Did the failure of the U.S. Military in the application of operational art planning and command and control (C2) result in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal? This paper contends that it did and if the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had designed an effective C2 structure for detainee operations before hostilities in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal would not have occurred. The dysfunction at Abu Ghraib was initially exposed in late January 2004 and created overwhelming animosity toward U.S. policy and the U.S. military. Specifically, the handling and treatment of prisoners within the Abu Ghraib facility from October 2003 - January 2004 provided bizarre visions of sadistic abuse at the hands of U.S. military personnel. Conclusions will be discussed, as well as probable causes for failure in operational planning and C2. In addition, recommendations are offered that may prevent or reduce such detainee operational failures in the future.
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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON SCANDAL AND ITS IMPACT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: [Signature]

31 October 2008
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ABSTRACT

Did the failure of the U.S. Military in the application of operational art planning and command and control (C2) result in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal? This paper indicates that it did and if the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had designed an effective C2 structure for detainee operations before hostilities in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal would not have occurred. The dysfunction at Abu Ghraib was initially exposed in late January 2004 and created overwhelming animosity toward U.S. policy and the U.S. Military. Specifically, the handling and treatment of prisoners within the Abu Ghraib facility from October 2003 - January 2004 provided bizarre visions of sadistic abuse at the hands of U.S. Military personnel. Conclusions will be discussed, as well as probable causes for failure in operational planning and C2. In addition, recommendations are offered that may prevent or reduce such detainee operational failures in the future.
INTRODUCTION

Did the failure of the U.S. Military in the application of operational art planning and command and control (C2) result in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal? This paper indicates that it did and if the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had designed an effective C2 structure for detainee operations before hostilities in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal would not have occurred. The dysfunction at Abu Ghraib was initially exposed in late January 2004 and created overwhelming animosity toward U.S. policy and the U.S. Military. Specifically, the handling and treatment of prisoners within the Abu Ghraib facility from October 2003 – January 2004 provided bizarre visions of sadistic abuse at the hands of U.S. Military personnel. Conclusions will be discussed, as well as probable causes for failure in operational planning and C2. In addition, recommendations are offered that may prevent or reduce such detainee operational failures in the future.

In the early spring of 2004, the 60 Minutes II television program and The New Yorker magazine obtained sadistic and humiliating photographs of Iraqi prisoners depicted in nude and lascivious poses in a prison facility known as Abu Ghraib. This large prison complex known for its horrendous treatment of Saddam Hussein era political enemies and common criminals was being utilized by the U.S. military to house prisoners and suspected terrorists during ongoing operations in Iraq. The facility was under the command of the 800th Military Police Brigade led by Brigadier General (BG) Janis Karpinsky. According to BG Karpinsky, “The 800th MP Brigade had orders to supervise and guard the prisons while providing on-the-job training for the Iraqis who eventually were expected to replace us.” In addition, BG Janis Karpinsky indicated that in the “do it now, rationalize it later atmosphere of the Iraqi reconstruction, the prisons department was under the same pressure I was to ‘just make it work,’ without any real plan or
guidance." A tall order indeed, but the absence of a clear or well formed plan would prove disastrous, as well as the inability of officers in command to shape any plan for detainee matters or properly oversee subordinate personnel that served as guards within the prison.

BACKGROUND

Being a nation at war on two fronts, the rhythmic tide of life can become erratic and human behavior can devolve into unacceptable realms not usually common in peace-time. This unfortunate fact does not absolve leaders at the operational level to do things on the fly. As a great nation, however, much is expected. The United States has historically held itself to high standards of human rights conduct during and after war, as evidenced in the post war reconstruction plans for Germany after World War II. The plans in that era served as a high standard of how to properly treat a defeated enemy and criminal combatants held for judicial procedures. At Abu Ghraib, no such standards or plans for detainee interrogation were instituted and chaos replaced the void created with the absence of proper command and control and the application of operational art through coordinated pre-planning. The CENTCOM plans for the first three phases of the war seem to have taken greater precedence and it appears that the planning of phase four (stabilization and reconstruction) was operated as if an afterthought, not meriting equal consideration. Measures of effectiveness or clear lack of it at Abu Ghraib seem to indicate this rather clearly.

