Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations

Selected Perspectives and Experience

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Foreword

Dr Graham Turbiville’s paper on “Hunting Leadership Targets” is a discussion of the critical topic of targeting leadership to defeat an opponent in a counterterror or counterinsurgency campaign. Dr Turbiville approaches the topic, using only open and unclassified sources, from an historical perspective discussing numerous cases where government forces have targeted leadership. His paper culminates in a more lengthy review of Mexico’s targeting insurgent leadership in the Guerrero Province in the late 1960s and Russia’s more recent campaigns in Chechnya.

Targeting leadership can be a difficult endeavor, and the role of intelligence is critical in any effective leadership targeting plan. In most cases, human intelligence is the key capability supported by other intelligence collection capabilities. Equally important is the ability to “share” the intelligence amongst the various interested parties through effective fusion cells and joint operations and intelligence centers. This last issue is especially critical as terror organizations morph into global enterprises and present a transnational threat. Intelligence sharing among international partners is more important than ever.

The relative efficacy of leadership targeting spans a broad spectrum from highly successful in the case of Peru and the Sendero Luminoso in the 1990s to the less successful campaigns in Rhodesia in the 1970s. It is important to note that in evaluating success, we must be careful to define the goals desired. A successful operation to target an opponent’s leadership may well be a tactical, or even operational, success, but ultimately lead to a strategic failure. Therefore, tying the tactical and operational activities to a broad, national counterinsurgency or combating-terrorism strategy is a critical component to success.

Ultimately, targeting leadership must take into account the enemy organization and its motivations. If an organization is “driven” by a charismatic leadership, as in the case of Guzman and the Sendero Luminoso, then effectively targeting the leadership can be decisive. In other cases where ideology for a “cause” is more important
than leadership, removing leaders will have less strategic impact. In this latter case, targeting may be effective tactically or operationally, but to be truly effective in a strategic sense, the operations must be linked to comprehensive agreement or conflict resolution.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
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About the Author

Dr. Graham Turbiville is a senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. His current research is centered on a range of regional and transnational threats to include insurgency, terrorism, the development of foreign Special Operations Forces (SOF), and foreign perspectives of the United States and allied capabilities and vulnerabilities. Dr. Turbiville also serves as a senior consultant and researcher for a Department of Defense/intelligence community program dealing with geographic and cultural intelligence in several areas of the world and producing history-based assessments of tribal/clan societies in contemporary war and conflict.

He received his B.A. in Foreign Languages from Southern Illinois University, M.A. in Russian Studies from George Washington University, and Ph.D. in History from the University of Montana. Dr. Turbiville served 30 years in intelligence community analytical and leadership positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of the Army. These positions included director/chief of long-range and current intelligence offices and directorates, director of a Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, and other assignments dealing with foreign combined arms, security, and SOF.

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations

Selected Perspectives and Experience

Introduction

This monograph reviews selected foreign experience in targeting insurgent and terrorist leadership. The intent is to provide a limited illustration of many efforts in various countries to locate and neutralize key combatant leaders or support cadres whose capture or death was judged contributive to eliminating a guerrilla or terrorist threat. As a dimension accompanying other counter-insurgency (COIN) measures or more developed COIN and counterterrorist strategies, the emphasis placed on leadership targeting has ranged from central to peripheral. The last several decades are replete with historical examples illustrating many facets of these foreign targeting actions as well as some analogous efforts by terrorist or insurgent groups to eliminate government representatives. Recent events indicate that analogous operations receive at least the same level of attention from foreign planners.

The last several decades are replete with historical examples illustrating many facets of these foreign targeting actions as well as some analogous efforts by terrorist or insurgent groups to eliminate government representatives. Recent events indicate that analogous operations receive at least the same level of attention from foreign planners.

The current emphasis on targeting and eliminating key leadership cadres in insurgencies and terrorist movements could scarcely be better underscored than by a series of rapidly occurring events in June and July 2006. Linked at least indirectly, these designated “special actions” by government forces and terrorist-insurgent groups took place in far flung locations and involved diverse participants. They served to punctuate the long history of such actions in conflict areas around the world. They also pointed to likely intensifying efforts to advance military-political success through the planned capture or killing of what are today, among United States (U.S.) specialists,
more often called “high value targets.” These actions unfolded with notable visibility.

Shamil Basayev—the most notorious, effective, and hunted Chechen insurgent and terrorist leader in the Caucasus—died in a large roadside explosion in Igushetia, a 10 July 2006 event that Russia quickly claimed as a “special operations” success. The last public communiqué that Basayev is known to have written appeared just the day before he died. It was issued to express his Caucasus jihadists’ gratitude to Iraqi mujahideen for their elimination of five “Russian diplomats” and “spies” ambushed in Baghdad on 3 June 2006. Basayev noted that the deaths were fitting revenge for the February 2004 assassination of former Chechen President, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, by Russian Foreign Security Service agents in Doha, Qatar. A likely contributing factor was the Chechen earnest request to the Arab/Iraqi guerrillas for this action. Further illustration of common Chechen-Iraqi insurgent interests were Iraqi militant demands that Russia withdraw from Chechnya.

One of the Russian diplomats in Iraq was killed on the spot, with the other four kidnapped and executed later that month by the Iraqi
“Mujahideen Shura Council.”⁴ The Shura Council, which videotaped the event, purports to be an umbrella organization for a number of guerrilla groups—for example, “Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (Iraq).” At the time, Al Qaeda was led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the priority terrorist target of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Being Iraq’s most prominent and murderous insurgent, he was killed in a U.S. operation on 8 June, just days after the Russians were kidnapped.⁵

Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted with seeming decisiveness to the murder of the diplomats in Iraq.⁶ He requested and received the authority—“unanimously, unconditionally, and limitlessly”—from the Russian Parliament to deploy military and security service/special operations personnel abroad to identify and hunt down terrorists who harmed Russian citizens and to attack their bases.⁷ He specifically ordered the personnel “to find and eliminate the terrorists” responsible for the abduction and murders.⁸ Not long thereafter on 20 July, Putin appeared on Russian television to personally decorate the unseen (by cameras) and unnamed Russian special operators credited with Basayev’s elimination.⁹

Remarkably in this several-week summer period, several incidents occurred:

a. A top Chechen militant leader was targeted and killed by Russian security services.

b. Russian diplomats (characterized as spies) were murdered in a carefully planned and executed operation by Iraqi insurgents.

c. The most wanted terrorist in Iraq at the time was eliminated in a U.S. special operation via air strike.

d. The vengeance for a 2-year-old Russian security service assassination in Qatar was invoked.

e. The President of Russia vowed to hunt down and kill specific individuals involved in terrorist attacks on Russians.

While the U.S. interest in targeting combatant leaders has become particularly visible and developed in the post-11 September 2001 security environment and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, attention to the issue predates that by decades. It has been at least as great in other countries, which have their own rich experience, rationale, successes, and failures.
Overall, individually and collectively, such historical and more recent approaches, successes, and failures of foreign terrorist/insurgent leadership targeting offer insights beyond the basic course of action. This paper considers some of the more instructive foreign initiatives over the last several decades, focusing on military and intelligence dimensions. Key issues are operational environment, planning, command and control, guerrilla/terrorist group and its leadership, military security force organization, intelligence approaches, guerrilla/terrorist countermeasures, language and cultural dimensions, technology, public affairs and media utilization, and human rights and legitimacy. All of the operations, however, were carefully protected and obscured at the time and mostly continue today for even the oldest examples. Consequently, data varies substantially in completeness and authority.10

The selected cases—addressed either briefly or in more detail—highlight not only the diversity of region, goals, and ideology level of sophistication but also instructive lessons. In addition, only specific operations were included—that is, those involving varying types or combinations of SOF, conventional military, and law enforcement resources and having instructive command and control innovations or challenges.

While not a focus of the study, a brief recap of some general U.S. considerations over the last several decades underscore some of the issues that arise more generally in “leadership targeting” discussions and structures. When these kinds of issues surfaced in analogous foreign operations, they often were either given no priority in foreign planning or assigned widely varying priorities. The complexities (and vagaries) of U.S. considerations, however, do serve to highlight the types of issues that to a greater or lesser extent are reflected in the perspectives of foreign security establishments faced with perceived threats to national security, public safety, and critical interests.

Some Past U.S. Considerations

For the U.S., the targeted assassination of enemy leaders has typically been controversial and frequently muddled in terms of basic facts, definition, legality, circumstance, and other factors. Among these confusions has been the “targets” considered for neutralization. Distinctions made in the targeting of foreign adversary political leaders
during peacetime, as opposed to enemy combatant leaders in time of war, have often been vague and in some cases so ambiguously linked that distinctions have been difficult to define. Considerations of the morality and legality of leadership targeting concepts—and the practicality, effectiveness, and consequences of any proposed or actual programs—were integral, yet unclear. Further, any discussions, once public, have often been highly politicized and focused on the most sensational of alleged abuses or plans by the intelligence community generally, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular.

Certainly one of the most visible and politicized hearings on “political” assassination was a component of the wide-ranging series of Congressional investigations carried out in the wake of the Watergate scandals (and Vietnam); it was conducted by the Church Committee, named for its chairman U.S. Senator Frank Church. It was also partly driven by a December 1974 *New York Times* article by Seymour Hersh on CIA “domestic spying” and a subsequent inference by then-President Gerald Ford that the CIA had been involved in political assassinations. More formally known as the “Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” the Church Committee prepared a 1975 report entitled *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* It was accompanied by splashy headlines, provocative revelations and allegations, and a rash of speculation (that collectively were seized upon by Soviet intelligence services for use in effective disinformation programs and forgeries aimed at the U.S. domestic population and American allies).

The Church Committee looked specifically at the planning and/or execution of “political” assassination efforts by the U.S. Government in five principal cases:

- a. Cuba and Fidel Castro (as well as Castro’s brother Raul and guerrilla leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara)
- b. Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (Zaire)
- c. Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic
- d. General Rene Schneider of Chile
- e. Ngo Dinh Diem (and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu) of South Vietnam.

Allegations concerning assassination planning for Haiti’s President Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and President Sukarno of Indonesia
were also considered peripherally. While the Church Committee found some evidence of planning in some of the cases considered, no evidence surfaced then of any actual U.S. participation. In the course of the investigations, the committee examined three areas: a) the actual plots, b) evidence of any authorization and the level at which it may have taken place, and c) communications and control associated with any planning or execution. New CIA documents, released to the public in June 2007, have pointed to more direct CIA leadership approval and Agency participation in the Castro case in particular. The Church Committee at the time, however, found only some evidence of planning for the Castro and Lumumba episodes, and no evidence of a direct U.S. role in the actual execution of Lumumba or of other leaders (Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider) killed in various circumstances.

In its recommendations, the Church Committee urged the passage of a statute that made planning or carrying out Government-sponsored, politically motivated assassination of foreign officials a Federal crime, however one might construe such actions as advancing national policy against adversary or rogue regimes. The definition of foreign official was specifically stated to include insurgent leaders or leaders of political parties not associated with states. It was denounced as follows: a) immoral, b) impractical, c) placing U.S. leaders in danger of reprisal actions, and d) altogether un-American. In any event, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 banning political assassination, with Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan issuing subsequent recast versions.14

The Vietnam War generated substantial discussion (and misinformation) about U.S. policies and actions aimed at targeting and neutralizing the Viet Cong infrastructure. Much of the initial public view on Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) program, and its later designation Phoenix, was shaped by books and reporting such as Seymour Hersh’s The Price of Power and Tad Szulc’s The Illusion of Peace. These kinds of works painted a picture of
unsupervised, immoral, and illegal killings of many thousands of Viet Cong “political” figures in which the U.S. was complicit or central.

More balanced and insightful treatments have presented a more compelling account and analysis—for example, Mark Moyar’s *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey*, Stuart Herrington’s *Silence Was a Weapon*, and legal treatments like Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker’s and Timothy E. Naccarato’s “Targeting Saddam and Sons.” Far from the reckless killing of “political” figures in an “assassination” or “murder” program aimed at “civilian officials,” assessments by Moyar, Herrington, and others identify the complexities of neutralizing political cadres living with or otherwise intermingled and protected by armed Viet Cong. Basing their judgments on more accurate data, firsthand experience, and/or a clearer understanding of legal responsibilities, they underscore the status of many so-called political cadres as planners, spies and terrorists, as well as the clear effort made by Americans and most South Vietnamese to capture, rather than kill, unarmed and unresisting civilian members of the Viet Cong shadow government.

Despite such measured assessments, real or contrived confusion over historical and recent U.S. policies and responsibilities in targeting insurgent or terrorist leaders has continued. An example is former U.S. Senator Gary Hart’s 2005 remarks, reputed to be knowledgeable of foreign and security policy. Hart asserted, with little attention to the record, as follows:

In some cases, the intelligence services even turned violent. The CIA, for instance, conducted the infamous Phoenix program that resulted in the systematic assassination of thousands of Vietnamese villagers accused of collaborating with the Viet Cong. This was the 1970s version of Abu Ghraib. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations we tried (with obsessive insistence in the case of Fidel Castro) to assassinate at least six foreign leaders. Too bad we didn’t have the Predator then. It would have been much simpler.

Similarly, the regrets and confusion expressed by some in the media and Congress over the targeting and killing of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s sons and others reflect the same absence of fact and reason. In “Targeting Saddam and Sons,” legal scholars Parker
and Naccarato dissect this continuing problem by examining the particular case of Hussein and his sons. They illuminate two areas:

a. Important distinctions not always made among peacetime, wartime, and civilian political leaders (including those integral to command and control and operations), combatants, enemy planners, military, intelligence and paramilitary forces

b. The context of existing legislation and policies.

This case was quite clearly in no violation of legal or policy requirements—not even considering the hidden roles that any pertinent Presidential directives might play. The issues, however, continue to generate opinions that vary widely in conclusion and accuracy.18

U.S. specialists have also examined another aspect of targeting leadership—that is, the effectiveness of such efforts. For some foreign operations, effectiveness has been an important consideration as well. A particular useful treatment for the U.S., for example, is Stephen Hosmer’s Operations Against Enemy Leaders. He examines the circumstance in which enemy leadership targeting has been effective, the difficulties and constraints, unintended consequences, pertinent legal dimensions, and overall value as a foreign policy tool. While analysts may differ on some of his conclusions, the systematic treatment is most instructive.19 Clearly since the 1970s, targeting of specific insurgent or terrorist leadership figures has remained a source of intense interest and discussion. Accessible resources and primary sources—if not widespread wisdom—are readily available. Of note, repositories like “The Assassination Archives and Research Center” are making a substantial amount of material available online concerning “political assassination.”20

In the post-9/11 security environment, the targeting of terrorist and insurgent leaders and cadres by U.S. military and intelligence resources has advanced in many ways—some publicly reported and visible—and have been accompanied by notable successes.21 Senior leaders have also sought to play down the centrality of successful leadership targeting. In February 2007, Army Chief of Staff (and former commander, United States Special Operations Command), General Peter J. Schoomaker, judged that the capture of Osama bin Laden—only one element of the terrorist problem—would in itself change little. He suggested that the event would likely be akin to the
capture of Hussein or the killing of his two sons and Zarqawi and underscored the transitory nature of such successes.22

Beyond the military, intelligence, and national leadership directly involved and largely silent, public discussions and arguments about targeting high value guerrilla or terrorist leadership have become more sophisticated in some quarters.23 They more often now reflect topics that received little consideration in the past—for example, better cognizance of wartime-peacetime linkages, state vs. nonstate entities, and transnational security threats vs. traditional military challenges.24 Overall, U.S. attention to targeting insurgent and terrorist leadership—however well addressed and argued—reveals some important elements in considering foreign experience. These elements include legality, morality, effectiveness, authorization, planning, target discrimination, command and control, and the contribution to overall military or foreign policy goals. As noted, only a few countries have given the same kind of attention or weight to most of these issues as the U.S. has over the last several decades. Nevertheless, the issues are all pertinent to understanding operations and outcomes and to considering how different some perspectives, and how compelling some expedients, may be. Also know that the misinformation and dubious judgments circulating about U.S. policies and actions (for which there is a substantial base of testimony and documentation) have been at least matched in pronouncements and other available information about foreign experiences.

What follows is a review of some particularly notable operations against insurgent or terrorist leadership cadres and the rationale or key issues they illuminated.

The Diverse Experience of Foreign Operations Against Insurgent and Terrorist High Value Targets

Foreign programs to target enemy leadership figures have sometimes been notably successful and served to advance whatever military or state agenda was being pursued. They also have long been associated with surprising complexities, profound mistakes, second thoughts, condemnation, serious backlash, and other unintended consequences including enduring legacies of hatred and resistance. The well-known and often-quoted judgment of French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand—contemplating repercussions
of an 1804 kidnapping and execution in which history says he had a role—has often been used to describe such shadowy operations gone badly: “It was worse than a crime; it was a mistake.”

Nevertheless, states (and nonstate actors) around the world have continued to view the elimination of enemy combatant—and political—leadership to have some utility.

Foreign experience in targeted capturing or killing has taken many forms and been underpinned by a wide variety of wartime and peacetime circumstances, assumptions, control mechanisms, goals, and law. They include instructive World War II and immediate post-war operations among which are German World War II Partisan Jaeger, Soviet insurgent warfare in the Ukraine, and French Indochina actions focused on Viet Minh leadership targeting. Other examples of targeting include:

a. The brutal actions by military and paramilitary groups in French Algeria—especially by Army special units, the “Red Hand,” and others—are among the most notable efforts by a state to eliminate key insurgent/terrorist cadres by targeted killing and associated torture and disappearance of prisoners.

b. Southern Cone countries in Latin America conducted an intelligence-sharing and direct-action program designated “Operation Condor” that was intended to neutralize or eliminate perceived communist and subversive threats to the respective governments, with a reach that was well beyond the immediate states concerned.

c. COIN campaigns in Mexico from 1964-1982 (and continuing) have received scant attention north of the border but have important lessons to convey.

d. South African and Rhodesian antiguerrilla actions were often marked by extraordinarily high levels of skill, audacity, and technical competence but ultimately did little to change the course of history in the region.

e. Spanish paramilitary teams—that some characterized as death squads—enjoyed some success in the Basque separatist Fatherland and Liberty (Esukadi ta Aksatasunas—ETA) cadre targeting, but left a legacy for Spain’s democracy that
still has an influence on the country’s policies and political environment.

f. The U.S.S.R./Russian efforts to eliminate insurgent leadership in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Central Asia have combined a complex mix of military, security service, and indigenous actions that continue to leave a substantial body of information and uneven results.

g. India has a wealth of experience to offer, with disparate insurgencies such as those in the northeast of the country occupying police, border security, and paramilitary and military forces.

h. Great Britain’s intelligence gathering and direct action against Irish Republican Army/Provisional Irish Republican Army leadership has received considerable attention in the popular media, yet remains an obscure topic that deserves close study.

i. Certainly Israeli actions against Palestinian, Hezbollah, and other terrorist leaders and support infrastructure since independence constitutes the gold standard for the systematic conceptual and operational consideration it has received from the Israeli Government and military and security bodies.

Any of these examples qualify for book-length treatment and indeed many of them have received it. In this assessment, a few of the specific issues judged most important from selected foreign experiences are highlighted for their contribution to overall observations, lessons, and consequences. In beginning a look at foreign experience, the first country to be addressed is one that considered targeted killing more carefully and critically as any nation including the U.S.

