tehran knows a stable Iraq is the best route to ending the American occupation. Therefore, Iran’s clerics and their political allies are pushing for a united Iraq with a weak federal system and strong provinces. On both the nuclear and Iraq issues, Takeyh points out that despite the revolutionary rhetoric employed by Iran’s leaders, at its core, Iran’s strategy is very much oriented toward realpolitik.

Hidden Iran focuses closely on internal politics and how Iran views itself in the Middle East and the greater international system. Though this is not a history of the country, Takeyh does an admirable job of explaining the historical context of key events and decisions in a moving, engaging style that will hold the interest of the novice as well as the expert. One area he does not address is how the various ethnic and religious minorities play into the political process. In addition to the Persian majority, Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs constitute small but strategically important minorities. They have played a role in helping Iran influence and build partnerships with neighbors who have the same minorities.

All military and national security strategists should read Hidden Iran and keep it on their bookshelves for reference. The complexities of Iranian politics are not always apparent to Western observers since even the pragmatic and reform elements in Iran continue to pay homage to Khomeini’s legacy. It takes a thoughtful observer such as Takeyh to help us understand how the country’s factions and personalities are relevant to its ambitions in the international system. Takeyh is optimistic that the United States and Iran can reach agreement on a variety of issues, including nuclear weapons and Iraq, as long as Washington makes the right diplomatic moves to help ease the tension.

JFQ

Lieutenant Colonel Rizwan Ali, USAF, is a career officer with extensive deployments and travels in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, Far East Asia, and Africa. He wrote this review while attending the National War College.
War is by nature a social activity. Its success depends on the collective actions of small groups working in concert in rifle squads, on gun crews, and in armored vehicles. Yet command is a solitary endeavor, and command in war is particularly lonely, especially when leaders have time to reflect on the decisions they made, the orders they gave, the men they lost, and the enemies they killed. Major Seth Folsom, USMC, does a thorough job describing this loneliness in The Highway War, a memoir of the invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Folsom felt the loneliness of command for nearly 2 years as he held the guidon of Delta Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. During this time, he trained his Marines hard and led them during the long journey from the Kuwaiti border to Saddam Hussein’s birthplace of Tikrit. He describes both the war and its lead-up in detailed prose free of exaggeration and self-importance.

Folsom writes with such bluntness that he occasionally gives the impression of describing something that happened to someone else. The author is unflinching in his description of himself; for example, he acknowledges that he graduated near the bottom of his class in the Basic School. He admits to worrying constantly about his company’s readiness despite a grueling train-up. He does not hesitate to address occasional differences with his fellow Marines; he endured more than one dressing down from the battalion operations officer and was the subject of several graffiti slurs at camp in Kuwait. Folsom sticks to this matter-of-fact approach during his successes as well. He describes all of Delta Company’s engagements (which resulted in zero friendly casualties) in stunning detail, although he neglects to mention that his leadership earned him a Bronze Star.

This style makes The Highway War extremely valuable for Marines and other warfighters who might soon be engaged in combat. Folsom expounds on topics as varied as counseling subordinates, the advantages of Marine close air support, and the importance of training, discussing them all without seeming didactic. Anyone who has been to war or even on a training exercise will identify with Folsom’s steadfast belief in the importance of sleep during operations.

The retelling of the invasion itself is true to life and therefore occasionally uninteresting. Following the dictum that war is 99 percent waiting for something to happen followed by 1 percent pure terror, Delta Company spent much of the war in trail behind 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and other lead elements of the invasion, snaking down highways in an endless column headed for Baghdad. In describing this period, Folsom captures the uncertainty and detachment that modern warfare produces. Often, the fighting is apparent to Folsom’s Marines only through the radio calls of engaged units, the report of friendly artillery batteries, and smoke on the horizon. Denied a stand-up fight or the expected starring role of walking point for the regiment, Delta Company endured the fatigue of endless road marches, the discomfort of an unrelenting environment, and the dangers of unexploded ordnance.

Folsom’s descriptions of the engagements that occurred when Delta eventually met the enemy are masterful. The battles are great examples of fire and maneuver and illustrate the devastating effects of a properly employed combined arms team. The book abounds with lessons for junior leaders as the author showcases the effectiveness of simple maneuvers and battle drills executed to standard. The star of the book is the company itself, well trained by Folsom, his lieutenants, and noncommissioned officers. The fact that so much of what the company did went well, from routine logistics operations to frequent artillery calls for fire, speaks much of the technical competence of individual Marines and junior leaders in Folsom’s company.

Folsom concludes by relating what he did following command. He worked on a battalion staff, redeployed, and attended the Naval Postgraduate School. While in school, he made a brief trip to Iraq to assist with a research project. This is the weakest part of the book, but the author uses it to explain how he came to grips with all he experienced and learned during the invasion.

The rawness of Folsom’s recollections, which range from prosaic descriptions of desert garrisons to his coming to terms with killing in combat, makes The Highway War a worthy successor to a series of memoirs that have sought to capture war as an experience, as opposed to war as a series of battles strung together. His approach calls to mind Charles McDonald’s description of World War II in Europe in Company Commander (Infantry Journal Press, 1947). The parallels are striking, though the conflicts differed greatly. Both authors show war as it is, stripped of its moonshine glories. Both felt the stress of leading. McDonald once calmed his nerves during an engagement by ordering himself to “act like a soldier, goddammit! At least you can impersonate an officer!” During a similar moment of self-doubt, Folsom summarized his ability to lead with the assessment: “They wouldn’t follow me into a bathroom right now, even if they had diarrhea.”

