THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-HORN OF AFRICA: THE OTHER FRONT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

BY

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The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: The Other front on the Global War on Terror

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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines because of the violence, the bloodshed and the political controversy which they ignite. Although these two campaigns are well publicized and have been going on for several years, they do not represent the only fronts against the global war on terror. There is a less publicized but equally important front on the global war on terror known as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, or CJTF-HOA. This project addressed the following questions: 1) what was the impetus behind the creation of the CJTF-HOA? 2) What is the CJTF-HOA mission and the history behind it? 3) What dimension of power will CJTF-HOA apply to execute its mission? 4) What means are being employed by the CJTF-HOA to accomplish its mission? 5) Is there an effective interagency process? 6) And lastly, what is the way ahead for CJTF-HOA? The CJTF-HOA mission is to conduct unified actions in the combined joint operations area of the Horn of Africa to prevent conflict, promote regional stability, and protect Coalition interests in order to prevail against extremism.

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THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - HORN OF AFRICA:
THE OTHER FRONT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines because of the violence, the bloodshed and the political controversy which they ignite. Although these two campaigns are well publicized and have been going on for several years, they do not represent the only fronts against the global war on terror. There is a less publicized but equally important front on the global war on terror known as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, or CJTF-HOA. This project addressed the following questions: 1) what was the impetus behind the creation of the CJTF-HOA? 2) What is the CJTF-HOA mission and the history behind it? 3) What dimension of power will CJTF-HOA apply to execute its mission? 4) What means are being employed by the CJTF-HOA to accomplish its mission? 5) Is there an effective interagency process? 6) And lastly, what is the way ahead for CJTF-HOA? The CJTF-HOA mission is to conduct unified actions in the combined joint operations area of the Horn of Africa to prevent conflict, promote regional stability, and protect Coalition interests in order to prevail against extremism.
The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa is the other front on the global war on terror. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines undoubtedly because of the violence, the bloodshed and the political controversy which they ignite. Although these two campaigns are well publicized and have been going on for several years, they do not represent the only fronts against the global war on terror. There is a less publicized but equally important front on the global war on terror known as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, or CJTF-HOA.

This project aims to address the following questions with respect to the CJTF-HOA: 1) what was the impetus behind the creation of the CJTF-HOA? 2) What is the CJTF-HOA mission and the history behind it? 3) What dimension of power will CJTF-HOA apply to execute its mission? 4) What means are being employed by the CJTF-HOA to accomplish its mission? 5) Is there an effective interagency process? 6) And lastly, what is the way ahead for CJTF-HOA?

What was the Impetus Behind the Creation of the CJTF-HOA?

On October 7, 2001, the United States and Great Britain commenced combat operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. This was the first American strike in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and was also the beginning of the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The purpose of the invasion was to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which had provided support and safe harbor to al-Qaeda.1 President Bush, in his October 2001 address to the nation stated:

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1. The statement is a reference to a historical address by President Bush.
“Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.”

One could make a case that the above statement may have been the “go-ahead” for the creation of the CJTF-HOA. Indeed, the CJTF-HOA concept was based upon the notion that the U.S. lead invasion of Afghanistan, and later Iraq, would create a flood of jihadis from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa was widely thought to be the ideal safe haven due to its ongoing border tensions, insurgencies, corruption, poverty, lawlessness, and large ungoverned spaces, all of which provide terrorists ideal conditions for planning and coordinating future terrorist attacks.

One year later, on October 19, 2002 the CJTF-HOA was established at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and was under the auspices of the United State Central Command (CENTCOM). The following month, Marine Corps personnel embarked on a twenty-eight day cruise aboard USS Mount Whitney destined for the Horn of Africa. Although the Task Force arrived in Gulf of Aden on December 8, 2002, they operated from the USS Mount Whitney until May 13, 2003, at which point the mission transitioned ashore to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti City, Djibouti.

