ACQUISITION CROSS-SERVICING AND MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN THE PACIFIC

BY

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Acquisition Cross-Servicing and Mutual Logistics Support in the Pacific

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Abstract:
Are existing Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSA) in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) sufficient to support operations in future? The basic parameters of this problem require a definition of both ACSA and MLSA, a review of standing PACOM agreements, and analysis of anticipated requirements in the future, closing with an identification of shortfalls and possible solutions. This project outlines the current logistics capabilities and provides recommendations regarding logistical support of the future, joint force in the PACOM AOR.
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Are existing Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSA) in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) sufficient to support operations in future? The basic parameters of this problem require a definition of both ACSA and MLSA, a review of standing PACOM agreements, and analysis of anticipated requirements in the future, closing with an identification of shortfalls and possible solutions. This project outlines the current logistics capabilities and provides recommendations regarding logistical support of the future, joint force in the PACOM AOR.
ACQUISITION CROSS-SERVICING AND MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN THE PACIFIC

In order for the United States military to be as agile and responsive as possible, the methods and systems by which we acquire logistics and supply our Airmen, Marines, Sailors and Soldiers must be equally responsive. The traditional systems and methods of supply and sustainment are often time consuming, bureaucratic, and costly. Traditional methods are often redundant and duplicitous across the services and across the capabilities of our friends and allies. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) and mutual logistics support agreements (MLSA) can provide a partial solution, especially for the future in United States Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. These agreements and similar arrangements can provide an easily activated, pre-programmed method to acquire goods and/or services from other countries on a reciprocal basis. The Navy’s need for support while underway has long been addressed by standing support agreements, yet the Department of Defense, and the other services are now just seeing the value of these types of agreements. The ACSA and MLSA agreements are true enablers for the military forces of today. Agility and responsiveness are enhanced during training exercises, such as Bright Star in Egypt, real world contingency operations, and humanitarian relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster. True responsiveness to the combat commander has long been identified as an essential component of the logistics strategy for coalition support during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The use of ACSAs and MLSAs has grown; they are key to ensuring our warfighting commanders have the logistical support needed, while simultaneously reducing redundancy, stockpiling, and limiting the vulnerability of
our logistical lines of communication. By identifying procedures for cooperative logistic support and capabilities, acceleration of support agreements is assured, and logistical lines of communication are shortened, thus making them less vulnerable. Agreements such as ACSAs and MLSAs not only provide shortfall logistic support, but also enhance U.S. force effectiveness when engaged in operations as part of an alliance or coalition. ACSAs are bilateral agreements for the reimbursable mutual exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services. These agreements are intended to provide an alternative acquisition option for logistics support by providing the authority to acquire logistic support, internationally, without resorting to commercial contracting procedures.

At the strategic level, these agreements for cooperative support provide for timely, flexible, and efficient logistics. Since the agreements are cooperative in nature, they strengthen the ties between countries, and further the goals of the National Security Strategy. The existence of an ACSA or a MLSA does not bind either the U.S. or the partner nation to conduct logistical transactions within the constraints of the agreements, but it does enhance the ability of “on the fly” planning for a time critical mission and establish another bridge to friends and allies. Links to increased operational effectiveness and flexible support to the warfighter enhance the criticality of these agreements at the strategic level of planning and execution. International cooperation acquired through ACSAs and MLSAs offer the opportunity to achieve cost savings while enhancing interoperability with allied and coalition partners and provides the basic framework for cooperation across the military support spectrum.
Background

This strategy research project explores the definitions of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) and mutual logistics support agreements (MLSA), discusses the differences in these agreements, and reviews standing agreements and arrangements. The paper concludes by seeking to define logistical agreement and/or arrangement requirements in the future and identifies the continued need for existing ACSA and MLSA specific to the Pacific Area of Responsibility.

