The conflicts of the future will require more than the ability to defeat an enemy, secure territory, and have freedom of movement through air, land and sea. It may require more than the consideration and balancing of the traditional three factors of Operational Art, time-space-force. A fourth factor called information, which impacts and underlies the three others, may be emerging. Whether information is an operational factor or part of force, its importance can not be denied. Part of what commanders must now consider as part of the information they require is knowledge about the human landscape. This human landscape, unfortunately, is not always scrutable or easy to understand. This paper discusses the options a commander, the director of Operational Art, has in reading the human landscape. It will examine the possibility of relying on anthropologists to provide that human landscape. It will examine the use of anthropologists within the framework of operational art, both past and present. It also asks whether the use of anthropologists for operational art is an ethical use of this discipline, for this has emerged as a major issue for anthropologists. It will also explore how best to use anthropologists and to what extent, and what, if any use, does operational art provide anthropology?
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“HUTS AND NUTS” OR “HEARTS AND MINDS”?—
ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND OPERATIONAL ART

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

The conflicts of the future will require more than the ability to defeat an enemy, secure territory, and have freedom of movement through air, land and sea. It may require more than the consideration and balancing of the traditional three factors of Operational Art, time-space-force. A fourth factor called information, which impacts and underlies the three others, may be emerging. Whether information is an operational factor or part of force, its importance can not be denied. Part of what commanders must now consider as part of the information they require is knowledge about the human landscape. This human landscape, unfortunately, is not always scrutable or easy to understand. This paper discusses the options a commander, the director of Operational Art, has in reading the human landscape. It will examine the possibility of relying on anthropologists to provide that human landscape. It will examine the use of anthropologists within the framework of operational art, both past and present. It also asks whether the use of anthropologists for operational art is an ethical use of this discipline, for this has emerged as a major issue for anthropologists. It will also explore how best to use anthropologists and to what extent, and what, if any use, does operational art provide anthropology?
INTRODUCTION: READING THE HUMAN LANDSCAPE

In wars and conflicts, all too often the Center of Gravity (COG) is misidentified. Even though the tactical battles are won, and the objective achieved by successfully attacking and felling what has been identified as the COG, the conflict continues unabated—albeit, its character may have changed. One sees this repeatedly in the post World War II conflicts of the twentieth century, when a leader or a military or paramilitary force was identified as the COG. One is perhaps seeing this now in the operations involving Iraq and Afghanistan. In many of these conflicts, the COG may actually be the hearts and minds of people. When these are won, fighting may be unnecessary (except during the interim when won-over hearts and minds are developing the will, means, and strength to protect themselves). Winning hearts and minds often does not require a military solution. What hearts and minds instead require are such intangibles as understanding, respect, and acknowledgement of their problems.

The conflicts of the future will require more than the ability to defeat an enemy, secure territory, and have freedom of movement through air, land and sea. It may require more than just consideration and balancing of the traditional three factors of operational art, time-space-force. Theorist Milan N. Vego raises the question of whether a fourth factor is developing in this information age, a factor called information that impacts and underlies the three others, or which may, instead, have such importance to combat power/combat potential that it is an integral part of the factor of force.\(^1\) Whether information is an operational factor or part of force, its importance can not be denied. Part of what commanders must now

consider as part of the information they require is knowledge about the human landscape. This human landscape, unfortunately, is not always scrutable or easy to understand.

This paper will offer the commander, the director of operational art, an option on reading the human landscape. It will examine the possibility of relying on anthropologists to describe that human landscape. It will look at the use of anthropologists within the framework of operational art, both past and present. It also asks whether the use of anthropologists for operational art is an ethical use of this discipline, for this has emerged as a major issue for anthropologists. It will also explore how best to use anthropologists and to what extent, and what, if any use, does operational art provide anthropology?

A historical look at the use of anthropologists and their data/analysis is featured in Appendix A. Its focus is to derive ethical and procedural lessons learned from this experience.

Appendix B examines recent Naval War College papers to divine contemporary insights into cultural awareness for operational art. Not all the options they explore provide the depth and breadth of expertise needed to support operational commanders, but much can be used for corroboration, alternative and timely insights, and to ensure necessary redundancy and back-up in the system.

Appendix C discusses some of the anecdotal reporting that demonstrates how commanders from tactical level to operational levels have come to regard the importance of anthropologists and of cultural awareness to their operations.

Appendix D explores the ethical dilemmas and procedural successes/failures that challenge anthropologists in their soul-searching to support the government, particularly the military and intelligence. Here are the pros and cons on using anthropologists to support
operational art. The existence of such controversy regarding the use of anthropologists makes it imperative that the military and intelligence communities engage with the anthropological community on how best and ethically to acquire detailed cultural analysis. It also highlights the need for the military and intelligence communities to consider alternatives.

In the main body of this paper, I will discuss current initiatives that make use of anthropologists to directly assist combatant commanders in the various campaigns and operations they plan and execute. Some of the ongoing proposals and initiatives enable commanders to do operational art with a cultural competence and understanding that goes far beyond the cultural awareness that currently “satisfices” needs.

Options that provide cultural awareness indirectly through anthropologists and by other means are discussed in Appendix E. These include but are not limited to: more culturally focused training (both on-site and web-site based) targeted to deployments and overseas tours; a more viable and career enhancing Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program; ongoing attempts by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to develop cultural intelligence (CULTINT); the establishment of a clearing house for sifting through publicly available anthropological information that could be used for military operations, reach-back options to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other Combat Support Agencies (CSA), open source centers, academic institutions; and even, the recruitment of first-generation Americans or immigrants raised and fluent in cultures of interest that could benefit operational planning.

Finally, I will conclude this paper by arguing why anthropologists should get involved and how and why it is in their ethical and professional best interests to do so.
DISCUSSION: ANTHROPOLOGISTS, CULTURAL AWARENESS, AND OPERATIONAL ART

A common understanding of the terms *Operational Art*, *Anthropology*, and *Cultural Awareness* must be established before any discussion of anthropology and its relationship to operational art can begin. For the purpose of this paper, I will adopt the views of theorist Milan N. Vego’s on *Operational art* from his massive work, *Joint Operational Warfare*. Dr. Vego presents operational art as follows:

…a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, constructing, and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives in a given theater. Operational art can be applied across the entire spectrum of warfare from operations short of war to high intensity to high intensity conventional warfare. Operational art highlights the need for commanders and their staffs to fully comprehend not only military but also nonmilitary (diplomatic, political, economic, financial, social, religious, etc) aspects of the situation in a given theater when they plan, prepare, and execute major campaigns or operations.\(^2\) [bolded lettering is my emphasis]

It is within this context of the commander’s need for knowledge that extends beyond military aspects of the situation that impels a new look at funding sources and proposals for the use of academics to read the human landscape within the “battlespace” or “operational environment.” At the national strategic level, Secretary of Defense Robert Gate’s Minerva Initiative and the National Science Foundation (NSF) have already challenged academia and others to offer their proposals and talents to benefit American understanding of the human

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2. Ibid., I-4; I-6; I-7. Bolded passage is mine, to emphasize the importance of non-military as well as military aspects to Operational Art.
landscape worldwide. These endeavors will be addressed in more detail later in this paper, but the results will likely benefit operational art and commanders as well.3

Using anthropologists for human terrain analysis is but one recommendation advanced to give Commanders that operational edge of cultural awareness—or, as some would insist, cultural competence. Yet how specifically anthropology and anthropologists will fit into the process of operational design is yet to be fully fleshed out. Understanding what anthropologists do and how they can contribute is not clear, either. The Encarta dictionary states that anthropology is “the study of humankind in all its aspects, especially human culture or human development. It differs from sociology in taking a more historical and comparative approach.” So broad a definition leaves much room for interpretation.

Even anthropologists have difficulties in describing and bounding what they do. United States Institute of Peace anthropologist and lawyer Montgomery McFate, for example, recalls the difficulty she had with her doctoral dissertation on the Republican Community in Northern Ireland. Her Yale University mentors and colleagues viewed her work as more “political science” than “anthropology.” She argued then and still insists, “how human beings go to war is as much a product of culture as table manners or sexual practices.”4 She regards anthropology as “a social science discipline whose primary object of study has traditionally been non-Western, tribal societies. The methodologies of anthropology include participant observation, fieldwork, and historical research. One of the


central epistemological tenets of anthropology is cultural relativism—understanding other
societies from within their own framework.” Through this focus of looking at a society from
the lens of that particular society makes anthropology and anthropologists vital to reading the
human landscape for tactical, operational, theater, and strategic operations.5

The suggestion to use anthropologists to support military and intelligence operations,
particularly in support of operational art, is not new. Throughout its short history as an
academic discipline, anthropology in its various forms often did assist military operations
and intelligence activity—though at times such use stirred controversy. Perhaps the most
significant use of anthropologists pertinent to the focus of this paper on reading the human
landscape was embodied in World War II employment of anthropologists to conduct
interviews with Japanese prisoners of war to piece together a greater understanding of the
Japanese culture and mindset. These studies were later used to successfully manage post war
Japan and its populace with dignity and respect. It was not until the Vietnam War that
anthropologists in greater numbers began to eschew an association with the military and
intelligence work as unethical. For a more detailed understanding of how anthropologists
have used in the past, a perspective on this history is offered in Appendix A.

