Building Global Partnerships: Cooperative Maritime Security Operations as the Most Effective Fire of 21st Century Warfare

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A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

Maritime commerce is an essential component of the current globalized economy and defense of the maritime domain is critical for ensuring continued economic prosperity and national security for the world's maritime nations. As many states reduce their resource allocation for maritime security capabilities, a multi-lateral approach to maritime security must be adopted. The United States maritime forces' Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower proposes a global maritime security cooperative to do just that. United States Joint Doctrine requires Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop a regional security cooperation plan but provides little guidance regarding the principles and procedures that comprise an effective security cooperation strategy. Developing the underlying principles that govern cooperative international security partnerships and creating the organizational structure and functional relationships required to manage a regional security partnership are essential elements in establishing an effective global maritime security environment.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

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by

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Signature: _________________________

31 October 2008
ABSTRACT

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The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security.
- President George W. Bush

INTRODUCTION

For the past decade, over 80 percent of the world’s merchandise exports were transported by sea. Expansion of the globalized economy, characterized by growth in merchandise exports, outpaced national GDP growth by a factor of 2:1.1 Ensuring continued growth of the global marketplace requires protection of its transportation infrastructure. As such, securing the global maritime commons may soon become the paramount task for the world’s maritime powers. Global defense expenditure decreased rapidly following the end of the Cold War but has remained relatively constant, measured as a percentage of GDP, over the past decade if the United States’ Iraq war spending is disregarded.2,3 Naval expenditure, as a percentage of defense expenditure has remained flat with a significant portion of naval spending earmarked for fleet upgrade and recapitalization rather than increased mission capabilities.4,5,6 With increasing utilization of maritime transport by the global commercial sector and individual states’ maritime security resources shrinking, how can the global maritime community meet its future maritime security requirements?

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower drafted by the United States maritime services proposes formation of a global maritime structure to cooperatively meet the emerging security requirements.7 As noted by Sea Power editor Richard Burgess, the concept of cooperative maritime security is not a new one for the United States Navy; elevation of security cooperation to one of the Navy’s six strategic pillars is.8,9 Securing the maritime commons is critical to the continued sustainability of the globalized economic system, and with the threat of a seaborne WMD attack, many states are closely associating maritime security with national security. Given the scope of the threat and the
interconnectedness of the maritime domain, no single nation is capable of unilaterally securing the world’s oceans and waterways. If the maritime commons can be secured only through a globally cooperative effort, how must the United States alter its operational structure to facilitate this global partnership?

The United States’ Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and their Maritime Component Commanders (MCCs) hold positions uniquely suited to the development and execution of a cooperative maritime strategy. While the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Planning Doctrine (JPD) require the GCC to develop a security cooperation strategy, none of the documents provide guidance regarding the underlying principles of international relations that will yield an effective security partnership. Also missing from the GEF and JPD is the organizational structure and functional procedures required to translate the underlying principles into an effective, efficient security cooperation organization. Development of the underlying security cooperation partnership principles and creation of a tailored organization designed to accomplish proactive planning and consistent application of sound operational practice is required to establish an effective cooperative regional security plan and facilitate a secure global maritime environment.

UNITED STATES DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

United States strategic guidance explicitly states that development of a maritime security cooperation framework is a fundamental requirement for national security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security states, “Success in securing the maritime domain will not come from the United States acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations.” Joint Strategic Planning Doctrine further narrows the scope of the cooperative
framework by specifying six activities requisite in maritime security cooperation plans.\textsuperscript{13} Though the six security cooperation activities provide the ‘\textbf{what to do}’ to increase international security cooperation at the theater-strategic level, they do not describe the ‘\textbf{how to do}’. The same is also true of the GEF’s eight security cooperation focus areas.\textsuperscript{14} Aligned to the theater-strategic level of warfare, the GEF’s eight focus areas direct specific activities for the GCC and MCC to accomplish within their AOR but do not offer an explanation of how they are to develop the operational relationships required to accomplish their security cooperation goals. The \textit{Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower} provides even less guidance, merely stating that effective maritime security cooperation must, “focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain.”\textsuperscript{15}

