THESIS

POPULATION ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING POPULATIONS IN COIN ENVIRONMENTS

by

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December 2008

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# Population Analysis: A Methodology for Understanding Populations in COIN Environments

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**ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)**

This thesis outlines a methodology for use by tactical operators to better understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are attempting to gain. In turn, these operators (Army soldiers, Marines, Special Forces, SEALs, Civil Affairs, etc.) can use this information to more effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and conduct tactical missions. Our methodology provides a heuristic model, called the “3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model,” that can be applied in any environment and will help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation. We believe that our methodology can be utilized to increase the operator’s understanding of the environment, and improve both non-kinetic and kinetic combat operations. As a counterinsurgency (COIN) force progresses from kinetic combat operations (those attempting to gain a security foothold in a non-permissive environment) to operations focused on gaining the support of the population, our methodology will aid in collecting human intelligence (HUMINT). Our methodology shows that by providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, and empower the locals to handle their own security.
POPULATION ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING POPULATIONS IN COIN ENVIRONMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis was motivated by our perception that tactical level American soldiers commonly lack a methodology for understanding the dynamics of the populations in which they work and how to properly assess these dynamics to gain and maintain a population’s support. These observations are based on eight years of personal experiences in the SEAL and Special Forces communities during worldwide deployments. We have worked with conventional U.S. Army units, U.S. Marine Corps, Iraqi Army, Afghan Army, various South Asian and South East Asian Armed Forces, and several militia elements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The fundamental theories of counterinsurgency are well known within the U.S. military, but the operational art of bridging the gap between strategy and tactics, and theory and implementation is difficult. Our thesis explains a methodology soldiers can utilize at the tactical level to better understand the dynamics of the population from which they are attempting to gain support. In turn, they can use this information to more effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and conduct tactical missions. Our process provides a heuristic model, called the “3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model,” which can be applied in any environment and which will help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation. Our acronym is not meant to be sarcastic or meant to give the impression that we take this subject lightly; but rather, it was designed to be memorable in the minds of operators who are already inundated with lists of acronyms pertaining to their daily duties.

We recognize that gaining information and carrying out basic governance are almost impossible to conduct in a non-permissive environment where forces are constantly engaged in direct combat; however, as combat operations enable security and the environment becomes more permissive, we believe our methodology can increase the tactical level soldiers’ understanding of their environment and can be utilized to improve precision kinetic combat missions. As a COIN force progresses from kinetic combat operations in an attempt to gain a security foothold in a non-permissive environment to operations focused on gaining the support of the population, this methodology will
facilitate the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT). This methodology shows that by combining the efforts of providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, and empower the locals to handle their own security.
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I. WHY DO WE NEED A TACTICAL METHODOLOGY TO UNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF A POPULATION?

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis was motivated by our perception that tactical level American soldiers commonly lack a methodology for understanding the dynamics of the populations in which they work and how to properly assess these dynamics in order to gain and maintain a population’s support. These observations are based on eight years of personal experiences in the SEAL and Special Forces communities during worldwide deployments. We have worked with conventional U.S. Army units, U.S. Marine Corps, Iraqi Army, Afghan Army, various South Asian and South East Asian Armed Forces, and several militia elements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The fundamental theories of counterinsurgency are well known within the U.S. military, but the operational art of bridging the gap between strategy and tactics, and theory and implementation is difficult. Our thesis outlines a methodology for implementation at the tactical level, and is designed to enable operators to better understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are trying to win. In turn, this information can lead to more effectively developed strategy, operations planning, and tactical missions. There are surely other methods, but we feel that our process provides a heuristic model than can be applied in any environment. We are confident that it will help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation.

The war in Iraq and the “Anbar Awakening” in particular is a powerful illustration of the need to understand and engage the population in order to win a counterinsurgency (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 41). The following story is about how Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi locals secured eastern Ramadi during the “Anbar Awakening” (MacFarland and Smith, 2008. p. 41). The “Anbar Awakening” provides a real world experience to exemplify the essential ingredients necessary to gain a population’s support: provide security, work by, with, and through locals, and build trust and cooperation. History shows that when these tasks are successfully executed a COIN force will gain the support of a population. With this support a COIN force will gain the
intelligence advantage and can use that advantage to precisely target the remnants of the insurgency (McCormick, 2007). This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the Ramadi story, what transpired, and then tell a more detailed story of how Task Force 1-9 (TF 1-9) and Naval Special Warfare Squadron Five (ST5) assisted in the transformation.

B. THE TRANSFORMATION OF RAMADI

Ramadi is the capital of Al Anbar Province in Iraq. The majority of its populace is Sunni Muslim, and is organized and aligned by tribe. Tribes tend to have geographic boundaries, but can have enclaves outside traditional tribal grounds. For instance, the Albu Soda tribe was predominantly situated in Sofia, an eastern suburb of Ramadi, but it had direct tribal ties to certain areas deep in Ramadi proper. Every family, tribe, and community within Ramadi is different in how or to what degree they practice Sunni Islam. From personal experience, the areas of Ramadi that are discussed here appeared to be relatively secular.1 The majority of people I saw wore western style clothing, worshipped privately, and were publicly accepting of Sunnis, Salafis, and Shia Muslims. Additionally, people I spoke with were eager to embrace democracy. Nevertheless, when religion was called into question or perceived to be under attack, the inhabitants of Ramadi were quick to take up arms in defense of their faith. The high degree of devotion to Sunni Islam was not apparent until Al Qaeda (AQI) stated that Ramadi was the capital of Sunni Islam, the Khalifa or Caliphate, and would be defended to the death. AQI called upon Sunnis to take up arms in defense of their religion. This turned Ramadi into an escalating war zone in 2005 (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42). Furthermore, throughout modern history Ramadi has served as an economic hub on the trade routes between Syria and Baghdad (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42). As with any economic portal, Ramadi has a complicated history of corruption, trafficking, and organized crime.

To quantify the insurgency in Ramadi is very difficult; it was made up of many different elements with different motivations. They may have shared desire to end the occupation or resist the new Iraqi government, but each element had different goals and objectives it hoped to reach through violence. To some it was all about killing

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1 LT Burke was in Ramadi, Iraq, from September 2006 until April 2007. His personal insights and experiences are the basis for the account of what transpired in Ramadi written in this thesis.
Americans. To others it was about defending Islam against hegemony by western influence. Some were just anti-occupation and some just needed money and were willing to fight for pay, services, protection, and status. Moreover, Ramadi was ripe with recruits. Debaathification, the disbanding of the Iraqi military, political alienation by the new regime, economic destruction, and families that lacked the means to attain their daily subsistence created the perfect disequilibrated society for the insurgency to develop and prosper. Specifically, AQI took interest in Ramadi because of its Sunni predominance, recruiting potential, and logistical suitability.

Fighting the Al Qaeda backed insurgency (AQI) in Ramadi, U.S. and Iraqi military forces (CF) capitalized on AQI’s military blunders and cultural insensitivity to gain a new level of cooperation with Sunni tribes (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 41). Initially, AQI was able to gain a foothold through a strategy of coercion, by religious affiliation, and by supplying a means to ordinary daily needs lacked by the restless society. Prior to the Awakening, Al Qaeda operatives and affiliates operated with virtual impunity within Ramadi and the outlying villages (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42). They imposed their Salafi religious traditions on Sunni tribes. Al Qaeda conducted terror campaigns, assassinations, and other violent acts to deter CF support within the local populace; anyone who supported CF was murdered (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, pp. 42-43, 47, 49). As CF attempted to combat Al Qaeda and its supporters the local population was often inadvertently caught in the crossfire. The fighting caused massive collateral damage, often leaving non-combatants homeless, wounded, or dead. However, Al Qaeda miscalculated the degree of tribal empathy for their cause, and the tribes eventually chose to side with CF (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, pp. 41-52). Gaining valuable intelligence from their new allies, CF, Iraqi Police, local militias, and brave civilians quickly secured Ramadi. In eastern Ramadi, the Albu Soda tribe provided the key ingredient to success that CF had needed for so long (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, pp. 49-51).

In September, 2006, Ramadi started turning around and tribal leaders began to cooperate with CF (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 44). In Eastern Ramadi and the adjacent outlying suburbs, the catalyst for progress was the relationship between the Albu
Soda tribe, TF 1-9, and ST5. Fortunately, TF1-9 and ST5 capitalized on the local populace’s growing disdain for Al Qaeda at the tribal level and logically fell into a “ground-up” counterinsurgency strategy (MacFarland and Smith, 2008. pp. 49-51).

Figure 1. Ramadi Iraq
Within the Ramadi area, Albu Soda was a relatively small tribe that resided northeast of Ramadi in an area known as Sofia (see Figures 1 & 2). Due to the overwhelming distribution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), CF soldiers were relegated to foot-patrols close to Forward Operation Bases (FOBs); Albu Soda territory had for a long time been unreachable due to the relative long distance from any CF base by foot, Al Qaeda check points along the foot paths, and IED riddled streets. Mortars were launched daily at CF installations in Ramadi from Albu Soda’s fields. The fact that the area was an Al Qaeda stronghold made the area one of keen interest to CF, but the U.S. military could not gain adequate intelligence or any sustained presence in the area due to overwhelming Al Qaeda control.

Sheik Jassim of the Albu Soda tribe maintained his position of authority by aiding and abetting AQI for many years; but in the early days of December 2006, tensions came to a head. Sheik Jassim grew tired of Al Qaeda’s destructiveness and tribal government oppression; he was tired of Al Qaeda’s coercion and terror. Fearing a total Al Qaeda take over and his assassination, he ordered his tribe to deny Al Qaeda sanctuary and take up
arms against them. In return for his heretical pronouncement, Al Qaeda turned on the tribe and murdered 36 men, women, and children in a barbaric attack on the village center. Members of Sheik Jassim’s loyal militia attempted to fight back, but were defeated.

Sheik Jassim went into hiding, but, through back channels, was able to contact the U.S. Army’s, TF 1-9, based at Corregidor (see Figure 1). TF 1-9 responded, and, in an unpredictable move, drove directly into the once denied territory to secure the sheik. Sheik Jassim was brought back to Corregidor, debriefed, and offered amnesty under strict terms: CF would reinstate him into the tribe, CF would provide security until his tribe was able to do so unilaterally, and in turn, Sheik Jassim would give information vital to combating Al Qaeda, and supporting a permanent CF presence within his tribal boundaries. He agreed and 24 hours later Sheik Jassim was escorted back into his tribal lands.

CF linked up with Sheik Jassim’s militia and established joint security positions anticipating a daylight attack by Al Qaeda; an attack that never happened. The sheik’s tribe provided information regarding Al Qaeda’s escape to Jalayba once they realized that CF had been inserted into the village. The CF show of force, willingness to fight on behalf of the Albu Soda tribe, and the sustained security presence led to widespread support from the tribe. Overnight, mortar attacks of Corregidor stopped and violence within the Albu Soda territory ceased. The populations’ support yielded new information on the insurgency, its caches, its tactics, and its safe havens enabling CF to perform precision raids. Coming full circle, the tribe became more secure under the umbrella of protection provided by CF armed with the locals’ intelligence.

After the first couple days of the campaign, the emphasis changed from security and offensive operations to providing civic needs and training the militia. All military and civic programs were orchestrated and coordinated through one single position: the unified command structure of TF 1-9’s Battalion Commander. Under TF 1-9’s authority, ST5 was responsible for training the local militia and began the process of transforming them into a legitimate police force. This required screening, training, equipping, paying, and establishing a command structure. In order to legitimize the force, volunteers had to
agree to attend one of the police academies accredited by the Iraqi government. These conditions required that police recruits leave their homes and families for up to two months depending upon the school: a considerable sacrifice given the conflict their tribe had just experienced and the concern for their family’s security in the forefront of their minds. Despite these requirements, the approximately 30-man militia that helped CF the first night of the campaign showed up in force for the first day of training. The feeble militia had grown to hundreds of volunteers. Word had spread of AQI’s brutality and the CF’s new alliance, which motivated hundreds of men and boys to want to join the cause. Due to the sheer numbers, three separate courses of instruction were organized. Many volunteers proved to be ex-detainees with criminal backgrounds including actions such as: mortaring CF facilities, building and emplacing IEDs, and even a member of a beheading cell. Despite their past transgressions, these ex-insurgents were given amnesty. Based on intelligence gleaned from the police recruits ST5 was able to further its area influence and raid AQI safe havens in neighboring tribes and even in Ramadi proper (see Figure 1). Ultimately, the first three courses of instruction yielded 176 trained, equipped, and funded militia policemen. They were considered militia policemen until they attended one of the accredited Iraqi Police academies, which was arranged for 30 of the officers within weeks of graduation from the ST5 course of instruction.