That anthropologists and anthropological information is essential for operational art is
becoming a more acceptable tenet of modern warfare, according to Dr. McFate. Whereas
West Pointers used to refer to anthropologists as "nuts and huts," today’s Army officer is
more apt to praise anthropologists on human terrain teams for their insights. In the July 2004
issue of the Naval War College's *Proceedings*, retired Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.,
pointed out that overwhelming technology has its place in war, but conflicts such as Iraq

5. Montgomery McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of
required more—the "exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their
motivation." The Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Adm. Arthur Cebrowski,
also considered the father of the technology-heavy Network-Centric Warfare Concept,
observed in October 2004 that "knowledge of one's enemy and his culture and society may be
more important than knowledge of his order of battle." Finally, in November 2004, the
Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
sponsored the first major Department of Defense (DOD) conference on the social sciences
since 1962 and called it *The Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security
Conference.*

Little doubt remains that operational art would greatly benefit from an infusion of
academic expertise. Anthropologists such as Lt. Col. David Kilcullen already actively
contribute to the strategic level of operational art. In 2004, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense tapped Dr. Kilcullen, a political anthropologist and active duty Australian officer
working for Australian intelligence, to write on insurgency for the Pentagon’s Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) 2006, the roadmap for military spending over the next twenty years.
“On loan” to the United States, Dr. Kilcullen eventually came to work for the State
Department, and other influential government organizations and think tanks that shape what
the military does and how they do it. The U.S. Government/military’s refocus of the war on
terror from crushing terrorists to combating a “global insurgency” is in large part due to the
zeal and insights of Dr. Kilcullen and his insurgency expertise. His study of insurgencies

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6 Ibid., 24.
began in his cadet days at Duntroon, the Australian West Point, and led to his doctoral
dissertation on Indonesian insurgencies at the University of New South Wales. 8

Dr. Kilcullen persuasively argues that pursuing terrorists without addressing the
insurgencies that perpetrate these terrorist acts is akin to curing the symptoms but not the
disease. Shifting the objective from defeating terrorists to defeating the worldwide
insurgency changes the remedy from a military solution to a holistic examination of the root
causes of the insurgency and looks at how insurgents get supported and why. It leads one to
consider how to separate (“disaggregate”) the insurgents from their support base. Populations
often support insurgents because their own government has failed to understand their needs,
whether it be for protection (possibly from the insurgents and their coercion), or from neglect
to foster an environment where food can be grown, families sheltered, commerce and
infrastructure thrive, jobs and schooling exist, talks about religion and politics go unfettered,
etc. They desire governance that enables their culture. They prefer peace and security over
the upheaval and violence that clashes between government and insurgents bring. The re-
focus to a worldwide insurgency makes this more a battle for hearts and minds than the
pursuit of terrorists alone. It asks that one looks into the cultures of those in need of
disaggregation from insurgents to the social networks that suck people into supporting
insurgent acts of terror.9

Assisting the campaign to win hearts and minds is yet another way anthropologists
can assist the military, the State Department, and other U.S. and coalition agencies
interfacing with other cultures. Information operations are one way to let others know what is

8. George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Refine the ‘War on
9. Ibid.
being done on their behalf and to enlist their support. However, the conduct of information operations will fail unless some understanding of how the targeted culture and its people communicate and feel is factored into these operations. The assistance of anthropologists on planning such operations can be of use at both the operational and tactical level, and must help guide the strategic level.

Another example of operational level shaping is Dr. Kilcullen’s work on the Army Field Manual 3-24 on fighting counter-insurgencies. The stamp of Dr. Kilcullen, who calls counter-insurgency “armed social work”, can be seen throughout this doctrine which forms the foundation of how the military thinks about its role in and handling of insurgencies.  

At a more tactical level, Dr. Kilcullen is also well-known for promulgating tips to company commanders on how to conduct relations with the local cultures and tribes in Iraq and Afghanistan. His widely e-mailed suggestions were so avidly read by officers throughout the military, that they have now become part of critical thinking courses conducted by the military and defense intelligence. “The first tip,” recommends Kilcullen, is to “Know Your Turf…know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.”

Dr. Montgomery McFate, a consultant to the military on numerous occasions, has also contributed to several levels of operational art. She watched with dismay the mistakes the American military kept committing through their ignorance of the Iraqi culture. Finally

10. Ibid., 65  
11. Ibid., 62-63. Dr. Kilcullen’s suggestions are assembled under the title “Twenty-Eight Articles: the Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency” and were distributed in 2006. They were inspired by T.E. Lawrence, a British officer who had worked with the Bedouins during the early part of the Twentieth Century.
called in by a science advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to unravel the mystery of poor relations between the American military and the Iraqi population, Dr. McFate was able to interview soldiers throughout an eighteen month study that sought to uncover patterns of interaction between the Americans and Iraqis, and improve them. It was little wonder that this job came to her. On a fellowship at the Office of Naval Research (ONR), she was one of the few anthropologists on the Defense payroll. Her studies and recommendations helped to launch what is now known as the Human Terrain Team (HTT) concept.12

HTTs first began to recruit anthropologists and academics with cultural expertise and language skills in 2006. Their purpose was to assist in counter-insurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The recruited academics to deploy with army units to map out the populace in the local region, identify the various clans and their relationships, and advise commanders on how to approach indigenous populations to leverage support.13

In a recent talk about HTTs, Lt. Gen. David Valcourt emphasized that “the dominant terrain in the 21st century is human.”14 He saw HTTs as “campaign focused, culturally enabled” clusters engaged in “non-kinetic operations” that fostered “positive effects” on local populations. HTTs not only embedded social scientists with deployed forces, but also provided those forces with a 24 hour - 7 days a week reachback capability to subject matter experts (SMEs) via collaborative computerized networks. During his presentation, Gen.

14. Lt. Gen. David Valcourt is the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and gave this talk at the Army Logistics Symposium and Exposition in Richmond, Virginia, on 14 May 2008.
Valcourt confirmed that the initial “proof of concept” teams deployed for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM had performed so well that the original six prototypes would swell to 25 teams by September 2008.15

The need for cultural awareness, as asserted by LG.Valcourt, stretches beyond the tactical level. It must also be factored into operational planning at the theater and theater-strategic level as well, and obviously for phase IV which concentrates on stability operations. Its importance remains significant throughout the entire spectrum of operational phases.16

Certainly, the need for cultural awareness as that “intangible element” needed for planning procedures and operational art has become the focus of numerous, recent Naval War College research papers. Appendix B offers a synopsis of several such advocacy papers.17 Of the papers sampled, most have concluded that operational art in its various forms or phases lacks the appropriate level or attention to cultural awareness that is and will be needed for operations. Some recommend contracting anthropologists and other soft science academics to provide the depth of knowledge needed for operational art. Others would derive or develop this knowledge capability from within the Services and the Department of


Marr, xxvi. In his paper, Major Stephen C. Marr concludes that “it is important that the United States armed forces begin to better understand and incorporate culture into our planning system…at the tactical level, the answer is clear—to develop better plans to defeat our enemies and save lives…at the operational and strategic level, the answer is more ambiguous, but equally important.”

17. Marr, iii. Maj. Stephen C. Marr uses the term “intangible element” in his abstract and body of his paper, “Beyond the Commander’s Estimate…” to describe the relevance of cultural awareness to Operational Art.
Defense (DoD). Such proposals look at adding cultural analysis to the skills portfolio of operational and/or intelligence officers, or reach-back to the Special Operations community which has long emphasized such skills.

The importance of cultural awareness, however, has gone beyond knowing one’s enemy. Battalion commanders at the tactical level, fire support teams (FISTS), information operations (IO) and civil-military operations (CMO) units are but a few of those constantly exposed to the general populace in an operational environment who have come to appreciate the importance of cultural competence and reading the human landscape correctly. Examples and individual vignettes of how commanders have come to regard anthropologists and their cultural insights are featured in Appendix C. Among the examples recounted are instances where anthropologists in Afghanistan and Iraq provided actionable insights that commanders used for decisions that ranged from defusing mob hostility to building respectful relations with the local populace or determining whom to trust. Commanders and their soldiers learned to deal more appropriately with communities once they better understood the complexities of local relationships that served to either support or undermine their efforts. Anthropologists, by introducing and using their fieldwork process of mapping out and data-basing these cultural and familial relationships, not only benefited current and future commanders and planners but expanded their own knowledge and the studies of their discipline. Other vignettes also illuminate the significance of cultural competence in planning and executing humanitarian relief efforts.

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Many, specifically those who never received cultural awareness training prior to deployment, voiced a need for such information. In response, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) created a Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 2004. TRADOC also singled out cultural training as one of its top three training initiatives in Operations Order (OPORD) 05-123A for Professional Military Education (PME).19

Beyond the scope of helping to plan more effectively the fight and its aftermath, cultural awareness is equally significant for operational art in military efforts beyond traditional warfare. The need for cultural awareness figures prominently in new roles the military appears to be assuming with great rapidity as part of its new norm. Such new responses are exemplified by the relief efforts and initiatives of Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE,20 Operation PROVIDE RELIEF (UNISOM I),21 Operation CARING RESPONSE,22 the African Crisis Response Initiative,23 and countless other actions.

DISCUSSION: A WAY AHEAD?

On 14 April 2008 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates addressed the Association of American Universities in Washington D.C. concerning his “Minerva Consortia,” then under development in the Pentagon. He cautioned that this project, though largely conceptual, sought to promote academic research in several specific areas. Among the projects he believed the Consortia would embrace was “the New Disciplines Project” where

19. Ibid. OPORD 05-123A was released in October 2005.
21. United Nations (UN) sponsored humanitarian relief effort to provide food to starving populations in Somalia best by civil war in 1994.
23. U.S. special forces training of African militaries to provide relief or peacekeeping operations when regional humanitarian disasters, begun in 1990’s.
government and the Department of Defense would “engage additional intellectual
disciplines—such as history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology.”

Several weeks later, the National Science Foundation (NSF) in conjunction with the
Department of Defense issued a program solicitation (NSF 08-594) entitled Social and
Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation (NSCC). This
“university-based social and behavioral science search activity, as part of the Minerva
Initiative launched by the Secretary of Defense…focuses on areas of strategic importance to
U.S. national security policy.”

