EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (DSPD) WITH A SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TARGET AUDIENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE PROPOSAL

by

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December 2008

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Renewed U.S. security and diplomatic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests the need to evaluate previous DSPD initiatives. The ACRF serves as a useful lesson for U.S. African Combatant Command (USAFRICOM) in how to communicate effectively with African partners. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) sources and messages using the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as a controlled comparison case study. Based on this aim, the study hypothesizes that a high level source employing a tailored message objective to the target audience’s home venue would achieve the most favorable effect. Based on the analysis of the ACRF proposal process, the thesis only marginally affirms the hypothesis, suggesting that country-specific contextual factors related to military-to-military relations and the condition of public diplomatic relations played a more significant role.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In mid-February 2008, President George Bush conducted a five country visit to the continent of Africa. Prior to the trip, the White House Office of the Press Secretary published a briefing sheet favorably highlighting the United States Government’s partnership with African nations. The sheet focused on three efforts of the United States Government in Africa: promoting democracy, overcoming poverty, and saving lives. These were represented as the focus of the President’s African foreign policy agenda. At the same time, many in the Departments of Defense and State were anxious to see where the President would use the African visit to complement ongoing efforts towards the establishment an African geographic combatant command (USAFRICOM). Despite a favorable African response to President Bush’s announcement of an $875 million Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a $675 million contribution to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) account in Tanzania,\(^1\) and the signing of a bi-lateral trade treaty with Rwanda, the President met with severe African criticism over multiple facets of USAFRICOM. The contrast in reception between American economic and military policies in Africa was sharp.

In Ghana, President Bush responded to specific West African concerns regarding the possibility of basing large numbers of American troops in Africa and a tacit militarization of American foreign policy inside Africa. However, to the disappointment of USAFRICOM supporters, Bush also announced that the command’s headquarters would be in Europe, co-located with European Command, leaving open the possibility of a sub-regional office in Liberia. This assuaged African leaders’ concerns about location of the command, but not those about its purpose and intent.\(^2\) In November 2007, President Umaru Yar'Adua of Nigeria, a regional leader in West Africa, publicly opposed an American base not only in Nigeria, but anywhere in Africa.\(^3\) This aligned with the position staked out by South Africa two months earlier.\(^4\) Even Kenya, a state highly supportive of American military-to-military training and of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) base in Djibouti, was hesitant about publicly embracing USAFRICOM in general, and the basing of its headquarters on the continent in particular.\(^5\)


The new command clearly lacked a sufficient level of support from three key partners in sub-Saharan Africa, even after its staff devoted significant effort to building such support. USAFRICOM had officially failed to find an African state to host its intended continental headquarters, a major setback in its efforts to establish and explain itself. American government officials viewed the tepid reception of USAFRICOM as irrational, since USAFRICOM represents an internal re-organization of the Defense Department’s bureaucracy intended to focus and increase the effectiveness of already existing military efforts in Africa, which are widely supported by African states. USAFRICOM had tried to allay fears that its establishment represented the militarization of American foreign policy toward Africa by re-asserting that the Department of State, not the Department of Defense, would lead diplomatic efforts in the region. Nevertheless," reaction to locating the Africa Command on the continent [remained] negative."

This was not the first time Sub-Saharan African nations had reacted unenthusiastically to a proposed United States military assistance initiative. Reaction to the Clinton Administration’s 1996 proposal to create an African peacekeeping force, known as African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) was more positive that that for AFRICOM, but still cool in a number of countries. The United States had

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refused to respond to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in the absence of significant national interests, adopting a realist “do nothing” approach that contrasted sharply with its failed idealist “solve everything” approach in Somalia the previous year. The negative fallout from both events persuaded the U.S. government that it could neither do nothing nor solve everything in Africa. In 1996, Burundi seemed to be following Rwanda down the path to genocide. Thus the ACRF’s fundamental driving concern was to support “African solutions for African problems” in general, and to address the Burundi problem in particular.

Although most countries invited to participate in ACRF agreed to do so, the response from the larger states was generally unenthusiastic. President Nelson Mandela of South Africa rebuked the initiative, saying he would prefer an African or United Nations supported peacekeeping force for Burundi. President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, prohibited from participation in the ACRF proposal because he headed military government, concurred. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya also opposed the ACRF for similar reasons. In light of this negative reception, the ACRF was abandoned in favor of a much less ambitious bilateral training program,

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the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). However, in the years following the withdrawal of the ACRF proposal, the African Union (AU) set out to establish an African Standby Force, with the same mission, structure and organization proposed in the ACRF. While the Africa Standby Force is organized under the auspices of the AU, and operationalized through five affiliated sub-regional organizations, it is entirely dependent on external funding and airlift, much like the proposed ACRF. Given the ongoing recognition of the need for a continental peacekeeping force along the lines originally proposed in the ACRF, why was ACRF not better received?

Unfortunately, due to the short life-span of the ACRF proposal, the existing literature tends to blur the distinctions between the proposal for a force and the proposal for a bi-lateral initiative, obscuring why the ACRF proposal failed and precluding a fuller analysis and explanation.\textsuperscript{14} There are two strands to the usual explanation for ACRF’s failure. The first emphasizes the ad hoc and reactive nature of the proposal. Authors in this camp argue that ACRF’s reactionary nature, driven as it was by the worsening situation in Burundi and anchored in the recent failures in Somalia and Rwanda, undermined its acceptance because African governments saw it as an excuse for the U.S./international community to do nothing and not get called out for it, rather than as a serious proposal for

a potentially successful solution to crises on the continent.\textsuperscript{15} The second explanation is not a low level of commitment by the Department of Defense (DoD) undermined ACRF’s acceptance on the continent. Andrea Pollard, for example, argues that the ACRF’s intended organization, training and equipment fell short of Department of Defense standards, suggesting a lack of commitment, which undermined ACRF’s viability as a peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{16} However, neither explanation examines the link between ACRF (its reactionary nature or its internal organization) and its actual acceptance/rejection by African governments.\textsuperscript{17}

Indeed, the literature tends to place the cart before the horse since the early rejection of the ACRF made its potential effectiveness moot, and no government publicly rejected it over concerns about its efficacy, although nearly every study of ACRF suggests public diplomacy weakness, none provides a systematic analysis of the effect of informational successes and failures on ACRF’s reception. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature on the ACRF, analyzing the variation in acceptance/rejection among target countries — variation that has been largely ignored in the existing literature.