With strategic guidance providing only a broad list of focus areas and cooperative activities that describe the ‘what to do’ in establishing a maritime security partnership, development of a set of underlying principles that can be used by the GCC and MCC to structure the ‘how to do’ becomes imperative. Every state has a unique set of strategic requirements. While it can be argued that a secure maritime environment is beneficial to all maritime powers, individual states’ diplomatic, economic, and security relationships cannot be ignored when developing a cooperative framework. The ‘Balance of Power’ theory, while not fully capable of explaining international coalition partnership behavior, is useful in providing the basic tenets of state motivation. Professor Kenneth Waltz summarizes state-motivation into thee basic principles: 1) Maximize gain at minimal cost; 2) Self-protection must never be sacrificed; 3) Ensure that beneficial international instruments remain in
While seemingly oriented solely in the self-interest of an individual state, these principles also justify a state’s participation in a cooperative security partnership.

Participation in a cooperative security partnership satisfies the first of Waltz’ principles by the reduced defense expenditures realized in a partnership that shares costs and capability requirements. The second principle is satisfied because securing the global commons will increase each participating state’s individual security against destabilizing actors. Waltz’ final principle is satisfied, in that once the partnership is established, it will be in the best (self)interest of each state to remain committed to participation based on the two benefits previously listed.

The nature of the partnership must now be determined. Will it be a coalition of equals or will a single nation direct the organization? The answer to this question is summed up excellently in a quote from Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Cuban Minister to the United States, taken from a speech given in 1923:

International cooperation, such as I understand it, can yield all its beneficial results only among such entities as stand on a footing of equality to each other. The principle of equality among nations is what constitutes the fundamental bases of international cooperation. That equality is in its turn founded upon a mutual respect, no matter how the military force or the territorial or economic importance of the nations may differ.

The capability that each nation brings to the global maritime security cooperative will vary based on its means and force structure. What is most important for the ultimate success of this cooperative effort is that each nation provides a critical capability to the coalition and is supported, when necessary, by its partners. With that goal in mind, the underlying principles of maritime security cooperation can be developed.
DEVELOPING THE PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY COOPERATION

Given the complex international political environment and the maritime security strategic guidance provided above, a set of overarching principles must be developed upon which the operational planning for a cooperative maritime security environment can be based. It is imperative that these overarching principles are translatable down to the operational commander so that concrete operational procedures can be developed. The basis for the overarching principles is inherent in the statement of requirements itself but must also provide for each state’s self-interest. Generally, each of the states involved must realize an increase in their own national security, the entire concept must be based on a global/theater-wide approach, and the terms of the security arrangement can not be dictated by a single actor. Specifically, a cooperative maritime strategy must be based on operational principles that build military-to-military relationships, leverage the inherent strengths and capabilities of each state involved in the partnership, be tailored to the needs/capacity of the regional states, receive buy-in from each of the partner states, be persistent, and coordinate across the inter-agency in order to promote a holistic approach to the partnership.

Developing strong military-to-military relationships throughout the maritime security partnership is the key to long term sustainability and success. There are two main threat vectors to consider when addressing maritime security. The first is use of the maritime domain to destabilize the international political order. Destabilizing actions include direct terrorist action against sovereign states, providing safe haven (willingly, or not) to terrorist organizations, trafficking in persons or narcotics, and the proliferation of WMD or WMD technology to failing or rogue states. The second is the commission of acts of violence against civilian or commercial maritime traffic (piracy, theft, hijacking, etc.). A Line of
Effort (LOE) consisting of intelligence, surveillance, and direct action must be established to counter either of the two threat vectors. Only the interoperability resident in a strong military-to-military relationship between partner nations can establish the functional cooperative capability required to execute this LOE. In fact, maritime component interoperability is necessary to realize any capability within the security partnership.

Developing military-to-military relationships must be accomplished through shared professional experiences such as combined education, exchanges, training, exercises, and operational engagements.\textsuperscript{18} The knowledge gained during the engagements will enable formulation of shared operational doctrine, common understanding of partner capabilities and limitations, improved communications, and information and intelligence sharing. These four elements, in addition to building professional camaraderie between the partners, support implementation of any cooperative partnership LOE, and allow for the most efficient utilization of resources within the common operating perspective. Without a strong military-to-military relationship, cooperative operations will not be achievable.