Are existing ACSA and MLSA in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) sufficient to support operations in future? The basic parameters of this problem require an understanding of logistics support. Additionally the language, methods, and means required to support the warfighter with on time, on target support, regardless of location must be defined. The evolution of ACSA and MLSA agreements in the Pacific area of responsibility finds its roots in Europe of the 1980s and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) logistics planning and standing agreements. The ACSA program was initiated in response to the NATO nations’ request to simplify the bureaucratic paperwork drill used to procure and fund training and supplies amongst member nations. In the early 1980s, Congress passed legislation enabling the U.S. military to enter into agreements with European/NATO member militaries for cooperative logistics support. Common support elements included life and combat support items like rations, petroleum, and common ammunition. Military airlift, sealift, and other forms of transportation services may also be acquired and transferred under the authorities and permissions of an ACSA. Legislative changes in the early 1990s removed the “Europe only” provision and the program grew. Currently, 12 ACSAs exist in the Pacific AOR and 6 are pending, some are with countries which range from
longtime cooperative partners like Australia and Japan to newer agreements with Sri Lanka and Tonga, while the opportunity to negotiate with other nations is growing.

The definitions of Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSA) have proven problematic. MLSA is not listed in Joint Publication 4-0, *Joint Logistics*; the “keystone document” which provides “doctrine for logistic support of joint and multinational (allied and coalition) operations.” Globalsecurity.org defines ACSAs as agreements which are negotiated on a bilateral basis with allies or coalition partners to allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. These agreements, as negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners, allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Generally, authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected or supported by national means in a timely manner. The support received or provided is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. ACSAs reduce logistics burdens and are considered “critical logistics enablers” by providing commanders increased interoperability, enhanced operational readiness, and cost effective mutual support. By allowing commanders the means to both acquire and/or provide mutual support during training, exercises, and military operations, or to provide expedited access to logistics assets of other armed forces to
satisfy the logistics support requirements of United States forces, logistic capabilities are enhanced across the spectrum. ACSAs can be multilayered and complex with many country specific exceptions. Implementing Arrangements (IA) are subsets of ACSAs. They are the supplementary arrangements for logistics support, supplies, or services that prescribe details, terms, and conditions to implement cross-servicing agreements effectively. While implementing arrangements may normally be more detailed in terms of defined levels of activities than cross-servicing agreements themselves, IAs must be completely consistent with associated cross-servicing agreements and supporting directives. Depending on the nature of the transaction, an implementing arrangement may involve the obligation of funds or specify the particular method of reimbursement.

Mutual logistics support is defined as assistance between two or more nations in the transfer, exchange, loan, or lease of logistics support, including contractor support. It is an important enabler which reduces support redundancies and fills capability gaps. MLSA, with “A” standing for “arrangement” vice “agreement” in the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide, is defined “as the process which provides a framework for the exchange of logistics support between nations. According to the guide, these arrangements can be either generic documents which cover multiple commodities for a series of years or an “emergent” document drafted for a specific operation or exercise. MLSAs make available the use of host nation resources to support day-to-day operations and future operational requirements.
Doctrine

Joint doctrine espouses the concept of “focused logistics” and the responsibility of the logistician to deliver “sustained logistic readiness for the combatant commander”\textsuperscript{7}. Focused logistics encourages new processes, yet by using older methods and systems which include ACSAs and MLSAs, and fusing the information and knowledge of technology and interoperability, this “focused logistics” can provide quick, timely, and well thought out logistical capabilities. Just as agreements and arrangements seek to fill the gaps and reduce redundancy, focused logistics draws from the core competencies of all services, defense agencies and our allied and coalition partners. As part of the joint doctrine concept of focused logistics, multinational logistics provides its own challenges and solutions. Mutual logistics support relationships between allies and coalition partners play an important role in most military operations. It is essential that planners capitalize on the resources, processes, and capabilities in order to best support the warfighter and ensure effective support of combatant commander requirements.\textsuperscript{8} Focused logistics supports the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review which stresses an increased focus on developing a global military force which relies more on mobile expeditionary and deployable forces versus those on/at static fixed bases. The United States Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) states five goals, three of which are directly affected by logistics and multinational operations. The three goals are: to develop rapidly deployable capabilities – not fight where based; focus on capabilities not numbers – what capabilities does the U.S. bring to the fight and what gaps need to be met by allied and coalition partners; and strengthen allied roles – better manage U.S. agreements and alliances – especially in Asia. The most important of these is the last goal. From a logistics perspective, by increasing interoperability and
reducing capability redundancy, U.S., allied, and coalition forces will have higher levels of cooperation and provide greater depth in support. In shrinking logistics footprints and reducing overall numbers and costs of a U.S. presence, end results will be reduced stresses, frictions, and irritations for forward-based troops in both forward operating sites and/or cooperative security locations (CSL). Through the continued use of ACSAs and MLSAs, United States Pacific Command can leverage access and logistics agreements and create a network of well supported CSLs in the region. Finally, through modernization and transformation of both U.S. and partner forces, new doctrines, strategies, and logistics capabilities will better support the warfighter.

