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BLUE DARTS
AWARD-WINNING OP-EDS

Compiled by

SHAWN P. O’MAILIA
Chief, Institutional Research, Air University

Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2008
Disclaimer

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Preface

Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, former Air University (AU) commander and now commander of Air Education and Training Command, initiated this project to challenge AU’s faculty and students to connect with the wider academic, professional, and broader communities. The culmination of this initiative is this collection of award-winning “Blue Darts.” A Blue Dart is the name AU has given to what is commonly called an op-ed, or a timely, provocative essay that advances an opinion or challenges the reader’s thought. These op-eds (some of which are derived from larger research studies) offer a unique perspective on national or global concerns. Public Affairs makes Blue Darts available to the news media and other outside agencies.

The following 27 op-eds were selected from 341 Blue Darts written by top AU students and faculty, as well as by outside experts. A committee of 73 AU faculty members reviewed the submissions from March through December 2007 and then selected the award winners based on selected criteria. Faculty members were from the Air Command and Staff College, Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center, Air Force Institute for Advanced Distributed Learning, Air Force Officer Accession and Training Schools, Air War College, Ira C. Eaker College for Professional Development, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and Squadron Officer College.

The AU Foundation and the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) provided the funding to award the top two papers $750 and the other 25 papers $75 cash awards. Thanks go to Col Joseph Panza, director of the AU Foundation, and to VADM Norbert Ryan Jr., US Navy, retired, director of the MOAA.

We hope that you will find these distinct viewpoints—uniquely presented by our contemporaries based on either their scholarly or personal, professional, and/or operational expertise—enlightening and thought-provoking. This compendium reflects AU’s overarching goal to be the intellectual and leadership center of the Air Force via teaching, scholarship, and outreach.
Department of Defense Sponsorship of “Soft Power” in Support of the Global War on Terror

Col Scott Aiken, USMC

Counter-terrorism is a battle of perceptions as well as one against terrorists. . . . Terrorism cannot be defeated without counter-terrorism, but counter-terrorism alone can never defeat ideas and the causes of terrorism.

—Anthony Cordesman
RUSI Journal, February 2006

The global war on terror (GWOT) is a struggle of numerous, ever-changing dimensions. One dimension, currently the scene of a complex, massive battle, is the information domain—a “war of ideas.” The United States can gain advantage in this domain by deliberately strengthening its “soft power.” As a premier US government agency in the GWOT, the Department of Defense (DOD) should add soft power to its arsenal.

Why should the DOD concern itself with soft power? Quite simply, the United States needs the assistance of others in prosecuting the GWOT. As Joseph S. Nye Jr., dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, ably states in his 2004 book Soft Power, “The United States cannot alone hunt down every suspected al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can it launch a war whenever it wishes without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation it needs for winning the peace” (pp. x-xi). With immense resource expenditure in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations across the spectrum of conflict, the US military should actively pursue any concept or technology that gives it an edge in warfare.

Soft power is becoming more important in the twenty-first century because of three major factors concerning the global security environment. They include the information age, the diffusion of power and governance globally, and the impact of nonstate actors. Soft power can influence all
three factors, making the further study of this concept militarily desirable. For the DOD to have a shared reference point of the concept of soft power, I suggest defining it as efforts to enhance the attractiveness of the United States’ political ideals and policies as well as the informational element of national power in support of the goals of the national security strategy.

Most assess terrorism as the United States’ most immediate threat. Organizations of Islamist radicalism require the support of sympathizers, and to some degree tolerance, from neutral and benign populations throughout the world and are thus susceptible to soft power.

As it conducts the GWOT, the DOD can sponsor soft power in several ways. These methods support the military strategic objective of “contribut[ing] to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism,” per the February 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Soft power can assist in the national strategic aim of the GWOT by “creat[ing] a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.”

The elements of soft power are “passive” or “active.” Passive elements include ongoing measures, such as applying rules of engagement, which have soft-power benefits. Active elements include actions conducted with the specific purpose of gaining soft power. I propose that the elements of soft power include:

• “Aura of power”
• Rule-of-engagement training
• Cultural intelligence and awareness
• Foreign humanitarian assistance
• Security cooperation activity
• Embedded media
• Leveraging excess medical capabilities
• Military civic affairs
• International military education and training
• Korean augmentation to the United States’ Army-like programs
• Global war on terror amnesty program
• International military organization participation

Most of these elements have proven track records and are inexpensive, easy to implement, and scalable—a necessity in an era of constrained military resources. As such, their increased military applicability is desirable for use to “defeat ideas and the causes of terrorism” that Cordesman describes.
When the Marine Corps introduced the concept of information operations (IO) into doctrine, its official documents described it as “an integrating concept that facilitates the warfighting functions . . . not simply another arrow in the . . . commander’s quiver [but a] broad-based capability that makes the bow stronger” (see the 2002 Concept for Information Operations). Soft power, used passively, can make the “bow stronger.” Used actively, it can become “another arrow in a commander’s quiver.” These 12 passive and active elements are a first attempt at doctrinally proposing the military application of soft power. Most of these elements are currently in place and need only expanding for GWOT application. Important still is our ability to expand these elements to other partner nations. As Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, a well-known expert on al-Qaeda, observes, “Terrorism cannot be fought by one single country” (“Countering Al Qaeda: An Interview with Dr. Rohan Gunaratna,” IO Sphere, Spring 2006, 6).

In The Sling and the Stone, Col Thomas Hammes’s final point about combating fourth-generation warfare, of which the GWOT consists in large part, is that the “fundamental message of the United States is the most powerful message ever crafted by mankind: we treasure the individual and provide an environment where a person can strive for his or her own dreams. . . . It is up to us to harness the message and use it to win.” Soft power can deliver that message.
We would all do well to remember who we are and what we represent when writing or speaking about our respective fighting forces. We would do better still if we remembered the same about our sister service counterparts before committing to word or deed that may infringe upon their efforts or reputation. The first notion is seldom a problem; the second is worth a moment of thought.

Dr. Richard Muller, in his article “Let’s End the Toxic Debate” (7 December 2006 edition of The Right Stuff), enjoins airpower advocates to “elevate the current debate,” noting that “there is something to be said for reticence, patience and taking the high road.” This is good advice for advocates of any persuasion, but we can and should go further by recognizing some ownership in the heritage and accomplishments of all our troops and military services when we comment or compare.

As an American citizen, I like to think of the US military as mine. It’s my Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, National Guard, and Reserve. But of course they’re ours really, and how they fare is how we fare. All are in a fight for our security, our liberty, even our professional reputations. Like me, you probably prefer to see them do well and have a real appreciation for the individuals, for their accomplishments, and for the history and traditions they represent.

As a Marine, I’m an inheritor of a substantial legacy of battlefield prowess over 200 years old. I’ve readily associated myself with the exploits of Brig Gen Herman H. “Hard Head” Hanneken, Lt Gen Lewis “Chesty” Puller, and thousands of other sea soldiers who have built our reputation in every clime and place. I’m expected to do my part to uphold that heritage as best I’m able and to keep the flame alive.
It's no different for Airmen, Soldiers, or Sailors. They sustain their legacy and are sustained by it. The Airman on duty right now is heir to countless valorous deeds and embodies the storied past of the Air Force and its Air Service pioneers. It’s the same Airman that, in another time and place, flew spruce and fabric biplanes against machine-gun fire, rode a lonely ball turret through the flak, repaired the jets on a frozen Korean flight line, or jumped from a helicopter into enemy territory to retrieve a downed pilot. The heritage is Rickenbacker over France, Doolittle’s raid, MiG Alley, Desert Storm, and a hundred more.

In this same way, every American Soldier represents victory snatched from defeat at Trenton, the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill, or outnumbered paratroopers holding the line at Bastogne. All American Sailors are figurative descendants of John Paul Jones, Farragut damning the torpedoes, and the crew of the destroyer escort USS *Samuel B. Roberts* against a battleship fleet off Samar.

These are people and stories in which we can all take pride. Maybe, like me, you’ve had occasion to serve alongside men and women of all US military services in peacetime and war. I’ve found in them the abilities and fighting spirit of their predecessors that keep the nation strong. I’ve gained some lifelong friends in the bargain. The relationship hasn’t always been a rose garden, and I’m confident I have annoyed my brothers-in-arms on occasion—as they’ve certainly done for me in that special way that only siblings can.

We owe it to ourselves and each other to dispense a little constructive criticism once in a while. But at the end of the day, I wouldn’t want anybody else running my military machine, especially during this time of war when it’s worth bearing in mind that we have intractable enemies that well and truly want to see us dead. I’m told that in the Beltway it’s all about the money and that it’s a zero-sum game. Acknowledge the prowess or utility of another team only at the peril of your own. In that context, the idea that we take some pride in our military kinsmen may seem a quaint or even dangerous sentiment.

But the next time we enter the debate about resources, roles, or missions, let’s pause briefly enough to consider the individual service member past and present, our common cause, and the heritage of our services before we go “on the record.” After all, we remark upon our own troops, military, and collective honor.
Transformation Success . . . Leadership Dependent

Col Allen Blume, USAF

Change . . . it’s inevitable. The way an organization approaches change, to include the strategic planning, public release, and implementation, will directly influence the outcome of the success. The Department of Defense (DOD) is undergoing massive transformational change throughout. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. The President’s Management Agenda, FY 2002 highlighted key areas where the government could improve, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld played the role of transformation puppet-master throughout his tenure.

Huge investments were made in transformation. Potential savings expected from streamlining and improved business practices were already taken out of the budget and used to fund other DOD programs. The Air Force financial management (FM) community finds itself in this same position. Significant change over the next several years will occur because of ongoing transformation initiatives. The success of these initiatives will directly influence the long-term viability of the FM community and the support it provides its customers. Make no mistake; this process must be successful.

In December 2005 the Air Force announced a 40,000-member reduction to its military personnel. The FM community’s share was close to 900 people, about one-quarter of its military strength. The tough question is, how do you take this kind of reduction and continue to perform the mission? Fortunately, the FM community had much of the answer since it had been studying ways to transform its operations since 2002.

A good friend once told me that “revolutionary change happens within an evolutionary context.” This is definitely the case for FM transformation. The plan depends on projected efficiencies through consolidation of finance activities and from the new systems coming online. Alone, these may not be transformational, but combined they are. According to John G. Vonglis, the assistant secretary of
the Air Force for financial management, the Air Force’s FM transformation plan is the “single biggest change in the 60-year history of our career field.”

The FM community’s plan, however, does not guarantee success. During implementation there will be many challenges, but one of the largest challenges may come from within. There is no way to know exactly how employees will react, but as Rosabeth Moss Kanter, a renowned change expert, puts it, “People don’t want things to change; they just want things to get better.” The library is full of books and articles providing different models to ensure successful transformation. Regardless of which model is used, each starts with bringing people to the realization that change is needed.

While these change models differ, they tend to be very similar and have one common theme—organizational leaders have the primary role in ensuring success in the change process. Based on this fact, the critical step in preparing for transformation is ensuring that leadership, at all levels of the organization, is ready to take on the challenge of change. This may be a challenge within the FM community due to the unique characteristics of each base-level organization. Yet there are several ways to prepare the commanders and supervisors to lead this change effort.

First, the leaders charged with implementing the change must understand the overall vision. The vision performs three roles: (1) it provides an understanding of the general direction the organization is heading, (2) it motivates people to take steps toward the determined destination, and (3) it helps orchestrate the actions of the entire organization. An effective vision should save time and money, as the organization will focus its efforts on value-added things that help achieve the goal.

Second, leaders should be encouraged to take risks. Successful transformation demands midlevel leaders and managers with the self-confidence to take the risk of empowering others. As leaders encourage followers to engage, the result should be more intellectual and emotional involvement, which in turn should result in greater “buy-in” and commitment to the process. Often leaders do not feel comfortable to “let go” during major changes and see it as a loss of control.

Third, leaders should be provided development opportunities. Long-term success is dependent on having leaders in the future with the right skill set to get the day-to-day job accomplished while making an effort to encourage further change. This will not occur by accident but only through a well-orchestrated development plan.