**Illustrations of Foreign High Value Insurgent and Terrorist Targeting**

**Israel.** Few countries have been more closely associated with the planned and systematic targeting of terrorist leadership cadres and prominent enemy combatants than Israel. These operations have been planned, supported, and/or carried out variously by the Israel Defense Forces and its military intelligence component Aman
(in wartime and for demanding special operations); the Mossad (for operations abroad); and Shin Bet/Shabak (for operations inside Israel and the controlled territories), with joint actions far from infrequent. The experience has been rich, varied, often quite successful, sometimes subject to mistakes or disaster, and frequently debated internally in terms of procedure, effect, goal, legality, and morality.

Intelligence collection and analysis—heavily human intelligence (HUMINT)-based and often using Arabs in targeted groups who for various reasons collaborate—have included the most sophisticated technological collection means. An integral part of Israeli intelligence gathering is their interaction with foreign intelligence services and utilization of support from members of the Jewish Diaspora abroad. Specific methods of dispatching terrorists, identified and targeted for elimination by intelligence and accompanying political decision, have evolved. The methods vary, as appropriate and feasible for each circumstance: a) intelligence and/or special operations personnel with small arms, b) remotely detonated explosive devices in cars, books, beds, telephones and other locations, c) poisons, and d) bomb and missile strikes from fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and drones. Because Israel has been under a constant terrorist—and often conventional military—threat since its founding, distinctions between peace and war have been less central than for many states.

The Israeli continuing attention to targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tool was evident in the immediate aftermath of the summer 2006 war in Lebanon with a senior officer declaring the Israel Defense Forces intention to kill Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.26 Some observers believed that during the war, killing Nasrallah was a central goal, and Lebanon had reported uncovering at least one plot well before the war.27 None of this struck observers as remarkable or other than expected because Israeli programs to eliminate terrorist and insurgent cadres had been a standard security tool for decades.

From the end of the Israeli War for Independence and the declaration of a ceasefire with Arab belligerents in 1949, Israel received
continued threats. Their resulting focus on security and existence as a state led to developing and strengthening the military and intelligence establishments. It also led to creating a series of special units intended or designated to strike specific kinds of targets including, in some cases, leadership.28 One of the first of these—said to have influenced the subsequent and continuing development of the sayeret (reconnaissance) special operations units—was designated Unit 101 and headed by then-Major Ariel Sharon.29 Unit 101 was composed of about 45 airborne and other military personnel tasked to help stop Palestinian and other Arab combatants’ growing infiltration into Israel and accompanying violent attacks on civilians. The Unit 101 method was to attack potential infiltrators on the infiltrators’ territory.30 Dressed and armed as irregulars, and rigorously trained in night infiltration tactics, Unit 101 raided Jordanian, Palestinian, and Egyptian targets, destroying infrastructure, eliminating enemy combatants, and weakening key groupings like the feydaysen cadres of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Hafez, head of Egyptian Intelligence in the Gaza Strip and commander of the feydaysen teams who perpetrated a number of attacks on Israeli civilians.31

No shortage of condemnation or praise existed for alleged and real Unit 101 activities during Jordanian, Palestinian, and Egyptian raids, especially the death of nearly 70 civilians in a raid that destroyed the West Bank village of Qibya (or Kibbiya) in October 1953.32 The international outcry led to the folding of Unit 101 into the Israeli Airborne. Arab publications, and a number of Western commentators typically critical of Israel, continue to condemn the activities of Unit 101 in every detail, asserting its murder of innocent civilians, many of whom, it is asserted, simply wished to return to the homes from which they were driven. One positive assessment of many, however, was the critical Israeli responses in a fight against Arab terrorism in which Arab infiltrators took the lives of innocent Israelis as part of broad efforts to destroy the Israeli state. Whatever the position, all sides agree that Unit 101 was a skilled infiltration unit, noted for eliminating its targets quickly, violently, and effectively and constituting a base of experience for some kinds of military leadership targeting and the application of intelligence to further that task.

More specific kinds of targeting began to take place as well. The Israel Defense Forces Intelligence chief in the 1950s, Major
General Yehoshafat Harkabi, advanced leadership targeting as a tool aimed at reducing the operational capabilities of the enemy they faced. This targeting included eliminating in Gaza the Egyptian military intelligence chief and faydayeen attack overseer of Gaza noted above.\(^{33}\) This officer, Hafez, was killed in July 1956, when Israeli military intelligence, using an Egyptian double agent, delivered a book to him containing a bomb. A similar approach was used in the assassination of Colonel Salah Mustafa, the Egyptian military attaché in the Jordanian capital.\(^{34}\)

Among the most celebrated of Israeli targeting efforts—in the category of “old business”—began in the late 1950s and culminated in May 1960 with the kidnapping of SS Obersturmbannführer Adolph Eichmann in Argentina by a Mossad team of some 30 members and air transport back to Israel for trial. Eichmann had been one of the architects and implementers of the Holocaust, and his careful tracking and apprehension by a team operating thousands of miles from home in an unfamiliar area was a stunning success.\(^{35}\) The Eichmann operation made such an impression that even 30 years after the event, speculation continued that the capture of Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) chief Abdallah Ocalon from Kenya and his transport to Turkey for trial as a terrorist must somehow have been carried out in Turkey’s behalf by Israeli operatives or “mercenaries.”\(^{36}\)

The Mossad also used bombs in targeting German rocket scientists and others abroad during the 1960s.\(^{37}\) These specialists, working on Arab weapons development, were targeted with the aim of both reducing their contributions and deterring others who might lend their skills to improving Arab long-range strike capabilities. What defined the practice for Israeli planners and observers around the world, however, was the Mossad’s Israeli targeted killing of Black September terrorists and associated terrorist facilitators after the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich.\(^{38}\)

Events surrounding Munich and its aftermath are familiar enough that they do not need to be reviewed here in any detail.\(^{39}\) Of particular note, however, are the contributions to concept, approach, intelligence utilization, target evaluation, direct action, and follow-up appraisals of performance and consequences that these operations had for future operations. The following aspects are treated in
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sufficient, seemingly authoritative detail in a number of sources to make them worthwhile:

a. Political approval process (including the Prime Minister, the “X’ Committee,” and Attorney General)

b. Planning by the Mossad’s “Caesarea” operations directorate

c. Support by special intelligence components that evaluated and analyzed human and other intelligence reporting and databases

d. Direct actions of the carefully trained and well-rehearsed Kidon (Bayonet) assassination teams, as then reportedly designated

e. Influence on Palestinian and other potential terrorist targets as they observed the long reach of Israeli power


Far from just “revenge” killings, the elimination of Arab terrorists after Munich was also accomplished to undermine operational capabilities of terrorist groups and to provide at least a measure of deterrence. While some consensus existed in official and public support of the actions, the lessons and continuing debates surrounding the efficacy and morality of targeted assassinations have shaped Israeli approaches, even as technology and circumstances have changed. When Israel was beginning its campaign to eliminate the Munich-72 Black September terrorists, CIA Directors Richard Helms and William Colby were issuing internal directives banning assassination, and the Church Committee not long thereafter began its hearings on alleged U.S. activities in that sphere. Those hearings continue to cast a shadow on U.S. considerations of leadership targeting 30 years later.

Israeli strikes at terrorist cadres have taken place in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and far abroad. When circumstances have allowed, fixed-wing strike aircraft and combat helicopter delivery systems for bombs or missiles—and sophisticated imagery and communications intelligence supplement the still-critically important HUMINT—have been employed. (In addition, new means are being developed, including reported research using nanotechnology to create hornet-size aerial robots to find targets in the most cloistered urban areas and other constrained environments.) The names and circumstances of prominent terrorists so targeted have been well recorded. Efraim Halevy, who headed the Mossad from 1998-2003, was responsible
for developing the terrorist leadership targeting strategy that eliminated scores of Hamas cadre, including the terrorist group’s elderly, ailing spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, killed by a missile fired from a helicopter gunship. In his interviews and recently published memoirs, Halevy had no second thoughts about the value and justification of the actions that he believes reduced the capability of Hamas to undertake suicide bombings. As he noted, the targeting effort was “a military strategy and it worked.”

Arguments have been as intense in Israel as anywhere about the effectiveness of targeted killings, and they continue. Evidence has been cited on all sides in support of varying judgments. For example, one side presented the decline of Palestinian and other terrorist attacks against Israel following the post-Munich “retaliatory and preventive” assassinations as effective deterrence. The Mossad and certainly many public commentators hold this view. Still others noted that the decline in image-damaging violence might have been a consequence of Palestinian pragmatism and a gradual transition to political action instead. Dr. Wadi Haddad is a case in point. Described as a “prolific and skilled” Palestinian terrorist, Haddad was the first to hijack an El Al airliner (1968), a sometime associate of Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (“Carlos the Jackal”), and an active perpetrator of many highly visible terrorist attacks on U.S., European, and Israeli targets. Haddad had for a time headed the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), but his sometimes unsanctioned acts of international violence resulted in his expulsion.

Haddad continued to operate with some loyal followers in a separate group, while he resided in a Baghdad, Iraq safe haven. In 1976 he organized (together with the German Baader-Meinhof Gang) the Entebbe terrorist hijacking of an Air France Boeing 747 that led to the stunningly successful rescue by the Israeli Sayeret Matkal SOF in Uganda. It was also the event that led to the Israeli decision under Prime Minister Menachem Begin to approve his assassination. While not acknowledged for nearly 30 years, the Mossad used a trusted Palestinian associate to give Haddad candy infused with a “lethal biological poison.” Haddad’s health declined over several months, and he died in an East German hospital where he had gone for treatment. Upon his death, the organization he had headed dissolved, and attacks on Israel and Israeli interests declined precipitously. Similarly, a kidon team’s 1979 assassination of Zuhir Mokhsan in
Cannes, France had positive results. The pro-Syrian Palestinian organization he headed, A-Tzaika, dissolved shortly after his death.\textsuperscript{47}

On the other hand, critics point to the danger and fact of backlash following assassination. They cite Shin Bet’s assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa, the leader of PFLP, during the violence of the Second Intifada, then PFLP retaliation with the killing of Israeli Cabinet officer, Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi.\textsuperscript{48} Some have pointed to the 1992 assassination of Hezbollah leader Abbas Moussawi in southern Lebanon as an action that sparked retaliation in the form of car bombs in Buenos Aires that killed 100 people.\textsuperscript{49} Finally, some argue that it is better to deal with the devil you know, than deal with a successor devil that may be worse. They cite the killing of Islamic Jihad’s Fathi Shikaki in 1995, and the dismay when his supposedly weak successor, Abdullah Ramadan Shalah, turned out to be extraordinarily effective and subsequently oversaw a series of destructive suicide bombings in Gaza.\textsuperscript{50} (See the appendix for views of Shin Bet Chief, Yuval Diskin in July 2006.)

Views abound within Israeli academe as well. Michael Oren, a senior fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and specialist in security affairs believes that the continuing security problems in Gaza should more heavily rest on:

\begin{quote}
... the targeted-killing policy that enabled Mr. [Ariel] Sharon to triumph over terrorist organizations. Israel must target those Palestinians who order others to fire rockets from within civilian areas but whose families are located safely away from the firing zones. No Hamas or Islamic Jihad leader should be immune from such reprisals—neither Prime Minister Ismail Haniya nor Khaled Meshal, who masterminds Hamas from Damascus.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Overall, however, it appears to be a solid judgment within the Israeli intelligence community that the assassination of Palestinian terrorists abroad “forced an end to overseas terror,” and that assassination more broadly is a useful counterterrorist tool even if far from a complete answer.\textsuperscript{52} The seeming success of past policies, as Daniel Byman suggests in his 2006 \textit{Foreign Affairs} article, may owe much to the public debate, surprising public transparency, solid procedures for target selection and authorization, and a relationship to overall counterterrorism policies.\textsuperscript{53}
Britain and Northern Ireland. The decades-long struggle between British security forces and the Irish Republican Army in its variants and factions continues to benefit from new assessments supplemented by documents and memoir literature. One of the notable dimensions of the long conflict in Northern Ireland—and in particular the United Kingdom (U.K.) struggle with the Provisional Irish Republican Army and factions—has been the effort of the British to acquire intelligence that would enable military or other security forces to target key members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) for arrest or neutralization in the face of armed resistance or planned terrorist action. Media accounts, court documents, memoir literature, and what appears to be a generous leavening of pure folklore addressing British military-PIRA interaction and encounters abound from the 1969 emergence of the PIRA to its July 2005 declaration on ending armed resistance. PIRA international terrorist linkages, murders, and organized criminality have been documented. They have also been accompanied by numerous charges of British security force malfeasance and human rights violations, including what some asserted to be improper “shoot to kill” rules of engagement and collusion with Loyalist/Protestant “death squads.” While always intriguing, these accounts of a fundamentally covert war are typically murky or otherwise present detail of questionable authority. It is useful, nevertheless, to briefly highlight some of what is known about British intelligence gathering. Doing so identifies terrorist leadership in a bloody conflict that saw parallel PIRA efforts to identify and liquidate British informers and British security personnel.

The evolution of the British forces used in this effort, based on open reporting, included at the height of the struggle—among more conventional elements including the U.K. intelligence agency, MI5—three principal entities:

a. The Force Research Unit (FRU), a military intelligence organization formed in the early 1980s and, like its predecessors, focused on agent handling and HUMINT

b. Substantial 22nd Special Air Service Regiment elements, operating overtly and covertly with a focus on counterterrorism and counterrevolutionary warfare that lent itself well to PIRA urban terrorism
c. The 14th Intelligence Company (among other reputed names), supporting the operations of Special Air Service or other special operations elements like the Special Boat Service.\(^{54}\)

As PIRA violence escalated in the early 1970s, British military operations aimed at targeting its leadership were undertaken with more intensity and relied heavily on special operations components as well as the interaction of overt military and police entities.

![Figure 2. British soldier on patrol in Belfast, Northern Ireland in 1971, when increasing IRA violence led to intensified British efforts to gather intelligence on leadership and planning.](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Reliable intelligence was key; and while the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had provided useful information, their asserted collusion with Protestant militia extremists placed a premium on independent intelligence that would be untainted by sectarian hatreds and score-settling. In addition, concerns about intelligence being used by extremist paramilitaries to attack real or suspected PIRA members proved at times to be more than a theoretical possibility and drew in British operatives as well.

Interaction with foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies was another contributor to intelligence gathering and application. Some reporting indicates that the Mossad collaborated with the British in assessing operations against PIRA, and subsequently contributed to Britain’s effectiveness in identifying Islamic extremists as they have evolved.\(^{55}\)

Collectively, the intelligence techniques developed by the British during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were innovative and pioneering. For example, by most accounts, 14 Company personnel and other intelligence elements were masterful users of covert visual and
electronic surveillance techniques of all types.\textsuperscript{56} Identified targets were typically left to the direct action of regular military, police, and SOF with whom 14 Company worked most closely. Memoir literature, while of often uncertain reliability, provides insights and local color for operations by 14 Company in Northern Ireland. One of the better examples is \textit{The Operators: Inside 14 Intelligence Company} because it describes in some detail the training and preparation associated with the kind of operations unit personnel (men and women) were tasked to undertake.\textsuperscript{57}

Human/agent intelligence collected and developed by the FRU and other elements—in the face of determined and brutal PIRA counterintelligence and countersurveillance efforts—became increasingly effective with the collation of information in well-developed computer databases. This joint military intelligence information management effort in Northern Ireland attempted to incorporate a substantial slice of the total population. Program components included a database on vehicles (supposedly code-named “Vengeful” and linked to official licensing records) and target folders on individuals (reportedly called “Crucible”) with documentation (e.g., photos, maps, activities, associates, and meetings).\textsuperscript{58} Technology was applied to upgrade these systems over time, and their names and basic capabilities changed as well.

Overall, the experience gained has paid dividends in efforts to target Islamic terrorists in the current period, both those in theaters abroad and at home. Examples are efforts to track the July
2005 London train bombers and other networks, as well as tracking terrorists in Iraq and providing quality actionable intelligence support to U.S. and British SOF. The FRU and 14 Intelligence Company names and groupings have evolved, but the Northern Ireland lessons are said to remain invaluable. In 2005, official British Ministry of Defense sources billed the creation of the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) as a joint component intended to deliver “a globally deployable special reconnaissance capability to the U.K. Special Forces.” The SRR is widely reported to incorporate heirs to the former 14 Intelligence Company (later renamed the Joint Communications Unit Northern Ireland) and the former FRU (later called the Joint Support Group). The effective and sophisticated surveillance and HUMINT data collected and acted upon by the relatively new force has been the foundation of a number of successful British special operations and other missions, and as noted, was a major contributor to subsequent terrorist-targeting initiatives.59

Spain and the ETA. Before Spain suffered the paradigm-changing train bombings by Islamic terrorists in March 2004, Spanish security forces had waged a four-decade internal campaign against Basque terrorists that had regional and international dimensions. The Basque separatist ETA is one of Europe’s oldest terrorist groups. With the goal of establishing an independent Basque state, and tools that have included political action, organized crime, and the most extreme violence, the ETA represented a major threat to Spanish public safety and national security. In the 1970s and 1980s it possessed—and to a more limited extent still possesses—international ties with other terrorist groups around the world and a penchant for violent acts that often made no distinctions between state targets and civilians. The ETA’s establishment of what was once a robust international logistics establishment for the acquisition of arms, explosives, and other material was based on the presence of strong Basque expatriate cadres in many Latin American countries as well as a presence in Europe and the Middle East. In its most active days of the 1980s, the ETA was responsible for the death of many police, military, and innocent civilians as well as the destruction of state and private property primarily in Spain. In addition to more distant areas abroad, ETA combatants made substantial use of immediate safe havens available in France.
Despite the work of Spanish and French police, and efforts to leverage other international law enforcement bodies abroad, the continued death and destruction perpetrated by the ETA frustrated the Spanish Government in particular and its internal security bodies. In the years following Ferdinand Franco’s death, a number of vigilante groups were established to deal with the “communist and leftist” violence and subversion that was quite real. Several of these groups existing, including the Spanish Basque Battalion (Batallón Vasco Español), the Anticommunist Apostolic Alliance (Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista), ETA Antiterrorism (Anti Terrorismo ETA), and the Armed Spanish Groups (Grupos Armados Españoles). Their purpose was to carry out extrajudicial killings, and they targeted known and suspected leaders and members of what were judged to be violent subversive groups. It was widely supposed that these groups received at least the tacit support of state law enforcement bodies.

Certainly the best known and most active of the vigilantes was the “Antiterrorist Liberation Group” (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación—GAL), which was most active in the mid-to-late 1980s. GAL was focused principally on attacking ETA leadership cadres in French safe havens as well as in Spain, and it carried out its actions using both active state security personnel (police, Interior Ministry, and possibly the then-Military Intelligence Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa) and hired gunmen recruited for the attacks. The intent, using intelligence from government sources, was to decapitate or degrade ETA operations, while also bringing pressure on the French to strengthen their anti-ETA law enforcement efforts. Although the role of the Spanish Government was soon suspected, it was only in the 1990s that the extent of its involvement became really known. As imprisoned GAL members slowly revealed, and as official and media investigations brought out, Government complicity and direct support was integral to GAL actions. The corresponding stories, such as their first (encapsulated below), virtually ensured public reaction and called for the punishment of guilty officials.