Mutual support agreements, as defined in JP 4-08, are a broad class of agreements developed by a multinational force commander or international organization and agreed upon by nations. The use of pre-negotiated agreements can facilitate logistics support. Mutual support concepts such as Role Specialist Nation for specific classes of support and the designation for Lead Nation to provide support on a geographical basis play a critical role in determining the best way to support the warfighter. ACSAs and MLSAs often take into consideration traditional lead nation responsibilities and capabilities. It must be noted that an alliance or coalition negotiated mutual support agreement does not generally provide the appropriate legal authority/legitimacy for exchanging support with multinational partners. Specific and additional agreements such as an ACSA may be required to fully implement and codify agreements for mutual support. ACSAs can and should be used for preplanned logistic support activities. Another consideration when using ACSA and MLSA agreements is to note that legislation explicitly prohibits Department of Defense (DOD) from using these
agreements to increase U.S. inventories in anticipation of allied and coalition needs. Routine partner requirements for replacement parts and maintenance support should be met through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Transformation

As the U.S. DOD force structure transforms and shifts from forward-based to a Continental United States (CONUS)-based, the need to provide timely and flexible logistic support grows. As forward presence decreases, allied and coalition support requirements increase. Negotiating additional ACSAs will enhance operational readiness, increase interoperability, and reduce the logistics footprint, especially in support of operations in the PACOM AOR. ACSAs also provide access to basing and infrastructure necessary for force projection and support of humanitarian and contingency operations. Current logistics strategy and policies are being redefined. The basic requirement of delivering commodities to the warfighter will not change; correctly using ACSAs and MLSAs will ensure required support is available and flexible. By leveraging allied and coalition capabilities, logisticians can provide improved support, reduce redundancies, and streamline operations. ACSAs and MLSAs can effectively manage the acquisition of resources, thus allowing supporting operations to be truly a joint logistics multiplier. As JP 4-0 directs the Services to transform logistics operations, the combatant commander, through his Theater Concept of Logistics Support, can contribute to the entire Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).

The United States Pacific Command, (USPACOM) Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners. The plan integrates security assistance,
military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country, whether ally, partner, or cooperating state. These security cooperation activities are essential to the success of U.S. national security strategy. This is the first step in assuring access to much needed logistical support.

Admiral Keating, Commander, United States Pacific Command, in his April 2007 testimony to Congress stated that his TSCP was the “primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners.” By building the military – military relationships between nations, and by advancing bilateral logistics agreements, combatant commanders can establish enduring relationships which will provide the logistics required for changing operational concepts and structures of the transforming force.

USPACOM forces continue to be called on to execute a full-range of military missions. Security and stability in the region depend on USPACOM’s readiness to dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat any adversary who chooses to operate on the high end of the spectrum of conflict. USPACOM will continue to posture forces forward, backed up by ready and agile forces in the continental U.S. Although Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets must be sufficient to maintain situational awareness, logistics will remain a key to long term success in this AOR. Maritime, air, and ground forces must have the logistics capability and capacity to prevail, and these capacities can be met primarily through ACSA and MLSA across and throughout the Pacific AOR. In a warfighting environment, in which potential adversaries are rapidly closing the capability gap, ensuring the survivability of our
logistics support base is becoming increasingly critical in a today’s battle space. U.S. force presence and posture in Japan, Korea, and across the Asia-Pacific AOR have long been a guarantor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. USPACOM will continue to position forces in theater to optimize agility and flexibility, ensure rapid response to crises, and provide the force presence that both assures allies and partners and dissuades and deters threats to security. USPACOM remains a ready, present, and flexible force supported by numerous logistical support agreements and arrangements. Current logistics agreements which support this force in the Pacific include those with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore. Additionally agreements with organizations can also facilitate support requests during emergency or time sensitive operations. Agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are two sources of additional leveraging partners. In the Pacific, ACSAs will continue to enhance interoperability and readiness, and provide a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support between U.S. and allied or partner military forces. ACSAs have been particularly helpful in the conduct of War on Terror (WOT) operations. For example, PACOM forces made extensive use of the current agreement with the Republic of the Philippines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines operations against terrorist cells in that country. As noted earlier, USPACOM has 12 ACSAs in place. An agreement with Sri Lanka was signed in March 2007 and both the Philippines and Tonga renewed their ACSAs during 2007. Additionally, logistics planners are negotiating an agreement with Indonesia and hope to maximize interest by Timor-Leste and Brunei. Admiral Keating, in his March 2008 presentation to Congress,
included the following to emphasize and highlight the need for support agreements in the Pacific region. “We view these agreements as vital in maximizing our interoperability and helping increase the readiness of coalition partners in the Pacific region.”