The viability of the FM community relies upon successful transformation. Transformation is difficult and needs the right leadership at all levels of the organization to be effective. If the leader is able to gain support for the vision and allow subordinate personnel to take an active role, the likelihood of long-term success is increased. This goal requires a systematic investment in personnel development.
Observers point out that the solution for Iraq lies in diplomacy and political action rather than in military action. I disagree—the solution for Iraq is not an “either . . . or” dilemma in which policy makers must choose military, diplomatic, or political actions. It is not a special case in which each initiative proceeds sequentially as one group hands the problem off to another; rather, all initiatives must work in concert to move from the present state of violence, terror, and instability toward a better society in which people no longer fear for their futures. And, ultimately, it is a solution Iraqis must forge themselves.

Recent history contains a success story with a combination of diplomatic, political, and military measures in the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Amb. Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy and lead US negotiator for the talks, characterized the effort as the “last best hope for peace.” The framework accomplished what many at the time believed impossible: diplomacy, backed by military force, created the conditions for stopping ethnic cleansing and conventional military conflict and established a foundation for ongoing political progress. With the surge in US troop levels, perhaps now is the time for a corresponding all-out diplomatic push to help Iraqi leaders realize that they face a choice between a more precipitous descent into civil war or a retreat from violence. What stands in jeopardy is the ultimate benefit derived from eliminating one of the most brutal regimes of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

In the early 1990s, a similar problem confronted European and US policy makers as the former Yugoslavia descended into ethnic violence waged by paramilitary, conventional forces, and brutal gangs. Pessimists claimed that peace agreements would last only until the next fighting season. Europeans feared that violence brewing in the Balkans would spill over into neighboring states. US leaders initially viewed the Balkans as a European problem. And the combatants used the lack of consensus among European and US leaders to good tactical advantage as violence reached genocidal proportions.
Only a coordinated effort including judicious application of force, the realizable threat of military escalation, and intense diplomacy involving all parties ended the war in Bosnia. But the centerpiece to this resolution was the diplomatic effort led by Ambassador Holbrooke and his dedicated team of negotiators. The denouement occurred when the parties gathered at Wright-Patterson AFB near Dayton, Ohio, to hammer out the agreement that later became the Dayton Accords.

Several key features made the Dayton effort a success. First, Holbrooke only negotiated with principals. He refused to allow Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to deal through his chosen proxies. Once Milosevic announced that he spoke for the Serbs, Holbrooke held him to that position and refused to allow new voices from the Serb camp to enter the dialogue. Second, Holbrooke sought to keep military pressure on Serb forces to set the stage for diplomatic initiatives. In doing so, he kept all instruments of power on the table. This allowed him to wage his diplomatic campaign from a position of strength characterized by the integration—or at least the availability—of all instruments of national power. Finally, he worked to shape the agreement in ways that precluded the resumption of fighting. Disarming combatants first and then working issues such as right of return for refugees and border delineation under a firm cease-fire increased the potential for a lasting peace. But even with these sophisticated tools, Dayton almost failed. At the last hour, representatives grudgingly agreed to terms that largely remain in force more than a decade later.

Conditions in Iraq today are not analogous to those of the former Yugoslavia. There are, however, principles from the Dayton experience that may help resolve conflict in Iraq. First, Iraqis must realize that finding peace in their country is their responsibility—not that of third-party interlocutors. Mediators can facilitate negotiations, but they cannot deal with the political and social conditions Iraqis must confront. Second, separating sectarian violence from insurgency-based violence is essential. Third, mediators must have the commitment of their respective governments to use necessary means (within reason) to move negotiations along. Finally, they must be prepared to walk away from negotiations—either to allow military force to bear or to place responsibility for continued violence and its consequences squarely on Iraqi shoulders.

The conflict in Iraq stems from frustrations after nearly 30 years of injustice imposed by the Ba’athist regime. It will not be easy to resolve. State and nonstate external agitators, coupled with the imbalance among Kurd, Shi’a, and Sunni groups, introduce complexities in Iraq that did not pertain to the same degree in the Yugoslav conflict. Also, the various groups vying for power in Iraq must reach a point where they believe they can gain as much or more at the negotiating table as they may on the battlefield; otherwise, they will continue seeking violent solutions to seemingly intractable problems. Dealing with these factors is a necessary component of the Iraqi solution. Nevertheless, only through diplomacy carried out in the public view integrated with other instruments of power can the potential for resolving conflict prevail.
The Perils of Unprofessionalism

Dr. Anthony Cain

As societies and their institutions experience stress, they can succumb to the temptation to tear themselves apart in a search for relief. Individuals who serve faithfully and well can come under attack from those seeking to identify scapegoats or to assign blame. While review and critique are important parts of learning strategic and operational lessons, such devices can have far-reaching negative effects on people and organizations when they depart from professional standards of respect and common courtesy. As the United States grapples with the challenges of the global war on terror, the military must be on guard against the perils of unprofessionalism.

A recent *New York Times* advertisement carried the headline “General Petraeus or General Betray Us?” The political action group MoveOn.org sponsored the ad as a means to question and criticize Gen David Petraeus’s motives and testimony before Congress on the progress in Iraq. Commentators have justified MoveOn’s accusation that Petraeus has committed treason by claiming that the tactic was necessary to call attention to the issues, thus igniting a serious and robust debate. Perhaps these kinds of libelous remarks are common in the rough-and-tumble world of partisan politics. Unfortunately, they can also become increasingly common among the officer corps.

It is one thing when overzealous political action committees launch smear campaigns to discredit political actors—it is another thing entirely when serving officers launch poorly considered and equally poorly constructed attacks against their superiors. In both cases, the attacks say more about the attackers than they do about the targets of the invectives.

Officers who launch public broadsides against the services or their leaders cross the boundary separating officership from actions that jeopardize good order and discipline. When retired officers and active-duty field grade officers publicly criticize civilian and uniformed leaders, they send several signals. On one hand they use the office of their rank to communicate that there is a lack of consensus among the military about national policy. While retired officers certainly have the right to participate in policy debates, they should do so with an understanding of the weight that their expert opinions have on those who hear their messages. On the other hand, senior officers who criticize civilian and military leaders and their policies also communicate to junior and noncommissioned officers that their leaders may not be qualified to lead. Such broadsides reflect individual disillusion with the system and with the senior officers with whom the nation has entrusted its defense.
Many of these attacks hark back to criticisms of the Vietnam-era generals who “failed” to stand up to the Johnson administration’s flawed approach to winning the war against Vietcong insurgents or North Vietnamese regular forces. According to the critics, the most popular correction for the alleged tepid performance of the Joint Chiefs would have required them all to resign in protest to force the administration to correct its approach to the war. Following this line of reasoning has led some to conclude that since Vietnam, military and civilian leaders have repeated the mistakes of that era. Generals failed to transform the services to fight small wars; instead, they pursued transformation strategies focused on high-tech platforms. Doctrine did not keep pace with the types of conflicts that we would face.

It is sometimes easy to forget that Vietnam and its aftermath occurred at a time when the United States faced a significant conventional (and nuclear) threat that it could not ignore. Service leaders in the post-Vietnam era knew the military was unprepared to meet the Soviet threat; and they, to use the current vernacular, recapitalized the force—both the technology and the personnel side of the force structure—to meet that threat. It is also easy to forget that in the past 20 years defense budgets have consistently declined (with the associated decrease in personnel end strengths). Generations of leaders from Vietnam to the present faced threats, shrinking budgets, and evaporating forces while somehow managing to win conventional wars against Iraq (twice), Bosnia, and Afghanistan; contain a defeated Iraq (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) for more than 10 years; and sustain major humanitarian and nation-building efforts across the globe. This has also occurred in the context of revolutionary changes in technology, organizations, and the international environment. At any one point along the post-Vietnam historical context, to suggest that engaging in counterinsurgency in Iraq would be the inevitable outcome would require clairvoyance beyond imagining. In other words, our leaders have managed to lead well in a time of unprecedented challenges to our national and international security.

It is also commonplace to articulate that warfare is ultimately a political activity, which implies that the politicians ultimately—and rightly—hold the deciding vote. In democracies, generals are usually understandably reluctant to comment publicly on policy matters—especially after the politicians cast the deciding vote. Generals are also reluctant to try to force the hands of their political masters for fear of upsetting the constitutional subordination of the military to civilian leaders—this is no trivial matter. In the post-Vietnam era, rather than seeking to cultivate more political involvement from its ranks, the officer corps has looked askance at “political generals” because they seem to have crossed the line between policy making and policy execution. We need look no further than the example of former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who resisted
committing the nation to war in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia (in the last instance, to the exasperation of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright).

Politicians cast the deciding vote on the ends and the means. Generals seldom think they get enough clarity in the former or investment in the latter, which leaves them to do the best they can with the third component of strategy. Generals find themselves devising ways to accomplish what they perceived to be ill-defined ends with insufficient means. And for their service, we owe them thanks rather than accusations of betrayal and treason. Despite the turmoil in Iraq now, all is not lost—nor does the United States have to make an all-or-nothing commitment to winning in Iraq. That is the often-missed part of the definition of limited wars—they are limited in the ends sought and the ways in which states seek those ends. One of the classic strategic blunders is to mistake the nature of the war in which one engages—in this case it is a mistake to use the language of unlimited wars in a clearly limited context. And visions of inevitable dominos falling in the Middle East just as they might have in Southeast Asia do little to calm the impulse to feed more blood and treasure into the fight.

It is a strength of democracy in the United States that we subject our policies to open and vigorous debate. We can and should accept challenges to policies from all layers of the political spectrum—participants in the process should also know the difference between normal debate and dissent and the kind of libelous attack against people who serve honorably. MoveOn.org crossed that line with its attack on General Petraeus. Officers must also know where to draw the line. Unprofessional commentary from the officer corps will jeopardize the hard-won respect that the US military has earned and enjoyed over the years. Furthermore, senior officers who sow seeds of ill-conceived criticism will reap the same crop in the future as the current generation of junior officers and noncommissioned officers follow their unprofessional examples. At a time when the debate over national strategy requires constructive, innovative ideas, there should be no room for character attacks or broadsides—especially from the officer corps. Engaging in such behavior imperils the faith and trust that we all place in the military.
To the best of our knowledge senior leadership, No. 1 and No. 2, are there, and they are attempting to reestablish and rebuild” (Mike McConnell, director of national intelligence, 1 March 2007). It is time to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. Air, space, and cyberspace power will play a vital role in finding, fixing, and attacking the enemy in Pakistan.

September marks the seventh year of combat operations in and around Afghanistan. Employing a more robust offensive strategy and campaign plan to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist organizations in Pakistan is necessary to winning the long war. Very few insurgencies with safe havens abroad have been defeated. Winning in Afghanistan and the long war is no exception. Isn’t six years sufficient time for Pakistan to capture or kill key leadership targets?

Although Pres. Pervez Musharraf is saddled with a delicate balance due to internal political and stability concerns, his military clearly requires greater assistance from the United States and world community. Despite political concerns, Pakistan should not be let off the hook when it comes to destroying terrorists. Analysis of Pakistani reaction to the Red Mosque uprising in the summer of 2007 may indicate that the silent majority favored the use of force.

What are the lessons to be learned from the Red Mosque uprising? Perhaps Pakistan could be doing more to fight terrorists? Although a nuclear power, is the country more stable than analysts think? The Red Mosque uprising, failure of the 10-month plan and strategy to work with tribal leaders to police al-Qaeda along the Afghan border, and increased violence are events that should have been a catalyst for greater diplomatic initiatives in support of Pakistan. Instead, they represent examples of missed diplomatic opportunity.

Now is the time to offer military assistance in the fight against homegrown and imported terrorists in specific regions of Pakistan. Diplomacy is vital to setting the conditions for operating
militarily in Pakistan. Failure to take greater diplomatic and military risk in defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda within Pakistan is unacceptable. What is needed is a campaign plan to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan through the use of air and land power.

The early phases will rely on diplomatic initiative to open the door for greater military effects within Pakistan. Then the dominate phase would simultaneously assist Pakistan with space, cyber-space, air, and land-power capabilities directed at finding, fixing, and finishing the Taliban and al-Qaeda within the North-West Frontier region and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Planning for follow-on operations in the Baluchistan and Sind provinces should be conducted. Critical to the campaign plan is Pakistan’s permission and coordination to deploy coalition forces to the FATA and North-West Frontier Province. Pakistan military and security forces will play a supporting role.