The first GAL operation was the October 1983 kidnapping of two young ETA members, Joxean Lasa and Joxe Zabala, in Bayonne. They were taken across the border to a disused place belonging to PSOE (Socialist Party) leader, Julen Elgorriaga, in San Sebastián. There they were tortured by members of the Guardia Civil for several weeks. They were then stuffed into the boot of a car and driven...
800 kilometers to Alicante. Taken to a lonely desert spot, they were shot in the back of the head and buried in quicklime.62

The Spanish Interior Minister and a number of senior and lower level security and police officials were implicated, convicted, and imprisoned, as were other officials to include allegedly the Prime Minister.63 In its principal period of activity, GAL was credited with more than two dozen targeted killings—27 by most accounts. Of these, about one third were asserted to have involved individuals who had no role in terrorism, although the basis for this judgment was unclear.64

The illegal GAL actions were not totally without “positive” result in the fight against ETA. The operations appear to have played a substantial role in causing the French to crack down on ETA refugees and legal status to include a more helpful role in facilitating extraditions to Spain. GAL operations allegedly ended at the time France declared these new measures. On the other hand, the “dirty war” stained the new-post Franco Spanish democracy, and some believe that the propaganda and sympathy generated for the Basque cause may have prolonged the life of the terrorist group and its political arms.65 In addition, the events created lingering resentment in some quarters of the Spanish population for the seeming reluctance of the judiciary to fully investigate the affair and to punish all of the supposed participants including the Prime Minister.66

Rhodesia. The military successes of the South African Defense Forces and the Rhodesian military and security forces included the well-known capture, kidnapping, and killing of enemy leaders and political officials. In southern Africa from roughly 1966-1980, for example, Rhodesian COIN actions against African nationalist guerrillas from Mozambique, Zambia and from within Rhodesia have been examined and celebrated in many assessments, despite ultimate regime outcomes.67 This interest is particularly keen for the tactical successes of experienced and competent Rhodesian COIN forces (and especially the SOF comprising the Selous Scouts, Special Air Service, and the horse-mounted Grey’s Scouts special reconnaissance regiment), in intelligence gathering generally and specifically locating and tracking guerrilla groups and leadership cadres by small teams and detachments operating in rebel areas. Police Special Branch and military intelligence collection on units and cadre, if not always coordinated,
was credited as exceptional by specialists inside and outside the Rhodesian security establishment. Innovations such as “pseudo-operations,” involving particularly the Selous Scouts, continued to be studied and contributed to the targeting of high-value guerrilla cadres.

This practice of selecting, preparing, and training Government units to successfully appear as enemy guerrillas, penetrate rebel areas, win the confidence of the local insurgent grouping and population, and gather critical intelligence for the prosecution of COIN actions were replete with individual successes. Reconnaissance teams operated in Zambia, Mozambique, and Rhodesia. In addition to their important and successful intelligence-gathering mission, Selous teams successfully sowed distrust between village populations and genuine insurgent groups and among insurgent groups themselves. Air or other fires strike were called in on insurgent units departing specific villages, sometimes resulting in retaliation by the insurgents on the village in the belief they had been betrayed to Government forces. Great success was also enjoyed in turning captured guerrillas to Government service using both coercion and rewards.

About targeting key personnel, a widespread approach involved identifying a key guerrilla contact in a village and then publicly executing him in their guise as insurgents, on the charge that he was disloyal. The concept was based on the view that a village, knowing his loyalty to the guerrillas, would become dispirited and confused. This practice attracted the attention of the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department who judged it illegal and opened a number of murder investigations for Selous Scots and Intelligence Special

Figure 4. Captain Roy Elderkin of the Rhodesian special operations regiment, Grey’s Scouts, which with the Selous Scouts was extraordinarily effective in tracking and eliminating insurgents in the 1970s. Used by permission from CPT (Ret.) Elderkin.
Branch members. The impact on Government legitimacy as populations became aware of the real nature of the activity was thought to be substantial.  

Direct action by Selous Scouts (and other special units) came to be carried out extensively in addition to the reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering operations. It was a widely repeated consensus (based on a 1978 Rhodesian Department of Intelligence Study) that some 68 percent of guerrilla casualties were the direct or indirect result of Selous Scouts actions, with 1,203 of 2,500 guerrillas killed credited by the commander to the unit in its first 4 years of existence (1973-1977). The dimension of pseudo operations in which “hunter-killer” teams were formed to aggressively eliminate guerrillas is especially pertinent as is the employment of kidnapping teams to the topic of this monograph. This objective involved the deployment of small groups of pseudo-guerrillas to ambush and eliminate guerrillas. The pseudo-guerrillas operated particularly in more remote areas where regular security forces could not be easily employed. Hunter-killer groups might be dispersed along infiltration routes to ambush guerrillas arriving or departing. Kidnapping or capture teams seized and transported guerrillas thought to be knowledgeable to home bases for interrogation. Tradecraft and experience associated with these kinds of practices have been addressed in a number of worthwhile treatments.

While tactical intelligence gathering and operations directed against leadership cadres and units were highly successful in so many respects, overall failure is most often attributed to the lack of a coherent overall COIN strategy. Overall intelligence problems remained centered in poorly integrated Central Intelligence Organization components (playing a heavy role in military support) and diffused military intelligence efforts, until the eventual establishment of a Rhodesian Intelligence Corps and other measures. More directly related to leadership targeting was the failure of special units to share intelligence more broadly with other COIN forces. The most prominent Special Forces units—the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service—had their own internal intelligence elements and became more heavily engaged in supporting their own direct action missions.
In addition, they were further distanced from other police COIN forces because of Special Branch control of pseudo-operations.

As the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service role became better known and understood by the insurgents, difficulties in intelligence gathering increased due to heightened suspicion and security. What was termed “the excessive use of aggressive and unlawful practices … led to loss of government legitimacy” was related to some extent by the actions of special units. Despite considerable and skillful tactical success in intelligence gathering and eliminating insurgent elements (including cadre), operations were not translated into the overall successes that might otherwise be expected. The excellent work by J. Cillers, in particular, provides a fine overview of the players and complexities of Rhodesian COIN efforts. Similarly, the often analogous and more extensive South African efforts remain productive areas of investigation.

**India.** The ongoing insurgencies and terrorism carried out in opposition to India’s Government policies and/or in behalf of separatist or religious agendas have spanned many areas of the multiethnic democracy and generated a spectrum of COIN and SOF tailored to meet threats in conjunction with regular police and military forces. The complicity of Pakistan in guerrilla and terrorist support has often been alleged and sometimes demonstrated in Karachi’s training, equipping, and indoctrinating guerrillas who return to India. Leadership and cadre targeting by Indian military and security forces has not been as visible a component of COIN as it has been in some areas of terrorism and insurgency, but it has nevertheless been a practice that has had its share of successes, failures, and surprises. The lack of public revelations regarding targeted leadership elimination has been partly due to secrecy laws, limited accountability of the intelligence and police establishments, remoteness of some actions, and complexity of the operational environment.

Media reporting, memoir literature, and official accounts collectively clarify that police, paramilitary, and military and national intelligence bodies have worked diligently to identify terrorist and insurgent groups and generate sufficient information for their neutralization or elimination in numerous COIN operations and actions. The complexities of dealing with violent insurgencies in India’s democracy of many cultures and religions have generated
difficult challenges for the Government and security forces. Although common to other insurgencies around the world, these challenges are more diverse than any other single country.\textsuperscript{77} While documentation is often absent, many allegations of extrajudicial killing of guerilla/terrorist/criminal leaders, disappearances, and torture levied against COIN security forces occur.\textsuperscript{78}

Anecdotal reports have occasionally included specifics. For example, the Research and Analysis Wing (R\&AW), responsible for external intelligence, was asserted to have quietly eliminated troublesome individuals. According to one allegation, the R\&AW “is believed to have worked with a particular criminal syndicate that is said to be behind the killing of a Nepalese member of Parliament, Mirza Dilshad Baig, a close associate of Dawood Ibrahim, Mumbai’s [Bombay’s] mafia don now allegedly working with the Pakistan army’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) from his base in Karachi.”\textsuperscript{79}

After the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S., India moved closer to the Israelis (with some shared British security legacy) in defense and security cooperation, particularly in the area of counter-terrorism and COIN. A scholarly and interesting comparison of Indian and Israeli intelligence systems and approaches in a Pakistani military journal provides some useful, if arguable, insights.\textsuperscript{80} According to an Indian Foreign Ministry official, “New Delhi would like to avail of Israeli expertise in tackling infiltration, improving security at vital installations, and hunting down terrorists” and “the two sides are sharing intelligence too.”\textsuperscript{81} The elite national counterterrorism force, the “National Security Guards,” is among those receiving training from the Israelis.

Indian security professionals continuously critique intelligence and military performance shortcomings (as they believe befits a democracy). The reality, however, is that since the late 1980s, modernized and better equipped Indian counterterrorist and COIN forces posses the intelligence base and competence to carry out sophisticated counterterrorist actions including discrete targeting. An example is the 1988 Operation Black Thunder II, where enduring Sikh terrorism with the least ostensible aim of creating a Sikh homeland—Khalistan—cost hundreds of lives and highlighted earlier problems in police and security force equipping, training and effectiveness. Black Thunder II, however, indicated that several years of serious remedial measures had changed things substantially.
Careful intelligence preparation of the operation and the effective employment of joint forces resulted in more than 200 Sikh terrorists (occupying the sacred Sikh Golden Temple at Amritsar in the Punjab) killed, captured, or surrendered without losing a single security force member. Participating agencies included two categories of protection:

- Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Forces, and Punjab Police (each with counterterrorism components)
- National Security Guards (NSG) counterterrorist force (termed popularly “Black Cat Commandos”), then newly formed and in a central role.

This operation and counterterrorist capabilities were unusually visible—that is, carried out in sight of some 150 assembled journalists. Counterterrorist forces (primarily the newly equipped NSG Special Action Group or SAG components) carried out detailed preparation with mockups during the 10-day siege before carrying out a well-orchestrated assault. Particularly effective and demoralizing to the terrorists were the use of NSG commando snipers, armed with newly acquired PSG-1 Heckler and Koch sniper rifles, firing special high velocity rounds accurate to 1,000 yards. NSG and other snipers, some shooting from a nearby 300-foot water tower, killed 20 terrorists during the siege. The particular death of the principal spokesman for the Panthic Committee (an umbrella militant coordinating body) had a profound effect on morale of the rest. Black Thunder II stood in sharp contrast to the 1984 Operation Blue Star, where 1,000 Sikhs occupying the Golden Temple were killed along with 150 troops.

About targeting guerrilla cadre and infrastructure, NSG commandos working jointly with Rashtriya Rifles personnel were also used in small unit hunter-killer teams paradropped in mountainous and forested areas of Kashmir beginning in 1998 against militants there. The teams—similar to others elsewhere in the world—were resupplied approximately every 2 weeks and otherwise operated independently. No publicly available information beyond their “success” has been made available.

As has frequently been the case in other areas, terrorists and insurgents have their own targeting initiatives aimed at key security force members. The families of police and security forces were also targeted in an effort to diminish the forces capacity and morale.
Specific individuals have long been targeted from the most senior Government officials to key security and political officials. For example, Prakash Singh, who retired several years ago as the Director General of the Indian Border Security Force and served in other top counterterrorist police assignments, recounted his personal experience in this regard while assigned to Nagaland. The causes and nature of continuing insurgency there date from the time of Indian Independence. The Nagas’ frustrated desire for cultural and political independence from India turned to armed insurgency in the mid-1950s and has, with periods of ceasefire and peace, continued periodically to the present time. Complex tribal relationships, a strong culture, and factionalism—in which head-hunting once played a central role and endured in some measure into the 1960s along with blood feuds—characterize the background of a people that Mr. Singh and other knowledgeable Indian security officials describe as “brave, tough, and straightforward” and “fine specimens of humanity.”

Mr. Singh had been assigned to Kohima in Nagaland beginning in 1965 as an Intelligence Bureau officer—the deputy director of intelligence—at a time when the Naga insurgency was in full swing. China was also training Nagas on their territory and providing them arms and other support. The Intelligence Bureau was charged with a broad range of internal intelligence collection as well as counterintelligence and counter-terrorism tasks, and Mr. Singh had personally developed “actionable” intelligence that enabled a large returning Naga militant grouping to be targeted and attacked. While substantial numbers of Nagas, who were fighting effectively, managed to break
out from the Army cordon, this major grouping’s operations were severely disrupted as follows:

a. Weapons, ammunition, and equipment were captured, including small arms and mortars.

b. Much intelligence that was seized implicated China as a source of training and weapons.

c. The movement was stunned by the Government’s action in locating a secret camp.

Some months later, however, after Singh had arranged to have Naga documents stolen and copied in another operation, he was surprised to see his name on one in the form of an ahza, an order signed in mid-September 1968 by the leader of the insurgent “Naga Federal Government” sentencing him to death. The Nagas had correctly identified him as the man not only principally responsible for identifying and locating the newly armed, trained and returning guerrillas but also with a role in a subsequent operation. They determined to permanently end any future problems generated by his successful intelligence work in Nagaland. The mission for “annihilating” Mr. Singh was given to the Security Command of the Naga Army, which specialized in special actions to include sabotage and assassinations. While the Intelligence Bureau headquarters wished to withdraw him from Nagaland, Mr. Singh declined and served out his tour (with additional security precautions taken). These operational experiences collectively helped the Intelligence Bureau and Indian authorities appreciate the military potential—and the effective intelligence-gathering capabilities—of Naga insurgents that have their “guerrilla counter-intelligence” analogues in other areas of the world.

South America. In Latin America, the express targeting of guerrilla leaders, key cadre, and major criminals has been a central and well-known feature in a number of countries from Central America to Argentina. In the Andean Ridge area, Colombia and Peru have been particularly notable. Among the largest and most intense targeting efforts in Colombia were the efforts to locate and eliminate the leaders of the powerful drug trafficking cartels that came to dominate much of Colombian life. Of special note were the successful intelligence and planning efforts carried out against José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar, both of which ended in the deaths of the principals sought. Gacha, after long efforts to track and identify
his location, was killed with his son by Colombian police in a December 1989 raid and gun battle on his ranch. The extensive and long-running intelligence and other efforts to find and eliminate Escobar, reportedly with extensive U.S. support, has been set out in some detail in Colombian and U.S. reporting.\textsuperscript{87}

These actions were carried out with the backdrop of COIN operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the smaller National Liberation Army, which continue to pose substantial threats to the Colombian state. The hunt for cartel leaders (part of a broader “kingpin” strategy to decapitate narco-leaders) and the efforts to identify and eliminate sometimes-linked guerrilla cadre, have had similarities in intelligence, planning, direct action, and support. Many of these efforts have been obscured by the proliferation of killings, kidnappings and “disappeared person” incidents attributed variously to guerrillas, narco-traffickers, paramilitary militias, death squads of murky affiliation, and the Colombian Government itself. Allegations of torture and other human rights abuses have accompanied the continuing Colombian conflict, and where nominally successful actions to neutralize criminal and terrorist leadership have left uncertain legacies.

The hunt for Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path (\textit{Sendero Luminoso}) leadership constituted one of the most intense and ultimately successful COIN and counterterrorist efforts in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike many others, it ended with the arrest and imprisonment, rather than killing, of Guzmán and his leading cadre. Guzmán, who had been a college professor at Ayacucho, led a Maoist terrorist movement with rural and urban dimensions. It was sometimes characterized as a kind of Peruvian Khmer Rouge, and it cost tens of thousands of lives—upwards of 70,000 by some accounts. Known to his followers as “Presidente Gonzalo” and the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” (joining Marx, Lenin and Mao), he had embraced Maoism in his travels to China during the Cultural Revolution and created for himself a Mao-style persona as a “revered” supreme leader.\textsuperscript{88} The principal role in hunting the Sendero leadership was played by the Peruvian National...
Police and particularly the National Counterterrorism Directorate (*Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo*) and under the leadership of General Antonio Ketin Vidal and able intelligence officers such as Mahor Benedicto Jimenez. The directorate was known best by its acronym **DINCOTE**. Guzmán was the personification of the Shining Path, and the belief was that his capture or killing might be the best hope for severely, and possibly fatally, harming the 12-year-old insurgency and accompanying terrorism.

By the early 1990s, Guzmán and the Shining Path had pushed Peru to the edge of becoming a failed state as businesses, investors, and prominent families fled the country. The hunt for Guzmán and the Sendero leadership became increasingly urgent and was characterized by careful and extended intelligence collection and evaluation—organized within a “Special Intelligence Group” reportedly with instructional, material, and other support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Britain’s Scotland Yard. The collection and evaluation were centered in substantial measure on human intelligence and the 1991-1992 surveillance of suspected Sendero safe-houses in the capital, Lima. Attention included the amount and contents of garbage deposited for pickup in suspect residences. By September 1992, DINCOTE agents became convinced that one house, in particular, was highly suspect, harboring more people than the supposed single individual of record and including someone whose discarded medication tubes indicated a skin disease like that of Guzmán. When a DINCOTE special operations unit raided the house on 12 September, they discovered Guzmán (and eight other people) hiding upstairs and arrested them without incident. The damage to Sendero was substantial and followed by the rollup of many additional Sendero leaders based on intelligence developed from materials seized and continuing surveillance. Extensive details of Shining Path unit deployments and equipping were recovered from the raid as well.

At the time of capture, the police seized Guzmán’s computer. Within it they found a very detailed register of his armed forces and the weapons each regiment, militia, and support base had in each region of the country. Guzmán had recorded that, in 1990, the Shining Path had 23,430 members armed with approximately 235 revolvers, 500 rifles, and 300 other items of military hardware such as grenades. Before his capture, Guzmán had been variously portrayed...
as a crazed psychopath, murderous terrorist, or common criminal.
One of the most compelling scenes in the wake of Guzmán’s capture, however—and one having a major impact on demystifying Sendero Luminoso and its leadership—was the Government’s decision to put Guzmán on public display in a free-standing cage, dressed in a comic-book style striped prison uniform, and looking far more like an aging, overweight pensioner than the feared terrorist whose movement had cost so many lives. The spectacle was compelling in many ways, evoking criticism from some quarters on human rights grounds, but had the effect of immediately dispelling the Sendero Luminoso aura of enduring success and organizational vigor. This dimension of the post-Guzmán capture was celebrated within DINCOTE, so much so that several years later the DINCOTE director’s office featured a model of the cage in which the Sendero leader had been held, as stark centerpiece in the office discussion area.

Of some note and interest was an apparent competitive effort directed against Sendero that paralleled DINCOTE’s intelligence-based initiatives to capture Guzmán and his leaders. According to some reporting, a secret Peruvian Army “death squad” unit dedicated to killing the Sendero leadership and suspected members operated simultaneously with the knowledge and support of the then Peruvian security chief Vladimiro Montesinos. Code-named “Colina,” the unit attempted, unsuccessfully, to leverage DINCOTE-generated intelligence to target leaders for killing. Whatever the merits of that program against a terrorist threat, the DINCOTE approach of carefully developing leadership intelligence and linkages led to extraordinary success without the usual widespread charges of human rights

Figure 6. Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzmán on display for the public shortly after capture by Peruvian DINCOTE agents in September 1992. Jaime Razuri/AFP/Getty Images, used by permission from Newscom.
abuses that characterized other dimensions of the struggle against Sendero. While the Colina unit had no known success against potential Sendero targets, they were accused of killing civilians, students, and a professor during 1991 and 1992. The notorious Montesinos was later convicted and jailed for a variety of crimes (arms and drug trafficking, money laundering) and now occupies a cell near Guzmán, while the DINCOTE stands as a premier example of counterterrorist-COIN success.92

The Shining Path did not just disappear, of course, and elements continue to function. Insurgent reorganization attempts have been accompanied by periodic attacks in Peru’s urban and rural areas and a frequently stated promise that the “people’s war will continue.” However, the organization has never recaptured its former place as a real threat to the Peruvian state, despite Peru’s political scandals and turmoil along with complex economic, social, and justice problems.