In short time the notion that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan would create a flood of terrorists from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa region proved to be a false premise. Thanks to the industrious nature of our CJTF-HOA Marines and CENTCOM leadership, the mission evolved from a “capture and kill” mission to something different and more meaningful than military planners had originally envisioned.
What is the CJTF-HOA Mission and the History Behind it?

To place the CJTF-HOA mission into perspective one must first grasp the shear size of the CJTF-HOA area of responsibility (AOR). The CJTF-HOA AOR includes the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. The other areas of interest include Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar. This region encompasses practically the entire eastern side of Africa bordering the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. The area for which the CJTF-HOA is responsible is enormous as it includes a total land mass of 7,298,346 square kilometers or 2,817,907 square miles. To place this into scale, the CJTF-HOA AOR is equal to roughly three-quarters the size of the continental United States. To further place their mission into scale, the CJTF-HOA AOR is roughly 6.7 times larger than the land masses of Afghanistan and Iraq combined. Despite the enormity of the AOR the CJTF-HOA is composed of approximately 1,800 short-term rotational personnel comprised from the U.S. military, civilian employees, and representatives of coalition and partner nations.

Although the CJTF-HOA carries a mandate directly linked to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), its’ mission has not always been constant. Initially, the CJTF-HOA mission was to detect, disrupt, defeat and deny al-Qaeda factions as they arrived in the Horn of Africa. In short, their original mission was to capture and kill the terrorists. However, as the CJTF-HOA mission progressed it soon became clear that the Afghanistan invasion did not produce the high volume of fleeing terrorists to the Horn of Africa region that CENTCOM had anticipated. In fact, the Horn of Africa region contained less terrorist activity than originally feared. This discovery was somewhat
contrary to the thinking outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States which stated “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are of failing ones.”

Somalia, along with other countries in the Horn of Africa, could easily be declared as failing states; however, collectively speaking they have not lived up to their reputations of being “safe havens” for terrorists. This nexus between failed states and terrorism which has guided U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa for several years was evidently guided by inaccurate assumptions and/or inaccurate intelligence.

Robert G. Berschinski who served as a panelist on the U.S. strategic perspective in Africa at the U.S. Army War College noted that several Horn of Africa specialists have dispelled the “failed state/terrorism nexus” which had originally guided the creation of CJTF-HOA. Academics Anna Simons and David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School contend “that failed states are no more hospitable to terrorists than they are to any other potential inhabitant.” Simons and Tucker point out that failed states are neither equipped nor capable of leading part of a world-wide jihad. Moreover, incoming terrorists do not possess an in-depth knowledge of the complex and shifting political alliances in the Horn of Africa region that are necessary for their survival. Lastly, failed states do not have the logistical infrastructure necessary to plan, coordinate and launch terrorist attacks.

The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point conducted a study that concluded that al-Qaeda had no more success at “getting along” with the Somalis than the Westerners. Their report noted:

“In Somalia, al-Qaeda members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and
betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction. In the past, al-Qaeda has sought to draw the U.S. into entanglements where it can bleed the U.S.’s military economic resources. In Somalia, al-Qaeda encountered an entanglement of its own.18

To be fair, the above noted studies were not published until after the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; however, it prompts several important questions which need to be examined in the future. Why were similar studies such as the ones noted above not available prior to the 2001 Afghanistan invasion? Upon what intelligence did CENTCOM establish CJTF-HOA? Was there an intelligence gathering effort or was the establishment of CJTF-HOA a unilateral decision by CENTCOM? Was there a rush to judgment in suspecting that the terrorists would flee to the Horn of Africa? Have our intelligence agencies determined why their intelligence estimates proved to be inaccurate?