Our diplomats should be selling this plan to Musharraf and opposition candidate Benazir Bhutto. For six years Pakistan security forces have been unable to find and kill the likes of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar. Although sensor technology and intelligence capabilities have been utilized to locate terrorists in Pakistan, until land and special operations forces are employed on the ground with airpower in a supporting role, the terrorists and top leadership will continue to operate with near impunity.

Cyberspace operations will influence al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, recruitment, and funding efforts. However, until the government of Pakistan permits the world community to assist it militarily on its soil, the descendants and disciples of bin Laden will continue to export terrorism and pose a global threat. Therefore, the campaign plan must address the radical madrasahs, opium trade, and funding to terrorists. Outsourcing the required military capability to private contractors or relying solely on Pakistani security, intelligence, and army forces does not and has not answered the mail.

A significant finding of the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland) is that al-Qaeda “regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan [FATA], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.” The threat requires a strategic shift which hinges on long-term commitment, political will, and joint land and airpower. Greater political and military risk is required!

Land, air, space, and cyberspace power will play a vital role in defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda operating from Pakistan. Until DNA can be tracked from space, human intelligence will also play a key role in finding the enemy. Soldiers and marines supported by air, space, and cyberspace power will be required to find, fix, and finish this threat. As William Tecumseh Sherman stated in September 1864, “War is cruelty and you cannot refine it.” The government of Pakistan and world community must step up to the plate with the political will to join forces and find, fix, and destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda threats.
America’s enemies and competitors watch fascinated as Washington turns on itself over Iraq. Gen David Petraeus’s plea for just a little bit more time underscores the dilemma the United States faces. On average, successful counterinsurgencies take over a decade to resolve. The United States needs many more years to attempt to achieve a stable, self-governing Iraq. With growing opposition in Congress, including senior Republicans, the administration is running on incrementalism. Bold policy options are needed; anything else is weakness.

Those who hope for US failure in Iraq know that they win when they do not lose. The deciding factor, therefore, is time, something America’s enemies inside Iraq have in abundance. Time provides the space in which the low flame of insurgency can continue flickering against both US will and the increasingly dislocated politics of Iraq.

However, it is to misunderstand the war to look to General Petraeus to buy America more time. He should be congratulated for developing the new counterinsurgency doctrine and successfully implementing it on the ground. In counterinsurgencies, political stability follows reconstruction, and reconstruction follows basic security. The problem is that General Petraeus is starting a long way behind the curve. A true soldier-scholar, he has made real inroads against the multiple insurgencies in Iraq. Security is improving in some provinces, laying the foundation for reconstruction and political stability. However, as the general admitted this week, the security environment is not improving everywhere, suggesting the “whackamole” dilemma (insurgents moving from Anbar to Diyala) might be continuing despite the surge.

Yet, in Iraq the biggest dilemma is political, not military. It is possible that the genie of political insecurity has long left the bottle. If that is the case, all the tactical military success in the world will not stop the rot. The Iraqi elections were a remarkable achievement, with a high turnout in the face
of grave threats against voters. But the imbalance resulting from the Sunni refusal to participate and the subsequent erosion of security combined to put formidable pressure on the new government. Making matters worse, the new government was itself riddled with factionalism. Clashes among factions continue to occur both in the cabinet as well as on the street as their respective militia struggle for power. Consequently, it should not be a surprise to learn that the police force, in particular, is compromised, and questions remain about the loyalty of parts of other security forces.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in Baghdad, an even bigger political problem exists in the United States. American will in the war in Iraq has been undermined by US policy failures. In order to sell the war, the administration made three critical mistakes that have since come to seriously weaken national will.

First, it overinsisted that it would be a short, inexpensive war: “It could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months” (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 7 February 2003); “I think it will go relatively quickly, . . . [in] weeks rather than months” (Vice Pres. Richard Cheney, 16 March 2003); “The cost of a war with Iraq could be in the range of $50 billion to $60 billion” (Mitchell Daniels Jr., director of the Office of Management and Budget, 30 December 2002).

Second, it failed to anticipate the insurgency: “I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators” (Vice President Cheney, 16 March 2003).

Third, it hyperinflated the threat: “There is no doubt Saddam Hussein now has WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. . . . There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use . . . against us” (Vice President Cheney, 26 August 2002); “Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud” (Pres. George W. Bush, 7 October 2002).

The reality is that the United States has now been at war in Iraq for the same duration as World War II. The war has turned into an insurgency that the US military, under General Petraeus, has only recently started to manage effectively. The war in Iraq (excluding Afghanistan) has resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 US military troops, nearly 800 contractors, and 127 journalists (according to July 2008 statistics). Military operations cost approximately $2 billion a week. The long-term costs of the war are harder to calculate. For example, over 33,000 casualties (to date) will require medical and related support for years to come. Finally, there was no evidence of WMDs.

The unfolding of these stark realities over the past few years has put increasing pressure on the willingness of the American public to stay the course. This political reality outweighs General Petraeus’s ability to provide a military solution measured in weeks or months.
The real choice before the American people is much starker than whether to act on General Petraeus’s advice to Congress. Bottom line: we have to accept the current situation and be realistic about fixing it, or we cut our losses and get out.

The question then becomes what is the higher cost—leaving now or staying another 10 to 20 years? If the United States leaves now there will be a bloodbath, but that will resolve a lot of the political questions it is frankly unable to influence. Iraq might break up. Who would gain control of Iraq’s oil reserves would also be a key strategic question, given the benefit to terrorists that the income from the oil fields might generate. Iranian-backed pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states would likely grow. However, Iran’s influence would probably be moderated by Iraqi and regional Arab-Persian tensions. Moreover, a bloodbath would no doubt put refugee pressure on Iran, complicating its strategic choices. Al-Qaeda safe havens would no doubt arise in the Sunni uncontested zones, but it is unclear if these would be outside of US strategic reach.

If the United States decides to stay, it should commit to at least 10—if not 20—years. Such a commitment would put overwhelming pressure on Iraqi insurgents who are currently merely waiting for the day the United States leaves. The silent Iraqi majority, who fears US resolve will never outlast the fury of the armed minority in its midst, will be empowered to choose freedom. This would not guarantee a perfect government in Baghdad, but it would provide the right conditions (security, reconstruction, political stability) within which Iraqis can attempt to find their Abraham Lincoln. Iran would be held in check, and the long-term prospects of the Middle East would be much brighter than today. However, such a commitment would be further fulfillment of Osama bin Laden’s warning that the United States intends on occupying a Mideast country indefinitely and would no doubt continue to act as a recruiting base for his villainous cause. The long-term problem, of course, is the very high risk that all of this would be in vain and that all of the negatives noted above would be heaped upon many more US deaths and a broken treasury (if not world economy).

Perhaps the greatest irony is that the longer the United States commits to staying, the more likely it is to succeed. Anything short of a multidecade commitment is incrementalism that will change nothing.

Dr. Cobb’s Blue Dart was judged as one of the top two award winners. For more on this topic, see his article “A Strategic Assessment of Iraq” in *Civil Wars* 9, no. 1 (March 2007: 32–60).
The events of 11 September 2001 thrust America into a war against terrorism, principally the form most closely associated with radical Islam born in the Middle East region. The dark clouds of this war have been forming since the end of World War II, with increasingly aggressive terror attacks on US citizens and interests occurring worldwide and shifting into high gear in the last decade. Pres. George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operation Enduring Freedom in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the terror attacks on New York and Washington, DC, with the broader global war on terror’s (GWOT) goal of eradicating terrorism as a viable tactic for those who wish harm upon America.

Operation Iraqi Freedom set out to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. An intended consequence was to establish an island of democracy in a volatile region, with the spreading of democratic values acting as a stabilizing influence. The US strategy is inherent in the president’s words to the Iraqi people on 10 April 2003: “We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave.” This strategy aims to rapidly withdraw US forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government on its own.

However, history has shown in the cases of post–World War II Germany and Japan that establishing a democratic government in a former enemy state from the ashes of war is a lengthy and expensive proposition. In those two cases, continued US military presence under the auspices of mutual defense and security cooperation agreements in the face of a common enemy not only served to eventually defeat that foe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but also enabled those nations to flourish into global economic powers and stalwarts of democracy.

The US strategy for Iraq falls short; it relies primarily on optimism without regard for historical reality. The strategy envisions a representative government in Iraq that assumes responsibility for gover-
nance in toto, including the guarantee of individual civil rights, internal and external security, and oversight of a market economy. Security responsibilities will transfer gradually to Iraqi forces, with the coalition providing supplemental quick reaction forces. A phased withdrawal of coalition forces would then occur from heavily populated urban areas into consolidated locations in less populated areas. Eventually all US forces will then withdraw from Iraq. One might assume that US forces would remain in the region outside of Iraq as a return to the status quo of the pre–Operation Iraqi Freedom force posture.

This strategy bases its foundation on an Iraqi government that is friendly to the United States, maintains liberal trade policies (particularly free access to oil by the West), openly engages in military-to-military cooperation, and enters into mutual defense and security cooperation treaties with the United States and neighboring governments. As President Bush asserts, free and democratic nations do not tolerate or support terrorism; therefore, the Iraqi government would enthusiastically support the United States’ GWOT, providing military forces, intelligence sharing, basing, cooperative planning, and other assistance. More importantly, a free and democratic Iraq in the Middle East provides an island of moderation in a volatile and unstable region. This inverse variation of the “domino effect,” with democratic values emanating from Iraq throughout the region, would temper the influence of radical factions in neighboring Middle East states.

While this outcome provides a solution to the Iraq problem and assists in the war on terror, it depends more on optimism rather than pragmatism. Although it is the best case, it is also the least likely. Once US forces depart Iraq, the probability of them returning by invitation to provide internal security assistance or to prosecute the GWOT seems fortuitous at best. Conversely, US forces returning to accomplish these missions by brute force would invite international disdain and political backlash against US unilateralism. An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of US military forces on defendable bases, lasting at least until victory in the “long war.” Iraq’s strategic and central geopolitical location in the Middle East necessitates that the United States maintain its influence there, ideally to enable a symbiotic relationship through military presence.

Alternatively, international agreements struck now with an increasingly ambivalent Iraqi government may allow for a Guantanamo Bay–type circumstance, allowing for US military presence irrespective of the political environment. Ensuring a strong future role for Iraq in the US global war on terrorism is achievable only through a logical and coherent strategy based on historical precedent and contemporary reality.

From the earliest days of man’s journeys he has depended on the basic signs of nature to guide his way—the sun, the stars, and landmarks along the way. Technology developed over time, and man used new implements to better exploit these basic natural guides—the compass, charts, sextants, timepieces, and so forth. In the last half century, perhaps the greatest advances in navigation technology have been created—precision radars, inertial navigation systems, computer-controlled aircraft systems, “paperless” charts, and the global positioning system (GPS). Unlike the natural guides they may exploit or replace, these technological wonders require an element that natural navigation aids do not—power and a permissive electromagnetic environment. Without this environment, these technological tools cannot function as they are intended.

Since the world’s entry into the twenty-first century, our schoolhouses have progressively trained a military force that is highly dependent on modern technology to accomplish its mission. We have approached our training and employment philosophy from the perspective of a global hegemon—always able to ensure an environment permissive to the use of these new and emerging technologies. However, with technological advances came also innovation in countertechnology—the ability to deny the use of these invaluable tools. Some of these include jamming technology—communications, GPS, computer network attack (CNA), electromagnetic pulse weapons, and so forth. Our training establishments embraced these new tools; however, they did so at the cost of skills such as celestial navigation, radio direction-finding, “time hacks,” and other time-tested, effective tools.

Today’s generation of aircraft has as its primary instrumentation a “glass cockpit”—or virtual instruments generated by computers interpreting inputs from sensors, digital compass equipment, and other mission-specific devices. But what happens when use of these new technological marvels
is denied by a technologically-savvy adversary? What happens when the GPS constellation is not available to tell aircraft where they are? What happens when damage to an aircraft takes away the computer or the display capability? Are there backup systems?