**Historical Background in the Pacific AOR**

The concepts and idea of cross serving agreements and mutual logistic support for the United States Armed Forces date back to the first partnerships of Revolutionary militias and the French. The methods of mutual support and the ability for compensation have evolved. Agreements such as ACSAs and MLSAs can have both a beneficial and a detrimental effect on relations between the United States and partner nations. USPACOM’s traditional allies and partners, as well as emerging partners, are willing to help set conditions for security and stability and work together for the common good of the people of the Asia-Pacific. This is seen in the emerging agreements amongst the countries of the Pacific Rim. Deployed forces benefit when utilizing these agreements to conduct business as well as enter into contractual agreements with commercial firms. However, shortcomings have been identified when using ACSAs and MLSAs. These included the ways in which the support is documented through agreements and memorandums of understanding, the extent to which processes are understood and exercised, and the level of expectations about what nations and organizations can and will provide. Some international logistics experts indicate these issues were, in large measure, due to the complexity and scale of the U.S. logistics enterprise (many organizations and their associated rules of engagement) and the difficulties for allied nations and other coalition partners to understand how to best work
within the legal confines of these agreements.\textsuperscript{14} It is important to note that despite multiple acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and implementing arrangements, Commander, Joint Logistics Australia observed that there are dangers inherent in planning staffs overestimating the ability of the United States to provide the depth and breadth of logistics support desired by Australia and other coalition partners, especially for commodities in high demand.\textsuperscript{15} Historic examples of ACSA in the Pacific region include petroleum and lodging support from the Kingdom of Thailand to support United States forces during the long standing, annual Cobra Gold Exercise. For this exchange the U.S. often pays cash for the support received. The Australians received riot control gear from the United States on a “replacement in kind” basis in preparation for the Sidney Olympics in 2000. The United States provided rations to the French Navy during Tsunami relief operations in 2004 and the United States was reimbursed by a cash payment. Additionally, on a cash reimbursement plan, the United Kingdom received cots, bedding, and tentage during relief operations for the Montserrat volcano evacuation in 1997. On a “replacement in kind” reimbursement plan, the United States provided firefighting equipment to Malaysia troops in support of operations in Indonesia fire fighting in August, 2005. USPACOM and Special Operations Command Pacific/Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (SOCPAC/JSOTF-P) made extensive use of the current agreement with the Republic of the Philippines to support operations against terrorist cells in the Philippines, providing cost effective supplies and services. Some of the specific benefits Naval ACSAs provide U.S. military forces in India include logistics support in the form of supplies, petroleum, and transportation. Base operations support and the use of repair and maintenance facilities have allowed
U.S. access to Indian airfields and ports. In addition to host nation supplies and services, ACSAs can give the U.S. access to basing and infrastructure necessary for force projection.

