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THESIS

THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE:
WIN, LOSE, AND DRAW

by

William “Dave” Driver
Bruce E. DeFeyter

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Thesis Advisor: Gordon McCormick
Second Reader: George Lober

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**Title:** The Theory of Unconventional Warfare: Win, Lose, and Draw  

**Authors:** MAJ William “Dave” Driver and CW3 Bruce E. DeFeyter  

**Abstract:** Clausewitz states that “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense” and to defeat ‘the stronger form of warfare’ “an army’s best weapon is superior numbers.” Given these two facts, how do special operations forces defeat numerically superior forces fighting in the defense? William H. McRaven’s book, *Spec Ops*, lays out a theory of special operations and six principles that are “applicable across the spectrum of special operations” (McRaven, 1995, p. 3). McRaven’s thesis postulates that numerically inferior forces can obtain Relative Superiority for short duration through the use of the six principles of special operations. McRaven’s thesis is focused on the direct component of special operations. The theory, arguably, does not cover the full range of special operations; specifically it fails to address the indirect component of special operations, Unconventional Warfare. Given that the defense is the superior form of warfare and numbers count, the question emerges, how can a sponsored insurgent organization or resistance movement defeat the state, which begins with an opening advantage of vastly superior numbers and already in the defense posture? The answer may be found in the flip side of McRaven’s Theory of Relative Superiority, or more accurately, the Indirect Theory of Relative Superiority. Indirect Relative Superiority is achieved when a counter state gains and maintains a decisive advantage over a state in an armed political struggle. We hypothesize that numerically inferior forces can obtain Relative Superiority over time through the use of six principles of Indirect Offensive Operations: Security, Networking, Purpose, Indoctrination, Influence, and Agility.
THE THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: WIN, LOSE, AND DRAW

William “Dave” Driver
Major, Special Forces
B.A. Political Science, Augusta State University 1996

Bruce E. DeFeyter
Chief Warrant Officer 3, United States Army
B.S. Liberal Studies, Excelsior College, 2005

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2008

Authors: William “Dave” Driver
Bruce E. DeFeyter

Approved by: Gordon McCormick
Thesis Advisor

George Lober
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis
ABSTRACT

Clausewitz states that “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense” and to defeat ‘the stronger form of warfare’ “an army’s best weapon is superior numbers.” Given these two facts, how do special operations forces defeat numerically superior forces fighting in the defense? William H. McRaven’s book, Spec Ops, lays out a theory of special operations and six principles that are “applicable across the spectrum of special operations” (McRaven, 1995, p. 3). McRaven’s thesis postulates that numerically inferior forces can obtain Relative Superiority for short duration through the use of the six principles of special operations. McRaven’s thesis is focused on the direct component of special operations. The theory, arguably, does not cover the full range of special operations; specifically it fails to address the indirect component of special operations, Unconventional Warfare. Given that the defense is the superior form of warfare and numbers count, the question emerges, how can a sponsored insurgent organization or resistance movement defeat the state, which begins with an opening advantage of vastly superior numbers and already in the defense posture? The answer may be found on the flip side of McRaven’s Theory of Relative Superiority, or more accurately, the Indirect Theory of Relative Superiority. Indirect Relative Superiority is achieved when a counter state gains and maintains a decisive advantage over a state in an armed political struggle. We hypothesize that numerically inferior forces can obtain Relative Superiority over time through the use of six principles of Indirect Offensive Operations: Security, Networking, Purpose, Indoctrination, Influence, and Agility
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William (Dave) Driver
I. REVISITING MCRAVEN’S THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

William H. McRaven’s book *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* has been translated into over a dozen languages and is highly influential in the special operations community. In his book, McRaven describes a theory of Special Operations based on a concept he refers to as Relative Superiority and the six principles related to it (McRaven 1995). In order to develop his theory of special operations, McRaven limits the scope of special operations to his own pared-down definition. The JP 3-05 definition of special operations at the time of his book’s publishing was:

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independent or in coordination with operations of conventional, non special operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in the degree of physical or political risk, operational techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 3-05, 1992)\(^1\)

\(^1\) The most current joint definition of special operations is:

Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 3-05, 1992)
For McRaven, “a special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative” (McRaven, 1995, p. 2). While his more narrow definition of special operations is not as unwieldy as either JP 3-05 definition, it excludes an important component of special operations, Unconventional Warfare. Unconventional Warfare is defined as “(o)perations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations” (FM 3 05.201, 2007). According to FM 3-05.130 “(a)ll UW operations are special operations.” Unconventional warfare is indeed a special operation because one, it is outside the scope of standard military operations (Spulak, 2007) and two, the complex nature of the mission requires unusual, specialized training (JP 3-05, 1992). While McRaven concedes that the eight combat operations that he analyzed “are more closely aligned to what Joint Pub 3-05 defines as a direct-action mission” (McRaven, 1995, p. 3), he believes that his theory of special operations is applicable across the full spectrum of the (JP 3-05) definition of special operations (McRaven, 1995, p. 4). Despite McRaven’s claim, however, we argue that his theory is unsuitable for Unconventional Warfare special operations and, therefore, does not apply across all special operations.

B. MCRAVEN’S THEORY AND PRINCIPLES

McRaven begins his study with two observations from Clausewitz: “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense” and “to defeat ‘the stronger form of warfare’ an army’s best weapon is superior numbers” (McRaven, 1995, p. 3). Given these two principles, McRaven poses the question, how do special operations forces defeat numerically superior forces in the execution of their mission? McRaven’s answer is the Theory of Special Operations, which posits that numerically inferior forces can obtain relative superiority for short durations through the use of the six principles of special operations: Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed and Purpose.

According to McRaven, the key to a successful special operation is establishing relative superiority early in the operation. Relative superiority is “a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well
defended enemy” (McRaven, 1995, p. 4). The longer the operation continues, the more likely the frictions of war (the will of the enemy, chance, and uncertainty) will affect the operation. McRaven analyzes operations beginning with the Point of Vulnerability (PV), when the force reaches the enemy’s first line of defense, through mission completion. In his eight case studies, the case with the longest time span from the PV to mission completion runs just under 30 hours. In his remaining seven cases, the average time span was slightly less than seven hours.

The six principles that allow special operations forces to obtain relative superiority are Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed, and Purpose. For McRaven, simplicity is achieved by limiting the number of objectives, establishing good intelligence and employing innovation, all with a goal of reducing the operation to the most essential elements and by eliminating as many complicating factors as possible. Security is primarily the concealment of the timing and means of insertion, thus reducing the enemy’s responsiveness at the time of the attack. Repetition is applied during the preparation phase by the use of standard mission profiles to reduce the reaction times of the operators. Surprise is intended to catch the enemy off guard at the moment of execution. Speed is focused on getting the attacking force to the objective as fast as possible to prevent the enemy’s reaction from becoming an overriding factor. The last stated principle is Purpose, which essentially means that it is necessary for the attacking force to understand and then execute the prime objective of the mission, regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities. McRaven also has a seventh unstated principle: Unilateralism. In order to maintain Simplicity and Security, outside force participation from friendly forces and allies alike should be avoided.

C. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

It is our contention that William H. McRaven’s Theory of Relative Superiority and the related principles laid out in the book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice are insufficient to describe the full array of special operations missions. Although useful for commando raids, the theory and principles are

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2 From a conversation with Dr. Gordon H. McCormick.
inapplicable and, in some cases, antithetical for Unconventional Warfare. McRaven’s longest case study lasted less than 30 hours; a UW campaign typically lasts for years. The operations McRaven describes were focused on specific military targets; UW is a political form of warfare. Each of McRaven’s operations was unilateral; UW is necessarily conducted by, with and through other forces or individuals that can operate undetected in the target area.

We propose a theory of Unconventional Warfare to complement, but not supplant, McRaven’s Theory of Special Operations. We will refer to Unconventional Warfare in its traditional construction of “working by, with, or through irregular surrogates in a clandestine and/or covert manner against opposing actors” (FM3-05-130, 2008), and not in the sense of employing unconventional tactics. Although we will use U.S. military terms and jargon, this is not strictly a theory of American Unconventional Warfare.

In this thesis we propose a theory of Unconventional Warfare that includes a UW specific theory of relative superiority and six principles. Relative superiority for Unconventional Warfare is a condition that exists between the state and the sponsored insurgents. Normally a state starts with objective superiority, but determining whether the state or the insurgents have relative superiority is a function of intelligence, resources, and political opportunity structures (POS). The principles by which insurgents achieve relative superiority against the state are Security, Networking, Purpose, Indoctrination, Influence, and Agility.

---

3 UW can be in support of resistance movements or insurgents. The legal and political differences between the two are irrelevant and for the purposes of this thesis we simply call them insurgents.