In 1777, in an order and plan to subordinate commanders of the Continental Army who had taken on prisoners after the victory at the Battle of Princeton, General George Washington wrote: “Treat them with humanity, and let them have no reason to complain of our copying the
brutal example of the British Army in their treatment of our unfortunate brethren...” The standard of America’s treatment of prisoners established by General Washington had been set. No standards of judicial precedence, could form a better foundation for the U.S. Military in its conduct toward prisoners and detainees. Clearly, the path taken for prisoner treatment at Abu Ghraib was a complete departure from the directives provided by George Washington 226 years earlier. Furthermore, such behavior as depicted at Abu Ghraib is absolutely forbidden according to the 1949 provisions of the “Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.” This important document on prisoner treatment clearly describes appropriate treatment for persons held in custody during time of war.

It is evident after viewing just a few of the many photographs from Abu Ghraib that on an operational level, the MP command structure of the 800th MP Brigade were unaware or unconcerned with the activities perpetrated inside the prison. While the photographs provided to the media tell a harrowing story of vicious prison guard activity within the prison, it is important to discuss the lack of planning operationally that led to a scandal of epic proportion so damaging that then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, “later disclosed that twice during the period [late April – September 2004] he had offered to step down as defense secretary.” Moreover, it has been contended that the many abuses which occurred at Abu Ghraib were not aggressively pursued by the military brass. The trickle of information initially was quite troubling; however, as hostilities raged during the late summer and fall of 2003 in and around Baghdad, it appears no serious efforts were pursued to confirm or eliminate the trickling allegations of prisoner and detainee abuses. According to former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, a friend of Secretary Rumsfeld, “To stop abuses and mistakes by the rank and file, whether in the prisons or on the streets, heads must roll at much higher levels than they have thus far.”
Obviously, even the experts who once held the crucial position of the U.S. Defense Secretary saw the gravity of this situation much earlier than some in the highest levels within CENTCOM and the DOD. Command had lost control. The inability to nip this matter in the bud would lead to even greater suspicion of our military leadership by many ordinary citizens that previously supported the war effort in Iraq. As if this were not enough bad news, Al Qaeda was using the pictures from Abu Ghraib as a recruitment tool and gaining a real foothold in their propaganda driven Information Operations (IO). Though not fair to the overwhelming good work performed by most U.S. military service members – perception had become reality. As former CENTCOM General Tommy Franks stated, “As for the few who defile the service of the many, our criminal justice system – both military and civilian will do its duty. But sadly, the images of the dogs and naked prisoners have taken the place of the more hideous pictures of Iraq’s mass graves.” General Franks observations were spot on and it appears evident that lack of command and control (C2) at the brigade level and higher had caused Abu Ghraib to become a story of continuing national embarrassment that had many citizens and allies beginning to question our role in Iraq.

PLANNING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Operational art and command and control in proper military planning are essential. When speaking about initial success in Iraq, former CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks stated, “Phase IV would be a crucial period. Having won the war, we would have to support the peace.” Throughout General Franks’ thoughtful memoir, it appears that he and his staff were painstakingly engaged in continuous planning for operational phases I, II, and III in regard to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, but always being under the watchful eye of then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Moreover, General Franks indicated that substantial planning for phase IV would be borne by the U.S. Department of State, as well as the Defense Department’s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Unfortunately, personality friction and territorial parochialism was strong between both departments. According to General Tommy Franks:

And that lack of trust was compounded by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Deputy Secretary of State Rich Armitage; Doug Feith, the undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and their senior staff members. Make no mistake, these men served their country passionately. Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell were loyal to these helpers; the views they developed and the points they presented throughout the planning of the war would make that very clear. But in many cases these advisors’ deep and inflexible commitment to their own ideas was disruptive and divisive as they sought to influence their bosses – and ultimately George W. Bush – with respect to Iraq policy.\[9\]

The discord and disconnect in phase IV operational planning is further expressed in former Defense Undersecretary Doug Feith’s 2008 memoir titled *War and Decision*, in which he writes:

Rumsfeld’s unease in being put in charge of detainee operations was well grounded. The responsibility would bring with it a series of serious problems. The Pentagon’s leadership appreciated the importance of honoring the Geneva Conventions, but issues arose time and again that required the very difficult balancing of weighty but competing interests: on interrogation methods, on transferring detainees to their home countries, and on whether to prosecute individuals as criminals or simply hold them as enemy combatants. And apart from policy dilemmas, there was the potential for abusive treatment that would materialize so disgustingly at Abu Ghraib. Despite astute forebodings about becoming the world’s jailer, he was not able to head the problems off.\[10\]

Obviously, the former undersecretary takes little if any responsibility for negligent planning as it relates to phase IV stability and detainee operations – even though he and counterparts in the policy office of the Defense Department had a significant role to play in planning and post war initiatives.

Finger pointing is not new within the DC Beltway, in many respects it is an art form – but certainly far removed from operational planning. Interestingly however, another planning
meeting at CENTCOM sheds further light and greater insight to the bureaucratic meddling that occurred shortly before commencement of the war. General Franks addressing a meeting with his immediate senior staff officers said, “Here’s the deal guys. I know OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] – Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith -- are demanding a lot. But they are not the enemy. Don’t start thinking good guys – bad guys. We’re all on the same side.”

Furthermore, the general known to be very frank went on to say, “I’ll worry about about OSD, all of them – including Doug Feith, who’s getting a reputation around here [CENTCOM] as the dumbest [expletive deleted] guy on the planet.”

The aforementioned commentaries by the former undersecretary and the general give some texture and a brief glimpse of the genuine disconnect that occurred between the civilian bureaucratic leadership and the CENTCOM leaders trying to collectively develop an overarching plan for success for Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the early stages of planning, civilian led detainee matters even though predicted to be quite large by military leaders, were simply not handled as priorities in any detailed or methodical way. Phase IV for detainee matters was simply an after thought that was poorly considered and mostly muddled by some civilian leaders with little if any military background. Good intentions aside, war is a serious business that requires genuine leadership and excellence in planning. The lack of both by those responsible for phase IV operations, put the previous three successful phases in great jeopardy.

As mentioned in Dr. Milan Vego’s authoritative war compendium titled, *Joint Operational Warfare*, he eloquently states, “The operational planning process should be conducted continuously in peacetime and in war. It should encompass the entire spectrum of possible contingencies in which one’s military forces could be employed to accomplish national or alliance/coalition strategic objectives.” Certainly coordination supported by greater unity of
effort between the strategic political leaders and the military operational leaders could have prevented the lack of planning that ultimately resulted in atrocious detainee treatment and a dysfunctional command and control structure at the brigade level and below. All the failures associated with Abu Ghraib do not rest at the strategic and operational level alone; it was, however, at this critical level that lack of planning set the stage for much of the associated technical failures.

The field forces most engaged in gathering detainees in Iraq were the U.S. Army and the United States Marine Corps. In December 2003 Army Intelligence was, "asked by one of the 'wise men' of the Army intelligence community to fly over to review her [BG Karpinski's] operations [at Abu Ghraib]." The man selected was former Army Colonel Stuart Herrington and in his initial report stated, "The facility is a pressure cooker where it is only a matter of time before prisoners stage an uprising." Colonel Herrington goes further to state, "A larger concern was how detainees were being treated, and not just by a handful of demoralized Army reservists at Abu Ghraib. He was shocked by the behavior of Task Force 21, an elite interagency team of about 1000 CIA paramilitaries and black Special Operations forces devoted to finding Saddam Hussein and his top allies." The strong approach and abuse by these contractors likely had a negative impact on military operations and tactical behavior inside Abu Ghraib, setting things in motion that fell well outside the Geneva Conventions and approved U.S. military doctrine as it pertains to appropriate treatment of prisoners. In addition, Colonel Herrington related a conversation he had with an officer at Abu Ghraib concerning prisoner abuse. According to Herrington, he stated, "One of the officers told him that he knew about the beatings." Herrington went on to say, "I asked the officer if he had reported this problem. He replied that, 'Everyone knows about it.' I advised the officer that this [response] was
inadequate.” Based on these exchanges, it is clear that overwhelming conditions of too many prisoners, too few trained guards, and the specter of other government agencies with little or no oversight working well outside the chain of military command operationally in OIF or tactically at Abu Ghraib was a recipe for trouble. This dysfunction, compounded by a brigade commander that spent little or no time attending to responsibilities of oversight at Abu Ghraib, was a recipe for disaster.

