Shaping the Future: Security Cooperation to Shape Chinese Diplomacy in the South Pacific

After significant US withdrawal from the South Pacific due to decreasing resources and Global War on Terror (GWOT) re-prioritization, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has drastically increased engagement in the South Pacific to redefine spheres of influence and increase China’s comprehensive national power (CNP) in order to secure the PRC’s future preeminence. Employing political and economic leverage over vulnerable South Pacific states, China has sought theater-strategic advantage in ways that undermine US security objectives and potentially threaten US access and freedom of maneuver. This paper examines PRC engagement patterns and practices in the South Pacific and demonstrates how China exploits the weakened institutions of vulnerable states in much the same way transnational threats do. This paper then argues that USPACOM must develop a “comprehensive approach” to SC, aligned with current Stability Operations doctrine, to successfully counter and shape Chinese diplomacy in the South Pacific in order to protect US interests and avoid further erosion of US influence and access.
SHAPING THE FUTURE: SECURITY COOPERATION TO SHAPE CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

Shaping the Future: Security Cooperation to Shape Chinese Diplomacy in the South Pacific.

After significant US withdrawal from the South Pacific due to decreasing resources and Global War on Terror (GWOT) re-prioritization, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has drastically increased engagement in the South Pacific to redefine spheres of influence and increase China’s comprehensive national power (CNP) in order to secure the PRC’s future preeminence. Employing political and economic leverage over vulnerable South Pacific states, China has sought theater-strategic advantage in ways that undermine US security objectives and potentially threaten US access and freedom of maneuver. This paper examines PRC engagement patterns and practices in the South Pacific and demonstrates how China exploits the weakened institutions of vulnerable states in much the same way transnational threats do. This paper then argues that USPACOM must develop a “comprehensive approach” to security cooperation (SC), aligned with current Stability Operations doctrine, to successfully counter and shape Chinese diplomacy in the South Pacific in order to protect US interests and avoid further erosion of US influence and access.
INTRODUCTION

History demonstrates that geo-political power shifts occur violently. Superpowers reluctantly cede power to rising states that forcefully challenge the existing world order. Historic diplomacy patterns for unipolar powers (polar states), such as the US, are particularly ominous as they reveal continuous conflict across the range of military operations followed by political-economic overextension, costly failure, and demotion in a new bi-polar or multi-polar world order. With this historical context, and as the US enters its seventh year in “The Long War,” China’s unprecedented political, economic and military expansion combined with its lack of transparency and often disruptive foreign policy becomes particularly threatening. The challenge for the US as it faces a relative erosion of national power is to implement a security strategy that will accommodate China’s rapid rise while simultaneously protecting US interests and avoiding a dangerous superpower rivalry.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the beginning of the 21st Century as a ‘20-year period of opportunity’ to maneuver to positions of global leverage and increase its comprehensive national power (CNP) in order to secure future preeminence. In that endeavor, it has sought to exploit opportunities where US influence has waned, and it has done so in ways that undermine US security objectives and potentially threaten US access and freedom of maneuver. Of particular concern is China’s exploitation of US ‘benign neglect’ in the South Pacific. After significant US withdrawal from this strategically important region due to decreasing resources and Global War on Terror (GWOT) re-prioritization, PRC engagement has increased dramatically. Today, China has more deployed diplomats in the region than any other country, has become one of the region’s top three aid donors, and has increased trade with the island states ten-fold in the last ten years.
With China’s heavy economic and diplomatic engagement comes increased influence over the political decisions of the 14 sovereign nations of the South Pacific; this political leverage could be used to further isolate Taiwan and counter US regional influence. Additionally, some have speculated that China’s satellite and missile tracking activities in the South Pacific and its directed aid toward potentially dual-use island infrastructure improvements might signal military interest as part of a future access denial strategy. While the PRC’s activity in the South Pacific does not pose an imminent regional danger, long-term, broader implications demand that US Pacific Command (USPACOM) place greater emphasis on security cooperation (SC) in this region.

USPACOM is charged with implementing an SC plan that will strengthen alliances to assure continued access and freedom of maneuver in the South Pacific. However, the South Pacific remains a relatively low priority in an area of responsibility (AOR) spanning 50% of the earth’s surface, encompassing 36 countries (several failed states), counting 60% of the world’s population, and including six of the world’s largest armed forces. Recognizing that resources required exceed resources available to accomplish SC objectives, USPACOM has identified two imperatives: “prioritize… security cooperation activities and leverage both interagency and multinational partners whenever possible.” With those imperatives in mind, USPACOM has developed a military oriented SC plan and has used staff action to seek interagency support (or at least de-confliction) during implementation. Instead, USPACOM must develop a “comprehensive approach” to SC, aligned with current Stability Operations doctrine, in order to successfully counter and shape Chinese diplomacy in the South Pacific and to avoid further erosion of US influence and access.
GEO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The South Pacific includes three primary cultural regions: Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia (fig. 1). Excluding Australia and New Zealand (NZ), the total region covers 20 million square miles of ocean and 117,000 square miles of land with Papua New Guinea (PNG) accounting for all but 20% of the total land mass. The area includes 14 sovereign states (with eight million inhabitants) and the US territories of Guam, the Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. France, NZ, and Chile also maintain territories in the region.10