Logistics and sustainment operations in the Pacific, on a multinational basis, were first codified by PASOLS, the Pacific Army Senior Officer Logistics Seminar. PASOLS seeks to facilitate logistics activities among member nations. It does this through the sharing of logistics developments, member nation logistic activities, regional-wide logistic initiatives and cooperative logistics. The Pacific Area Cooperative Acquisition and Logistics System (PACALS) is the most important “value added” information sharing program coordinated by PASOLS. This list of potential areas of logistics cooperation can aid in achieving cost savings and information sharing through a cooperative approach to national resources. PACALS is an “unofficial” ACSA list of commodities aimed to reduce redundancies and cover the sustainment gaps in the region. PASOLS is an evolving organization with 23 members and coupled with existing ACSAs and MLSAs in the Pacific Area of Operations can often provide for the transforming sustainment needs of the United States Pacific Command. In PASOLS, the most common and accepted reciprocal logistics support arrangement is a MLSA. As discussed earlier, the MLSA is a legal framework under which participating nations agree to the basic terms, conditions, and procedures where by member nations provide logistics support to each other. Within the PASOLS framework, MLSAs may not always apply to a specific operation or circumstance, but can contain the details necessary to process logistic support requests from initiation through payment. Mutual logistics support provided under the MLSA banner is generally organic in nature, that is to say,
not provided through a contracted source. PASOLS asserts that MLSAs do not present any real risk, either political or operational, to participating nations. As seen in ACSAs, MLSAs are non-binding. Participating nations are not obliged or obligated to provide any logistic support requested, although the expectation is that best efforts are made to honor the request.

In the Pacific

With the role of the United States growing more visible and prominent in the Pacific region, the importance of USPACOM’s force sustainment plans and procedures is crucial. The region is home to five United States treaties and one-third of the world’s population. The growing United States interests in the region are based on the National Security Strategy. The ability to support and sustain forward projecting forces can be addressed through the ACSA and MLSA program. By establishing relationships and negotiating agreements with regional nations and organizations, and through the identification of logistic infrastructures, capabilities, and procedures, USPACOM will be better poised to support forward operating forces. These agreements and relationships must be consistent with existing operational plans and treaties/alliances. While simultaneously providing commanders the flexibility of logistical support, both in peace or combat operations, interoperability and cooperation are enhanced. The ability to request logistic support, supplies, and services from allies and coalition partners through a rapid ordering process creates a mutually beneficial situation while providing timely, flexible, and critical assistance. Since it is a two way agreement, USPACOM and their partners in the Pacific area of responsibility, share both the responsibility and benefits of ACSAs and MLSAs. Access to logistic support networks throughout a
geographical region, and at times throughout the world, increase the combat commanders “tooth–to–tail” ratio. By increasing the number of “warfighters” while decreasing the number of logisticians, commanders gain flexibility, a reduced support footprint, and increased military–to–military contacts with partner nations. The bottom line is that it provides strategic engagement and improves theater security cooperation as part of the theater security cooperation plan. At the strategic level, it is very clear for the need to use national resources efficiently and effectively.¹⁸ The logistical enablers at both the strategic and operational level must be husbanded. “Operationalizing” resources through bilateral logistic support agreements translates into building a logistics base for partner forces. “Burden sharing” is often another common term when discussing logistics support and services. ACSAs and MLSAs share the costs and burdens of logistics. This sharing results in efficiencies and reduction of the logistics footprint. Burden sharing leads to a common operating picture and start point, and provides the commander with a unified, multinational perspective. This perspective translates easily into the unity of command and effort required on the battlefield. Unity of command and unity of effort have long been touted as the “principles” of war, yet “unity of support” is equally as critical to strategic successes. Early planning, in the form of agreements such as standing ACSAs and MLSAs, ensures the maximizing of logistics cooperation and facilitates interoperability and mission success.

Some nations in the Pacific view these agreements as a part of the continued “imperialist” and “exploitative” nature of the United States. Some opposition groups voice concerns that ACSAs also refer to the mandatory exchange of troops and/or military equipment. The Republic of the Philippines is one such nation whose very
vocal opposition repeatedly seeks to have alliances, treaties, and agreements dissolved on a regular basis. To counter such opposition, many nations have begun a “pro agreement” campaign. Since ACSA programs do not permit a forward, permanent presence of United States troops in the partner country, many allies and friends continue to highlight the value added by these agreements. Since it is not a basing or access agreement, United States forces are not a permanent, visible presence within allied or partner boarders. ACSAs do not compel partner nations to support the United States, join a U.S. led coalition, or make an alliance. There are no requirements to commit troops or in any way participate in ongoing operations. In fact, both parties have the right of declination.¹⁹