4 From Gordon H. McCormick’s Seminar on Guerilla Warfare class at the Naval Postgraduate School.
II. THE THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY

William H. McRaven in his book, SPEC OPS, explored, established, and defined the concept of relative superiority; “a condition exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (McRaven, 1996, p. 4). This narrow tactical construct worked well to graphically depict how a numerically inferior Special Operations Force could successfully launch an attack and succeed against a much larger unit in the defense. Relative superiority is also a critical concept within the theory of UW. The application and definition of the term, however, is quite different from McRaven’s concept. This theory of UW postulates that Relative Superiority is a condition whereby two parties measure the relative strength of three key components; intelligence, resources, and political opportunity structures. These three conditions are necessary in order to conduct any successful insurgency or counterinsurgency. If any one of the components is missing, operations will be at best, ineffective—at worse, counterproductive.

Intelligence is information that is analyzed in context to the environment, situation, and resources. It provides the information needed to coordinate forces and determine what resources are required or opportunities are applicable. Without intelligence, any military action is, by definition, a proverbial “shot in the dark.” Generally speaking, accurate intelligence is the hardest component to acquire, much less maintain. At the beginning of the contest, the intelligence advantage generally falls on the side of the insurgent; governments are often ignorant of insurgents’ intentions, plans, and capabilities until late in the game.

Resources are those assets utilized to accomplish the mission. The assets can take the form of money, personnel, weapons, or any other tangible material goods or services. In theory, an organization with good intelligence and the requisite political opportunity, but having no resources, would fail in accomplishing its mission, or worse compromise the most valuable resource—intelligence. Generally speaking, even the most anemic government
has objective superiority in material support, personnel, and monies in stark contrast to a fledgling insurgent organization. However, with all other things being equal, resources are the easiest to component to acquire.

Doug McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald (2008) define political opportunity structures (POS) as those “political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded” (p. 3). In simpler language, these opportunities represent political “room to maneuver.” This political space is determined by how much consensus versus constraint or coercion the state needs in order to effectively govern and control the populace. Rules that are observed by consensus are effectively driven by internal standards and norms the population voluntarily submits too. For example, most people in the U.S., when driving their cars on isolated roads, in the middle of the night, will come to a complete stop at a four-way intersection with stop signs, even though there are no police visible—they stop because it is the “right” thing to do. Coercive rules on the other hand, are those rules forced on the population by law enforcement mechanisms. Case in point, those same drivers in the U.S. will reduce their speed solely by the threat of a punitive fine from the local police force. The goal for any rational governing body is to strive for compliance of consensus driven rules. In the long term, consensus is cheaper to enforce, and consensus reinforces a solid, stable, homogenous nation with shared values, thereby increasing the state’s POS. Coercive rules tend to be costly to implement and maintain. Coercive enforcement inherently causes friction with the populace and creates a POS opportunity for the insurgents (McCormick, 2007).
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between POS, consensus and coercive rules with two hypothetical countries. Theoretically, “country A” (such as Iraq, circa 2004-2006) could exist in an atmosphere where the social contract is so badly broken that amateur insurgents would find resonance and traction, thus providing the insurgency with a large POS. On the other hand, there could exist a nation (such as Norway or Sweden) where the population concedes such a high level of “consent to governance” that real armed opposition could not exist. Even if country B were populated with insurgent experts with unlimited resources, there would be virtually no POS. Technically there exists a third category, neutral efforts; these are categories of constraints that are imposed by outside organizations, such as religious affiliations. This category can be utilized by either party, the insurgent or the state.
Intelligence, resources, and political opportunity structures represent the necessary components to determine which side has the superior position when compared to the other; hence, the term relative superiority. Therefore, the theory of UW hypothesizes that relative superiority is gained when one side’s components outweigh the others in the following equation;

\[ I^2(i) \times R(i) \times \text{POS}(i) = I^2(g) \times R(g) \times \text{POS}(g) \]

This equation assumes ordinal numerical values, weighted products with whole integers. The equation is multiplied, as opposed to summed, to reflect that all components are necessary. This suggests that a single missing element would reduce the entire equation to a zero value. The intelligence (I) and resource (R) values are independent of each other (non-zero sum) to reflect reality. For instance, it is possible that both the government and the insurgent might have “perfect intelligence” on each other, reflecting a score of five, with zero being the lowest. The intelligence value is squared as a direct result of the tactical, operational, and strategic importance it has over all other components and the exponentially more difficult effort intelligence takes to acquire. The POS value is the only zero-sum figure as it relates to the other side of the equation, five being the highest value and zero being the lowest possible score (Fox, 2008).