While ST5 conducted police training and intelligence gathering, TF 1-9 provided area security and spearheaded Civil Affairs missions. CF employed locals to fix the local power plant, and provided generators and gasoline to those without a power resource. They contracted locals to prepare food for the soldiers and police recruits, and employed local mechanics to fix generators, plows and miscellaneous equipment. They rented empty houses for CF berthing, and renovated abandoned buildings to operate as police stations. CF contracted locals to clean up the trash along the sides of roads: trash was notoriously used to hide IEDs. The most important milestone was the development of democratic elections for local positions of authority: Sheik Jassim was voted head of the tribal council, while a neighboring tribal Sheik, Sheik Abbass, was elected to head the multi-tribal militia police force. CF and the militia police provided such a high level of
security that the residents gained enough confidence to hold a market, re-open their stores, and send their children back to school. All these programs combined built local support for CF, controlled the populace, and gained the information advantage.

In a matter of weeks, ST5 supplied the tribe with a self-reliant police force capable of securing their tribal boundaries while TF 1-9 re-energized the tribe’s economy and set in motion democratic ideals to further the divide with Al Qaeda. News of security, economic prosperity, and an end to Al Qaeda’s destructiveness traveled fast and wide. Albu Soda quickly became a model that neighboring tribes envied. Sheik Jassim joined efforts with Sheik Sattar of the Albu Rishawi tribe in western Ramadi and pledged to form a tribal coalition against Al Qaeda. Tribal sheiks from all over Ramadi, and even some who had fled the country, traveled to see firsthand the progress and made oaths to cooperate with CF. Sheik Jassim’s house became the local conference center. As sheiks and their advisors came to speak with Sheik Jassim and the TF 1-9 Battalion Commander, members of ST5 were there to capitalize on new intelligence resources and pledges of new police recruits. The intelligence overlapped into western Ramadi and even distant towns: Fallujah, Habbinyah, and Baghdad (see Figures 1 & 3).
Operating without boundaries, ST5 apprehended dozens of insurgents including multiple high value individuals and cell leaders throughout the entirety of Ramadi and its outlying areas. In a relatively short period of approximately three months, most of Ramadi and its associated outlying villages were stabilized. However, parts of Ramadi proper were still plagued by pockets of insurgent fanatics willing to die, rather than retreat.

TF 1-9 prioritized the outlying villages and applied similar templates as they moved into other previously Al Qaeda dominated areas and tribes. Eventually, TF 1-9 isolated eastern Ramadi proper by controlling all the surrounding territory. The Ma’laab district of Ramadi was such an insurgent stronghold that TF 1-9 conducted a major clearance offensive, similar to the assault on Fallujah in November of 2004 (see Figure 3). Despite the environmental and situational similarities between Fallujah and Ramadi, there was no mass exodus of civilian non-combatants out of the Ma’laab. This played into the hands of CF providing an opportunity to conduct a census as they conducted their house-to-house assault. Armed with the information of the census, combined with the intelligence pouring in from the local population, CF virtually expunged all remaining insurgents in eastern Ramadi. Additionally, the local populace quickly reported on little
pockets of resistance remaining elsewhere in Ramadi and these were neutralized. CF pushed out of its bases and occupied permanent facilities in downtown Ramadi. CF employed and empowered local Iraqi Policemen and the Iraqi Army to secure the city block by block, opening opportunities for CF Civil Affairs elements to re-invigorate the economy.

CF empowered local security forces and put the Iraqis back in control. CF achieved the essential ingredients required to gain the support of the population: provided security, worked by, with, and though the local population, and built trust and cooperation with the community. For eastern Ramadi, once the Albu Soda tribe aligned with CF, the transformation was relatively fast. The battle for Ramadi had been ongoing for years.

Many men and women, military and civilian, had been killed, wounded, or rendered homeless during the years of fighting in Ramadi. The Anbar Awakening quickly turned Ramadi around, but CF had spent years inching toward success, bravely fighting, and slowly gaining a hard won foothold. Moreover, efforts to maintain the support of the community are still ongoing today and will continue indefinitely by the Iraqi state. Though ultimately successful, a more systematic methodology would have enhanced understanding of the population, provided a common operating picture (COP), and more rapid and efficient insurgent kinetic targeting.

C. THE WAY AHEAD

We believe the methodology we propose here will help tactical level soldiers understand the dynamics of the populations whose support they seek, and lead to similar success more efficiently with less cost of blood and treasure. We recognize that these COIN tactics are almost impossible to conduct in a non-permissive environment where forces are constantly engaged in direct combat; however, as the environment becomes more permissive, we believe our methodology can be utilized to increase the tactical level soldier’s understanding of the environment, to improve strategy, and to better facilitate kinetic combat missions. As a COIN force gains a security foothold and progresses from kinetic combat operations to a non-permissive environment to operations focused on gaining the support of the population, this methodology will also aid in collecting human
intelligence (HUMINT). This methodology shows that by combining the efforts of providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, and empower the locals to handle their own security.
II. COUNTERINSURGENCY 101

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Key to Counterinsurgency: Popular Support

This chapter will discuss widely accepted theories and tenets of insurgency in order to justify the application of our methodology. Our methodology is based on the assumption that the center of gravity for an insurgency and a counterinsurgency is the ability to control the population each side seeks to govern. Understanding that the population holds the resources for either the insurgency or counterinsurgency to be successful leads one to ask the question: how can either side gain the support of the population? Our methodology offers an important first step in winning the support of the population—a heuristic tool to help understand the dynamics of a population, specifically its subgroups, and their needs. By identifying a population’s subgroups and their needs, it is possible to understand which needs are not being met and possibly use this as an opportunity for engagement. It is our opinion that by understanding the dynamics of a population, providing security, working through locals, and building trust and cooperation, that COIN forces can gain the support of the population and defeat an insurgency.

This chapter has two parts. The first section begins with an overview of literature on the causes, characteristics, and tactics of insurgency. It stresses that insurgencies are wars for populations and whichever side gains the support of the population wins the battle. The second section outlines Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model and how it explains the relationship between the state, counter state (insurgency), population, and international actors. Additionally, it explains the advantages and disadvantages of the stakeholders, their goals and tactics, and likely mistakes. The goal behind explaining the “Mystic Diamond” is to help the reader better understand the dynamics of insurgency and also point out where our methodology fits into the COIN process.
B. WHAT IS INSURGENCY?

1. An Internal Struggle for Control

Insurgency describes the violent struggle between an internal faction and the ruling government. An insurgency starts from an idea or grievance and grows, producing leaders who inspire or coerce the population to follow them or at least remain neutral while they gain resources, grow, and conduct anti-government operations (Galula, 2006, p. 2). Writing in the 1950s, French insurgency expert David Galula describes insurgency as, “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order” (2006, p. 2). His description highlights that the struggle is enduring and formulated to break the government’s will and popular support.

Generally speaking, there are two main motivators that lead to insurgency: the population’s perception of one or more injustices committed by the government, or a difference in ideologies between a group within the population and the state (O’Neill, 2005, p. 19). Essentially, insurgencies are designed to combat governments that do not meet the needs of the population, have alienated some portion of the population, or have an opposing ideology (O’Neill, 2005, p. 19). For example, Mao Tse Tung describes an environment ripe for insurgency, writing: “A potential revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to ensure at least a minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens” (1965, p. 8). In every state there exists some counter state element that disagrees with the ruling government; the extent to which they gain support from the population determines whether or not the movement will evolve into an insurgency.

Insurgencies can also be motivated by differing ideologies. O’Neill further develops this idea: “Non-ruling groups may resort to violence to change existing social, economic, or political policies that they believe discriminate against particular groups (e.g., ethnic, religious, racial, or economic) in the population” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 19). For example, communism played a large role in the insurgencies in Vietnam and Latin America from the 1950s-1970s... In today’s world, Western societies face a global insurgency being waged by proponents of political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.
Counterinsurgencies are fundamentally different from conventional wars and require different tools and tactics. Conventional war is defined by two or more states’ militaries engaging in combat with the goal of defeating the other’s military and compelling its government to change its policies\textsuperscript{2}. John Nagl describes this difference between conventional warfare and counter insurgency saying:

> While the primary challenge of conventional warfare is massing firepower at the appropriate place and time to destroy the enemy, the key to success in counterinsurgency is massing intelligence derived from the local population to identify the enemy; the counterinsurgent is literally dying for that information (Galula, 2006, p. vii).

In conventional war, armies are focused on gaining a geographic advantage that enables them to destroy their adversary’s forces. Nagl explains, on the other hand, that, “Key terrain in an insurgency is not a physical space, but the political acquiescence of the people who inhabit that space” (Galula, 2006, p. ix).

It is important to not only to know the difference between conventional warfare and insurgency, but also some nuances of terminology commonly associated with insurgency. Defining terms such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, people’s war, and low intensity conflict is a slippery slope. There is no consensus on an exact definition, but for the sake of this thesis, terrorism and guerilla warfare are tactics that insurgents can incorporate into their struggle; however, they do not mean insurgency. The word terrorism is used to describe operations conducted to terrorize the population and cause a reaction from the state that further alienates the state from the population (Hoffman, 1998, p. 43). Guerilla warfare is used to describe insurgent operations that indirectly attack conventional forces; not force on force focused operations designed to attrit enemy’s forces (McCormick, 1999, pp. 23-33). Similarly, terms such as people’s war, revolution, rebellion, and low intensity conflict are used as synonyms for insurgency (McCormick, 1999, pp. 23-33). There are nuances and differences in definitions that

\textsuperscript{2} However, it is important to keep in mind that conventional war can also be used to describe when an insurgency goes head to head in attrition warfare with the government’s security forces. This may occur in the later stages of an insurgency when the counter state has grown large enough and acquired conventional military means to directly attack the government’s forces as in the example of the Tet Offensive (1968).
academics can argue, but for the sake of this thesis and its brief overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency the terms people’s war, revolution, rebellion, and low intensity conflict will be used synonymously.

Much has been written about counterinsurgency, but despite the level of attention it has received, there is no controversy over what is at the heart of the matter: controlling the population. Historical and acclaimed academics such as Clausewitz, Mao Tse Tung, Nathan Leites, Charles Wolf, David Galula, Gordon McComick and many others agree that the struggle in an insurgency is a competition for the control of the population. In the Forward to David Galula’s book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, John Nagl states, “An insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims” (Galula, 2006, p. viii). An insurgency wants to overthrow the government, but it cannot do this without the support or at least neutrality of the population (Galula, 2006, p. 53). Mao Tse Tung says, “The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people” (1966, p. 260). This thesis focuses on the competition for the population and explains a methodology designed to help counterinsurgent forces understand the dynamics of a population and identify opportunities for the state to engage and “win” the population.

In an insurgency, a population has three choices: side with the insurgency, remain neutral, or side with the government (Galula, 2006, p. 53). Galula discusses this relationship: “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause” (Galula, 2006, p. 53). The first two choices result in advantages to the insurgent. He must only remain invisible to the state to survive, and this provides him time in order to sway or coerce the population to his favor. Conversely, if the population sides with the government then the insurgency will likely never gain traction or if it has already gained momentum it will be quickly stopped. Mao further puts the importance of the population in context saying:

This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental (1966, p. 260).
Therefore, the key question that both opposing sides must attempt to answer is: how do they control a population?

The tactics used to wage the insurgent’s war vary and may transform with time and as the insurgency grows or wanes (McCormick, Horton, Harrison, 2007, pp. 322-323). Situations similar to what Mao describes may be present all over the world, but it takes motivated leadership to capitalize on the ripe environment and grow an insurgency (Galula, 2006, p. 2). If it grows large enough to counter the government, an insurgency may even take on the form of a conventional war, but only at the moment the insurgency has reached full maturity. O’Neill lays out insurgent tactics writing:

Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (2005, p. 15).