Further to the south and some two decades earlier, another Latin American intelligence-centered “counterterrorist and countersubversion” initiative was aimed at identifying and sometimes eliminating leaders in Latin America. It was particularly notable for the level of regional intelligence cooperation among several countries. The initiative also has notoriety from the continued efforts to prosecute state officials who were at the time involved. This multistate intelligence collection, exchange, surveillance, and targeting program—code-named Operation Condor—has become further known over the last several years with thousands of declassified U.S. and foreign materials becoming available and the discovery of a substantial cache of documents in Paraguay. Operation Condor involved primarily Southern Cone countries and a few states on the periphery, including Bolivia and Peru. While the U.S. was clearly cognizant of the Condor program at the time of its most active operations and following some of its activities, the full extent and nature of U.S. intersection remains a topic of dispute and controversy among the principals involved.

Overall, Condor was an ambitious effort—conducted most actively in the 1970s—to counter communists, terrorists, and subversion in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay as well as Bolivia. The threats were real in many ways, as seen in a review of subversive activity in Latin America in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The intelligence cooperation was a governmental reflection of efforts among armed subversive groups to better coordinate and control their own activities as they pursued their various agendas, including the violent overthrow of existing governments. The efforts of the Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta—JCR), formed in February 1974 with strong Cuban (and Soviet) support if not in fact at their initiative, is especially notable. The JCR coordinated the activities of some of the region’s bloodiest guerrilla/terrorist groups and maintained ties with outside terrorist organizations. The most prominent groups were as follows:

a. Chile’s Movement of the Revolutionary Left
b. Brazil’s Popular Revolutionary Vanguard
c. Argentina’s People’s Revolutionary Army
d. Uruguay’s Tupamaros (more formally the National Liberation Movement)
e. Bolivia’s National Liberation Army.

The JCR also had reported links to Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization and its factions (using training camps in Lebanon and Cuba).

Condor and other operations were part of a larger context for Southern Cone Latin American governments in which they sought to counter armed opposition such as that mentioned above, as well as the political opposition and dissidents, often making little distinction among them. The direct participants in Operation Condor included the intelligence, police, military, and other security components of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil and involved operations not only in Latin America but also in Europe (Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy) and the U.S.\(^3\) Bolivian and other Andean Ridge intersections existed as well. Operation Condor has been examined in various venues including those incorporating much of the latest information.

John Dinges gives among the most condemning examinations. In his 2004 book, *The Condor Years*, and earlier articles, Dinges describes “an intelligence organization in which multinational teams
tracked down and assassinated dissidents outside their home coun-
tries” and “… at least 13,000 people were killed, and hundreds of
thousands were imprisoned in concentration camps in the six coun-
tries participating in Condor.” The book sets a tone for how Oper-
ation Condor is generally viewed today, judgments in which some
successor Latin American governments have concurred to various
degrees.

The Chileans—identified by the U.S. as the prime movers in
the Condor initiative—insisted that the operation was intended for
intelligence gathering and exchange only and denied any assas-
sination dimension. This premise was evidently true for at least
Brazil, which participated in the mutual intelligence exchanges on
terrorism and subversion but did not agree to take part in joint direct
actions. However, a number of other participants—including Chile,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in particular—had moved by the
mid-1970s to the active killing in Latin America and abroad of guer-
rillas, terrorist group members, exiled political leaders, and other
individuals declared to be threats. Activities also included the forced
repatriation or kidnapping of foreign exiles—for example, about 50
Uruguayan refugees arrested by Argentine and Uruguayan security
forces in Argentina and taken back to Uruguay. Many of these
activities are detailed in declassified U.S. documents, representative
examples found online at the George Washington University National
Security Archive.

For the U.S., among the most egregious of Condor direct actions
was the 21 September 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, the
former Chilean foreign minister under the ousted Marxist president
Salvador Allende. Letelier and an American associate at the Instit-
tute for Policy Studies, researcher Ronni Moffitt, were killed by a
car bomb near “embassy row” in Washington, D.C. The bomb was
planted in their Chevrolet Chevelle by Chilean DINA (Dirección de
Inteligencia Nacional)-controlled operatives acting in behalf of the
Augusto Pinochet government of which Letelier was an outspoken
opponent. The bomb was detonated electronically from a follow-
ing car by an anti-Communist Cuban refugee hired for the purpose.
A modified beeper in the target car activated a detonator and explo-
sives taped underneath the vehicle.

Many countries in Europe and elsewhere (yet not the U.S.) had
experienced targeted killings of foreign nationals by agents from the
same or third countries. Uruguayan intelligence officers were also accused of advocating the assassination of then-Congressman (later New York City Mayor) Edward Koch because of his efforts to cut off U.S. military assistance to Uruguay for human rights abuses. While the officers were only known to be threatening Koch, the Letelier killing (and Israeli actions against Black September) provided early evidence of “globalizing” targeted assassination. The practice would later become a more prominent feature of the international security environment.

Condor and other Southern Cone operations and efforts of the period will likely be better illuminated and evaluated with the release of more information and further analysis. Elements of the Operation Condor program had potential for acquiring a far different reputation as an effective example of regional intelligence cooperation against terrorism. Participants and knowledgeable Latin American security specialists deemed the innovative intelligence collaboration and exchange efforts helpful in countering real subversive threats of the region. The extraordinary excesses by some participating states and agencies, however, will likely overshadow any positive counterterrorist successes. Specifically, the legal and human rights abuses, even if not directly associated with Condor, included disappeared persons, torture, and targeting of political dissidents and mere suspects that did not meet the definition of armed terrorists or insurgents.

Collecting solid intelligence has been key in virtually every counterterrorist and COIN leadership targeting effort. Security forces seeking to gain information on guerrilla networks and the location of leadership have almost always generated charges of torture. A notable example occurred in the 1954-1962 French-Algerian War, where French efforts were sometimes characterized as “counterterror” because of the brutality of interrogations and the often indiscriminate killing of real and suspected nationalist combatants (mainly the National Liberation Front—FLN). The group known as the “Red Hand,” and thought to have at least the tacit support of the French security authorities, also operated in Europe, where for several years Algerian nationalists were the targets of “bombings and killings.”

The 8 years of war cost the lives of 30,000 French military and security personnel and from 300,000 to 1 million Algerians. French efforts to destroy nationalist/terrorist/insurgent groups during this time were intense, and as epitomized by the 1957 Battle of Algiers, known
to be brutal in execution. But the revelations of French General Paul Aussaresses in 2001, a company grade intelligence officer assigned to the French 10th Paratroop Division in the mid-1950s, made more explicit what had long been reported in various forums. The general, who before Algeria had served in Indochina, detailed French torture and assassinations (or summary executions) carried out with the alleged knowledge and support of French political and judicial leaders and officials.\textsuperscript{104} Algerian nationalist networks and many important terrorist/guerrilla leaders were eliminated as a consequence of Aussaresses’ efforts. One could judge that he made a substantial contribution to the successful prosecution of the purely military component of the war, even though French political decisions negated these. However, his and other analogous actions left a heavy legacy for the French military and state, characterized by most as war crimes in the West, France, and North Africa. For his part and after his book appeared in 2001, Aussaresses continued to maintain the military necessity of his measures in the struggle against terrorism.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{A Closer Look at Two Diverse Approaches: Mexico and Russia}

Mexico and Russia present sharp contrasts in the terrorism and insurgency they have faced, the forces available to deal with it, and the level of technology that could be applied. Similarities and analogies in approach do exist, however, and in the enduring legacies they seem to have left among sections of their constituent populations. Specifically, their substantial body of information (which allows some aspects of targeting to be addressed in detail) is more readily available to government and security establishments than in other areas of the world:

a. In addition to some excellent investigative reporting in Spanish-language Mexican magazines and newspapers, Mexico has an extensive, recent archival and U.S. Freedom of Information Action release of documents and reporting on COIN issues for 1964-1982 and beyond. These documents include newly declassified materials and revelations, especially regarding the impact on the population of the major areas of guerrilla and government operations.\textsuperscript{106}

b. Russian media reporting, official statements and claims, memoir literature, informal military and security service
Internet sites, and voluminous and at times more reliable reporting from the Chechen combatants themselves, contribute a broad overview and some substantial plausible detail on Russian practices and experience.

The overviews of these two cases suggest the value of focused case studies, particularly because simmering or more intense guerrilla problems promise to continue for some time to come.

**Mexico—Targeting Guerrilla Leadership in the Sierra Madre del Sur.**

More than 20 years before the Zapatista National Liberation Army spokesman and leader, “Subcomandante Marcos,” became world famous for his flurry of surprise attacks and media blitz in Chiapas state, Mexico’s most celebrated guerrilla leader was a schoolteacher named Lucio Cabañas Barrientos. Leading the military arm of his Party of the Poor (Pdlp), Cabañas operated successfully for years in the rugged mountains of Mexico’s Guerrero state. For many Mexicans, the Pdlp’s “Peasant Brigade of Execution” ambush of military and police units, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other armed actions were an unwelcome specter of potential communist revolution that by the late 1960s and early 1970s seemed to be gaining ground in Mexico as it had in other parts of Latin America.

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Figure 7. Left: Lucio Cabañas. The 1967-1974 campaigns to capture/kill Cabañas and destroy the “Peasant Brigade of Execution” is linked directly to current Mexican COIN approaches and shaped by a legacy of human rights abuses. Source: U.S. Army Military Review.

Right: A Cabañas relative holds the portrait nearly 30 years later. Reuters/Susana Gonzalez, used by permission from Newscom.
Some people considered Cabañas to be a strong champion against an oppressive local regime in Guerrero state and an indifferent central government in Mexico City whose policies had perpetuated the poverty, lack of opportunity, and brutality that characterized day-to-day life in much of rural Mexico. Cabañas advocated a multipoint program that called for defeating the government of the rich and installing a new regime; expropriating factories and facilities for the workers’ benefit; enacting broad financial, judicial, educational and social welfare reforms that focused on workers, peasants, Indians and women; and removing Mexico from the colonialism of the U.S. and other foreign countries.\(^{107}\)

When Cabañas and several key followers were finally hunted down and killed in Guerrero by the Mexican army in late 1974, it was cause for both official Mexican celebration and deep disappointment among some in Mexico’s southern Sierra Madre who saw Cabañas as a romantic revolutionary leader fighting for justice in rural Mexico. North of the border, however, Cabañas and his comrades’ deaths earned only a short notice on the *New York Times*’ back pages and limited commentary thereafter.\(^{108}\) The U.S., focusing on a host of Cold War security issues, had only passing interest in the death of an obscure Mexican insurgent whose group posed no serious military threat to the Mexican government.

Nevertheless, insurgency in Mexico has continued at low levels, erupting from time to time in surprising and sometimes spectacular events and lately threatening to erupt again. The insurgency in Mexico today is directly linked to the guerrilla groups of the 1960s and 1970s and to the legacy COIN campaigns that were run during those years. Only recently have the activities of those years become better known. What is now popularly referred to as the “dirty war” in Guerrero state—echoing on a smaller scale the analogous experiences in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere—underscores the freshness of the events for parts of the population in that still-poor and marginalized area.

Guerrero—about the size of West Virginia at 64,586 square kilometers—is best known to U.S. citizens and other outsiders as the location of the somewhat faded resort area of Acapulco, now in the news principally for especially violent forms of drug violence including a number of decapitations. Much of the southern Mexican state is remote with difficult-to-reach rural, sparsely populated areas. It is
bordered on the north by the Mexican states of Michoacán, México, and Morelos; on the east by the states of Puebla and Oaxaca; and on the south by the Pacific Ocean. Guerrero has 76 municipalities in its confines and a capital city, Chilpancingo (de los Bravos), located in the about center of the state. The Costa Grande—the site of much of the guerrilla activity and COIN operations—is defined as the 160-mile stretch of coast between Acapulco and the river Rio Balsas near Lazaro Cardenas. Its area of somewhat more than 5,000 square miles is almost exactly the size of Chechnya.

Guerrero’s 40-year guerrilla history, as in a number of other Mexican states, got its start in the 1960s. A declassified U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) report from 1972 presented an overview of this activity in U.S. judgments at the time, when it was at a high point for the period under review. While Mexican insurgency may have been a matter for general indifference in the U.S., the INR report captured the Mexican perspective by noting that “the dimensions and seriousness of the terrorist guerrilla problem in Mexico are only now becoming evident.” While judging correctly that the activity did not then threaten regime survival, the 15 guerrilla groups assessed as being active were cited for their rural

Figure 8. Mexico’s Guerrero state, site of continuing insurgency activity more than three decades after the Mexican security forces tracked down and killed Lucio Cabañas near Tecpan in the Costa Grande region.
and urban dimensions, acts of terrorism (bombings), kidnappings, ambushes of security forces, fund-raising criminality, and potential for increased terrorist activity.\textsuperscript{110}

The 15 rural and urban groups identified in the INR report were mostly small and transitory. The insurgents in various forms set out a range of motivational issues including justice, human rights, peasant and indigenous oppression, anti-globalism, and government and economic change, most with a Marxist overlay. Their most notable leaders—such as Cabañas or Guerrero’s Revolutionary National Civic Association chief Genaro (or Jenaro) Vázquez Rojas (killed in 1972, the year the report was released)—developed loyal local followings that generated popular ballads and enduring legends celebrating their careers.\textsuperscript{111} In fact, the death of Rojas (in an automobile accident while being pursued) resulted in the early inactivity of his followers and the dissolution of his group. This no doubt added to the Mexican Government’s hope that a similar result would occur if Cabañas could be captured or killed. The popular, romantic, revolutionary images of Cabañas and Vázquez seemed to be inspired more by Mexican inequalities than some larger communist vision and represented only one dimension of the 1960s and 1970s insurgent and terrorist groups.

Clearly, some groups were encouraged, materially supported, and sometimes trained by communist regimes abroad. Inspired by late 1950s student activism and fueled by real inequities in wealth, opportunity, and justice, small Mexican groups became increasingly militant and inclined to armed action in the 1960s. Radical groups became associated with Soviet, North Korean, Cuban, and Maoist ideologies. They debated the relative merits of these various ideologies, however far removed they may have been from Mexican realities. Sometimes they angrily split into factions over differences—for example, about the value of Cuban foco guerrilla strategy versus a Maoist-style “prolonged people’s war” approach to establishing socialism in Mexico.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR) is a notable example of a group supported by foreign communists. The MAR was fully established in 1969 and became active principally in Mexico’s Federal District and the state of Veracruz, although MAR elements existed in some other states too. MAR originated in the late 1960s in Moscow, where Mexican students attending Patrice Lumumba
University—thanks to scholarships from the Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange Institute in Mexico City and Monterrey—formed a “studies circle” that developed a concept for what became the insurgent group. The group received support from Soviet ally North Korea, and in 1968 the first small Mexican cadre was dispatched to a training center near Pyongyang for ideological and extensive guerrilla training. At least two other MAR contingents followed in 1969 and 1970. North Korean military personnel provided the instruction. The group sought to create instability in Mexico and establish the conditions for a Marxist-Leninist regime there. They recruited and trained new members in Mexico, supported themselves with bank robberies and kidnappings and conducted numerous armed assaults and acts of sabotage against regime targets. MAR structure included an urban guerrilla wing designated 2 de Octubre del MAR and a rural wing, Ejército Popular del MAR. The group was nearly destroyed by Mexican security forces in the 1970s and apparently disappeared by the early 1980s.¹¹²

All this activity raised the specter for the Mexican Government that the potential for communist insurgency was far greater than its immediate presence, and the experience of governments elsewhere in Latin America offered real-world examples of the consequences. Economic reforms and initiatives underway at the time by the regime of President Luis Echiverria had little or no impact on inequities and opportunities in areas like Guerrero, and the government put its emphasis on the employment of military, police, and other security forces.¹¹³ The most dangerous guerrilla in the Mexican authority’s view, as noted, was Cabañas, and the decision to allocate substantial resources and an intense focus on his elimination resulted in a 6-year hunt that increasingly frustrated Mexican authorities.

A range of military and law enforcement resources were employed, including the Army and Air Force (under the National Defense Secretariat called the Sedena), State and Federal Judicial Police including special units, municipal police elements, and other elements including the Navy and Marines (under a separate Naval Secretariat or SEMAR), in limited roles. Intelligence at the highest
level was under the purview of what was then designated the Directorate of Federal Security, a CIA analogue that now is called the Cisen). Regional and local intelligence was also generated by intelligence components of the Army and Federal and State Judicial Police. The hunt for Cabañas involved tens of thousands of military troops (largely infantry) and some large deployments and involvement of police and associated law enforcement personnel, the development of brutal COIN approaches, and the creation of a legacy that still shapes today’s popular attitudes and the posture of armed groups in the Guerrero’s Costa Grande/Sierra Madre region.\textsuperscript{114}

The Army conducted about 16 separate operations over the course of the 6 years spanning 1967-1974. Despite insurgent ambushes, firefights, and the taking of casualties, locating the guerrillas for major decisive encounters—and most importantly for them Cabañas and other leadership—was an enduring problem. An immediate approach was to “flood” the Costa Grande region periodically with military units and patrols that reportedly reached up to 24,000 soldiers for the 5-6 thousand square mile area. Local residents were generally less than helpful in providing useful information on guerrilla identifications and locations. The Mexican Army offered rewards for intelligence and began developing a network of informers in the area. As frustrations, casualties, and guerrilla actions that included some 30 kidnappings mounted, however, the Mexican Army and police approaches became increasing brutal. The arrests of suspected guerrillas, and those thought to have knowledge of their operations, was accompanied by torture.

Arrests included family members of suspected or known guerrillas and their interrogation using whatever methods necessary to obtain the names of insurgents or locations. On the basis of these results, the mass arrests of new suspects immediately took place and the process continued. A declassified 1972 State Department INR report stated it as though not fully understanding what was being done:

A major new technique is the approach used in interrogating captured terrorists. Whereas previously the police attempted to laboriously obtain complete statements from every person arrested, they now concentrate on simply getting more names and addresses quickly enough so that the information can be used to make more arrests.\textsuperscript{115}
Suspects were often detained and tortured, and in some cases killed, in military installations along the Costa Grande. These bases progressed up the Pacific coast of Guerrero from Acapulco to Pie de la Cuesta, to Atoyac de Álvarez, all population centers that then and now have been associated with state, guerrilla, and criminal violence. They also included Military Camp No. 1 in the Mexican Federal District.

Government hostage-taking, coercion, and “disappeared” persons grew in targeted communities, with settlements relocated and even the destruction of villages taking place. This pattern had been incrementally reported in media and personal accounts and has been well documented in 2006 Mexican Attorney General (PGR) reporting. In illustration of the push to capture or kill Cabañas, a reported 126 Cabañas relatives were killed during this period. In fact, the name “Cabañas” was so identified as a symbol with the insurgency that a number of persons who merely bore the name, but had no relationship to the family, “disappeared” also. Many “Cabañas” names may be seen in the list of detainees included in the chapter “Genocide” in the official Mexican report on the Guerrero “dirty war.”