As noted, the rush of fleeing terrorists from Afghanistan never materialized so the original mission of “capture and kill fleeing terrorists” was dissolved. Our Marines, with the permission of the CENTCOM Commander, then-General John P. Abizaid, revamped the CJTF-HOA mission to something more meaningful.19 The present CJTF-HOA mission statement reads as follows:

“The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa or CJTF-HOA conducts unified action in the combined joint operations area of the Horn of Africa to prevent conflict, promote regional stability, and protect Coalition interests in order to prevail against extremism.”20

The conditions the CJTF-HOA hope to establish, with the help of coalition forces and partner nations, will limit the opportunity for terrorist organizations to hide among and
recruit from the local population, reducing the threat of violence across the continent and world.

**What Dimension of Power will CJTF-HOA Apply to Execute its Mission?**

CJTF-HOA’s newly fashioned mission known by the “four Ps,” (prevent, promote, protect, prevail) adopts a “soft” power approach rather than a “hard” power approach to combating extremism/terrorism. Soft power, as coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, explained soft power as:

> “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.”

Towards that end, the CJTF-HOA aims to provide partner nations a stable and secure environment and a place where education and prosperity are within each person’s grasp. To provide a place where terrorists, whose extremist ideology seeks to enslave nations, have nothing to offer African citizens. The CJTF-HOA’s focus is centered on ensuring partner nations have the capacity to secure their homeland and contribute to the Horn of Africa’s future. The CJTF-HOA is helping develop conditions for economic growth and establishing enduring relationships which aids in creating a more secure region.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, during a speech at Kansas State University underscored the emphasis that U.S. strategy abroad must indeed be based upon the foundation of soft power. In November 2007, he stated the following with respect to the importance of soft power.
“My message is that if we are to meet the myriad of challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power”.  

Major General Timothy Ghormley, U.S. Marine Corps was a former Commander of the CJTF-HOA from May 17, 2005 to April 12, 2006. He stated the following with respect to the mission:

...we’re waging peace...there is little, if any, shooting going on...we don’t seek to engage the enemy but we do seek out those in need. Our primary maneuver elements are doctors, veterinarians, well drillers, and civil engineers.”

Tom Broderick, a U.S. Navy CAPT, presently serving as the Executive Assistant to the Commanding General of CJTF-HOA, stated the following with respect to the CJTF-HOA mission.

“...the Task Force in non-kinetic, the operations order is non-kinetic, and we are at phase zero. We go out and we attempt to develop and provide enhance security, strengthen sovereignty and increase stability through working with the governments and the particular armed forces in trying to professionalize their armed forces.”

And finally, CAPT Patrick Myers, U.S. Navy, is the CJ-5-Planning Director for CJTF-HOA, he classified the mission as a capacity building operation more than anything else. In a 25 Jan 08 interview, CAPT Myers stated the following with respect to the CJTF-HOA Mission:

“Our mission here has evolved into getting at the root causes of...the individuals or organizations that want to use extremist or terrorist type actions against people...us. This is our lane; it’s about capacity building...almost everything that we do here links to providing the ability for the Africans to help themselves and to learn.”
What Means are being Employed to Accomplish its Mission?

The CJTF-HOA operates under the four Ps, which translates into prevent conflict, promote regional stability, protect coalition interests, in order and prevail against extremism in east Africa. There is no easy way to clearly delineate where each sub-task would fall under each of the fours Ps. This is for good reason; as each effort taken by members of the CJTF-HOA actually feeds into each aspect of the four Ps, they are interlaced efforts that support each other towards accomplishing the common goal of combating extremism. So, how does the Task Force aim to accomplish their mission?

The Task force aims to accomplish their goals through a variety of military-to-military training programs, humanitarian assistance efforts, disaster relief, consequence management, and civic action programs which include medical and veterinary care, school and medical clinic construction and water development projects.

Military to Military Training

One of the integral aspects to the CJTF-HOA mission is that of military-to-military training, more commonly referred to as mil to mil training. Mil to mil training assists the countries within the AOR to enhance their capacity to defend their borders and improve their security capability in order to combat extremism. In short, mil to mil training helps partner nations to help themselves. The CJTF-HOA has found that the most effective way to accomplish mil to mil training is through the “train the trainer” concept.