The letter of intent to answer this solicitation was due 30 September 2008, with full
proposals to be provided by 30 October 2008. Proposals were to address such wide-ranging
topics as: terrorist organization and ideologies; the strategic impact of religious and cultural
change; political, cultural, and social dynamics under authoritarian regimes. The appearance


25. The National Science Foundation (NSF), created by the National Science Foundation
Act of 1950, is an independent Federal agency whose purpose is “to promote the progress of
science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare by supporting research and
education in the fields of science and engineering.” It works with over 2000 academic
institutions from K-12 school systems to university research centers and even funds
businesses, informal science organizations and other types of research organizations. NSF
entertains as many as 40,000 proposals annually and funds approximately 11,000. In addition
it reviews thousands of applications for graduate and post doctoral fellowships. It is
responsible for about 25% of the federal support provided to academic institutions for basic
research.

26. NSF 08-594 intentions were to seek and fund proposals which would:
1) Develop DoD’s social and human science intellectual capital in order to enhance its ability
to address future challenges;
2) Enhance the DoD’s engagement with the social science community; and
3) Deepen the understanding of the social and behavioral dimensions of national security
issues. Quoted from: National Science Foundation (NSF). “Social and Behavioral
Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation (NSCC)”-- Program Solicitation,
NSF 08-594.
of this solicitation is significant because it broadens the scope of the NSF, once heavily focused on the engineering and the hard sciences, and allows NSF to reach out more forcefully to the soft science community. Though pitched to the national level, the results of such studies will trickle down to the various levels of operational art and affect commanders and what commands design and do. The expectation is that operational plans will become more realistic, more comprehensive as they take into account the insights developed by academics.

The growing litany of how cultural information benefits operational art has not, however, inspired anthropologists to rush to their local military recruiter and offer their services. Instead, the use of anthropologists to read the human landscape for commanders and for intelligence support has spawned controversy and debate, especially on ethics, at professional and government-sponsored conferences. Some of these arguments, pro and con, are discussed in Appendix D. Advocates, such as Drs. Kilcullen and McFate contend that the employment of anthropologists on the front-lines of government efforts across the D-I-M-E (diplomatic, informational, military, and economical) will lessen the blunders well-intentioned American leaders, from the tactical to the strategic and national levels, make in dealing with other cultures. However, more cynical anthropologists, such as Dr. David Price, fear that their studies and methods will be used to harm or subvert the very people they study. They point to the nineteenth century use of anthropologists and anthropology as “the handmaiden of colonialism. This moniker and image continues to rankle many anthropologists and haunts their efforts as they negotiate with understandably suspicious...
post-colonial governments to establish cultural studies and projects. Anthropologists also point to more recent events such as the Vietnam War of the later twentieth century, where anthropologists became so closely identified as agents or “spies” of the U.S. government that they could no longer venture into “the field” to do their work. The military and intelligence agencies also repeatedly ignored their advice on ‘pacification” and resettlement” issues. The Army’s PROJECT CAMELOT during the 1960’s was also viewed (but never proven) as an effort to recruit anthropologists to build cultural pictures of populations and their leadership in South America for the purpose of overthrow and subversion. As a result, “Do no harm” to those studied has become as strong a moral obligation for anthropologists, as is the Hippocratic imperative for medical doctors who must administer care to the ill, regardless of status or allegiance.

If, for one reason or another, a way is not found for enough anthropologists to support operational art, the Commander’s need for cultural awareness must be provided through some other process or means than “an anthropologist on staff.” Appendix E discusses some of these options which include the military’s Foreign Officer Area (FAO) Program, Open Source internet options and interface with academia, the development of Cultural Intelligence


(CULTINT) within the intelligence agencies, and reach-back to various institutions and agencies who excel in collecting and analyzing cultural data.

**RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION**

A multi-layered approach will serve commanders best in their quest for cultural information. No single approach is sufficient to ensure the commander gets what he needs to conduct operational art. Certainly, a multi-layered approach is desirable, even necessary, to enable the delivery of actionable cultural information to a commander in a form he or she can use.

The 7 May 2008 death of anthropologist Michael Vinay Bhatia, a member of an HTT in Afghanistan, from an improvised explosive device (IED) demonstrates the vulnerability of the human as a source of information. Fortunately, HTTS have several team members to include others with some training in local culture, and a reach-back capability to a 24 hour 7 Day a week academics/analysts on call through open source computers. 32

The tragedy of Michael Bahtia’s death and subsequent attacks on two other academics assisting the military shows that this is work that is not without great physical risk for anthropologists.33 This serves as a powerful argument to dissuade individual


33. HTT social scientist Nicole Suveges was also killed on 24 June 2008. Her death resulted from a bomb explosion in Sadr City where she was attending a District Advisory Council meeting. [http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/nicole.html](http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/nicole.html) In Nov 2008, a locally popular and accepted social scientist Paula Lloyd was set afire by an alleged Taliban agent in an Afghan village she frequented as part of an HTT. She is currently undergoing treatment for burns over 60% of her body. Noah Shachtman. “Army Social Scientist Set
anthropologists from pursuing such work. It should also be a consideration in designing future processes on employing anthropologists to assist in execution and planning at the tactical and operational level. Despite the danger, however, some anthropologists view employment with HHTs as an unparalleled opportunity they should embrace. Dr. David Matsuda, one such anthropologist—a self proclaimed anti-war liberal and Democrat--has embraced this dangerous challenge, and justifies his actions in this way, “Anthropologists believe that all societies operate according to a certain “script.” Iraqis have one script, Americans have another. The HTT’s mission is to provide an interpretation of the Iraqi cultural script that will help soldiers make the right decisions.” To him, devining the script of different cultures and bringing these different cultures together so that they can find points of commonality and understanding is exciting and gives meaning to his life’s work. "I came here to save lives, to make friends out of enemies," claims the idealistic Dr. Matsuda.34

Moreover, the development of Network Concentric Warfare (NCW), once its compatibility and connectivity issues are resolved, is likely to facilitate information flows from analyst to the military member on the frontlines with such rapidity and flexibility, its full implementation may well obviate the need to place non-combatants (anthropologists) in “danger zones.” Such technology will allow anthropologists to continue rendering the support and insights for cultural competence that military members need. What may be more

difficult, however, is to create a process whereby the anthropologists can conduct the fieldwork that is their bread and butter in that “danger zone” where it may be most needed.

In the final analysis, operational art can still be practiced without the tool of anthropology or an anthropologist on staff—but it may be the difference between the masterful or pedestrian (amateurish) attempt at providing the cultural competence a commander needs, whether at the tactical, or operational level.

Ultimately, anthropologists will also lose by not becoming involved. With operational art, the anthropologist has great opportunity to see the fruits of their labors have effect. The knowledge they uncover and provide may save lives, build better relationships among culturally disparate peoples, help leaders to make better and wiser decisions that will prove mutually beneficial to various cultures, and enable our culture to reach out to other cultures with the appropriate respect, awe, and understanding. Those who pursue knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but prefer their field work to become encased in an ivory tower miss the opportunity to educate greater masses of people about other cultures—especially the very Americans who are most likely to meet and interface with other cultures and who must learn to better themselves as ambassadors of our own culture.

If the issue is ethics, an anthropologist must understand that whatever he/she publishes or produces will become readily available through the openness of the internet and the information age. An anthropologist no longer has the means to keep his/her analysis and study restricted to fellow professionals of choice or to a specifically intended audience. What an anthropologist must decide is how best to influence those who could and will use their work. Better to change the hearts and minds of the military and intelligence organizations than to isolate oneself from them. The image of “playing ostrich” illustrates what
anthropologists are doing in discouraging their fellow professionals from working with the military and intelligence. Such an act is tantamount to sticking one’s head into the sand to ignore that there are those who crave one’s feathers and are determined to have them. The ostrich stance is awkward and indefensible, and allows the ostrich to be plucked at will. Instead, anthropologists should engage, so that they can shape how their work is to be used and ensure that “no harm” comes to those they study. If anthropologists believe their work will be misused by the military and by intelligence to harm those studied, then their ethical obligation is to engage with the military and intelligence to try to prevent harm. The question should not be if anthropologists can support military and intelligence organizations but how.

Anthropologists also do more good than harm in deploying with the military in HTTs and in providing cultural awareness. They have helped to shape for positive the mindset of the soldiers they support towards the populations they study. In the words of Col. Schwietzer who witnessed a change in attitude of his forces towards Afghans with the introduction of cultural expertise: “We’re not focused on the enemy [anymore]. We’re focused on bringing governance down to the people.”

In specific situations, anthropologists have helped the military not to give offense and to treat other cultures with appropriate deference and respect. What anthropologists fear is that they can be misused for pacification operations, interrogations, and political manipulation. Any contract an anthropologist would sign with the government should stipulate that an anthropologist can not be coerced into activity that breaks the ethical code of “do no harm.” The American Association of Anthropologists (AAA) might do well to seek

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legal advice on how contracts should be written to ensure anthropologists “do no harm.” Just as doctors and nurses who must treat the ill, irrespective of whether the patient is friend, foe or neutral, and just as priests and lawyers guard the confidentiality of those who confide in them, so should anthropologists be placed in a non-combative category that ensures they will not betray the people they study. AAA and anthropological professionals might better serve anthropology and the people they study by engaging the U.S. Government to put practices in place that will compel military and intelligence organizations to guard against violating the ethical imperatives of anthropologists in their employ. To do other than engage with the government, to do other than continually address, readjust and re-shape the way anthropologists are used in support of government efforts means that anthropologists will be walking away from “a wicked problem” that will spiral into widespread ignorance of other cultures and possible harm to the very people anthropologists want to protect.