Economically, the majority of the South Pacific islands suffer from geographic isolation, limited natural resources, poor infrastructure, weak governing institutions and small, unskilled populations.11 Tuvalu, Niue, and Tokelau have the smallest three economies of all countries in the world; the states of Nauru, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Palau, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, American Samoa, and Tonga are all within the bottom 20 economies listed.12 Within the entire region, only PNG, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands are considered by the Asian Development Bank to have good economic development potential.13 However, these three states have all suffered from civil unrest, including insurrections and military coups.14 Additionally, all of the South Pacific islands remain vulnerable to natural disasters. Cyclones, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and floods plague PNG; the Solomon Islands and Fiji have recently suffered tsunamis; and Tokelau, 16 feet above sea level at its highest point, is slowly sinking and unlikely to remain inhabited beyond the 21st Century.15 In general, many of the islands are on a socio-economic decline which has resulted in significant population exoduses. Approximately 80-95% of Cook Islanders, Tokelauans, and Niueans now live in
New Zealand. Niue, an island only about 18 miles in diameter now contains only 1400 inhabitants.

BENIGN NEGLECT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Since World War II, the US has sought to maintain preeminence throughout the entire South Pacific. However, particularly after the Cold War, the US has concentrated its efforts and limited resources on a geographic arc extending from Hawaii through Micronesia to Guam and Palau. The US views this as its primary security zone to protect vital sea lanes, to provide a buffer zone for Guam, and to ensure freedom of access and maneuver throughout the Asia-Pacific security region. In addition to its territorial claims, the US maintains military bases on Guam and Kwajalein atoll and has entered into Compacts of Free Association in the Micronesian area. Of the $140.6 million of foreign assistance the US dedicated to the Southern Pacific in 2006, 50% went to Micronesia, 22% went to RMI, and 21% went to Palau, leaving only seven percent, or less than $10 million, to the remaining island states. Putting these figures in perspective, Wal-Mart Corporation donated $245 million dollars to US charities in 2005.

Essentially, a security gap exists over the smaller South Pacific island states, rendering these fragile countries vulnerable to instability and exploitation by outside entities. Faced with significant resource constraints and higher GWOT priorities, the US has relied heavily on Australia and NZ for the security of Melanesia and southern Polynesia. While the US maintains embassies in Fiji, Palau, FSM, RMI, and PNG, it only maintains “Virtual Presence Posts” and “Virtual Embassies” in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Samoa -- no formal diplomatic presence is maintained elsewhere. Additionally, budgetary constraints and security concerns forced a 50% decrease in South Pacific Peace Corps
missions, with complete withdrawals in the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu, PNG, Solomon Islands, and Nuie. Currently, there are only 350 Peace Corps volunteers serving in seven countries. Also, USAID, closed its Pacific region mission office in Fiji in 1996.

This South Pacific “arc of instability” threatens the national security of the US and its allies. Most obviously, instability provides opportunity for illicit trade, international crime, and trans-national threats. Echoing concerns outlined in US National Security Strategy, NZ Prime Minister Helen Clark noted, "Everyone is aware of what 'fragile and failed states' mean in today's world. It can mean penetration of financial systems, lax borders, drug trade, financing terrorism or other activities." As predicted, weak governance in these states has facilitated illegal immigration (to include passport sales), money laundering, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and terrorist activity. For example in 2003, vessels under the Tongan flag were caught transporting weapons, explosives, and Al-Qaeda terrorists. Many of the islands also serve as major hubs for drug trafficking from South-East Asia to other Pacific nations. A less obvious risk to US interests, however, comes from China who, in the face of US regional withdrawal and weakening state capacities, is seeking to gain theater-strategic advantage.

CHINESE EXPANSION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The PRC’s coordinated diplomatic and economic strategy to fill the power vacuum resulting from US withdrawal has dramatically impacted the South Pacific. The PRC has opened full diplomatic missions in all Pacific countries and now has more diplomats in the South Pacific than does any other nation. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, “China reportedly has been investing in the best and brightest for recruitment into its
increasingly sophisticated diplomatic corps and lengthening their assignments in order to foster improved language skills, cultural understanding, and diplomatic effectiveness.31

Currently Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, and Nauru have embassies in China, and Kiribati maintains a consulate.32 The PRC has made a practice of hosting extravagant, high-level meetings in Beijing for Pacific Island leaders, and as one commentator noted, “It is now accepted routine that the first official overseas visit by a new head of government from the region is made to Beijing, not to Canberra, Washington, or Wellington.”33 To facilitate diplomatic relations, the PRC has sponsored training in China for 2,000 Pacific island government officials.34 The foundation of PRC diplomacy is massive economic investment and aid which it uses to build bi-lateral partnerships and to gain access to regional inter-governmental organizations. Expanding its regional influence, China has become a dialogue partner with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and has joined other key regional forums.35 In 2006 the PRC sponsored its first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF) in Fiji.