Mil to mil training includes, but is not limited to, training on basic infantry tactics, counter-terrorism, land warfare, human rights, maritime security training and military police tasks. For example, military police training includes tasks such as conducting patrols, operating road-blocks, traffic control points, improvised explosive devices,
marksman, leadership, and battle drills. In fact, members of Alpha Company 1/294th Infantry Light of the Guam Army National Guard conducted mil to mil training with the Ethiopian Army to address problems with their porous borders in order to eradicate the influx of transnational terrorists. This past December, Delta Company 1/294th Infantry graduated 65 Djiboutian soldiers from a 70 day train the trainer program which focused on traffic control points, convoy operations, and close quarter combat operations.

The CJTF-HOA has an enormous land based AOR yet they have not neglected their responsibility with respect to Maritime security. Maritime security is one of the foremost challenges in the region and Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the former Commander of CJTF-HOA until February 2008, began the effort which aims to help the coastal region countries improve their naval capability. According to Admiral Hunt most countries here, with the exception Kenya and South Africa, have no maritime capability and if there are no means to control maritime borders then piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing thrive.

Although piracy and smuggling are valid concerns, illegal fishing is the highest priority with respect to maritime security. Admiral Hunt explains that his intelligence personnel estimate that about $2 billion annually is lost due to the exploitation of natural resources to include fish. The lost revenue represents a lost economic growth opportunity; money which could be well spent on improving schools, clinics, roads, social programs and other infrastructure that could provide jobs, thereby promoting stability for the region.
The CJTF-HOA has taken two significant steps towards improving maritime security in the region. First, in the fall of 2006 the U.S. Coast Guard donated four refurbished forty four foot former Coast Guard patrol boats to the Djiboutian Navy via the Foreign Military Financing program. The Djiboutian sailors also received a month of training from a team of U.S. Sailors. The U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, Marguerita Ragsdale said:

“These boats allow Djibouti’s navy to significantly improve its security operations in the Gulf of Tadjourah and will significantly improve its coastal patrol capability in the Gulf of Aden along Djibouti’s northern and southern coasts.”

Secondly, this past September the Commanders of CJTF-HOA and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), along with the Kenyan Defense Department, hosted the 2nd Annual East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean (EASWIO) Maritime Security Conference and Port Security Seminar in Mombasa, Kenya. Nearly 150 personnel representing the maritime regional governments came together to discuss maritime safety, port security, coalition efforts, maritime economics and environmental issues. This meeting is a prime example of how countries can come together, open dialog, discuss ideas, and develop joint plans that work towards the collective goal of regional security and stability. Admiral Hart, then Commander of CJTF-HOA stated that:

“This unique collection of regional leadership will provide an enhanced understanding of issues impacting both safety and security and will facilitate an increase in dialogue towards developing comprehensive regional solutions.”

CAPT Patrick Myers, U.S. Navy, CJ-5-Planning Director for CJTF-HOA, explained that an important aspect of CJTF-HOA’s capability with respect to promoting regional stability is that the CJTF-HOA is the only group in the area that has the ability and the
The CJTF-HOA focuses on key leader engagement where often times they can bring together Prime Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of the Army, and Chiefs of the Navy to discuss regional issues. CAPT Myers stated that:

“This is a good example of regionalizing problems and to get out of the bilateral business. It is a way to saying...here’s your neighbor and here’s how you can help.”

Civic Action Programs

Another means by which the CJTF-HOA aims to accomplish their mission is through promoting regional stability via civic action programs (CAP). The various CAP’s include providing medical care, dental care, veterinary care, school and medical clinic construction, improved roadways, and water development projects throughout the region. Engaging with the locals to help them with such basic services allows the CJTF-HOA personnel to earn respect and to build relationships and ultimately their trust. These types of efforts help build a bridge to a better, more prosperous and stable environment for the Africans in the region.