Certainly the chaos during war can mitigate minor oversights, however in Brigadier General Karpinski’s memoirs; she does not dispute this charge of the Army’s chief investigator at Abu Ghraib, Major General Antonio Taguba. BG Karpinski said concerning charges filed against her, “One was dereliction of duty, probably originating in Taguba’s finding that I failed to distribute standard operating procedures and other communications in a timely manner.” She further added, “Show me a command that did amid all the chaos.” That was BG Karpinski’s response. Good, bad, or indifferent – command and control particularly when the general’s brigade had command responsibilities for prisoners at Abu Ghraib cannot be avoided. In this regard she was fully responsible. In fairness, however, BG Karpinski was not responsible for initial failings in proper operational planning at the Pentagon or other entities in government that set in motion substantial personnel shortfalls for adequately trained prison guards. Furthermore, the general cannot be faulted for inadequate housing facilities or the specter of paramilitary contractors working in the dark for other government organizations. Finally, she cannot be fully culpable for those contractors who allegedly answered to no one and very likely encouraged poorly trained guards to perform dastardly deeds. The general did however fail to provide proper oversight and reportedly did not venture into many areas of the prison or show adequate interest in ensuring that her staff was enforcing appropriate doctrine for the treatment of prisoners. BG
Karpinski’s final punishment resulted in demotion to colonel, at which time she immediately retired from the U.S. Army. No further action was pursued.

A primary handful of malcontents assigned to the 372nd Military Brigade Company comprised of, “… suspects – Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick, II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles Graner (ring leader); Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Meghan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivits – were, at the time facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that included conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, had been reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant with Graner’s child and was charged later.”

This group of dishonorable soldiers were rightfully charged and recently punished for the hideous acts perpetrated against the detainees. “Nothing can excuse the outright physical abuse that took place in cellblock 1A: beating a prisoner unconscious, stomping on prisoners fingers, sodomizing a prisoner with a broom, and all other outrages.”

IMPACT OF THE SCANDEL

Many who have viewed the photographs of Abu Ghraib are understandably dismayed that American soldiers could behave in such a manner, even with little or no significant directives from the military. The aberrant behavior at Abu Ghraib negatively impacted the good work of almost all of our men and women in uniform and may have a detrimental impact in OIF for years to come. Additionally, the behavior recorded at Abu Ghraib has served as a tremendous recruitment tool for Al Qaeda and its affiliated movements throughout Iraq and the Middle-East.
Furthermore, the illustrated behavior of a few has created unfortunate concerns amongst coalition partners who have called American prestige into question, as well as the effectiveness of our military leadership. To further add increased drama to this volatile situation, HBO released a scathing documentary that highlights the cavalcade of failures that interview many former high ranking government officials and is titled, “Ghosts of Abu Ghraib.” The film discussed how the former Secretary of Defense openly recited the name of Specialist Joseph M. Darby during a public congressional hearing in the summer of 2004 concerning his (Darby’s) information being the source that opened the initial stages of the inquiry concerning abuse at Abu Ghraib. Such an open airing of this source information may have been inadvertent, but would prove to have a chilling effect on other soldiers who might wish to provide additional information. Revealing information in this manner is highly suspect and not the type of behavior one would expect of a high level government officials. Again, it appeared as though incompetence was becoming almost infectious in the manner in which this matter was being handled both operationally and politically.

During a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing in May 2004, then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and then Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myer were sworn in to testify before the committee members and former Vietnam POW and Senator John S. McCain (Ranking member). The Secretary was asked the following:

_Sen. McCain_: “I’d like to know what agency or private contractors were in charge of interrogations. (Deliberate pause) Did they have authority over the guards and what were their instructions to the guards?”