\textsuperscript{16} Analysis of the Measures of Effectiveness for the African Crisis Response Initiative (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000).

Such an evaluation of previous DSPD initiatives is essential given growing U.S. security and diplomatic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. The ACRF case can provide useful lessons for USAFRICOM in how to communicate more effectively with African partners. From a more narrow DSPD perspective, the absence of an explicit adversary in Africa means that military tactics there should be focused on capturing “human terrain” through the robust utilization of information operations rather than more conventional stratagems.18 To accomplish this, the Department of Defense needs to understand how to communicate effectively with Africans. The command’s focus on interagency cooperation and building partnerships with African states makes successful Information Operations even more critical and the role of DPSD even more central to ensuring that Department of Defense actions align with and complement other elements of national power to synchronize an American grand strategy in Africa.19

The focus in this thesis is on informational causal mechanisms, defined as the “physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities.”20 Using Wilbur Schramm’s disaggregation of

communications into a source and message, the case studies will treat the ACRF’s and related Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) sources and messages as independent variables, and the acceptance or rejection of ACRF as the dependent variable. The target audience is composed of the state level actors who possessed the ability to accept or reject the ACRF proposal. This hypothesis is depicted in Figure 1.

\[\text{Defense Support to Public Diplomacy}\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Source} & \quad + \quad \text{Message} \\
\text{Accept/Reject} & \quad = \quad \text{Destination Audience}
\end{align*}\]

Figure 1. ACRF DSPD: Causal Process.

To measure the dependent variable, the joint DoD definition of ‘effect’ is utilized. An effect is a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom upon a given
In this case, the observed effect upon the target audience will be compared to the objective of the associated source and message. Since the ACRF proposal solicited state membership, the target audiences will be viewed as the African decision makers and ruling elites. For the purposes of this research, it was initially assumed that Sub-Saharan African target audiences have broadly similar characteristics. This assumption was supported by a consensus in the marketing literature that the Sub-Saharan market is unique, but with little internal variation. Thus, variations in effects were initially attributed to the source and message rather than potential variations in the target audience across cases. However, the initial results reported in Chapter II reveal that this working assumption is not always valid. Therefore, the analysis goes on in Chapter III to consider country specific antecedent conditions that mediate the relationship between the theorized IVs and DV.

ACRF membership was not offered to all Sub-Saharan African states. First, only democratic states were eligible. Second, since ACRF proposed a force rather than a treaty, not all states possessed sufficiently capable defense forces to warrant membership in it. Finally, since the ACRF was intended to be an African sourced and led


22 Since the ACRF proposal only possessed the ability to change its source and message, the destination portion of Schramm's model remains static. Therefore, the target audience or destination represents a true constant condition at the time of the ACRF proposal.

force, it required states not only to provide troops, but also the skill and logistical sustainment to enable the ACRF’s deployment and operation. Force enablers included the capability to command, control, communicate and sustain the ACRF. Since the purpose of this research is to evaluate the effects of communications from the U.S. on potential contributors, only states that were invited to participate are considered.

Because Africa has historically been low on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, communications have often come from relatively low level officials, sometimes sending mixed messages or giving ultimatums, and generally not taking the time to go to Africa to consult with ‘partners’ there.24 This sends certain signals to the target audience, while also communicating a general disregard for the region by the U.S. policymaking establishment, thereby reducing the receptivity of the target audience to the message content. Thus, the thesis’ central hypothesis is that the use of a high level source with a shaping message objective, at the target audience’s home venue offers a more effective informational strategy, which maximizes the probability of acceptance by the target audience.

Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) source and messages are multi-faceted independent variables. Both overt and unclassified DSPD came from clearly attributable sources. The sources will be identified according to the

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state of origin, associated organization and, when possible, the status of the message’s originator. Table 1 illustrates this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>Organization/Billet</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Department of State, Secretary</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S. European Command, J-3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>26th MEU, Public Affair Officer</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Example Source Description Method

The message variable possesses two elements: objective and venue. Messages also include content, but in the case of ACRF the content is a constant: all target states were invited to participate in the ACRF.

The combination of objective and venue comprises the measure of the message variable. Four non-doctrinal definitions of commonly used information operations objectives – shape, inform, convince, and influence – help us classify the objective element of the message variable (Table 2). The objective is the most important element in DSPD because it expresses the nature of the engagement. Venue describes the location of the delivery, and is coded as being internal or external to the target audience’s country. If the message was delivered in the target audience’s country, then it was resident. If not, then the venue is described as external to the target audience.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform</td>
<td>Make target audience aware of message content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Line of Persuasion (LOP) to achieve long term target audience consent regarding the totality of the message’s content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Line of Persuasion (LOP) to achieve near term target audience consent regarding message content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convince</td>
<td>Line of Persuasion (LOP) to achieve immediate target audience consent regarding message content.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Message Objective Definitions