The answer is yes—and no. While there are basic analog (nondigital, noncomputer) navigation instruments, they lack the ability to effectively navigate long distances. The F-22—our Air Force’s newest and most advanced fighter—has an ultrahigh frequency direction-finding (UHF/DF) capability with its backup instruments but does not have that capability using a high-frequency (HF)/DF signal, which would enable it to home in on a shore base over long distances. For aircraft such as the C-17, C-130, P-3, and other long-range search and logistics aircraft, the skill of celestial navigation is no longer available as a long-range navigation aid. Both the Air Force and the Navy have stopped teaching this centuries-old skill and have removed the equipment—and the capability—from their aircraft.

The answer is a simple one—don’t eliminate the basic skill sets upon which our technology of today was built. There is still a use for wet compasses, sextants, flashlights, charts, and stopwatches. There is still a use for HF/DF homing. There is room in the training continuum to start with the basics before immersing our future pilots and navigators into their technology-driven flying careers.

We must also be able to effectively attain our goals in a nontechnological battlefield. As technology marches ahead, we must refocus on the traditional means that have guided people through centuries, reintroduce basic navigational skills and equipment into our training continuum and aircraft, and be prepared for the full spectrum of operating environments.

It is this foundation of basic skills—and having the basic equipment available—that will allow our joint air forces to operate when our technology is gone. We watch as riders on horseback, living in tents and communicating with simple means, effectively attain their goals. These are the adversaries that will prevail when technology is taken out of the equation.

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The World Wide Web enables people around the globe to view a wide range of content with high availability and low delay. This phenomenal and seemingly ever-present capability, built upon the fixed infrastructure of the Internet, has fostered tremendous innovation in the way we conduct business. A side effect is that it has created a voracious human appetite for data and connectivity and impatience with systems which fail to provide it.

A natural result of this capability is that military leaders desire the equivalent capability for military operations. Indeed, net-centric warfare is repeatedly touted as key to continuing US military superiority. Despite years of yearning, we seem to be floundering in our attempts to bring net-centric visions to reality, primarily because there are significant differences in the infrastructure required for equivalent military systems. The purpose of this piece is to explain the chasm between such fixed infrastructure and the operational environment of a military network and to encourage national investment in solutions to these challenges in an effort to improve military capability abroad as well as domestic emergency services.

Military operations have one characteristic that is fundamentally different from the Internet: mobility. For military networks, mobility exists not just at the edge of the network (e.g., cell phones) but at the core, where aircraft, ships, and trucks would be the equivalent of mobile cell-towers. This presents two significant problems—a wireless backbone and dynamic topology—each of which causes significant disruptions in connectivity.

The wireless medium is a harsh environment. While messages are rarely corrupted in wires and fiber-optic cables, wireless communication links must employ a vast array of error correcting schemes for successful connections. As mobile nodes move around, the wireless channel changes
frequently. Nodes may move in and out of range, resulting in persistently intermittent connections. Such intermittent behavior severely degrades performance of systems which expect high reliability. New protocols which can absorb the losses gracefully are required.

The second problem arising from mobility is more subtle. As devices move with respect to one another, knowledge of present connections must be somehow maintained and updated in order to route information. For small systems, the overhead required for this is minimal. However, for large systems, the amount of data required just to exchange the updates can exceed the capacity of the network. As a result, the network cannot scale up unless mitigating mechanisms can somehow reduce the amount of connectivity data required.

Several key challenges remain. How do we structure an addressing protocol to take advantage of preplanned military movement while ensuring reliable packet delivery when key nodes do not follow the prescribed plan? How can we maintain reliable connections when links are persistently intermittent? And how do we invest in and develop such a network in an evolvable fashion, preserving our investment as new systems become available? The answers to these questions will be determined through focused research and development in these military-specific challenges. And who will do that?

Commercial entities are now the primary innovators of the worldwide Internet. That is useful for the Department of Defense (DOD) as we no longer shoulder the burden of development costs. However, there is little incentive for commercial developers to design and build the systems and protocols required for the kinds of mobile networks needed by the DOD; hence, relatively little research and development exists in these areas. It is true that wireless research is strong, and there is much research funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the area of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), but these only address a portion of the challenges faced by a mobile network core. Commercial systems simply do not require movement of the access points of the network. Military systems do. And as long as we attempt to adopt commercial solutions for our military networks, we will be unable to create a truly mobile military network. We must design and build it ourselves—just like DARPA did with the Internet in the first place.
Improving the Responsibility and Accountability of Privatized Military Firms

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In a recent edition of the *Wall Street Journal*, Yochi Dreazen comments on the killing of an Iraqi security guard by a Blackwater USA contractor in December 2006. He states that “to date, no US contractor has been put on trial for murdering an Iraqi” and cites Cong. Jan Schakowsky’s remark that “there are almost as many contractors in Iraq as soldiers, and they seem to be entirely outside the reach of the law.” While government contractors can play an important role in contributing to US policy, their mistakes can have a negative impact. To stabilize and improve contractor performance, future agreements with privatized military firms (PMF) should resemble those associated with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program.

P.W. Singer, in his book *Corporate Warriors*, describes the modern rise of the privatized military industry and examines the role PMFs play in US policy. He describes PMFs as “private business entities that deliver a wide spectrum of military and security services” and cites the security gap created by the end of the Cold War, various transformations in warfare, and faith in marketplace efficiency as the primary reasons for PMF growth. Singer classifies these entities as provider, consultant, or support firms and states that the “idea of private businesses as viable and legitimate military actors has begun to gain credence among a growing number of political analysts and officials.”

But do these policy makers clearly understand the benefits and problems associated with PMFs? The transformed US military force that achieved initial combat success in Iraq was not organized, trained, or equipped to handle various postwar nation-building requirements. PMFs quickly filled these roles.

According to Singer, PMFs can rapidly provide military capabilities, offer a means of bypassing public debate and legislative controls, and achieve greater cost savings when compared with using military forces. While these benefits are alluring, they tend to offer only short-term solutions. Singer
states that these “companies become a temporary means of propping up the existing order, but do nothing to address underlying causes of unrest and violence.”

The problems associated with PMFs are numerous and significant. Singer highlights contractual dilemmas, difficulties with international relations, maintaining an appropriate civil-military balance, and unpredictable moral behavior as challenges related to using PMFs in war zones. He states that “through privatization, the state’s agent of action is now no longer its national military, but instead a profit-motivated actor.”

Any potential solution should begin with the initial agreement and address the above-mentioned problems. The features associated with the CRAF provide a useful framework for dealing with PMF concerns. Under CRAF agreements, US civilian airlines provide aircraft to meet Department of Defense (DOD) emergency airlift requirements. In return, CRAF participants receive guaranteed government contracts during peacetime. According to Air Mobility Command (AMC), these guaranteed contracts amounted to over $418 million in 2005, with an added $1.5 billion coming from additional DOD business. CRAF activation occurs in incremental stages depending on military airlift augmentation requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft must be available for service within 48 hours and are controlled by AMC during mission execution.

Several benefits suggest themselves when applying a CRAF-like framework toward PMF augmentation to the US military. First, government contracts are established prior to conflict. This helps avoid potential cost fluctuations or delays in service that can accompany negotiating a contract during a crisis. Second, guaranteed peacetime contracts provide PMFs with a consistent income source while at the same time offering leverage against poor performance. If a PMF fails in providing effective warehouse security in Iraq, it could lose its guaranteed contracts in the United States. Third, incremental activation and established response requirements would provide the DOD with a wider range of capabilities and greater flexibility in responding to different emergencies. Finally, when activated, PMFs would fall under DOD control. The DOD would be responsible for incorporating PMFs into military operations and oversight that would ensure PMF performance remains aligned with host-nation laws and US policy initiatives.

Current trends indicate that PMFs will play a growing role in US policy. As such, US policy makers should consider establishing programs and procedures that direct their utilization. Arthur S. Miller once wrote that “democratic government is responsible government—which means accountable government—and the essential problem in contracting out is that responsibility and accountability are greatly diminished.” Applying a CRAF-like framework to PMFs would help achieve both of these desired characteristics.
Are Afloat Prepositioning Programs Putting US National Security Strategy at Risk?

Col Clarke D. Henderson, USMC

In recent years, many factors have placed much greater importance on Department of Defense (DOD) afloat prepositioning programs. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a nearly 50 percent reduction in US military forces permanently stationed overseas, resulting in a reliance on strategic airlift and sealift to deploy forces from the continental United States (CONUS) to respond to global threats or humanitarian crises. The FY 2007 US government budget includes measures to continue this trend through its Global Posture Initiative, a plan to reduce overseas bases from 850 to 550 and return between 60,000 and 70,000 military personnel to the CONUS over the next six years. Allies and coalition partners are also under increasing pressure to avoid hosting permanent and temporary US military bases as they try to maintain domestic and regional political support by taking more neutral positions in regards to US foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, conventional and nonconventional threats against forward-deployed US personnel and overseas bases have increased in recent years, and threats against fixed sites are forecasted to become much more lethal in the future.

The National Defense Strategy of 2005 describes the need to review our capabilities of forward facilities and prepositioning programs and increase our capacity to rapidly surge forces in response to future global crises. This strategy document also highlights the need to transform afloat prepositioning from the current organization of individual service programs to a future program that “must be increasingly joint in character” in order to rapidly source, deploy, and employ a joint force.
Both Congress and the DOD have recognized this imperative and have recently sponsored numerous studies and research efforts related to strategic mobility and prepositioning. The 2005 Government Accountability Office report *Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs* concluded that, although directed by Congress, the DOD has not moved forward on plans to develop future joint prepositioning programs. This report found that as much as 75 percent of afloat prepositioning equipment sets and supply stocks have been used in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and have yet to be reconstituted. It further states that without a plan that establishes a joint framework and prepositioning priorities, the “DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will ultimately produce programs that will operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable.”

Without taking aggressive steps to recapitalize afloat prepositioning and transform it into a program that supports the rapid deployment of a joint force, the United States will continue to accept unnecessary risk to its national security strategy. The DOD should use the upcoming drawdown of forces from overseas commitments and the need to recapitalize equipment as an opportunity to transform today’s service prepositioning programs into a joint maritime prepositioning force (JMPF). This program would be a driving mechanism to promote the implementation of current joint doctrine and future concepts, specifically designed to support joint command and control, joint deployment, and joint theater logistics operations. It would also include capabilities that have been developed to meet unanticipated expeditionary combat requirements and mitigate operational shortfalls highlighted during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The JMPF would provide a logical move forward toward the future goal of interdependent joint operations vice the ad hoc methods of coordination and deconfliction of service component capabilities that have characterized past operations.

Establishing a JMPF program will allow the geographic combatant commanders to project a force that is organized as an integrated and interdependent joint organization before arriving in an operations area. A JMPF-based force could rapidly employ with coalition and US forward-presence forces and prepare an operations area to receive and integrate heavier follow-on forces from the United States or overseas commands in other regions. This advantage will be particularly important should the United States have to quickly respond to a future crisis in an
austere environment, without the benefit of having the many host-nation forward operating bases available as in recent operations.

Transforming afloat prepositioning from service-centric capabilities into a joint program could be accomplished with the ships and equipment sets currently allocated to prepositioning programs. Additionally, it will reduce or eliminate redundancies that waste critical ship space today, providing extra space to add combat capabilities or enhance support capabilities that could be quickly outstripped in a future high-intensity operations scenario. Until the DOD acts to correct prepositioning program deficiencies, the United States will continue to assume undue, excess operational risk to its national defense strategy.

Colonel Henderson’s Blue Dart was one of the top two award winners. His article is more fully expanded in his 21 February 2007 Air War College paper of the same title (see https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2007/awc/Henderson.pdf).
One of the greatest challenges confronting the global community is the preservation of the physical expressions of mankind’s cultural heritage. If left unchecked, increasingly intensifying pressures will inevitably lead to the destruction of a significant portion of that heritage.

Of course, simply because a building or site is old does not automatically make it a property worthy of international, national, or even local preservation efforts. Alternatively, many buildings and sites are certainly worthy of preservation. Some have significance for the whole of mankind while others possess national significance for a particular state and its peoples. Still others are of local significance. But many of these properties are increasingly threatened by such pressures as uncontrolled urban/industrial expansion, population pressures, pollution and other environmental changes, and unregulated tourism. These threatened sites must be immediately targeted for stabilization and preservation or they will be irretrievably damaged or destroyed altogether. Either they will fall victim to the urban/economic planner who, for reasons of public safety and/or economic development, will seek to demolish them; be overtaken by local developers; or succumb to uncontrolled destruction by what is, in many cases, a desperate, expanding population in search of shelter. In any case, there is a clear risk that these sites will be lost—and if they are lost, a piece of mankind’s common cultural heritage, a nation’s heritage, or local identity will be gone forever.