Inherent to each state that participates in the maritime security partnership are a set of \textit{unique maritime strengths and capabilities} that can be leveraged to achieve a positive synthesis throughout the partnership. These strengths and capabilities may include competence in a specific mission area, financial resources, doctrinal development, and geographic location.\textsuperscript{19} A theoretical example to illustrate this is as follows:

Pakistani intelligence identifies a Contact of Interest (COI) that has recently departed a port in South East Asia for the Middle East. The COI is located in international waters by the United States Navy using its Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities. The target is monitored as it moves out of the U.S. Navy’s operating area and passed to an Indian Navy corvette for tracking. Track information is passed to the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) maritime operations center as the COI enters the territorial waters of the UAE. UAE Coast Guard is assigned to escort the vessel to port in Dubai where the vessel is met by a team of inspectors from Emirati and United States Customs and the cargo is screened for WMD components.
Though a fictional scenario, the capabilities described above are resident in each of the countries mentioned. Operational capability, communication and information sharing, doctrine, geographic location, and port infrastructure elements are only a few of the unique capabilities required to prosecute the COI in the example above.

Functional strengths must be developed in partner states to include the capability to monitor critical geographic locations for smuggling, the capability to control and sustain long-term maritime presence operations, and the capability of one partner nation to provide physical resources or training to another. A specific example of cooperative development is described in a speech by the Malaysian Minister of Defense Dato Abd Razak, “PACOM has mobile training teams that could assist us in acquiring a number of specialized skills. Achieving better infra-agency [sic] coordination, via the use of a common tactical data information system and standard operating procedures, is another area where we hope to learn from the experiences of other countries.”20 In every area of operation, a careful analysis at the regional level must be done to identify the critical capabilities and needs that must be met in order to develop a secure maritime environment.

Directly tied to the requirement of leveraging the existing strengths and capabilities of partner nations is the need develop a tailored security relationship in response to the unique role that each partner nation plays within the maritime sphere of influence. First, the unique attributes of each state that could be exploited by destabilizing actors must be identified. Once identified, steps must be taken to deny the actors that opportunity. Some general examples are: A state with a large transshipment port must possess a robust port security capability; a state with a long, sparsely populated coastline must possess maritime domain
awareness of its coastal approaches; a state with a vast tidal estuary must possess a large number of small patrol craft to monitor the river basin. The capabilities necessary to maintain local maritime security must be specifically tailored to each situation. Unique capability and regional interface requirements must be fully addressed to eliminate seams that destabilizing actors could exploit.

An example of relationship tailoring on a global scale can be seen in each state’s sphere of influence. Excepting the few blue-water navies in the world, the focus of most maritime states is their regional and territorial waters. The focus of effort by these regional maritime states consists mainly of coastal defense, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and law enforcement/safety. Examining the Strait of Malacca and the requirements of its shared territorial partners, the security relationship should be tailored to incorporate cooperative C4ISR and cross-territorial operational doctrine. Tailoring the regional security relationships to satisfy the unique needs of each state will create an effective, efficient, and sustainable cooperative relationship throughout the global maritime commons.

In order to form an effective maritime security cooperation partnership, no single state can be the sole resource provider or lead actor in the global partnership. Currently only the United States has the capability to act as such an entity. Each partner state must provide resources within their means and the United States must be judicious in its resource allocation to allow the other states within the partnership to become fully vested members. As stated by Dr. Céspedes above, to truly legitimize the maritime security partnership, each state must be able, and is required, to act according to the limits of its own strengths and capabilities. For the United States, financial assistance, global reach, and established doctrinal procedures may continue to be some of its strengths. Other states will contribute by
providing mine countermeasure capabilities, controlling their littoral waters, enforcing customs regulations at transshipment ports, preventing illegal trafficking, or providing persistent presence in geographic choke points.