Measurement of the dependent variable, commonly described as the Measure of Effectiveness or MOE, indicates whether the proposal’s target audience accepts or declines participation in the ACRF. Rather than express the MOE as a binomial assessment of accept/reject, a relative scale was established as depicted in Figure 2. An MOE of zero represents no evidence of either ACRF acceptance or rejection. A positive or negative ‘1’ suggests a “soft” acceptance or rejection respectively. This value is assigned to the DV when the preponderance of evidence indicates that a decision was made, but the decision was not made public. A positive or negative ‘2’ indicates public acceptance or rejection of the ACRF. Though not perfect, the MOE scale is useful as a measure of the dependent variable because it provides a metric of the DSPD success.
The next chapter tests the thesis’ hypothesis based on available data for all states that the U.S. publicly invited to participate in ACRF. It finds that the independent variables outlined above do not adequately explain the variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, Chapter III examines contextual factors in each case that seem to have preempted the expected relationship between the IVs and DV. Chapter III also includes a discussion of Nigeria’s role in the continent’s consideration of the ACRF proposal. Although Nigeria was disqualified from participation, as a regional and continental power its position likely influenced opens decisions. The thesis then concludes with a summary of findings, and a discussion of their implications for USAFRICOM.
II. EFFECT OF DPSD SOURCE AND MESSAGE ON DECISIONS
OF PROSPECTIVE ACRF PARTICIPANTS

Since the ACRF proposal required the immediate creation
of a force capable of deploying within a short time, ten
states were asked to join at its inception. Two of the ten
received private invitations.25 "The invited provider
states were selected on the grounds of good governance,
security force capacity, and military proficiency to meet
the near term deadline for establishing an operational
force. It was anticipated that seven of these would be force
providers (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Mali, Ghana, Senegal,
and Tanzania) and that the eighth, South Africa, would
assume responsibility for command and control as the force
enabler.26 While many states were suitable as force
providers, South Africa was the only real candidate for a
force enabler role.27 Being the force enabler for ACRF
required providing the headquarters element of the ten
battalion sized brigade. The primary enabling function of

25 Chris Mcgreal, "Africans Give Christopher Cool Response; President
Moi of Kenya Barely Hid his Hostility towards America," The Guardian
(London) October 12, 1996, 13. The two private invitees are most likely
Botswana and Malawi, which were not publicly invited to participate but
announced their agreement to participate in 1997. Eric Berman and Katie
E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva;
Pretoria: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Institute

26 Eugene M. Mensch II, US Army Attaché, Pretoria, South Africa,

27 Eugene M. Mensch II, US Army Attaché, Pretoria, South Africa,
ineligibility, Kenya’s refusal to join, and Ethiopia’s acceptance only
as a force provider, South Africa became the only realistic candidate to
command the force. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was
also approached as a candidate for the force enabler role, but the
primary reason for SADC’s candidacy was again South Africa’s
capabilities, "U.S. 'Will Do Its Part' in Africa," AllAfrica.com,
October 13, 1996.
the brigade headquarters would be to command and control (C2) the ACRF through its deployment and operation. As a result, despite the title, the ACRF possessed restricted membership by design, but was still broad enough to yield an independent deployable brigade.28

The following DSPD analysis focuses on the eight countries that were asked publicly to participate. Since the focus of the study is public diplomacy, private invitations and closed channel processes are excluded from analysis, with the recognition that excluded private communications may have effects on outcomes that are not captured in the analysis. Due to a combination of the force’s hasty conception and short lifespan, the preponderance of DSPD for the ACRF proposal centered on Secretary of State, Warren Christopher’s six day trip to Africa during October 1996.29 Details of Christopher’s first and only trip to Africa, and its purpose of creating a continental peacekeeping force, became public knowledge on September, 29, 1996.30 On October 9, Christopher arrived in Bamako, Mali. Mali publicly accepted the ACRF proposal on the same day.31 The next day, Christopher departed for Addis Abba, Ethiopia for an OAU conference. At the conference,

Christopher discussed and promoted the merits of the ACRF.\textsuperscript{32} On October 11, he flew to Arusha, Tanzania where Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were offered ACRF membership. Uganda accepted the proposal while Kenya declined.\textsuperscript{33} On October 12 and 13, Christopher engaged President Mandela in South Africa. Mandela agreed with the broad concept, in that a regional peacekeeping force could promote security and stability, but rejected the ACRF based on the lack of consultation with Africans before the plan was announced, and concerns about the U.S., rather than the UN, being in a position to affect its operation.\textsuperscript{34} Following these public comments, Christopher and other U.S. officials engaged Mandela in further rounds of discussion, establishing a collegial exchange not in evidence elsewhere.

On October 14, Ethiopia announced its acceptance of the proposal, pledging to supply two battalions of soldiers.\textsuperscript{35}

The same day, Christopher flew to Luanda, Angola, on other
business, before returning to the U.S. on October 15.\textsuperscript{36} On October 28, both Ghana and Tanzania publicly announced their acceptance of the ACRF.\textsuperscript{37} The only other act in the DSPD as it relates to the ACRF, was a high level military visit to Senegal on January 7, 1997 to discuss the details of the ACRF. This announcement confirmed Senegal’s private acceptance of ACRF.

After six months of private diplomacy targeting the two states that had not accepted ACRF, Kenya and South Africa, the U.S. ceased use of the term ACRF, and moved ahead with the ACRI training program in July. This was a response to the failure to secure a force enabler, even though hopes remained that South Africa might later take on the role. When South Africa did not, ACRI became a bilateral program for training forces to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.

Overall, Christopher’s trip netted six acceptances and two rejections for the ACRF.

A. SELLING THE ACRF TO THE FORCE PROVIDERS AND ENABLER

To evaluate the DSPD process, this study used Lexis Nexis Academic, Proquest and Torpedo Ultra database searches of the world news media. Each instance of defense support for the bid from its announcement in September 1996 to its \textit{de facto} abandonment in July 1997 was coded as a relevant message. Each instance of direct and related DSPD in the


\textsuperscript{37} "Five ECOWAS Members Agree to Send Troops for Peacekeeping," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 11, 1996.
media reports was then coded for its source, message objective, and venue. Due to the short duration of the DSPD process, the invited participant states are evaluated together in the following analysis.