The history of the preservationist movement has shown that successful preservation efforts must blend local enthusiasm and support with meaningful national backing. In this context, many government archaeological agencies—both in developed countries and throughout the developing world—are to be both admired and commended for their tenacious efforts to preserve historic sites, often with extremely limited resources. Unfortunately, however, many other states, especially those in the Third World, lack agencies and qualified personnel with the skill and dedication neces-
sary for the preservation of the antiquities entrusted to their care. Moreover, there is always a shortage of funds, and even many protected sites in Europe and the United States are both fragile and underfunded. The problem of scarce resources is even greater in developing countries where the authorities are under tremendous pressure to prioritize resources designed to develop the economy and address vexing social problems. While cultural preservation projects may seem insignificant when compared to other demands, the ravages of time will not wait.

It is possible, however, to generate revenue for the stabilization, restoration, and development of threatened historical sites through the tourist industry itself. For understandable reasons, many countries, especially those in the Third World, consciously refrain from charging high admission prices to visit antiquities so as to enable their own nationals to visit these sites. But greater use of an “antiquities surcharge” for foreign visitors in conjunction with visa applications and hotel accommodations could be exclusively dedicated to facilitate restoration projects. In a larger sense, however, if significant sites around the world are to be preserved for posterity, the wealthier nations of the international community must provide increased financial assistance. Actually, with respect to properties designated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as World Heritage sites, the 1972 UNESCO convention created the World Heritage Fund to facilitate their preservation. Similarly, the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict created a fund for the protection of cultural properties at risk from damage or destruction as a result of armed hostilities. Moreover, there are several other international bodies and professional organizations that stand ready to assist in preservation efforts. Indeed, in the past, the international community has taken decisive measures to preserve such endangered monuments as Abu Simbel and the Temple of Philae in Egypt. The need today, however, is perhaps greater than ever before for the wealthy nations of the world community to generously contribute to restoration efforts so that worthy preservation projects will not be abandoned simply due to the proverbial “lack of funds.”

Just as wealthy nations should make preservation of mankind’s cultural heritage a high priority, recipient states must use the money wisely to guarantee lasting protection for funded sites. In addition, in determining which projects are to be funded and preserved, insofar as possible, decisions should be free of partisan and communal politics. It is an error for a state to allow the decay or, even worse, the destruction of architecturally and historically significant symbols and structures just because they represent foreign or indigenous oppression or a religion other than that which is officially endorsed by the governing authorities. In this context, one of the most egregious examples of destruction was the demolition of the Buddhist statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Finally, once
sites have been stabilized or restored, they must be maintained by dedicated professionals and accessible to the public. Personnel administering these sites must be numerous enough to adequately protect them from those who would deface them. These guardians must also be individuals of integrity who are sufficiently professional and well paid so as to resist the tourist who would offer a bribe in return for the prohibited photograph or the loose brick to take home as a souvenir.

In short, we need to make the preservation of mankind’s cultural heritage one of the highest priorities as part of our larger agenda to make a better life for the world’s population. Earlier generations created irreplaceable elements of mankind’s heritage. Our contribution to history should be not only to continue to create but also to preserve and protect the heritage that earlier generations have entrusted to our care.
Net-centric warfare (NCW) promises to provide information superiority in the form of more reliable information delivered in a manner that is more complete and timely. It can be broken down into two broad subcategories: the operators who make critical battlefield decisions and the infrastructure they use to share information across the battlespace. An interface is needed between the two to allow them to operate effectively. The operators require information about the underlying network state in order to make informed decisions about which data streams can fit within the network bandwidth under current operating conditions. Similarly, the infrastructure requires information about the priorities of the operators in order to adapt to network changes in a sensible manner. Another way to say this is that the infrastructure middleware requires information about the context in which the information will be used as well as the relative importance of the users of the system—translated into numerical values that are amenable to machine use—in order to make effective decisions about how to optimize the routing, bandwidth management, and topology control in the system.

The need for work into this area is being driven by many simultaneous trends. The Department of Defense is placing a greater value on real-time information systems, such as the Air Force work in the joint battlespace infosphere. New communication technologies are becoming available that provide much greater bandwidth than was ever present before. Free-space optical (FSO) communication promises to provide extremely high bandwidth together with a very secure data link. The combination of high-bandwidth directional links together with broadcast radio frequency (RF) links
offers the potential for global connectivity while sidestepping some of the fundamental scaling limits associated with omnidirectional wireless links. However, directional links necessitate topological decisions in addition to the traditional network routing decisions. Because topology directly affects routing, the two tasks are inherently coupled. Although some work in communication across such hybrid networks has been done, little research has been done in the area of combined routing and topological switching decisions in such a hybrid-communication network.

New sources of information, such as sensor networks, predator drones, and more real-time battlefield information using tools like Blue Force Tracking are all contributing to a great rise in bandwidth demand at a time when bandwidth to the war fighter on the battlefield, as opposed to the rich bandwidth available to the air operations center (AOC) and in fixed military bases, is only growing slowly. Work is needed now in anticipation of greater bandwidth demand and availability in the future.

The Air Force Institute of Technology’s Cyber-Advanced Networking in Mobile applications Laboratory (Cyber-ANiMaL) is dedicated to investigating these and other important aspects of NCW to build the infrastructure required to provide an information-rich environment for the war fighter in the future. Key research areas include: (1) creating an interface to give the users of a battlefield information system the information they need to make intelligent choices about the bandwidth and network characteristics available to them; (2) providing the right information to underlying network hardware to allow it to effectively increase the utilizable bandwidth available; and (3) enabling the hardware to effectively manage routing, information management, and system topology to meet the requirements of the most critical military information sources. These systems will go far beyond the crude spectrum management performed today. The communication infrastructure of the future must be capable of incorporating preplanned node trajectories, such as an airborne flight path or satellite orbit, as well as preplanned communication mission needs. This could perhaps take the form of an information tasking order, which is similar to an air tasking order but concentrated on network requirements. Moreover, the routing and topology control subsystems must be able to adapt to dynamic network conditions including changing user needs.

Over a span of three years, the lab has already made impressive gains in approaching these problems. These gains include investigations into fast heuristics for topology-control problems when using directional lasers and RF signals, technologies that are able to overcome wireless network disruptions without modifying standard Internet protocols, and work that is even able to monitor and predict network conditions over time. Together, this progress is helping to point the way towards a truly information-rich environment for the war fighter in the future.
On 1 July 2002, an AC-130 supporting Operation Full Throttle in southern Afghanistan suppressed surface-to-air weapons that threatened coalition helicopter and ground forces conducting a security sweep. This lethal force engagement eliminated the threat but also killed significant numbers of civilians. The US Central Command (USCENTCOM) investigation concluded that the responsibility for that loss rests with those that knowingly directed hostile fire at coalition forces. The operators of those weapons elected to place them in civilian communities and elected to fire them at coalition forces at a time when they knew there were a significant number of civilians present.

The dead and wounded later observed by coalition forces were mostly women and children. Villagers had initially claimed 250 dead and 600 injured, but a village elder later admitted that the real numbers were only about 25% of those figures.

This event, described in the media as the “wedding party massacre,” galvanized many to argue that a war crime had been committed. As a result, this single event produced a propaganda coup for our enemy, damaged US international support, and weakened our legitimacy in Afghanistan. Consequently, it serves as an illustration of the incompatibility of the mission our military must fight and the tools we have provided it to do so. It also illustrates the dilemma that troops face in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Armed only with lethal means, our forces must achieve a balance between the opposing missions of pacification and offensive COIN—all while maintaining force protection with an enemy that is ruthless, invisible, and not hampered by rules of war. Individuals or vehicles approaching restricted areas may be a hostile enemy or disoriented civilians. Individuals on rooftops may be civilians seeking to escape the summer heat at night or a sniper.
seeking to ambush a patrol. When target discrimination is all but impossible and hostile intent ambiguous, tragic outcomes appear inevitable. The resulting loss of legitimacy and popular support threatens strategic objectives. In response to the civilian casualties of 1 July 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said: “It is going to happen. It always has and I’m afraid it always will.” I argue that this outcome is not inevitable if we recognize the importance of nonlethal weapon (NLW) technologies as an essential element in COIN operations.

Insurgents use violence to create chaos and casualties and, if possible, provoke a disproportional response. This serves their strategy in three important ways. If they can create sufficient casualties, they may break our will. If they attack government supporters, they may gain strength by intimidation. If they can provoke a disproportional response and create the perception that the government is both indiscriminately brutal and unable to protect the population, they can weaken its legitimacy. The challenge for counterinsurgency forces is to win the hearts and minds of a population and protect their forces from attack while they discriminate and destroy an elusive opponent who is zealous, resourceful, and not bound by the rules of war. When we compound this challenge with cultural differences that increase the risk of misunderstanding, mistrust, and mistakes and a military force optimized for lethality, the potential for failure is high.
The Efficient Use of Radio Resources
How Cognitive Radios Can Help

Dr. Richard Martin

Cognitive, or thinking, radios are those which can autonomously make decisions about when and how to transmit in order to best meet user needs. Three potential military applications of cognitive radios are more efficiently using available radio resources, maintaining a low probability of intercept of the communications signal, and avoiding or creating jamming.

Due to the proliferation of wireless communications devices, the radio spectrum is becoming increasingly crowded. Military users in particular have a need to transmit large amounts of data (e.g., reconnaissance images), making efficient use of radio resources paramount. However, many existing communications devices do not use these resources efficiently. Resources are often distributed to the various users, and if one user does not use its resources, they are not reallocated to another user. For example, the Link 16 communications system assigns short time slots to each user, and the users transmit in turn. If a given user does not have anything to transmit, the time slot is wasted, even though other users may have more data they wish to transmit. When the available resources are distributed in the time, frequency, and spatial dimensions, the problem becomes even worse, and a large fraction of the bandwidth may go unused. Cognitive radios can overcome this problem by sensing the available resources and filling them to capacity. Imagine an ice cube tray with four or five missing ice cubes and that each slot in the tray represents a time and/or frequency available for use. A cognitive radio would sense this situation and pour water into the tray until it was full, thereby using all of the available resources.

A second use of cognitive radios is the ability to transmit with a low probability of intercept (LPI). In tactical communications, one wishes to transmit without giving away any information to an adversary, including the simple fact that one is transmitting. A cognitive radio can avoid the spec-
trum used by an adversary and transmit elsewhere so as not to create a disturbance. To continue the ice cube analogy, if one arbitrarily picks a slot to make an ice cube, there may be one already there, and pouring water into that slot will create a disturbance—it will melt or crack the existing ice cube. However, by spreading one cube’s worth of water across all of the empty slots, no disturbance is created, and the small amount of water per slot may go unnoticed.

Yet another use of cognitive radios involves jamming. If an adversary is attempting to jam a communications link, a cognitive radio can evaluate the mode of jamming and attempt to sidestep it by choosing a method of transmission that is robust to that particular type of jamming. If the adversary changes its method of jamming, the cognitive radio will sense this and change its transmission mode accordingly. The radio operator need not be aware of this, and hence the human burden is reduced.

In a similar vein, if one wishes to jam an adversary, a cognitive jammer will sense the adversary’s mode of transmission and will select a jammer that will cause the most disruption. To continue our analogy, standard jamming can be likened to poking an ice pick into each slot in turn without looking to see if there is a cube there, whereas a cognitive jammer can be likened to looking in the tray first and repeatedly poking only the slots with ice cubes in them.