Anthropologists must also not be misused as prophets of the future. They are no better at it than the weather forecasters and intelligence briefers a commander sees daily. What they do provide operational commanders from the strategic to the tactical level is a vital reading of the human landscape.

Much can be learned from the past use and misuse of anthropologists for campaign and operational planning. Many ethical considerations remain and a process by which to use anthropologists appropriately still needs to be developed and universally understood. In the long run, if considered and planned carefully, reliance on anthropologists may become more ethical than not employing them—a future necessity for waging a just war and even more importantly for the commander a necessity in re-establishing societal stability and maintaining the peace. Not to use what anthropological studies have to offer and in an ethical
manner will well be a serious failing for operational art and for the future development of anthropology.
Using anthropologists to assist the military did not always provoke the level of professional introspection and debate that it currently fosters. Not a single voice was raised against one of the initial uses of anthropologists to support the American military. This use involved physical anthropologists to collect biometric data on the American male for the purpose of designing and mass-producing military uniforms and equipment.¹

Physical anthropologists also significantly contributed to a later war effort by adding their techniques to expedite the recovery and identification of the war dead during the Korean Conflict. Anthropological methods developed and used to identify the war dead led to establishing a new branch in anthropology--forensic anthropology. It also enabled returning the war dead to their families during ongoing combat operations. As many as 95.6% of the recovered American bodies during World War II were identified, though many were never returned to their families. Those that returned came home came many months, even years, after the war ended. This was much improved from a century earlier when no capability existed to identify bodies recovered during the War with Mexico. The invention of dog tags eventually made it easier to identify bodies after combat, but the ability to identify and return war dead in near-real time did not become reality until the Korean Conflict. The alignment of a vastly improved system for moving bodies, an organization optimized for such an endeavor, and the creativity of anthropologists in applying their field methods to the body

identification process enabled the Korean War dead to be returned to their families in as little
time as a month.²

The use of physical and forensic anthropological methods to identify the dead appears
to have little in common with the more controversial use of anthropologists to provide
cultural awareness to the commander and staff. But the importance of this branch of
anthropology and its contributions to Operational Art should not be underrated.

Commanders are tasked with the responsibility to comprehensively plan for recovering,
identifying, and repatriating the dead during a campaign or operation. Failure to do so can
have a demoralizing impact on war will as was quickly learned during the Korean Conflict.
Waning public support worsened once Americans began to perceive that military officers did
not seriously care about their lesser-ranked war dead. When the U.S. Eight Army Corps
Commander died overseas in a December 1950 traffic accident, his body was quickly
transported home for a very public funeral. Parents and spouses of loved ones lost in
overseas conflicts soon began to question why their own dead could not be returned more
expeditiously. The transformation of the Korean Conflict from “war” to a limited “police
action” further exacerbated the public’s patience. They refused to accept as reasonable any
rationalization concerning delays on the return of their dead during an event that was not
total war. This outcry enabled a very capable Quartermaster general to finally receive the
approval and funding he needed to implement plans to identify and return the war dead

². Ibid., 179-180, 185-186, 194. Also cited data from F.E. Randall, “Anthropometry in
the Quartermaster Corps,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology (6 September 1948),
372-380.
quickly. He based his system on the recommendations of a leading physical anthropologist who had toured the WWII war dead registration facilities in 1946.³

The military and the public were not the only ones to benefit from the use of anthropologists during this Korean Conflict. An outgrowth from this venture was to predispose the military to spend research dollars on physical and forensic anthropology projects. Moreover, the anthropologists that worked to identify human remains during the Korean Conflict returned to academia to shape anthropology, its focus, and its methods, infusing into the study what they had learned during their wartime efforts. They fostered the development and maturation of a new discipline within physical anthropology—forensic anthropology—which had not formally existed prior to the war.⁴

On the other hand, the history of cultural anthropologists and their relationship with the military is far more checkered. Cultural anthropologists, now sought for the enlightenment they can bring the American military during its endeavors among other cultures, remain skeptical of resuming a relationship that virtually ceased to exist after the Vietnam War.

Even during more pro-military periods in academia, a few lone cultural anthropologists voiced alarm at the alliance of their discipline with intelligence and the military. During World War I, a leading cultural anthropologist Franz Boas publicly criticized four of his contemporaries for using their profession as a cover for espionage

³. Ibid., 194-195.
⁴. Ibid., 214-216, 222.
activities. The American Anthropological Association at that time censured him for this action. 5

The use of cultural anthropologists in World War II took Sun Tzu’s dictum to “Know Your Enemy” to new levels. Academics were recruited to assist in military planning and post-war operations by investigating and studying enemy behavior. Historian John W. Dower in his monograph *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* described the mobilization of academics as part of this all-out effort that carried everyone and everything in its wake. The creation of “formidable war machines” in World War II fomented an “unprecedented mobilization of resources” that engulfed even the “scientific and intellectual community.” The U.S. government easily enticed well-known and nascent anthropologists with offers of “exhilarating” opportunities to take theory and apply it to an honorable cause—“understanding the enemy, hastening the end of the war, and laying the groundwork for a more tolerant and peaceful postwar world.” Academics were no longer confined to academic institutions and academic publishers. They could now support government agencies such as the U.S. Office of War Information and intelligence organizations. They could influence government agencies to adopt their lexicon and methods to create a common language and inject scientific rigor into the studies and recommendations produced. 6


Cultural anthropologists who came to work for the U.S. government during World War II soon found themselves focused on Japan, Germany, Burma (now Myan Mar), Thailand (what was then Siam), and Rumania (now Romania).\(^7\)

However, it was the U.S. effort to understand Japan and the Japanese that became most visible—after the war. One reason was the publication of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* by Dr. Ruth Benedict, a well-known Columbian University anthropology professor. This post-war work was the culmination of her war year studies of the Japanese for the U.S. government. When *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* was published in 1946 more than 500,000 Americans still remained in Japan. Benedict countered many of the stereotypes U.S. propaganda had conditioned Americans to believe about the Japanese. It also offered baffled Americans explanations as to why “such a merciless war’ could spawn so “peaceful … [an] Allied occupation” where “genuine good will…developed between the Japanese and the Americans.” Benedict’s work helped to bridge the seemingly contradictory images of wartime and post-war Japanese. The work Ruth Benedict and her counterparts did in interviewing Japanese prisoners of war and piecing together a cultural understanding of the Japanese people helped to influence post-war operations and reconstruction in Japan.\(^8\)

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7. Ibid., 119.
8. Ibid., 120, 301. Ruth Benedict, when recruited, was regarded as one of the two most renown women anthropologists of her era—the other being Margaret Mead. Fellow scholars regarded Ruth Benedict’s 1934 work *Patterns of Culture* as trailblazing in its concept and its methods to seek the cultural attitudes that underpinned societies. Her work was in sharp contrast to the giants of nineteenth century anthropology who believed in biological determinism and “scientific racism” and whose work, wittingly or unwittingly, devolved into racist supremacy theories expounded by Hitler, apartheid proponents, and the Ku Klux Klan. Ruth Benedict’s mentor Franz Boas was the first to introduce “scientific antiracism” which Benedict faithfully fleshed out in her 1934 monograph *Patterns of Culture*. Ruth Benedict’s expertise in exploring thinking and behavior in different cultures made her a natural choice for her World War II assignment to study the Japanese.
While some cultural anthropologists gathered their data by interviewing Japanese prisoners of war, others did their “field work” in Japanese-American internment camps in the United States. When President Roosevelt issued Order 9066 on 19 February 1942, he authorized the U.S. Army to inter more than 110,000 individuals with Japanese ancestry living in the United States—two-thirds of which were American citizens. The War Relocation Authority (WRA) administered both the move and the camps. WRA director Dillon Meyer hired well-known anthropologist John Provinse as Chief of Community Management, and eventually hired twenty more anthropologists to research life within the military zones. At first, most anthropologists worked in Washington D.C. until riots and protests at the camp compelled anthropologists to go into the camps as “community workers.” Many of the deployed anthropologists sought to improve living conditions for the interned and also sought to enlighten the public’s misconceptions about the Japanese. However, some historians believe their “studies” led to the unintended effect of prolonging internment for the Japanese. When the war ended, one special unit of anthropologists (with the unfortunate name of “the Liquidation Unit”) conducted a year-long study on the return of the interred to the American mainstream. The WRA finally ceased to exist on 1 July 1946, when the last of the anthropologists returned to civilian life.9

Nowadays, anthropologists and historians question the use of anthropologists in the internment camps. The more radical view, in tones reminiscent of the unflattering moniker of anthropologists as “handmaidens of imperialism and colonialism,” sees the anthropologists as complicit in the maltreatment of American citizens based on race. But

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most anthropologists who had done this work instead saw themselves as instrumental in
improving a regrettable situation.\footnote{Ibid., 702.} They were the translators and advocates for the people
to the camp administrators, and conveyed the needs and perspectives of this particular group
of Americans who were now treated as “aliens,” “the other,” even “the enemy.” One can
argue that many of the Japanese, as Americans, needed no translator for their behavior—they
were Americans, after all. Anthropologists nevertheless provided that insurance that a
lawyer provides on behalf of clients who really can not navigate in a court of law. The
Japanese-Americans were defendants in their own land and needed an advocate.