As an insurgency develops and grows, the insurgent forces usually engage in terrorist and guerrilla operations designed to produce a reaction from the government’s security forces: these cause collateral damage and alienate the general population and further justify the insurgent’s cause (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 48). All too often states are more than willing to fall into the insurgent’s trap and use heavy-handed violence to respond (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 36). Again, this only furthers the insurgents cause and supports their propaganda (Leites and Wolf, 1970, pp. 36, 55). It is easy to read historical accounts of insurgency and counter insurgency and point at ill-conceived operations, but the purpose of this thesis is to help defeat insurgency and therefore study properly executed operations and engagements.

Knowing the insurgent’s tactics is half the battle for the state, the other half is knowing how and when to respond and in what manner. The goal in a counterinsurgency should be to gain the support of the population so that they will disavow the insurgents and deny them safe haven, resources, and manpower. Security forces must take every precaution to limit collateral damage—inferring the population or its resources—when conducting kinetic operations. They should focus on getting the support of the people in order to increase the actionable intelligence. Nagl says, “The government should target
the insurgents armed with specific, local information derived from long and close
association with the population” (Galula, 2006, p. viii).

Once insurgent elements have been removed or pushed out of an area, that area
must remain a priority to the counterinsurgency. It is natural for a military to want to
chase fleeing insurgents, but they must not if it requires giving up control of recently
cleared areas. Galula explains:

The problem is how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent
forces will be free to operate elsewhere. This can be achieved only with
the support of the population…The populace, therefore, becomes the
objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy (2006, p. 52).

Again, counter insurgency theory experts stipulate that the civilian population is the heart
of the contest between insurgent and state; therefore, it follows that engaging the
population is the critical component of counterinsurgency strategy. As insurgents are able
to maintain dark networks, invisible to the state’s countering forces, it is incumbent upon
the countering force to engage the population, so as to learn the whereabouts of the
elusive insurgents. Engaging the population takes many forms, but at the general level it
implies the use of various incentives and disincentives to sway the population and
convince it that their future lies with the state, rather than with the insurgents.

Counterinsurgents face a dangerous temptation when fighting an insurgency. The
state, which has a force advantage, is naturally inclined to engage in an asymmetric war
that plays into the hand of the insurgency (Galula, 2006, pp. 3-4, 44-45). However, with
the right focus of effort, counterinsurgency can be successful. All elements of a nation’s
power must be aimed at gaining the support of the population, or in other words massing
the political will of the population. This can be achieved by working through local
leaders, and building trust and cooperation. Military operations should only be conducted
when they support the goals of gaining better intelligence for fighting the insurgency,
separating the population from the insurgents, and minimizing collateral damage. In
order to accomplish this it is essential to understand the relationship dynamics between
the state, population, insurgency, and outside actors.
C. DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. Competition for Control of the Population

An insurgency starts from nothing. In order to grow it must capitalize on opportunities afforded to it by the state as it lacks control of the insurgents’ environment (McCormick 1999, pp. 25-26). In order to grow, the counter state must control the population where they can, maintain anonymity with the state, and use their freedom of maneuver and secrecy to recruit, grow, and spread their propaganda (McCormick, 1999, pp. 25-26). In order to win the population over, the state must extend its power to the village level and deny the counter state’s freedom of maneuver. Moreover, state needs to be at the village level to know the population and its vulnerabilities. This will help the state identify social and infrastructure needs and will likely produce intelligence resources to better fight the insurgency. Hopefully, if the state is able to push its influence down to the village level it will not have to kinetically fight the insurgency; but rather, it will fight the insurgency by understanding the needs of the population and attempting to address these needs.

Security is the essential ingredient that will allow the state to extend its influence. Kinetic operations are sometimes required to break into non-permissive environments. Kinetic operations are a way to gain an initial foothold of security, but it is then vital that the COIN force moves to a strategy designed to gain intelligence, address civil grievances, and conduct precision raids on insurgent holdouts. Again, in a COIN environment, violence is a way in, but not a means to an ends. Depending upon the amount of civilian buy-in to the government, the state must control the populace through coercion (Leites and Wolfe, 1970, pp. 11, 33). In this case coercion means using force, threatening force, denying resources, or threatening the denial of resources to gain the compliance of a person or group; even threatening to publicly announce one’s involvement with CF could be a tool to coerce (Schelling, 1966, pp. 4-5,167,172) (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 33). Furthermore, the amount of the population controlled by the state is directly related to the amount they do not control; the amount that a state does not control provides the opportunity for the insurgency to attempt to maneuver and gain control (McCormick, 2007). Thus, controlling the population is a zero sum game.
Kinetic operations and coercion are not a long term strategy, nor are they sustainable, but they are a means to gain an initial foothold and help COIN forces provide the all important security that is required to gather intelligence from the populace and build genuine consensus and security. Bottom line, it is essential that the regime in power extend its control down to the lowest levels; the state must have instruments of control down through the national, provincial, city, and village levels. Again, this depth and breadth of control is directly related to the amount of unforced support the general populace has for the government (Leites and Wolfe, 1970, p. 11).

This process and dynamic relationship is illustrated in Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond,” which outlines the struggle for power between a state and counter state, their relationship to the population, and the position of international actors (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).

Figure 4. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond

To understand the “Mystic Diamond,” it is vital to highlight the inherent advantages that each side has. The state typically has an overwhelming advantage of force; conversely, the counter state has an information advantage (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13). The state has government and military infrastructure, money, and manning; whereas, the counter state is trying to attain support: specifically, people, guns, and money (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13). Due to the nature of the
clandestine world from which the counter state must grow, it has an information advantage within the immediate populace (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13). The counter state controls how overt and public they want to be according to their insurgent strategy (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13). The natural disadvantage of a large bureaucratic organization is a lack of ground level intelligence. Ultimately, the people are the key for either the counter state to gain momentum and eventual control, or the state to suppress the uprising and maintain control (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).

The goal for both the counter state and the state is to control the population. The state and counter state must engage in tactics to first gain control of the population represented by Tactic 1 on the “Mystic Diamond” diagram (McCormick, 2007). Once either side has engaged the population, they will receive feedback for their actions. This feedback can be positive or negative. The state is looking for feedback in the form of intelligence, while the counter state is hoping for support generally characterized as people, guns, and money. The feedback loop is ongoing throughout the entire process (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).

Once feedback is received from the populace, the state or counter state can engage in Tactic 2 (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13). Tactic 2 focuses on attacking the mechanisms by which the opponent controls the population. The goal for the state and counter state is to sever control mechanisms established in Tactic 1. Not until Tactics 1 and 2 have been successfully completed is it advantageous for either side to engage in Tactic 3, directly targeting the opposing enemy. If either side engages in direct force on force combat without good intelligence then they will cause collateral damage, alienate the population, and give credit to their adversary’s propaganda and cause.

As history shows, many states and insurgencies have received external support from international players. Tactics 4 and 5 address the international support lines and infrastructure that external actors supply, such as logistics line for importing arms, ammunition, and advisors. If attacking the logistical lines of support from international stakeholders isn’t effective then the state can attack the actual international players. If a state is bogged down in trying to suppress an insurgency it will probably be reluctant to
engage in war with an international player, but the option does exist. A prime example of this is the war in Iraq today. Iran is providing support to the insurgency in many ways. CF are attempting to engage the logistics lines of support, but are reluctant to directly engage Iran. However, if either side has effectively conducted Tactics 1, 2, and 3, and taken advantage of the feedback they have received from via their control of the population, then Tactics 4 and 5 should be easy or unnecessary. In essence, at this point the state controls the information, has cut off the support from the population, and is able to directly combat the insurgency. External support for the insurgency from international actors can be easily identified and denied with the support and information from the population.

All too often, states mismanage counterinsurgencies and try to directly combat insurgency without the support of the population; this costs the state both popular support and good intelligence (Galula, 2006, pp. 3-4, 44-45). Conventional militaries are not designed to operate in the realm of the insurgent process because they are trained to conduct direct action combat missions and are kinetically inclined. Conventional militaries are created to defend their homeland and attack an enemy’s. They tend to focus their training on military tactics that pertain to directly fighting the enemy in a war of attrition. Because of this focus, it is far stretch to change their mentality to be focused on gaining the support of the local population. If a conventional military overreacts to insurgent attacks then it will likely cause collateral damage. The insurgency will use the collateral damage for propaganda and further alienate the state from the population. This happens all too often, so it is important for a conventional military to know its own tendencies and have tactical patience while they try to gain support from the population and accurate, timely intelligence. Good intelligence concerning the enemy allows the state to minimize collateral damage while increasing their effectiveness in combating the insurgency.

The ground-up principles of controlling the populace diagramed in McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” have been operationalized in the counterinsurgency efforts being waged in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and emphasized here with respect to CF in Ramadi, Iraq (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13) (Wilson, 2006, pp. 2-12). There are multiple
reasons for success in Al Anbar, but one key tenet of counterinsurgency that has been exemplified is gaining the support of the population. After gaining this support, Coalition Forces attained actionable intelligence, which allowed it to capture, kill or drive out the insurgents. CF could have done this quicker and more effectively if it had engaged the population sooner. The following chapter will explain what we believe to be the two critical qualities essential for beginning a counterinsurgency campaign: understanding the population’s group affiliations, and assessing its needs / motivation. Our methodology will directly affect Tactic 1 of McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” and help a COIN force gain an understanding of the dynamics of the population and their needs. With this knowledge we hope that the COIN force can identify and capitalize on opportunities for engagement and gain the support of the population.
III. POPULATION 101

A. ACADEMIC STUDIES: USEFUL FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING POPULATIONS

Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy.

Major General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, CJTF-76, Afghanistan, 2006 (Kipp et al., 2006).

The previous section reviewed contemporary counter-insurgency theories to emphasize the central important role played by the population. Ultimately, counter-insurgency is a struggle for control of the population, or, as insurgency expert Gordon McCormick frequently states, “The population is the prize.” (McCormick, 2007) As such, it then follows that the next step is to understand the intricacies of the targeted population, dissect it, and to determine how to “win” it.

This section will briefly explore the social sciences of anthropology, sociology, and psychology to introduce the reader to the academic fields that have been developed to make sense of populations. There is a large body of scholarship in these social sciences. A plethora of detailed information exists to allow a better understanding the nuances of populations, and their interaction. Theories and literature cover a diverse array of subjects from the Freud’s concept of the id and ego to Marx concept of class struggles (Freud, 1923) (Marx, 1847). For the purpose of this thesis, we have chosen to focus on the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology to extrapolate general theories useful to the tactical operator. The end-state of this endeavor is to explore the utility and methodology of each approach to help frame our pragmatic approach to understanding a designated population. In turn, this analysis allows the state to form a strategy toward achieving the critical relationship it must establish with a population.

While these academic approaches each offer understandable explanations as to how human populations form, interrelate, communicate and exchange, this thesis argues
that all explanations must be considered holistically in order to reach and influence each subgroup through an overarching strategy. These viewpoints in mind, the rest of this section will discuss the sciences of population as applicable to this method.

1. **Anthropology**

Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender (FM 3-24, 2006. Section 1-80).

Recent emphasis on counter-insurgency, peace-keeping operations (PKO), and stability operations have lead the United States Government (USG), international organizations and non-governmental organizations to seek better understanding of their geographical and human environments. These efforts have lead many to the field of anthropology.

According to the University of California at Los Angeles Department of Anthropology website:

Anthropology, the broadest of the social sciences, is the study of humankind. One of the strengths of anthropology as a discipline is its "holistic" or integrative approach; it links the life sciences and the humanities and has strong ties with disciplines ranging from biology and psychology to linguistics, political science, and the fine arts (University of California Los Angeles, 2008).

Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines anthropology as, “the science of human beings; especially: the study of human beings and their ancestors through time and space and in relation to physical character, environmental and social relations, and culture” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). Compared to sociology, anthropology emphasizes the importance of cultural understanding. Anthropologists’ methodology involves in-depth field research investigating their targeted population through interview, observation, archeological research, biological research, psychology, linguistics, and religion. The methodology is designed to reveal patterns, relationships, and values within the studied population, and relies on the scientific and other research methods to achieve its results. It should be stressed here that anthropological approaches vary widely depending upon the researcher, his background, and intent of the study.
In 2003, two years after intervention into Afghanistan and shortly after the Iraq invasion, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) set out to respond to field requests for better “cultural intelligence.” Their answer was to employ civilian anthropologists to seek non-military advice on what make local populations tick. In 2007, DoD deployed the first Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded with U.S. Combat Brigades. The Human Terrain System (HTS) is designed to develop a working knowledge of U.S. areas of interest, to advise individual soldiers, field commanders, and policy-makers, and maintain a cultural database (Kipp et al, 2006)(Rhode, 2007). With respect to the consideration of cultural data in operational planning, this program has been compared to the U.S. Marine Corps Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program developed during the Vietnam War, in which, the Marine Corps created an interagency through, by, with program to pacify southern Vietnamese Provinces (Kipp et al, 2006).