It is impossible to accurately assess the PRC’s actual financial investment in the South Pacific because China deliberately withholds such information. However, it is possible to make general estimates concerning PRC trade and aid levels. There are more than 3,000 Chinese businesses (many state-owned) in the Pacific collectively valued at approximately one billion dollars.36 Many of the state owned corporations have invested in significant developmental projects to include, for example, a $651 million investment in the Ramu Nickel and Cobalt Mine in Madang, PNG.37 In 2006, China’s total trade to the South Pacific nearly doubled that of the US and was exceeded only by Australia’s and Japan’s trade levels.38 Even within the US security zone of Micronesia, PRC trade has increased
significantly. For example, in RMI, total trade in 2006 reached $457.3 million (an annual increase of 62.8%). In all, China’s trade in the South Pacific is ten times what it was a decade ago, dramatically increasing its influence in the region.

PRC direct aid and assistance to the South Pacific is conservatively estimated at around $150 million, but estimates exceed $300 million when concessional loans to the region are considered. Demonstrating how the PRC uses concessional loans as unaccounted aid, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at the 2006 CPICEDCF, announced the PRC’s provision of $376 million in preferential loans over three years to the Pacific Islands while also announcing cancellation of several of the countries’ maturing debts. Few would argue that PRC aid is inspired by Chinese philanthropy; however, debate remains over whether PRC investment and aid represents “well-funded, integrated foreign policy goals, developed to secure… China’s economic and security interests at the expense of the United States,” or simply PRC effort to maintain the economic growth required for internal national security and to defend its “One China” sovereignty claim.

CHINESE STRATEGY AND COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

Some suggest that the PRC’s aggressive expansion in the South Pacific merely reflects its insatiable hunger for resources and the Chinese Communist Party’s conviction that its very legitimacy relies on its ability to continue delivering a rising standard of living. China, the world’s largest fish exporter, is certainly interested in expanding its access to the Pacific Islands’ collective 20 million square kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone (seven times larger than China’s). This interest also helps partially explain the PRC’s funding of several fish processing plants and its construction of the Tuna Management Commission headquarters in FSM. Also, the Ramu Nickel and Cobalt mine previously mentioned is
hoped to produce 32,800 tons of nickel annually which will support China’s expanding stainless steel industry. However, overall return on investment for China in the South Pacific has been poor, and furthermore, China’s total trade volume in the South Pacific accounts for only 1/1000th of China’s total trade volume. Arguably, the PRC’s economic engagement has more to do with expanding influence and gaining leverage than with increasing profit and securing vital resources.

Many explain the PRCs dramatic engagement of the South Pacific as an effort to gain political influence over the 14 independent South Pacific nations in order to further isolate Taiwan and to gain greater leverage in intra-governmental entities such as the United Nations where China’s questionable human rights record is often a central topic. There is little doubt that this assertion has merit. Of the 23 states that recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of China (an independent Taiwan), six are in the South Pacific; the remaining eight South Pacific countries maintain formal relations with China. The regional contest between Taiwan and the PRC to woo these islands to their side has been coined “dollar diplomacy” as both sides exchange aid, investment, gifts and favors for political alliance. For example, both Taiwan and China have provided island governments with disproportionately large and extravagant building complexes to include a parliamentary complex in Vanuatu, government offices in Samoa, a large convention center in Majuro, RMI, a new government office complex in Tuvalu, and several other non-essential structures. However, despite the obvious impact of dollar diplomacy, it still does not completely explain Chinese engagement patterns. For instance, the PRC’s large expenditures for wharf construction, airport maintenance, road improvements, broadcasting tower repairs, electricity upgrades, and a 100-room hotel on Niue provide China no apparent economic or political value.
unexplained behavior leads many to consider the potential dual-use of these infrastructure developments.