_Sec. Rumsfeld_: “First with respect to this eh...eh...eh...”

_Gen. Myer_: “We did not bring it!”
Sec. Rumsfeld: “Oh my!”

Gen. Myer: “Yes. Oh my is right!”

Sec. Rumsfeld: “It was all prepared.” (Appearing bewildered - looking at the general.)

Gen. Myer: “It was, indeed ....I’ll walk through the chain of command.”

Sen. McCain: “No! You can submit the chain of command....Please! (Clearly agitated) Secretary Rumsfeld in all due respect - you’ve gotta answer this question and it could be satisfied with a phone call. This is a pretty simple straight forward question.”

The evasive and almost rehearsed response by both defense officials gives even a casual observer on Abu Ghraib matters some concern, as to the inability of the secretary to provide a clear answer to the senator’s straight forward inquiry. This type of lapse in a credible manner during an important inquiry might be something acceptable for a first time visitor before a congressional committee or sub-committee. But, is it credible for a former military aviator, congressmen, diplomatic envoy, and two time defense secretary? Moreover, is it reasonable that either the secretary or chairmen of the joint chiefs would not have their staffs bring with them all appropriate materials (talking points, memorandums, reports on the matter, etc.) while these two leaders of national significance are appearing before the United States Congress. Furthermore, would the secretary or general be satisfied with such non-responses from their subordinates if involved in a similar situation? This kind of lapse in memory does not build confidence. Shortly after the inquiry, Senator John S. McCain joined the chorus of many congressional leaders in asking the secretary to resign. In November 2006, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigned from his position at the Defense Department, abruptly after the conclusion of the congressional elections.
CONCLUSION

It has been asserted by some of the soldiers and guards charged at Abu Ghraib that nothing would have come to light in this scandal if no one had photographs. The contention is that if no one had photographs - Abu Ghraib would just be another terrible prison from the past years of Saddam Hussein’s torturous regime. Perhaps that is true, but they did. The fact that they did even further buttresses the contention that without proper pre-planning for post war Iraq a complete analysis of the enemy’s critical factors was not a serious endeavor conducted by the proper personnel. Serious endeavors are tough work, but work that could have paid off, as evidenced by the myriad failures displayed at Abu Ghraib.

For the most part, Major General Antonio Taguba did the job he was assigned to do at his level as the U.S. Army’s chief investigator concerning Abu Ghraib. He uncovered the facts locally and surfaced those directly involved in the multitude of heinous acts. Unfortunately, it appears that others well above the good generals reach or pay grade, such as other government officials, government civilians, and some contractors not firmly under the control of the military, may have slipped through the cracks. It appears in this case of interagency cooperation, rather than enhance the efforts of our military, the personnel involved likely ran amuck. Will those civilians and contractors be held as fully accountable as the soldiers directly involved at Abu Ghraib? Were higher level government officials at Defense, State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff aware of more than what they discussed with the American public or our U.S. Congress? Perhaps, we’ll never know completely, but the questions to date seem to outweigh the answers. It bends the mind that low level soldiers were not spirited or carefully directed in some way by
other entities. Those entities sought plausible deniability through their exploitation of less educated reservists with nominal abilities to differentiate between lawful and unlawful directives. The acts of the legally charged soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib 1A cell block torture was inexcusable under all circumstances, however it is troubling and almost inconceivable that the months of atrocious behavior in 1A did not surface sooner and when they did, the source (Army Specialist Joseph Darby) of the information was surfaced publically - almost immediately. By exposing this young man to the world with no cover whatsoever was a terrible decision. Who’s been held accountable at that level? That question will likely remain unanswered.