Some cultural anthropologists did come to regret their war-time work for the
government. Anthropologist Gregory Bateson, who worked for the Office of Strategic
Studies (OSS) and deployed into Burma, later saw his work with the indigenous populations
as “manipulative.”\footnote{David Price, “Past Wars, Present Dangers, Future Anthropologies,” Anthropology
Today 18, No. 1 (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, February,

Not every effort of anthropologists during World War II was appreciated, however.
The publication of a 1943 pamphlet \textit{The Races of Mankind} that Ruth Benedict had helped co-
author met the disdain of both the U.S. Army and the United Service Organizations (USO).
They banned use of the pamphlet because of its divisive nature and its potential to incite
black/white antagonisms. The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
tarred it with the stamp of “Communist propaganda.”\footnote{Dower, 120.}

The U.S. government was not alone in its use of anthropologists for operational art.
Like the Americans, the British used anthropologists to better understand the Japanese, but
questions of whether anthropologists used selective bias in their methods to frame the
culture, thinking, and behavior of the Japanese still prevail as a subject for lively discussion
among the British.  

The swift victories early in the Pacific War for Japan (the fall of Singapore, Malaysia,
and Burma) drove the British to seek greater knowledge of their enemy. Obviously the
British stereotypes of the Japanese prior to the war had not served them well and lacked
accuracy. As with the American effort, the British used anthropologists to interview
Japanese POWs to ascertain what would break the Japanese will. In his Burma Campaign,
General Mountbatten sought cultural experts to improve the effectiveness of his
psychological warfare operations. He saw cultural experts as instrumental in determining
what propaganda worked and what did not in his campaign to undermine enemy morale. The
successes of his Burma campaign in Arakan led to greater funding for propaganda warfare
and established such warfare, along with its dependence on anthropological methods for
analysis, as “an integral part of military operations.”

Perhaps the most well known and catastrophic use of anthropologists as tools of
authoritarian or repressive governments can be found in Nazi Germany and the communist
Soviet Union. The intent here did not even hint at helping the people it studied, nor was any
attempt made to couch such studies in altruistic terms. For example, Czechoslovakian
anthropologist J.A. Valsik tells of how the Nazis who invaded his country had virtually
stopped all anthropological study in the universities, and destroyed several well-known

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14. Ibid., 440-441, 463.
collections. The few anthropologists who remained were soon engaged in the Gestapo-sponsored practice of determining the validity of “Jews” claiming to have Aryan origins.\textsuperscript{15}

For some, the abusive use of anthropologists to advance the cause of governments can be found in the very development or roots of anthropological studies and its close alliance with colonialism and imperialism. Manipulative, in fact, is often the description applied to anthropologists working on behalf of colonialists and their colonizing government. In his monograph \textit{The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History, and the Emergence of Western Mentality}, Peter Pels explores this relationship of anthropology to colonialism and reminds us that one of the few images the public has concerning military intelligence and anthropologists is that of the cold and heartless Colonel Creighton in Rudyard Kipling’s novel \textit{Kim}.\textsuperscript{16}

The Cold War spawned what critics regarded as an unethical “revolving door” for anthropologists and intelligence organizations. One such critic, David Price, a professor of Anthropology at St. Martin College, Olympia, Washington, cites as a typical of the “revolving door” the Human Relations Area File (HRAF), an anthropological research center that was openly funded by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the CIA.\textsuperscript{17}

Not all anthropologists knew that their work supported the military and/or intelligence organizations. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Price also found

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} David Price, “Interlopers and Invited Guests: On Anthropology’s Witting and Unwitting Links to Intelligence Agencies.” \textit{Anthropology Today}, 18: 6 (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandDecember, 2002), 17-8. \url{http://www.jstor.com/} (accessed 30 August 2008).
\end{itemize}
records concerning CIA funding fronts, such as the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology (SIHE) also known as the Human Ecology Fund. Through the MKULTRA program (then secret), the CIA was able to dispense “cloaked grants” during the 1950’s and 1960’s to anthropologists and academics who knew nothing about the real source of their grant funding.18

In 1964 the Special Operations Research Office at American University, funded by the U.S. Army, launched an expansive study of rebellion and warfare in Latin America. The study was called PROJECT CAMELOT. Given the circumstances of the time and the probability of another event such as Castro’s take-over of Cuba, the American government and academia were both highly interested in understanding how such insurgencies developed and why. Chile became the focus of the first effort under this project and offered several anthropologists the opportunity to participate. The project was never a secret, but it failed to put forward a public relations campaign to build support and an avid constituency. Public release of information on PROJECT CAMELOT, so close to the heels of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, was met with much suspicion by neighboring countries south of the United States and by the U.S. State Department (which had not been consulted about the project). Chile, already suspicious of U.S. intentions, officially protested much to the embarrassment of the American ambassador who knew nothing of this study. Though definitely an event that put a significant damper on anthropology’s relationship with the military, PROJECT CAMELOT was not the final straw that led to the total disaffection

18. Ibid., 20-1.
of social scientists, particularly anthropologists, for government employ. That particular
distinction belongs to the Vietnam War.19

University of Chicago anthropologist Gerald Hickey arrived in Vietnam sometime
after the French were defeated in 1954. His work of studying populations in the highlands
eventually indicated that the people there would not readily integrate with the South. This
was not what the government of South Vietnam or its American advisors wanted to hear. Dr.
Hickey soon found he could do no field work unless he accepted sponsorship from the Rand
Corporation, which he suspected might be working against the very population he studied.
He stayed, because he felt he could at least he could represent the views of the highland
populations and persuade Rand/the U.S. government to understand these culture and their
needs. On the other hand, Rand and the U.S. government had little patience for the type of
painstaking work that Dr. Hickey produced. They wanted what we now call “actionable
intelligence” which would bewilder Dr. Hickey who was so steeped in details. In any event,
field work became difficult for all anthropologists in general in Vietnam as the war spread.
Some began to do their anthropology by studying history instead of conducting field work
where the war raged. Those that continued field work were suspected of being “spies.”20

The Vietnam War had a profound effect on anthropologists. Many, except for the
renegade anthropologist and occasional contractor, eschewed government work after

Lesson of Project Camelot,” Background 9, No. 3, Proceedings and Papers: The New

20. Erik Lind Harms, “Vietnam, Anthropology, and Ethnographic Authority Through
Time and War,” Paper. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Department of Anthropology, 22
Vietnam. The war had made many of the anthropologists feel powerless to appropriately balance the act of doing good fieldwork in or near a war zone while still protecting the people they studied.
“Cultural Awareness” is the focus of several recent Naval War College research papers, highlighting that this has indeed become a topic of much interest for military leaders. Most have concluded that Operational Art in its various forms or phases lacks the appropriate level or attention to cultural awareness that is and will be needed for operations. Some recommend contracting anthropologists and other soft science academics to provide the depth of knowledge needed for operational art, but others would derive or develop this knowledge capability from within the Services and the Department of Defense (DoD). Such proposals look at adding cultural analysis to the skills portfolio of operational and/or intelligence officers, or reach-back to the Special Operations community which has long emphasized such skills.

U.S. Army Major Stephen C. Marr, in his paper “Beyond the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation: The Role of Culture and Society in the Military Decision” argues that the military needs to “incorporate a better understanding of culture and society into current doctrine.” He advocates expanding and transforming the Foreign Area Officers (FAO) program and establishment of a cultural advisor program to increase the cultural awareness and expertise available to commanders.¹

In examining the FAO program, Major Marr rules out intelligence as the sole focal point for cultural intelligence. “The military can not expect its intelligence officers and personnel to be regional experts in every potential theater.” Instead, he promotes

strengthening the FAO program with incentives to make it a viable career move for the individual and a more effective tool for commanders to use. “FAOs acquire a regional specialization, language and cultural expertise, and personal contacts that the average military officer can never achieve due to frequent moves between jobs and locations. Trained FAOs can be reassigned from embassy and attaché positions to tactical and operational headquarters to assist with cultural assessments, training and integration. As members of the planning staff, FAOs could provide tremendous insight into the cultural ramifications of U.S. or coalition operations within a particular area.”2

Major Marr also advocates the use of “vetted, indigenous cultural advisors” and cites the rich ethnic diversity of the U.S. as a readily available source for providing cultural awareness. “Their cultural insight as members (or former members) of the society that the military is trying to understand…would be unmatched,” but he caveats that advisors must be carefully screened to ensure “they do not harbor personal agendas, biases, or vendettas.”3

He sees using FAOs and indigenous cultural advisors as especially crucial to a commander’s Information Operations (IO) staff, although their contributions can be easily spread across the entire range of military operations (ROMO) in a variety of functions.4

Army Major Kenneth D. McRae, in examining “The Role of Culture on Joint Operations” also singled out doctrine and intelligence as failing to adequately provide cultural awareness in sufficient depth for joint operational commanders. He views cultural estimates are inadequate if they fail to provide analysis on “ethnic groups, political authority, cultural attitudes, customs and beliefs, lifestyle, history, religion, language, ideologies, tribal

2. Ibid., xxiv.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
affiliations, social institutions” and anything else that may affect operations in regard to those, including coalition partners, with whom the military interfaces. “Multiple United State (U.S.) military after-action reports (AAR) and lessons learned studies from Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and most recently Afghanistan and Iraq, have consistently pointed to a lack of cultural awareness as a major impediment to mission success...Commanders at all echelons have continually acknowledged that cultural awareness would have reduced battlefield friction and the fog of war.”

Major McRae cites American mirror imaging as a failure of phase IV planning in Iraq. He is not alone. Each Service has endeavored, in one way or another, to shore up their capability to provide cultural awareness to their commanders. The Army uses the concept of “red-teaming” which it introduced and developed at its University of Foreign Military and Culture Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Centers of Excellence, which have conducted Joint Cultural Intelligence seminars for more than ten years, expanded in 2005 to include a Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL). The U.S. Navy bolstered its own Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program by making the FAO designation a permanent career field. The Air Force also expanded its FAO program to include an International Affairs Specialist Program. The lack of centralization and coordination in these programs, however, has resulted in cultural analysis that McRae describes as “completely inadequate at the operational level of war and precludes the Joint Force Commander from developing any cohesive and cultural operation and campaign

plan…cultural training and doctrine…is still ad-hoc, out-dated, stove-piped, and inadequate,” and not tied together by unified joint doctrine or procedures. 6

Joint Intelligence Publication 2-01 has begun to address the issue of cultural intelligence, but Major McRae still believes Defense Intelligence has not yet fully developed capabilities to provide cultural awareness in the form of actionable intelligence the commander can use.