The employment of anthropologists by the USG is not new, and is not without controversy. Criticism arises from academics who view the use of anthropology to influence populations along a USG agenda as unethical; as an un-objective lens on studied populations (Beyerstein, 2007). We include the controversy in this section not to dissuade the reader from this valuable resource, to advise him of the friction he may encounter in certain applications of anthropology to government operations.

The methodology presented in this thesis is not designed to replace anthropological expertise or endeavor. Rather, access to anthropologists will increase the operator’s knowledge of his working environment, and can be used or set aside as necessary. Anthropology is therefore a complimentary effort to this method and should be viewed positively.

2. Sociology

Sociology emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries as philosophers sought to understand the inner-workings of society. It is defined by Merriam-Webster as, “the science of society, social institutions, and social relationships; specifically: the systematic study of the development, structure, interaction, and collective behavior of organized groups of human beings” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). This social science is another broad umbrella under which populations are understood, and arguably one of the most holistic,
yet scientific, of the social sciences. Under this umbrella, many notable sociologists have developed theories designed to better enable us to understand dynamics between people, and to aid the layman in making sense of complex human structures. According to the University of North Carolina’s Sociology Department, “At its most basic, sociology is an attempt to understand and explain the way that individuals and groups interact within a society” (University of North Carolina, 2007). For our purpose here, we hope to isolate characteristics useful in understanding a designated population. The following paragraphs will highlight the efforts of some of the most noteworthy sociologists, and their contributions to the field.

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) is described as one of the founders of sociology. In the earliest days of sociology, thinkers, such as Durkheim, attempted to apply a scientific methodological approach to understanding societal change. During this era, philosophers such as Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx each contributed to the field in their attempts to explain the world around them. At a very basic level, this scientific approach is the method described in this thesis. We argue the need to collect data on a designated population, to analyze the data, and then deduce what is driving it away from the state, and toward rebellion. In understanding the structure and motivations of the population we study, and will then attempt to influence that population.

Durkheim was one of several thinkers to create the concept of “Functionalism,” focusing on the structure and workings of a society. Functionalism is the oldest, and still the dominant, theoretical perspective in sociology and many other social sciences. This perspective is built upon twin emphases: application of the scientific method to the objective social world and use of an analogy between the individual organism and society (Grinnell, 2008). This theory will have great importance as we proceed in describing the population engagement methodology outlined in this thesis.

The next useful theory related to sociology is “Positivism” –a theory derived from the studies of early sociologist Auguste Compte. Positivism is the belief that one can objectively study humanity utilizing the scientific method, and that this approach will minimize personal bias. Others contend that this approach can never remove bias, or that a strict scientific method cannot be applied effectively against a dynamic, human
organization. While controversial, positivism is a similar approach to our methodology in that it stresses the importance of taking an analytical approach, and in maintaining objectivity.

The last important theory to emerge from sociology is the emphasis on a base unit. As physicists attempt to isolate the smallest, baseline element possible, so do sociologists, though in different ways. Some sociologists emphasize the individual. Some stress the primary group or family. Others still focus on the qualities that make up a simple base-line group. Grinell writes, “The second emphasis [the first being functionalism], on the organic unity of society, leads functionalists to speculate about needs which must be met for a social system to exist, as well as the ways in which social institutions satisfy those needs.” (Grinnell, 2008, p. 1). This focus on the “organic” societal unit will also emerge as an important point in this thesis. Importantly, our thesis argues that the most important unit is the “sub-group”, which is the intersection of individual or societal need, and group affiliation. We will describe the idea of sub-group later in the next section.

3. Psychology

According to the American Psychological Association (APA):
Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior. The discipline embraces all aspects of the human experience — from the functions of the brain to the actions of nations, from child development to care for the aged. In every conceivable setting from scientific research centers to mental health care services, ‘the understanding of behavior’ is the enterprise of psychologists” (American Psychological Association, 2008).

With respect to this thesis, the effort toward “the understanding of behavior” is why psychology bears importance in our methodology. Though the focus of this thesis is the sub-group, collective individual behavioral choices are critically important in counter-insurgency strategy.

Topics contemporarily considered psychological in nature were first explored in the fields of philosophy and religion. The concept of “soul” and the many variables thought to affect human behavior have intrigued humans since time immemorial. Following the age of enlightenment, psychology developed around the same time as other social sciences in the attempt to specifically isolate and predict cause and effect of human
behavior. In the late 19th century, Wilhelm Wundt founded the first psychology department at the University of Leipzi g, Germany. Van Wagner writes that Wundt outlined many of the major connection between the science of physiology and the study of human thought and behavior (Van Wagner, 2008). Psychology has since split into scores of sub-fields, from clinical research on experimental subjects to understanding social behavior broadly.

Psychologists employ variations of scientific methods to investigate individuals and societies, and to confirm or deny generated hypotheses about behavior. Patterns of individual behavior analysis and background can be used to predict individual motivation and behavior. As will be addressed in later sections, psychology’s importance in counterinsurgency is to better understand behavioral motivation. While group influence on individual choice is a critical component of societal behavior, choice, ultimately, is an individual matter. In a COIN environment, particular individuals, such as Tribal Elders, politicians, and charismatic persons can maintain great sway in influencing the population around them.

Psychology is also known for its controversy. Theories such as those of Sigmund Freud and Abraham Maslow remain controversial, and have clouded the legitimacy of the field for some who view it skeptically. Psychological operations by the military, intelligence agencies, and other government entities remain ethically controversial due to their real or perceived deceptive nature. This thesis does not endorse or dismiss any particular theory, but argues that psychological analysis is an important component of overall population analysis. Emotion, trust, and desire, often considered ‘touchy-feely’ aspects of human decision-making, can be critical influencers on an individual’s decision to aid the state or the insurgent, and is why the field of psychology has been stressed here.

4. Summary of Academic Review

This section has reviewed three of the most prominent academic fields in the study of a population. Though each field promotes a different approach to analyzing a designated population, all have relevance in a holistic approach. As operators struggle to gather information about the human terrain in their respective area of operation, experts
in each field will have important insight and contributions to the picture. We encourage operators to consult experts from any of these fields to help shed light onto the population they seek to influence.

B. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

With respect to population analysis, this thesis will focus on two specific aspects: individual / societal needs, and group affiliation. The terminology used to describe populations from social science, military, and everyday perspectives can make discussion confusing. Before continuing discussion of this thesis’s methodology, it is imperative we establish a vernacular useful for the rest of the discussion of this thesis, the model, and the approach we outline in this thesis. In particular, we will begin by defining the words most commonly referenced in this thesis, and relate them to other popularly used terminology.

1. Dictionary Definitions

Where applicable, we wish to utilize the most broadly accepted and commonly used terminology possible, hence the reason we have included dictionary definitions here.

Population: The broadest of our definitions, we adopt Merriam-Webster’s definition of population 1b as it relates to a defined geographic area or formed human organization, “the total of individuals occupying an area or making up a whole” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). Specifically, we mean to indicate the total human population in a demarcated geographic area, as defined by international bodies, a USG official, a military commander, or as understood by the inhabitants. We use the word population to simply indicate a geographically based sum of individuals. A population consists of individuals who reside, work, or transit a specified or an unspecific geographic region, such as a city, valley, neighborhood, or historic lands. In COIN literature, the word populace is commonly used synonymously.

Individual: An individual is one human being; the base element of a population. In Social Network Analysis, a related but separate approach from the methodology presented here, defines an individual as a “node” (Scott, 2007).

Group / Sub-group: The overall premise of our methodology is based on identifying a population’s sub-groups. We broadly adopt Merriam-Webster’s 2a
definition of a group as, “a number of individuals assembled together or having some unifying relationship” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). We further define a sub-group as a smaller portion of a group that shares common individual and societal needs. A sub-group, therefore, is a number of individuals within a group, assembled in a smaller group having some unifying relationship or common ground.

**Affiliation:** Merriam-Webster’s definitions 1a and 1b best define what we mean by the term affiliation, “1 a: to bring or receive into close connection as a member or branch b: to associate as a member <affiliates herself with the local club>” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). Here we define affiliation as a voluntary or involuntary membership to a recognized or outlined group.

**Need:** We also adopt Merriam-Webster’s definitions 2a and 2b of need, as they apply well to individuals and populations alike “2 a: a lack of something requisite, desirable, or useful b: a physiological or psychological requirement for the well-being of an organism” (Merriam Webster, 2008).

2. **Social Network Analysis**

Though this thesis is not focused on social network analysis (SNA), some SNA terminology will be used here, where applicable. Populations are composed of individual people, or *nodes*. Nodes are connected by *links*, representing a relationship to another node. Additionally, each node has particular *attributes*, or qualities that make it distinct from other nodes in the population. Lastly, subgroups, the focus of this thesis, are groupings of nodes; each affiliated with other nodes by shared qualities, though not necessarily direct relations (Scott, 2007).

3. **Military**

The U.S. military too, has developed a vernacular for referencing players and phenomenon surrounding counter-insurgency theory. According to the most recent military manuals regarding counter-insurgency, a vernacular has been developed to identify specific players in the insurgency and the population. Similarly, the U.S. Army has developed the following vernacular, which we will use here:

A *society* can be defined as a population, whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common
culture, and share a sense of identity. Here, society can be used synonymously with population or populace.

A group is two or more people regularly interacting on the basis of shared expectations of others’ behavior and who have interrelated statuses and roles. A social structure includes a variety of groups. These groups may be racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal. There may also be other kinship-based groups.

A race is a human group that defines itself or is defined by other groups as different by virtue of innate physical characteristics. Biologically, there is no such thing as race among human beings; race is a social category.

An ethnic group is a human community whose learned cultural practices, language, history, ancestry, or religion distinguish them from others. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from other groups in a society and are recognized as such by others. Religious groups may be subsets of larger ethnic groups. An ethnic group may contain members of different religions.

Tribes are generally defined as autonomous, genealogically structured groups in which the rights of individuals are largely determined by their ancestry and membership in a particular lineage. Tribes are essentially adaptive social networks organized by extended kinship and descent with common needs for physical and economic security (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. Section 3-25).

With respect to geographical vernacular, the military again has several key terms:

The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

The area of interest is area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02) (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. Section 3-25).

This section reviewed commonly used jargon related to populations to inform the reader of the terminology that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. While some of the language is common, it is important to establish a base point early before discussing more complex issues. The next section will begin the analytical portions of our thesis, in breaking down a populace to its base components.
C. BREAKING DOWN A POPULATION: WHAT MAKES IT TICK?

This section introduces the two major criteria used in our analysis methodology: needs/motivation and group affiliation. Humans are universally motivated by the need to survive. Of course, survival is relative, as perceived by the individual based on psychological, physical, and social needs. It therefore follows that in a counter-insurgency campaign it is critical to understand the psychological, physical, and social needs of the targeted population.

First and foremost, we tend to our immediate needs such as hunger, resource allocation for our families, and strategies to better our situation based on our perception of the future. At the micro level, individual desires and decisions matter a great deal. At the macro level, however, social desires are not necessarily the sum of aggregated individual desires. Social needs / motivation often differ from what an isolated individual might express. The importance of identifying a society’s needs / motivations cannot be underestimated, for they shape the population’s behavior in determining who will best meet those needs, the state or the insurgent. In addition to these desires, group dynamics play heavily into group choice, and are the second criteria for our analysis.

Our second criteria, group affiliation, affects the way we perceive the world, the way we interact with the rest of society, and how we gain information. In this section, we argue that such needs and group affiliation fall into several important categories, and should be the focus of a COIN effort determined to gain and maintain the support of the population. In this effort, we attempt to put forth a simple methodology that accounts for each of the major influences effecting a designated population.