Major General Taguba did his job as it was assigned to him by his superiors. According to noted war writer Seymour Hersh, in his book, Chain of Command, “The picture he [Taguba] drew of Abu Ghraib was one in which the Geneva Conventions were routinely violated and much of the day to day management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army intelligence units and contract employees.”25 No written manuals can supplant poor leadership and lack of real interest by leaders who are in positions of command and authority. According to Dr. Milan Vego, “Centralized C2 maximizes efficiency through the extensive use of information technologies as a means of eliminating uncertainty.”26 Clearly at Abu Ghraib no such process existed in regard to efficient C2. Apparently, within the Pentagon, CENTCOM, and in theatre within Iraq, Abu Ghraib was not a high priority. The command and control was broken - badly. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the myriad failures in the early stages led to the scandal that will remain in the collective memory of many Americans, as well as those who wish America harm. History or perhaps some future developments will determine whether the final chapter has been written for Abu Ghraib.
RECOMMENDATIONS

To avoid or reduce problems that will invariably occur in detention facilities in war, even when the best of plans are initiated, it is imperative to have a fully independent investigative body that cannot be swayed politically. Organization specific policing can be effective to a point, but when the possibility or perception of influence at the highest levels within that organization are implicated rightly or wrongly – autonomy is absolutely essential. For example, in 1924 Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone made an observation about the role of proper investigations and the FBI. He said, “The [Federal] Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.” In addition, when a 29 year old highly intelligent and very capable attorney named John Edgar Hoover was offered the position of acting director by then Attorney General Stone, Hoover said, “I’ll take the job Mr. Stone on certain conditions, “What are they?” Stone asked. [Hoover responded.] “The Bureau must be divorced from politics and not a catch all for political hacks. Second, promotions will be based on proven ability, and the Bureau will be responsible only to the attorney general.” “I wouldn’t give it to you under any other conditions,” Stone replied. “That’s all. Good day.” The critical point is that when things go wrong, all investigations of a significant magnitude should be completely independent – especially from any politics. Even the perception or lack of autonomy by the investigator(s) will cast doubt on the quality of an investigation, whether founded or unfounded. Only when the ability to follow the facts as high as necessary, without fear of
retribution toward one's career by the investigator(s) can an inquiry or investigation stand the
test of time and accomplish a level justice for all concerned.

Poor planning and lack of engaged leadership can be the downfall of any system or
process. Certainly, complete operational art analysis and planning were not adequately
conducted through all phases. These early failures occurred substantially, due to the devolution
of command and control and lack in unity of command between CENTCOM and some within
the civilian leadership at the Pentagon and State Department. It appears that stabilization and
reconstruction were afterthoughts and lessons learned in prior wars were simply avoided or given
only tangential attention. The failure in the initial planning stages of command and control and
lack of proper planning should be avoided. The neglect in sufficient early planning for phase IV
was the broken lynch pin operationally that set the stage for much of what happened at Abu
Ghraib. A larger question thus remains: Can future military and civilian leaders learn from this
mistake and not repeat this type of failure in future operational planning?

In the writer's opinion, if future situations of a similar magnitude occur, any primary
investigative leader convened to conduct a thorough investigation, should be the institutional
rank equivalent or higher than the person or persons being investigated. If matters dictate, the
investigation should be removed from the primary control of the entity assigned the investigation
and it should then be reassigned to an outside investigative body commanded solely by the U.S.
Department of Justice. This measure would ensure objectivity and eliminate the chance of
political pressure, in order to sway an investigation inappropriately. Obviously, such an
important interagency decision for an external investigation should only be considered in the
most extreme cases.
NOTES

1 Janis Karpinski, One Woman’s Army (New York, NY: Miramax, 2005), 175.
2 Ibid. p. 175.
6 Ibid. p. 379.
8 Ibid. p. 420.
9 Franks, op. cit., 375-376.
12 Ibid. p. 362.
13 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006), ix-xi.
15 Ibid. p. 259.
16 Ricks, op. cit., p. 259.
17 Ibid. p. 259.
18 Ricks, op. cit., p. 259.
19 Karpinski, op. cit., p. 236.
20 Ibid. p. 236.
22 Karpinski, op. cit., p. 234.
24 Ibid. film chapters 9-12.
25 Hersh, op. cit., p. 46.
28 Ibid. p. 20.


THE PHOTOGRAPHS

[date unknown]