Many believe that Chinese engagement in the South Pacific is intended to support naval power projection beyond the “second island chain” and anti-access/area denial capabilities designed to limit US freedom of maneuver (see fig. 2 and note).\textsuperscript{52} The US assesses that, to achieve these capabilities, the PRC will concentrate on “expeditionary warfare; undersea warfare; anti-air warfare; long-range precision strike; maritime C4ISR; expeditionary logistics and forward basing… and more activist military presence abroad” as enablers.\textsuperscript{53} The Pacific Islands could contribute to the PRC’s objectives by providing forward basing for C4ISR, forward air bases, expeditionary logistics sites, land-based anti-ship missile sites, and future locations for missile defense systems. In this context, the major development projects on Nuie (and other small islands) begin to make sense – though they seem out of place for this tiny island with only 1400 inhabitants and no significant industry, they would make a rapid deployment for military operations more feasible.\textsuperscript{54} To counter such concerns over the PRC’s motivations, the Chinese Embassy in Fiji stated to the media, “China does not station troops or set up military bases in any foreign country.”\textsuperscript{55} Ironically, one exception to that statement can be found with the PRC’s “satellite space-tracking station” built on Kiribati in 1997. This site was run by the Chinese military for space warfare development purposes and possibly to gather intelligence on US military activities on Kwajalein atoll. The site became highly controversial in 2002 local politics along with claims that the PRC had been tampering with local elections and making runway improvements for military intentions.\textsuperscript{56} The site was eventually closed in 2003, and now the PLA instead deploys Yuanwang series space tracking ships to the South Pacific (fig. 3).\textsuperscript{57}
Assessments explaining China’s bold expansion in the South Pacific in purely economic terms (the pursuit of limited resources), purely political terms (dollar diplomacy), or purely military terms (pursuit of forward basing for power projection and access denial) suffer from western linear thinking that emphasizes four distinct strategic lines of operation: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). To properly interpret and respond to PRC diplomacy, it must be evaluated in the context of China’s concept of comprehensive national power (CNP). Otherwise, US policy makers and strategists will attempt to interpret China’s moves on a chess board while the Chinese are playing go, and miscalculations, miscommunications, and misunderstandings could provoke dangerous superpower conflict.58

China’s policy and strategy is developed and implemented based on its careful calculations of CNP. CNP is essentially the measurement of total national power, relative to other nations’, considering both quantitative and qualitative variables.59 CNP incorporates hard power and soft power calculations and factors in the concept of ‘shi.’ There is no Western equivalent to shi, but it essentially refers to power that is inherent in relative position, considering relationships of time, space, and force. Shi is about establishing disproportionate power through positions of leverage (physical, political, informational, social, or psychological) or by achieving mass at a decisive place and time.60 It is important to understand that, in Chinese strategic thought, establishing shi is a continuous process that requires the adroit, symphonic, seamless application of all instruments of national power to maintain leverage over competitors. While military might is a vital part of CNP, the goal is to subdue the enemy without engaging in costly battle that would significantly reduce CNP. In his book Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqui at China’s Academy of Military Science states:
Victory without war does not mean that there is not any war at all. The wars one must fight are political wars, economic wars, science and technology wars, diplomatic wars, etc. To sum up in a word, it is a war of Comprehensive National Power.61

Viewing PRC activity in the South Pacific from its paradigm of CNP, it becomes clear that China is maneuvering, physically and politically to obtain leverage and to increase CNP, by definition, at the expense of the US and other regional powers – a zero-sum gain proposition. China believes that protracted war (GWOT) has decreased US CNP to the point where it will lose its polar state status.62 Consequently, China believes it is in a struggle to re-divide spheres of influence, a struggle to be won asymmetrically through economic action, political action, and with what the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee refers to as the “Three Warfares:” psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare.63 Costly military conflict is to be avoided while enough leverage is established to make PRC regional supremacy a fait accompli.

COUNTERING AND SHAPING PRC DIPLOMACY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

China’s pursuit of CNP in the South Pacific has damaged the integrity of island governmental and economic institutions and has contributed to regional instability which threatens US interests.64 Additionally, China’s zero-sum gain approach to expansion, combined with its pursuit of anti-access technologies challenges US influence and operational reach. “The United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and to important strategic regions of the world to meet our national security needs.”65 China’s pursuit of CNP in the South Pacific potentially threatens that freedom. China is utilizing all instruments of national power to shape the environment in order to set the conditions for China’s regional preeminence.66 Leveraging soft-power advantage, USPACOM must shape
the environment to counter PRC diplomacy in order to avoid further erosion of US influence and access.

US strategy relies heavily on shaping operations to achieve strategic ends. The USPACOM CCDR is tasked with developing an overarching Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that includes within it a Security Cooperation Plan (SCP), focusing on Phase 0 activities.67 The SCP defines how the CCDR intends to shape the AOR “by continually employing military forces to compliment and reinforce other instruments of national power.”68 A key point emphasized throughout US strategy documents and doctrinal publications is that SC must be a cooperative effort. As stated in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group Handbook, “The global security environment… requires even greater cooperation among and between USG agencies…. and … with that of our multinational partners and various IGOs, NGOs, and regional security organizations.”69

Providing the CCDR guidance specifically related to China, the National Military Strategy states that Phase 0 activities will pursue a strategy of “shaping and hedging.”70 Hedging involves maintaining capability to deter potential PRC aggression and to ensure victory if combat were to occur. The shaping described in US security guidance related to China has two elements: The first element involves shaping the environment to counter PRC exclusionary diplomacy, ensuring “access to operational areas… and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach.”71 The second element involves shaping China’s decisions: “We will… develop a comprehensive strategy to shape China’s choices” and “encourage China to participate as a responsible stakeholder;” this is to be done in ways that will “foster accountability, cooperation, and mutual trust.”72 Essentially, this two-fold guidance challenges leadership to shape the international environment by creating
democratically based alliances and coalitions with the capacity to resist any threats to good
governance, economic reform, security, social well-being, human dignity, or stability. This
security environment based on partner capacity would de-incentivize Chinese behavior
counter to collective security interests, while accommodating PRC diplomacy that supports
collective interests, paving the way for increased cooperation and trust. Security cooperation
is USPACOM’s “principal vehicle for building security capacity.”