1. Needs / Motivation: Why People Do What They Do…

The first of our two major tools for analysis will be needs / motivation. These criteria, which will make up the Y axis of our model, attempt to account for the issues of greatest importance to a population, and what drives it to make decisions, to motivate, and to shape action. We often view populations caught in the middle of an insurgency as primitive. While some of these societies may, in fact, lack the infrastructure and organization deemed requisite by the developed world, we submit that overall human needs / motivations are roughly the same globally, though with a cultural
In order to keep our approach simple and memorable, we have broken needs/motivation into three broad categories that we believe account for the general needs of a population: Psychological, Infrastructure, and Governance.

**a. Psychological**

Accounting for psychological needs is fuzzy. There are few metrics by which we can measure psychological needs. Rather, operators in the field, in enduring contact with their designated population will be able, through discussion, observation, and cultural awareness, to determine if the emotionally driven needs of the population are satiated. We argue that psychological needs are a key component of a population’s motivations, and are a vulnerability to be satisfied by either the state, or the insurgent.

Psychological theory is generally developed to explain behavior at the individual level. However, we find these theories useful for categorizing motivation at our level of analysis, the subgroup, as well. The following theorists have outlined psychological needs they believe explain human behavior. While we do not subscribe wholly to either of the theories outlined below, we find them a helpful place for operators to begin their assessment of their population’s psychological needs.

(1) **Maslow.** Arguably the most famous psychologist to study individual motivation was Abraham Maslow, who developed his “Hierarchy of Needs” in 1943. In his article, Maslow argues that there is a progressive stepladder of needs that must be addressed, more or less, in succession in order to get to a better or “higher” state of being. He categorized these needs into the five following groups, “physiological, safety, love, esteem, and the need for self-actualization” (Maslow, 1943).
Physiological needs are the most primitive, and include basic health, food, sleep, and other bodily functions. The premise here is that as long as individuals have bodily needs, those needs will supersede other needs and motivational factors. According to Maslow, therefore, physiological needs are the most important needs to address if you wish to enable individuals to focus on other matters.

Safety needs encompass more social aspects, such as comfort in one’s surroundings and security in what Maslow emphasizes as a “…schedule of a kind, some sort of routine, something that can be counted upon, not only for the present but also far into the future” (Maslow, 1943, p. 377). The theme of a predictable future will also re-emerge as we discuss the establishment of trust in later sections. Maslow argues that safety needs also lead individuals to seek solace in a religious or philosophical doctrine, anything that provides a stable environment. Maslow writes, “The tendency to have some religion or world-philosophy that organizes the universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in part motivated by safety-seeking” (Maslow, 1943, p. 378). Maslow contends that the need for the feeling of safety can be an overriding motivator, putting other interests on the back burner.

Love is the next higher level in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Maslow writes, “If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified, then there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs…” (Maslow,
1943, p. 381). This level of need pushes individuals to seek belonging, and a sense that others care for them. Such needs are satisfied by family or social organizations in which the individual is made to feel a member.

*Esteem needs* follow the need for love. Here, beyond belonging, individuals seek to fulfill the need to feel important, in their own mind, or in the minds of others. Maslow writes, “By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that which is soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others” (Maslow, 1943, p. 382). Once the lower level needs are satiated, Maslow contends that humans continue to seek more that they currently have, in this case a feeling of accomplishment or gratitude from internal and external sources.

*Self-Actualization* is Maslow’s highest level of need. This desire, in Maslow’s hierarchy, manifests itself to give the individual greater meaning. We view this need similar to that of a desire to gain fulfillment in an activity or passion. Maslow writes, “What a man can be, he must be” (Maslow, 1943, p. 383). This highest level, in Maslow’s theory, is most evident in artists, social movement leaders, clergy, or those who dedicate themselves passionately to a particular cause.

We also argue, though not addressed directly in Maslow’s paper that desire for fame infamy, or legacy may also fit into several categories. It could be argued that the desire to secure one’s place in history is an example of an esteem need. One could also argue that such a need could fit into self-actualization, or perhaps above the hierarchy outlined by Maslow. Whether as hero or celebrity, the need for fame is a powerful motivational force to be considered.

(2) Reiss. Other contemporary psychologists contend that there is not a hierarchy of needs, but that individuals have motivation to satisfy multiple desires simultaneously. Steven Reiss suggests that humans have 16 intrinsic motives that drive them. Reiss writes, “Motives are reasons people hold for initiating and performing voluntary behavior” (Reiss, 2004, p. 179). A USA Today article, written in 2001, summarizes Reiss’ research stating:

After conducting studies involving more than 6,000 people, Reiss has found that 16 basic desires guide nearly all meaningful behavior: power,
independence, curiosity, acceptance, order, saving, honor, idealism, social contact, family, status, vengeance, romance, eating, physical exercise, and tranquility (USA Today-Reiss, 2001).

Reiss’ theory argues that there are multitudes of motivating factors in an individual’s life, but that each person selects among them and prioritizes them differently. According to Reiss, some may forgo basic physiological needs such as eating to satiate acceptance, as we might find in an anorexic Hollywood actress. The main point in Reiss’ theory is that while we are all driven by similar motivating factors, there is no recipe for how those factors may play out in any one individual (Reiss, 2008).

(3) Academic Debate. The debate amongst psychologists over needs and motivations continues today and is based on various schools of thought, experiments, or beliefs regarding the degree to which psychology is nature or nurture or a mixture of both. Though he caveats his own hierarchy toward the end of his paper, Maslow’s approach postulates that one cannot ascend to higher levels of need until the more basic needs are met. He therefore maintains that satiating needs, from a third party standpoint, should be prioritized from basic to complex. Reiss, on the other hand, argues that there are many (16 to be precise) motivating factors that drive human behavior and that different people prioritize them differently (Reiss, 2008).

This section was designed to aid the operator in his population analysis by introducing him to popular theories regarding human motivation. We do not advocate any particular theory, but suggest that operators pay most attention to the categories put forth by Maslow, Reiss, and other psychologists in the field. That said, in developing this methodology, we appreciate Maslow’s hierarchy for its elegance, simplicity, and completeness. Those new to psychology will find his five categories a bit easier to digest, and less apt to confuse, rather than simplify analysis. We further recommend that operators use their cultural knowledge of their population to apply psychological analysis as they deem adequate for their specific situation.

b. Infrastructure

The most obvious needs are those we can see. In our engagement with foreign populations, we are quick to identify tangible needs such as unpaved roads or a
lack of lights after sunset. In the COIN fight, one of our greatest advantages is our ability to bring resources to bear against these needs. Tangible infrastructure development is as obvious to a designated population as the lack of infrastructure is to us in the developed world, and is, therefore, is a critical part of satiating the needs / motivation of a designated population.

Some aspects of infrastructure are obvious to all. Transportation infrastructure such as roads, port systems, and railways are visible to average operators. However, more specialized needs, such as bridges, storm water runoff, and general urban planning can require additional expertise.

Power production and electricity are paramount to a developed population. Lights extend daylight, enabling extended productivity, and illuminating streets for safety and security. Electricity opens doors to new industry, while also allowing for development of modern communications resources.

Health issues can be more difficult to detect. Stagnant water, non-potable water, and water delivery systems can be critical for improved infrastructure and to satiate infrastructure needs.

Community service infrastructure should also be analyzed. Community centers, hospitals, medical clinics, judicial facilities, law enforcement facilities, education facilities, and governance facilities facilitate general governance, which is the topic of the next section.

Infrastructure is an important, but complex issue in COIN. We tend to attempt to replicate our own society when engaging developing populations and almost immediately begin physical infrastructure projects. They are obvious, tangible, and measurable, but they are not everything. Few insurgencies have begun over a lack of physical infrastructure, and insurgencies cannot be defeated by physical infrastructure alone. Tangible infrastructure is the physical cornerstone of a developed society, but we warn the operator to exercise caution in implementation. Not all change is progress. Developments in physical infrastructure are not without controversy. An engineering assessment that concludes that water should be diverted through a particular neighborhood can raise, or resurrect, tribal or ethnic conflicts between local residents.
Inadvertent favoritism can be counter-productive. Physical projects, which stand as billboards for progress, can also be attacked or destroyed by insurgents, demonstrating a lack of control by the state. As a last caution, physical projects can be expensive, time consuming, and devour physical and human resources. We therefore include this cautionary note when attempting to satiate physical infrastructure needs. It is paramount that the implementation of any strategy to satiate needs be executed through, by, and with local representatives, and balanced against all other variables.

c. Governance

According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), “The concept of "governance" is not new. It is as old as human civilization. Simply put "governance" means: the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance” (UNESCO, 2008). As societies have expanded over time, they have elected or looked to a group of individuals to guide, direct, or coordinate them, to allow more fluid interaction within the population. Populations in the middle of insurgency often suffer from a lack of governance, in that the existing representation or government lacks the knowledge, goals, will, or resources necessary to bring about a satisfactorily stable society. A lack of governance in a given population will preclude its capacity to satiate the needs of the people, and governance must be established if ideas, projects, or development are to be conducted.

In its advance forms, governance consists of many components with which we are all familiar: a legislative body to formulate societal rules, a judicial system by which laws can be enforced and disputes adjudicated, an executive branch that oversees the government, community health services, education services which provide skilled citizens, and others services. We do not mean to imply here that any particular form of governance should be replicated, but rather, that operators must recognize and consider the local cultural norms and locally acceptable approaches to these issues in order to aid the local population in governing themselves.


d. **P.I.G.: Motivation Made Simple**

The methodology we propose here was developed with the operator in mind. The model we developed will enable the operator to better understand the population he hopes to influence to his side; in turn, this understanding will assist the operator in determining which facets of the population are most vulnerable in the contest between the state and the insurgent.

Each of the above subjects is important. COIN cannot be waged on the basis of psychology, infrastructure, or governance alone. Progress in one area will affect other areas, perhaps negatively. In this light, we stress the need to approach any population holistically.

In this section, we have summarized the three broad areas in which populations have needs, and we have given easily memorized titles to these areas. Thus, we can summarize a population’s needs / motivations with the acronym P.I.G., representing the broader needs of Psychology, Infrastructure, and Governance. Hence, P.I.G. will make up the Y-axis of our analytical model as described in the next chapter.

2. **Group Affiliation: How People See Themselves Fitting In**

Group affiliation is the second attribute analyzed for population engagement. Societies are composed of groups of people. Group identity can be based on a plethora of qualities. For example, Dennis O’Neil offers the following as categories for group identification: age or rite of passage, gender, vocation (job/skill set), avocation (hobby), common residence or geographical affiliation, religious belief, political ideology or past experience (2008). These categories are not all-inclusive, but account for a good starting point in the identification of groups in a given population.

However, no one group is homogenous. Each group contains members with different individual needs and motives, as discussed previously. As population analysis is discussed, it is important to note that a node, or individual, may belong to multiple groups, and have multiple needs. The key to this analysis is not to cater a strategy for a specific person, but to address all the cross sections to ensure that the state, not the insurgent is meeting the needs of all cross sections identified. This processed will be further fleshed out in Chapter V, The Model in Practice.
3. **Why Group Identity Matters**

Group identity is critical in understanding how individuals in a targeted population see themselves in relation to the rest of the population, how they receive information, and whom they must go through to receive material, financial, social, or psychological support. Individuals can belong to one or more groups, and may have stronger affiliation to one than another. Consequently, it is important to ensure each group is addressed as part of a cross-group strategy, or individually, as required.

**a. Insulation**

“Cohesion” is the glue that holds society together, and group affiliations are an important component of cohesion. Group affiliations are comprised of sets of subgroups commonly linked by one of the group dynamics discussed previously. A state attempts to influence every subgroup in a population, it must consider the communications channels internal and external to each group. Some communications, services, and influences can be cast across all groups. In other cases, insulated groups can only be reached through leadership, who control the flow of information and resources to the rest of the group. As an example, if the state wishes to address the food needs of a very insulated Tribe, it may have to work through the Tribal leader to reach those in need.

Group identity and insulation of a group can lead to false impressions about a population. Groups that are less insular, or who have outgoing leadership may be easier to access, leading to the impression that the whole population is being accessed. Such interaction can conceal groups that are not being accessed due to their position in the population. The operator must be cognizant not to just interact with the first group to approach his truck, or to extend a handshake. Failure to dig more deeply into group affiliation may lead to the operator unintentionally favoring a particular slice of the population, and may prove counter-productive.