1. DSPD Source

The primary source used in the DSPD process for all eight states, and the only one for six of them, was Secretary of State Christopher, an exceptionally high level source for Sub-Saharan Africa, who brought the message to the continent.38 In Ethiopian, multiple engagements on military-to-military matters preceding the ACRF proposal served as DSPD for the ACRF although not originally intended as such.

First, on February 7, 1996, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Vincent Kern visited Addis Ababa and pledged assistance to the Ethiopian army in discussions with the Ethiopian Parliamentary Defense Committee, led by House Speaker Dawit Yohannes.39 Kern was a medium level source. Next, on April 26, 1996, the day the United Nations called for sanctions against Sudan, CIA Director John Deutch visited Ethiopia. On June 20, 1996 a high level U.S. military delegation led by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston met with Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense

Minister Tamirat Layne to discuss ways of beefing up the organizational capacity of the Ethiopian air force.\textsuperscript{40} Deutch and Ralston were both high level sources.

In the Ghanaian case, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose held discussions reported to have dealt with ACRF behind closed doors with President Jerry Rawlings immediately preceding Christopher’s trip.\textsuperscript{41} Moose was a medium level source.

Overall then, the sources used in the DSPD process for the ACRF are surprisingly few, and infrequently employed given the scope of the proposal being made. For Ethiopia, the level and frequency of sources utilized resulted from the pre-existing trajectory of Ethiopian and U.S. relations that aligned with the ACRF proposal largely unintentionally. Secretary Moose’s visit to Ghana represented a lower level source which, while directly supporting the ACRF proposal, was motivated primarily by other foreign policy initiatives. Thus, it seems clear that the DSPD strategy associated with ACRF was very limited even within the context of the time available.

\section*{2. DSPD Message Objective}

While the content of the DSPD message was consistently a request for participation in the ACRF, the message objective varied across countries. The most common objective was ‘convince,’ seeking to achieve immediate target audience consent. Because of the limited DSPD

\textsuperscript{40} "Ethiopian Deputy PM Meets US Military Delegation," Xinhua News Agency, June 20, 1996.

occurrences connected with the proposal, the single, short fused offer associated with Christopher’s visit is classified as ‘convince’ for Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and Senegal. In the case of Ethiopia, even though Secretary Christopher made the same offer for the ACRF, the DSPD interaction with Ethiopia in the months prior to Christopher’s visit established a shaping objective, since the ACRF proposal came in the context of ongoing consultations over a larger program of cooperation between the U.S. and Ethiopian armed forces. In South Africa, the open discussion between Mandela and Christopher indicates a shift in objective from ‘convince’ to ‘influence’, attempting to achieve near term (rather than immediate) target audience consent.

3. DSPD Venue

The DSPD venue was external to the target audience in Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, and resident from the other five states. Prior to the proposal, Ghana and Ethiopia received resident bilateral DSPD communications from U.S. officials. During Christopher’s visit, Mali and South Africa received similar resident bilateral communications. Christopher visited Ethiopia to address the OAU, and actually discussed the ACRF proposal with Ethiopian officials in Arusha, Tanzania, along with officials from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. After the proposal tour, the only DSPD related to the ACRF was a bilateral meeting in Senegal. Thus, all of the communications for ACRF were delivered on the African continent, although not always in the target state’s own
country. Give that the proposal was for a multilateral initiative, the mix of resident and external but continental contacts was perhaps appropriate.

4. DSPD Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

For Mali, the immediate lead acceptances of the proposal constituted a soft accept. Uganda’s and Tanzania’s delayed acceptance, without a definitive promise of pledging troops is considered a soft accept. Kenya immediately rejected the ACRF, making the DSPD MOE a hard reject. South Africa’s response was delayed as was the acceptance of Uganda and Tanzania and therefore considered soft since it involved consideration. Although Senegal eventually accepted the ACRF, initially the nation provided no public response to the offer. In January 1997, Senegal softly accepted the ACRF, making its MOE a soft accept.

5. Findings

Overall, source level does not appear to have significantly affected the probable acceptance of the ACRF by target states. The source was consistently high level, which cannot explain the variation in acceptance/rejection. Frequency does not appear to explain variations either, as the strongest acceptances came from Mali and Ethiopia, on opposite ends of the frequency spectrum. Similarly, there is no clear correlation between message objective and acceptance or rejection. Countries that received ‘convince’ objectives accepted and declined, while those that received softer objectives also went both ways, Ethiopia accepting and South Africa declining. Venue also does not appear to
have significantly affected the probability of acceptance. Of the three nations that received the ACRF proposal external to their target audience, two (Ghana and Uganda) accepted the proposal. Of the five nations that received the ACRF proposal with their target audiences, South Africa was the only nation to reject the offer. While a higher percentage of nations accepted the ACRF proposal when it was pitched a resident venue with the target audience (80% to 66%) the evidence nevertheless suggests that venue did not significantly affect the probability of acceptance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Audience</th>
<th>Source Level</th>
<th>Message Objective</th>
<th>Message Venue</th>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Hypothesis Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>High/Medium</td>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Convince</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Convince</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>High/Medium</td>
<td>Shape</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Convince</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Influence</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. ACRF DSPD Assessment
B. CONCLUSION

Based on the inconsistent results across cases, the study’s hypothesis is not supported. The failure of the theory to predict outcomes correctly suggests that country specific contextual factors are more important than originally theorized. The impromptu manner and the short lifespan of the ACRF meant that decisions were significantly affected by the state of each country’s relationship with the U.S. at the precise moment the proposal was launched. As a result of this conclusion, the next chapter will attempt to identify and analyze the effect of such factors.
III. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE DPSD SOURCE, MESSAGE AND EFFECT ON THE ACRF PROPOSAL

This chapter argues that because no time existed to implement a well thought out marketing strategy, decisions by target states were made largely based on inertia – those with good U.S. relations that year were inclined to support the proposal, those without were not. This chapter is dedicated to an assessment of how bilateral relations shaped responses to the ACRF proposal. It concludes with a discussion of the lateral role of Nigeria’s exclusion from the ACRF.