In addition to resources, roles must be defined within the maritime partnership. Initially, as the global partnership is established, the United States may find itself filling the role of enabler and coordinator. Maritime security operations in the Strait of Malacca are a case in point. Though one of the most important transit lanes in the world, a United States led coalition is both unwanted and potentially destabilizing. In this case, regional maritime security will be best served by the United States assuming a supporting role to the security cooperation organization established by Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. The United States must assess each maritime region independently and be prepared to assume the role and provide only the resources required to best achieve maritime security in each region.

Long-term persistence of effort by the United States will be a major factor in determining if the proposed maritime security cooperation partnership will be effective. Capacity and relationship building is a long-term effort that must be undertaken as such from the beginning. It takes little effort for the United States to deliver a shipment of patrol boats to a partner nation, but if the maritime forces of that nation are not capable of employing or maintaining those boats, the effort is wasted. Similarly, even if the partner nation is capable of operating the boats professionally but there is no capacity for cooperative operations they will be less than optimally effective. The GCC must stress that all future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts contain provisions for the long-term training of both maintenance personnel and operators. These provisions will not only provide for a more capable force,
but will also provide an avenue for United States personnel to interact with their counterparts in the partner nation.

Long-term persistent commitments from the United States to its partners will establish mutual trust and inter-dependence. As then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet ADM Gary Roughead stated when discussing U.S.-India naval interaction, “Friendships that are able to endure over [10 to 20 years] could be good for both of our navies and both of our countries.” Predictable, repetitive scheduling of exercises, training, and operations will serve to increase the interoperability of the forces as doctrine and tactics are made common across the regional cooperative partnership. Frequent visits by United States military Mobile Training Teams, especially visits that provide cooperative opportunities for multiple regional partners, will also aid in establishing cooperative coalition relations and interoperability. Support for regional centers of excellence, whether the center is sponsored by a partner nation or by the United States will serve to increase the persistence of the United States in the region as well.

Securing the global commons is in the best interest of every nation, regardless of the political system to which they subscribe. It is currently untenable for the United States Government to engage directly with certain states based on their political system, but establishing a cooperative regional security partnership will make such direct engagement unnecessary. Each sovereign state will police its own territorial waters against terrorist and criminal elements as this is in their own self-interest. The cooperative regional security partnership, to include (or not) the United States, will then secure the maritime commons. Within the political relationships inherent to the cooperative, not all states will require bilateral relationships with the United States for the cooperative to function effectively. In
this way the security cooperative will function and endure regardless of United States’
support for any individual state at any given time.

*Utilization of the inter-agency* is the final principle required to develop a functional
cooperative maritime security framework. Application of the Diplomatic, Informational,
Military, Economic (DIME) model when addressing operational objectives will allow
maritime security operations to be the catalyst for international relationship building between
the United States and its perspective global partners. Two specific examples of this are the
Department of State’s partnership with the military to support the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and the Department of Defense’s utilization of the Gulf Security Dialogue to
promote military interoperability. The Gulf Security Dialogue is a high-level diplomatic
exchange between the United States and its partner nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
While the purpose of the Dialogue is to diplomatically address issues of strategic importance,
the Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense, specifically the
CENTCOM J5, to ensure that operational military matters that impact the wider Persian Gulf
region, such as ballistic missile defense and oil infrastructure security are addressed.
Multilateral diplomatic elevation of operational issues ensures that Gulf state interoperability,
and persistent United States presence, is maintained in the Persian Gulf region.

The Proliferation Security Initiative is well suited to support the DIME approach to
maritime security cooperation. For example, in the course of conducting an intercept
operation, coalition partners are highly dependent upon inter-agency and multinational
intelligence sharing. PSI operations require close inter-agency coordination and coordinated
diplomatic actions between partner states to coordinate PSI intercept delivery in advance of
the operation. Assets from multiple coalition partners may also be required to execute the
operation. Finally, in order to prepare for PSI events, military exercises provide an opportunity for coalition partners to practice cooperative operations. Each of these four elements provides the opportunity for relationship building, information exchange, and interoperability between multiple members of the global maritime security cooperative.