5 This mathematical expression was originally developed by CW3 Bruce E. DeFeyter. However, the math and boundaries of the equation were significantly reworked with the help and mentorship of Dr. Gordon H. McCormick, Dr. William Fox, and Dr. Doowan Lee, Professors in the Defense Analysis Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

6 Values for intelligence reflects the following: a score of “5” reflects the ability to forecast detailed tactical, operational, and strategic information on movements, plans, and intentions of leaders and the broader organization, probably a theoretical score except in extreme cases. A score of “4” represents intelligence access to group’s operational and strategic intentions and general tactical objective. A score of “3” represents intelligence access to an organization’s strategic goals and only general operational concerns and movements. A score of “2” represents informational access to general strategic plans and intentions and limited operational aims. A score of “1” represents knowledge of the opposition. A score of “0” represents no knowledge of an organization or an POS at all—this score is usually only very temporary and is primarily a theoretical figure.

7 Values for resources reflects the following: a score of “5” reflects the ability to deploy and sustain continuous ground, air, and naval forces (when necessary) to influence and carry out specific actions. A score of “4” represents the ability to deploy those same forces but there are some limits to the ability to carry out specific actions. A score of “3” represents the ability to deploy forces with limits to the ability to sustain themselves and consequently, sever reductions in the ability to carry out orders. A score of “2” depicts the ability to deploy into a region with no capability to sustain those forces. A score of “1” depicts an organization that has the ability to deploy in limited, narrow fashion into a specific area to carry out finite actions. A score of “0” is mostly a theoretical figure, but represents an organization with no resources or ability to carry out any goals or aims.
The equation is used in a straightforward manner. For instance, in the early stages of an insurgency, the insurgent forces will have the upper hand in intelligence, because in all probability, the government is possibly not even aware of their existence. In this case the insurgent forces would get a score of four (five being the highest and zero the lowest). The government on the other hand, only vaguely aware of unrest much less an insurgency, would get a score of one. The resource advantage being in the government’s favor would give them a score of four and the insurgents, significantly smaller, would get a score of one. In this example, political opportunity is assigned a value of one to the insurgents; to reflect a fairly stable, consensus controlled population. Therefore, the equation would look like this;

\[ 4^2 (i) \times 1(i) \times 1(i) = 1^2 (g) \times 4(g) \times 4(g) \]

\[ 16(i) = 16(g) \]

\[ I = G = 0 \]

In this case neither side possesses “relative superiority.” The goal for each side is to establish dominance: the insurgents by growing in resources and expanding their political opportunities or the government by eroding the information advantage, reducing the insurgent resources, and / or closing the insurgent political opportunities.

If the insurgents were to establish a hold on the population and thereby increase their resources even negligibility over the government, keeping POS stable, the equation would look considerably different;

\[ 4^2 (i) \times 2(i) \times 1(i) = 1^2 (g) \times 4(g) \times 4(g) \]

\[ 32(i) = 16(g) \]

\[ I > G = 2 \]
The insurgents, in this hypothetical case, would have relative superiority over the government forces. However, suppose the government was to simply erode the intelligence quotient by a single degree, the equation would look notably different:

\[
3^2(i) \times 2(i) \times 1(i) = 2^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 4(g)
\]

\[
18(i) = 48(g)
\]

\[
I < G = 2.67
\]

As depicted in the example above, relative superiority would be with the government. The state would maintain that advantage until the insurgent forces could negate the intelligence loss or expand on their resources and / or political opportunities. Quantifying relative superiority has at least two advantages: first, it highlights the strategies that alter the equation, and second, it provides metrics that help determine the effectiveness of each side’s campaign over time. What’s more, these metrics can be graphically illustrated.

For instance, let us assume a hypothetical case where the insurgency and the state start out in neutral positions (such as the first example). Over the course of 18 months, the insurgency maintains the intelligence advantage and insurgent forces expand both their resources marginally and, more so, their political opportunities. Mathematically their relative superiority could be expressed in the following equations below:

Insurgency formed: \[
4^2(i) \times 1(i) \times 1(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 4(g) \] // I:G 16(i) = 16(g) // I = G = 0

Six months: \[
4^2(i) \times 1(i) \times 2(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 3(g) \] // I:G 32(i) = 12(g) // I > G = 2.6

One year: \[
4^2(i) \times 2(i) \times 2(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 3(g) \] // I:G 64(i) = 12(g) // I > G = 5.3

