TRANSFORMING THE USARNG: CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARFORGEN MODEL

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

| 1. REPORT DATE   | 30 MAR 2009 |
| 2. REPORT TYPE   |             |
| 3. DATES COVERED |             |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE | Transforming the USARNG: Challenges in Implementing the ARFORGEN Model |
| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER |             |
| 5b. GRANT NUMBER |             |
| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER |             |
| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER |             |
| 5e. TASK NUMBER |             |
| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER |             |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) | Michael Woods |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220 |
| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |             |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) |             |
| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) |             |
| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) |             |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | Approved for public release; distribution unlimited |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES |             |
| 14. ABSTRACT | see attached |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS |             |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: |             |
| a. REPORT | unclassified |
| b. ABSTRACT | unclassified |
| c. THIS PAGE | unclassified |
| 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT |             |
| 18. NUMBER OF PAGES | 44 |
| 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |             |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
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Transforming the USARNG: Challenges in Implementing the ARFORGEN Model

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Michael J. Woods

TITLE: Transforming the USARNG: Challenges in Implementing the ARFORGEN Model

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 3 February 2009 WORD COUNT: 8,740 PAGES: 44

KEY TERMS: Operational Force, TTHS Account, Objective State, Cross-Leveling, Equipping, Training, Manning

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since 9/11 the nation has relied on the Army National Guard (ARNG) to be a critical component in the nation’s war against terrorism. With existing threats abroad, our nation has increased the operational demand of the Active Army to the point that reliance on the ARNG to aid in the fight on terrorism is essential. The ARNG has transitioned from a strategic reserve into a fully functional operational reserve. Transformation has accelerated across the Army, Army Reserve and ARNG in order to keep pace with the current operational tempo. In addition, the Army has developed a USARNG Amy Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to generate fully trained and ready forces across a six year planning cycle. Once the Army achieves steady state operations, the ARFORGEN model will produce additional challenges for the ARNG in manning, equipping, training and stabilizing the force over the 6 year cycle. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ARNG-ARFORGEN model, identify challenges and possible solutions for the ARNG to implement the model and increase their ability to train and fight in a full spectrum environment in the twenty-first century.
TRANSFORMING THE USARNG: CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARFORGEN MODEL

For over 200 years the United States Army has modified its force structure to exploit technological advances and to meet the threats to our national security interests. Globalization, rogue states, failed states, hostile non-state actors, events of 9/11 and the conduct of irregular warfare within the context of sustained long-term persistent conflict are just a few current trends and representative threats driving the current organizational changes within the Army. Over the last decade, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has emerged as a critical resource in meeting the contingency and rotational force requirements demanded by this new and complex strategic and operational environment.

Correspondingly, the ARNG has transitioned from its traditional role as the nation’s strategic reserve into a fully functional operational force. This shift in roles has created unprecedented challenges and opportunities for the Reserve Component in general and the National Guard in particular. Whether the National Guard continues to serve as a viable operational force in the conduct of the “long war” depends in large measure upon its ability to develop viable management processes that accommodate its unique limitations associated with being a “reserve force” of citizen-soldiers while concurrently meeting our Nation’s exigent strategic and operational requirements.

This paper begins by briefly examining the context of the current strategic force requirements; evaluates the processes and procedures developed by the Army to meet operational challenges through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model; identifies the unique challenges the USARNG has in meeting the reset, training levels and deployment readiness requirements once the ARFORGEN model is fully
implemented and is operating in its objective design steady-state condition; and proposes some possible solutions in meeting those challenges.

Strategic and Operational Environment

Today’s operational and strategic environments are continually morphing at higher and higher rates of change. To meet these challenges, the nation’s forces (Active-Army, Reserve and National Guard) re-organized, trained, equipped and deployed to protect our nation’s vital interests and also support civil authorities in response to natural and domestic emergencies. The future of our nation’s security depends on the military’s ability to continue to transform and adapt to the threats posed in the twenty-first century and provide the quantity of forces required to meet the demands of our Nation’s overall strategy.

The current complex and demanding strategic environment has created unprecedented demands on the number, types, and readiness of military forces. State and non-state adversaries are exploiting technological advances, seeking niche areas of US vulnerabilities, and using asymmetric approaches to threaten our security and national interests. The US defeat in Vietnam and forced exodus from Lebanon and Somalia, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, and Israel’s impotency against irregular units of Hezbollah all serve to reinforce the efficacy of asymmetric approaches for our current and potential future adversaries. Our enemies simply cannot match the U.S. conventional capability either in the quality of their combatants or the amount and effectiveness of their equipment. Furthermore, the number and diversity of threats and crises have increased manifold. Witness our most recent military involvement in homeland security, disaster response, counter-drug operations, humanitarian
assistance, and stability operations in failed or failing states. Moreover, the US military must also be prepared to meet conventional threats to include Major Combat Operations (MCO) against emerging peer competitors or conventional operations against North Korea or Iran. This range of mission requirements demands a full spectrum capability from a large enough military to meet these ongoing and worldwide commitments.

The combined day-to-day rotational and contingency force requirements generated by the strategic and operational environment currently exceed Active Army force levels. This has reduced the Boots on the Ground (BOG) dwell time to be less than ½ the design criteria specified in the ARFORGEN objective state (currently averaging about 15 months deployed to 12 months at home station vice the objective design criteria of 2 years at home station to 1 year deployed for the AC.) This high OPTEMPO is being replicated in the National Guard as well.

Since 2001, every Army National Guard combat brigade has been deployed overseas at least once and six have already been deployed twice. Moreover, last October, the Defense Department notified eight National Guard brigades to be ready to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in either fall of 2008 or early 2009. Of the eight Guard units, all have already served at least once in either Iraq or Afghanistan since 2001. According to the Defense Department’s standard deployment to dwell time ratio, reserve units should receive five years at home for every one year deployed. As with the active force, the DoD has been forced to break its own policies with regard to reserve deployment to dwell time ratio in order to maintain large numbers of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, three of the eight brigades on call returned from deployments in 2005 and two more returned from Iraq in 2006—well short of the recommended five years at home.

