IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2006 REASSIGNMENT OF U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

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**Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs**

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ABSTRACT

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In 2006, the Secretary of Defense re-designated United States Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces as conventional forces, rather than Special Operations Forces. This paper examines strategic leadership decision-making flaws leading to that action, flaws in the implementation, and unintended consequences as issues impacting the future of the Civil Affairs branch. In light of increasing requirements to conduct civil military operations as part of stability operations in an era of persistent conflict, this paper proposes a strategy to ensure that Civil Affairs forces can meet the demands of both conventional and special operations forces.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2006 REASSIGNMENT OF U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

This paper examines the history leading up to the October 1, 2006 reassignment of most U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the Army, and discusses the implications of this action on the future of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs branch in support of both conventional and special operations forces (SOF). Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld made the decision to move the majority of the CA force and re-designate those CA forces that he moved as no longer SOF, over the objections of both his civilian and uniformed advisors. While Secretary Rumsfeld's decision was probably flawed in its conception, it certainly was flawed in its implementation. Unintended consequences included less than optimal CA support to both conventional forces and SOF, and a split in the CA branch between active and reserve component members. Given the recent rise in the importance of stability operations, relying significantly upon CA capabilities, this decision should be revisited by the current Secretary of Defense.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, defines CA as: “Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.” Civil Affairs operations are further defined as: “Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other governmental agencies to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for
deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other United States objectives.² The personnel that conduct CA operations for the U.S. Army are 96% U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and 4% active component. In 1987, all CA forces were assigned to USSOCOM, which was established under Title 10 U.S. Code, subsection 167, as a unified combatant command for SOF. CA was defined, in this law, as a SOF activity. No such responsibility was codified for conventional forces, even though each division and corps had CA personnel permanently assigned to their G9 staff section (Civil Military Operations), and each combat battalion and brigade had S-9 authorizations on their tables of organization and equipment.

The genesis for Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to split CA is found at the end of 2003. Phase 4 of U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) Operational Plan 1003V, Major Theater War – East (later named Operation Iraqi Freedom) was not going as well as hoped. In January, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld, intuitively decided that CA forces would better meet the requirements of the Army if they were removed from SOF, freeing USSOCOM, which had the lead in coordinating the Global War on Terror, to concentrate on finding and killing the enemy. His rationale for this decision was that maintenance of CA skill sets was a “distraction” for USSOCOM and that the regular Army should develop this capability, improving access at the same time.³ This assumption (that CA was not inherently SOF) ran counter to army and joint doctrine that CA is a core SOF competency, provided to support both SOF and conventional forces as units, and as staff augmentation. The Secretary eventually approved a plan that caused the CA force to split, with USAR CA forces supporting the regular Army (conventional forces) and active duty CA forces primarily supporting USSOCOM.
missions. Leadership of the Joint Staff, the Army, and USSOCOM all provided institutional resistance to this decision, delaying implementation of the final plan for nearly three years, but eventually splitting both the CA and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) branches along active and reserve lines. Had Secretary Rumsfeld simply directed that all CA forces be transferred to the Army, or listened to his staff and commanders and left CA under USSOCOM, conventional commanders fighting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq would have been better able to access CA forces and the greatly expanded active duty CA force would not have been used primarily for SOF missions as they are today. The execution of the decision was a flawed compromise.

In 2003, all U.S. Army CA units (except one CA brigade headquarters assigned to Pacific Command) were assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), a two-star command subordinate to U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and USSOCOM. In November, 2003, OIF was in its eighth month. Reserve component CA soldiers, involuntarily mobilized under partial mobilization (U.S. Code Title 10, section 12302), were nearing the end of their mobilization orders and would have to redeploy soon. USACAPOC had 5481 USAR and 207 active duty CA personnel assigned. Of those, 2559 CA Soldiers (47%) were deployed in support of USCENTCOM missions. While it was unknown how long the OEF and OIF missions would last, it was clear that the U.S. Army CA force would be unable to maintain current force levels for more than another year without a change in mobilization policy, or access to alternative sourcing.
By the beginning of 2004, neither OIF nor OEF had achieved the level of stability envisioned as the operational end state, indicating that military operations were going to take more time and require increased involvement in nation-building. In Afghanistan, US-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were being established in thirteen of the thirty-four Afghan provinces as a method to more effectively manage this interagency effort. The Afghan PRT model was based on a CA company of thirty-two U.S. Army personnel, augmented by interagency representatives, a security force, and leadership comprised of Department of State and military personnel. The PRT model was expected to be applied in Iraq, requiring additional CA companies in US-led PRTs envisioned for six of the fourteen Iraqi provinces. USCENTCOM conventional force commanders expected that USSOCOM would continue to provide at least the same level of CA support to brigades and divisions that they began OEF and OIF with. USSOCOM however, withheld its one active duty CA battalion for SOF use (in accordance with doctrine) and reduced its CA Soldiers deployed in support of OIF and OEF by more than 50% to 1195 personnel per rotation. Joint sourcing of these CA requirements was examined to meet the expectation of even more critical shortages beyond early 2005.