The round-up of suspected guerrillas, their family members, and sympathizers had clearly gathered emphasis when Cabañas began to ambush Army units. Some guerrilla actions by Cabañas were stunning for their impact—for example, the kidnapping of the notorious Guerrero Governor Ruben Figueroa, who the Army “rescued” (or more likely ransomed for as much as 2 million dollars). The Army reportedly carried out actions in accord with a formulated Counterinsurgency Operations Plan intended to eradicate the guerrillas. They also conducted specific operations that included those code-named “Teleraña,” “Amistad,” and “Luciérnaga,” which generated documented human rights violations. Because of the abuse, it was termed even officially as a genocide plan. Documents and communications becoming available in recent months are judged by reviewers to have implicated three Mexican Presidents (most notably Luis Echeverría, 1970-1976) as well as senior defense officials (including Sedena chief Hermenegildo Cuenca Díaz) and the commanders of two military districts, along with numerous other law enforcement and security officials. Methods of torture and the disposal of the bodies were
described in detail. The role of the 20th Military Police battalion in disappeared persons and killings, as recently documented, has now become notorious.

Accompanying the intelligence-gathering work noted above were efforts to improve the command and control of forces attempting to act on whatever useful information became available. The command and control relationships of Guerrero “Costa Grande” military and security forces targeted against the Pdlp’s Peasant Brigade of Execution became more developed, and while roughly analogous to contemporary leadership-targeting models, substantial shortfalls remained and coordination was often more notional than real. Figure 9 illustrates the rough command and control outline in place for the final operation that resulted in the death of Cabañas in December 1974. The deployment and employment of Mexican military and
supporting forces in Guerrero had by the fall of 1974 begun to close in on the guerrillas of Cabañas’ Peasant Brigade of Execution.

On 30 November, Army units engaged guerrilla forces, killing 17 insurgents and capturing a weapons and equipment cache. The Mexican President (Echeverría) and national Defense Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Díaz took a direct interest in the course of operations, which were conducted by the IX Military Region and its subordinate XXVII Military Zone incorporating the Costa Grande area. Forces that were used included those permanently stationed in the zone and region as well as reinforcing units deployed there for COIN operations. As noted, intelligence was generated by the Directorate of Federal Security, local military and police interrogations, and military patrols that often used knowledgeable local guides in searching areas for guerrilla presence or acting on specific reports. The Federal and State police, including motorized and special units, carried out some actions that were coordinated with the military (e.g., blocking), but were not a tightly integrated part of military planning. The final phase of the Cabañas operation was led by Brigadier General Jesús Gomez Ruiz, whose task force included military zone and reinforcing units. It was elements of his force—organized into patrol groups from the 19th Infantry Battalion—that eventually located and killed Cabañas and his companions and captured a few weapons and some documents. A photograph of the type seen in many parts of the world was taken of Mexican infantry participants with the body of the deceased insurgent leader.

According to the declassified American Embassy cable at the time, the Defense Secretariat announced on 2 December 1974 that 27th Military Zone forces killed Cabañas and 10 other guerrillas near the old municipality of Tecpan de Galeana in the Costa Grande north of Acapulco. They were reportedly led to the guerrilla’s location by an informer and/or guide who evidently knew Cabañas, since he and two others also helped identify the body. Whether the information was induced by reward, coercion, or loyalty to the Mexican
government is unknown, but it was in any case a consequence of the sustained intelligence effort aimed at eliminating the most threatening component of Mexican insurgency.\textsuperscript{125} Despite the identification of the guerrilla leader’s body, questions about his actual death remained. He was rumored to be still alive over the next three decades, some thought living in Cuba. The stories were mostly put to rest in 2002 when a team of scientists—including a Mexican forensic archaeologist—located Cabañas’ grave outside a military base in Guerrero’s Atoyac de Álvarez, near Acapulco. Forensic tests, including DNA matched with surviving Cabañas relatives, confirmed that the remains were those of Mexico’s most famous insurgent.\textsuperscript{126}

The post-Cabañas COIN program began immediately after his death. It was characterized by post-operational judgments on performance that termed the previous operations as full of “errors” and “stupidities.” No official hint of human rights abuses occurred, however. Military and intelligence organizations correctly anticipated that new guerrilla cells would attempt to form. They intended to deal with them more effectively via the newly developed Defense Ministry 1975 Counterinsurgency Plan that was prosecuted throughout the rest of the decade. A Counterinsurgency Patrol Course (Curso de Patrullas Contrainsurgentes dubbed “Cupac”) with Guerrero exercises was set up and new intelligence-gathering approaches were adopted to include agent and guide selection, interrogation, dealing with disinformation, and other elements. New, better trained forces began to be developed as well, and doctrine for COIN was better codified. These efforts appeared to have been successful, and remnants of the guerrilla groups in Guerrero and elsewhere were soon pushed to the point of inactivity.

The dilemma was that the guerrilla leader’s death only sent his “socialist” insurgency into a two-decade hibernation. Goals that retained a constituency and remained quiet hopes follow:

- Defeating the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) government then still in power
- Installing a new regime
- Expropriating resources for the workers
- Enacting broad reforms of all types
- Removing Mexico from U.S. and other foreign colonialism.
Travelers in small Guerrero towns over the next two decades saw posters and graffiti honoring Cabañas and his efforts. The sudden January 1994 emergence of the unassociated Zapatista National Liberation Army—EZLN—in Chiapas State featured only a short-lived armed-action phase. The EZLN served as a catalyst, however, for resurgent guerrilla activity by unrelated and far more militarily active groups claiming the legacy of Cabañas, particularly in Guerrero—for example:

a. Revolutionary People’s Democratic Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática—PDPR) and its military arm
b. People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario—EPR) that appeared in 1996 in the heart of Cabañas’ former Costa Grande operating area and proved itself capable of launching simultaneous attacks and armed actions against army, police, and government targets in about six states.

These groups have continued periodic small actions and have been joined by new or splinter groups—for example:

a. PDPR-EPR affiliated Revolutionary Democratic Tendency (Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria)
b. Revolutionary Arm of Insurgent People (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente) appearing in 1998
c. Lucio Cabañas Barrientos Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Lucio Cabañas Barrientos) appearing in 2001
d. Popular Revolutionary Command-Fatherland Comes First (Comando Popular Revolucionario La Patria es Primero), which in July 2005 assassinated a former state official suspected in the Guerrero State Police-sanctioned murder of 17 Guerrero peasant activists a decade earlier.

The 28 November 2005 assassination of another individual with ties to the murdered official and the Guerrero State Police has raised some speculation that organized revenge killings by armed groups may be taking place.127

Most of these groups have been charged with, or claimed, armed attacks or bombings against government targets. Unlike the EZLN in Chiapas, these groups most often insist on the need for continued armed struggle to reach goals that range from the overtly Marxist
to the very hazy, but which always cite societal inequities redolent of Cabañas and his contemporaries. Despite a rich guerrilla past, Mexico’s insurgency problems over the last 40 years have never been as intense as those of Central and South America. There are specialists in Mexico, however, who believe that the Government has not seriously studied the proliferation and wide presence of armed groups, and that the magnitude of the future threat has not been properly recognized. In any event, the mid-1990s reappearance, continued activities, and spread of these groups in states of southern Mexico (and in limited ways essentially Mexico-wide) sparked the expansion and more intensified operations of military COIN units and special police.

Like many of the guerrilla groups that hark back to Guerrero in the 1960s and 1970s, today’s more robust Mexican special operations components have used the example of Army special units that operated in Guerrero against Cabañas and other groups of that period as a touchstone and example of success. It is these evolving forces, along with the national intelligence agency CISEN and elements of the continually reorganizing Federal law enforcement establishment, that have been the forces of choice in neutralizing guerrilla or violent criminal cadres. Growing Mexican concerns about terrorism, at hosted international events and other potential internal contingencies in the mid-1980s, saw the 1986 creation of a Rapid Response Force (Fuerza de Intervención Rápida). By 1990 this organization had become the first Airmobile Special Forces Group (Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales—GAFE). With the January 1994 Zapatista uprising and resurgent armed groups in Guerrero and elsewhere, an Army transformation plan was developed and began to be implemented in 1995. Designated the “Mexican Army and Air Force Development Plan,” it called for forming more small, highly qualified commando groups (i.e., more GAFEs) designed to conduct COIN and counterdrug operations against increasingly violent trafficking groups. These organizations include a more centralized special forces command element and a special forces school.
The additional GAFE units that began forming in the mid-1990s were company-size mobile light infantry units with more advanced and specialized training in desert, mountain, and jungle operations. Experienced foreign armies provided special operations training; an example army was the Guatemalan Kaibles SOF, employed throughout Guatemala’s long communist insurgency. In 2002 the GAFE units were reorganized as Special Forces battalions and brigades, although they are still referred to informally as GAFE. By 2004, total GAFE troop strength was estimated at about 5,500. The mandated Special Forces Command (Corps)—Cuerpo de Fuerzas Especiales—was created in 1997 and the Special Forces School (Escuela de Fuerzas Especiales) in 1998. Army Amphibious Special Forces Groups (Grupos Anfibios de Fuerzas Especiales), intended for riverine and coastal operations, were also created that same year. In addition, Naval and Naval Infantry (Marine) special forces were maintained as well as air and naval support elements. While these forces have individually and collectively been employed in COIN operations, they have been particularly active against drug trafficking organizations and their increasingly well-armed and trained “militias.”

An enduring backdrop to all of these developments—insurgent and military—is the legacy of the 1967-1974 hunt for Cabañas. While most people can understand a government’s desire to use vigorous military means to deal with an armed threat, the actions that accompanied the Mexican effort continue to overshadow the Government aim of ending insurgency in the area. A seeming military success, it was obtained at a cost that has contributed to the proliferation of small guerrilla groups in Guerrero and elsewhere. It has also shaped the development of the Mexican Armed Forces in a number of ways. The November 2006 acknowledgment of what transpired in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s finally makes clear in official ways much of what had been alleged about the period. Whether this acknowledgment, and any associated reforms, will have an impact or not is yet to be seen—for example, on the disaffection that characterizes those marginalized Mexicans who may be inclined to force change with arms.

An analogous effort to track down and neutralize guerrilla elements is found in the Russian experience in Chechnya. The next section discusses Russian efforts to counter rebel groups through targeting leadership.
Russia and the Hunt for Chechen Insurgent Leaders in the Caucasus. As 2006 drew to a close, Russian military spokesmen announced a substantial draw-down of security forces in Chechnya, and the further development of a command structure designed to deal with terrorism in the region. The focus was carrying out the continuing hunt for “remnants of rebel units.” Seemingly, the professed optimism comes with at least some justification—the severe attrition inflicted over a decade on most of the best-known Chechen rebel field commanders, their subordinates, and notable Arab jihadists and combatants who joined the fight against Russia. The death of Basayev in the summer of 2006 (see Introduction) was presented as a major counterterrorist accomplishment, whatever the real circumstances of his death may have been.

Other specialists in Russia and elsewhere are far less sanguine about the impact of Russian operations against the rebel groups. Their concern is about the spread of Islamic militancy in other parts of the North Caucasus and the building of new, as yet unknown, guerrilla/terrorist cadres. Specifically, these cadres may prove to be as effective in the field as their predecessors and more purely
motivated by Islamic extremist goals than by aspirations for independence from Moscow. In any event, Russian forces and pro-Moscow Chechen allies continue to engage rebel groupings, suffer casualties and surprises, and seek to destroy the remaining and reorganizing Chechen guerrilla/terrorist leadership.

Russian and Western specialists have detailed not only the accelerating deterioration of Russo-Chechen relations as the Soviet Union began its collapse but also centuries-old historical antecedents. Amidst the creation of provisional armed groups in the Caucasus generally, the Sunni Muslim Chechens in particular seemed to constitute a potential catalyst for Russian dissolution. These Sunni were also a source of the increasing regional turmoil in which the Chechens were already embroiled. The controversial Chechen President Dzokhar Dudayev (a former Soviet Air Force general), had declared full independence from Moscow in 1993 and had called for the establishment of a “Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples” uniting Muslim areas there. Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, became the exile home of Georgian armed groups opposed to Russian interest in Georgia, and the Muslim Brotherhood reportedly established a training center to prepare Afghans, Pakistanis, Libyans, Algerians, and others for insurgent operations.129

Some reporting judges say that the first Al Qaeda fighters and other Arab jihadists from Afghanistan began to filter into Chechnya during the early 1990s, establishing a presence and cooperative venues with Chechen armed groups. These elements would have far more importance for the later Chechen guerrilla campaigns against Russia when Wahhabism and radical Islamic ideology grew as motivation for senior commanders like Basayev.130 The decision by Moscow to put a stop to Chechen aspirations for independence and deal with other problems resulted in the military intervention that lasted 2 years and became known as the “first” Chechen war.

Leadership targeting for state enemies, guerrillas, and dissident groups had long been a practice for Soviet military, intelligence, and security forces as it was subsequently for the Russians. The most notable experience before Chechnya had been in the near decade of war in Afghanistan ending in 1989. The opening hours of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw the targeted killing of Afghan President Amin by Soviet SOF following the direct order of the Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov. It was not accomplished with
long-distance weaponry or precision, but with direct ground combat. The leader was 57-year old KGB spetsnaz Colonel Grigoriy Boyarinov, an experienced World War II veteran named to command a task force composed of 120 Zenit (Zenith) and Grom (Thunder) spetsnaz detachment personnel. Boyarinov was among the first to enter Amin’s palace in an assault that Afghan defenders hotly contested.

By Soviet accounts, the special operations teams broke into the palace with explosives and fought from room to room on the first floor until they seized and destroyed the communications center there, a primary target. Boyarinov then led regrouped team members and reinforcing spetsnaz upstairs to the second and third floors, killing almost all of Amin’s bodyguards and Amin. In fact, according to Soviet and Afghan forces, a Soviet agent had incapacitated Amin and some of his staff members via poisoned food per plan before the assault forces arrived. Amin and the staff were nevertheless killed by the heavy gunfire or grenade explosions marking the Soviet move to the upper floors. Friendly fire killed Boyarinov shortly thereafter as he exited the palace. The action was hailed as a wholly successful KGB-led special leadership targeting initiative that accomplished its immediate aims of “liquidating Amin” and destroying critical communications that may have rallied more resistance. Boyarinov was honored for his role in the war, being the first to receive the “Hero of the Soviet Union” designation. The action established—in the absence of standoff or other options—a carefully planned, combat-intensive model founded on good intelligence and preparation for how teams would accomplish leadership-targeting actions.131

The military catastrophe suffered by Russian forces in the First Chechen War (1994-1996) was not preceded by any such operation. It was punctuated in its early aftermath, however, by the successful (so it was officially claimed) Russian effort to kill proclaimed Chechen President Dudayev. Accounts of how Dudayev was killed typically acknowledged that it was Russian action and involved an explosion. Otherwise, explanations varied from an aircraft-launched missile homing in on his satellite phone, a car bomb, and a prepositioned explosive device in a remote area he was known to visit.132 Whatever the case, Dudayev would certainly not have been the first Chechen leader to be selectively targeted, and it highlighted publicly what was to become an evolving, intensified effort to track down and liquidate
political and combatant Chechen leaders. The sometimes-agonizing considerations that have characterized the Israel formulation of targeted-killing approaches or U.S. debates on the same issue have not appeared to be present in Russian decision-making. Rather, Russian intentions appear to be predicated principally on the belief that eliminating leaders will materially reduce the capabilities and cohesion of the group targeted. And if the circumstances under which a prominent guerrilla/terrorist combatant is killed are ambiguous or problematic, quickly taking credit for it as a planned success is deemed to have value as well.

The simmering Russo-Chechen and regional tensions by the late-1990s had become not only nationalist and separatist but Islamic and ideological, regional, and international. Terrorist incidents in Chechnya, the region, and inside Russia abounded with engagements between Chechen guerrillas and Russian forces being common. The Second Chechen War begun in the fall of 1999 and was an effort to reinstitute Russian control over the breakaway state, destroy resistance by rebel groups, and curtail destabilizing terrorist incidents in their scope and diversity. Intense bombing of Chechen targets (beginning in September 1999 and continuing with an October ground invasion) was partly successful, but allowed guerrillas to scatter to mountain and other safe areas including beyond the boundaries of Chechnya. From these locations, the struggle continued at varying levels of intensity. Relationships established years earlier with international jihadist groups gained additional importance—for example, for financial and ideological support and the importation of experienced Arab fighters, including some in leadership roles manned by Chechens and Arabs. Since resistance is continuing, rebel groups still operating, and the curtailment of spectacular terrorist incidents far from controlled (including suicide bombings), the Second Chechen War is considered by many specialists to be underway.

Since 2000, Russia has evolved its counterterrorist and COIN policies, organized major security agencies, and implemented forces. This major effort has included the intensified targeting of Chechen and associated resistance leaders. While taking place in the larger context of Russian COIN operations, specific features and innovation deserve focused attention.
Features and Innovation. The Russian approaches to locating and eliminating Chechen insurgent/terrorist leadership cadres and conducting overall COIN operations in the North Caucasus have undergone a number of iterations since Chechnya proclaimed its independence. One useful way of considering these changes in approach has been to look at operational concepts before and after Beslan.\textsuperscript{133} In nearly a decade of spectacular Chechen insurgent attacks—beginning in 1995 with Basayev-led combatants seizing hundreds of hostages at a hospital in Budyenovsk, Russia—changes in Russian counterterrorist approaches were adjusted somewhat. It was the September 2004 hostage disaster at North Ossetia’s Beslan Middle School No.1, however, that gave impetus to partially implemented changes and generated intensified and more fundamental “reforms.”\textsuperscript{134}

Played out over about 52 hours, the Beslan terrorist action—overseen remotely by Basayev with at least some support from international Arab jihadist sources—resulted in the deaths of nearly 350 civilians and more than 170 school children. It also cost the lives of an unprecedented number of elite Russian security forces, and despite the personal bravery of special operations personnel, underscored the fundamental systemic flaws in intelligence, force coordination and execution, and the civilian/military/security/law enforcement leadership reliability and integrity. The actual operation, according to Russian authorities, was led by a terrorist known as “The Colonel,” who was later identified as a man named Ruslan Khuchbarov, wanted since 1998. His body was not found at the site, and he remains one of the most wanted terrorists in Russia.\textsuperscript{135} In terms of impact, Russian specialists pointed to the analogues of major terrorist attacks in other parts of the world (e.g., the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.) and the consequent defense and security reorganizations that were undertaken in an effort to forestall future occurrences.

Prior to Beslan, the Russian counterterrorist effort had come to involve principally five organizations:

a. Federal Security Service—FSB, a KGB successor with its elite counterterrorist forces (notably Al’fa and Vympel) and generally recognized as the lead agency

b. Ministry of Internal Affairs—MVD, especially the Internal Troops (VV) hierarchy of special operations units and the MVD’s Militia Detachments of Special Designation (OMON)
c. Foreign Intelligence Service, another KGB successor responsible for activity abroad

d. Federal Protection Service, formerly a KGB directorate and still charged with leadership protection

e. Ministry of Defense with its Main Intelligence Directorate— GRU, the largest component and consisting of special operations units and resources.

Cooperation and interaction among these organizations was uneven or wholly lacking, changing with the deployment of personnel and units in the Caucasus and adjustments in their respective roles. Targeted operations were carried out by the various components—FSB, GRU, and MVD spetsnaz in particular—and success occurred amidst profound disarray and spotty intelligence.