This describes what a cognitive radio does but not what it is. A cognitive radio is simply one that is defined primarily in software rather than hardware so that it is flexible, with the authority and intelligence to make decisions on how best to transmit. Developing the decision and control algorithms used in a cognitive radio is one of the research projects underway at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Many issues still need to be investigated before cognitive radios become fully mature. If multiple users are each trying to use a cognitive radio, they may each be trying to fill the same ice cube tray. Thus, a method of arbitration must be found in order to prevent conflicts. Other issues have to do with imperfect sensing, that is, having an imperfect estimate of the environment. If you do not have an accurate idea of which slots are empty, you may disturb existing ice cubes. By investigating these open issues, more mature radios can be developed that can efficiently use radio resources and confound adversaries.
How does one go about getting blood out of a turnip, when the turnip represents a dwindling military budget underpinning an unprecedented global war on terror being fought with the oldest aircraft inventory in the history of the Air Force? In his August 2006 “Letter to Airmen,” Gen T. Michael Moseley, United States Air Force chief of staff, stressed that the Air Force will meet today’s challenges by being “more agile, more compact and more lethal than ever—ensuring global air, space and cyberspace dominance for the United States as we enter the 21st century.” The Air Force financial management (FM) and comptroller community has long recognized the need to change and adapt when faced with a challenging environment. Despite actions of the FM community over the past 20-plus years, as well as existing internal transformation efforts currently underway, financial managers should continue to look for ways to operate more efficiently while guarding against degradation of existing support to the war fighter. While they have already made gains in achieving these goals through internal transformation initiatives, financial managers have not sufficiently exploited external opportunities to further lean the Air Force and posture it for continued success in the twenty-first century. It is time for FM to look outside its own house for consolidation efforts that will enable the Air Force to remain the world’s preeminent air, space, and cyberspace power in the lean environment of the twenty-first century.

The internal consolidation efforts implemented by FM in the past, as well as those efforts currently underway, do not sufficiently bridge the gap between where the FM community is and where it needs to be to support the war fighter in the lean environment of today. What then, should FM do? To remain relevant and better meet current realities, FM now needs to turn its collective attention to external consolidation efforts in the hope of freeing up additional savings for the Air Force.
It is imperative that senior leaders analyze such consolidation efforts to assess if changes will degrade, improve, or remain neutral to the ultimate bottom line—support to the war fighter.

Several options are available to senior leaders to begin the push for external consolidation. One way would involve consolidating the installation-level comptroller and contracting squadrons while retaining separate career fields for both functions. In addition, as part of the ongoing deployment of the new Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), the FM community should champion the establishment of a separate and distinct human resources (HR) specialist Air Force specialty code.

Time is a critical factor in determining external consolidation efforts. The deployment of the DIMHRS system is projected to occur in 2009, requiring timely decisions on the level of FM involvement in DIMHRS as well as consolidation initiatives with manpower and personnel (personnel shredout only). In addition, current transformation programs call for continuous process improvement and out-of-the-box thinking. Other Air Force career fields provide several examples for FM leadership to review where external consolidation efforts have successfully occurred. Financial managers can look to logistics readiness consolidation efforts as well as the recent merger between the personnel and manpower communities to determine the next phase of their own exciting transformation journey. They must consider beginning these external changes now to continue to be relevant to the Air Force and to America in the future. The FM community needs to get its arms around external consolidation opportunities and determine how, when, and with whom FM consolidation should take place to best serve the interests of the Air Force.

The time for financial managers to deliver is now. The way to deliver is through external consolidation. The Air Force and the American taxpayer are depending on the FM community to continue its transformation journey through all means, internally and externally, to successfully meet the challenges of “Financing the Fight” in the twenty-first century.
Arrows and an Olive Branch for China

Lt Col Clayton Perce, USAF

What's the US Air Force doing to help make China a “responsible stakeholder”? So far, not much. And it's time for that to change.

China's rise is practically a cliché. Everyone, it seems, is aware of China's rising economic power, military capability, and diplomatic and cultural influence. And many think China's rise will be the most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century. To meet that challenge, the US national security strategy calls for a balanced approach. With an olive branch in one hand, the United States is to “develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power,” including China. In this way the United States can encourage China to act as a responsible stakeholder—a nation which enforces the international rules, embraces the economic and political standards that go along with that system of rules, and contributes to international stability and security by working with the United States and other major powers. This is a tall order indeed, which is why the United States, holding a bundle of arrows in the other hand, is to “hedge against other possibilities” as well.

Since its earliest days, the US Air Force has been a powerful, cost-effective way for the United States to hedge its bets. And that proud tradition continues. Looking at the US Air Force, China sees a force that can deliver global vigilance, global reach, and global power... a force that can completely dominate operations in air, space, and cyberspace... a force that makes the responsible stakeholder path look like a pretty good deal after all.

And that's a good thing. But the Air Force, and the nation, could do better.

The US Air Force needs to go ahead and develop its “agenda for cooperative action” with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of China. Then it can provide the United States with additional sovereign options—not just arrows but also an olive branch—with which to respond to China's rise. This agenda should meet two specific, prioritized objectives: (1) do no harm, and (2) advance US security interests.
First, to paraphrase a former US Army attaché to China, the USAF should “do nothing to improve the PLAAF’s capability to wage war against Taiwan or US friends and allies, do nothing to improve the PLAAF’s ability to project force, and do nothing to improve the PLAAF’s ability to further repress the Chinese people.” Additionally, the USAF should implement solid operational security and counterintelligence plans for all engagement actions to limit the extent to which those actions aid PLAAF modernization. And the USAF should engage in multilateral forums with allies and other partners whenever possible to minimize the opportunity costs of engagement with China and to encourage a regional perspective.

Second, to best advance US security interests, the USAF should focus on the following areas, in priority order: security dialogues, to increase understanding and reduce miscalculation; limited cooperation, to address common security challenges; and intelligence gathering, to open a small window on PLAAF modernization efforts. Engagement actions should be selected based on estimates of the associated risks and benefits of the action to the United States, not on any consideration or expectation of transparency or reciprocity. China and the United States have fundamentally different concepts regarding deterrence, relationship-building and trust, so China will rarely—if ever—meet US expectations regarding transparency and reciprocity. Similarly, USAF engagement actions should not focus on deterring or influencing China. Trying to use an olive branch like an arrow can only lead to resentment, frustration, and failure.

That leaves scores of potential opportunities for USAF-PLAAF cooperation. The best prospects involve strategic consultation and dialogue between senior governmental and nongovernmental leaders; regional security cooperation through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and cooperation in nontraditional security fields such as environmental security, flight safety, pandemic response planning, POW/MIA accounting, search and rescue operations, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations.

Prudent USAF engagement with the PLAAF can play an important, expanding role in the overall US response to China’s challenge. It’s time for the US Air Force to step forward as the nation’s olive branch to China, not just its arrow.

The opinions in this Blue Dart are more fully developed in Lieutenant Colonel Perce’s 23 April 2007 Air War College paper Challenge and Response: Developing a USAF Agenda for Cooperative Action with China (see https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2007/awc/Perce.pdf).
Who should be responsible for making strategic and military policy? The textbook answer: civilians make policy and the military executes it. But the advisory process that precedes the orders and the implementation process complicate matters. When, how much, and at what level of detail should military officers advise civilian policy makers, and when should this process end? Conversely, when, how much, and at what level of detail should civilians involve themselves in the implementation of military policies?

When civilian and military leaders agree on these issues, harmony reigns; when they disagree, trouble may loom.

After observing powerful military commanders influence policy during the Clinton era, former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld intended to reassert civilian control of the defense establishment in order to “transform” it. He did not accept that senior military officers possess unique expertise about the management of violence to achieve political ends. His brusque manner and active management style kept the services on the defensive.

Although serving officers tolerated Rumsfeld, many retired officers and observers thought he exhibited too much confidence in his own ideas, too often disregarding advice from military commanders—particularly with regard to Iraq. They complained that Rumsfeld was intolerant of criticism and excluded critics from the decision-making process.

The primary example of this is the former Army chief of staff, Gen Eric Shinseki, whom Rumsfeld cashiered shortly after he publicly provided Congress with his best military judgment about post-war occupation forces. Such examples led to forced harmony but proved dysfunctional.

Rumsfeld’s departure may presage an equally dysfunctional harmony of a different sort—the dominance of military officers.
In May 2006, retired generals called for Rumsfeld’s resignation. In October, European Command boss Gen James L. Jones informed the Washington Post that he passed on becoming chairman of the joint chiefs because he would not be a “parrot on the secretary’s shoulder.” And after Rumsfeld’s resignation, the head of US Central Command, Gen John Abizaid, testified on Capitol Hill that “Shinseki was right.” New defense secretary Robert Gates has pledged to “listen to the commanders” as he considers “the way forward” in Iraq. This is the right answer. But there is a danger that he and the officer corps will overcorrect. It is possible Gates will be too passive in evaluating military advice.

And the generals may be too willing to offer it. On the day Gates was sworn in, someone leaked to the Post that the joint chiefs had “taken a firm stand” against “surging” additional troops to stabilize Baghdad and that Gates would find Abizaid “resistant” to increasing American forces there. Although President Bush has said the troop increase is “policy,” the willingness to preempt such policy reassessments through public statements does not bode well.

The military’s reaction to Vietnam was to hamstring civilian options through force structure and policy. Necessary capabilities were placed in the reserves to preclude the president’s ability to wage war without fully engaging the American people. And the Weinberger and Powell doctrines set exacting criteria for the use of force that circumscribed our ability to shape the post–Cold War world to our liking.

It may be that free people are free to do dumb things, as Rumsfeld famously put it. And perhaps his resignation has liberated members of the officer corps. Let’s hope their elation passes quickly and that they do not overcompensate for having their counsel suppressed. If not, more dysfunction looms.
Since the Chinese antisatellite missile test of early 2007, the US space community has swarmed to address how to protect space power now and in the future. Based on testimony from leading commanders, the United States must invest in tenfold improvements in global strike; space situational awareness (SSA); and flexible intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. These enable attribution and, more importantly, retribution should any nation interfere with US space power.

It seems natural to build such expensive, complex systems to protect expensive, complex satellites. Gen Bernard Schriever dubbed this “technological war,” famously predicting that “the kind and quality of systems which a nation develops can decide the battle in advance and make the final conflict a mere formality—or can bypass conflict altogether.”

In many other aspects of its mission, however, the Air Force is recognizing that technological superiority is an incomplete solution. The newly created International Affairs Specialist program proves that the USAF will work intimately with global partners and recognizes that future operations will require carefully crafted relationships. It is the right time to apply this inclusive mentality to US space power. There are numerous opportunities to expand relationships with space counterparts in places such as India and Europe.

India, for example, is currently deciding the composition and role of its own space force, Aerospace Command. Senior Indian Air Force officers are eyeing the USAF as a model and have visited to learn more. In turn, perhaps we can learn something from them. As an example, exercise Cope India proved to be eye-opening for USAF pilots when they were reminded that supposedly outdated technology consistently surprises in the hands of skilled operators. In the
past 20 years, India’s space power has met numerous challenges with unique solutions—what can we learn from its experiences?

Europe is also transforming its space power. Simple and global-market friendly solutions such as those used by England’s Surrey Satellite Technology company give us a glimpse of what effective “responsive space” might look like. With a new generation of federated ISR satellites coming online, the European Union is also tackling how to effectively share space data in what essentially is the coalition environment of the European Union. Many will argue that despite decades of experience, even the United States lacks a decent solution to this problem—therefore, some amount of collaboration would be worthwhile.

Granted, international cooperation is still uncomfortable to many in the US space community. A common concern is that through international exchanges, the United States will reveal sensitive capabilities or vulnerabilities that could be exploited by our adversaries. It is also common, however, to underestimate the sophistication many nations already possess. In fact, there is a sizable common denominator of capability that could be more freely discussed and shared.

In the increasingly multipolar space power environment, even a fractional investment in building ties will yield returns in developing space as a shared center of gravity, enable coalition-based threat monitoring and defense, and help us realistically test our policy and war-fighting assumptions. Developing familiar relationships now is a worthy parallel investment and may prove a critical complement to any technical system currently pursued.
The United States Air Force is poised to make another technological and strategic leap that has marked its short and storied history. The delivery of payloads of consequence over strategic distance is a hallmark of the Air Force contribution to national defense. Over the last 60 years the threats have changed, and the Air Force has combined ideas, technology, and doctrine to produce effects—relevant to its era—that give the president an enduring suite of capabilities for the nation. The emergence of cyberspace as a recognized domain is the latest in a series of technology-based mission sets dating back to the beginning of airpower.