On January 12, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote the first of six short memos, referred to as “snowflakes,” on the subject of reassigning the CA force: “Let’s talk about whether or not all the Civil Affairs ought to be in SOF. I am inclined to think not.” This snowflake was addressed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Meyers, and was copied to Undersecretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz. Mr. Rumsfeld’s inquiry was presumably triggered by his concern
for the level of CA support to conventional forces in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, combined with his desire to see SOF concentrate more on finding and destroying the enemy than on strategies to prevent the growth of new adversaries. He seems to have answered his own question. Regardless, General Meyers consulted with the USSOCOM Commander, General Bryan ‘Doug’ Brown, who described the existing plan to increase the size of the active duty CA force from one battalion to a four-battalion brigade while expanding the USAR CA structure to meet the ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) model of CA support to brigade combat teams (BCTs). The rationale for the expansion (taken from the Army’s end strength and given to USSOCOM) was to better serve the conventional force while continuing to meet the SOF requirement for CA operations in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It is not known if General Meyers explained the USSOCOM plan to Mr. Rumsfeld before the deadline of January 21, 2004.

On March 2, 2004, Mr. Rumsfeld expanded on his first snowflake with a second: “My impression is that civil affairs was put in with Special Operations because it was different and Special Ops was different, which made sense. Probably also it was because the regular Army did not want it. It continues to be different from Special Ops, as well as being different from the regular Army. My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless. Furthermore, I don’t think there is anything lost by moving it out of Special Ops, and possibly something gained. Please think about it and get back to me.” If Mr. Rumsfeld heard the USSOCOM response to the first snowflake, he did not
accept the plan. This memo clearly indicated that CA was expected to play a central role in stabilization operations and that the Secretary believed that the regular Army had the lead in those operations, not SOF. A deadline of 26 March, 2004 was given to respond to this snowflake.

On April 27, 2004, in the midst of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse story being widely publicized, Mr. Rumsfeld sent a third snowflake expressing frustration over the issue of CA reassignment: “When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?” A response deadline was set for May 9, 2004. Apparently, the Secretary of Defense had not yet heard an acceptable plan to move CA under the Army.

On May 5, Secretary R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, wrote to Mr. Wolfowitz in response to the third snowflake. He outlined how the FY 06 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) planned to meet the Strategic Planning Guidance, and how the Army and USSOCOM were continuing to analyze “whether a force design change is warranted and whether additional CA resources will be needed.” The memo stated that USACAPOC could only source 52% of USCENTCOM requirements under current personnel mobilization policy and that the command was waiting on approval to utilize personnel from other U.S. Governmental agencies and coalition partners. It is likely that the language of this response did not satisfy Mr. Rumsfeld’s instinct to reassign CA, and probably raised his level of concern that his plan was being actively resisted. At the same time that this report was given to Mr. Wolfowitz, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Richard Cody, convened a ‘Tiger Team’ (analysis group) to study the USASOC ‘Way Ahead’ Plan. The team considered three courses of action:
keep USACAPOC under USSOCOM and complete transformation in Army Force Design Update (FDU) 08-13 to support Army modularity; reassign USACAPOC to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); and, split USACAPOC to support both SOF and conventional forces. The team recommended that USSOCOM complete transformation and retain USACAPOC. General Meyers wrote directly to Secretary Rumsfeld with another response to the third snowflake on September 13, 2004 (well after the 9 May deadline) reporting that the Army had completed its analysis and that he recommended that all CA and PSYOP (Psychological Operations) units remain assigned to USSOCOM. This recommendation, if seen, was likely viewed by Mr. Rumsfeld as further resistance to institutional change since it failed to bring any CA directly under the regular Army.