The critical requirement or key enabler to the PRC’s rapid expansion in the South
Pacific has been the weakened capacities and vulnerabilities of the island states. While the
GWOT has increased US and ally sensitivity to exploitation of vulnerable states by
transnational threats, inadequate consideration has been given to the security threat posed by
China’s exploitation of the South Pacific states. As cautioned in the US National Defense
Strategy, “states… often seek to exploit the instability caused by regional conflict, and state
collapse or the emergence of ungoverned areas…. (to take) control of strategic resources…
(this) is a particular concern.” To counter PRC diplomacy, USPACOM must redefine SC
in the South Pacific to “help build the internal capacities of countries at risk..., thereby
denying China diplomatic sanctuary.” Ironically, while seven years of combat in the US
Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR has degraded US relative power in the USPACOM
AOR, sustained Stability Operations have also given rise to new organizational and doctrinal
concepts that can be successfully employed to counter PRC diplomacy and to shape China’s
future decisions in the South Pacific. USPACOM must align its Security Cooperation Plan
(SCP) with the newly developed Stability Operations doctrine, employing a comprehensive
approach to Phase 0 (Shaping) operations.
The newly released doctrinal publication FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, states that “the greatest threat to our national security comes not from... ambitious powers, but from fragile states... unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people.” The point is that fragile states are easily exploited and susceptible to corruption and conflict. Additionally, fragile states potentially blur balance of power equations among strategic states, further increasing the likelihood of conflict. *Stability Operations* was written to institutionalize transformational doctrine that has been developed through years of combat against transnational threats that exploit instability to gain power. While *Stability Operations* is described as a “roadmap from conflict to peace,” the publication also points out that “security cooperation plans share many of the same broad goals as stability operations conducted after a conflict or disaster.” In fact, the doctrinal concepts found in *Stability Operations* provide an effective framework for an improved SCP to engage both the vulnerable South Pacific islands, and a powerful, expanding China.

Utilizing Stability Operations doctrine as the model, the goal of an improved USPACOM SCP would be to defeat threats by building the capacity of supported nations. The key to success for such a plan is a comprehensive approach. Beyond a whole government approach which seeks interagency collaboration, the comprehensive approach specifically accommodates the potential contributions of all regional actors and leverages shared information, common understanding and shared vision to develop mutually supporting relationships for synergistic effects. The comprehensive approach enables unity of effort through shared vision and common goals, capitalizing on contributions of partner stakeholders without requiring specific interagency interaction. With a common end state in mind, the comprehensive approach integrates effective joint command and control with
effectual interagency collaboration; the whole government then applies proactive cooperation with nongovernmental, multinational and private sector organizations to achieve mutually supporting goals (fig. 4).\textsuperscript{84}

The improved SCP would enable civil-military unity of effort by utilizing the same purpose-based framework employed in Stability Operations which defines five broad end states from which to assign objectives and tasks: a safe and secure environment; established rule of law; social well-being; stable governance; and a sustainable economy.\textsuperscript{85} These five end states are the foundation for five “stability sectors” or “lines of effort” that provide the overarching structure for an essential task matrix (fig. 5). The essential task matrix is a collaborative, living document among partner stakeholders that synchronizes activity to maximize effect.\textsuperscript{86} Integrated in and enveloping all activity is a strategic communications plan that carefully sequences information events to achieve decisive results. Also, a detailed assessment plan, shared as appropriate with stakeholders, enables continuous adaptability and improvement.

A major challenge for USPACOM in the development of a comprehensive SCP would be identifying roles and responsibilities of governmental agencies as well as establishing cooperative goals for discretionary partners. It is for future research to provide specific detail as to how USPACOM should achieve this comprehensive approach in an AOR including 36 independent states and countless other stakeholders. However, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), \textit{Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization}, and its supporting document, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, \textit{Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations}, offer some general guidance that applies to SC planning
and implementation. While the DOS would serve as the lead agency for integrating US shaping activities, a coordinator for SC would be designated as described in NSPD-44. This coordinator would be the USPACOM CCDR by virtue of his overarching theater responsibilities and his staffing, resources, and command and control architecture. Though USPACOM would perform a coordinating function, the SCP would emphasize using the military as an enabler for the employment of the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power to create conditions that preserve peace while protecting US interests.