Consequently, the Army is “frozen” in the bridging phase of ARFORGEN implementation. Overwhelmed by “exceptions” and the current OPTEMPO, the model
is being implemented without the stability and predictability it was designed to provide. Nevertheless, it has proven effective for allocating scarce resources and preparing specified units for rotation into the various theaters of operation. Consequently, the Army has not fully examined nor has it tested the ARFORGEN model consistent with its objective design criteria. This paper examines some of the key issues associated with implementing the ARNG ARFORGEN model when forces available are sufficient to meet the design OPTEMPO steady-state requirements of one year deployed or available to deploy in every 6 years for the National Guard. The paper will start with a description of the model with a focus on the National Guard Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the representative unit of analysis. The assumption is that overall rotational and contingency force requirements will require the deployment of both AC and RC ARFORGEN “available” forces to meet existing and future emerging strategic requirements.

The Army Force Generation Process

The Army prescribes its approach in meeting future force sourcing challenges in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The ACP “directs comprehensive strategic change across doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership, education, personnel and facilities to build a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.” To achieve a campaign quality expeditionary force, the Army has embarked on an effort to modularize its organizations and simultaneously implement a comprehensive Force Generation model to cyclically manage the availability and deployability of those modular forces. The ARFORGEN model is designed to be the framework for managing
the readiness and deployability of the total force. The ARFORGEN process is the implementing mechanism for ensuring the Army attains an expeditionary capability.

The ARFORGEN model provides for a sustained readiness and deployment posture of RC and AC operational units. The model “provides predictability to potential time-frames at which ARNG units might be called to active federal service.”

ARFORGEN is designed to manage projected rotational requirements as well as program forces for on-demand emerging contingency requirements. It represents a migration from a tired readiness approach to cyclic readiness. The ARFORGEN model creates operational readiness cycles where individual units increase their readiness over time culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy given the needs of the combatant commander. Manning, equipping, resourcing and training processes are all synchronized within the process. The ARFORGEN model manages forces within three “Force Readiness Pools” and designates units along three modular-based Deployment, Ready, and Contingency Expeditionary Force resourcing and employment paths.

The ARFORGEN model is designed to provide stability and predictability while programming specific periods where units can periodically undergo intense periods of equipment and organizational modernization without regard to overall readiness. Generally, it is a tool for managing unit availability and resourcing. The steady-state ARFORGEN design template specifies that Active Army units will be on a 3 year cycle with 1 year in the available pool. The ARNG will be on a six year cycle with 1 year in the available pool and the Army Reserve will be on a five year cycle with 1 year in the available pool. The plan calls for the active Army to eventually have a total of 48
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) for a total of 16 in the available pool at one time. The ARNG will have a total of twenty-eight BCT's with four and two-thirds in the available pool.\textsuperscript{12}

To achieve the readiness progression required by operational readiness cycles, units transition through three successive force pools: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available force pools described below.

\textit{RESET/TRAIN Force Pool}: This pool is comprised of units coming out of the Available pool and often recovering from a previous deployment. Units are provided replacements in manning, equipment, funding and training resources to achieve Reset/Train force pool capability. The units mission is to reset equipment, receive new equipment, make organizational changes, transfer out personnel whose terms of service has expired or who rotate to other professional development jobs and schools, receive and train new personnel to achieve unit personnel levels of readiness as required by the ARFORGEN model, and prepare to transition to the Ready force pool. Units in the Reset/Train force pool are not ready for combat operations; however they are capable of performing Homeland Security missions in support of civil authorities. ARNG units normally are in the reset/train force pool for two years.

\textit{READY Force Pool}: Units in the Ready pool transition from individual, crew and squad core training competencies. Units conduct collective training with an operational headquarters for upcoming missions, focusing training requirements on Mission Essential Task List (METL) such as stability operations or core full-spectrum combat missions, depending on whether the unit is identified to deploy as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) package or as a Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) package.
Ready force pool units are available for mobilization and can be mobilized, if required, to meet operational (surge) requirements. Generally units in the Ready pool are available to support Civil Authorities including Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Homeland Security as well as “surge” to meet emergency combat requirements at a lower level of readiness that those units in the Available Pool.13

**AVAILABLE Force Pool:** The available force pool includes units that are immediately available for deployment and mission assignment. AC units are available for immediate deployment and Reserve component units are available for alert/mobilization/required post-mobilization training/validation and then deployment. Both active and reserve units who transition into the “Available Pool” will remain prepared for or deployed for a period of one year. For the RC units, this year will be reduced by the amount of time it is required to mobilize and conduct post-mobilization training to the level required of the contingency. Current DOD policy restricts RC mobilization to one year total; this includes whatever time is used for assembly, sourcing for deployment, pre-deployment training, and for redeployment.14

Within the three Force Readiness Pools, the ARFORGEN model allows for modular units to be designated along two major employment paths: Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or Ready Expeditionary Force (REF). Additionally, the REF path has several branches within the Ready and Available Pools. When entering the Reset/Train Pool, selected units will be sourced against known operational requirements and designated as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or alternatively designated to prepare for possible on-demand unknown contingencies and be designated as a Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) unit. Essentially, DEF units are
programmed against known rotational force deployment requirements (such as OIF/OEF). This path allows for greater predictability and permits focused training on a limited number of theater-specific Mission Essential Task List (METL) training requirements.

Conversely, REF units are contingency-force units postured to respond to any unknown or emerging mission and must prepare for the full range of operations/missions. While in the Ready Pool, if a Request-For-Forces (RFF) is received for a routine operational requirement, forces in the REF can conduct training and prepare for deployment as a DEF unit and deploy when ready. Moreover, any or all units in the REF pool can be surged for an emerging major crisis (usually if all the units in the Available Pool have already been committed). Forces remaining in REF status (not alerted for deployment) through their time in the Ready Pool transition into Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) status when moving into the Available Pool. These units are postured to be alerted and deployed on short notice to meet contingency operational requirements and, should it occur, would transition into DEF status.

The current model has all components (AC, USAR and ARNG) potentially sourced as Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) packages, Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) packages or as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) package. See Figure 1. The ARFORGEN model and associated statuses provide unique challenges for the ARNG, especially if and when they are programmed to become CEF designated units. The ability for ARNG units to respond to short-notice deployment contingencies from a non-mobilized posture is problematic. It is likely that these units would not be
sufficiently trained or prepared for short-notice deployments as the strategic and operational environment would require.

Figure 1: Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN)

Unique ARNG Challenges

The ARFORGEN objective steady state concept provides challenges for the USARNG across manning, equipping and training functional areas. The ARNG current experience within the “Bridging State” of the progressive ARFORGEN implementation scheme both informs this analysis and obfuscates many issues that will emerge when and “if” force requirements allow for steady state conditions. From the macro level, the current high OPTEMPO creates a degree of turbulence and prevents units from achieving the cyclic readiness standards envisioned in the ARFORGEN design objective state. Once fully implemented, the ARFORGEN model requires full-spectrum, joint mission capable forces that possess: “the capability to defend the homeland,
provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, deter conflict in critical regions, surge to conduct major combat operations, and preserve the quality of the All Volunteer Force in persistent conflict.”