On October 29, 2004, a fourth snowflake was sent by Mr. Rumsfeld to General Meyers: “What is taking so long in deciding where Civil Affairs ought to be located? If they don’t agree I want it kicked up to me and I will figure it out. Let’s get moving.” This memo further demonstrated that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted CA moved to the regular Army and was unhappy at having to wait for a detailed plan. The inquiry suggested that he had not heard General Meyers’ answer to precisely that question six weeks previously. The deadline for response was set at November 5, 2004. On December 29, 2004 a U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) concept for assignment of CA forces was briefed by LTG Phillip Kensinger, USASOC Commander, to the USSOCOM Commander. The reassignment plan proposed that all of USACAPOC, minus its two active duty subordinate units (the 96th CA Battalion and the 4th PSYOP Group), be reassigned to the Army. This was the first time that PSYOP
was brought into the discussion at the DA and Joint Staff level, and was included because USSOCOM did not want to dissolve USACAPOC, which would have resulted if all USAR CA personnel were removed from USACAPOC. Additionally, the logic for having USAR CA units primarily support conventional units applied equally to USAR PSYOP units.

On March 7, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld sent a fifth CA snowflake, addressed to Mr. Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army:

It seems to me that it ought to be increasingly clear to all of us that the United States requires a 360 degree Army. Most battlefields of the future are unlikely to be solely linear in nature. Therefore, the idea that the Civil Affairs should be largely in the Reserves and/or in the Special Operations units strikes me as an anachronism (out of its proper time in history). I continue to believe that Civil Affairs should be rebalanced into the Active Force and moved from the Special Operations to the regular Army. I say this because of my conviction that the Army needs to develop greater skill sets in those areas, and that those particular skill sets are, at this stage, probably more of a distraction than a benefit to the increasing Special Operations roles and missions. I have been waiting impatiently for you folks to get back to me on this subject. Time is wasting. Please come back to me in 10 days with some options how this might be accomplished.\(^\text{16}\)

While it is unknown what response Secretary Harvey gave to Secretary Rumsfeld, USSOCOM was directed to finalize the reassignment plan. Through the summer and fall of 2005, USASOC developed a plan to transfer USACAPOC, minus its active duty units, to the Army. The plan was approved by USSOCOM and the Army on November 22, 2005.\(^\text{17}\) On December 20, 2005 the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) FY 2008-2013 directed USSOCOM to transfer all Army Reserve CA and PSYOP forces from USSOCOM to U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) however, JFCOM failed to take ownership of the transfer action causing further delay.\(^\text{18}\) With the action to transfer USACAPOC to the Army now in the PDM, USASOC and USARC finalized a
transfer plan and memorandum of agreement that conspicuously lacked any Joint Staff, Army or USSOCOM directive to implement. On May 26, 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld addressed his sixth and final CA snowflake to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker (copied to General Brown and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace): “I am confused about where the Active and Reserve components’ Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations people currently are located. Could someone please explain it to me?” This last snowflake on the topic highlighted an apparent lack of effective communication between the uniformed military leadership and the Secretary of Defense. Although USASOC and USARC signed their memorandum of agreement on May 31, 2006, it took an additional five months for General Schoomaker to publish General Order No. 12 officially reassigning USACAPOC from USSOCOM to USARC, effective October 1, 2006. Ironically, General Order 29 established Civil Affairs as a basic branch of the US Army, effective October 16, 2006, just two weeks after taking action to break the branch in two distinct parts. On November 3, 2006 funding for CA forces was moved to reflect the transfer in the FY 2008-2013 PDM, and on November 14, 2006, six days after Secretary Rumsfeld resigned, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, directed the transfer and re-designation of USACAPOC as no longer SOF. The Department of the Army followed up on March 1, 2007 with an execution order assigning USACAPOC to USARC, three years and two months after Secretary Rumsfeld decided that CA should be moved.