Navy CAPT Tom Broderick, the Executive Assistant to the Commanding General of CJTF-HOA, stated the following with respect to how the CJTF-HOA aims to promote regional stability.

“we intend to enhance the living conditions of the populations through better schools, better health facilities, medical civil affairs programs, veterinarian civil affairs programs, dental civil affairs programs, and show the face of America, that we are the good guys, and that we embrace the rules of law, ethical government......our (U.S.) government is by, for and of the people, and that is what we want to see grow in the Horn of Africa.”

Highlighted below are just a few examples of the heroic efforts and good deeds achieved by the great men and women of CJTF-HOA.
Medical Civic Action Program

In September 2007 a Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) from CJTF-HOA spent two weeks in the villages of Dalay-Af, Alaili Dadda and Obock treating villagers. The MEDCAP mission commander, Army LTC Alana Conley of the 350th Civil Command planned and led the effort which was supported by the 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, a unit that consisted of doctors, nurses, a mobile medical team and translators. ⁴⁰

During their mission the doctors and nurses treated a number of injuries and illnesses which ranged from dehydration, abrasions, and headaches to those with upper-respiratory infections and orthopedic problems. Upon their departure, the MEDCAP team augmented each village clinic with an assortment of multivitamins, antibiotics, soap and mosquito netting.⁴¹

LTC Conley explained that every MEDCAP mission is meant to complement local medical clinics and to teach and empower locals with the knowledge of preventive care. LTC Conley explained that their efforts are dependent on the relationships formed with local leaders, communities and coalition partners.⁴²

Veterinary Civic Action Program

Veterinary teams composed of CJTF-HOA and Ugandan personnel concluded a large scale Veterinary Civic Action Project (VETCAP) in the northern districts of Gulu and Amuru, Uganda in February 2008. For over a month the VETCAP teams worked closely with the Departments of Veterinary Services and Animal Industry, Fisheries, Entomology, veterinarians from the Ministry of Agriculture, and university students from Gulu and Kampala to treat over 30,000 animals.⁴³
Their goal was to target the growing number of livestock deaths in the north, where funding issues limited the government’s ability to help the herders. It is important that we realize that animal population is a key indicator of wealth and sustainability for humans in this part of the world. The income generated from livestock is more than just money for daily living; it represents dollars to the local economies. According to Dr. Charles Aisu, who is responsible for the veterinary inspection and regulations of Entebbe International Airport under the Ministry of Agriculture, stated that:

“Livestock contributes a lot to household income, nutrition, milk, meat,” “I would say it contributes no less than 30 percent of the household income.”

Two weeks later the CJTF-HOA conducted another VETCAP in Manda Island, Kenya. Members of 350th Civil Affairs Command joined with the locals to treat and vaccinate over 400 goats, sheep and dogs which were all brought to the VETCAP by a local herder. The herd of 400 plus were treated for parasites and other contagious diseases and were also given a dose of multi-vitamins. The VETCAP team expects to treat over 20,000 animals during their current mission. Eventually, they expect to have the capacity to treat over 10,000 animals in a single day.

Schools and Education

The CJTF-HOA and members from the Manda Bay (Kenya) community celebrated the opening of the newly re-furbished Manda Bay Primary School on 18 February 2008. Prior to the Task Force’s arrival the pre-existing schoolhouse was in a state of disrepair and was close to being shut down by Kenyan authorities.

The 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion (Civil Affairs Team 14) contributed labor and “know-how” to repair the faulty foundation and the unstable columns supporting the roof. The
CJTF-HOA Team provided outside improvements to the school as well. The school now includes a dry-pit latrine and clear grounds so the kids can play volleyball and soccer. Thanks to the 402nd the children of Manda Bay are proud of their safe new classrooms. Before the school’s reconstruction, there were about one-hundred students enrolled. With the new facility there will be close to two-hundred students enrolled in the primary school.

