SECURITY ASSISTANCE--IT CAN BE A TWO-WAY STREET

By

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There are two views of almost everything, especially when U.S. government (USG) programs are the subject; and security assistance is certainly no exception. From the definition in JCS Publication 1, we know that security assistance (SA) is "a group of programs which provide defense articles, military training and related defense services, by grant, credit or cash sales to qualified countries in the furtherance of national policies and objectives." But many critics contend that SA is another case of the USG spending valuable tax dollars with no clear goal, resulting in the U.S. acting as a "merchant of death" which sells or gives unneeded weapons to insolvent third world nations.

Our concern with these two perceptions of SA is that neither one addresses specific SA cases to analyze the actual impact that SA is having on the foreign nation as well as on the U.S. At the case level, SA is much more than the generic description in JCS Pub 1, and is, in fact, one of the best programs that we have to assist our foreign friends. More importantly, SA can be mutually beneficial to both our armed forces as well as to the forces of the recipient nation. To illustrate this mutual benefit, we will examine two unique Republic of Korea FMS cases: the Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation system (ACMI) at Osan and an F-4E simulator located at Taegu AB. The ACMI and F-4E simulator programs are unique because they combine the joint U.S.-Korean use of military equipment with an FMS case to ensure the costs of operation and maintenance of these systems are shared equally by both countries. This joint-use concept reduces the cost to both the U.S. and Korea, while providing operational benefits to both countries. This paper describes the background of how these two programs developed; explains the operation of these programs; outlines their mutual benefits; and finally, proposes that the U.S. seek other opportunities to develop joint-use, cost-shared programs. In order to understand the purpose and value of joint-use programs, a brief background of these two cases is in order.

When PACAF began planning an ACMI system to enhance the combat training of Pacific region USAF crews, several sites were initially considered as offering an optimum location. The geographic search quickly ended when the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) announced it was interested in participating in the construction and operation of an ACMI range. Negotiators for both sides quickly resolved all legal considerations and agreed upon the framework for this joint-use effort.

The second Korean joint-use program is the F-4 simulator. Prior to 1981, when Kunsan AFB transitioned from the F-4 to the F-16, the ROKAF had been purchasing Kunsan F-4 simulator time on an hourly basis from the USAF. After the Kunsan F-16 transition, USAF and ROKAF representatives
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agreed to transfer the Kunsan F-4D simulator to Taegu AB where ROKAF and USAF aircrews could jointly share the simulator. Unfortunately, other requirements for the Kunsan simulator resulted in its shipment to Carswell AFB, Texas, in December, 1980. However, an F-4E simulator from Luke AFB was available and arrived in Korea in February 83.

We believe two factors influenced the decision to place an F-4 simulator at Taegu. First, the ACMI joint-use arrangement had recently been completed, and both the U.S. and Korea knew this type of arrangement could be implemented effectively; and second, there was already an existing agreement between the USAF and the ROKAF whereby ROKAF F-4 personnel were performing maintenance on USAF F-4s stationed at Taegu. Thus, both factors contributed to the joint use program that was developed for the F-4 simulator.

Having examined the origin of these joint-use programs, we will now briefly explain how both systems were designed, starting with the ACMI. The ACMI consists of antenna sensors located in and around a combat training range which can receive inputs from a transmitter pod placed on an aircraft. These signals can then be relayed by microwave to a computer data display system (DDS). A console at the DDS can depict and record a variety of aircraft actions performed during air-to-air engagements. In the Korean joint-use application, a single sensor range is used by both USAF and ROKAF pilots, but separate DDS's are located at both Osan and Kunsan ABs for the USAF, and at Cheong Ju AB for the ROKAF. Operation of the ACMI is under a contract to the Cubic Corporation, with all hardware and equipment owned by the USAF, except 21 pods and one pod test set. Operations and maintenance costs of the systems are shared equally by the USAF and ROKAF.