Critics would counter by arguing that there is no globally applicable set of underlying cooperative principles that can be used to develop a security partnership and that maritime security cooperation requires an approach individually tailored to each state. While it is true that the unique needs of each state must be addressed independently, the guiding principles stated above remain universally applicable because they are designed to address underlying common requirements without being tied to a single central actor or specific threat. Security of the maritime domain, both locally and globally, increases every sovereign state’s control over its maritime borders. Whether this control is used to stop the flow of WMD, criminal trafficking, or undocumented foreign workers, its application is in the best interests of each sovereign state. As such, the underlying principles necessary to develop effective security partnerships within the maritime domain remain globally applicable.

In summary, while each of the six underlying principles of maritime security cooperation is unique in its composition, their application must be highly integrated. Developing lasting military-to-military relationships will assist the United States in maintaining a persistent presence with its partners. The focus of the relationships must be development of complementary doctrine and operational procedures that leverage the unique strengths of each partner state. At the operational level the GCC must direct the United States’ role in developing cooperative regional relationships in order to accomplish national security objectives. As the cooperative relationships develop over time, partners in the AOR
will become increasingly interoperable and will further tailor their doctrine to increasingly rely upon the capabilities of the other partner states, thus strengthening the regional security cooperation partnership.

OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

United States Joint Doctrine explicitly mandates conduct of regional security cooperation as a subset of Phase-0 operations. Each of the GCCs is required to develop a security cooperation plan for their AOR. It is easy to dictate such a requirement and just as easy for each of the GCC staffs to list a set of goals and operational functions that will be employed to support each of the overall security cooperation goals. However, this process is a paper exercise and can not yield an effective security cooperation framework. To develop an actionable set of maritime security cooperation tasks, the underlying principles listed above must be translated into operational procedures. Both the GCC and MCC staffs must be physically and functionally restructured to achieve this.

Personnel on both the GCC and MCC staffs must be assigned to a Theater Security Cooperation Office (TSCO) for security cooperation operations to be conducted effectively. The organizational structure for the security cooperation office is shown in figure 1. As security cooperation planning and execution are ongoing tasks, the TSCO at the GCC and MCC levels should be located in the Current Operations (COPS) cell. Each Embassy is different, and the task loading of each Liaison Officer will be unique. However, as a standard, the maritime security cooperation officer should be located in the Embassy’s Security Cooperation Office, (SCO) or the office that provides this function for the Embassy.
FIGURE 1
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Not depicted within the physical organizational structure shown in figure 1 are the functional relationships that allow for optimization of the military-to-military relationships necessary to develop the effective maritime security cooperation partnerships. The most important aspect of military-to-military relationship development is the interaction between the country liaison officer (CLO) resident in the Embassy’s SCO and the partner state’s Maritime Liaison Officer. This relationship must be close-knit and long-term, both in the commitment of the GCC to staff the position and the length of the assignment for the liaison officer. Without this relationship, the liaison officer will be unable to determine the needs, capabilities, and tailored relationship necessary to achieve a functional security cooperation partnership. The CLO also provides the GCC a direct, timely, and persistent liaison with the
inter-agency process and builds important relationships within the Embassy’s diplomatic framework with the partner nation.\textsuperscript{28}

The second most important relationship required to develop an effective maritime security cooperation partnership is the between the CLO and his counterpart in the Maritime Component Commander’s TSC office, the Country Coordination Officer (CCO). The CCO becomes the advocate for his partner country regarding U.S. resource/effort distribution. The CCOs for all of the countries in the AOR collectively form the U.S. Liaison Coordination Office (LOCUS), as shown in figure 2. The Liaison Coordination Officer serves as the director of the LOCUS. As a group the LOCUS is able to address the collective planning, resourcing, and execution of the GCC/MCC theater maritime security cooperation plan.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{LOCUS_OrganizationDiagram.png}
\caption{LOCUS ORGANIZATION}
\end{figure}
The organizational structures represented in figures 1 and 2 create the foundation for an effective security cooperation partnership by establishing a persistent presence by the United States in the AOR and developing close military-to-military relationships between the GCC/MCC and each of the partner states. The next function of the cooperative process is for the liaison officers to use their relationship with the partner states to determine the needs, capabilities, and tailored supporting framework necessary to optimize the cooperative synergy within the AOR partnerships. This process will be unique for each partner nation and is beyond the scope of this paper to address. What is important is what is done with the information once it is determined by the United States and its partner nations.