At the most general level, responses of African states to U.S. initiatives reflect the history of U.S. relations with the continent. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman J. Cohen asserted in 1995 that he had yet to see a credible definition of U.S. national security interests on the continent beyond the Israel-Egypt-Persian Gulf nexus. Africanist scholar Peter J. Schraeder concurred, arguing in 1994 that: “No other continent has been so consistently ignored by our policy-makers, and yet none but Europe has been so continually connected to important developments in America.” Official U.S. policy in the 1990s more or less embraced this marginalization of Africa. The 1998 U.S. National Security Strategy defines

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Africa as the lowest priority amongst the world’s regions. However, even at the time there were indications of the growing importance of Sub-Saharan Africa for the U.S. For instance, the U.S. military used force in Africa more than any other geographic region during the 1990s, but listed it as the least important geographic area in its official security strategy. East Africa was expecting more attention given the evolving primacy of U.S. Central Command military operations in the Middle East, even as the U.S. considered abandoning the region since it saw no significant post-Cold War interests there. But even as the U.S. attempted to turn away from Africa, the continent’s weak states and humanitarian crises threatened to require continuous U.S. involvement. Out of this context came the proposal for the ACRF, perceived as a similar blend of engagement and dismissal. In turn, we might expect African states varied responses to be equally ambivalent.

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A. THE MODAL RESPONSE TO ACRF: SOFT ACCEPT

The most common response to the ACRF proposal was to take it under advisement and then quietly accept it without making any concrete offer of troops or other support. From an objective point of view this would have to be judged a logical response from small weak states to a superpower proposal about which many had doubts. The states that made this decision generally had limited but good relations with the U.S. None were regional powers, and thus none saw themselves as major players beyond their own borders. When there were no contextual factors pushing them to a more enthusiastic embrace of multilateral security cooperation with the U.S., and none pushing them away from it, target audiences consistently made a soft accept decision, anticipating small direct and indirect benefits and minimal costs.

1. Uganda

By the mid 1990s, Uganda was being praised by the U.S. for its success in moving beyond its previous chaotic conditions and creating a constitutional government, economic reform, and creating a sense of future optimism.\textsuperscript{50} Uganda still faced significant internal security problems from the low intensity insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance

\textsuperscript{49} Steven Metz, \textit{Refining American Strategy in Africa} (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 7-12.
Army to the fallout from the Rwandan genocide, which included instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), and the creeping genocide in Burundi. Most worrisome from the Ugandan perspective was the security threat posed by Sudan on its northern border. The idea that Uganda had an interest in regional peacekeeping was supported by the series of letters from President Museveni to the UN Security Council asking for action against Sudan. Shared security concerns in the East African sub-region acted as an additional driving factor in establishing close friendly relations between Uganda and the United States.

Nevertheless, President Museveni was not inclined to embrace a singular alliance with the United States, seeking instead to build a network of alliances to better serve Ugandan interests. He hosted U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown as the two promoted their shared commitment to ‘trade not aid.’ The high level visit signaled a new era in the Uganda-United States relationship, after decades of state

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53 Uganda, Letters dated 96/04/15, 96/06/24, 96/08/30 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (New York: UN); Letter dated 96/05/20 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (New York: UN, 1996).

54 Radio Uganda, "Uganda; Visiting US Commerce Secretary Says USA is Pleased with Uganda's Reforms," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, February 26, 1996.
collapse and violence in Uganda. However, Museveni’s government also hosted the President Rafsanjani of Iran, to the dissatisfaction of the U.S. government. The small, but politically important Ugandan Muslim population turned up in droves to see Rafsanjani. Like Brown, Rafsanjani brought a message of goodwill and economic investment, providing Uganda improved prospects for growth.

This broad appeal to outside partners explains why Uganda chose a soft rather than hard accept, despite its many shared interests and relatively strong relationship with the U.S.

2. Tanzania

Given its early embrace of African Socialism, Tanzania had always been committed to non-alignment. Nevertheless, by the 1990s, Tanzania like other African countries, had accepted the necessity of political and economic cooperation with the West, and was implementing political and economic liberalization. Tanzania’s position on the continent was somewhat paradoxical, having always played a leadership role on Southern and East African issues, while being extremely dependent on external aid.

Between late 1994 and 1996, Tanzania had to deal with a considerable refugee problem stemming from the Rwanda genocide. Nearly a million Hutu refugees residing in Tanzania feared reprisals from the now Tutsi led government.

57 Ibid., 188.
in Rwanda, and refused to return home. This problem would have been significantly exacerbated by an increase in violence in Burundi; indeed Tanzania was already receiving Burundian refugees on a daily basis. Thus, Tanzania shared U.S. concerns over Burundi, but lacked the stronger security concerns associated with the threat from a radical Islamist government in Sudan. Beyond that, U.S.-Tanzania relations were positive, but very limited, predisposing Tanzania to a soft accept of ACRF.

3. Ghana

Ghana’s move towards democratization became apparent in 1996, following a flawed election in 1992 that represented an engineered civilianization of Rawlings’ military rule. This liberalization, particularly the opening of political space for the growth of civic institutions, produced a favorable response from the United States, and led to improved relations between the two countries.58 It is significant that the December 1996 elections were imminent when the ACRF was proposed, since Ghana’s selection as one of the ‘democratic’ states tended to legitimize President Rawlings’ claim to have transformed himself fully from coup maker to democratic leader.59 In addition, Ghana’s willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions, and demonstrated ability to do so professionally, led the U.S.

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to seek improved relations with it.\textsuperscript{60} At the same time, the unpredictability of events in conflict-ridden West Africa during the 1990s heightened Ghana’s interest in improving the continent’s security architecture.\textsuperscript{61} Thus, U.S.-Ghanaian relations were on a favorable trajectory when ACRF was proposed, which made Ghana more inclined to support it. On the other hand, the relationship was not so strong as to eliminate Ghana’s need to accommodate the sub-region’s natural hegemony and would-be peacekeeper, Nigeria.