Operation of the F-4E simulator program is similar to the ACMI. To begin with, the USAF provides both the simulator hardware and the technicians to service, maintain, and operate the system. For its part, the ROKAF built the facility at Taegu that houses the simulator, and also pays a 50 percent share of all operations and maintenance costs associated with the system. In addition to paying for USAF maintenance, special contract maintenance, and spare parts, the ROKAF also pays the applicable asset use charges that are required for FMS cases per the provisions of Section 21(e)(1)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act. Now that we have briefly reviewed the development and operation of these two programs, let us turn to the benefits each air force accrues from them.

The first and most tangible benefit is reduced costs. Both the ACMI and F-4 simulator are operational necessities which are normally funded solely by the USAF. But due to the innovative nature of these two cases, the USAF enjoys both capabilities at a fraction of the normal cost. The fact that the ROKAF uses both systems should not be used as an argument that if they did not use them the costs would be proportionately less and that therefore there is no real savings for the U.S. In reality, the maintenance and MILCON costs associated with these programs would be almost the same without the ROKAF participation since the systems would still require certain facilities, personnel, and maintenance activities. The accessibility of these two systems also results in reductions in TDY, travel, and deployment costs for those USAF aircrews (frequently including aircraft and support) that would be required to obtain this training elsewhere. Thus, these programs
result in very tangible benefits for the USAF. Similarly, from the ROKAF perspective, both of these systems become quite affordable because the cost sharing agreements have meant lowered initial costs and reduced annual operations and maintenance outlays.

A second important mutual benefit is increased combat readiness. Looking first at the ACMI, we see one of the most beneficial aircrew training tools ever developed, since it allows actual training sorties to be taped for later review. This tape can be replayed at the aircrew's home base after mission completion, thereby allowing the aircrew to analyze those combat tactics which were successful and those which failed. The ability to use the ACMI on a frequent basis results in aircrews which are more proficient in their mission, more knowledgeable about tactics, and, therefore, more combat ready. Since this program is shared by the USAF and ROKAF, both sides benefit equally.

A separate aspect of combat readiness is enhanced in the F-4E simulator. Only in a simulator can aircrews be placed in emergency situations involving aircraft systems, enemy threats, and other dilemmas which could result in the loss of an aircraft. We have certainly proven that there is no substitute for hands-on training, and the simulator gives us the ability to train crews in situations which they may only see once in an aircraft without this training. Any training which increases ROKAF and USAF aircrew capabilities to save an aircraft and crew enhances our overall combat readiness.

The third mutual benefit to be discussed is one that is very difficult to quantify but is certainly significant in terms of international understanding. We are referring to the interaction of the ROKAF and USAF personnel involved in these two systems, and the enhancement of their mutual relationships. Both the ACMI and the F-4E simulator create numerous situations for Koreans and Americans to interact on an almost daily basis, not only on official topics ranging from tactics to logistical support, but perhaps more importantly, on subjects of direct mutual interest, such as culture, lifestyles, and global perceptions. The net result of such interchanges on both official and unofficial topics is a clearer perception by both Koreans and Americans of how the other party resolves problems, performs the military mission, views the world situation, and applies its value system. These perceptions are an invaluable part of increasing global harmony and cooperation, which is high on every free nation's list of goals.

We believe that the three benefits just discussed clearly demonstrate that these two Korean FMS cases are valuable tools in not only meeting Korea's defense needs, but also in achieving U.S. national objectives while improving our own defense capabilities. It stands to reason that since these two cases are accomplishing so many objectives with such a small amount of overhead, the U.S. should consider pursuing similar programs with other friendly and allied nations. In a world filled with divisiveness and competing ideologies, we should be quick to pursue any avenue which serves to bring us closer to our friends while improving our own capabilities.

But stepping back from these two specific cases we must again revisit the overall concept of U.S. security assistance. Using these cases as a microcosm, we have seen that security assistance can be handled in a way that bolsters our defenses and the recipient nation's defenses, and improves
cooperation on both national and personal levels. We know of very few other programs that can achieve so much for so little.

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