To develop an effective security cooperation partnership within the AOR, the needs, capabilities, and cooperation framework for each of the regional states must be accounted for. There are two approaches that can be used to do this: Shared Doctrine and Need Resourcing. The concept of Shared Doctrine is most effectively applied through the use of common tactics and training procedures. At the broadest level, this is embodied in the usage of U.S. Fleet Exercise Publications (FXPs), NATO publications, and international standards of operation during cooperative exercises. Need Resourcing is the second functional requirement of the TSCO. Unique needs and capabilities reside in each state’s force structure. A secure maritime environment can only be achieved if resident regional capabilities are utilized to meet overall regional needs. Current capabilities must be tailored to meet the needs of the partner state and the regional security partnership. Where there is a capability shortfall, the TSCO must use its resources and the inter-agency process to correct the deficiency. The LOCUS structure will be able to effectively coordinate capability acquisition and tailoring to meet overall theater maritime security requirements.
Littoral Combat and Mine Warfare are two tailorable capabilities. The specific example of Mine Warfare in the Persian Gulf region can be used to show how this process is employed. The United States maintains a limited Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) capability. Though there are U.S. MCM forces forward-deployed to the Persian Gulf, they are insufficient to conduct Gulf-wide MCM operations. Deployment of additional forces is expensive and time consuming. Effective maritime security in the Persian Gulf will require regional partner states to develop robust organic MCM capabilities. The LOCUS would emphasize a theater wide solution that employed common operating systems. Through cooperative exercises and personnel exchanges, the Persian Gulf MCM cooperative would develop common doctrine (plans, tactics, and operating procedures) and interoperability.

Critics of the expanded maritime security cooperation framework outlined above will focus on the increase in manpower required at the GCC and MCC levels. An increase in resources, specifically manpower, will be required to establish the TSCO and security cooperation framework described above, but the overall resource savings will more than offset this increased cost, as Phase-0 operations are extremely cost effective.\textsuperscript{31} Not only will an increased emphasis on security cooperation at the GCC/MCC level make the prospect of conducting major combat operations less likely in the future, it will make resource allocation more efficient, as the benefits gained by current Phase-0 operations will be honed and expanded.

The forward presence of the U.S. Navy during its overseas deployments provides unique maritime security cooperation opportunities. A robust Maritime Component Command TSCO structure is essential to prioritize and optimize utilization of available resources.\textsuperscript{32} The LOCUS will allow the MCC to exercise unity of command over security
cooperation assets through central resourcing and to exercise unity of effort in executing the theater security cooperation plan by prioritizing security cooperation tasks to ensure that regionally critical events are accomplished. Inter-agency requests for assistance can also be resourced using the same TSCO structure. The established long-term relationships will allow for immediate communication with partner states and synchronization of maritime security cooperation efforts with United States national security goals.

Increasing tour lengths for the Country Liaison Officers and Country Coordination Officers will provide benefits other than just temporal persistence with the partner states. Long-term assignment within the TSCO structure will minimize turn-over related inefficiencies. Engagements conducted within the military-to-military partner relationship will become incremental rather than repetitive and ultimately reduce the resources required to achieve the end-state of regional maritime security. Some resource saving can be realized by the assignment of multiple partner nations to a single CCO-CLO liaison team. A single CCO-CLO liaison team would serve multiple states possessing minimal capabilities or partnership roles. Partner states with significant maritime resources and a central role in the maritime cooperative partnership would have a dedicated CCO-CLO liaison team assigned. While the security cooperation office organization described above would increase manpower requirements for the GCC and MCC, the overall reduction in the number of fleet assets required to conduct regional theater security cooperation engagements and the total number of regional engagements required to reach and maintain a secure maritime environment would more than offset this manpower requirement.
SUMMARY

The requirement for increased security cooperation operations is clearly stated in U.S. policy documents ranging from the GEF to Joint Doctrine to the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The United States maritime forces have also identified security cooperation as a key element in protecting the global maritime commons. Absent from all of the strategic guidance are the principles and procedures that must be followed at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war to ensure establishment of an effective cooperative maritime security environment. Utilizing the underlying principles of building strong military-to-military relationships, leveraging the inherent strengths and capabilities of each partner state, tailoring the partnership uniquely to each regional state, gaining ownership in the partnership from each state, persistence, and inter-agency coordination will build the framework for developing an effective regional cooperative security structure.