Like Major McRae, U.S. Navy LT Shannon Clark in her paper “Muslim Culture: Center of Gravity for Global War on Terror” sees culture as the Center of Gravity (COG) that too many operational designers somehow fail to identify. Nevertheless, her recommendations go to a more strategic and national level, seeking to enlist those who are themselves part of the culture and more moderate. She asks them to wrest influence away from those who have hijacked their culture for more nefarious purposes. 7

U.S. Army Major James A. Karcane, in “Cultural Competence and the Operational Commander: Moving Beyond Cultural Awareness into Culture-Centric Warfare” Offers vigorous arguments and recommendations on how to fix the dearth of cultural information commanders receive for Operational Art. He labels cultural awareness as the current buzzword and claims that it fails to adequately convey what commanders need in the form of cultural analysis. To him, cultural understanding and cultural competence are two higher levels of information that directly support decision-making while cultural awareness only covers the basic cultural niceties, “the do’s and do not’s.” He sees cultural competence as that “graduate level cultural analysis” that, when known, can rightly affect decisions and

6. Ibid., 9-10.

courses of action. He cites as examples of those who received and acted on, or who developed and used, the cultural competence level of information as General Pershing, T.E. Lawrence, and Gen. Macarthur. Obviously cultural competence for decision-making is not something new.  

But Major Karcanes does offer innovative ideas in the form of “culture-centric warfare…A military or political plan will not work if the population and their needs are not understood from a culture-centric vantage point.” He argues that same culture-centric vantage point is vital to our working relationships with our coalition partners. “The U.S. military…often fails to recognize that ‘the American way is best’ bias is unproductive.” He wants to re-focus the military mind-set from technology-based solutions to solutions that are intellectual or human based to help “demystify our adversaries.” With this culture-centric focus, HUMINT collection and tasking become more important, and the specter of using regional cultural anthropologists as part of joint operational planning comes closer to reality. As with Major Marr, Major Karcanes sees information operations (IO) escalating in significance, as do anthropologists, especially if culture-centric warfare become the newest paradigm.  

These perspectives all confirm the importance of understanding culture for the military and for the American hegemon at large. The discourse continues and is becoming increasingly prominent at war colleges, as the military personnel ricochet from one operation to another, from one different culture to another.

9. Ibid., 6-7, 11-12.
APPENDIX C – VIGNETTES DEPICTING COMMAND APPRECIATION FOR “CULTURAL AWARENESS”

Several of the anecdotes recounted in this Appendix illustrate how commanders and their forces have come to appreciate anthropologists and/or see a need for greater culture awareness.

The importance of cultural awareness and reading the human landscape was fully illustrated during an OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) incident captured on film by a CNN news camera crew. In Najaf, Iraq, an agitated crowd that looked bent on violence, confronted Lt. Col. Christopher P. Hughes, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, and several of his forces. Lt. Col. Hughes ordered his men to point their rifles to the ground, smile, then turn and walk away. His awareness of the local culture, where smiling implied friendship and expressionless faces indicated hostility, enabled him to take the bold move of ordering his men to perform actions that, though risky, defused the situation. This highly televised demonstration of restraint earned the battalion praise as the “heroes of war” and underscored the importance of cultural awareness. This same battalion commander, now Col. Hughes, several months later, would recount that knowing people, not just the enemy, was the “center of gravity” for influencing people, the objective of any counterinsurgency.¹

In making her case for providing cultural awareness for the military, Dr. McFate relates a more benign incident than Col. Hughes’ but equally telling. One young Army captain she instructed confided his confusion over his first encounter with the local culture. “I was never given classes on how to sit down with a sheik. He is giving me the traditional dishdasha

and the entire outfit of a sheik because he claims that I am a new sheik in town so I must be dressed as one. I don't know if he is trying to gain favor with me because he wants something [or if it is] something good or something bad.” Dr. McFate explained to him that as a member of the forces that had removed Saddam Hussein, he had now become a part of the Iraqi social fabric and must be shown respect and honor. This is only one of many examples Dr. McFate describes in her writings and interviews to demonstrate the value of anthropologists advising military leaders on the nuances of the local culture. She believes that commanders from every level, tactical up to strategic, benefit from the assistance of anthropologists who show them how to take actions that foster respect not offense.2

The recent recruitment and use of academics to help in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) demonstrate yet another practical use of anthropologists to provide cultural awareness. In October 2007 The New York Times featured a story on the Army’s latest new weapon--the anthropologist--deployed with its latest team concept, the HTT. The article focused on the employment of Tracy, an anthropologist with the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, and one of the first several social scientists to be embedded with combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Her commanding officer, Col Martin Schwietzer, credited the 60% drop in combat operations over eight months to Tracy’s arrival to his unit. He found that Tracy was able to re-cast the views of his soldiers who saw local tribesmen as hostile. With Tracy’s help, the soldiers began to see that the local populace, long bullied by the Taliban, saw little to distinguish the Americans from the Taliban who had harassed them. Both Taliban and Americans used aggressive methods of control. With Tracy’s insight, the Americans began to change their tactics and treatment of the local

populace and learned how to behave in ways that demonstrated respect. Col. Schwietzer summed up the change in attitude of his forces towards the Afghans in this way: “We’re not focused on the enemy [anymore]. We’re focused on bringing governance down to the people.” ³

Col. Schwietzer is not alone in his appreciation of HTT social scientists or the need for cultural awareness. LTG Peter Chiarelli, former Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, noted that when “I asked my Brigade Commanders what was the number one thing they would have liked to have had more of…they all said cultural knowledge.” As one HTT member said of his academic support, “One anthropologist can be much more effective than a B-2 bomber – not by winning a war, but creating a peace one Afghan at a time.” ⁴

The New York Times article also characterized American officers as “lavish in their praise” of anthropologists and social scientists, often calling them “brilliant” and essential in their dealings with local tribes and their elders. In September 2007 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates authorized another 40 million dollars for the Human Terrain Team program which would expand to 26 the number of combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan that would have social scientists attached.⁵

OPERATION KHYBER provides yet another example of how anthropologists can read the cultural landscape to help commanders make better decisions and implement better courses of action. In OPERATION KHYBER, a force of 1000 (half of them American, the other half Afghan) was to oust Taliban insurgents, as many as 250 strong, from the Paktia

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⁴ Ibid.
province. Its objective was to enable the smooth flow of logistics and goods along Afghanistan’s most important southeastern road. The operation also sought to halt mounting suicide attacks against local troops and leaders. Through the help of an anthropologist, the American commander was also able to employ non-military methods to effect a long term drop in suicide bombings and reduce insurgent numbers in the area. The astute anthropologist had observed that the villages in the area had a high number of widows. She reasoned that since widows in this culture depended on their sons for income and survival, young men felt duty-bound to support their families by joining the well-paying insurgents. To counter this unfortunate circumstance and provide a less lethal source of income for the local people, the Americans began to develop job-training programs for the widows.6

In early 2008, Infantry News also featured an item on HTTs and the social scientists they employed. The team followed in this article had Dr. David Matsuda, a California State University anthropology professor and developmental psychologist, as their social scientist. The article recounted how Dr. Matsuda was able to map out tribal relationships in this one vicinity to assure the American forces that the local depot and food warehouse would not be infiltrated by Moqtada Al Sadr’s Shiite militia despite local support in much of the surrounding area. The family connections Dr. Matsuda uncovered insured that the local forces guarding the warehouse would deny militia members access.7

In Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, a humanitarian action to assist the victims of an overpowering and devastating tsunami, the American military rushed to provide relief to two areas most wasted by the tidal wave. From 5-18 January 2005, the 15th Marine

6. Ibid.
Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) established and conducted relief operations in the Aceh region of Indonesia and in the Galle port area of Sri Lanka. Although the Indonesian and Sri Lankan governments provided some information concerning the populace in these areas, the information often contained bias that impeded operations—the governments saw these blighted areas as strongholds for militant minorities.8

In contrast to repeated government warnings about the hostility remote populations of Aceh rendered foreigners, Marines found those in insurgent hinterlands to be helpful and appreciative of the aid delivered. More accurate information on the attitudes of tsunami victims towards Westerners might have helped to expedite operations. Marines also wished they had known more about the attitudes of government officials and military in the region. Not knowing these attitudes caused delays and led to countless work-arounds and negotiations. Government conduct of counterinsurgency operations in these areas further complicated relief efforts. Government officials constantly restricted MEU efforts because of their concern that a Western face on aid would make the Indonesian government appear ineffective. They relaxed their attitudes somewhat when Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) units showed up to assist in relief operations, and to facilitate relations between the Indonesian and American forces.9

In Sri Lanka, Marines also received some basic cultural information from the embassy and in-country cultural experts. Even more detail, however, was garnered through

9. Charkowske, 20-21. Nevertheless, American offers to assist the Singaporeans in rebuilding the airport and roads to facilitate aid distribution, continued to be spurned as “redundant.” SAF soldiers were also permitted to carry weapons and provide force protection for those distributing relief, while the Marines were not;
the use and translation of local Sinhalese and Tamil newspapers. Though both sources
offered the biases of their particular ethnic mindset, the newspapers reaped a wealth of
information on the two cultures that would enable MEU operations. This review of local
press enabled the MEU to factor analysis into its planning of relief operations through the
port of Galle that sought to avoid the appearance of delivering more aid to one ethnic group
over another. Such a perception, if not averted, would likely lead to attacks on relief
personnel.\textsuperscript{10}

These are but a few vignettes to illustrate where anthropologists are currently in use,
and where they could prove valuable.