**b. Groupthink**

Groupthink is an important concept to consider when analyzing groups. Insulation from other groups and limited communications networks can lead to the reinforcement of ideas, regardless of the reality of such ideas. Stereotypes, prejudice, bigotry and a warped sense of fairness can be reinforced in an insulated group, leading to
starker differences with other groups, and further isolation. Marc Sageman highlights this concept at a micro level with analysis of terror cell sub-groups in his book *Understanding Terror Networks* (Sageman, 2004). Groupthink plays an even greater role in a stateless situation in which there is no nationalism. A lack of national pride places even more emphasis on the role of smaller groups and increases the influence of groupthink.

c.  **Leadership: Are Group Members Accessible, or is there a Leader in the Way?**

Leadership matters, particularly in insulated groups. Some groups are open to influence from the rest of society as are most groups in the United States today. Some groups, however, are less open to outside influence, and can only be accessed through their recognized leaders. As an extreme example, consider a religiously fundamentalist group. In an effort to maintain their norms and values, they may isolate themselves from the rest of the population, requiring outside influence to be filtered through designated representatives. As we continue to discuss population engagement analysis, it should become clearer that not only are group affiliations defining, but they also determine the method by which the group can be reached.

d.  **Population Summary**

This section introduced the academic fields, terminology, and our two criteria for analysis of a population. The purpose of this section was to introduce the operator to the qualities of a population, its needs, and its group dynamics. These facets will enable the operator to identify the subgroups in his population based on their specific societal needs and accessibility. The key to our method is not to tailor solutions for individuals, but to address the needs of each subgroup.

The next section will introduce the model we have developed to aid the operator in better seeing his designated population. In the model there is a place for each of the population characteristics outlined above. Our purpose in introducing the complex dynamics of population analysis it to introduce the operator to the minefield of complexity they may face in engaging a population. We hope our model enables the operator to undertake his endeavor with greater clarity and ease.
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IV. THE MODEL

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL

The preceding chapters introduced counterinsurgency theory, and the many academic fields that deal with analysis of a population. This chapter will introduce a model designed to aid the operator in the analysis of a given population based on group affiliation and needs/motivation. The model serves as a lens through which the operator can better see his assigned populace. The end state of our methodology is the identification of “subgroups” in a population, and their needs and vulnerabilities. This will allow the operator to meet the needs of the most vulnerable in a population, building trust and support with these subgroups and beating the insurgents in their battle for the population.

If you recall from the counter-insurgency chapter, “the population is the prize” (McCormick, 2007). It follows that if the fight is over the population, we can consider the population analogous to a checkerboard, each square in play, and vulnerable to both the insurgent and the state. In this analogy, each square on the checkerboard is occupied by a subgroup of the population, and is up for grabs with respect to support. Our model was created to allow the operator to discern these subgroups within a given population so that strategies may be formed to ‘win” each one. We name our model the 3 x 5 or “PIG SPEER” model to reflect the general dimensions outlined in the previous chapter: three needs / motivation categories; five group affiliation categories. If you remember nothing else from this thesis, we encourage you to remember the acronyms we have developed to aid the operator in keeping this analysis in the front of his mind: “PIG SPEER.” Our acronym is not meant to be sarcastic or meant imply that we take this endeavor lightly; but is meant to be memorable in the minds of operators who are already inundated with lists of acronyms pertaining to their daily duties.

1. Purpose of the Model: How We See the Model Fitting into COIN Strategy

First and foremost, the 3 x 5 model is an analytical heuristic tool designed to allow operators to better view their designated population. When developed for a particular population, the 3 x 5 model enables planners to determine a population’s
critical needs, and further determine if we and the state, are meeting ensuring those needs, or if insurgents have filled the void.

Second, the model serves as a synchronization tool for planners and operators. Ultimately, as a visual tool and common ground for discussion, we intend the 3 x 5 model to facilitate interagency, international, and interdisciplinary synchronization of effort.

Last, the 3 x 5 model outlines categories that may be used as the basis of measures of effectiveness (MOEs). We argue that the subgroups identified in the course of this analysis may be individually analyzed to determine the portions of the population supporting the state, and those supporting the insurgent.

2. The Vertical Columns: Group Affiliation

Figure 5 represents the group affiliations identified in the last chapter. In a real-world population, there may be several or several dozen groups identified. Here, the vertical columns in the 3 x 5 PIG SPEER model account for group affiliations found in the example population. In the example below we have only accounted for the five general group affiliation categories identified in the previous chapter.

Figure 6. Group Affiliation
3. **The Horizontal Rungs: Needs / Motivation**

Figures 6 represents the general, broad categories for a population’s needs and motivations. Here the categories are represented as horizontal rungs that stretch across a designated population. The three general categories illustrated here are the broad categories we have developed for easy recall. In a real-world case, there may be scores of identified individual and societal needs within a population.

![Population Needs / Motivation](image)

4. **Subgroups Revealed: The “3 x 5 PIG SPEER” Model**

Once cross-meshed, the intersections of Needs / Groups reveals “Sub-Groups,” the focus of this methodology. In Figure 8 below, “PIG SPEER” or 3 x 5 Model is illustrated to show the cross-section of needs / motivations and group affiliations. Here the circle highlights a specific subgroup, with the same infrastructure need and employment group affiliation.
5. What the Model Is… and Isn’t

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the methodology and model presented in this thesis are designed to aid the operator in better viewing his target population. The model is intended to be an analytical tool, a synchronization tool, and a basis for creating measures of effectiveness. The end state of this methodology is a better understanding of the conflict, a point of discussion with other organizations in the area of operation, and a starting point for review of success.

What the model is not, is a strategy for “how to win” sub-groups. Once identified, the types of power and resources available to the operator discussed in chapter six will assist the operator in course of action development, but will not determine a best strategy for engaging specific populations. Each solution will depend upon the characteristics of the subgroup, the persons within it, and the discrete point in time. Nor is this model static. It will have to be updated constantly as more is learned of the targeted population, as the environment changes, and as progress is made. The next chapter will outline the basics in utilizing the model, and address the long process of getting to know your designated population.
V. THE MODEL IN PRACTICE

Population Engagement Strategy is an ongoing process. In conventional warfare, enough resources can overcome even somewhat flawed initial plans and lack of information. Counter-insurgency and population engagement strategy, on the other hand, are dynamic endeavors. They can go on for years, and necessitate a constant stream of the most up-to-date information for the COIN force to adapt as the environment morphs.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline our intended use of the model. In this effort, we hope to give the operator a clearer picture of how this heuristic 3 x 5 PIGSPEER tool is a valuable for revealing the dynamics of his populace, and how it will facilitate strategy for “winning over” the population, one sub-group at a time. The key to this analysis is not to cater a strategy for any specific person, but to reveal each subgroup. Once revealed, the state can then develop strategies for each subgroup to ensure that the state, not the insurgent, is meeting the needs of the population. The following sections will outline the use of the 3 x 5 “PIG SPEER” model. The end result is the revelation of the population’s subgroups.

A. IDENTIFYING GROUPS

Our analysis begins with knowledge of the groups within the population. This knowledge will allow the state or allied power to determine access points to subgroups, and to develop strategies for engaging each. The process of group identification should begin prior to entering a population’s geographic environment; the more that is known of the environment before interaction the better. Information obtained on the ground will confirm or repudiate previous belief, and aid in better inquiry with the designated population.

Perhaps the most useful information regarding groups within a designated population will come from operator interaction with groups themselves. Local demographics may not be readily appreciated in the study of official records, books or journals. For example, a split within a tribe or family may have created two distinct groups previously under one group heading, leading to two similar, but separate groups. This is information most likely gained from interacting directly with the population.
The group categories presented in chapters three and four are: Social, Political, Employment, Ethnic, and Religious. However, these categories are designed only to stimulate group recognition, not to box subgroups into one specific category. Most individuals will fall into numerous groups. Again, this method is not tailor-made to the individual, but to the subgroup. If for example, all the wood-gatherers in a designated Afghan population are Tajik, two groups have been identified: wood-gatherers and Tajiks. The wood-gatherers will have certain needs, as will the Tajiks as a whole. These details will be worked out in time. Just get to know the groups in the area. Start broadly, and refine as time allows.

As groups are identified, the operator should catalog each group into a detailed list. The list compiled will become the categories for the X-axis of the PIG SPEER model. As more groups are identified, the model can be modified. To see an illustration of this process see Figure X: Ramadi Subgroups and Needs.

B. IDENTIFYING NEEDS / MOTIVATION

1. General Process

Needs and motivation is the second portion of our analysis. Determining a population’s needs is difficult, and will take time to assess accurately. We also caution the operator from imposing his own desires onto the perceived needs of the population, as they may not, in fact, reflect the common desires of the population.

Needs and motivation are discovered in many ways: some through dialogue, observation, and demands made by the population itself. The process of identifying groups alone will place the state or operator in contact with the people and their needs. Therefore, when working to identify subgroups, simultaneously pay attention to needs and motivations.

Other needs will be discovered through analysis. Regardless of the technique, or the type of need, the objective here is to determine the population’s own perceived needs. Referencing Chapters III and IV, will aid in the process. The broad categories developed to aid the operator were: Psychological, Infrastructure, and Governance. Again, the categories themselves are not important. They are merely used to jog memory.
Analysis has an additional function. Particularly in developing countries, states and foreigners will be asked for many things. Some of these things will be easier to address or deliver than others. Some are simply indicators or symptoms of other, deeper problems. Care must be taken not only to catalog grievances, but to attempt to find solutions that are more permanent than superficial.

2. **Putting Needs / Motivation into the Model**

As needs and motivations are identified, they should be cataloged into a consolidated list for the community. Needs identified for one group may have implications for the entire population, and are listed on the Y-axis. The needs for a small group of people may indicate needs across a population. Other needs are more specific to a particular group, and may not hold true for other groups. Prioritizing needs will require careful analysis, and should be accomplished through, by and with the local community.

C. **SUBGROUPS: THE TARGET OF CARROTS AND STICKS**

1. **Subgroups Revealed**

   No one group is homogenous. Each group contains members with different needs and motivations, forming smaller subgroups. Following analysis of group affiliations and needs / motivations, subgroups will begin to reveal themselves. The cross sections of needs/motivation and group affiliation represent subgroups, the focus of this methodology. Subgroups share the same identity and needs.

2. **Prioritizing Subgroup Vulnerability**

   The next step in our method is to conduct subgroup analysis. As we have created a checkerboard of subgroups, each of varying needs and size, we must now determine which subgroups are most vulnerable to the insurgent, as they will command the most immediate attention. Subgroup analysis will also allow us to identify subgroups that do not require much attention. For example, if the need for electricity is identified for the population, but the wood-gatherers do not have electricity as a critical need, that subgroup may not need to be addressed on this specific issue. In this methodology we do not propose any particular prioritization of effort or hierarchy based on needs /
motivation or group affiliation. Every scenario will require analysis to determine which subgroups require the most immediate attention based on overall objectives and resources available.

3. **Synchronization of All Efforts**

Prioritizing a designated population’s subgroups enables the state to focus effort and to strategize to meet each subgroup’s needs based on vulnerability to insurgents. This method also allows efforts to be synchronized. This thesis does not address specifics of synchronization, as synchronization varies dramatically from place to place. Nor does it address specifically how to meet these needs, only what the needs are and which subgroups have them. In synchronizing efforts, we simply mean to imply that the PIG SPEER model can be a starting point for communication, coordination, and synchronization of effort. For example, if healthcare is identified as a critical need, and Doctors Without Borders and the International Red Cross are working diligently to address the need, the state or operator may direct attention to other needs. For political and pragmatic reasons, domestic and international agencies in the area may not wish to coordinate efforts. Though unfortunate, information regarding each agency’s efforts helps facilitate the prioritization of effort given existing efforts in the region.

D. **HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION IN RAMADI**

The figure below is an illustration of how a tactical level soldier in Ramadi might have developed his understanding of the environment using the model. As the operator gathers information to enter into the methodology he may see trends. Trends of needs might be logical places to start because they maximize their effectiveness across a broader range of people. The subgroups and their needs are fictitious, shown here only for illustrative purposes.
As can be seen above groups are easily identified. In the figure above an example of a social group is a soccer team or league and their needs might be security, a field to play on, and a level of confidence that allows them to play and not worry about being caught in the crossfire of security operations. They may also need soccer balls, jerseys, and soccer nets.