Operational employment of the capabilities developed within the cooperative framework requires the establishment of a robust regional maritime security cooperation organization. The Theater Security Cooperation Office, specifically the CCO-CLO liaison elements resident within the LOCUS, will provide the organizational structure and functional relationships necessary for the United States and it partners to develop and maintain an effective maritime security partnership. The unity of command and unity of effort resident within the LOCUS will yield a prioritization and optimization of partnership resources within the AOR and ultimately produce a secure global maritime operating environment.
NOTES


7 For the purpose of this paper, the United States Maritime Services are defined as the U.S. Navy, United States Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard.


11 For the purposes of this discussion, Joint Planning Doctrine is considered to be contained within the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 5-0, and the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan.


13 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006), I-3. The six security cooperation activities are: 1) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs. 2) Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities. 3) Multinational training. 4) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program. 5) Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States. 6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

14 Sweeney, Patrick C. *A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System*. (Naval War College NWC 2061, Newport, RI, 14 May 2008), 4-5. 1) Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action -- Gain
unfettered access to and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture realignment and larger U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs. 2) Operational Capacity and Capability Building -- Build usable, relevant and enduring Partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and Partner objectives. 3) Interoperability with U.S. Forces/Support to U.S. Capabilities -- Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures with Partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability. 4) Intelligence and Information Sharing -- Gain and/or share specific kinds of intelligence or information and developing shared assessments of common threats. 5) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building -- Assure Allies and Partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of like-minded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order. 6) Defense/Security Sector Reform -- Assist Allies with transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable, well-managed and subject to the rule of law. 7) International Defense Technology Collaboration -- Promote technological collaboration, foster mutually beneficial exchange of technology and defense equipment, gain access to foreign technology and reduce the overall cost of defense to the U.S. taxpayer. 8) International Suasion and Cooperation -- Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations.


16 Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1979), 51-52. The three principles, as written, are a paraphrase of Waltz’s summary of Morton Kaplan’s six rules for balance of power systems. Kaplan’s original six rules are: 1) Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. 2) Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities. 3) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. 4) Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system. 5) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supernational organizing principles. 6) Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.


19 To include Tactics, Training, and Procedures (TTPs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).


21 Blue-water navies must be capable of sustained global power projection. Examples would be the United States and the United Kingdom. Regional navies that could be considered to have limited blue-water capability would include many of the Western European states, Russia, China, India, and Brazil,


27 Tour lengths for Country Liaison Officers are recommended to be no less than 24 months. Tour lengths for Country Coordination Officers are recommended to be no less than 18 months.


29 Taking this concept to a more detailed level would foster development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) between the United States and its partners. These SOPs would include areas such as communications, search and rescue, and maritime interdiction operations. While many of these SOPs may remain bi-lateral in nature, the goal of LOCUS is to develop an AOR standard of operation. Operational application of doctrinal commonality is achieved through establishing common training frameworks between the United States and its partners. This can be done at multiple levels including Tactical Officer Exchanges, Fleet Training Exchanges, and development of common planning processes.

30 Avenues available to provide capabilities to partner states include Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and targeted Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). While the military has little leverage over the DCS process, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is in a position to ensure that releasability and training issues can be worked in conjunction with a DCS contract to provide theater wide commonality.


32 Security cooperation engagement requests for each regional partner are developed by the CCO-CLO team and the LOCUS prioritizes the regional requests into an execution matrix. This execution matrix is passed to Future Operations who allocates available resources and tasks units to complete specific security cooperation engagements while they are still inbound to the theater. The front-loaded assignment of security cooperation engagements to inbound units will result in accomplishing the maximum number of engagements with a minimum amount of unit repositioning and minimal missed engagement opportunities.
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