**Recommendations**

The continued use of ACSAs and MLSAs in the PACOM AOR is critical for effective and efficient logistical support. With the advent of the ACSA Global Automated Tracking and Reporting System (AGATRS), and the visibility it gives the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and service components into the ACSA program, capability gaps and logistics shortfalls will be mitigated. This web based tool helps manage ACSA agreements and provides a knowledge management capability and data base of existing agreements worldwide. This program helps with logistics visibility and gives logistics professionals a tool to leverage standing ACSAs for the exchange of supplies and services with allied and coalition partners. The exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services allows partner nations and the United States to reduce logistical footprints and redundancies across the support and services spectrum. The rising role and globalization of the nations of the Pacific, coupled with the criticality of the region on
the stability and security of both the world and the United States, highlight the true importance for the forces of United States Pacific Command to have all the needed support and supplies in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. Match the growing global role of the nations of the Pacific with the continuing uncertainty in the area and the need for allies and partners to assure sustainability of forces, and the need for logistics agreements is clear. Current ACSAs and MLSAs encourage burden sharing among nations and will support the needs of the U.S. forces in the Pacific region. The needs for sustaining forces will grow, and the existing agreements, though sufficient, will need to be renewed and expanded. Key shortages may surface in the commodities of liquid logistics, petroleum and potable water. United States Pacific Command logistics planners must continue to examine support structures and capabilities both domestic and allied. With careful strategic planning and a decrease in petroleum use across the force spectrum, there should be sufficient resources to maintain adequate support. By placing more attention on allied and partner needs and allocating resources to foster interoperability, the combatant commander will grow the capabilities he needs for the future. Strategic, future-focused, logistics planning will enable required support for the force structure in the Pacific, reduce logistic footprints, and continue to meet commitments and support security requirements. Through close consultation, cooperation, and coordination with allies and regional partners, U.S. strategic reach and access will be assured. Access to the critical regions and nations of the Pacific Rim will be the cornerstone to logistics, support, and services needed by all forces and an effective strategic policy for the Asia-Pacific region.
Conclusion

This paper articulates the criticality of ACSAs and MLSAs in the Pacific region and provides a strategic view of their need in the future. In an attempt to understand the variations and manifestations of these support agreements, a review of the definition, doctrine, practice and polices were highlighted. The inclusion of support agreements during the execution of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, allows the combatant commander to build, during peace, what is critical during war. It also builds interoperability and cooperation skills and relationships which will facilitate flexible and timely logistics support when time is of a criticality. Employment of support and services under an ACSA or MLSA benefits both nations involved in the agreement by decreasing the need for large, standing inventories and support and service providers. Increased material availability and decreased wait times continue to prove these support agreements provide the combatant commander and his force the needed supplies and services. The benefits for the Pacific far outweigh any negatives; for partner and allied nations, the gains in interoperability and good will are immense. Added benefits for the United States Pacific Command are the employment of cooperative agreements while supporting the Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the security strategy. In order for the United States military, and the land, sea, and air forces of the United States Pacific Command, to be as agile and responsive as possible, the methods and systems by which we acquire logistics and supply our Airmen, Marines, Sailors and Soldiers must be equally responsive. The systems and methods of supply and sustainment, when integrated and supplemented by ACSAs and MLSAs, decrease wait time and increase sustainment capabilities. By overcoming the traditional time consuming, bureaucratic, and costly methods of singular nation support, nations in the Pacific, especially the
United States, can be as flexible and responsive as required and dictated by our strategic needs. Through a reduction of duplicated and redundant services and supplies resident in the military services and across the capabilities of our friends and allies, logistic planners can maximize support to the commander. These agreements and similar arrangements provide an easily activated program for acquiring goods and/or services from other countries and organizations on a reciprocal basis. Couple this logistics support framework with AGATRS, and the visibility it gives the combatant commands and service components, collectively will lessen capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. At the strategic level, these agreements for cooperative support provide for timely, flexible, and efficient logistics. Being cooperative in nature, they strengthen the ties between countries, and further the goals of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 23.


6 Ibid., B-5.

7 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics, Joint Publication 4-0*, I-1.

8 Ibid., III-1.


15 Ibid.