From the mid-1990s to the late summer of 2004 before Beslan, Russian special security forces claimed—or were credited with—killing or arresting some 100 Chechen or Arab field commanders (some called sheiks or amirs/emirs), including some particularly prominent ones. A number of these insurgent/terrorists controlled their own detachments or far larger groups, often combining or cooperating in operations against Russians or pro-Moscow Chechens. One recap of mid-level combatant leaders neutralized noted that:

... a large proportion of the “brigadier generals” and “amirs” in Chechnya were eliminated thanks to agents’ work. Back in 2000 special-purpose army marksmen set up an ambush to catch “Ichkeria’s [the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria] chief counterintelligence officer” Abu Movsayev, who was involved in identifying spies and “agents of foreign special services.” Movsayev was killed, as was another cutthroat, Baudi Bakuyev, thanks to the receipt of accurate and timely information. The same fate overtook one of Basayev’s deputies, “Brigadier General” Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiyev, nicknamed “Big Aslanbek,” killed at the Shali regional center. The use of agents made it possible to take out Arbi Barayev in the summer of 2001. At the time information that the Wahhabite leader had entered his village of Alkhan-Kala was received through several channels simultaneously.136
The senior leaders captured and killed during this period included the Chechen field commander Salman Raduyev (the survivor of a previous special operations ambush that left him seriously injured) and Arab guerrilla and terrorist, “Amir” Ibn ul-Khattab, who had been reported dead by the media almost a dozen times before the event was actually accomplished on 19 March 2002. Raduyev was a successful field commander in the First Chechen War, but most notorious for the January 1996 raid he led on a hospital and community at Kizliar in the Dagestan Republic. He and about 300 of his combatants took several thousand area residents hostage for a few days in a surprise raid and then escaped leaving nearly 80 servicemen, police, and civilians dead. FSB Al’fa, GRU military spetsnaz, and MVD Vityaz special operations components (and other forces that deployed quickly to the scene) failed to deal effectively with the guerrillas, who broke out with a large number of prisoners and escaped into Chechnya.

Efforts to kill Raduyev were nearly successful a few months later when he was shot in the head by a Russian sniper and barely survived. He eventually returned to the field, where he feuded with other commanders and was tracked by Russian forces. Al’fa special operations personnel somehow “snatched” Raduyev near his home with three other Chechen militants in March 2000. Many reports said that he had been betrayed, and the Al’fa team clearly relied on reliable agent intelligence. Raduyev was interrogated, tried, sentenced to life for his past terrorist acts, and died in a Urals prison in December 2002 from “internal bleeding.”

Figure 12. Arab guerrilla leader Ibn ul-Khattab (left) in Chechnya, where he became one of the most wanted rebels. ITAR-TASS/FSB public relations department, used by permission from Newscom.
Ibn ul-Khattab, among the most famous of the Arab jihadist fighters to serve in Chechnya, was reported to have various ethnic roots. While some believed he was Saudi Arabian, Russian authorities said he was from a prominent Jordanian family with Chechen origins. He had fought earlier in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in other foreign actions, losing a hand and suffering other injuries. He came to Chechnya in the mid-1990s with about 18 “associates” and set up training camps in the mountains where countless Chechen and other regional (including ethnic Russian) youths learned combat skills and particularly sophisticated bomb-making techniques. The FSB had been seeking Khattab for a targeted kill. Called the “Black Arab” (Cherniy Arab), Khattab was billed as the “most bloodthirsty mercenary ringleader in Chechnya” among other colorful descriptors. The targeted killing was accomplished finally by a poisoned letter, delivered by an FSB-paid Dagestani Wahhabite and double agent (on the periphery at least) of Khattab’s inner circle. Khattab supposedly died minutes after opening the envelope and handling the letter. The event was slightly redolent of the December 1979 poisoning that preceded the spetsnaz assault against Afghan President Amin. The action reportedly contributed to the widespread replacement (and reported execution) of suspect bodyguards by other field commanders. Images of Khattab’s funeral were posted on Chechen Web sites and picked up and disseminated on official FSB postings and in the media.

During this period, good intelligence and assistance was sometimes generated by FSB efforts to exploit differences among rival
leaders and groups. Russian security forces compromised and liqui-
dated some key leaders as follows:

a. Exacerbating existing rebel antagonisms and blood feuds
b. Extending bribery and reward money
c. Applying coercion and threats backed up by retaliation and the
   interrogation and torture of captured or suspected guerrillas.

Some useful intelligence (and direct action) was developed by plant-
ing FSB-controlled Chechen agents in groups and in taking family or
community hostages to elicit information. Technical collection was
certainly used, but since the mid-1990s, guerrillas had become quite
sophisticated in minimizing its impact. The task of halting terrorist
financing and weapons/explosive supply was far from adequate. Chechen insurgents skillfully penetrated Russian operations and
over time induced a sense of Russian paranoia that severely under-
mined information sharing and the use of the very local resources
that sometimes had provided them with information.

Overall, Russian operational shortcomings were more promi-
nent than progress. Despite the targeted elimination of leadership
figures, a drumbeat of guerrilla hostage-taking incidents—punctu-
ated by highly destructive terrorist bombings—continued in the Cau-
casus, throughout Russia, and specifically in Moscow. In October
2002, a familiar pattern of failed countermeasures and/or response
occurred. Chechen terrorists held about 800 Russians hostage at
Moscow’s Dubrovka theater; the 57-hour stand-off resulted in the
deaths of 130 hostages and 41 terrorists.

A June 2004 Chechen raid in Ingushetia again highlighted
the lack of effective Russian military response and performance.
Shamil Basayev and Dokku Umarov controlled the operation, and
Chechen rebel president Aslan Maskhadov authorized it. Accord-
ing to Chechen sources, it involved about 370 combatants from the
“Riyad us-Saliheen Righteous Islamic brigade of Martyrs” and 600
additional guerrillas from other groups in direct or support roles. The
8-hour nighttime raid resulted in rebels capturing a large number
of weapons, ammunition, and uniforms, which they carried back
to Chechnya for distribution to guerrilla units there. Federal and
local security forces suffered a substantial number of casualties.
A prelude to Beslan involved three bombings in late August
2004 by Chechen female suicide bombers. Two planes were
downed, killing some 89 people on the same day by two of the bombers, while a third bomber killed at least 10 others outside a Moscow subway station a few days later. Consequently, renewed efforts to improve counterterrorist structures and approaches continued as did the search and targeting of senior Chechen and allied insurgent leaders.

Incremental changes taking place in the FSB between the 1995 Budyenovsk and 2004 Beslan terrorist actions included the following:

a. Reorganization of counterterrorism resources within the FSB (i.e., the creation of a Counterterrorist Center, otherwise known as an ATT)

b. Study of variants for deploying Al’fa and Vympel special operations teams grouped with support infrastructure under the FSB Special Designation [Spetsnaz] Center near Moscow

c. Regional spetsnaz analogues stationed in the Caucasus.

In July 2003, the MVD was given official authority over two important dimensions of counterterrorist operations. In the North Caucasus, the “Regional Operations Staff” (Regionalniy Operativniy Shtab—ROSh) was strengthened, restructured, and transferred from the FSB to the MVD to coordinate and control North Caucasus COIN and counterterrorist operations. In the following month, at the Central (i.e., Federal) level, the MVD established the so-called “Counterterrorist Center T” with a number of regional components that carried out mass arrests of individuals suspected of terrorism.
Occasional successes continued to punctuate difficulties in overall COIN efforts. In mid-April 2004, Russian forces killed Amir Abu Walid al-Ghamdi in Ingushetia; he was the leader of the international Islamic combatant contingent and the Saudi-born replacement of Khattab. The al-Ghamdi suffix to his name indicates he was a member of the same Saudi tribe (Ghamid tribe of Asir and Baha Provinces) that provided three of the U.S. 9/11 airline hijackers. His death, reported numerous times in the past was eventually accepted as confirmed. Accounts of what happened to him varied, however, including the place. The Chechen resistance claimed he was killed by an air or artillery strike while at prayer, an account given some credence since a substantial Russian operation was underway at the time. Another version was that he died at the hands of a Russian seizure group during an intelligence-and-search operation in southeastern Chechnya. Whatever the truth, Walid was the perpetrator of a number of successful attacks against Russian interests and billed as “the commander of the western front of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.”

According to some reporting, pressures for more success mounted in the summer of 2004 and led to the more widespread use of extra-judicial killing by special operations personnel. A number of special designation forces participated while broader COIN operations went on in parallel. This effort to root out difficult-to-identify guerrillas and supporters included actions by two entities formed under the GRU, the “East” (Vostok) and “West” (Zapad) battalions. The two units are composed entirely of ethnic Chechens, administratively assigned to the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, but under GRU operational control. Their reported mission was focused on “the liquidation of suspected insurgents,” a task at which they have by all accounts excelled. The lack of distinction between suspected and actual guerrilla/terrorists seemed not to be a major concern. Both battalions have as many as 1,500 personnel and have been accused of war crimes and atrocities, particularly the East (Vostok) unit. The West (Zapad) battalion may have been part of the operation that killed Saudi jihadist Walid.

The FSB “Summary Special Groups” (Svodniye Spetsial’niye Gruppy), which was comprised of regional spetsnaz from the FSB
and MVD stationed in the North Caucasus, became more active in this regard under ROSh direction. In addition, the formation of security forces under the pro-Moscow Chechen government (especially Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, son of President Akhmat Kadyrov assassinated in May 2004) added an uncontrolled and particularly nasty set of players to the mix. Both the FSB and MVD dispatched centrally subordinated Federal spetsnaz teams to Chechnya with the express aim of targeting insurgent leaders. These teams operated under Moscow’s direct control, not that of the ROSh; and the issue of effective local resources and intelligence support was a problem that from all indications—and subsequent command and control arrangements—had not been well addressed.146

Russian engagements in so-called “countercapture” operations were those directed against the families of accused “terrorists.” Family members of suspected terrorists—sometimes in large numbers—were taken into custody and held until the guerrilla/terrorist surrendered or information for his liquidation was forthcoming.147 Reaching a particularly repellent dimension of security operations targeted at leadership cadres at this time, the practice was condemned by Russian human rights groups and international observers.

Far from resolving problems or creating more effective operations and intelligence, the collective changes initially—according to Russian commentators—created further confusion and flawed understandings of agency responsibilities. Numerous arrests of suspects created even further hostility and hatred among Chechen civilians without measurably improving intelligence. Nevertheless, the overlapping FSB and military intelligence (GRU) gathering and evaluation continued. Databases were flawed and out of date and information was not shared. At the same time, rebel forces claimed with some plausibility that Russian security structures had been penetrated. The clandestine head of a Chechen “special unit” that was focused on counterintelligence-type activities stated:

Today [October 2004] we have reliable agents operating in virtually all Russian special services and in those units that are working more actively against us. We have good channels of intelligence information right up to Putin’s closest circle, not to mention secret aides and officers who have been infiltrated into the so-called Chechen police and puppet ‘government.’148
The Russians indicated that the problem of leaks, especially with the admission of ostensibly loyal Chechens into some Russian military and security forums in Chechnya, was a “nightmare.” Renewed efforts to resolve or at least mitigate all of these problems intensified with the September 2004 impact of Beslan.

The top leadership of the ROSh headquarters was replaced within days of the terrorist attack, but the headquarters remained under MVD control. At the same time, a new division within the FSB counterterrorist structure, the “Directorate for the Fight Against International Terrorism”—UBMT, energized its interaction with foreign intelligence services concerned with international terrorism. At least one commentator suggested the UBMT should be given responsibility for “destroying insurgents abroad” as President Putin had said immediately after Beslan. Other initiatives aimed at increasing access to information from foreign intelligence services were also undertaken, including the appointment of a senior FSB officer to serve as a special “Presidential envoy” for international counterterrorist cooperation.

Perhaps the most important development for subsequent COIN and counterterrorist efforts—and leadership targeting—was Russian President Putin’s direction to create 12 new Federal headquarters in each North Caucasus administrative region. The implementation began on the eve of Beslan, but was far from ready in an operational sense. The new headquarters, each designated as an Operational Control Group—GrOU, received more serious attention and resourcing in the immediate wake of the Beslan disaster. Each GrOU was set up to have assigned, dedicated forces from the various “troop” ministries (e.g., Ministry of Defense, FSB, MVD, and Ministry of Extraordinary Situations for civil defense/emergency situations) that would be responsible for the “suppression of subversive and terrorist actions” and the management of their consequences.

The joint troop components for the GrOU were strengthened to about 19,000 personnel by December 2004. Each GrOU commander has been an MVD colonel whose identity is secret, and they are given extraordinarily wide latitude for acting in their counterterrorist roles at the first indications of an impending or ongoing terrorist incident. To some Russian ears, the acronym GrOU immediately suggested the historic and notorious “Smersh” (Smert’ Spionam—Death to Spies) military counterintelligence organization whose contraction
was made famous in James Bond fiction but which had a quite real and bloody record. In any event, a GrOU commander boiled his role down to the basics: “... if it has been reported to us that a group of guerrillas is over there ... we immediately employ men and equipment in order to seize and destroy them.”

In early 2005, a GrOU was credited typically with having these components:

a. Motorized rifle company
b. 70-man MVD police spetsnaz detachment (quick reaction)
c. Combat engineer team
d. Civil defense/emergency troops and resources for rescue and construction work
e. So-called “heavies” or special operations teams comprised of elements from the North Caucasus FSB directorates, designated as spetsnaz.

Russian commentators emphasized that the special operations team are not the elite Al’fa and Vympel detachments, subordinate directly to the FSB’s Special Designation Center (TsSN) in Moscow. Rather, they are competent but less trained and experienced special operators, likened to “physically fit agents of the local FSB directorates.”

In any event, under this new system, the centrally subordinated Al’fa and Vympel detachments remained available for rapid deployment to the North Caucasus for especially important missions that included the capture or killing of key Chechen guerrilla leadership. The ROSh continued its coordination of local counterterrorist resources and conducted operations, some successful, but GrOU played an increasingly central role.

Intelligence remained the same challenge it had always been, but efforts to better collect, analyze, and share information was reportedly centered in a new “joint intelligence service” drawing on FSB, GRU, and MVD elements that seemingly was headed by an MVD officer. Little has been reported publicly about the structure of this intelligence organization that began to form in early 2005. However, Russian authorities noted that its work began to have positive effects by 2006; the service helped eliminate the intermediate level of processing and oversight that had contributed to the lack of timeliness.
One of the most illustrative examples of how the new GrOU command and control structure and associated forces operated in targeting a principal Chechen commander was the location and “liquidation” (as Russian sources termed it) of Maskhadov on 8 March 2005 in Chechnya. He had been a party to Chechen independence aspirations from at least the beginning of the 1990s. Far from an outside dissident without ties to the Soviet establishment, Maskhadov had been a colonel in the Soviet Armed Forces, serving as an artillery officer throughout the Soviet Union and abroad in the Southern Group of Forces, Hungary. In 1992, after 20-plus years of service, he retired from his Ground Forces post and became Chief of Staff of the newly proclaimed Chechen Army. He oversaw the “Army” and its constituent armed groups and bands in the First Chechen War, and after the killing of then-President Dudayev (addressed above), represented Chechnya at the peace talks in 1996 that gave the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria de facto independence (i.e., a deferment of a final decision for 5 years).

Maskhadov was elected president in 1997 and served until Russian/pro-Moscow Chechen force of arms ousted him in 1999. He had been considered a moderate by some, resisting as he did the Islamic extremism—particularly Wahhabism—that was becoming increasingly influential with Basayev and a number other field commanders and warlords around the republic. With the Second Chechen War and continuing Chechen terrorist attacks (which were sometimes stunningly successful), Maskhadov was not regarded by Russian counterterrorist planning in any nuanced way, just a top commander that needed to be eliminated. The difficulty, however, was locating his whereabouts and then successfully targeting him in

Figure 15. Former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, considered a moderate influence by some, became one of the most wanted field commanders. Zavrazhin Konstantin/Gamma, used by permission from Newscom.
an environment where top Chechen resistance leaders slipped away
time after time. The intelligence priorities, approaches, and variants
for targeting Maskhadov included a heavy emphasis on HUMINT and
signals intelligence (SIGINT) by Russian accounts. However, existing
intelligence databases were regarded as hopelessly inaccurate and
out of date, and central information resources in far-distant Moscow
were just as inadequate for current information of immediate oper-
ational value. It was recognized, of course, that the best informa-
tion—what the U.S. military calls “actionable intelligence”—would
most likely come from local resources, and the networks of informers
had been developed to some extent. However, the effort to gather and
apply this information was hampered by fundamental—and justi-
fiable—Russian mistrust of the loyalty and reliability of Chechen
informants and Chechen government security resources.

Monitoring of cell phone and other electronic transmissions was
a continuing intelligence effort, but the effectiveness and contribu-
tions have been subject to a wide variety of interpretations. At this
point in Russian COIN/intelligence operations and the sophistica-
tion of the Chechen resistance, the careful use of electronic trans-
missions that could be intercepted was a prime rebel concern. The
offer of substantial rewards was a Russian staple in seeking informa-
tion about top level targets, and that was an effort with Maskhadov
too. The Russian security services offered $10 million for information
leading to the “apprehension” of Maskhadov. The additional stan-
dard technique of developing information, one leading to countless
charges of Russian security force kidnapping and abuse, follows:
a) interrogation of prisoners and suspected associates and b) sweeps
of areas and houses where suspected rebels might reside.157

Maskhadov was finally located in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, just
a dozen miles from the Chechen capital Grozny.158 Upon receiving
intelligence about his location, Russian forces entered the village and
established a cordon around it, either proceeding to the actual house
where Maskhadov was located or searching the cordoned area until
the bunker located under a village house was found.159 Both Rus-
sian in-area security forces, with armored vehicles and substantial
conventional manpower, and elite out-of-area special operations
teams flown in from Moscow interacted in a hastily prepared opera-
tion. This effort included the deployment of FSB “Al’fa” and “Vympel”
teams directly from Moscow, who linked up with the supporting
GrOU elements that had developed the intelligence (at least in part). The spetznaz team was under the commander of FSB, General Alexander Tikhonov, reflecting the importance of the target.

The suspect’s house was entered under the guise of a routine passport check and via a trapdoor to the bunker. Apparently two factors surfaced a decision to blow it up with “special weapons” rather than attempt an assault that would endanger spetsnaz team members: a) receiving no answer from a challenge issued down the entryway and b) homeowner saying that the people hiding would never surrender. The explosion destroyed the house, collapsing the bunker and evidently killing Maskhadov.

Four other individuals were arrested at the house, the owner and three in the bunker with the main target. The usual flurry of stories, regarding how Maskhadov actually died, quickly found their way into press reporting (e.g., shot by his bodyguards or in

Figure 16. Maskhadov’s house was destroyed by FSB spetsnaz in an 8 March 2005 raid that left the former Chechen president dead in a basement bunker, possibly from the explosives used. NTV/AFP/Getty Images, used by permission from Newscom.

Figure 17. Al’fa Detachment member with a flag that Maskhadov supposedly used while president of Chechnya; it was found in Maskhadov’s bunker. Russian State TV/Gamma, used by permission from Newscom.
an exchange of fire, killed elsewhere and brought to the scene). Photographs taken on the scene and released suggest he died in the explosion or its immediate aftermath, which official accounts have continued to reflect.