Eighteen months: \[
4^2(i) \times 2(i) \times 3(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 2(g) \] // I:G 96(i) = 8(g) // I > G = 12
As depicted on the previous page, it is clear the insurgency has developed a “relative superiority” over the state. Taking the example another eighteen months for illustrative purposes, let us assume the state continues to weaken and the insurgency only expands in political opportunities and forfeits further resource gains. The equation would look like this:

Three years: \[ 4^2(i) \times 2(i) \times 4(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 1(g) \] // I:G 128(i) = 4(g) // I > G = 32

Graphically depicting relative superiority against time the entire conflict would look like this:

At this point in the conflict, the insurgency, although possessing fewer resources and personnel, completely dominates the state by exploiting the insurgents’ intelligence advantage and expanding the political opportunities. In other words, at least
mathematically, the insurgents can contradict and overcome two of Clausewitz’s warfare principles—that defense is the superior form of warfare and that, in order to defeat the stronger form of warfare, the best weapon is superior numbers—thus, proving the theory of Unconventional Warfare. Putting the math aside for a moment, the insurgents can accomplish and achieve relative superiority through the six principles of UW illustrated below in the UW model.

B. THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MODEL

![Unconventional Warfare Model Diagram]

The UW model (Figure 3) is built along three phases—planning, preparation, and execution—that mirror the corresponding operating environments, clandestine, covert, and
The model is comprised of six principles that build on each other, that are not mutually exclusive, and that extend across all operating environments. Each of the principles interlocks and, when necessary, connects with the others. The UW model is built on a stable base, rather than a delicately balanced inverted pyramid such as McRaven’s Special Operations Model, in order to survive repeated setbacks in spite of a lack of money, weapons, and manpower. The UW model works for insurgencies that are started from the “bottom up” or “top down,” and in rural or urban environments. This model allows for an insurgent organization, or UW cell, to conduct offensive, indirect warfare while remaining hidden from the state’s security apparatus. The following paragraphs will detail each principle by phase.

1. **Planning Phase**

The planning phase is comprised of the three core UW principles: security, networking, and purpose. This phase lays the foundation for all other phases and is very passive with little opportunity for any activity to be observed by outsiders. If this phase is executed correctly, in a clandestine manner, state security forces likely will be completely unaware that an insurgent organization, much less a UW cell, exists. The goal for the insurgents during this phase is to build what Doug McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, (2008) describe as mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures are “…those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through with people mobilize and engage in collective action” (p. 3). These collective vehicles, otherwise known as networks, need to be built securely and towards a common purpose.

Security is simply defined in the Joint Publication 1-02 as “1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences” (JP1-02, 2008, p. 489). Security for an insurgency, much less UW, is the foundation upon which all actions must be built. It is often established at the sake of efficiency, especially in the beginning stages, in order to protect core members, plans, and limited resources from discovery and retaliation. In essence, security represents the single
greatest defense the insurgents possess. This principle allows the insurgency to avoid costly targeting by state security forces. The problem faced by the insurgents and/or the sponsors conducting UW is that, as time progresses, the organization will have to expose itself to the local population and state security forces in order to conduct operations. This often means that security will need to be built upon layers, and certain elements of the organization will have to be kept intentionally uninformed. Security measures must be frequently examined and altered according to changes in people, operations, technology, and geographic boundaries.

Networking, the second greatest resource of an insurgency, is done by capitalizing on formal, informal, and family ties. These ties will need to be built over time and more importantly through trust. Often insurgent warfare requires individuals to commit what the state would term criminal acts—thus, it will be this time-tested trust which will keep the insurgents free. Furthermore, these networks are crucial to establishing, developing, and maintaining the intelligence advantage insurgent organizations need to survive. Networking is essential to the growth of the insurgency, both in a passive and active manner.

Both models, UW and Special Operations, use purpose as a principle. McRaven however, defined purpose for his theory as a set of discrete objectives that could be clearly defined in time and space such as “rescue the POWs, destroy the dry dock, sink the battleship, etc” (McRaven, 1996, p. 21). These clearly defined tactical objectives are not compatible with the political and strategic nature of an insurgency. In the UW model, a successful revolution requires a strategic purpose of unrelenting and unbending will towards a political objective, the overthrow of the state. Once these three principles are established, security, networking, and purpose, the insurgency then can move forward from a period of planning to the preparation phase.