There are several implications to the CA branch split. Secretary Rumsfeld’s plan assumed that bringing CA under the Army would improve access to CA units for the conventional force. It had the opposite effect. Because the DA personnel policy was
changed to allow involuntary reutilization of USAR CA forces during the Global War on Terror, and because joint sourcing of CA requirements was approved, it wasn’t until the May 2006 ‘surge’ in Iraq that USACAPOC was unable to meet the USCENTCOM demand, allowing a test of the wisdom of the CA forces split. On short notice, the 95th CA Brigade deployed five companies in support of the five surge brigade combat teams (BCTs). However, the deployment of these active duty CA companies was for only ninety days, just long enough to give a USAR unit, the 360th CA Brigade, time to mobilize and deploy troops for the duration of the surge. While this short-duration surge is doctrinal for the active duty CA force, it was not conducive to uninterrupted support to BCTs engaged in combat, and reinforced the perception that SOF CA would only do the bare minimum needed to support the conventional force. Ironically, the policy changes, recommended by USASOC in 2005, that were discounted as unacceptable, ended up as the new Army personnel policy by 2006. When Multi-National Corps, Iraq (MNCI) requested an additional CA company from USSOCOM in 2007, it was told those forces would not be available for a considerable amount of time and USSOCOM has not provided any, to date. These two examples illustrate that USSOCOM seems to consider the requirements of the conventional force as secondary to its own needs, a cultural problem between SOF and conventional forces.

Secretary Rumsfeld also assumed that freeing USSOCOM from the conduct of CA operations would allow it to better focus on its other core competencies. USSOCOM never intended to give up CA. It not only maintained control over all active duty CA, but increased the size of its CA force by 500% (from one battalion to four battalions and a brigade headquarters), and currently plans to add a second brigade.
None of that greatly expanded active duty CA capability will normally be used to support the conventional force, even though the reason that the Army provided the personnel positions to create the 95th CA Brigade was to ensure that it could call on that force when it was needed, and not for just 90 days. The reality is that the conventional force is not given free access to the active duty USSOCOM CA force. The resulting lack of access is directly contrary to Secretary Rumsfeld’s intent in directing the transfer.

Another cultural problem increased by the split is the divide between USAR and active duty CA Soldiers. The transfer decision immediately exacerbated the already present cultural bias against the USAR SOF that was always present in USASOC and created a significantly wider rift between the two components of the branch that will expand over time, unless action is taken to reverse it. Morale of the USAR members of the branch was adversely affected with many USAR Soldiers believing that USASOC and USSOCOM only looked after the active duty personnel in a desire to ‘get rid of the Reserves’ and leave them to perform the majority of the CA operations in support of OIF and OEF by themselves. The terms ‘CAPOC-alyse’ and ‘divorce’ were applied to the action. The USASOC commander partially succeeded in resisting the organizational change directed by Secretary Rumsfeld by sacrificing the structure he felt he was best able to afford, while retaining all programmed growth in the active duty force. The USASOC Commander saw the opportunity to end the threat to active duty CA and PSYOP by sacrificing all USAR SOF units. There were staff members at USASOC and USSOCOM that took the position that transferring the USAR SOF units would be a welcome method by which to reduce the requirement to support conventional forces and rid the command of the challenge of managing USAR units with their separate
funding requirements and the historical problems of keeping a reserve component command combat ready. This transfer action is akin to directing that only active duty medical personnel can provide medical care to active duty Soldiers, with reserve component Soldiers supported by only reserve component medical personnel. Such a split of responsibilities along active duty/reserve component lines runs contrary to the ‘One Army’ concept.

CA unit funding is another area with several unintended consequences. Under USSOCOM, USACAPOC received a significant portion of its funding through Supplemental Requests that captured incremental Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) requirements directly associated with Title 10 SOF activities (including CA) under the operational control of different Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). Now, if USACAPOC determines that there is a need for a new, non-standard, piece of equipment, it must either request that USSOCOM consider the non-standard equipment for use by its active duty CA units and spend USSOCOM funds (at which point it can request that the Army allocate funds to allow it to be included in the purchase), or compete with the rest of the Army (as one of its smallest branches and without proponency within the Army) for funding to modernize and maintain its capability. The Army tends to assume that all CA is funded through MFP11, since the active duty units are, and are disinclined to fund USAR CA requests since proponency resides in USSOCOM. With no single stream of modernization money, USACAPOC is relegated to trying to convince the Army to convert SOF-specific funded equipment to army common equipment with little hope of success in an era of shrinking budgets. FY 2008 funding was drastically reduced for USACAPOC from FY 2007 by 31.5% in Reserve
Personnel, Army (RPA) dollars, and 38% in Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) dollars while the operational requirements increased by 38%, representing 25.9% of all USAR personnel deployed to IOF/OEF and the Horn of Africa. The reduction in funding for the majority of the CA branch, at the same time that requirements are increasing, does not improve the branch’s ability to support the Army.