Russian sources—including official ones—have reported variously on how Maskhadov was actually located, a typical situation in almost every operation in which a high level leader was killed. According to a gamut of reporting, his location was obtained variously from an interrogated prisoner, reward respondent(s), and call intercepts. Basayev said that Maskhadov was found because of his too frequent use of a mobile phone and further concluded as follows:

There was no chance for FSB officers to capture Aslan. I made a belt of explosives for him last year and it was permanently with him. Dying in the name of Allah he became a ‘Shakhid’ [a martyr who sacrifices according to certain Islamic traditions, used by some to describe martyred jihad- ists including suicide bombers]. The Russians only abase themselves by idle talk over his dead body.161

Russian security services did report their recovery of a suicide belt belonging to Maskhadov along with weapons, documents, and a detailed map of Chechnya; five computers (one purchased in Moscow in 2004) and numerous floppy disks; and mobile and fixed communications equipment.162
Another top Chechen chief—Akhmad Avdorkhanov, the Eastern Front commander and reputed to be an anti-Wahhabi moderate like Maskhadov—was killed on about 12 September 2005. His death reportedly came during a clash with Russian forces under the same command and control setup, although details are lacking about the encounter and forces employed. As is often the case, pro-Moscow Chechens circulated a number of stories about rival Chechen warlord Basayev poisoning him, which Chechen sources vehemently denounced.\textsuperscript{163}

On 14 November 2005 the Arab guerrilla leader in Chechnya, sometimes nicknamed “Dzhaber,” was killed by Federal forces in what the FSB described as a winter base in Dagestan while others said in Chechnya. His full name was Mohammad Bin Abdullah al-Saif al-Jaber al-Buaynayn al-Tamimi or Sheik Abu Omar Safe. The FSB billed him as “the ideologist” of international terrorism in the North Caucasus, charged with many raids and terrorist actions. Russian spokesmen also named him as a representative of Al Qaeda, and in any event he had spent 2 years in Afghanistan as part of his jihadist background. He was said to be a successor to Walid, the Saudi killed by Russian forces in April 2004 (as addressed above), and had become responsible for financing and conducting guerrilla operations in an expansion of his earlier role—training fighters in Georgia for introduction into Chechnya. According to the FSB regional commander overseeing the operation, Dzhaber was found as a consequence of information from a village resident living near the base camp. He was reportedly killed in a “fierce” firefight with FSB regional spetsnaz accompanied by elements of an MVD Internal Troops brigade. The counterterrorist action was controlled by the ROSh, not long before the headquarters’ responsibilities were subsumed in the new command and control structure, and appears to have been the result of a sustained and reported effort to catch Dzhaber.\textsuperscript{164}

Figure 19. Chechen insurgent leader “Abu Omar Safe” (left) was killed in a “fierce” November 2005 firefight with FSB regional spetsnaz accompanied by elements of an MVD Internal Troops brigade. ITAR-TASS, used by permission from Newscom.
Another important new entity was added to the command and control structure in February 2006, the “National Antiterrorist Committee” (NAK) with internal Regional Antiterrorist Committee staffs called RAKs. The NAK has Russia-wide responsibilities for coordinating the “actions of federal organs of power in the fight against terror” and is billed as “completing” the counterterrorist structure for at least the present. Because the FSB chief heads the NAK, the lead for counterterrorist operations and coordination is the FSB. The principal ministries dealing with terrorism are represented on the NAK, which some fear will become too powerful and others suggest will degenerate into just another deliberative body. However, it appears to date that the NAK is serving as an active player in directing counterterrorist operations. This aspect was borne out by the disestablishment of the MVD-led ROSh as superfluous with the NAK in place. The GrOU headquarters and forces, now directly under the NAK and their RAK components, retained the same key roles and functions. In addition, they were removed from constraints formerly exercised by the local ROSh authorities.\(^{165}\)

The new structure as it exists in its basic elements is notionally diagramed in Figure 20. It illustrates the command and control of high value target operations in the Southern Federal District that remains operative into 2007. The system has been an effort to combine the new structure with those practices, forces, and assets that had at times enjoyed success. It was an effort to create a more clearly defined command structure leveraging available forces and staff in the Chechnya and the North Caucasus more generally, with the employment of elite special operations units from Moscow for those missions deemed especially important.

Continuing Russian leadership targeting saw another major Chechen guerrilla and political figure killed in Chechnya during the predawn hours of 17 June 2006 at Argun, a city near the Chechen capital Grozny. Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, the successor to Maskhadov as President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya, was killed in a 2-hour firefight after Russian and allied Chechen forces surrounded the house at which he was staying and then, after a waiting period, assaulted it. According to some accounts, about 350 troops that included regional FSB officers and elements of the so-called ethnic Chechen “Ahmad Kadyrov Special Forces Regiment” supported by armor took part in the operation. It appeared to
villagers—at first expecting some kind of Russian “cleansing” operation—that the house had been known and targeted. Consistent with this, but lending no real credibility due to his profound unreliability on every score, the thuggish pro-Moscow Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that a member of Sadulayev’s inner circle had revealed his location for 1,500 rubles “to buy one drug dose.”

The developing role of Kadyrov, his forces, and their future actions on territories contiguous to Chechnya is continuing to develop and the independence from Moscow’s central control remains a cause of some concern to Russian authorities (as does the future loyalty of
ostensibly pro-Moscow Chechen militias, since ranks are filled with former Chechen militants).\footnote{167}

As previously noted, the death of the most successful, feared, and hunted Chechen insurgent leader and terrorist, Basayev, a month later seemed to cap a years-long string of successful leadership-targeting efforts, albeit without destroying the insurgents and with enormous costs inflicted on Russia and Russian interests from parallel terrorist actions. The death of Basayev saw Dokku Umarov—who has pushed for a wider North Caucasus war against the Russians and had just replaced the “liquidated” Abdul-Kahlim Sadulayev—emerged as the most hunted member of the Chechen leadership. Even before Basayev’s death he had outlined plans for reorganization of the Caucasus and Dagestani Fronts together comprising the Army of Chechnya Republic of Ichkeria.\footnote{168}

The command and control structure, intelligence, and operational dimensions of leadership-targeting and COIN efforts continue to evolve.\footnote{169} In addition, continuing troop reorganization and drawdown is underway per Presidential Edict No. 832s, signed on 2 August 2006.\footnote{170} According to Russian assertions, the same force levels are not required since the insurgents have taken such leadership and personnel losses, and the 12 MVD-controlled GrOU existing components will in any event increasingly centralize Russian responses as troops draw down.\footnote{171} The withdrawal of Russian forces is scheduled for 2007-2008.

Some Russian commentators assert that despite the changes and successes, Russia has failed to learn the “lessons of Beslan.” A central problem, however, is that intelligence on reorganizing forces

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure21.jpg}
\caption{Abu-Salam Sadulayev, who replaced Maskhadov, was killed by Russian SOF in June 2006. HO/AFP/Getty Images, used by permission from Newscom.}
\end{figure}
and the real impact of actions to date remain uncertain, and as one commentator reminded in September 2006, “before the attack on Beslan, nobody had heard of the terrorist Khuchbarov (nicknamed “The Colonel”), the designated commander on the scene.” Other commentators point to bleak prospects for not just Chechnya but in neighboring republics where Russian forces now engage insurgents in an expanded conflict. By November 2006, the commander of the North Caucasus Combined Force, Col-Gen Yevgeniy Baryayev, warned that the guerrillas were recovering from the leadership losses they had received during the summer and again constituted a threat requiring the closest attention.

As for the Chechen insurgent perspective, new commanders continue to be appointed and the groupings of terrorist formations realigned. The pro-Chechen Kavkav Center site used a tract by Hussein bin Mahmoud—billed as a “Muslim scholar” and Mujahideen supporter—to capture Chechen militant views in what he described as a continuing struggle against Russia dating from Catherine the Great:

> The power of this religion is not imprisoned in a body, for it is a spiritual force that moves from body to body and person to person, for there was Dudayev, and then Khattab, then Walid, then Shamil, and there will be others who will come to carry the banner after them. Their power will be focused in one man who will be even more ferocious and deadlier to his enemies using their experiences and abilities, so let the Russians have their little joy, for they will cry much ...

**Observations**

Insurgencies and terrorism around the world have long spurred governments and security forces to formulate tailored initiatives designed to eliminate principal guerrilla/terrorist leaders and key cadre. As the examples illustrate, these initiatives have varied widely in basic concept, level of sophistication, type of enemy confronted, environment, and place within overall planning or strategy. Elements that have played a role in leadership targeting for some of the specific cases reviewed include:

a. Nature of the specific COIN/counterterrorism operational environment
b. Planning concepts, approaches, tactics and variants

c. Command and control evolutions

d. Nature of the guerrilla/terrorist group and leadership characteristics

e. Security/task force/team organization and equipment for SOF, regular, and other security forces

f. Intelligence priorities, approaches, and variants

g. Guerrilla counterintelligence and counter-reconnaissance activities

h. Language and regional expertise issues of dealing with tribal/clan cultures and reliability

i. Technology (e.g., computers, databases, analytical tools, and sensors)

j. Public affairs and media utilization

k. Human rights and legitimacy.

Since virtually all leadership-targeting operations are marked by secrecy, many by varying and conflicting accounts, and most by ambiguities in what data is available, care has to be exercised in reaching even general judgments. Despite the many differences and uncertainties, however, they can be instructive for some of the more visible and verifiable successes, pitfalls, and failures.

**Has Leadership Targeting Been Effective?** Among the most central questions is whether leadership targeting programs have been effective in achieving intended aims. For most countries, these have been founded in varying ways on the belief that eliminating key leaders will result in the following:

a. Damaging the target organization by depriving it of effective direction and experience

b. Deterring future terrorist/guerrilla activities by the group through demonstrating the consequences

c. Demoralizing rank and file members by removing the most prominent and effective members

d. Creating or reinforcing for local and international view the viability of the regime in providing security

e. Imposing justice on perpetrators of past acts (which some characterize as “revenge”).
The extent to which these aims are articulated and thought through clearly varies from country to country. Israel, for example, with surprisingly visible programs, has certainly given these issues the most attention and closely argued consideration. On the other hand, those initiatives driven heavily by individual security agencies in some countries—often in the simple belief that killing as many insurgent cadre as possible will somehow translate into overall success—typically get the least attention. The examples of the anti-ETA GAL operations in Spain and components of Operation Condor serve as cases in point.

At one level, the criminal justice “death penalty” argument (mustered by some) applies because at least the one eliminated terrorist is stopped and deterred, even if no broader effect is realized. In the case of a charismatic leader, or group whose existence and direction depends heavily on a single person, the effect can be substantial as with Peru’s capture of Guzmán. Another case in point is a previously cited judgment (with some dissenters) as follows:

a. The decline of Palestinian and other terrorist attacks against Israel was a deterrent consequence of Israel’s post-Munich “retaliatory and preventive” assassinations
b. Terrorist actions are at least held in check by continuing leadership targeting programs.

The success of individual operations and campaigns, however, often has not translated into more than transitory accomplishment unless integrated into an overall and effective COIN and counterterrorist strategy and the political and popular will to support it. Superb Rhodesian guerrilla leadership tracking and elimination capabilities and actions could not by most views overcome strategic and political failings (although they nearly did). What most specialists judge to be the brutal effectiveness of French COIN efforts in Algeria—cutting wide swathes through the FLN (National Liberation Front) leadership and supporting infrastructure—went for nothing due to political decisions and left a legacy that tarnishes France and French arms in the eyes of much of the world. Success has also been temporary, as with Mexico in the hunt for Cabañas.
The legacy of that 7-year operation and what the Mexican attorney general now judges to be a criminally flawed and executed COIN plan continues to fuel the creation and sustainment of a variety of guerrilla groups despite its success in eliminating Cabañas and his group at the time.

While it is too soon to make final judgments about their eventual success, the continuing conflict in Chechnya and the Caucasus suggests that even unprecedented Russian security force success in targeting and eliminating major guerrilla leaders—such as those publicized actions taking place in 2005-2006 alone—may ultimately generate little more than tactical or operational pauses. Despite the deaths of leading political-military leaders and Chechen and foreign field commanders—including former President Maskhadov, eastern front commander Avdorkhanov, former President Sadulayev, Arab commander and financier “Dzhaber” (Abu Omar Safe), and the most effective and notorious guerrilla commander Basayev—Russian military and MVD forecasting remains bleak regarding the elimination of guerrilla groups active in Chechnya and elsewhere in the region. Centuries-old antagonisms and independence goals, new Islamic extremist ideological content, and indifferently brutal Russian security actions and policies have given the armed opposition a vitality that has enabled them to absorb blows, reorganize, and continue operations.

Among the many planning concepts, approaches, tactics, and variants underpinning foreign leadership-targeting programs, one of the most important has been the command and control of participating government forces. The ability to conduct discrete special operations as needed—or in some cases the development of ways to integrate overall military, law enforcement, and other security forces in support of targeting actions—has often been fundamental to immediate success. Mexico and Russia constitute good examples in this regard and illustrate the long learning curve required. The action that killed former Chechen President Maskhadov is especially notable (even recognizing varying accounts). It appears that a greatly adjusted command and control system finally reaching maturity in this action was, as designed, able to leverage locally developed and national intelligence, in-area military support resources, and Federal-level spetsnaz strike teams flown in to the target area to conduct a successful operation.
From India to Ireland, Peru to Israel, and elsewhere, the centrality of accurate intelligence to operational successes has been demonstrated time after time. The importance of technical collection means, computer databases, and other technological innovation is clear, but an essential element underpinning most actions (and often leading to the successful application of the former technologies) has been human intelligence and accompanying analysis. The use of informers motivated by reward or revenge, the exploitation of rivalries within groups, interrogations of prisoners, agent surveillance with and without technical means, and information provided by regional and international cooperation have all been cited in the operations addressed here.

For some countries, the combination of intelligence and careful analysis has not only provided actionable information but minimized the death or injury to civilians or other innocent parties by contributing to the accurate, discrete selection of targets. The Israeli efforts in this area are among the most notable in an extremely complex operational environment. Peru’s hunt for Guzmán is a particularly good example of intelligence based heavily on surveillance, tracking of visitors among residences, trash searches by DINCOTE agents, and developing analytical conclusions that led not only to the Sendero leader’s capture but also the subsequent wrap-up of other leadership figures. Continuing problems cited in some multiethnic countries and regions have included the widespread challenge of developing or acquiring language and regional expertise, adequate knowledge of tribal and clan cultures, and approaches to promote the reliability of indigenous allies.

Active counterintelligence and counter-reconnaissance activities by guerrilla and terrorist groups has been a prominent feature in foreign experience including the targeted killing of military and security officials. Several groups have sometimes developed effective and even sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and direct action programs against military and government officials—for example:

a. PIRA
b. Indian insurgents in Nagaland, Kashmir, and elsewhere
c. Palestinian terrorists
d. Colombian guerrillas and drug traffickers
e. Chechens.
Most countries have, with varying degrees of success, sought to exploit the capture or elimination of guerrilla and terrorist leaders via various types of post-operation publicity. Except for clandestine programs that were never intended to be seen (e.g., those by Spain’s GAL or in Operation Condor), most countries have provided official photos of the captured or deceased, and in the Internet age now post them on Web sites. The Russian FSB is an example. Aside from touting the presumed accomplishment, governments are well aware that cynical populations need as much definitive proof as possible to accept that a famous/notorious guerrilla has really been neutralized. The Guzmán capture was especially effective, thanks to the images released of the imprisoned leader. On the other hand, Mexico’s published photograph of slain Pdlp leader Cabañas did not end rumors of his escape for many years thereafter. Russia has had the same experience, partly due to the frequent reports of a rebel leader’s demise and then his magical resurrection one, two, or even three times thereafter. Certainly, the rapid unraveling of the Letelier-Moffitt assassination in Washington, D.C. highlighted the power of photos, the ready presence of the international media and eyewitness reports, but not in ways ever intended by the Chilean planners and hired agents.

**Morality and Legality Issues.** Finally, abuses of national and international law and human rights committed in many guerrilla and terrorist leadership-targeting programs are not only illegal and immoral but have had enormous negative impact on the effectiveness of larger COIN plans and goals. New governments and various “truth commissions” continue to document various violations—for example:

a. Indiscriminate round-up of people for interrogation in search of actionable intelligence

b. Widespread and systematic torture conducted toward the same end, extra-judicial killing by death squads sometimes conducted at their own discretion

c. Nonjudicial detention and punishment without proper vetting and authorization

d. Criminal indifference to peripheral casualties in the pursuit of targeted leaders.

Both the unrepentant accounts of General Aussaresses in Algeria, and the startling historical footnote that some 126 relatives of
Cabañas disappeared during hard-pressed Mexican Army and police efforts to locate the leader, underscore the kinds of legacies that live on in some local populations. For conflicts like those in Chechnya, the full dimension has not been revealed. Some groups and journalists have confirmed enough, however, to point to the most egregious and sustained brutality and illegality by Russian security forces and their local allies. Governments who practiced such abuses undermined the legitimacy of the cause at the time, whatever the provocation or viciousness of the terrorist acts that caused the responses or initiatives, and may have caused enduring disaffection.

Few countries, and most of the international community, deny the right of states to target and eliminate armed combatants bent on violence and the overthrow of an existing order. As noted above, gray areas of who is a combatant and who is not continue to cloud discussions for the U.S. and other countries. The morality and legality of leadership-targeting concepts abroad will certainly continue to be debated from differing perspectives, as will their practicality, effectiveness, and consequences. However, even commentators disposed to dispute the legitimacy of states who practice such actions have acknowledged that developing standards, rather than demanding bans, can bridge gaps. The principal gap is between the “harsh realities of armed conflicts” in an age of transnational terrorism or enduring insurgencies and the “idealistic standards of behavior that cannot reasonably be demanded of parties faced with this reality.”

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Appendix. Problems with Targeted Killings in Gaza

Excerpt from Ron Ben-Yishay, “The Enigma,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 14 July 2006, pp. 16, 19, 20, and 22, translated from the Hebrew by the Open Source Center, No. GMP20060714754003:

[Shin Bet Chief Yuval] Diskin’s skepticism about the targeted killings and the “remote-controlled warfare” is based on a number of concepts fused through years of cumulative experience. First, targeted killings and “remote-controlled warfare” can only be done in areas where no civilians can be hurt. This substantially limits the chances of hitting the arch-terrorists.

Secondly, targeted killings are complex operations requiring constant surveillance with a variety of means and real-time eye contact with the targets until the opportunity to strike them comes. This demands the activation of Shin Bet sources close to the target as well as coordination with the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] weapons systems. Dozens of individuals and systems are therefore involved in every such operation. Shin Bet headquarters contains a special “targeted killing war room” outfitted with state-of-the-art technology. The IDF activates the aircraft and other measures from “control cells” elsewhere. These two operation rooms exchange information to obtain maximum accuracy.

All this is costly and entails hard-to-get quality human resources. The Shin Bet admits that since the disengagement, the enlistment of agents and collaborators among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has become far more complicated. This is not surprising because now it is much more difficult for Shin Bet regional coordinators to meet with individuals marked as potential recruits. A large part of the recruitments are performed in ways that make James Bond movies pale.

Third, targeted killings do not enable hitting the rocket-production infrastructure, which is located at the heart of densely populated centers, sometimes even in the homes of large families. Tunnels can likewise not be detected or destroyed from the air. Another reason the targeted killings have lost their effectiveness in the Gaza Strip is that they had originally been planned to strike quality targets—
namely, “ticking bombs” and prominent terrorist leaders. Given the prevailing anarchy in the Gaza Strip, there are hardly any “quality targets” whose killing would paralyze a terrorist organization. The Hamas government has no control over the military arm. Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyah is not Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, so there is no point in going after him.