In support of the ARFORGEN steady state design criteria, the Army developed supporting strategies for “manning, equipping, training, sustaining, modernizing, funding, reporting readiness, mobilizing, deploying, and educating the force to conduct full spectrum operations…” Unfortunately, the current OPTEMPO precludes the examination and even the full development of these “strategies” and a corresponding assessment of the overall feasibility of the ARFORGEN Objective Steady State design template. Stuck in what appears to be a perpetual ARFORGEN “bridging state,” the Army continues to refine the ARFORGEN processes focusing primarily on allocating scarce resources to meet near-term readiness and operational requirements within the current strategic environment. Importantly, the Army recently began a Reset Pilot test program to examine the institutional challenges associated with executing RC and AC unit activities within the ARFORGEN Reset phase. However, the Army still does not have a comprehensive program to examine the institutional changes required to implement all phases of the ARFORGEN Model.

In order to frame the challenges associated with full ARFORGEN implementation it is important to first examine the unique ARNG systems, processes and policies that constituted its organizational framework while the ARNG functioned as a strategic reserve. This framework impedes the ARNG transition into a fully functioning operational reserve and impairs its ability to respond to short-notice contingency operational requirements.
The Army National Guard as a Strategic Reserve

Decades of acting as the Nation’s strategic reserve imbedded systems and processes within the National Guard across manning, equipping and training domains that restricts its use as an operational force. Manning policies focused primarily on enabling the recruitment and retention of “citizen” soldiers, equipping strategies centered on minimizing overall equipment expenditures consistent with the low-priority “activity” designator of the RC, and training distracters and time constraints prevented the development of effective collective training regimens.

Shedding Outmoded Manning Processes

Perhaps most deleterious to stability, unit cohesion and collective training proficiency were the personnel policies and manning procedures adopted during the post WW II period. As a ‘community-based’ organizational force, the National Guard relies on the maximum dispersion of over 3,000 armories spread throughout all 50 states and the four U.S. territories\(^{18}\) to act as recruiting and training centers for small units. In order to attract recruits into the force, the National Guard sought to minimize distractions and maximize the convenience for service by its citizen-soldiers. For many National Guard units, overcoming manning-the-force challenges became the *sine qua non* for all other activities. Armories multiplied and were placed in areas conducive to recruiting and convenient for attendees. The National Guard’s close relationship with the community became both its strength and a liability. ARNG units draw from the local communities and their soldiers live, work, are housed in their own private quarters, and only periodically train with the Guard…and usually within close commuting distance of their home. Guardsmen are thus fixed to a geographical location.
Whereas, the Active Component moves MOS qualified people around to fill position vacancies, the ARNG moves positions to where there are people and then re-qualifies them on the required skills. Personnel are a fungible quantity for the AC, in the Guard, positions are more fungible. Thus, filling personnel shortages prior to actual mobilization is problematic. Unless a qualified Guardsman can be lured to move into the area (leaving his old community, home, civilian job, and former Guard unit/position for what is essentially another part time military job in a new community), the positions must be filled from within the geographical area of the vacancy. Within the unit, the Guardsmen must be laterally transferred from another presumably overstrength Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) position, promoted from lower ranks of the same MOS into the position vacancy, or a new soldier recruited from the community and sent to initial training to get MOS qualified.

The real challenge for fully manning the Guard for collective training and deployment occurs during the pre-mobilization period in dealing with attrition, emerging non-deployable soldiers, and transfers. The pool of replacements mostly comes from the immediate vicinity of the unit and their qualifications/MOS must be consistent with the vacancies. Generally, the longer the pre-mobilization period, the greater is the demand for personnel from WITHIN the community to fill emerging vacancies. However, once mobilized ARNG soldiers become “full time” employees of the government and they transform into a geographically-independent AC-like fungible resource for filling vacancies force-wide. The ‘cross-leveling’ of mobilized individuals from other units/geographical locations however, creates other serious problems within the ARNG that is aggravated by the historical over structuring of the ARNG force.
Over the years leading up to 9/11 the Guard became over structured. By 2003, organizational billet positions had increased to almost 10% above the congressionally-authorized end-strength. This made sense within the context of a community-based strategic reserve that seldom deployed. Having more authorized positions than personnel to fill them allowed greater lateral mobility of soldiers to transfer to where their civilian employment took them, thus retaining them in the Guard. It also permitted increased authorizations for all ranks that improved upper mobility by providing more units with higher rank opportunities for the undermanned force. Unfortunately, it also created a ‘hollow force’ that, with even 100% of Congressionally authorized manning, would still be 10% below its Force Structure Allowance (FSA)…and the units were routinely well below even their 90% authorized manning levels. Moreover, new recruits are assigned to specific organizational positions prior to receiving basic training. While they count as assigned strength, these new recruits are also not available to deploy. These non-deployable new recruits constitute an average of about 10.3% of the ARNG and, when combined with the 21 various ‘other’ reasons for non-deployment, the total number of non-deployable assigned personnel average about 15.7% (data collected from Oct 2001 to Oct 2007).¹⁹

Complicating these manning distracters was the absence of an ARNG individuals’ personnel account where transients, trainees, holdees, and those attending long term schooling (commonly referred to as the transients, trainees, holdees and schools (TTHS) Account for the active force) could be assigned and not count against the assigned strength of the unit. Although many of the Active Component (AC) individual account statuses are not compatible with how ARNG manning systems
account for soldiers in like statuses, this AC accounting approach could have been
developed and modified to apply to the Reserve Component and helped to ameliorate
some of the drain on present-for-duty strength that disrupted or prevented effective
collective training. For instance, the AC generally allocates 13% of its end-strength
(around 63,000 positions) to account for soldiers in these statuses. By not establishing
a TTHS-like account, the RC chose to decrease present-for-duty strengths by those
TTHS amounts and in doing so created another distracter to collective training that
degraded readiness. Not until 2005 did the ARNG move to establish a TTHS account,
and then it allocated a paltry 8,000 positions. This amount was subsequently reduced
to 6K and then finally to 2K in the latest Total Army Analysis (TAA). However, even
this balance is scheduled to be re-programmed into force structure to establish a cadre
structure for the Recruit and Sustainment Program (RSP). Notwithstanding, the
ARNG could significantly improve its present-for-duty training and deployable strength
with creative use of a TTHS-like account for RSP soldiers and others.