CA branch proponency was retained by USASOC after the split, even though the vast majority of the branch was transferred to the Army. At the time of the transfer, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) showed no interest in obtaining proponency and the matter was uncontested by the Army. USACAPOC now must attempt to make any changes to doctrine or force structure through a complicated network of coordination lines. Ultimately, any requested changes must be vetted through USARC, Army, JFCOM, USSOCOM, USASOC to the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). This level of bureaucratic encumbrance ensures a lack of responsiveness. The new chain of command automatically creates inefficiency in training and equipping the CA branch (unless those changes are biased in favor of the active duty/SOF portion of the branch), slowing the branch’s ability to adapt to changing roles and missions. As an example, the now-conventional CA force wanted to tailor branch qualification training to the part-time nature of the reserve component by maximizing distance learning and reducing resident schooling. At the same time, USASOC extended the branch qualification course length from four to nine weeks, greatly slowing the training pipeline. This proponent-led change in the training requirements created a funding and accessibility
problem for USACAPOC that was temporarily mitigated only by using a mobilization training schedule that maintained student throughput in support of OIF and OEF. A long-term solution remains to be found for maximizing throughput in support of the conventional force, while improving the quality of training, as directed by the proponent.

‘In-lieu of’ individual augmentees from the Navy and Air Force, and rapidly retrained personnel from other branches of the Army Reserve were increasingly the norm in filling USCENTCOM CA requirements from 2004 through 2008. While these units (sometimes 95% filled from non-standard sources) were often not as effective as they could be, they got the job done, and sometimes performed better than normally assigned and trained CA personnel. Prior to the split, USSOCOM consistently violated three of its four of SOF truths (Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; Quality is better than Quantity; Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur) for much of the duration of OEF/OIF. It remains to be seen whether a CA branch, reintegrated under USSOCOM, can correct this doctrinal deviation.

Frustrated in its desire to more effectively manage stability and reconstruction operations, and recognizing that these operations require an interagency solution, the United States government began a multi-faceted approach to increase the capability that it traditionally left to Army CA. The Department of State (DoS) has begun to establish a Civilian Response Corps with a 100-person ‘active’ membership and 500-person ‘standby’ membership (both groups are double-slotted in other DoS positions), and a 2000-person ‘Civilian Reserve Corps’ made up of non-federal government personnel with private business or government expertise. The State Department
webpage states that the Civilian Response Corps will “allow the military to focus on its core responsibilities, with the assurance that civilian experts will be available to address critical reconstruction and stabilization tasks.”\textsuperscript{25} It can be argued that reconstruction and stabilization are primary tasks for the military, now more than ever given the recent publication of US Army Field Manual 3.0, Stability Operations.\textsuperscript{26} The 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) reinforces the role of the military in these areas by listing ‘relief and reconstruction’ as one of the four basic military activities, while it stresses a ‘whole of government’ approach.\textsuperscript{27} The establishment of this DoS capability seems, on its face, to be a duplication of the functional specialties cells found in USAR CA battalions, brigades and CA Commands. These functional specialty cells are comprised of a: Public Health and Welfare Section; Rule of Law Section; Infrastructure Section; Governance Section; Economic Stability Section; Public Education and Information Section, but in reality these sections are seldom filled with personnel verifiably competent in an appropriate civilian-acquired skill. Accordingly, the institutionalization of DoS capability in a Civilian Response Corps can be an asset to both conventional and SOF commanders.