The bottom line is that the targeted killings and the “remote-controlled warfare” can be part of the measures Israel employs, but they cannot constitute an overall intelligence-military solution to the problem. This is Diskin’s view. “We lack two central elements to foil Qassam firings and thwart attacks from Gaza: detentions and interrogation,” a senior security source says. “We have sufficient intelligence information about what is happening in the Gaza Strip; the problem is how to translate this data into a targeted-killing operation. This is precisely why similar Qassam rocket or mortar firings have not developed in the West Bank. Our intelligence capability in both areas is comparable, but the difference is that the IDF’s control over the West Bank allows us to capture the suspects and bring them to the interrogation room. In the Gaza Strip, we cannot bring the wanted persons to the interrogation room, get additional information from them, and use it to generate further detentions and interrogations until we can convert the intelligence information into a targeted killing that uproots the cell and removes the threat. We do carry out targeted killings in Gaza, but these do not yield intelligence and do not handle the root of the problem. I prefer to have the terrorist activists alive in my interrogation room than dead from a targeted killing, because a dead man cannot talk.”

A tangible manifestation of this can be found in the attack on the outpost and the tank at Kerem Shalom. It has become clear now that the Shin Bet knew and reported months before the operation about a general intention to carry it out at that location. Jamal Abu-Samhadanah, one of the initiators of the kidnapping, was killed from the air when he was spotted observing the squad’s “dry run” several weeks before the actual operation. Three days before the terrorists surfaced from the tunnel, the Shin Bet pro-
vided a localized warning. The failure rests with the IDF’s reaction to the attack, but this is not the point. It is obvious that if that operation had been planned in the West Bank, the IDF—with the help of Shin Bet intelligence—would have long paid a “house call” to some of the initiators and perpetrators. They would have been arrested and questioned by the Shin Bet, in turn leading to further detentions and interrogations until the entire operation would have been exposed and foiled.

Another recent example is the way the Shin Bet and IDF handled two separate kidnappings: a soldier Gil’ad Shalit in the Gaza Strip and a civilian Pinhas Asheri in the West Bank. The Shin Bet located the kidnappers and the body of Asheri in less than 24 hours from the moment the Popular Resistance Committees announced they were holding him. One week later, the entire kidnapping squad was already behind bars. With Shalit, the Shin Bet groped in the dark for many days, although it had detained two of the individuals involved in the incident at Kerem Shalom prior to the deed, and the bodies of the terrorists who were killed in that operation were identified.
Endnotes

1. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, “Basayev’s Death: Versions Abound,” Chechnya Weekly, 14 July 2006, Vol. VII, No. 28. This article addresses the variety of conflicted stories appearing in the first days following Basayev’s death. The circumstances of his death have been widely disputed, including whether Russian security forces even had a role. However, the Russian government pressed ahead with its claim of a “well-coordinated and targeted” special operation despite some foreign and internal Russian skepticism.


Yandarbiev was assassinated by a remotely detonated bomb planted in his car, possibly placed while he and his bodyguards were visiting a mosque. His two bodyguards were killed and his teenage son wounded when the bomb exploded on a Qatari highway. Two Russians, allegedly intelligence officers working temporarily at the Russian embassy, were arrested after Qatari security traced their van. They confessed after “clever interrogation” and were tried and sentenced to life in prison. However, authorities in Qatar agreed to their extradition to Russia months later. Alternative stories have Yandarbiev assassinated by rival Chechen factions and disgruntled business partners.

3. Francesca Mereu and Simon Saradzhyan, “Putin: Destroy Hostage Killers,” 29 June 2006, No. 3442, available from www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/29/001.html (accessed May 2007). In addition, the Chechen opposition has a “special unit” whose mission is to search for individuals who commit “war crimes” against the Chechen people or remove property or war booty. Even after the Russians were sentenced in Qatar, the unit commander claimed to be gathering information on Yandarbiyev assassination perpetrators. The unit supposedly has a database that includes fingerprints, voice recordings, and other information for post-war trials against Russians and others who “killed and plundered under the cynical silence of the whole world” wherever they might hide. The unit commander denied any intention to carry out extra-judicial punishment.

See also “The experience of Mossad is unacceptable to us,” Chechenpress, 29 October 2004, translated in CEP20041101000342.

4. The Web site of the Chechen resistance-associated Kavkaz Center—www.kavkazcenter.com/—published the “thank you” telegram. The released part of the message read as follows:

Mujahideen of the Caucasus express huge gratitude to those who has carried out the elimination of the Russian diplomats
the spies in Iraq. Their elimination is the worthy answer to the murder by Russian terrorists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of the Chechen diplomat, ex-president of CRI [Chechen Republic of Ichkeria], Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev.


6. Putin chose to publicly announce his intentions to seek out the militants involved—and call for help in identifying the murders—at a 28 June 2006 meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister in Moscow. See Francesca Mereu and Simon Saradzhyan, “Putin.”

7. See three references:

8. Putin’s intentions were called “absolutely moral and legal from a logical point of view,” by the First Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, Oleg Morozov, and widely reported in the Russian media. For example, see ITAR-TASS, 4 July 2006, translated in CEP20060704950089.

9. The 20 July 2006 award ceremony was noted in various media, including Tatyana Aleksandrova and Mikhail Antonov, presenters, “Vesti,” Rossiya TV, 20 July 2006, translated in CEP20060720950276.

10. Bearing caveats about the limitations of data in mind, sufficient material exists (in a number of cases) to identify and assess selected foreign efforts and thereby:
   a. Track and neutralize insurgent and terrorist leadership figures
   b. Illustrate and frame some common issues and variants in approach and effectiveness
   c. Highlight operations that have been little studied and whose lessons have not been exploited.
   These may suggest cases for more complete treatment than what is provided herein.


18. Parker and Naccarato, “Targeting Saddam and Sons.” In addition, popular commentators have underscored the silliness of some thinking—pointing out the contradictions of willingly inflicting mass casualties and collateral damage, while reacting with horror to the prospect of avoiding or ending a conflict by eliminating a leader integral to an enemy’s war effort. For example, see Ralph Peters, “A Revolution in Military Ethics?” *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 102-108.


20. The online archive of CIA and other materials is at www.aarclibrary.org/ (accessed May 2007). The Center, which is supposed to expand its holdings, has concentrated heavily on the John F. Kennedy (JFK) assassination. However, it indicates the following broader mission for itself:

   The Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC) was founded in 1984 to provide a permanent organization that would acquire, preserve, and disseminate information on political assassinations. With the passage of the 1992 JFK Assassination Records Collection Act and successful suits under the Freedom of Information Act, the AARC has acquired hundreds of thousands of pages of long-awaited government records. This Web site is devoted to reaching the widest possible audience with this new information.

21. These successes exceed the scope of this paper with its focus on foreign experience. Among discussions by knowledgeable reporters who purport to see is Rowan Scarborough, “In hunt for terrorists in Iraq, general is no armchair warrior,” *Washington Times*, 2 October 2006.
Also, two examples of the better memoir literature that provides insights into U.S. approaches and procedures follow:

a. Shelby G. Spires, “CIA terrorist hunter: ‘We've got to stay mad,’” *The Huntsville Times*, 16 April 2006


25. This was the kidnapping and execution of the Duke of Enghien, Louis-Antoine-Henri de Bourbon-Condé. In the original memorable French: “C’est plus qu’un crime, c’est une faute.”

26. “Senior officer: Nasrallah ‘must die’” *Jerusalem Post*, 20 August 2006, received from www.jpost.com and “IDF officer: Israel committed to hunting down Nasrallah” *Haaretz*, 20 August 2006, received from www.haaretz.com. An interesting parallel was drawn between the search for Egyptian military leadership intelligence in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and in the 2006 Lebanese war. While Israeli intelligence reportedly located the Egyptian General Staff command bunker in 1973 before the end of the war, and had the Matkal special operations unit plan a raid, the cease fire was called before the plan could be implemented. See Ronen Bergman, “Head Clearing,” *Yedi’ot Aharonot*, 2 February 2007, translated in GMP20070202743005.


28. The Haganah, in the War for Independence, reportedly made use of assassination, as noted by Yossi Melman, “With Guns, Bombs, and Poison. No Questions Asked ...,” *Haaretz*, 17 March 1998, received from www.haaretz.com/ . Before a Jewish state existed, the unsanctioned assassination of perhaps 200-300 Nazi SS officers had taken place in the immediate post-World War II period in Europe. These actions were carried out by a few dozen members of the Jewish Brigade formed under British auspices and sent to Italy to fight in November
1944 for the last months of the war. While information is sketchy, one of the best sources is Howard Blum, *The Brigade: An Epic Story of Vengeance, Salvation, and WWI* (New York: Harper Perennial Reprint edition, 2002).

29. Examples of these special units include the following:
   a. *Sayeret Matkal*, the General Staff Reconnaissance unit formed in 1957, was influenced by the British Special Air Service and probably the best known of IDF SOF components for its skilled hostage rescue missions
   b. *Sayeret Shaldag*, the principal Air Force special operations unit
   c. *Shayetet 13* (Flotilla 13), the principal Navy SOF unit with counterterrorism roles along with other naval special operations duties
   d. *Sayeret Egoz*, formed in 1956, and in various iterations serving as an elite COIN light infantry and with counterterrorism duties in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank
   e. *Sayeret Yahalom* (Diamond), an elite engineering special operations support unit with components that reportedly include *Yael* (Ibex) for special demolitions and long-range sabotage operations, *Samoor* (an acronym for “tunnels and caches” and also meaning *weasel*) intended for the location and neutralization of underground facilities, and *Yachsap* for mine and demolition neutralization and infiltration support
   f. *Alpinistim*, the special alpine units trained for cold-weather and mountain operations on the Syrian border
   g. *Oketz*, the K-9 special operations unit used for all manner of military urban and rural support to include tracking and man-hunting.

Names change, units are dissolved and reformed, and some units are not identified publicly. For two recent recaps, see Nathaniel Rosen and Max Kite, “The best of the best,” *Jerusalem Post*, 2 August 2006 (good summary of the most prominent Israeli special operations units) and Yaakov Katz, “Elite Yael unit clears the way for IDF,” *Jerusalem Post*, 31 July 2006 (a discussion of *Yael*).


34. Ibid.
35. See Isser Harel, *The House on Garabaldi Street* (London: Frank Cass, 1997) for one of the best accounts. Harel, the near-legendary chief of the Mossad at the time, personally led the operation in Argentina.
37. Melman, “Targeted killings.”
38. Black September was a component of the Palestinian terrorist group Fatah, which most specialists acknowledge was a creature of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) despite the effort to obscure linkages.
40. Aaron J. Klein in *Striking Back* (pp. 132-133) said that by the end of 1972, the head of the assassination effort, Michael Harari, had three teams, each comprised of about 12 individuals and tailored in accordance with the given mission and environment:
   a. *Logistics* included arranging for places to stay or hide, transportation, and communications.
   b. *Surveillance* had many females and was reportedly masterful in the use of disguises and surreptitious observation.
   c. *Assassination* combatants were organized in twos, manned by personnel recruited typically from elite Israeli military units.
41. At Lillehammer, the confluence of a working theory on the targets movements, seemingly confirmatory intelligence, and the failure to consider anomalies or carry out final checks resulted in the assassination of a Moroccan waiter resembling Palestinian terrorist Ali
Hassan Salameh in the presence of his pregnant wife, followed by the arrest and punishment of several Kidon team members by Norwegian authorities.

42. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, p. 282. (See Endnote 12.) The Church Committee called for more permanent and sweeping bans (i.e., a law), noting that CIA directors and other Government officials change and thus internal policies may as well.


47. Ibid., p. 209.


50. Melman, “Targeted Killing.”


53. Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”

54. Michael Westaway McCue, “Britain’s Shadowy 14 Company played a dangerous cat-and-mouse game in Northern Ireland,” *Military History*, January/February 2006, pp. 19-21. As noted (p. 18), 14 Company had other names; two of them were the Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team and the Intelligence and Surveillance Group. See also:


59. These lessons—with specific reference made to the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SSR)—were reportedly drawn upon in the wake of the July 2005 Islamic terrorist attack in London.


64. Woodworth, “The stain of Spain’s dirty war.”

65. Ibid.

66. Paddy Woodworth, *Dirty Wars, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL, and Spanish Democracy* (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2001) is a well-
received account of GAL, its activities, and consequences for Spanish democracy.

67. For examples, see:


70. Ibid, pp. 128-129.

71. Cilliers, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, pp. 124 and 132.

72. http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/external_operations.htm has examples.

73. Scott-Donelan, Tactical Tracking Operations.

74. Cilliers, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, pp. 244-245.


78. www.fas.org/irp/world/india/home/bsf.htm (accessed May 2007) has a recap of some charges.


83. The NSG is divided into two units:

a. Special Action Group (SAG) with highly trained members drawn from the Indian Army, primarily used for assault and special direct action roles

b. Special Rangers Group (SRG) with equally well-prepared members drawn from the paramilitary police forces (e.g., Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Forces) to support the SAG (e.g., provided security and sealed off target areas).


84. Ibid.


89. La captura de Feliciano, la guerrilla de las versiones: en tres actos y diversos comentarios (The capture of Feliciano, guerrilla of the models: in three acts and with diverse commentaries), Lima, Peru: Unidad de Analisis de Sociedad, DESCO: Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1999.


92. Lane, “Superman’ Meets Shining Path.”


95. For example, in December 2004—decades after its most active phase—a Chilean judge indicted Augusto Pinochet for various crimes associated with Operation Condor, which included the 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier.


99. For example, see the 14 declassified cables available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index2.htm (accessed May 2007).

100. Augusto Pinochet, who some still hoped to prosecute for Condor and other alleged crimes, died 12 September 2006 of a heart attack at age 91.


111. After several years of robbing, kidnapping, and attacking state targets in Guerrero, Genaro Vázquez Rojas was killed in a 1972 car crash in Michoacán state. Three references follow:

112. Salvador Castañeda, a prominent former MAR member, has written about the group activities. One of his observations was that MAR failed to establish necessary support bases outside their immediate operating areas before undertaking armed actions. See the following references for more about MAR and other insurgent groups:
   a. Marian Leighton, “Moscow’s Courtship of Mexico,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 660, 5 July 1988
   b. Tomás Tenorio Galinda, “Una vieja visión de la guerrilla”

e. Salvador Castañeda, “Things are Going to be Difficult for the EZLN,” interview (January 1995), in “Documents on Mexican Politics,” edited by Alex López-Ortíz for the Internet from a published version in the German-language magazine *Analyse & Kritik*, No. 373. **Note:** EZLN is the Zapatista National Liberation Army.


116. This number was claimed by one of Lucio Cabañas’ cousins, Guillermina Cabañas, and referred to the extended Cabañas family members. See “Authorities Arrest Former Police Commander Accused of Torture, Disappearances in “Dirty War,” *SourceMex*, 25 February 2004, received from http://ladb.unm.edu/sourcemex/ (accessed May 2007).


120. Julie Watson, “Mexican Ex-Presidents Blasted in Report,” Associated Press, 19 November 2006. The other two former presidents were Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and Jose Lopez Portillo.


122. “Según informe detienen y torturan a más de mil 600 en centros secretos” (According to information, more than 1,600 were detained and tortured in secret centers), 5 March 2006, available from www.elporvenir.com.mx/notas.asp?nota_id=55126 (accessed May 2007).


125. American Embassy cable “Death of Lucio Cabañas Barrientos.”


127. For discussion and background, as well as other turmoil in the Guerrero region, see “Video Bombshell Exposes a North-South Dirty War,” Frontera NorteSur (FNS), 5 December 2005, Center for Latin American and Border Studies, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico, available from www.nmsu.edu/~frontera/ (accessed May 2007).


133. Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan,” Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre, 1 September 2005 is one of the best summaries of Russian counterterrorism structures as they have evolved since the mid-1990s, before and after Beslan. Received from http://studies.agentura.ru/english/listing/terrorismprevention/ (accessed May 2007).

134. Chechen fighters led by Shamil Basayev seized hundreds of hostages at a Russian hospital, defeated elite security force (including Al’fa counterterrorist personnel) efforts to free them, and escaped with officially provided money and transportation, leaving behind more than a hundred dead hostages and security personnel. Rumors were that officials considered a similar bargain for resolving the Beslan terrorist hostage-taking before events escalated.


137. Oleg Kutasov, “Raduyev Betrayed by His Own People,” *Kommersant*, 14 March 2000, as translated CEP20000314000156


138. Two of the various accounts—all of which are subject to some skepticism—follow:


139. Viktor Baranets and Mikhail Falaleyev, “How are we weaker than the terrorists?” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 17 September 2004, as translated in CEP20040917000288.

140. The pro-Chechen resistance Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency Web site had a discussion of the raid and a video (picked up and used by the FSB) on 27 July 2004. Available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/ as reported and translated at CEP20040727000341.

141. For a good discussion of the ROSh, its mission, and constituent membership from its formation in 2001 to the end of 2004, see “Regional’nyi operativniy shtab po provedeniyu kontrterroristicheskoi operatsii—ROSh” (Regional operational staff for conducting counter-terrorist operations—ROSh), late 2004, available from www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/regions/rosh/ (accessed May 2007).


143. Soldatov and Borogan, “Terrorism Prevention in Russia.”

144. Limited numbers of personnel from these two units have deployed troops to Lebanon, providing security for a Russian engineer contingent. A good recap of the units and their activities in Chechnya follows:


145 Suvorov, “Russian Army Special Forces Commander.”
Soldatov and Borogan, “Terrorism Prevention in Russia”; also “FSB prevrashchayetsya armiyu” (The FSB is converted into the army), undated, circa early 2004, available from www.agentura.ru/.

Soldatov and Borogan, “Terrorism Prevention in Russia.”

“The experience of Mossad.” (See endnote 3.)


Within the FSB, counterterrorism was by then centered in a component with the cumbersome name of “Service for the Protection of Constitutional Order and the Struggle with Terrorism.” See the competent recapitulation of Russian counterterrorist responsibilities in summary entitled “Rossiyskaya sistema bor’ba s terrorizmom” (The Russian system for the struggle with terrorism), at www.agentura.ru/.

Soldatov and Borogan, “Terrorism Prevention in Russia.”

Ibid.

Staffs were largely untrained and resources limited. See Aleksandr Bondarenko, “Act Without Waiting for Instructions,” interview with an unnamed MVD colonel GrOU commander (5 July 2005), Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), as translated in CEP200050728949004.


Mikhail Falaleyev, “Chechnya Without Masks or Cleansings,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 18 March 2006, as translated in CEP20060320021004.


Two of the voluminous Russian and Western reports of Maskhadov’s death at the hands of Russian security forces follow:


159. Timofey Borisov, “Maskhadov’s Inglorious End, Special Operation,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 10 March 2005, as translated in CEP20050317000009.

160. Ibid. and Channel One TV (Moscow), 13 March 2005, as translated in CEP20050314000086.


162. Channel One TV (Moscow), 13 March 2005.


164. “FSB Agents Kill ‘Influential’ Arab Mercenary in Chechen Special Operation,” Channel One TV, 1529 GMT 19 November 2005, as translated in FEA20051118013289


165. Ibid.

166. “President Sadulaev [Sadulayev] was attacked by more than 350 enemy troops,” 19 June 2006, received from www.chechenpress.co.uk/english/news/2006/06/19/09.shtml. The Chechen special forces regiment was essentially a militia under the control of its namesake’s son, Prime Minister Ramzam Kadyrov, noted for its especially brutal actions.


See also “Regional paper downbeat on results of Russian campaign in North Caucasus,” Makhachkala Novoye Delo, 25 August 2006, as translated in CEP20060830950188.


171. “Statement by Russian Internal Troops Commander, Colonel-General Nikolai Rogozhin,” ITAR-TASS, as translated in CEP20060327027122.


173. “Regional paper downbeat.”