To facilitate collaborative planning and unity of effort, USPACOM must work with Department of State (DOS) to establish entities similar to the Interagency Management System (IMS) and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), though these new organizations would focus on regional steady-state activities vice reconstruction and stabilization. USPACOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) would also play a pivotal role in planning and execution; the new SC concept would require an expansion of JIACG capabilities. Currently, TCPs and SCPs are developed separately from ambassadors’ Mission Strategic Plans (MSP). This promotes disunity of effort and puts the US at a disadvantage against an authoritarian competitor that maintains state control over all instruments of national power. As part of the new comprehensive approach to SC, regional chiefs of mission should be signatories to the SCP that employs the planning framework and civil-military planning/implementation teams described above. Continuous cooperation and coordination along the five lines of effort is critical to success.

Using a comprehensive approach to build partner capacity would insulate South Pacific countries from exploitive PRC engagement practices that threaten regional stability.
and US interests. Additionally, this approach to SC would more effectively accomplish GWOT objectives while better preparing regional partners for other potential contingencies. This new approach would exploit US soft power advantage to establish shi despite resource constraints. Finally, the comprehensive approach would provide a framework from which to shape PRC decisions. An interagency, multi-national, civil-military collaboration with common objectives seeking a safe and secure environment, rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and stable economies stands the best chance of creating an environment that “foster(s) accountability, cooperation, and mutual trust.”90

CONCLUSION

While the US has been heavily invested in the GWOT, the PRC has been committing significant resources in the South Pacific to redefine spheres of influence. China’s pursuit of CNP in the South Pacific threatens regional stability and US national interests. The challenge for USPACOM is to counter the PRC’s diplomacy in ways that will preserve peace, protect US interests, and guide China down a cooperative path. These ambitious objectives require a new, comprehensive approach to SC that builds partner capacity among the vulnerable island states in the South Pacific to achieve collective security. Current Stability Operations doctrine provides USPACOM with a framework for a new SCP to shape the South Pacific and Chinese diplomacy in order to achieve national objectives. While this paper only briefly addresses concepts for implementation of this new framework, it is clear that execution will require profound operational art. However, creative leadership behind these sound concepts will significantly contribute to US national security in the USPACOM AOR while also providing a framework for increased cooperation with China as a responsible stakeholder, sharing the burden of theater security and stability.91
Figure 1. Pacific Island Cultural Regions

Figure 2. Theater-Strategic Island Chains
Figure 3. Yuanwang Series Space Tracking Ship

Figure 4. Comprehensive Approach
Glossary of Terms

**alliance**  
(joint) The relationship that results from a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.  
(JP 3-0)

**capacity building**  
The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.  
(FM 3-07)

**civil-military operations**  
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation.  
(JP 1-02)

**coalition**  
(joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.  
(JP 5-0)

**comprehensive approach**  
An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.  
(FM 3-07)

**country team**  
The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission.  
(JP 3-07.4)

**crisis state**  
A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory.  
(FM 3-07)
diplomacy
the coordinated implementation of all instruments of national power in foreign relations to strengthen national power and promote interests abroad. Diplomacy may be supported by the threat or use of force, but this term generally does not include combat operations.

*fragile state
A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

*governance
The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (FM 3-07)

information engagement
The integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts. (FM 3-0)

interagency
(joint) United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

interagency coordination
(joint) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

intergovernmental organization
(joint) An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 3-08)

isolate
In the context of defeat mechanisms, to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. (FM 3-0)

joint interagency coordination group
An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

line of operations
(joint) 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 1-02)

military engagement
(joint) Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)

multinational operations
(joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

nongovernmental organization
(joint) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human
rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

**peacetime military engagement**
All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the United States military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. (FM 3-0)

*rule of law*
A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. (FM 3-07)

*sanctuary*
The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Sanctuaries traditionally were physical safe havens, such as base areas, and this form of safe haven still exists. But “virtual” sanctuaries can exist in the Internet, global financial systems, and the international media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to try to make belligerent actions seem acceptable or laudable to internal and external audiences. (FM 3-24)

**stability operations**
(joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

**stakeholder**
an institution or group that has an expressed interest in the outcome of a political process or operation though not perhaps a participant in the activity at hand

**synchronization**
(joint) 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 2-0)

**unified action**
(joint) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**unity of effort**
(joint) The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

*vulnerable state*
A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. (FM 3-07)

*whole of government approach*
An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

Terms marked with (*) are newly defined or updated in doctrinal publications


9. U.S. Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-4. “A Comprehensive Approach: A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” Also, for this paper, the term diplomacy refers to the coordinated implementation of all instruments of national power in foreign relations to strengthen national power and promote interests abroad. Diplomacy may be supported by the threat or use of force, but this term generally does not include combat operations.