Informal processes initiated at the unit level also contributed to manning
problems as Commanders were pressured to fill unit authorizations. Local Guard
commanders were held accountable for recruiting; as opposed to their Active
Component counterparts who rely on an entirely separate command to fill their ranks.
As a consequence, ARNG Commanders are acutely attuned to issues that affect
recruitment and retention and have a tendency to liberally consider waivers and
exceptions vice potentially adversely impacting their assigned strength.

The overall result of these imbedded practices was that once mobilized, ARNG
units have had to rely on substantial numbers of individual fillers 'cross leveled' from
other ARNG units to fill the unit to the required manning level (normally to 100% or more of authorized strength) and then must undergo a lengthy post-mobilization collective training regimen to attain the level of unit proficiency required for deployment.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, by cross leveling individuals from non-mobilized units to mobilized units (even if volunteers) the Guard reduces the available strength and destroys the collective training proficiency of those loosing units and makes them even more dependent upon cross leveling for when they are subsequently mobilized.\textsuperscript{24} In a period of persistent conflict with sequential rotational mobilizations of ARNG units, this policy of ‘cross leveling’ has a mounting pernicious effect as these personnel transfers “further reduces the available pool of deployable personnel for other donor units. In short, each additional deployment of a unit that requires cross leveling would further decrease the fill rates of non-deployed units.”\textsuperscript{25} This cross leveling often leaves the donor units at manning levels at 50% and lower.\textsuperscript{26} The GAO reported that as of May of 2004, the ARNG had cross leveled over 74,000 personnel to deploying units to fill these vacancies.\textsuperscript{27} In one extreme case recently cited by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR), one California National Guard Transportation Company that was mobilized for deployment required 163 out of a total of 170 personnel to be transferred into the unit; only 7 that eventually deployed were originally assigned to the company when it was alerted. These cross-leveled soldiers were drawn from 65 different units located at 49 separate locations.\textsuperscript{28} “When such units go to war, they require months of reconstitution and training to forge a cohesive, competent unit, often adding months to the total length of their mobilization.”\textsuperscript{29} The challenge for the ARNG transition to an operational force will be to stabilize and increase manning levels so as
to minimize cross-leveling and improve pre-mobilization training proficiency levels and readiness. To do this, the ARNG must adopt a dramatically different manning strategy.

The Limiting Constraints of Legacy Equipping Policies

Similarly, ARNG equipping policies have impaired readiness and training. In general, National Guard combat units ‘mirror’ active force units with large, expensive, and complex equipment but “lacked the time and resources to properly maintain their readiness or mobilize and deploy them efficiently.” Moreover, the Army adopted a ‘first to fight, first to resource’ prioritization that gained economies by shorting forces that were scheduled later in the flow for the two Major Theaters of War (MTW) plans. These later deploying forces (mostly in the RC) received comparatively low levels of funding for individual and crew training and for the maintenance of their equipment. “This resulted in steeply tiered readiness, with many units being unready for deployment with significant post-mobilization training and equipping.” Additionally, the Total Force Concept equipping approach was designed for ‘cascading’ modernization to the RC. Generally, reserves received the old equipment from Active forces when the Active forces received newly fielded equipment. Consequently, RC units were encumbered with higher maintenance costs, lower equipment availability rates, and overall had less capability than their modernized Active component counterparts. Based upon these ‘cold war’ equipping principles, Army National Guard units were “typically provided from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime mission” and, because of their late deployment timeline, were expected to have the time to receive and train on the contingency-specific mission-essential equipment prior to deploying. When confronted with the relatively short notice RC deployment requirements of the
GWOT, these shortages were made-up by cross leveling available equipment primarily within the ARNG. Thus the cross leveling of equipment created the same ‘Robbing-Peter-to-Pay-Paul’ effect that cross-leveling personnel created. However, the amount of equipment transferred was aggravated by two other factors: (1) a large number of systems within the ARNG were outdated items that were not deployable to Iraq and Afghanistan; and (2) units were required to leave behind their equipment that they deployed with for use by follow-on ARNG units. The GAO reported that by July of 2005, the amount of equipment cross-leveled among ARNG units exceeded 101,000 items and that those transfers coupled with the equipment left overseas for follow-on forces had reduced the levels of essential war fighting equipment in non-deployed units to about 34 percent of authorizations. The cross-leveling of equipment was so insidious that by 2007, LTG Blum reported that 9 out 10 of the National Guard units not already deployed had less than half the equipment they needed to respond to domestic or overseas deployment contingencies. The net effect of the legacy equipping processes and those employed to meet the current rotational deployment requirements have adequately provided for those units deploying but have created a veritable pool of un-ready ARNG forces at home. “Reserve commands, in practice, are cannibalizing the force to meet short-term deployment needs.” The challenge of operating within the objective ARFORGEN steady-state condition will be to develop sufficient stocks of material and equipment to allow for high levels of cyclical readiness and training for the Total Force to meet both the sustained rotational deployments and other emerging force requirements both at home and abroad.
Grappling With Training Proficiency

Historically, the RC has struggled to maintain collective training readiness. Essentially manned as a ‘hollow force’ and confronted by a growing number of individual training requirements and a lengthening Mission Essential Task List addressing a wide range of “full spectrum” collective training requirements, the ARNG has been overwhelmed by increasing training demands. Moreover, it has been constrained by a limited number of training days: usually 39 days per year (12 two-day weekends and a 15-day annual training period). Within these 39 days of training, ARNG commanders are expected to conduct activities to maintain administrative deployment readiness, individual skills proficiency and collective training proficiency usually up to the platoon level. Conversely, a study conducted in 2002, revealed that the active component has 256 training days per year (although directed to perform 297 days of required training) to achieve individual and collective training proficiencies across their METL tasks. The active component generally trains to attain a battalion-level collective training proficiency with periodic collective proficiency developed at the brigade combat team (BCT) level. Although the AC can gain some economies with multi-echelon collective training for activities conducted at battalion level and above, the vast majority of the 256 days of available annual training is conducted at the company level and below to achieve individual, crew, platoon and company training proficiency. Notwithstanding having over 5 times more training time than the ARNG units, studies indicate that the active component is able to consistently achieve only platoon and company level collective training proficiency. For instance in a study of 36 AC battalions, with each conducting almost 100 days a year of actual field time and following an extensive ramp-up training regimen, 50% of battalions were unable to
perform ANY of the critical skills needed to plan and execute battalion combined arms maneuver synchronization and integration requirements during their first operational missions at the NTC/JRTC. Additionally, fewer than 50 percent of the battalions were able to adequately perform half the critical skills even at the end of the rotation.\textsuperscript{41}