There are several possible solutions for the problems caused by the transfer of USACAPOC to the Army. The first is to maintain the status quo. This is not recommended since it perpetuates the current condition of a “broken” CA branch. A second solution is for the Joint Staff to direct that the Army assume CA proponency and reassign the 95\textsuperscript{th} CA Brigade to the Army. Any new CA force structure increases would fall under the Army and it would be useful to create a structure, such as the Civil Affairs Division utilized during World War II, in order to properly advocate for, and manage the
branch. USSOCOM would request the use of Army CA capabilities through JFCOM. This solution assumes that the logic used by Secretary Rumsfeld was sound and simply completes the action that he tried, but failed, to complete. Changing proponency, establishing a ‘Center of Excellence’ schoolhouse, and assignment of the 95th CA Brigade, are the most complex aspects of this course of action. A third solution is to reassign USACAPOC back to USASOC, change the doctrine that directs active duty CA capability to support only SOF, and correct how JFCOM apportions CA capabilities against conventional force requirements. This solution would be easiest to accomplish, since USACAPOC funding requirements are known, and the action would not require realignment of proponency structure. Although this solution reverses Secretary Rumsfeld’s action, it does address the underlying cause for the action: insufficient responsiveness to conventional force requirements.

In conclusion, Secretary Rumsfeld’s decision to split the CA capability of the U.S. Army along the lines of active duty and USAR was an example of a senior leader decision that failed to adequately address the underlying issue (conventional force access to CA), and was made over the objections of the organizations most impacted and senior leaders (to include the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of USSOCOM). The compromise split reduced the ability of the CA branch to meet the needs of the conventional force by transferring a “broken” reserve organization, producing the opposite of the intended result. The conventional force is now unable to rapidly employ CA forces: active duty because they will not support conventional forces for any useful amount of time; and USAR CA forces because they cannot sustain the required level of
operations tempo. Additionally, the Army does not fully control the training or equipping of CA since much of that process was retained by USSOCOM. This top-down edict by Secretary Rumsfeld did not seem to recognize the programmed active duty CA growth by USSOCOM would be of no value to the conventional force.

Neither the Army, nor USSOCOM have any specific plans to request that USACAPOC be reassigned to USASOC, although USSOCOM unsuccessfully asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the command be designated as DoD/Joint proponent for CA. Any effective action to fix the current situation with USACAPOC will have to come from the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, The White House, or Congress. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 required that the Office of the Secretary of Defense report to Congress by April 1, 2009 on a study of Civil Affairs because the “committee believes the ultimate effects of these steps [i.e. dividing active and reserve CA units between special and general purpose forces] remains unclear.” When delivered, that report will address Department of Defense CA policy, doctrine, training and structure. This congressional initiative is the best opportunity for the errors in the decision made by Secretary Rumsfeld in 2003 to be corrected. The underlying questions regarding the decision to split the CA force are: whether the conventional force needed this realignment in order to better serve its operational requirements; whether the splitting of CA forces between special operations forces and conventional forces was a sensible solution to this perceived problem; and, whether this solution best met the needs of the United States military to conduct CA missions. The answer to all three of those questions is “no.” Clearly, national emphasis is finally being placed on a whole of government, coordinated effort to conduct stability and reconstruction
operations, as well as using those same capabilities in engagement and security operations. Now is the time to reintegrate the CA branch, reuniting the USAR and active duty CA units, before the widening gulf between them becomes too hard to bridge. The Army requires a competent, motivated and well-trained CA branch that is not fractured and working at cross-purposes. The most important step in achieving that end is for DoD to direct that the CA branch be immediately reunited.

Endnotes


2 Ibid., 1-1.


5 Ibid.


11 Ibid.
12 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Richard A. Cody, “Results of the G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT),” memorandum for USASOC Commanding General, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Washington, DC, August 26, 2004.


17 U.S. Army Special Operations Command Chief of Staff Colonel Andrew N. Milani, “Executive Summary – USSOCOM Brief to Chief of Staff of the Army,” Fort Bragg, NC, November 22, 2005.

18 Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) III, Washington, DC, December 20, 2005. This PDM directed the transfer of USAR CA and PSYOP personnel, equipment, units, and funding from USSOCOM to the Army.


21 Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders No. 29, “Establishment of the Civil Affairs Branch,” Washington, DC, January 12, 2007. The CA branch is a non-accession branch, meaning that is does not have an officer basic course or Captain’s Career Course, although it does have an Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for initial enlisted training.

22 Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Gordon England, “Reassignment and Designation of Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces,” memorandum for Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, Washington, DC, November 14, 2006.
Department of the Army Execution Order: USAR Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces Transfer from the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), Washington, DC, March 1, 2007.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Michael G. Mullen, “USSOCOM as the DOD/Joint Proponent for Civil Affairs (CA),” memorandum for Admiral William Owens, Washington, DC, November 17, 2008.