4. Senegal

Senegal and the U.S. were drifting toward favorable relations based on mutual interests at the time of the ACRF. In addition to sharing Ghana’s regional security concerns, Senegal was seeking to diversify its partnerships amongst Western states as a means of balancing its strong relationship and heavy dependence on France, while boosting its role as a regional actor in competition with Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{62} This reorientation had been demonstrated by Senegal’s deployment of forces in support of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia with U.S. encouragement and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Alassane Fall, \textit{Senegal between France and the United States of America: Foreign Policy, Cooperation and Conflict} (M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, International Studies, 2004).}
\end{footnotes}
assistance, and in the face of French opposition. Initially, Senegal did not publicly accept or reject the ACRF proposal, to which France openly objected. Senegal had to walk a delicate line between its traditional patron and its new one. As a result, Senegal took a low visibility position, accepting ACRF only privately, and softly.

B. ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT FOR ACRF

1. Ethiopia

Ethiopia was the only target state to strongly embrace ACRF, which it did based on significant shared security interests with the U.S. and more serious engagement by the U.S. in the years before the proposal. The fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Marxist government in 1991 had created an opportunity for renewal of the historically close U.S.-Ethiopian relationship. The U.S. government supported the rebel Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s transition to power in Addis Ababa by negotiation and by facilitating a soft landing and a smooth withdrawal of government forces. The U.S. went on to work with the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) as it established itself and consolidated its authority, supporting its efforts to achieve democratization, human rights and


economic reform.\textsuperscript{65} Within thirty months of assuming power, the TGE conducted a marginally successful national election, drafted a constitution and established a fundamentally democratic government.\textsuperscript{66} In a July 1994 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary of State George E. Moose stated that the two countries’ relationship rested upon common regional interests, including in Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda.\textsuperscript{67} This assessment was shared by Ethiopia.

There are many contributing factors to success of the renewal of U.S.-Ethiopian relations, but military concerns, as always, played a prominent role in shaping the bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{68} U.S.-Ethiopian relations were rooted in military strategy from the time of the Second World War until the Marxist revolution of 1974.\textsuperscript{69} The end of the Cold War significantly altered the geographical importance of the Horn of Africa, but the rise of the threat of radical Islam immediately thereafter, especially in Sudan, presented new

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Kinfe Abraham, Ethiopia: from Bullets to the Ballot Box: The Bumpy Road to Democracy and the Political Economy of Transition (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
opportunities for U.S.-Ethiopian cooperation and a new
impetus for both to strengthen military-to-military
relations between the two states.\textsuperscript{70}

With the exception of the period of Marxist rule (1974-
1991), the United States and Ethiopia had always possessed a
unique relationship. During the first part of the Cold War,
the United States cultivated its relationship with Ethiopia
for its geographical position on the Red Sea. Beyond
Ethiopia’s favorable maritime positioning, the U.S. base at
Kagnew was an invaluable resource for signals intelligence
against the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{71} The fundamentally
conservative Christian monarchy in Ethiopia looked to the
United States for support against threatening ideologies and
neighbors. Then came Marxist rule, when the U.S. adopted a
regional containment policy, switching its support and
assets to neighboring Somalia, as the Mengistu government
aligned with the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{72} It was only
beginning again in 1991 that the two nations resumed
favorable relations.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{70} Peter Woodward, \textit{US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa}
Schraeder, \textit{United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism,
Crisis, and Change} (Cambridge Studies in International Relations,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 31, 167-180; Sam Makinda,
\textit{Security in the Horn of Africa} (London: Brassey's for the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992).

\textsuperscript{71} Michela Wrong, \textit{I Didn't Do It for You: How the World Betrayed a

\textsuperscript{72} Paul B. Henze, \textit{The Ethiopian Revolution: Mythology and History}

\textsuperscript{73} Redie Bereketeab, \textit{Eritrea: The Making of a Nation} (Trenton, NJ:
Red Sea Press, 2007), 48; Clement E. Adibe and David R. Black, “The
Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Ottawa, Canada,” \textit{The
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(London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1992).
However, the renewal of favorable U.S.-Ethiopia relations represented more than a return to the status quo. The end of the Cold War further strengthened U.S.-Ethiopian relations by eliminating external competition for influence in the region and allowing the two states to cooperate on addressing security concerns across the Horn of Africa. This context explains Ethiopia’s extraordinary enthusiasm for extending its growing military-to-military partnership with the U.S. in general, and participation in the ACRF in particular.

2. Mali

Mali’s strong accept of ACRF is a bit more difficult to explain. Mali had made great strides in political liberalization in the early 1990s and improved its relationship with the U.S., as had the other soft accept states. In terms of military-to-military relations, the U.S. was contributing $1 million in funding for Mali’s demobilization of its Northern Tuareg rebel group at the end of a five year low intensity civil war. This would have been supplemented by ACRF training for Mali’s armed forces. Thus, the most reasonable explanation for Mali’s greater than average enthusiasm for ACRF is the ongoing military-to-military relationship, much as in the case of Ethiopia, but with a national rather than a regional focus.


C. HARD REJECTION

1. Kenya

In contrast with the general trend toward improved bilateral relations in the early 1990s, the U.S.-Kenyan relationship, always one of the strongest on the continent, became more rather than less strained after the end of the Cold War. Kenya’s Cold War strategic security importance to the U.S. dwindled, while it played a much smaller role than Ethiopia in containing radical Islam in Sudan. In addition, the Moi government swam against the current, resisting pressure from the U.S. and other Western states for democratic reform. In response, the U.S. withdrew most if its support to Kenya, launching a campaign in 1992 to freeze western and multilateral aid until multiparty democracy was adopted.