Three cases have emerged and endured over the last 60 years. The 1930s and 1940s were years of strategic bombing. For the first several years of World War II, the only direct action against Nazi Germany was the strategic bomber. The strategic nature of the bomber and missile forces delivering nuclear payloads dominated the 1950s and 1960s. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Air Force recognized that a new operational domain and the enabling technology were emerging in space. Technology now enables precision strike and expeditionary operations as a timely projection of power that enables rapid response and immediately available strategic options.

The brief history of the Air Force is replete with examples of transformation and innovation geared toward leveraging the technology of the day against the emergent threat at the time. As the Air Force embraces operations in cyberspace, some lessons and warnings from the past can be drawn and applied to reduce turbulence within the force and streamline the adoption of this new domain into the war-fighting lexicon.

• Do not resist change. Do not fight the adoption of new technology that may threaten established communities and interests within the Air Force. The creation of new capabilities is driven by ideas and technology that are going to change.
• **Avoid institutional think, aka “The Way It’s Done.”** Air and space are definable domains with understandable and relatively apparent boundaries. Definitions are useful, but they change over time.

• **Remember the mission.** The mission of the service to organize, train, and equip drives funding and procurement. The Air Force has historically reorganized and restructured to meet the relevant threat of the day.

• **Do not wait for guidance ... accept risk.** The Air Force has taken the lead in identifying revolutionary technology and applying it to the strategic problem or threat of the day.

• **Develop strategic thinkers and leaders.** Each of the leaps in capability and options provided by the Air Force is the brainchild of exceptional leaders and thinkers. The Air Force created the institutions that produced the talent needed to keep each key mission relevant as the world changed.

• **Remember history.** As new technology emerges, it may threaten existing programs and constituencies. Ideas are often sacrificed at the budget altar. If new and innovative ways of producing effects compete too aggressively, they can become budget detritus.

• **Technology is only as good as the doctrine it supports.** The employment of strategic bombers in World War II varied by nation and national conditions as they developed in the interwar years.

One of the pitfalls for service planners may well be assuming that the executive agency for cyberspace operations will automatically be given to the Air Force, as it was for space. Cyberspace is inherently a joint, interagency, and civil environment, and claiming it or staking it out may not be in the national interest, although it would certainly be in the parochial Air Force interest. The creation of a subunified command with operational control of joint and interagency forces may well be the desired end state for the nation. A blatant power grab for primacy may initially put the Air Force in charge but at the expense of inclusiveness and a robust implementation of national security imperatives.

These lessons and warnings from history are useful as the Air Force begins the process of adopting cyberspace as an operational domain. By placing cyberspace in the context of the current strategic threat, the Air Force is poised to assume leadership in this new arena as it has in the past. The historic examples of the Air Force leveraging technology offer ways ahead and pitfalls to avoid. The intellectual and operational flexibility the Air Force has demonstrated in the past will be key to effectively operating in and dominating the new environment.

I have an operational focus and a tendency to think that words have specific meaning. As a result, I take issue with some recent uses of the term *joint interdependence*. Joint interdependence may, in fact, be a very good thing, but we need to know what we mean when we use the term. Therefore, I think we should more narrowly define it before we embrace it as the ultimate joint destination.

The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines *interdependence* as “a reciprocal relation between interdependent entities.” Simple enough, but delving into two further definitions—interdependent and dependent—leads us to the basis for my concern. *Interdependent* from the same source means “mutually dependent.” *Dependent* is defined as “contingent upon something or someone else; subordinate, or relying on or requiring the aid of another for support: dependent children.” Given these definitions, interdependence can be viewed through multiple lenses—social psychology, military, and economic—to name a few. From the latter perspective, the definition of *economic interdependence* states that national economies are dependent on one another for food, energy, minerals, manufactured goods, financial institutions, and labor. When I see this economic definition, it is probably the word *dependent* that causes me the most concern. Dependency in the economic sense, while a potential cause for concern, also reflects the reality of the world’s distribution of resources and the need to share this resource base. Extrapolating the economic definition to the operational military environment is my core concern. When we use an economic definition for joint interdependence, we must understand that we are talking about no single service being “able” to do its job without “aid and support” from another service. To what lengths are we willing to take this economic concept of joint interdependence?
I am not the only one advising caution when applying an economic interdependency concept to joint military operations. In the August issue of *Military Review*, Col Chris Paparone and Dr. James Crupi discuss an interdependent business model highlighting three types of interdependence, and they argue for the need to move toward organizational structures that facilitate reciprocal interdependence. There are some valid business (efficiency) reasons to move toward interdependent practices. But there are also frictions in the combat environment that make it very risky to embrace business practices when engaging in combat operations. Paparone and Crupi warn of the perils often discussed in my business school graduate classes some 20 years ago: there are inherent risks when balancing the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness. In their view, “given the requirement to properly balance these risks, the military might not want to rush toward business-like efficiencies in reciprocal relationships because doing so might endanger effectiveness.” Let me rephrase that: the military must maintain its effectiveness, and, therefore, efficiency must be a secondary consideration.

Interdependence taken to its logical conclusion can lead to single-point failure, and failure is not an option when your mission is to serve as the guarantor of US security. I am alarmed when I read articles that claim we must adopt interdependence as a model because otherwise we cannot afford the cost of defending the nation. In an article in the summer 2005 edition of the *Joint Force Quarterly*, Col Chuck Harrison states: “The Army Strategic Planning Guidance says that in order to reduce redundancies and gain efficiencies, we must become interdependent. That is, each service must depend on the other services for certain tasks so the entire force can function at the lowest cost.” Most alarmingly, the article goes on to suggest that artillery and close air support are redundant capabilities. That is, an artillery piece that can range 25 to 100 miles as often as required until it runs out of ammo is redundant with an aircraft that can range a thousand miles or more but will be limited to four to 20 passes on the target. And then this from the US Navy: “We must also examine our relationships with the Army and Air Force to exploit interdependence whenever and wherever possible. In a highly constrained resource environment, budgetary realities require it.” Caution: interdependence may be an attractive business strategy, but the operational practitioners of war must ask for the capabilities required by the combatant commander to enable effective defense of the nation. All good operators know efficiency is required, but the term *efficient* is not found in the military’s definition of *mission statement* per Joint Publication 1-2 (*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 [As Amended through 04 March 2008]).

Now don’t miss my point here. I think that the Army’s and Navy’s strategic guidance statements could be outstanding for establishing the most efficient and effective procurement practices for the
services. Interdependence might be a brilliant business strategy to pursue common interdependent acquisition strategies to affect the mutually supportive effectiveness goals of all services. I suggest that the USAF was right to propose that it act as the executive agent for development and procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles that operate above 3,500 feet. The USAF request for executive agent status was focused on “how” to buy the best capabilities for the services in the most efficient way. That is a valid argument for acquisition; however, the economic interdependent model is not the right one to use when determining “what” the military needs to procure to defend the nation, nor is interdependence in the context of the business model the path to insured operational success.

If we step back and look at the operational implications of joint interdependence, we will surely find a uniquely military definition more appropriate than other definitions that are in use in other disciplines. I like what Gen Peter Schoomaker had to say in the summer 2004 issue of Parameters: “Joint interdependence purposefully combines service capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities.” This is a solid operational definition of joint interdependence. It allows combatant commanders to identify required capabilities to the Joint Staff and the services (the providers), and the services can then budget for and provide those capabilities. It allows the military to provide the nation with the required number of options to defend the nation according to the risks the nation faces.

In closing, let me hearken back to a Cold War example that neatly fits the General Schoomaker operational definition. The strategic nuclear triad, composed of bombers, missiles, and submarines, was purposely not “dependent.” Those capabilities still exist to make sure that “independently” if only one leg of the triad survives, it will still be able to provide the firepower required to destroy the enemy. The triad is still a powerful deterrent, made possible by maintaining the ability to take independent action. The strength of the triad is that it purposefully combines the services’ capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. If we are striving for complete and total operational interdependence, the term itself must be properly defined and well understood. As the term is bandied around today, I must urge “Caution: joint independence.”
The greatest threat from a chemical, biological, radiological, or low-yield nuclear (CBRN) attack is neither the destruction of property nor a catastrophic loss of life. Few of America’s enemies possess the ability to carry out these types of attacks, and those who do can probably be contained. The greatest threat posed by a CBRN event currently is its ability to cause mass panic and undermine the public’s confidence in the government. CBRN weapons probably should be renamed weapons of “mass disruption” rather than weapons of mass destruction because that is the real threat. Although many experts agree that this is the primary threat from these weapons, few researchers have examined the problem closely or proposed solutions to the problem. But these attacks have occurred, and the answer to the problem lies in looking at these events.

The three most commonly cited CBRN events that involved mass panic are the 1987 Goiânia accident, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack, and the 2001 anthrax letter incident. Even though each of these events involved only a small amount of a CBRN material, health care facilities were overwhelmed with patients who did not need medical attention. These patients, often called the “worried well,” can constitute 20 times the number of actual casualties. In the Goiânia incident in Brazil, a thimble-sized amount of Cesium-137 affected 249 people and killed five, but more than 100,000 demanded medical attention. In the Aum Shinrikyo attack, the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system claimed the lives of 12 people and sickened almost 1,000, but more than 4,000 flooded hospitals seeking medical care. This worried-well surge stifled the medical community’s ability to respond. The anthrax attack saw a few teaspoons of anthrax shut down the US Congress.

So what can we do? This paper lays out a plan to mitigate this problem. First, government leaders can reduce and possibly eliminate the problem by learning to effectively communicate
with the public during a CBRN event. In the past, government officials were often reluctant to engage with the public and inadvertently stoked the worried-well response. To calm the public, government leaders need to develop an information plan well in advance of a CBRN event. This plan would entail partnering with the media, setting up Web sites and hotlines, and using prepared messages.

Next, local, state, and federal agencies should also promote greater community resilience. One way to do this is to conduct drills and exercises like the ones that were conducted during the Cold War. More importantly, local communities should be organized to develop plans for their area that will promote community “toughness” so that they can quickly respond and recover from a CBRN event.

Finally, health care facilities and responders need to set up alternate facilities away from health care centers that can screen and assist the worried well. This alternate facility could be staffed primarily by paraprofessionals trained to discriminate between the truly injured and the worried well. The worried well could be monitored, while the truly injured could be sent to local treatment facilities.

The worried-well response in the cases studied reveals a frightening potential problem. These cases were relatively small, and yet they caused a swell of people to seek medical care. The health care facilities in the United States are unable to handle even small surges and would be crippled by a significant CBRN event. Unless the problem of the worried well is addressed, the health care community will be swamped with unaffected patients and neglect the truly injured. The result will be significant social disruption and needless loss of life. Currently, there are very few papers on this important topic. This is one of the few that lays out a comprehensive plan to deal with this difficult problem.
No Rest for the Weary—
Special Operations Missions Proliferate

Col Bradley Thompson, USAF

Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has gotten significantly smaller, but its overall missions and operations tempo has increased dramatically—especially after the horrific events of 9/11. Due to its unique capabilities and responsiveness, the Secretary of Defense has mandated that the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) be given the lead role in prosecuting the global war on terror (GWOT).

Within USSOCOM is a very small community of Air Force battlefield Airmen comprised of combat controllers, pararescuemen, and combat weathermen, known collectively as special tactics (ST). This community of highly specialized Airmen has been integral in the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as operations in the Horn of Africa. Like the rest of the DOD, it has also seen its taskings proliferate to include, most recently, adding domestic humanitarian relief missions to its mission sets. This concept was best illustrated during the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Despite significant balancing around its overseas commitments, nearly the entire ST community had some role in rescuing hundreds of stranded victims and reopening two major airfields—most notably the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport. To handle these additional taskings, the ST chain of command has primarily responded in an ad hoc manner. Although this has proven successful in the past, the ST community as a whole could do better with a concerted effort toward longer range planning. Furthermore, it is neither equipped nor funded to support domestic missions. Lastly, the use of ST assets is a zero-sum game. When the ST community responded to Katrina, for example, other missions and training were delayed or cancelled. Although the ST community has the “right stuff” to successfully respond to these additional missions, it is the wrong use of an overtaxed community.
There is, however, an existing military component designated to accomplish domestic first-response missions: the Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG has two such special tactics units administratively assigned to its command that are better suited and constitutionally authorized to respond domestically. However, drawing on detailed research and interviews, the author found that notwithstanding the domestic focus of the regular Guard, its special tactics squadrons have the same mission statement and nearly the same deployment operations tempo as the active ST force. Conversely, both active and Guard units were called upon to act during Hurricane Katrina. Of course, *posse comitatus* places restrictions on the active unit functions within the United States—restrictions that do not apply to the Guard units. On the contrary, circumventing *posse comitatus* is one of the reasons for the existence of the Guard. While the Guard should be permitted to support the active duty ST forces in the GWOT and related external tasks, this should not be at the expense of its domestic missions. Moreover, both groups, which have special operators in the tens and not hundreds, need to plus up given the high payoff in both combat and domestic support roles.