10. Thomas Lum, Southwest Pacific, 4.


13. Thomas Lum, Southwest Pacific, 5.

14. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” The National Interest 72, Summer, 2003, 97. Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu struggle to govern hundreds of small islands consisting of small societies, many prone to conflict. PNG has suffered a decade of civil war along with Vanuatu, and a military coup overthrew the elected government of the Solomon Islands in 2000. According to the previously cited Red Cross Report, “States of emergency were declared in Fiji, the Southern
Highlands province of Papua New Guinea and Tonga as military coups, law and order, governance problems and pro-democracy riots took hold of the countries… In the Solomon Islands, civil unrest flared up in Honiara following the March 2006 elections. The unrest spiralled out of control, forcing neighboring countries like Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea to intervene with civil defense forces."


19. Thomas Lum, Southwest Pacific, 6. The Northern Mariana Islands maintain a commonwealth arrangement with the US. The Marshall Islands and Micronesia maintain a Compact of Free Association. As part of the compacts, the US is obligated to defend the Freely Associated States (FAS), and the FAS citizens enjoy “habitual residents” status with the US.

20. Thomas Lum, Southwest Pacific, 10.


22. The Honorable Alexander Downer, “Australia’s Renewed Commitment to the South Pacific” (address, Centre for South Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 18 July 1996). http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1996/pacifics.html (accessed 15 October, 2008). Both Australia and NZ have also been forced to prioritize limited resources. Of the roughly $574 million Australia dedicates to Pacific aid, $400 million is directed to PNG with the remaining 30% divided primarily among seven other island nations.

23. Thomas Lum, Southwest Pacific, 12. The Peace Corps mission was also terminated in the Marshall Islands.

24. Ibid., 2. USAID provided $250,000 in disaster relief to the Solomon Islands following the 2007 tsunami.


27. John Henderson, “Dragon in Paradise,” 99. In one year, 800 illegal immigrants (mostly Chinese), “boat people,” were picked up in the South Pacific. Passports are sold in a number of island states, mainly to ethnic Chinese.

Billions of dollars from international criminal organizations have been laundered in Nauru, and terrorists have been caught with fake Nauruan passports.


Thomas Lum, Southwestern Pacific, 14.


Thomas Lum, Comparing Global Influence, 28. “By contrast…US… has frozen staffing levels…and the diversion of human resources to Iraq and Afghanistan have created…shortfalls in staffing (and) cuts in language and other training.”


U.S Army Reserve, 301st Military Intelligence Battalion, China’s Political and Economic Influence, 8. Established in 1971, the PIF includes Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Nuie, Palau, Papau New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

Thomas Lum, Southwestern Pacific, 16.

Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon Looks South,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2008. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=814. The mine project also included an additional concessional loan to fund a $US 248 million hydropower project to meet the mine’s energy requirements.

Fergus Hanson, “Dragon Looks South,” 3, 4.


Fergus Hanson, “Dragon Looks South,” 3, 4.


Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific,” 8, 9. Ten year extensions were provide to others. Loans also regularly include no or very low interest rates. Aid provided in the form of state-owned business “projects,” never intended for profit also remains unaccounted. For example, much infrastructure, facilities, and lodging improvement/construction is conducted by Chinese tourist companies that fail to make a profit. Also unaccounted are the expenditures for “gifts” to governments and for enumerable PRC funded scholarships and tours to China for islanders.

Thomas Lum, Comparing Global Influence, 18.

Ibid., 6.


Ibid., 4.


Terence Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania,” 11.

States that recognize the independence of Taiwan include Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. The Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands both maintain Embassies in Taipei.


52. Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University, August 2003), 11. General Liu Huaqing, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) head in the 1980’s inspired a three-stage naval development plan for a globally capable blue-water fleet; the stages for this plan were based on naval power projection capability expanding out to and beyond concentric island chains in the Pacific. The second phase of the plan was to ensure freedom of action to the “second island chain” which ranges 1800 nautical miles from mainland China as depicted in Figure 2. The third phase, to be reached in the first half of the 21st Century envisioned a global naval power emphasizing missile-carrying submarines.


60. David Lai, Go, 2.


62. Jiang Yang, “China South Pacific,” 4. Despite China’s rapid expansion, and despite erosion of US investment and physical presence in the region, the US still maintains a unique soft power advantage that may be undervalued in Chinese CNP calculations. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to define soft power. According to Joseph Nye who coined the term, soft power is different from influence (despite popular usage of the term). Influence can be gained through incentive (such as economic influence) or coercion (such as military force). However, soft power involves truly inspiring others to want what you want, co-opting them into your vision. It is winning the hearts and minds. While China’s economic resources remain attractive to South Pacific countries, the PRC’s soft power suffers due to its ideology and its behavior. The South Pacific Islands’ strong Christianity, anti-communism, natural skepticism of large power engagement, and perceptions of PRC human rights violations automatically create image problems for China. Political corruption, exploitative economic practices, aggressive immigration, and criminal activity associated with Chinese engagement have further damaged PRC soft power. Conversely, US soft power remains strong, built on a long history of positive friendship. The islands have been influenced by Western, Christian missionaries for centuries, and many of the islands were liberated from Japanese occupation by US military forces during World War II. The US remains committed to democratic ideals and the promotion of freedom, human dignity, and economic pluralism. Most importantly, US aid and investment has consistently focused on improving quality of life for islanders and on supporting the rule of law vice Chinese investment strategy which often targets government officials and elites with little regard for the long-term benefit to the local population. The tremendous soft power advantage enjoyed by the US gives the USPACOM Combatant Commander (CCDR) a unique opportunity to counter China diplomacy with an indirect approach through shaping operations as part of SC. PACOM must intentionally exploit this soft power advantage in its SCP.