The Highway War is a great read for those interested in Operation Iraqi Freedom or looking for an unpolished war story. Readers seeking nonstop action will find the book slow. With maneuver warfare long gone in Iraqi Freedom, it is a pity that no memoir of equal caliber describes the difficulties of the counterinsurgency fight, for our young leaders need lessons distilled from those battles as well. Perhaps Major Folsom will supply a sequel. JFQ

Andrew Marvin is a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Science Applications International Corporation.
Joint Doctrine Update
Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

The joint doctrine development community continues to place a major emphasis on the warfighter through comprehensive reviews of doctrine and its effects on current and future operations. This quarter, our focus has been on two emerging joint publications (JPs), JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations, and JP 3–26, Counterterrorism. In May 2007, the community recognized a doctrinal void in these areas and approved the writing of the two publications. These developing JPs will address insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism.

The development of this doctrine has garnered interest from U.S. Government agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other organizations working to develop additional related publications. The U.S. Government, with the support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is working on the Interim Counterinsurgency Guide for the interagency community in its effort to capture ongoing duties and responsibilities. Concurrently, NATO is working on allied joint counterinsurgency operations and antiterrorism to support current and future operations.

JP 3–24 and JP 3–26 are being developed simultaneously to ensure that they are born joint and unified. They will focus on the joint task force commander and staff while discussing the operational level of war along theater strategy. They must answer the question of how we translate tactical action to affect the operational environment and, over time, reach the theater strategic endstate.

Our terminologists were busy at the most recent NATO Military Committee Terminology Conference (MCTC). In October, agreements were reached on 70 proposals to update AAP–6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), which is accessible via the Joint Electronic Library and Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS). A U.S. recommendation to review the underlying policy of the NATO Terminology Program (NTP) was unanimously adopted by the two NATO strategic commands and the majority of the member nations. The MCTC provided input to revise the Directive on the NATO Terminology Program at the April 2008 MCTC meeting in Norfolk, Virginia, where the U.S. delegation completed agreement on 149 proposals for AAP–6, in addition to recommendations to revamp the NTP Directive.

JDEIS continues to serve as the exclusive source of approved joint doctrine as well as a robust portal containing links to other pertinent content throughout the Joint Staff J7 and the joint force in general. This quarter, a terminology resources page has been created to more efficiently house JP 1–02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and AAP–6, as well as other key resources to help both doctrine researchers and doctrine developers in the field of standardized terminology.

Three new courses have been introduced on the Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) Web site (www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/tointer.htm). JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery, helps the user understand the Defense Department personnel recovery system, including the roles and responsibilities of various parties involved. It walks the user through the four phases and five tasks of personnel recovery, and outlines the composition of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell. Like all DOCNET courses, it integrates voiceover with animation and graphical elements to deepen the understanding of doctrinal principles involved and how to use the information contained in the publication.

The interagency coordination course has also been updated to reflect the recent revision of JP 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations. The changes include expanded coverage of intergovernmental and nongovernmental coordination, as well as broad coverage of the relationship between the Defense Department and homeland security and the Department of Homeland Security and civil support. Finally, a course entitled Joint Operations Planning Vignette has been added, based on a vignette taken from JP 5–0, Joint Operational Planning.

JDEIS developers continue to work with J7 to evolve and increase the capabilities and functionality of the Web site to provide the joint force warfighter the most comprehensive set of tools and references in one easy to access spot. For access to joint publications, go to the JDEIS Web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil (dot.mil users only). For those without access to dot.mil accounts, go the Joint Electronic Library Web portal at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

Joint Publications (JPs) in 1st Draft
CY 2008
2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations
3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support
3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations
3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations
3-26, Counterterrorism
3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-40, Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
4-01.5, Transportation Terminal Operations
4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution

JPs in Final Draft
CY 2008
3-04, Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments
3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations
3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations
3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations
3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
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JFQ Dialogue

Forum

Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath By Joseph J. Collins

Since 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has contributed to the Project on National Security Reform study of the interagency process. As part of this cooperative effort and in furtherance of the INSS mission to inform the national defense policy debate, INSS is publishing selected analyses on national security reform.

In this case study, Joseph J. Collins outlines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what improvements could be made in that process. Finding that U.S. efforts were hobbled by faulty assumptions, flawed planning, and continuing inability to create adequate security conditions in Iraq, Collins concludes with several recommendations to improve the decisionmaking process for complex contingency operations, such as developing a new planning charter, improving the interagency planning process, and strengthening interagency execution.

43 pages. Available only from NDU Press. Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on this and other publications: <ndupress.ndu.edu>

International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction By Paul L. Bernstein

This paper examines the roles, manifestations, and challenges of international cooperation to combat the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat and poses important questions for future leaders to address in improving international cooperation in this area. The author delves into subjects such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD, financial measures, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, nuclear detection and forensics, biodefense and biosecurity, and U.S. efforts to engage with allies and other security partners to increase their capacity to detect, deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats.

42 pages. Available only from CSWMD. Visit the CSWMD Web site for more information on this and other publications: <ndu.edu/WMDCenter>
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Essay Competition Winners

plus

Whatever Happened to the “War on Drugs”?
Legal Solutions to Terrorist Violence

... and more in issue 51, 4th Quarter 2008 of JFQ