Navy CAPT Brian R. Hastings, the CJTF-HOA Strategic Communications director, addressed the Manda Bay community on behalf of the CJTF-HOA Commander to underscore the importance of education and the relationship with Kenya and the United States. He stated:

“We celebrate the partnership between CJTF-HOA and the people of Manda Bay Primary School. Working with Kenya, this project is an excellent example of how Americans and Kenyans partner to promote peace and stability. We share an appreciation for what education can accomplish. Yes, it can advance the lives of the young people here today, but it can also educate a generation that will advance society, the nation and ultimately the world.”

In past January 2008, female service members from CJTF-HOA donated more than fifty book bags containing school supplies, flip flops, shampoo, soap and treats to young girls at the Orphanage Center in Aicha Bogoreh, Djibouti. The supplies were received through donations from service members, family, friends and organizations such as the Federally Employed Women Organization, the Department of the Leadership, U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Legal Service Office.

**Water Development**

In February 2008, after several months of work, a U.S. Navy Seabee team in Shant Abak, Garissa District, Kenya, transferred responsibility of a vital water well to the
locals. This particular well has the capacity to pump twenty-five gallons of water per minute. The construction of a second well will begin as soon as parts and equipment arrive.\textsuperscript{50}

The well was graciously received by the community. Sheikh Hassan Amey, chairman of Garissa Council of Imams, remarked:

\textit{“Speaking for the Islamic leaders in this region, I thank the American Government for the good work we are seeing here today, we have always known the American Government as a war government but we need to change that perception in light of these good works they are doing.”}\textsuperscript{51}

In another example, a small cell of soldiers from the 1132nd Engineering Detachment, an Army National Guard unit based out of North Carolina, just departed CJTF-HOA after spending a year in country. While in Djibouti the cell can be proud of the fact that they provided water to more than 10,000 Djiboutians, by drilling ten wells and repairing another four.\textsuperscript{52}

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Class William R. Brown of the 1132nd Engineering Detachment was the well drilling team leader and acting First Sergeant. He said the following prior to his departure:

\textit{“Before the wells were completed, these villages relied solely on water being transported from Djibouti City. The water the villages received was only delivered two to three times a week as long as the water truck was running. No truck - meant no water. It is a great feeling knowing our job, if done correctly, can save countless lives. It allows our team to cast a positive image for other Americans who come behind us.”}\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Is an Effective Interagency Process in Effect for the Different Agencies Playing a Role in the CJTF-HOA?}

Several officials have opined that the CJTF-HOA may well serve as a model upon which AFRICOM can build, especially with respect to the interagency process. After all,
the Task Force has evolved from a “capture and kill” mission to a capacity building mission and is already working closely with the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), non-governmental offices (NGOs), the governments in the region as well as local village leaders. Early on however, the interagency process was not seen in a favorable light by all.

COL Tom Duhs, who served as the CJTF-HOA J-5 and Deputy J-5 from 1 December 2002 to 15 July 2003 was not impressed with the interagency arrangement during his tenure. COL Duhs suggested that a rivalry existed between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) which created an unclear strategic vision in the HOA. He opined that the DOD had the unchallenged and unquestioned authority to act in both Afghanistan and Iraq; therefore, there was no question as to who was in charge.

COL Duhs argued that the center of gravity (COG), the hub of all power and movement” should reside with the DOD and not the DOS so the CJTF-HOA could maintain the operational initiative against the terrorists. However, this was and is still not the case, as the American Ambassadors in the region still decide much of what does or does not occur militarily. As such, according to COL Duhs, this bureaucratic arrangement caused the military to lose the operational initiative. Consequently, this unclear vision along with the undertone of rivalry, created a lack of unity of effort which compromised the overall effectiveness of the mission.54

In all fairness, COL Duhs was serving in the CJTF-HOA during which time the mission of the CJTF-HOA was to “capture and kill” terrorists; a time where decisive military engagement depended upon maintaining the operational initiative. Since then
however, the CJTF-HOA mission has evolved into preventing conflict, promoting
regional stability, and protecting coalition interests in order to prevail against extremism,
otherwise known as the four Ps. This new mission set, the four Ps, is decidedly more
accommodating to a true interagency approach.