\textsuperscript{10} Charkowske, 21.
APPENDIX D – ANTHROPOLOGIST VIEWS: PROS AND CONS

The checkered history of cultural anthropology’s past association with the military and intelligence organizations has much to do with current apprehensions among anthropologists concerning support to the government. This contrasts to anthropology’s earlier function as "the handmaiden of colonialism" with its virtually symbiotic association with government. The Vietnam War changed everything, according to Dr. McFate, so that today we have this situation: “Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. Yet, none of the elements of U.S. national power-diplomatic, military, intelligence, or economic-explicitly take adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of policy. This cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause--the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment.”

Although the excesses of the Vietnam War drove American anthropologists to distance themselves from the military for the past 30 years, and the relationship forged in the past between Intelligence and Anthropology were not easy ones, many believe the time is ripe for reconciliation.

Dr. David Kilcullen is often credited as the “architect” of the strategy to use anthropologists to help win hearts and minds in what is labeled as “armed social work.” Like Dr. McFate, he sees the absence of anthropologists as a problem at every level (from tactical to strategic) when the conflicts and the issues at stake are all about culture and the human terrain.

These arguments have not convinced everyone, however. Some see the War on Terror as the worst of reasons to use anthropologists. Anthropologist Davis Price, a vocal critic of

military and intelligence use of anthropologists, points out that all anthropologists believe they must oblige to “protect and serve those studied.” But not all anthropologists view their government, particularly their intelligence and military establishments, as understanding this limitation of anthropologists. Such critics fear those who conduct the war on terrorism, which seems specifically targeted against minorities and indigenous people, will betray the trust of anthropologists and destroy not only terrorists but the populations from which they come.² Such critics point to the more famous example of Lawrence of Arabia as an intellectual exploited by his government. T.E. Lawrence ultimately felt he had been manipulated to betray the very Arabs whose trust and respect he had worked so hard to cultivate.

Adding to this sense of wariness of government trustworthiness, critics point to the past abuses by the CIA and other clandestine services in using anthropology as a cover for their activities. This has led some countries to regard with suspicion all anthropologists doing field work within their borders and has prompted the seizure, search and destruction of materials associated with anthropological studies. Various anthropologists believe that their fieldwork, in close proximity to populaces with connections to insurgencies, was tampered with by regional governments and police, and even the CIA and other Western intelligence organizations.³

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Critics find the association of their anthropological activity, voluntary or not, with the CIA or special forces as particularly discomfiting. Some perceive the CIA and special operations as perpetrators of acts they consider immoral, unethical, and/or illegal—i.e., the assassination of democratically elected leaders, torture and secret prisons, etc.—and any connection to these groups should be deemed as ethically inappropriate for anthropologists.\(^4\)

As early as November 2005, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) commissioned an exploration into ethical and professional dilemmas raised by providing support to US security, military and intelligence organizations. The final report of the Committee on the Engagement of Anthropology with US Security and Intelligence Agencies in neither endorsed nor opposed the use of anthropologists to support the government. It did, however, summarize several ethical risks regarding the many opportunities such work opened for anthropologists. On 31 October 2007, the AAA’s Executive Board specifically issued a statement on the US Military’s Human Terrain Team System (HTTs) project delineating several ways in which HTTs violated the AAA Code of Ethics, a code that mandates anthropologists must do no harm to their research subjects. An open forum later discussed the Commission report during panel discussions bearing such foci as: The Empire Speaks Back: US Military and Intelligence Organization's Perspectives on Engagement with Anthropology; Against the Weaponization of Anthropology: Critical Perspectives on the leaders of rebel movements within Mozambique, much to the apprehensiveness of the Mozambique government. Eventually Harris had to flee the country—without his research. When his papers were finally returned to him, they were stained with food crumbs and cigarette ash. He never received an explanation as to the condition of his papers, but was reassured no one had read his work. Harris believed otherwise and held the Mozambique Government and/or the CIA responsible but could prove nothing. (paraphrase).

\(^4\) Price, Interlopers, 21.
Military, War, and US Foreign Policy; and Anthropologists and War: Non-Participation in Counterinsurgency.  

But what of operational art and the Commander whose operation needs the expert advice of anthropologists in the design of activities meant to help and protect the local populace? What of the Commander who may be assisting a UN mission to enable the feeding of refugees from Darfur? Or the Commander who contemplates applying the lessons learned of the past to operations of the future or even to operations he currently conducts in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? Milan Vego points out that “A failure to heed correct lessons has often been also the result of an inability to understand the local conditions or to accept another army or society on its own terms.”  Certainly, the insights of an anthropologist may enable a commander to better understand the various societies he will encounter and deal with in any operation he plans.  

Dr. Hugh Gusterson, a professor of anthropology at George Mason University, and one who has argued (as recently as July 2008 on the Foreign Policy website) that “the Ivory Tower and the Pentagon don’t mix,” nevertheless admits in his article “When Professors Go to War” that they must mix, albeit not through funding streams.

…U.S. military planners and policymakers are confronted with…questions with profound long-term implications for U.S. security and international peace: Is Middle Eastern terrorism inherent to Islamic theology? Is it an inevitable Islamic response to globalization and

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5. The American Anthropological Association (AAA), established in 1902, is the world’s largest professional organization of anthropologists and of those with an interest in anthropology. Its average annual membership consists of more than 10,000 members. It is based in Arlington, VA and represents all specialties within anthropology – cultural anthropology, biological (or physical) anthropology, archaeology, linguistics and applied anthropology; http://www.aaanet.org/issues/AAA-Opposes-Human-Terrain-System-Project.cfm (accessed 18 Oct 2008).
Westernization? Is it, instead really a response to poverty and underdevelopment that happens to draw on the language of religion? Or, as Osama bin Laden himself has suggested, is it a response to U.S. military intervention in the region? If the United States draws down its interventionist presence in the Middle East, will al Qaeda leave Americans alone, or will it be emboldened to pursue them to their own shores? Are Middle Eastern countries readily capable of Western democracy, or is this a dangerously ethnocentric neoconservative fantasy?

If American policymakers get the answers to these questions wrong, the people in the region will suffer, and more Americans will die unnecessarily—be it in more Middle Eastern wars, in future 9/11s, or both.7

Dr. Gusterson, often depicted as a critic on the use of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), finds commendable and necessary the willingness of the Department of Defense (DoD) to better understand the cultures U.S. forces encounter. He lauds the desire of DOD to seek knowledge from those who devote their lives to studying cultures, but warns that unrealistic expectations could result from the use of anthropologists. He opines that had the US military conferred with anthropologists prior to the Iraqi invasion, they would have received assurances that Iraqis would regard Americans as liberators, and that once Saddam Hussein left power, Sunnis and Shiites would more likely turn to each other, rather than on each other. Gusterson posits that such an erroneous prediction would have been offered by anthropologists because of their selective bias. He perceives that anthropologists who would willingly have chosen to work for the government in 2002-2003 as more neoconservative than those who eschewed the military.

Dr. Gusterson stands among those who believe anthropologists have much to offer—i.e., “important insights about religious extremism and terrorism”—but cautions that the military must seek to rely on a broader range of anthropologists than merely those who

would directly work for the military and the government. He strongly urges that the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and other neutral
organization not associated with the Pentagon act as umbrellas or sponsors to attract all
anthropologists to work certain issues. Anthropologists want to help, he claims, but many do
not want to be under the direct control of the government or the military. They may shun
association with the military or intelligence but nevertheless believe their research invaluable
to keeping the government and military from doing harm rather than good. Anthropologists
would be more willing to undertake the sponsorship and funding of intermediary
organizations with strong reputations for seeking truth in the spirit of scholarship. Through
such organizations, anthropologists would feel more free to develop without undue influence
the knowledge that would be made publicly available and which may well be what the
government and military need.8

The advice of anthropologists such as Dr. Gusterson obviously did not go unheeded.
The Minerva Initiative and solicitation for proposals under the sponsorship of the National
Science Foundation are but one of several ways the government, military, and intelligence
organizations look to harness the expertise of anthropologists to assist in Operational Art.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has shown a willingness to address the
concerns of anthropologists and other academics on issues of ethics and control over the
materials and studies produced. At the Association of American Universities where he
publicly launched the Minerva Initiative, the SECDEF addressed the subject of Human
Terrain Teams and the “questions surrounding the use of anthropologists in Afghanistan and
Iraq.” He also acknowledged that there existed “a long history of cooperation—as well as

8. Ibid.
controversy—between the U.S. government and anthropology. Understanding the traditions, motivations, and languages of other parts of the world has not always been a strong suit of the United States. It…remains a problem.” He went on, however, to advocate why anthropologists were proving such vital asset to HTTs:

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the heroic efforts and best intentions of our men and women in uniform have at times been undercut by a lack of knowledge of the culture and people they are dealing with everyday—societies organized by networks of kin and tribe, where ancient codes of shame and honor often mean a good deal more than “hearts and minds.”

The U.S. military has therefore combined hard earned trial and error with the assistance of anthropologists and other experts to get a better sense of the culture in which they are operating. The Human Terrain program …is still in infancy and has attendant growing pains. But early results indicate that it is leading to alternative thinking…inviting local powerbrokers to bless a mosque restored with coalition funds. These kinds of actions are key to long term success, but they are not always intuitive in a military establishment that has long put a premium on firepower and technology…the net effect of these efforts is often less violence…fewer hardships and casualties among civilians.9

To ascertain the commonality of these communities and to determine if they can work together in an ethical manner has indeed become the focus of several recent conferences.