As the United States promoted its democratization policy across Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was singled out as a constant target of criticism, even as equally non-democratic governments, such as that in Uganda, were silently embraced by the U.S.\(^\text{76}\) The Moi government considered this a betrayal of its support for the U.S. during the Cold War, when most other African states turned to the left.\(^\text{77}\) In January 1996, Congressman John Porter referred a resolution entitled the Kenya Human Rights Initiative (KHRI) to the House Africa Sub-Committee.


The increasingly hard line U.S. stance on democracy in Kenya was personified by its new Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell. Ambassador Bushnell was unpopular with the Kenyan target audience for her open criticism of the Moi government, which differed greatly from her predecessor Ambassador Brazeal’s less critical brand of diplomacy. Ambassador Bushnell employed a hard line approach in an attempt to force President Moi to initiate reforms, tackle corruption and incorporate democratic institutions.

A series of unpopular American government efforts, however morally and politically justified, established a baseline disinclination to cooperate with the U.S. in general, and ACRF in particular, among the Kenyan target audience. Yet, Kenya was courted to lead ‘African solutions for African problems,’ even as it was chastised for failing to create democratic intuitions, institutions which it claimed were un-African.78 The tension between encouraging Kenyan to participate in regional security engagements, while simultaneously pressuring it to adopt political reforms that threatened the incumbent’s political survival, culminated first in Kenya’s firm and immediate refusal to support ACRF, and then in the United States declaring Kenya ineligible for the follow-on African Crisis Response Initiative based on its non-democratic governance.

By the summer of 1996, Kenya’s position on sending forces into Burundi was outright negative. At a conference called by Burundi’s president, President Moi, despite pressure from the United States and the European Union,

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explicitly stated his opposition to any intervention in Burundi without the consent of all involved participants.\textsuperscript{79}

D. SOFT REJECTION

1. South Africa

In April 1994, the Republic of South Africa held its first elections not governed by racist apartheid laws.\textsuperscript{80} The elections not only marked the end of apartheid, but a return of South Africa to the fold of the international community. President Mandela’s election was one of the most important political transitions in modern history.\textsuperscript{81} Prior to the elections, the U.S. was cautious regarding the consequences of the transition from a regime with which it had formally had good relations, to a new government led by a Marxist liberation organization it once listed as a terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{82}

Both before and after the 1994 elections, the United States sought to support a smooth transition and to bolster non-racial democracy, while supporting economic growth and


The two states established a bilateral commission to supplement traditional diplomatic channels to facilitate cooperation on issues of mutual concern. Interaction between the two countries during South Africa’s transition to democratic rule illustrates three important facets of relations during the period when ACRF was being proposed. First, South Africa is clearly a giant in Sub-Saharan Africa destined to play a large role on the continent. Secondly, the political and ideological trajectory of South Africa coincided with U.S. diplomatic, national security, economic and informational goals during the post Cold War period allowing for a more common base on which to build relations. Finally, despite many shared interests, South Africa was clear that it would make its own path in the new world order because its foreign policy was in many ways dominated by domestic issues in the 1990s. These three factors played a significant role in South Africa’s soft rejection of ACRF.


84 As a testament to the uniqueness of this arrangement, the United States had only done this twice before with Russia and Egypt, Stephen Wright, African Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 95.


The South African Defense Forces (SADF) were the most competent and professional force on the continent. In addition, the SADF had played a positive role in the transition from apartheid, and remained professional and loyal to the new democratic black-led government. However, while South Africa clearly had the capacity to exercise military leadership on the continent, its forces were in the midst of a transition from white-dominated military that had played a large role in suppressing the democratic transition, to a multiracial military that served all its citizens, under firm democratic civilian control. This required rapid training and advancement of black officers who would benefit from favorable engagement on a military-to-military level with the United States. Mandela understood South Africa’s natural responsibility to the continent, but he also understood his government’s very significant challenges in the realm of difficult political, economic, and social transformations at home. On balance, this led his government to undertake military engagements on the continent selectively and carefully.

The African National Congress (ANC) government was ambivalent in its relations with the United States. The U.S. anti-apartheid movement had been of significant support.

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and the U.S. government has also supported the transition, if belatedly. However, the U.S. government had staunchly opposed the ANC for decades, and in the 1990s the ANC and Mandela remained on the U.S. State Department’s terrorist list. In addition, the ANC remained committed to friendly relations with those who supported its liberation struggle, to include Iran, Cuba, and Libya. This served as an irritant to the U.S. Thus, there was a significant gap between the idealism of shared values between the two countries, and the reality of lingering tension over world affairs.91

An additional key element in South Africa’s foreign policy and external relations is its position in and with sub-regional organizations.92 South Africa has a rational interest in supporting the South African Development Community (SADC) for a number of reasons. First, SADC was initially formed to contain South African dominance in the region, and the change of regime in 1994 did not immediately eliminate the concerns of neighbors about its political, military, and economic dominance. Second, the many cross border issues in the region blur the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, and require multilateral solutions.93 This means South Africa views SADC’s success as a vital national interest, and is careful to act in consultation with it.94 South Africa wanted the ACRF integrated into the UN, OAU, and SADC frameworks both as a

92 Ibid., 55.
93 Ibid., 59.
94 Ibid., 38.
means to reduce U.S. influence over its use and as a means to support more truly African solutions to African problems, much as major powers generally prefer UN action to unilateral action on security issues. As a result, South Africa was willing to entertain the ACRF proposal, but not to accept it on the terms, which ultimately led to its soft reject decision.

E. NIGERIA’S SPOILER ROLE

Nigeria, a major power in West Africa, was prohibited from ACRF participation due its military regime. Nigeria played a central role in the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) security apparatus, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). If the motivation behind the ACRF proposal was “African Solutions for African Problems,” ECOMOG represented a viable, existing United Nations sanctioned force for dealing with African regional security issues. Therefore, the prohibition on Nigerian involvement represented a tacit rejection of the concept of possible, partial or full partnership with a pre-existing and active African crisis response capable force. ECOMOG’s poor performance as a crisis response force in Liberia and Sierra

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97 UN, Security Council (51st year), President, Statement (New York: UN, 1996).