Not surprisingly, the National Guard units have experienced profound difficulties in attaining collective pre-mobilization training proficiency. The most notorious instance of ARNG training un-readiness occurred when, in 1990, the President mobilized three high priority roundup/out brigades for the Persian Gulf War. At call-up, the brigades estimated they would need 28-42 days of post mobilization training to be able to deploy. However, for the two that completed training, they required 91 and 106 days of intensive training. Further, the Army estimated they still needed an additional 24 days of training before they were ready to deploy. In a related study conducted by GAO of seven ARNG roundout/up brigades in 1993, their combat platoons mastered an average of just 14 percent of their Mission Essential Tasks and less than one-third of the battalions met the gunnery goals.\textsuperscript{42} More recently, the Army has adopted a policy of mobilizing RC units for 16-18 months to develop the readiness level necessary for a 12 month Boots-on-the-Ground (BOG) deployment.\textsuperscript{43} This allowed 4 to 6 months of post-mobilization preparation, individual and collective training.

Not surprisingly, these long mobilization periods place a tremendous strain on citizen soldiers and their families. Thus, in January 2007, the Secretary of Defense changed this procedure and limited mobilizations to a total of 12 months which includes whatever time will be needed for post-mobilization preparation and training. The directive also requires that mobilizations be conducted as units instead of mobilizing
individuals. This potentially reduces the BOG deployment time to 6-8 months and could possibly limit cross-leveling manning activities. As a response, the Army is examining the pre/post mobilization training (PPMT) concept in an attempt to reduce the post-mobilization training period to 45-days. This “train-alert-deploy” approach would permit around 320-day BOG deployment period. However, it would also require lengthening annual training periods and improving training resourcing, manning, equipping, and the overall readiness of the ARNG units while they were still NOT mobilized…which historically has been problematic. Still, overcoming these challenging constraints correspond closely with enabling the ARNG to function within the ARFORGEN framework that requires a relatively rapid transition from a pre-mobilized/available status to a deployment footing when those units are in the Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) status. If the ARNG is to continue to provide forces for employment in the GWOT and for emerging contingency requirements within the ARFORGEN construct, the training regimen will have to improve to allow for rapid mobilization and deployment.

Adapting Manning, Equipping and Training Systems to ARFORGEN

Arguably the most important reforms will have to be made to the ARNG manning strategy. The good news is that substantial progress has been made in improving the manning strategy that will facilitate ARFORGEN implementation; the bad news is that the ARNG has not gone nearly far enough. The major challenge for the Army and the Guard is fully manning ARNG units during the pre-mobilization training phase so that collective training can be conducted, unit cohesion developed and maintained, deployment readiness attained, and unit manning sustained at or above 100 percent
through pre- to post-mobilization and deployment. “Manning is the center of gravity for ARFORGEN to work for the RC.” The current cross-leveling manning dilemma can be resolved with several systemic measures: (1) expand the current miniscule Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account to cover all those personnel carried in those statuses including all those in the Recruit Sustainment Program (RSP)/Training Pipeline (TPL) categories; (2) increase TRADOC’s annual average throughput of ARNG Soldiers attending IET to reduce the RSP/TPL numbers; (3) increase the overall end strength or reduce NG force structure allowance (FSA) to permit over-strength manning of units to account for historic attrition and non-deployable personnel; and (4) refine and use the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve/Regular Reserve so that there is a pool of NG personnel willing and able to replace emerging non-deployable personnel identified AFTER mobilization.

Applying the TTHS account to the ARNG unique manning environment is difficult. Generally, the approach must accommodate the geographical manning constraints of the Guard in the pre-mobilization phase and account for the massive Training Pipeline (TPL) soldier population attending or awaiting Initial Entry Training and Advanced Individual Training (when they are split). As opposed to the AC that is able to centralize personnel management pools for personnel in those individual TTHS statuses, the ARNG would likely have to decentralize TTHS authorizations down to the unit level where soldiers are recruited, managed and reside. Correspondingly, this creates another recruiting/retention burden on the unit commanders to fill positions in excess of what appears on their unit tables of organization and complicates human resource management within the ARNG context. The additional unit recruiting burden in and of
itself is not a trivial challenge given the difficulty in filling already authorized positions. This probably explains some of the reluctance of the ARNG to take on the full TTHS additional manning requirement. The solution to the manning challenge needs to begin by increasing manning authorizations above those specified unit organization documents (Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and successfully recruiting the additional soldiers by ARNG unit commanders to fill those positions.

For high-density skill level 1 soldiers, TTHS-like position authorizations could be uniformly distributed and managed relatively easily at lower levels. Those returning to duty are easily re-integrated into formations and units, even if those units are temporarily over-strength in the MOS. For higher ranking positions in low-density skill areas, management would be much more difficult. Because of the low-density, TTHS authorized positions would have to be designated MOS immaterial and grouped within certain rank brackets and be periodically populated with actual personnel infrequently present for UTAs and AT. How or whether they would be re-integrated into the unit upon their return from those TTHS-like statuses would be situational dependent with wide variances across commands and commanders. Clearly there would be inefficiencies and delays in re-integrating returning personnel into unit positions already backfilled. Those returning would likely be continued to be carried in those TTHS billets (probably centralized at brigade level) while serving in other vacancies or doubling up in already manned positions in the geographical proximity of their home/job. Notwithstanding, having MOS mismatched personnel serving in vacant positions either above or below their authorized rank is better than having no person at all for collective
training and readiness. Nevertheless, as units gained experience in responding to attrition and managing TTHS authorizations and absences, the TTHS-like position distribution could be refined to reflect geographical and historical tendencies while gaining some economies and efficiencies.

How many positions should be in the ARNG TTHS account? As previously mentioned, the AC TTHS account is historically about 13% of its total end strength.\(^{49}\)

As of Nov 2008, the ARNG authorized end-strength (ES) was 358.2 K\(^{50}\) but they had successfully recruited a total of 361,551 personnel.\(^{51}\) Of that number, there were 44,252 soldiers in the training pipeline (TPL) waiting for initial training; which coincidentally is 12.3% of its current end strength.\(^{52}\) This number is somewhat inflated by a significant backlog of soldiers awaiting IET and the lack of sufficient TRADOC throughput to train them. Establishing a TTHS account of 45K personnel distributed throughout the ARNG in amounts equating to 13% of each unit’s assigned strength would equate to a similar AC allocation of end strength numbers. Nonetheless, the 45K TTHS requirement appears well above what the ARNG appears willing to resource.