The issue of anthropologists working with the Intelligence Community was the recent focus of a symposium sponsored by the International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA). It took place in Springfield, Virginia on January 26 & 27, 2007. In setting the stage for discussion at this Second International Conference on The Ethics of National Security

Intelligence, Dr. Nicholas Gessler\textsuperscript{10} characterized the anthropology-intelligence relationship in this way:

Anthropology has had an uneasy relationship with intelligence. Both seek objective understandings of "other" cultures: the insider's knowledge of the "other" people's seemingly enigmatic ways of thinking and doing -- perceptions, understandings, expectations and behaviors that seem radically different from our own. Born of colonialism, anthropologists have struggled, independent of national interests, to gain the trust of those they study in order to build bridges between their cultures and our own. They negotiate the tangled lines of authority and responsibility, navigating between the interests of their subjects, their peers, those who fund their studies and the ideals of furthering the "scientific" and "humanistic" goals of anthropology. Anthropologists have also worked collaboratively with and antagonistically against the intelligence community, a relationship that is often plagued by conflicting loyalties. An anthropological perspective can contribute to the intelligence profession by developing what might be called "cultural intelligence"...by trying to impart...a critical awareness and appreciation of the deeply rooted and often invisible cultural differences among peoples...we will look at the ethical issues raised in each of these two communities when they each pursue their separate ends as well as the issues raised when they work together.\textsuperscript{11}

This dialogue between intelligence/military and anthropology needs to continue. At stake are the very cultures the military and intelligence must deal with and the anthropologists seek to understand.

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\textsuperscript{10} Nicholas Gessler, Ph.D. University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Human Complex Systems Program, was a conference facilitator.

\textsuperscript{11} Gessler, \url{http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/gessler/tutorials/} (accessed 20 September 2008).
APPENDIX E– OTHER OPTIONS FOR READING THE HUMAN LANDSCAPE

The requirement for cultural knowledge and competence will not abate any time soon. Many within the military and intelligence communities are already working on alternatives. Some solutions depend on redistributing the current resources of military services and focusing on cultivating cultural expertise from within the ranks.

For example, the TRADOC Culture Center has created a cultural awareness training support package (TSP), initiated in FY07, that includes 300 hours of cultural training on Iraq and Afghanistan and a 40 hour train-the-trainer program. Other TSPs under development focus on the Horn of Africa, Iran, China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and other strategic areas. These will be easily accessible on-line.¹

In his Naval War College research paper “Beyond the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation: The Role of Culture and Society in the Military Decision Making Process,” U.S. Army Major Stephen Marr advocated the greater refinement of a military specialization known as the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. Some of the Services have already sought to make this a specialty, but more could be done to make this a competitive program with a track for “movers and shakers.” A joint version of this program also needs to be developed.²

Such a joint FAO program could include immersion training that would send carefully selected military members to live, breathe, and think in the cultures they intend to master as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Doctorate level training in anthropology and targeted cultures may be involved. However, to cultivate such experts takes time. It also takes military members away from their primary duty. Some would argue that the FAO concept differs little from the Defense Attaches program which also plucks military officers from their principal line of work to provide military support to the ambassador. A FAO, nevertheless, can be called upon throughout his or her career to assist in operations in the area of expertise.

Other solutions look to intelligence to provide the cultural competence that commanders need.

In July 2006 the Center for Advance Defense Studies (CADS) Directorate of Research published as part of its Defense Concepts Series a paper on *Cultural Intelligence and the United States Military*. The paper cited “a lack of cultural awareness by the military” and “its failure to institutionalize cultural awareness as part of doctrine and training especially in intelligence” as an underlying cause of why the U.S. as a superpower could not replicate its overwhelming success in conventional warfare to less conventional or low intensity type conflicts. It postulated that “Cultural awareness is an understanding of all aspects of a nation’s cultural arc--its past, present and future. Once awareness is achieved, tools that constantly create such awareness can be incorporated into intelligence mechanisms
and thus establish cultural intelligence (CULTINT)…Cultural awareness is central to ensuring successful military operations, especially in long-term, low-intensity conflicts.”³

The CADS placed the responsibility for a solution to provide commanders with the appropriate level of cultural awareness squarely upon the discipline of Intelligence.

Defense Intelligence is working towards providing the cultural competence needed for planning and executing operations and campaigns. Calls have gone out to command to voice their requirements for cultural intelligence. Plans are being reviewed to ensure they contain the appropriate requirements for cultural awareness. Where possible, efforts are enacted to leverage expertise rather than rely on “amateurs” to analyze cultural data. None of this is easy to do and all of it takes time. CADS confirms, “In the military sense, cultural intelligence is a complicated pursuit in anthropology, psychology, communications, sociology, history, and above all military doctrine.” Defense Intelligence continues to grapple with how best to do it.⁴

A June 2007 thesis from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey proposed a virtual community of culture expertise as a possible answer. Born out of a need by Special Operations commanders (from tactical to operational) to receive a greater depth of cultural knowledge than readily available, U.S. Army Majors Matthew A. Zahn and Wayne R. Lacey proposed that the Intelligence Community build a virtual community that was wiki-technology based and open source. This would enable the academic community to participate and provide their expertise. It would also allow others, military or other, to share their experience with various cultures and to also seek advice. The technology runs on

⁴ Ibid.

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networked collaboration tools that are already developed, commercially available, and already in use by the government—in their words, a solution that would provide cultural knowledge with “low overhead and high coverage.” Their proposal would create a virtual encyclopedia of culture on-line that would be hosted on unclassified systems with password protection. They could also be hosted on, but not exclusive to, INTELINK (the intelligence internet) or INTELLIPEDIA (the intelligence version of Wikipedia), which both reside on the classified domain. As with wikis, self-policing by participants would occur but a cultural czar or knowledge manager would have the final say over how to present more controversial data, and could eliminate data that did not meet professional standards. Majors Zahn and Lacey also propose locating this virtual community within the Library of Congress or another .gov rather than a .mil. This would assuage the qualms of academics and donors who wanted no direct links to the military or intelligence.5

Some would say that these proposals are already being acted on or that they mirror initiatives, such as open source.gov, long in the works by government agencies. They would add a portal to open source that would host cultural data. Others would emulate what the Open Source Center does. The Open Source Center login website announces that it “provides foreign media reporting and analysis to policymakers, government institutions and strategic partners. We deliver targeted, timely and authoritative open source intelligence for analysis, operations and policymaking.” A Cultural Knowledge web login site might perhaps offer academics, government institutions, and strategic partners cultural knowledge for analysis, operations, and policymaking.

The Army’s Human Terrain System is also working to build a collaborative network of subject matter experts (SMEs) for its Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). The HTTS program recruits academics, students, and those with knowledge specific to Iraq and Afghanistan. These SMEs work without clearances and answer questions posed by HTTs within twenty-four hours and through “open source” sites. This already established network could become a prototype for a larger network used by the joint operational environment or it could (and may be already) incorporated into the open source.gov site.6

In any event, these proposals illustrate that there are ways to harness the knowledge of anthropologists. A more open and “democratic” means of sharing information through the internet might appeal to anthropologists who shun direct work for the military. The memory of the U.S. Army’s social research PROJECT CAMELOT in 1964 to divine the causes of violent behavior behind insurgencies is still regarded by many as a veiled effort to enlist anthropologists to assist in overthrowing the Allende government in Chile. Though never proven, anthropologists continue to perceive that working with the government will lead to the classification of their data as “secret” (and thereby restricted to government use only) and that their data may be misappropriated to “do harm” against the populace studied.7

A move toward greater openness in Anthropology received a recent boost with the recent decision of the American Anthropological Association’s (AAA) to release some of its content through open access (OA). The AAA also announced on 13 Oct 2008 that the Andre W. Mellon Foundation had awarded it and several other professional academic organizations under the National Humanities Alliance Task Force on Open Access and Scholarly

6. For more information, see http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/smenet.html
Communication a $50,000 grant to determine how it should move forward to make academic research more publicly accessible.\(^8\) If the military is to work with anthropologists, much of that work will have to stay on the unclassified level.

Others are looking into the possibility of expanding reachback to other Combat Support Agencies (CSA) through the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) located at commands, and to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The organizations represented may already have anthropologists on staff, access to academic communities, and studies on hand that would provide in-depth cultural information.

Still others are looking to stand up an Operational Strategic Studies (OSS)-like organization as used in World War II to serve as a clearing house that aligns academic expertise with the military and intelligence as required. It would not compete with the CIA (the offspring of the original OSS), but would keep its focus at the operational level. Among its many duties, it would provide the anthropologists and also cultural studies commissioned by the Defense Department. It would leverage a variety of approaches to bring the appropriate expertise to the command and joint staff level.

This OSS-like clearing house might also include among its experts the resumes of regional experts and professionals who are native transplants to America. It could recruit first generation Americans who have lived within or spoken the language of targeted cultures. Such expertise, if properly vetted, can help enormously to foresee the pitfalls of

\(^8\) Also included in the task force are: Modern Language Association, the American Sociological Association, the American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the National Communication Association, the American Statistical Association, the Political Science Association and the American Academy of Religion. 
http://blog.openaccessanthropology.org/ (accessed 18 Oct 2008); 
activities that might be undertaken by the U.S. government (whether of a military or
diplomatic nature) and could be misperceived as offensive or hostile.

These proposals each have strengths and weaknesses. The sheer volume in ideas on
how to provide expertise for reading the human landscape—of which the above is only a
sampling-- clearly indicates that cultural information is essential to Operational Art and
determining its delivery and use is a modern challenge we are tackling.
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