Leone suggested a definite need for training to better fulfill ECOWAS' political will in order will to resolve regional security issues.\textsuperscript{99}

Despite Nigeria’s prohibition from the ACRF, the United States provided $20 million dollars to fund ECOMOG in September 1996. However, approximately one week prior to Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s African ACRF trip, President Clinton, in a White House memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, directed the following:

I therefore direct the drawdown from the inventory and resources of the Department of Defense of an aggregate value not to exceed $10 million in commodities and services to provide assistance to states currently participating (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali), and for those states that may in the future participate, in ECOMOG to enhance ECOMOG's peacekeeping capabilities to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis in Liberia.\textsuperscript{100}

Since Nigeria provided the majority of ECOMOG’s financial support, the move affected Nigeria almost exclusively. If dollars serve as a barometer of political and military support, the drop in funding for ECOMOG can be considered both telling and confusing given the ACRF timeframe. Since, at the same time $10 million was being withdrawn from ECOMOG, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was offering a $20 million initial pledge for the ACRF, with a promise to pay a share of the estimated $20-45 million follow-on establishment costs, followed by an annual sum of


\textsuperscript{100} "Text of Memo from President Clinton to Secretaries of State, Defense," U.S. Newswire, October 1, 1996.
$5 million for the Force’s sustainment. Some might view the drop in financial support to ECOMOG timed with the pledge of support to the ACRF as a means to garner democratic West African states’ support for ACRF, while marginalizing the Nigerian led ECOMOG. This guaranteed Nigerian opposition, which could not have helped the ACRF proposal.

F. CONCLUSION

While the analysis in this chapter is necessarily impressionistic, it nevertheless suggests that bilateral relations and individual states’ interests, as they perceived them, were the key decisions related to acceptance or rejection of ACRF. This means that the efficacy of DSPD strategies was, and will likely remain, bounded by these larger international relations and foreign policy factors, and that the U.S. government cannot approach African states as if they are all largely the same.


IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis set out to evaluate the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DPSD) sources and messages using the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as a case study. The thesis’ hypothesis posited a high level source, employing a shaping message aimed at the target audience in the target’s venue would yield the strongest acceptance. The hypothesis was disproved based on the analysis of available evidence. However, further analysis of the impact of bilateral relationships on the decisions of African target states provides some insight into why simply the message, messenger, and venue are insufficient.

Favorable relationships tend to make impromptu offers work. When a security challenge emerges such as trouble in Burundi, the pre-existing relationship can make the message objective appear as informative, shaping and influencing versus a convincing ultimatum. This suggests a necessary persistence in the DSPD process to develop, maintain and sustain relations translates into a long term strategy that can accommodate near term dilemmas. Though not explicitly related to the ACRF, the frequent military-to-military interaction between Ethiopia and the U.S. made the ACRF offer, despite the proposal’s reactionary and impromptu manner, a next step in course of the to nation’s relationship. The same conclusion can be drawn from the Ghana case. By applying the same set of logic, the downturn between Kenya and the U.S.’s relationship would require
greater DSPD efforts. The nature of the pre-existing relationship directly relates to the efficiency of the DSPD process therefore should not be ignored.

From an external position, context directly affects the message, destination and effect. In terms of best practices, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal rank as the top examples in DPSD for the ACRF while Kenya and South Africa merited modification. Even though the success of the Ethiopian case was due to renewed relations based on mutual security concerns, the approach, using constant and meaningful DSPD, resulted in Ethiopia’s hard accept. Using a similar line of approach, Secretary Moose’s preparatory trip to Ghana before his very public proposal helped in gaining Ghana’s soft acceptance. Although still a best practice example, Senegal’s success drastically differs from the high profile approaches used in Ethiopia and Ghana. Predicated on Senegal’s need to walk a delicate line given its relationship with France and the U.S., a private approach eventually netted a soft acceptance.

In looking at Kenya, the U.S.-Ethiopian example of renewing historically close ties should have been employed. If time did not permit the use of this approach, the U.S. could have weighed the risk of receiving a hard reject and could have employed a more informed proposal instead. Similarly, looking at the favorable relationship between South Africa and the U.S., an opportunity was missed to inform the South African audience of the U.S. desire to create the ACRF before it was publicly broached on a high profile trip. Mandela’s critiques regarding the ACRF’s failure to integrate with regional organizations and the
ACRF’s selective membership could have been rethought. Adjustments then could have been made to earn South Africa’s buy-in, especially since South Africa was the best candidate to assume ACRF’s command and control role.

As a result, the figure used to depict Schramm’s heuristic to explain the thesis’ hypothesis would be revised to include the role and impact of context in any DSPD. It should be noted that context equally applies to an internal and external role. The internal role in Shramm’s communication heuristic applies the source. During the ACRF proposal, the U.S. public diplomacy and DSPD never took an introspective look at the very transparent nature of the ACRF in that the proposal reflected the standard criticism of U.S. policy and action in Africa. Consequently, had the U.S. looked at it its motivations, it would have seen the true nature of the ACRF.

As seen with the South Africa case, product always matters in the sales process. President Mandela’s public rationale for the rejection accurately identified the conceptual flaws of the ACRF. While military strategy is subordinate to national strategy, the DSPD process requires good public policy to make the process effective. This is not to say that the ACRF was a poor idea without merit. As stated in the introduction, multiple African regional peacekeeping forces emerged that closely resembled the ACRF within several years of the proposal’s demise. That suggest that a better conceived DSPD could have helped sell the proposal. In a sense, what ended up being the final proposal, could have been a starting point for mutual dialogue between the U.S. and the targeted nations.
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