An example of a political subgroup might be ex-Bathists. They might be feeling neglected by the new government and need representation and a sense of inclusion.

An example of an ethnic subgroup might be the Albu Soda tribe. They might need security of their tribe to ensure their lands are not used as an insurgent safe-haven. They might also need cell phone towers, gasoline, IED free streets to enable their economy to re-emerge, and a sense of inclusion in the local government.

Often times the operator may identify multiple subgroups of one kind of group: as can be seen with doctors and taxi drivers in the employment group. Again, just in this brief description of what an operator might have learned about his environment there are commonalities of needs between subgroups. Depending upon what the operator thinks he can affect, these trends may be the ideal place to initially focus their efforts of
engagement. To better explain how these subgroups and their needs can be leveraged the following is an in-depth discussion of three of these subgroups.

Doctors and taxi drivers are examples of employment subgroups. Doctors might need security at their hospitals, and modern technological resources to help them provide better healthcare, a sense that they are making a difference. Taxi drivers might need secure roads, access to fuel, and cell phone towers to better enable their business. A mosque, its leadership, and its constituency is an example of a religious subgroup. They might need security, repairs, and an apology from the security forces that damaged their property.

Taxi drivers are an example of an employment subgroup. An operator might observe rows of unemployed taxi drivers are a common sight and that the drivers park in a line and sit on their hoods smoking and carrying on conversation with one another; their social interaction might yield volumes of valuable information. Hypothetically, in Ramadi the taxi drivers’ needs were overall security to include IED free streets, cell towers so that they could be called into service, and fuel for their vehicles. Why engage taxi drivers? Taxi drivers know who comes and goes. They sit around all day and observe their environment. They could be an excellent source of information. Imagine if CF were able to secure the roads or at least major arteries, allow taxis to operate on them under local supervision, open secure fuel centers not subject to corruption and smuggling, and introduce cell towers and cell phones to energize their business. More than likely they would be heavily employed, in favor of the local security forces, and a wealth of ongoing information. Obviously, taxi drivers are not the only subgroups that would benefit from these actions. Freedom of movement for the greater populace would instill confidence in their security forces and could potentially energize the economy.

Another example of an employment group is doctors. In Ramadi, hospitals were poorly equipped and often over crowded. Hypothetically, let us assume they lacked modern technologies such as sterilization equipment, X-ray machines, and ultra-sound machines. Additionally, there was no security at the hospitals to stop insurgents from using them as safe-havens, as well as disrupting operations, and intimidating patients. Why should we engage doctors? Local doctors were often obligated to work on injured
insurgents. Therefore, they could be a resource for information. Possibly timely intelligence on when insurgents arrive, who and how many are injured, and where they go after being treated. Additionally, there is always a need for health care, and often people can’t get to a hospital or can’t pay for services. By providing the needs of the doctors, the doctors will be able to provide better healthcare, feel emboldened by their ability to help, and possibly support the local security forces. They might become willing to share information with the security forces and even agree to export their services to the greater populace through Civil Affairs operations. Providing security to the hospital denies insurgents a safe-haven, professional medical assistance, and an opportunity to intimidate the locals. This further diminishes the insurgent’s ability to operate in the environment and may lead to more detentions or capitulations.

Doctors are not the only ones to benefit from an increase in security and civic action. The population as a whole will get better health care and it will be more available to the masses. People will no longer be afraid to go to the hospital and they will have the security forces to thank. Additionally, the affects of engagement with the taxi drivers will also benefit the doctors in that people will better more reliable transportation to the hospitals with an increase in the taxi drivers’ business. It is our belief that security will have one of the greatest overall affects on the environment.

An example of a religious subgroup might be a specific mosque in the neighborhood of where the soldier using the methodology is working. Mosques have often been used as safe-havens and planning centers, and their loud speakers have been used to coordinate operations. In Ramadi, it was illegal for U.S. forces to enter or engage a mosque without a dire need and high-level approval. In searches, mosques were often damaged. This enraged the local populace, and provided fuel for the insurgent’s rhetoric.

Hypothetically speaking again, let’s assume that a specific mosque needs new speakers for their call to prayer and damage to their property repaired. Why should security forces help a mosque that supports the insurgency? It might be that the leadership of the mosque is being strong armed to support the insurgency and they might be willing to denounce the insurgency if security forces can provide adequate protection. By attempting to make right the wrongs that have been committed against the mosque,
security forces might gain favor from the mosque’s leadership and the local populace. It might be as simple as fixing their loud speakers, repairing doors, windows, or anything else that might have been damaged in the search for insurgents. Since U.S. service men are not allowed to enter mosques unless in distress, the repairs would have to be contracted through a local source: helping re-energize the local economy. Making right the wrong might also require a public apology. All these things are worth the effort if they gain the support of the leadership of the mosque and the local populace. Ultimately these actions may lead to a better standing with the local population and an increase in the flow of information to security forces. If actions taken are truly successful then the loud speakers might be used to publicly denounce the insurgency.

Again, these examples are purely hypothetical and should not be construed as a list of best practices or likely groups to engage in any environment. They are to show how the methodology might be built and utilized. Hopefully, this reference back to Ramadi shows the relevance of the methodology and its ability to focus efforts and maximize results.
VI. GETTING STARTED: WORKING TO “WIN” SUBGROUPS

The intent of this chapter is to provide a starting point for the operator. Again, this thesis is not designed to develop solutions to any given conflict, but to educate the state or operator to better view his or her population. We will now discuss the basic approaches and resources at his disposal. In the discussion below, this chapter will lay out the concept of trust as the key to engaging a population. It will then frame the different kinds of power held by the state to better inform planners to the approaches available to them. Last, this chapter will outline the Elements of National Power available to the state and operator alike.

A. GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR POPULATION

1. Sources of Information

   a. Pre-Deployment Preparation

   The state or international third party should begin education as soon as they are on notice that they will have responsibility for conducting a COIN campaign. General information on most populations is now readily available via many sources. The internet has opened an overwhelming number of official and unofficial sites with information from government, non-government, commercial, and private sources. Most government organizations have intelligence personnel whose job is to maintain reporting on specific areas of interest, and who can customize information for a particular purpose. Most important in this effort is the synthesis of multiple sources of reporting to best illuminate the designated population.

   b. Open Sources

   The Internet has revolutionized our ability to obtain information. Filtering the overwhelming amount of data can be challenging. Internet search engines such as Google or Dogpile and government resources such as the CIA World Factbook and Department of State Travel Warnings websites are great tools for revealing information on your particular population, and allow tailored searches for specific inquiries.

   Equally abundant are new and old books relaying stories and information from every corner of the globe. Travel book series such as Lonely Planet, Let’s Go, and
Fodor’s offer cultural insights and information useful for navigating foreign geography. A book series of particular value to the authors has been the CULTURE SHOCK series by Graphic Arts Publishing, which offers a detailed, culturally focused account of many foreign locales through a western lens. In addition to the internet and books, local newspapers, periodicals such as National Geographic and movies can be very helpful in revealing local culture.

**c. HUMINT**

Once on the ground, the operator will encounter a plethora of sources. Some will prove more reliable than others, some will only seek benefit in their relation with the operator, and some will not be able to succinctly articulate their group or needs. Nevertheless, real time local human sources will be the operator’s best source of information.

Securing human sources is paramount. Though a human source may be comfortable enough to engage in dialogue with the state or the operator, he puts himself in great danger by siding against the insurgent. All efforts to secure a human source must be taken very seriously, even if the environment appears to facilitate interaction. A source whose personal or familial safety has been compromised will dry up as an information resource, and may encourage others to shy away from divulging information as well. The insurgent has great incentive to silence popular support for the state, and uses coercion and violence to that end. Operators should seek HUMINT expertise in even the most benign circumstances to preserve relations with locals who have risked everything to aid the state.

**d. The U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS)**

The U.S. HTS was discussed in Chapter III. The program is now quite robust and has over twenty-six Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) spread across U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deeper resources and data centers reside in the U.S. Intelligence professionals and analysts who can access HTS resources and have the ability to ask specific questions of their designated population. HTS is another valuable resource for
understanding the cultural lens through which your population has organized itself with respect to group affiliation, and understanding the values which drive needs / motivation.

d. Peers

Peers are an obvious resource, but are seldom utilized to their full potential. Within any region of the world are experts, who have extensive experience with specific populations. Within academia, for example, reside post-doctoral candidates who have formed their dissertation around your designated population. Many have published their research, or may be contacted for further information.

Relief in Place or Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) provides another venue to question peers regarding a designated population. We believe our 3 x 5 model is an excellent tool for RIP/TOA as it provides a common operating picture (COP) for new and old organizations to discuss the social dynamics, leaders, and stakeholders within the population. A picture is worth a thousand words.

B. TRUST

Trust is the foundation for influencing a subgroup. For the state to effectively sway a population to the point at which they are willing to aid the state against the insurgents, perhaps putting themselves in danger in the process, the state must assert itself as the legitimate path to a better future. Therefore, the most important relationship for the state to establish is trust. Merriam-Webster defines trust as, “dependence on something future or contingent” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). Trust, typically considered a positive term, is the best means through which the state can hope to establish a relationship with the population. This is not to imply that the state must befriend each individual or node. When establishing trust is not possible, the state must, at the very least prove to the population that it is consistent and equitable in order to bolster its legitimacy. Reliance upon the state to predictably execute future action substitutes for a trusting relationship.

Piotr Sztompka states that, “Intuitively we feel that trust must be vested in people, rather than natural objects or events” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 19). Furthermore, he
emphasizes that social phenomena are the proper domain for trust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 19). Thus, it is paramount for the population to view the state as a group of reliable people in whom they can trust their futures. If previously damaged, re-establishing this relationship will take time.

There are several basic ways that trust can be established. For example, infrastructure projects promised by state officials must be completed as promised, on time and with the capabilities expected. Equality in education, suffrage, and social welfare must be perceived as reasonable expectations by each subgroup throughout a community. Szompka writes, “All social interaction is an endless process of acting upon expectations, which are part cognitive, part emotional, and part moral” (Sztompka, 1999). Regardless of the subgroup being targeted, the critical component of the establishment of trust in the state is managing expectations. Subgroups that feel they know what to expect from the state can put their faith in it. As such, individuals can bet their lives with the state, deciding to aid, rather than remain neutral, or worse, support the insurgent.

The word trust has positive connotations, and a positive relationship should be built whenever possible. However, where not possible, predictability must suffice. The state must endeavor to allow each subgroup to feel they will follow through as promised, whether positively or negatively.

C. TYPES OF POWER

The preceding section stated that managing expectations was a key to earning the trust of the population. This next section will focus on power techniques useful in influencing subgroups. Contemporary academics have written extensively on the application of power with respect to managing people, organizations, markets, and populations. Philosophers and authors such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jeffery Pfeffer, Bertram Raven, and John French have each laid out models by which power, and its implementation can be better understood. This paper will focus on French’s and Raven’s “Bases of Power” model for the engagement of subgroups in a targeted population. This thesis focuses on the state’s application of power to win a population from insurgents, and does not address the insurgent’s use of power, which may be similar.
1. French and Raven - Outlining the Types of Power Available to the State

Population engagement strategy must address the underlying or root causes of grievances with the state, as they are the leverage of the insurgent. This can only be done by establishing dialogue with the population in order to determine both individual and group dynamics and motivational factors. Upon the completion of the analysis of the designated population, a strategy must be developed to engage each discovered subgroup.

Techniques designed for influencing one subgroup may not work for another. Additionally, several techniques may be employed simultaneously against one subgroup. The following paragraphs explore five social powers, defined by sociologists French and Raven, which are useful frameworks for the state in developing techniques for engaging population subgroups. Last, this chapter will outline the elements of national power, which provide a comprehensive list of the types of resources available to the state or operator.