To create enough spaces to resource non-deployable personnel awaiting training or in the TPL requires either an increase in overall end strength or a reduction in the Guard force structure. Given recent successes with the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP) and Every Soldier a Recruiter (ESAR), the Guard appears more pre-disposed towards increasing end-strength.\(^{53}\) This is reinforced by a broad base of political support for increasing the strength of local National Guard units in Congressional districts nationwide and OSD’s immediate need for increased readiness of ARNG units for GWOT deployment purposes.
Correspondingly, the Guard is moving towards an overall increase in end
strength (ES) to 384K that they expect to achieve between the end of FY 11 and by FY
13. However, this increase in end-strength is NOT supported by the most recent
Total Army Analysis (TAA) Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum. Apparently,
the ARNG is addressing their manning problem by recruiting as many soldiers as
possible, regardless of geographical location and unit affiliation, and intend to rely on
continued cross-leveling of these geographically dispersed ‘excess’ soldiers to
deploying units when the units are alerted for mobilization. Thus, they have essentially
created a de-facto ‘ghost’ TTHS account and are relying on ‘post-mobilization’ cross-
leveling of unauthorized over-strength personnel to meet personnel demands. The
increased manning and associated funding is apparently being supported through
GWOT-related waivers and supplementary funds and is likely not a viable long-term
manning solution to meet steady-state ARFORGEN manning challenges.
Notwithstanding, the ARNG intends to stabilize FSA at about 358.2K and recruit to an
ES of 384K and try to limit the overall RSP/TSP ‘excess’ personnel total to around 26K.
Of that 26K, approximately one-half or 12.5K would be intended to cover those
personnel in the RSP and about 13.5K would cover those in training. However, this
presupposes that TRADOC could increase its training base throughput to reduce the
backlog of the 25K non-prior-service recruits (or 14% of all NG E1-E4 positions)
currently awaiting training. This would require TRADOC to increase ARNG throughput
by about 12K soldiers per year for a total of around 26K ARNG soldiers graduating
annually. Given that the current RSP/TPL population is 44K and taking into
consideration a TRADOC increase of 12K throughput, it appears that this plan is still at
least 6K short of covering those in the RSP/TPL and does not even address the other TTHS-like categories that also reduce overall unit PFD training strength. To address the 6K of TPL soldiers and with another 4K towards addressing the other TTHS categories and shortages (for a total of 10K), the ARNG end-strength authorization would have to be increased to be around 394K. Even with this 10K increase, the ARNG TTHS-like account would constitute only 9.1% of its total end-strength; far below the AC’s 13% historical average. Whether the ARNG could achieve high rates of PFD personnel manning for collective training with a TTHS-like account of just 9% of end-strength would have to be further evaluated. In either case, the accounting will not address the expected 5.2% of attrition experienced post-mobilization from the other 21 non-deployable categories. This requires some additional personnel management measures.

The ARNG must also establish a personnel pool to fill emerging non-deployable personnel losses that occur following mobilization alert and prior to beginning post mobilization certification training. As indicated previously, the ARNG invariably experiences around 5.2% losses of non-deployable personnel following mobilization. Historically, these shortages were filled by cross-leveling MOSQ personnel from other units with the corresponding negative impact on the gaining/losing units. This shortage could be made up by increasing the TTHS-like account authorizations and/or with the utilization of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING). Clearly, a way to address the in-stride losses of non-deployable personnel is to increase the TTHS-like account authorizations and carry even more excess personnel in units. Thereby units would be continuously assigned PFD personnel at about 105% to
accommodate expected losses following mobilization. This would have the added advantage of allowing these personnel to be available during the pre-mobilization training periods and thus become a cohesive contributor to achieving collective training proficiency. However, excess personnel are usually utilized in positions other than the ones already filled by another soldier, so collective training on the required tasks would probably still be required when the non-deployable soldiers “drop out” following mobilization. Also, carrying known overages is very inefficient albeit more effective. A more efficient and probably less effective approach would be to replace the small percentage (5.2%) of non-deployable soldiers with fully MOS-qualified substitutes for post mobilization train-up without robbing other ARNG units of their qualified individuals. The recent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves proposed reinvigorating the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard (ING), as well as the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve, to help respond to mobilization manning challenges and thus avoiding the adverse affects of cross-leveling. They proposed that these manpower pools be better screened and managed to identify both those willing (with volunteer incentives) and qualified to be mobilized and used as backfills for vacancies created by non-deployable personnel and other sources of attrition. Given the relatively large number of personnel in these statuses, the overall requirement of about 18.6K reservists over a force-wide six year deployment cycle (about 5.2% of the 358.2K FSA with a worst case assumption that that 100% of the force will be deployed every 6 year period) appears to be feasible.

In summary, the manning strategy must accommodate two major objectives. First it must account for TTHS-like absences so as to consistently achieve 100% PFD
strength for critical pre-mobilization collective and individual training. Second, it must be able to backfill emerging non-deployable personnel following mobilization to account for expected attrition without cross-leveling these personnel from other Reserve units. Successful accomplishment of these two objectives will assure that units are postured to be successfully trained and equipped for ARGORGEN cyclical rotations. Finally, the manning ‘solution’ must be long-term and ‘systemic’ in nature and meet Congressional oversight and Army programmatic TAA ARSTRUC Memo guidance.