CAPT Broderick, (U.S. Navy) who is presently serving as the Executive Assistant
to the Commanding General of CJTF-HOA, explained that the interagency process is an
enduring process because that is what has made this Task Force effective. The Task
Force leadership routinely deals with embassy and USAID personnel in each country in
just about every element of their operation. The CJTF-HOA Commander deals with the
American Ambassador and Deputy Chiefs of Mission while the staff routinely
coordinates with the African Bureau at the DOS, the African Bureau at the DOD, NGOs
and USAID personnel. The CJTF-HOA has great relationships with many of the NGOs
in the HOA region although there are some NGOs who are not receptive to the military.
In these cases the CJTF-HOA attempts to synchronize efforts the best they can in order
to eliminate duplicate work. 55

CAPT Patrick Myers (U.S. Navy) who is presently serving as the CJ-5-Planning
Director for CJTF-HOA, explained that CJTF-HOA has Liaison Officers (LNOs) in
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen who work directly in the USAID agency. These
CJTF-HOA LNOs work and team with USAID personnel to review their respective
planning processes so that they both know what the other agencies are doing and how
they can work together. Interagency teamwork between CJTF-HOA and USAID is
especially critical in regards to the stand-up of schools. The CJTF-HOA only has the
capability to build or rehabilitate schools, whereas USAID has the capability to staff the school with teachers and stock it with textbooks.56

What is the Way Ahead for CJTF-HOA?

Presently, the CJTF-HOA operates under the auspices of CENTCOM; however, to conduct its mission the CJTF-HOA leadership has to coordinate with three different combatant commands. For example, the countries of Uganda and Tanzania are within the CJTF-HOA AOR but the CJTF-HOA leadership must coordinate with European Command (EUCOM) when pursuing operations within the EUCOM AOR. Likewise, when the CJTF-HOA conducts operations in the Seychelles or Madagascar, the CJTF-HOA must coordinate with Pacific Command (PACOM).

The establishment of a new combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), will stand-up on 4 October 2008. As the sole combatant command in charge of African affairs it aims to remedy many of the coordination problems such as the one described above. According to Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, Deputy to the AFRICOM Commander for Civil-Military Activities, explained that the reorganization of the command structure would enable the United States to be more responsive to requests for assistance and would ensure better coordination with our African partners.57

The long term outlook for CJTF-HOA appears secure. The transition to AFRICOM should have a positive impact on the mission for CJTF-HOA, most notably because the CJTF-HOA Commander will have the benefit of dealing with one Combatant Command as opposed to three. Ryan Henry, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated the following in regards to the continuation of the CJTF-HOA mission.
“That command (CJTF-HOA) will continue to exist. There are no plans to change that currently. It will -- when AFRICOM first begins to stand up as a -- what we refer to as a sub-unified command, it will continue to be part of Central Command (CENTCOM). But prior to the command becoming fully unified and independent, which again will be in the late part of 2008, at that point, that task force will transfer to AFRICOM. But it'll continue to do the civic affairs missions that it's doing today.”