In 1959, French and Raven published a study revealing five different types of power, each with a specific relationship between powerbroker and audience in mind. While the original study was designed to describe relations within a society at large, the bases of power laid out here provide a useful framework for describing the powers held by the state over a targeted population. In return, for the use of this power, the state seeks compliance. The bases of power are: Legitimate Power, Referent Power, Expert Power, Reward Power, and Coercive Power (Raven and French, 1959).

a. Coercive Power – Potential to Take Away

Coercive power is the use of negative influence, and is the opposite of reward power. In this kind of power, the individual or group has leverage over other individuals or groups, and the ability to impose punitive action or to deny positive reward. Common applications of coercive power are overt threat, physical suffering, blackmail, or the loss of freedoms or prestige. While effective in providing a population the incentive to act in a certain manner, coercive power must be used sparingly. In the long term, coercive power will only last as long as the powerbroker is in position to maintain negative consequences. Afterwards, those who were coerced will not continue
to be influenced by their former oppressor, and may in fact turn against them. Examples of those who hold coercive power are insurgents who threaten retaliatory action for compliance with the state, criminal organizations who threaten citizenry with physical harm should they go to the state, states who maintain the ability to detain citizens, block roadways, or deny access to services or aid. While effective in the short term, the long term effect of using coercive power is contempt for the state, and should therefore be used sparingly.

b. **Legitimate Power – Recognized Power; the Goal of the State**

Arguably, the most important type of power in an insurgency / counter-insurgency contest is legitimate power. Legitimate power, as the name suggests, is derived by the position held by the individual or group. Official or perceived positions within a society wield formal authority typically delegated by the state, or formal organizations. The accepted responsibilities and resources held by such persons or groups entitle them to privileged and therefore powerful positions within a society. Common examples of individuals and groups who hold legitimate power are politicians, police, and other easily identifiable officials.

c. **Expert Power – Skill and Knowledge**

Expert power, as the name suggests, is derived from the possession of specific, desired knowledge or skills. Expert power is held by engineers, doctors, technicians, literate individuals, clerics anointed to interpret God’s will, politicians with greater access to information than the public, or educated individuals who have a broader knowledge-base and a better than average ability to make an argument. Expert power is maintained as long as others cannot obtain special skills.

d. **Reward Power – The Potential to Give**

Reward power is, simply put, held by those with the ability to assign positive benefit to others. As such they are also able to maintain the attention of those without. Rewards take the form of money, promotion, perks, recognition, and extended freedoms. While humans are susceptible to reward power, there is a danger in its application. Rewards given too freely can become the standard, not the exception, leading to a reduction in effectiveness. Rewards distributed unevenly or erratically can cause the
powerbroker to lose influence over others. The most common powerbrokers who wield reward power are managers, bosses, and those with possession of scarce resources. With respect to rewards held by the state, most often, these come in the form of provision of social services aimed at basic needs. While Raven and French focus mainly on the expectation of reward, in this practice, it is likely the expectation based on demonstrated action that matters. Raven and French write, “The utilization of actual rewards (instead of promises) by O [the state] will tend over time to increase the attraction of P [the populace] toward O and therefore the referent power of O over P” (Raven and French, 1959, p. 156).

e. Referent Power – Charismatic Influence

Referent Power is the most difficult for state entities to replicate for it is a natural phenomenon held by those whose charisma and personality charm others to them. These natural leaders often develop subgroups around themselves, perhaps unintentionally. The number of individuals, or nodes, who wish to maintain relations with this powerful individual, can be very high, often becoming loyal followers- even if the individual does not necessarily seek the authority position.

French and Raven’s “Bases of Power” provide the state with five different approaches to each subgroup. The type and of power best suited for the state’s interaction with the subgroup will depend on the specific qualities of the subgroup, objectives, and resources available. Over time, a variety of approaches may be necessary, and if one base of power proves unsuccessful, another may be substituted. Our purpose in outlining the bases of power is to remind the state of its array of options. (Raven and French, 1959, p. 156).

D. M.I.D.L.I.F.E: THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

1. M.I.D.L.I.F.E.

The elements of national power are those assets available to a state for engaging both domestic and foreign populations. The traditional acronym for the elements of national power was DIME: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and Economic. They have now been expanded to more specifically account for their unique qualities, utilizing the acronym MIDLIFE: Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence,
Financial and Economic (Wendt, 2005). We have included the elements of national power as useful reminders of the types of resources available to the operator as he or she develops strategy for each identified subgroup.

a. **Military**

Military resources include all of the Department of Defense or Ministry of Defense assets. Typically, military power is utilized to physically force or coerce an opponent to their will, but also has more altruistic components such as Civil Affairs or the Medical Corps.

b. **Information**

Information includes all assets the state maintains to put out information. This includes radio, print media, television, internet, and public addresses. In COIN, crafting messages is a critical component to providing overall governance.

c. **Diplomacy**

Diplomacy is dialogue. It is based on the premise that issues can be discussed and resolved by agreement between parties. Often times, a COIN environment lacks a proper venue for the expression of needs.

d. **Law Enforcement**

Law enforcement includes the components of basic judicial systems, including legal counsel, lawyers, judges, police, and legislative counsel. Police are often the furthest extension of governance, and symbolize the level of security present in the population.

e. **Intelligence**

The Intelligence Community (IC) is comprised of the military and civilian agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate information. The IC has many resources for gathering information in a subtle manner, and can field specific questions of a designated population.

f. **Finance**

Finance is a powerful form of reward power, and a catalyst for many endeavors. States maintain funding for many functions, many of which may aid the operator in providing for the needs in his population.
g. **Economic**

Economic power is the ability to assess, invigorate, and regulate a population’s economy. States have multiple ministries, departments, and agencies dedicated to ensuring a robust economy. A strong economy is a solid platform upon which a stable society can be built.

### E. POWER AND THE STATE: HYPOTHETICALS

Though originally intended to outline powers held within society, the kinds of power, and resources available discussed in the previous sections frame the approaches available to the state for use in engaging the targeted population. In order to gain control of the targeted population, a combination of the above types of power must be applied to convince the population to change behavior in order to aid the state in identifying the insurgents. Additionally, it is important to identify what type of power leaders possess in order to know how to affect, motivate, or coerce them. This process can take place across multiple subgroups simultaneously, or in any manner deemed prudent for the overall strategy. Below, we will discuss the application of power to influence the hypothetical needs, outlined below.

1. **The Application of Power to Hypothetical Needs**

   **Status.** Status is defined by Stephen Reiss as, “Desire for social standing (including desire for attention)” (Reiss, 2004). Insurgent ranks are filled by many people, some of whom seek status. As such, the state must satiate this need through legitimate means. However, status is not necessarily a matter of hierarchy within a group. Status is desired by many within each group, and the “higher” status levels may not be the most important. Here, legitimate power and reward power can be leveraged to offer official status to the portion of the population that seeks it. Positions within the state are one solution. Venues in which individuals can be recognized by the state to voice grievances are another. Allowing those who seek status to have a channel through the state can pull those segments of the community toward it. Referent power will aid to affect those in this category. Leading by example, or enabling individuals in this category to seek the same referent power may encourage them to seek legitimate, versus insurgent positions to satiate their desires. True ideologues may not be easily swayed, for the status they seek is
insatiable. In such circumstances, coercion power may be helpful in influencing these people because of their vulnerability to stay on course to pursue their selfish desires. Coercive power can be used in cases where the state has the ability to prevent the individual from achieving their goals. Legitimate, reward, and coercion power are used together here in exchange for compliance.

**Employment.** Our next hypothetical need is employment. State maintained expert power can be used to create economic growth, and a means for people to find work, hence rewarding a compliant society with a legitimate future. Trade and legislation can work to bolster economic activity and to enable the population to create an efficient productive marketplace. Security will also bolster such an effort. As is mandated by society, the state enables a population to make a living for itself under the protection of the state.

**Roads / Power.** Roads and electric power are basic infrastructure needs. States hold Expert Power in the form of engineering, manufacturing materials, and the decision as to where these scarce resources will be distributed. Wielding expert power that positively affects enough people will lead to legitimate power. The more the state can convince the population that it will remain their source of expertise and care, the more it will secure its role as the legitimate authority in the people’s eyes.

**Security.** With respect to the people’s security, the state must exercise its legitimate power to protect the population from insurgent forces, thereby enabling the population to see the state as their legitimate provider. Additionally, the state must exercise their coercive power to deny insurgents the ability to sway the populace. Roadblocks, control points, and state military patrolling are examples of state action that can deny insurgents power, while simultaneously securing the people. These actions will serve to endear the people to the state; in response, the state asks for complicity.

**Food.** In extreme circumstances, food can be a critical need, particularly if there has been extensive infrastructure damage. In such a circumstance, the state holds several types of power it can use to secure the population’s compliance, if not loyalty. Reward power can be effective. Often the state maintains the ability to import, secure and distribute food, and other commodities. Populations in need of food, who deem the state
their best chance for future resources, have incentive to comply with the state. Conversely, the state can utilize its coercion cower to deny food supplies, and even prevent populations from obtaining food on their own. Expert power can also be useful here, as the state maintains access to experts in areas such as agriculture. Subgroups without physiological needs or in need of safety will be most receptive to the immediate influence of material and welfare services, the type of power typically held by a state over citizens. Reward power, in the form of material reward doled out consistently can aid to bond those in need to the giver. This tactic is used commonly by groups such as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, who distribute basic humanitarian assistance and civil services. In turn, Hezbollah achieves legitimate power as they in many ways, have replaced the rightful position of the Lebanese government. As demonstrated by Hezbollah, if enough reward power is applied, the result can be legitimacy of the giver.

F. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to explore how states can begin the process to influence a population into acting favorably toward it, and away from the insurgent. Because the population holds critical information about the insurgent, population engagement is a critical component of counter-insurgency strategy. The process of successfully influencing a population begins only after thorough population analysis, as outlined in the preceding chapters.

The overall methodology presented in this thesis begins with gaining access to the population. In a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment, access may not be possible until a reasonable level of security has been established. However, once established, the next step is to conduct a thorough analysis of the population.

We began with the identification of groups within a population. Next, the population’s needs / motivations must be assessed in order to understand the missing components leading to instability. The identification of group affiliation and needs / motivations will, in turn, reveal the population’s subgroups.

Once subgroups are revealed, the COIN effort can prioritize its work by analyzing which subgroups to engage in order to achieve overall objectives, and the feasibility of
“winning” each. Next, the COIN effort can strategize how best to engage with each subgroup, in order to sway it from the insurgent and toward the state.

The first component of this strategy is the establishment of the population’s trust in the state. Where trust may not be possible, the state must bolster its legitimacy by establishing itself as predictable. The most important quality is consistency. After the priority of effort is assessed, the state must assess its resources and determine the kinds of power it has at its disposal to effectively sway each subgroup. Power is used in exchange for the compliance of the population. One or more kinds of power framed by French and Raven may be leveraged against each subgroup in order to fulfill its needs. The operator should be ever careful to not create too great a reliance on the state, or create an imbalance across the population. Lastly, these efforts should be synchronized with efforts from other operators in the area, including other U.S. agencies, NGOs, and IOs, to reduce redundancy, and to ensure all subgroups’ needs are addressed.

The “3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model” is designed to be applied in any environment and to help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation. We believe that our methodology can be utilized to increase the operator’s understanding of the environment, and improve both non-kinetic and kinetic combat operations. As a COIN force progresses from kinetic combat operations (those attempting to gain a security foothold in a non-permissive environment) to operations focused on gaining the support of the population, our methodology will aid in collecting human intelligence (HUMINT). Again, this methodology shows that by providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying and capitalizing on opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, empower the locals to manage their own security, and stabilize the environment. Ultimately, we hope our methodology will assist tactical level operators to understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are attempting to gain, and help them more effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and conduct tactical missions.
APPENDIX

The Graphic Training Aid (GTA) is a pocket reference designed to remind the operator of prior training, doctrine, operating procedures or protocols, useful acronyms, and checklists. We have designed the GTA below to as a reference for the methodology outlined in this thesis.

The front side is a summary of McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model, important needs / motivations (PIG), group affiliation categories (SPEER), Bases of Power, and National Elements of Power.

The back side is a matrix designed for field use. While too small to capture an entire population, we intend it to be a starting point for field documentation.

We encourage the printing, lamination, and use of the PIG SPEER for operators in irregular warfare environments.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Burke, M.C. (2008). LT Burke is the Co-Author of Population Analysis: A Methodology for Understanding Populations in COIN Environments. LT Burke’s personal insights and experiences are the basis for the account of what transpired in Eastern Ramadi, Iraq, written in Chapter 1 and revisited elsewhere in the thesis.


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