**Equipping the Force for ARFORGEN**

Similarly, the Army is moving to correct systemic equipping challenges. Although not entirely resource dependent, the majority of ARNG equipping challenges can be met with increased funding. The recent report by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) provides a comprehensive summary of the Army’s funding approach to meet ARNG equipping challenges. The Army has funded or programmed $37 billion dollars for the ARNG between 2005 and 2013. If these budget plans are actually executed, the Army RC will be equipped to about 74% of its total authorization within 5 years (2013) and to about 90% within 11 years (2019). Consequently, the ARNG equipment woes are expected to continue for at least another decade and thus require continued cross-leveling that adversely impacts non-deploying unit training and readiness to perform even Homeland missions. Moreover, the CNGR expressed skepticism over whether these programmed funds will ever be committed in the planned amounts. They cite the un-programmed budget requirements needed to meet the “grow-the-army” initiative that will likely redirect funding/equipment away from the RC; the historical diversion of ARNG programmed equipping funds for other
purposes (routinely diverting up to 50% before the year of execution); and the expected increased expense for new high-technology FCS equipment sets for both the Active and Guard units that will likely reduce other (AC and RC) equipment funding.62

In summary, the proposed ARNG equipment funding plan is much too long to allow the ARNG to transition into an Operational Force to support near- and mid-term operational requirements and fully integrate into the design objective ARFORGEN process. Funding needs to be increased and equipment provided in sufficient quantities to maximize pre-mobilization training opportunities and to minimize post-mobilization equipment cross-leveling. The Army should decrease the length of time funding is currently programmed for and increase the amount of overall funding so that the ARNG reach a 90% or better equipment on-hand as-soon-as-possible but not later than 2015. Additionally, critical dual use (CDU) equipment that is essential to conduct the full range of homeland missions should be provided immediately but not later than 2013.63 The continued shortage of equipment impairs pre-mobilization training, lengthens required post-mobilization training requirements and correspondingly reduces ARNG unit BOG time. A reduction in ARNG BOG time necessarily translates into increased AC deployment BOG time and/or unit deployments, adversely affects the entire force, and likely delays indefinitely the full implementation of the ARFORGEN model. Lack of required equipment prevents non-deploying ARNG units from conducting important training and also limits their ability to respond to Homeland missions.

Training the Force for ARFORGEN

Partial implementation of the ARFORGEN Model has had some positive impacts on the ARNG. In responding to deployment requirements, the ARNG has developed
and refined a progressive training regimen to maximize available time and resources. With the majority of deploying units programmed against specific theater mission requirements, the process provides for better predictability, focused training requirements, and efficient allocation of scarce resources. Correspondingly, with almost continuous alerts, mobilizations, and deployments the Guard has refined and developed its overall training and support processes. Many of these refinements are applicable to those expected in the ARFORGEN steady state implementation phase, others are not. Most developed processes and procedures support the RC use as a DEF force when the ARFORGEN steady-state is implemented. However, the greatest training challenge will be synchronizing the manning and equipping processes to enable ARNG units to attain the collective training proficiency to respond to emerging operational contingencies while those units are in the REF or CEF statuses of the “Ready” and “Available” ARFORGEN pools respectively.

In order to meet these contingency response training requirements, the ARNG must change their training approach. “One weekend a month, two weeks in the summer no longer meet the Nations’ needs.” Historically ARNG units train a total of 24 days or 48 Unit Training Assembles (UTA) and a 15 day Annual Training period within each calendar year. Under the steady-state ARFORGEN model, ARNG soldiers will be required to complete much more rigorous training requirements for the 6-year cycle. ARNG soldiers would train for the statutory period (39-days) during just the first two years of the unit ARFORGEN cycle, 45-days for the third year of the cycle, 53-days the fourth year and 72-days for the fifth year (just prior to deployment or assuming CEF-status). Should the ARNG unit transition into a CEF status and not be mobilized, this
increased 72-day training regime would likely have to be continued throughout the one-
year Available pool period and still require a 45-day plus post-mobilization train-up
period. It appears that the maximum amount of training capable of being performed by
a citizen soldier who must maintain his civilian employment in a non-mobilized status is
likely about 70-80 days. Additionally, these training periods must be fully resourced to
maximize the available training opportunities with training support packages that include
additional simulations, training funds, training oversight (with First Army OC’s), and
equipment. Providing these extra resources is estimated to cost over $2.5 billion dollars
annually above the existing budget.

‘First Army’ has the mission to support ARNG units throughout the process and
has developed a comprehensive program to minimize post-mobilization training time
and maximize BOG time for deploying ARNG units. The program begins at minus 730
days from mobilization-day (also could be applicable to time prior to assuming CEF
status in the steady state ARFORGEN model) and progresses through a series of
training and deployment preparation activities. The program provides for required
individual, team, crew and squad/platoon collective training, periodic assessments,
focused resourcing, issuance of alert orders, soldier readiness processing,
implementation of stop-loss measures, etc. and progresses through specific milestones
at 365-days, 180-days, 120-days and 90-days prior to mobilization or assuming CEF-
status. The long-term goal is to achieve company-level collective training proficiency
and thus limit post-mobilization training to 45 days.

The First Army model also recognizes different training requirements for different
types of units and for different known deployment missions sets. For instance, Security
Force (SECFOR) Battalions are targeted for 45-days, SECFOR BCTs require 62-days, and Aviation Battalions require 71 days and Postal units require only 22-days of post-mobilization training. Thus another way to limit post-mobilization training and maximize BOG-time is by targeting RC units for specific mission requirements that do not require extensive collective training on a wide range of mission essential tasks. However, this does not work for emerging on-demand operational mission requirements that RC units in the REF or CEF statuses would have to respond to if called upon.

Conclusions

Following the events of 9/11 the Nation and its military was thrust into a ‘hot’ Global War on Terrorism. Still mired in a cold war readiness framework but with a dramatically reduced military force structure, the Nation called upon the RC to assume an operational role. The rotational nature of deployments of both AC and RC units in support of the “long war” led to the formulation and implementation of the Army Force Generation Model designed to provide a degree of predictability and stability and aid in the efficient allocation of scarce resources. From the outset, the model was overcome by operational requirements that has frozen its implementation in the “bridging state” and derailed efforts at instituting reforms necessary to fully implement its design objective state. Although much progress has been made towards optimizing processes and procedures to accommodate ARNG near-term deployment requirements, serious questions remain as to whether ARNG units can meet the continuous readiness requirements dictated by REF and CEF statuses within the ARFORGEN Model. Moreover, many ad hoc expedient approaches adopted to meet immediate deployment requirements of select ARNG units in the current bridging state are incompatible with
those necessary to ensure the cross-force readiness needed in the ARFORGEN objective state.

Clearly cross-leveling of personnel and equipment has degraded readiness throughout the ARNG as non-deploying units were and still are being cannibalized. The most important and perhaps the most difficult challenge is solving the ARNG manning issues. The establishment of a TTHS-like account to ‘cover’ personnel in those long-term absentee statuses, reinvigorating the IRR and the ING (as well as the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve) to replace non-deployable personnel following mobilization, and increasing over-strength authorizations to accommodate estimated attrition would all dramatically improve both the readiness and cohesion of Guard units.