63. Larry M. Wortzel, Chinese Armed Forces, 102.

64. John Henderson, “Dragon in Paradise,” 98. China is often criticized for importing labor from China for commerce in the South Pacific at the expense of islander employment. For example, China brought hundreds of garment workers Fiji, and action condemned by trade unions. Perceptions of uncontrolled Chinese immigration led to the riots in Tonga which destroyed 80% of the business district.


Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 1-11. The *National Security Strategy* seeks to “promote freedom, justice, and human dignity…to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free trade and wise developmental policies.” Chinese diplomatic engagement that includes bribes and political tampering, and Chinese economic engagement that creates dependency on Chinese labor and resources for sustainment undermine state institutional legitimacy. Also, though not PRC sponsored, other illegal activities associated with Chinese economic engagement, such as illegal immigration, illegal trade, and human trafficking, have contributed to instability and human rights violations.


67. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations (JP 3-0)* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 6 March 2006), IV-27, 28. Phase 0 Shape. Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.

68. CJCS, JP 3-0, VII-1.


70. DOD, *National Defense Strategy*, 10. Hedging emphasizes military capability enabled by the adroitly coordinated application of the other instruments of national power. Shaping however emphasizes using the military as an enabler for the employment of the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power to create conditions that preserve peace while protecting US interests.

71. CJCS, JP 3-0, xxi.

72. DOD, *National Defense Strategy*, 10, 13. Stakeholder: an institution or group that has an expressed interest in the outcome of a political process or operation though not perhaps a participant in the activity at hand.


74. U.S Army Reserve, 301st Military Intelligence Battalion, *China’s Political and Economic Influence*, 8. In 2007 the Asia-Pacific Island Nations Summit gathered representatives from 22 island states to address their vulnerabilities. A top agenda item was fostering “a closer alliance between island nations to protect their natural resources and cultural heritage while promoting sustainable development,” in the face of Chinese engagement.

75. Transnational threats include cross-border crime, criminalized international economic institutions, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, external extremists, international terrorism, encroachment by rogue states, hostile acts by foreign nations, and pandemic virus.

Thomas Lum, *Southwest Pacific*, 3. While some may debate whether Chinese diplomacy should be labeled exploitative, the fact that many islanders perceive it to be so has caused a great deal of regional instability. In 2006, anti-Chinese riots broke out in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, forcing Australia and NZ to deploy peacekeeping troops to the Solomon Islands, and forcing China to evacuate hundreds of its citizens.

77. Ibid., 9. See Glossary of Terms for new doctrinal definition of the term sanctuary.

78. U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 1-4. A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.


80. Ibid., Forward, vii.

81. Aligning the SCP with this new Stability Operations doctrine would not only provide the best approach for countering PRC diplomacy but would also more effectively accomplish GWOT objectives while also facilitating transitions to other potential missions such as Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Relief operations.

82. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 1-8. Capacity building is the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.

83. Ibid., 1-3. Unity of effort is the foundation of success for operations that require integrating the capabilities of all the instruments of national power, as well as those of other nations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

84. Ibid, 1-5.

85. Ibid, 1-16.

86. Glyn Davies, “United States Policy Toward South Pacific Island Nations Including Australia and New Zealand,” *DISAM Journal*, July 2007, excerpts of the statement presented to Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 15 March 2007. “We believe it is crucial to keep this vast, strategic region and its mostly small, sometimes struggling states firmly on our side. Growing political, environmental, and economic challenges, compounded by longer-term transnational threats, menace some of the fragile island societies. We are seeking to expand our engagement and reverse the perception that the US has withdrawn from the Pacific…. Our goal is to step up our efforts to promote prosperity, good governance, and the rule of law in the region. Toward that end, we are labeling 2007 the Year of the Pacific and developing a whole government approach with the Department of Defense (DOD), Coast Guard, Department of the Interior, US Trade Representative, Peace Corps and other agencies to expand our presence in the region. The Department of State (DOS) had taken the lead in this effort.”


88. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 1-14. The IMS is a management structure designed to assist policymakers, chiefs of mission, and military commanders by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It consists of three planning and implementation teams, one at each level. The CRC is a standing, deployable team at the tactical level.

89 Country teams send representatives to the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan Development Conference annually, and Senior Defense Officials provide input to country MSP/MPP, but this falls short of the level of continuous integration and assessment that must occur.


91. Ibid., 10.

92. Thomas Lum, *Southwestern Pacific*, 27.
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