The author argues that the Guard’s ST squadrons should reprioritize their mission statement to indicate the support of the homeland mission first; if they then have any remaining capability, they should only lend support to the GWOT mission. Additionally, the author recommends continued education of key decision makers—specifically, at both the National Guard Bureau and the state adjutant levels and within the active force’s ST chain of command—to ensure that all parties have visibility of the inherent capability that exists within the Guard. This level of awareness will help ensure that the Guard’s ST forces are tasked before the active ST forces. Lastly, the author recommends that the ST chain of command initiate some form of joint planning between the ST state and Guard bureaus, which should help reduce ad hoc mission responses. This should also enhance interoperability when, indeed, these parties do get tasked to come together to respond to a domestic crisis.

Whether one believes in “global warming” or not, there is nonetheless overwhelming scientific evidence that the climate is changing. This change is very likely to cause more frequent and destructive hurricanes to strike the United States in the future. It is incumbent upon our nation to remain ready and forward thinking in order to provide the best and most effective response possible. This will include using the unique capabilities inherent within the Guard’s special tactics squadrons. They are the right force with the right capability and are federally mandated as first responders to support their respective states and regions. Leveraging the Guard’s ST forces will free up the active ST forces to focus on the GWOT.
The United States, China, and Japan
Living in Normalcy?

Col John Tobin, USAF

Political scientists, policy makers, and heads of state often refer to Japan’s desire to become a normal nation, yet fail to define exactly what “normal” is. Normal countries share several key factors. They are economically able to engage in the globalized economy, able to provide internal and external security for their people, and led by a stable government that can conduct independent action using its various sources of national power.

In light of this definition, how normal are China, Japan, and the United States today? China has all the elements to be “normal.” Its limitations reflect its relative youth as a modern world power, stunted by years of seclusion and mismanagement. Mature economically and politically and with a population level unlikely to grow, Japan appears to have reached its potential. Only Japan’s military restraint prevents it from being a normal actor on the world stage. The United States also shares the characteristics of a normal nation. However, lack of US legitimacy—as seen through the eyes of other countries around the globe—is slowly eroding this nation’s ability to exert influence.

What about normalcy between nations? Dr. Ni Lexiong, a professor at the Shanghai Institute of Political Science, argues that when China is stronger than Japan, there tends to be peace and stability in the region. Conversely, he contends that when Japan is stronger than China, there will be war and conflict.

To test his theory, analysis of the major historical conflicts between Japan and China is called for. Essential measurable elements of national power for this analysis are economic strength, population, and military strength. Conflicts between these two nations are numerous. The Battles of Bun’ei and Koan, fought between 1274–81; the Imjin War of 1592–98; the First Sino-Japanese War of
the Second Sino-Japanese invasion of China fought during World War II provide the basis for a test of Dr. Lexiong’s theory.

In all these military adventures, China only once attacked Japan. On all other occasions, the Japanese were the aggressors, apparently convinced that despite a much smaller population, its economic strength and military might could prevail. Japanese decision makers recognized the obvious numerical military disadvantage they faced, yet convinced themselves their technical superiority could prevail.

Why has conflict not broken out between Japan and China for the past 60 years? China is formidable, but its national power certainly has not eclipsed Japan’s. The evidence makes a strong case that Japan’s economy and military presently put the nation in a more powerful position than China. China’s population—roughly 10 times the size of Japan’s—certainly represents potential power, but this burgeoning population represents as much liability as advantage.

It is clear that calculations of the balance of power between Japan and China are not indicative of future peace or aggression. The unique security relationship between the United States and Japan and the intertwined Sino-Japanese economies make it unlikely either of these nations will conduct anything more than military posturing and diplomatic or economic uses of their national power.

Armed with the outcome of this analysis, a prescription for US policy is clear. First, the United States should attempt to ease Chinese fears of a remilitarized Japan. Second, it should encourage both China and Japan to become responsible global stakeholders. And third, the United States should work to help remove current barriers to a more normal relationship between China and Japan.

The relationship between China, Japan, and the United States is complex, changing, and fraught with “abnormality.” However, few relationships between nations can contribute as much to global security as this one. The United States should act as a responsible steward to shape the trilateral relationship in order to foster a healthy relationship between Japan and China. China and Japan should step up fully to their roles as responsible stakeholders and help guarantee peace and stability throughout Asia.

US policy towards Asia must be deliberate and focused. Ultimately, the United States may have a large say in what will be normal in Asia. The United States must remain firmly engaged in the complex and historic relationship between Japan and China. It is crucial that the United States use every instrument of its national power as a counterweight for Asian balance between a fully maturing Japan and the adolescent China, emerging from its tremendous growth spurt, as they both pursue a more normal relationship.
Genocide

LTC Joel Williams, USA

The United States, as the current world hegemon, should prepare for and take early action in identifying and preventing genocide, regardless of location. Both pragmatic and ethical arguments support going beyond strong language and denunciation. Thomas Barnett’s work regarding intervention as it relates to globalization, Alan J. Kuperman’s statistics regarding the genocide in Rwanda, Andrew Natsios’s arguments for early intervention, and Joseph S. Nye’s discussion of the benefits of soft power lead this writer to support early action in identifying and preventing genocide.

The criminal acts of genocide outlined by Article 2 of the Genocide Convention are straightforward. One can easily understand, for example, that starvation and forced migration under harsh circumstances are covered under “bodily or mental harm.” The difficult and ambiguous sections of the Genocide Convention appear to be how one would define Article 4’s “shall be punished” and Article 5’s “provide effective penalties.”

Theologians and ethicists have long stated the moral mandate to act against the death of the innocent. The cynic would say that this applies at best only to our allies.

In his book Soft Power, Nye describes how the use of attractive, legitimate policies and actions “get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, [and therefore] you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.” With globalization spreading at an ever increasing pace, the visionary strategist should not balk at the idea of providing assistance to those who are not, but likely will be, strategic partners.

Barnett arguably nails the coffin shut on the argument against early intervention by stating that the cost of doing nothing is twice as much as “massing the Core’s collective power to impose peace.” Barnett goes on to say that states recovering from a genocide-like situation must “endure a roughly ten year recovery period.” However, if “troops can be offered for approximately five years
on average, then the country in question typically hits a growth recovery spurt in 4 to 7 years.” Stated bluntly, it is more expensive to do nothing. From Nye’s perspective, if we help underdeveloped nations now, they are more likely to help us later. Resource rich but chaotic regions must be viewed for their current economic worth as well as for their potential.

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine of no exit strategy, no intervention is an anti-intervention argument which must be considered overcome by the impact of globalization. In light of a globalizing world, a hegemon that ignores genocide is likely to suffer in terms of both economy and respect. It risks suffering direct action in the form of terrorism by failing to ameliorate terrorist breeding grounds.

Kuperman’s recommendations resulting from his analysis of the massacre in Rwanda are far more compelling and support not only early intervention but also activities which support stability and prevention of genocide. He makes a quantified argument for early intervention in his 2001 work *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*. According to Kuperman, of the 494,000 Tutsis killed as a result of genocide between 7 April and 21 July 1994, over 324,000 were killed in the first week alone. Economic sanctions, strong denunciations, and visits by diplomats will not affect this type of swift massacre. Although Kuperman later states that he does not believe early military intervention would have prevented genocide in Rwanda, the trenchant statistics he cites, as well as his later comment that the enemy military capability was weak, contradict him.

Given the speed with which genocide can occur, in order to prevent genocide anywhere in the world, an armed force capable of quick deployment to any location should be developed and ready to respond immediately. This force must be able to defend itself and to quickly assess a chaotic situation on the ground as well as be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct what has traditionally been called armed reconnaissance. This force would be the advance party to the “SysAdmin” (or stability, security, transition, and reconstruction [SSTR]) force Barnett describes. Waiting until genocide is confirmed, as Kuperman has shown, runs the great risk of arriving too late, after the bulk of the atrocities have occurred.

Rafael Lemkin was correct: when the rope is around the neck of the helpless, swift action is needed, not high-level meetings or consensus building. Sovereignty is no excuse for allowing genocide. Even more important than putting teeth back into the Genocide Convention and punishing the perpetrators is the ethical mandate to save the lives of the innocent. Saving the lives of the innocent will always be attractive to those who want to do right. Nye was also accurate—legitimate policies enhance our power—and saving innocent lives will always be legitimate.
Time for “Smart Power”?  

Dr. Jim Winkates

It has been almost seven years since the worst one-day loss of life on American soil. The global war on terror (GWOT) that began in October 2001 with the successful US intervention in Afghanistan to depose the Taliban regime and initially terminate the al-Qaeda leadership has now stalled. The effort has settled into an indecisive battle against a still virulent terrorist network, a debilitating and testy war of words within the United States and with its coalition allies, and a counterterror strategy that has created deep doubts about the capabilities of the US coalition to achieve victory. The war now exceeds the duration of World War II. The GWOT has largely been about the use of power to gain a decisive victory against an elusive foe. The essence of power is the ability to achieve what you want. The US strategy to achieve victory in this war has fallen short.

The heavy reliance on traditional instruments of “hard power”—use of military force, economic sanctions, and the use of “sticks” rather than “carrots” has so far fallen short. More of the same will not do. It’s time for a change in approach. Joe Nye, a Harvard University dean with considerable Washington policy experience, argues that hard power is “the ability to shape what others do,” while “soft power” is “the ability to shape what others want.” The American character, to its credit, has been marked by principled pragmatism over our 200-plus years of history. We now need to expand the network of allies and employ more soft power to shape what others want in the long war against terrorism.

The judicious combination of hard and soft power Nye calls “smart power.” We need to pursue a new strategy for the times. That strategy would embrace more multilateralism and far earlier coalition building. After all, brutal terrorist violence has touched the UK, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, India, and Indonesia, among others. A midcourse policy correction suggests earlier deference to the views of our historic allies, more engagement with countries (e.g., Iran and Syria) which are often
hostile to US interests in this war (“know your enemy”), more nonpartisanship in our domestic politics, and more coupling with our internal publics. It’s time to broaden the organizational response to global terrorism. Creation of a new World Council on Counterterrorism, to be led by “middle power” states most impacted by the scourge of terrorism, could be an appropriate and timely, broad-based policy vehicle. Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan can generate new or increased coalition support, but the war on terrorism might if that leadership is more widely shared. The major powers, including the United States, Russia, and China—all three of which have somewhat controversial counterterrorist agendas—would be associate members only as resource providers but not agenda setters, similar to associate status in other international organizations.

A revived International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), with 186 member states, could serve as the terrorist intelligence collection agency and coordinator of national police unit exchanges. The United States would still provide most tangible resources (money, technology, logistics) but withdraw from the prominent leadership role. Why? The United States cannot manage well two unpopular theater wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the GWOT. The latter gets short shrift but can generate far more allies because homelands are at risk, and they have contributions to make if the United States recedes from its too-prominent leadership role. Decoupling the GWOT from the shrinking support for the two combat theaters will delink national priorities and broaden prospects for the long war that really counts for all 200 nations—the war on terrorism and the extremist factions that fuel it. The new World Council would request any desired international military forces directly from the existing Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council.

International terrorism—not unlike pandemic disease, illegal narcotics, refugee flows, and international river basin regulation—calls for long-term, transnational, and institutionalized cooperation by the affected parties. These challenges are by their nature transborder and insoluble by individual, sovereign nation-states; beg for nontraditional, multilateral responses; and must be managed by multiple parties to avert health, environmental, or violent disasters. Multinational counterterrorist management would set a precedent in the arena of human conflict. Attacking causes of terrorism and low-end response would be the use of “smart power” by the United States.
Blue Darts

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