Similarly, fully equipping ARNG units to allow for realistic and relevant training and improving their ability to respond to domestic missions is a key enabler for achieving unit readiness. Increasing the current program funding and accelerating the equipment fielding plans are critical to attaining the cross-force readiness levels necessary for ARNG to assume its necessary role as an operational force in the ARFORGEN objective state.

Manning and equipping challenges must be solved as a prerequisite for effective training. Increasing the training regimen is fruitless if it is conducted with personnel who are expected to leave before the unit deploys or have not yet arrived. Likewise, training without the required or even outmoded equipment seriously impairs training. Even with fully manned and equipped units, collective training proficiency is difficult to maintain in Active Component units let alone within the RC. Attaining company-level collective training certification in the ARNG prior to mobilization appears optimistic even with
increases in training to 70-80 days per year. It is even less likely that ARNG could sustain this company-level proficiency throughout the one-year period where they were not mobilized but prepared to deploy as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) unit. To even approach these collective training readiness levels, the ARNG needs to be fully resourced and funded the additional $2.5B annually and more experience gained in developing training programs for non-mobilized standby ARNG CEF units.

Nevertheless, the ARFORGEN model promises to provide the Army and the ARNG an overall framework for attaining fully manned, equipped and trained units able to accomplish their domestic and wartime missions. The nation’s Active Component forces cannot sustain their current level of OPTEMPO and security obligations in support of U.S national interests without the ARNG. “Fully integrating the Army’s RCs into the ARFORGEN is both essential and critical for ARFORGEN to succeed.”

In order to fully implement the ARFORGEN model, Congress and the Department of Defense must institute changes in policy and procedures and reform associated institutions to enable the transformation of the ARNG into an effective and viable operational force.

Endnotes


6 The USARNG BCT was selected for analysis because it is the primary unit of deployment/maneuver and its manning, equipping, and training regimen is well understood and communicable. The author acknowledges that there may be even greater challenges in implementing the ARFORGEN model for non-maneuver units.

7 LTG James A. Lovelace, “Commission on National Guard and Reserves,” (April 12, 2007), 2.


10 Ibid., 7.


16 Ibid., F-9.


20 U.S. Department of the Army, Memorandum, Subject: Army Structure Memorandum 09-13 (Grow the Army), (Washington DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, October 4, 2008), 9.

21 “The ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program (RSP) is similar to the Army and USAR Delayed Entry Program (DEP) as the formal process for indoctrinating and preparing ARNG Soldiers for the successful completion of their Initial Active Duty Training (IADT). Army and USAR DEP Soldiers initially contract at the MEPS and remain in the DEP until they return for their actual enlistment and IADT ship processing. ARNG Soldiers are accessed during the initial MEPS processing and are on active, paid drilling status while awaiting their IADT ship date. They drill with their State’s RSP until they depart for Basic Combat Training (BCT), and then join their actual unit of assignment when they are MOS qualified.” The United States Army Home Page, http://www.army.com/resources/item/3411http://www.army.com/resources/item/3411 (accessed December 30, 2008).


23 Joseph E. Whitlock, How to Make Army Force Generation Work For the Army’s Reserve Components, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006), 15.

24 Jacob Alex Klerman, Rethinking the Reserves, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Institute, 2008), 11.


31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.


41 Ibid., 33 & 39-40.


100% manning objective is also supported by Major Barry Vincent in his analysis of personnel policies of the National Guard. Barry K. Vincent, *Personnel Policies for an Operational Army National Guard*, Thesis for Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth KS: Command & General Staff College), 81.

Ibid.


Ibid., 7.

The G-RAP provides bonuses to National Guard Soldiers for recruiting new members into the National Guard. Existing ARNG soldiers recruit for the ARNG under a civilian contract and are called Recruiting Assistants (RAs). RA’s are paid $1,000 once a potential soldier enlist and another $1,000 dollars when the new soldier departs for Basic Combat Training. G-RAP and ESAR (Every Soldier a Recruiter) have been very successful in assisting the ARNG in meeting their “congressionally directed end-strength of 350,000 soldiers.” ARNG recruiting goals were met in 2006 for the first time in years. The “ARNG added more end strength then all other Army Components combined” Recruiting programs such as G-RAP and ESAR, along with an increase in full-time recruiters, are helping the upward swing in recruiting and retention. It is likely that the ARNG will continue to achieve recruiting goals with these programs and an increase in enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses will continue to aid the ARNG in meeting its recruiting goal, as it did in fiscal year 2007, recruiting over 65,000 new soldiers. LTG Clyde A. Vaugn, “National Guard 2008 Posture Statement,” 6.

Vaughn, “Investing in our Nation’s Readiness: Path to Increased ARNG Readiness,” 6-8.


Vaughn, “Investing in our Nation’s Readiness: Path to Increased ARNG Readiness,” 6-8.

The AC TTHS statuses do not correlate exactly with the ARNG manning processes, but even given that, there is likely not a 4% difference and/or better efficiencies of ARNG...
management than those of the AC. Moreover, there would likely NOT be OSD support to increase ARNG end strength authorizations to the 412K needed to provide a 13% TTHS manning level for a 358.2K FSA. This increase in overall manning would also probably push-the-envelope of what could be feasibly recruited even with G-Rap and ESAR. Thus the force structure allowance would have to be reduced by about 15K to 343K if a 13% TTHS proved to be a more realistic estimate of the number of TTHS-like statuses than the 9.1% proposed. The final allocations would reflect 394K end strength of which 51K would be in the TTHS account and 343K in FSA.

59 Vincent, Personnel Policies for an Operational Army National Guard, 17.

60 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves January 31, 2008), 335-344.

61 As of 2005 there are 22,773 in the Standby Reserve of which 20,723 on the Inactive Status List; 627,424 personnel are in the Retired Reserve; and 1,522,532 personnel are in the Retired Regulars. Each one of these pools contains soldiers with varying degrees of qualifications and readiness to deploy and together constitute an untapped resource for potential mobilization. Arnold L. Punaro et al., Commission on the National Guard and Reserve: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force.

62 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, (Arlington VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves), 227-228.

63 Ibid., 33.


65 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, (Arlington VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves), 210.


67 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, (Arlington VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves), 212.


69 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, (Arlington VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves), 210.
70 MG Thomas D. Robinson, USAR, DCG “First Army” Briefing, December 2007. 17.

71 Whitlock, How to Make Army Force Generation Work For the Army’s Reserve Components, 22.