From a more specific functional and operational aspect, CAPT Broderick states that the CJTF-HOA model is working but like everything else, it can be improved. He noted that one of the biggest challenges is the constant tyranny of personnel turnover. The core staff is made up of 80-100 Reserve and Active Component officers and enlisted personnel ranging in rank from Rear Admiral (O7 pay grade) down to Sergeants/ Petty Officers (E5 pay grade). This core staff forms every October to undergo a four month rigorous training program. Afterwards the new core staff transitions to their in-country assignments each February and will remain in country for twelve months. Interspersed among the core staff are 350 others who fill in the Joint Manning Document (JMD) and they fill in with different tour lengths of four to six months. CAPT Broderick noted that “it is a ‘hodge-podge’ across 350 billets of which about 100 are core staff.” The constant turnover of personnel has a negative impact on CJTF-HOA just like it does in any organization. There is a learning curve where the synchronization takes a dip until everyone “gets up to speed” then resynchronization takes hold once more. CAPT Broderick suggested a possible remedy, once AFRICOM stands up, would be to place soldiers on longer orders (permanent change of station-PCS orders) of two to three years to help with the synchronization efforts.

The CJTF-HOA men and women, both military and civilian, have and still are continuing to lay the groundwork for AFRICOM. According to Rear Admiral
Moeller, while serving as the Executive Director of the AFRICOM Transition Team, stated that:

“CJTF-HOA provides a good example of the kind of interagency coordination that AFRICOM hopes to achieve. We’ve understood for a long time that the challenges in Africa cannot be solved by the military alone. Economic development, responsive governance, health, crime, and poverty are all pieces of the security environment.”

Admiral Moeller commented that the CJTF-HOA is the clear model for what comes next as it has served as a test-bed for concepts and ideas, and has found approaches that work well in several countries on the Horn of Africa. The CJTF-HOA model could become the franchise that will be replicated across the entire continent.
Endnotes


3 The CJTF-HOA AOR includes the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. The other areas of interest include Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar.

4 CENTCOM is one of nine combatant commands operating under the Department of Defense. CENTCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to attack, disrupt and defeat terrorism, deter and defeat adversaries, deny access to WMD, assure regional access, strengthen regional stability, build the self-reliance of partner nations’ security forces, and protect the vital interests of the U.S.. Available from www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom2/Misc/Mission2.aspx; accessed 22 January 2008.

5 Camp Lemonier is a United States Navy Forward Operating Site situated in Djibouti and is home to CJTF-HOA of the United States Central Command. It was established as the primary base in the region for the support of Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA). It is a former military barracks of the French Foreign Legion.


[15] Robert G. Berschinski served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force. He led antiterrorism and force-protection intelligence analysis for U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s premier contingency airfield operations unit responsible for Europe and Africa. He worked in Kigali, Rwanda, as the Air Force’s chief of deployed intelligence for NATO Operation AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN II (AMIS II), and provided reach-back support to European Command’s 2005 Operation FLINTLOCK. Mr. Berschinski has published works in the Yale Journal of International Affairs, The Politic, and The Encyclopedia of the Cold War, and has served as a panelist on the U.S. strategic perspective in Africa at the U.S. Army War College.


[18] Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007.

21 Soft power is a term used in international relations theory to describe the ability of a political body, such as a state, to indirectly influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies through cultural or ideological means. The term was first coined by Harvard University professor Joseph Nye, who remains its most prominent proponent, in a 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. Hard power is a term used in international relations. Hard power is a theory that describes using military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies. It is used in contrast to soft power, which refers to power that comes from diplomacy, culture and history.


26 Phase 0 is the 'shaping' phase that deals with the prevention of conflict by building partnership capacity, influencing non-partners and potential adversaries, mitigating the underlying causes of conflict and extremism; and setting the conditions that enable rapid action when military intervention is required.

27 CAPT Tom Broderick, U.S. Navy, Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, CJTF-HOA, telephone interview by author, 21 February 2008.


29 Ibid.

The CJTF-HOA is the primary (but not sole) military component assigned to accomplish the objectives of the mission. The naval component is the multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) which operates under the direction of the United States Fifth Fleet.


A fifth boat was donated and will be used as a “parts farm” and cannibalized to keep the other boats afloat.


CAPT Tom Broderick, U.S. Navy, Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, CJTF-HOA, telephone interview by author, 21 February 2008.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


44 Ibid.


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


51 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.