2. Preparation Phase

The preparation phase is comprised of two UW principles: indoctrination and influence—the battle of ideas. This phase originates with the core cadre group, which U.S. doctrine refers to as the Underground, and extends outward to what will become the Auxiliary and the Mass Base and, more importantly, the center of gravity—the general
population. This phase is generally conducted in a covert manner, concealing the true identities of the people that conduct any visible acts. The insurgents or UW cell must maintain all activity below normal levels of violence and disruption or risk alerting state security forces to the presence of an insurgent organization. The goal for the insurgents during this phase is to lay the foundation for victory in the battle of ideas and perception. The insurgency will accomplish this goal by isolating the state from the population through use of what David Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford (1986) call the “master frame.” This master frame both unifies the insurgency and isolates the government through the use of indoctrination and influence.

Indoctrination is an inward focused activity and is generally defined as “to imbue with a specific partisan or biased belief or point of view” (Dictionary.com). The word is used synonymously with terms like brainwashing and propagandizing, and, realistically, there is some truth to the notion. “Physically and psychologically they [the Underground] must be capable of operating under the great strain that will be imposed by their clandestine and often illegal operations” (Momboisse, 1970, pp. 48-49). Indoctrination is the key to survival and success. Routinely, military and police units use indoctrination as a means of inculcating core beliefs and principles to their members in order to handle complex and confusing situations where orders can not possible cover every contingency. Insurgencies also must adapt the same principle of indoctrination in order to survive without communications in an ambiguous, illegal, and dangerous environment.

Influence is an outward looking mechanism and is defined as “the capacity or power of persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behavior, opinions, etc., of others” (Dictionary.com). In the case of an insurgency, revolutionary forces can use imagined power (to make up for a lack of real power) via psychological operations to manipulate the center of gravity and the state into action, inaction, or acquiescence. While it is important to be able to influence what is occurring on the ground, it is equally vital to be able to manage those effects and expectations. Without effective management, the influence an insurgency has struggled so hard to acquire can be used against it.
3. **Execution Phase**

The execution phase has only one UW principle: agility. This phase builds on the groundwork from all the other phases. This phase is generally conducted in an overt manner directly attacking the state from concealed positions and identities at a time and place of the insurgents’ choosing. The insurgents or UW cell will need to utilize all previous principles to appear larger, stronger, and omnipresent. The goal for the insurgents during this phase is what McAdam *et al* (2008) describe as cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation creates in “…people a need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” (p. 5). The solution to their collective problem is the overthrow of the state and the establishment of the counter-state. The insurgents will accomplish this goal by standing on the solid base built in the previous two phases and through the use of agile operations, the last principle of an insurgency.

Agility is often synonymous with flexibility, but in conjunction with the other insurgency principles, agility is more than that. Agility is more proactive than reactive. Agility in a UW context is about strength, balance, coordination, and speed, in addition to being operationally limber. Agility gives the insurgency the perceived ability to be in multiple places at once, sidestepping government security forces, and shaping the events in locations as the situation requires.

C. **CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY**

Lastly, we will analyze our Theory of Unconventional Warfare against three cases studies: one involving an insurgent victory, one a loss and one a draw. The case studies were selected because the results are indisputable to the larger community: the U.S. sponsored overthrow of the Soviet Union’s government of Afghanistan in 1989, Cuba’s attempt through Che Guevara in the ill-fated “foco” revolution in Bolivia of 1967, and Iran’s ongoing sponsorship of Hezbollah interfering in the affairs of Lebanon.
III. UNITED STATES’ WIN: MUJAHEDIN IN AFGHANISTAN

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. participation in a loose conglomeration of states fighting an Unconventional Warfare campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan has been called “perhaps the most satisfying experience the Americans ever had with guerrilla warfare” (Joes, 2000, p. 279). Working from Pakistan with a few hundred CIA employees on the ground, the U.S. supported mujahedin (Arabic for struggler) succeeded in driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan in ten years. The Soviets invaded a devoutly Islamic country imbued with warrior tribal values that detested Communism, thus providing the insurgency readymade mobilizing structures, a master frame, and cognitive liberation. Even as a successful example of Unconventional Warfare, Afghanistan is a cautionary tale for Unconventional Warfare planners. The Afghan mujahedin received external support from a “motley crew” of state actors. In addition to the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran played important roles in supporting the resistance. Each country brought its own agenda and acted in its own interests. The U.S. role in supporting the mujahedin was dominated by the Pakistani ISI, which worked at cross-purposes to the United States long term goals for Afghanistan.

B. BACKGROUND.

Afghanistan is a land-locked country that sits astride the junction of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, although it is frequently omitted from all three geographic groupings (Roberts, 2003, p. viii). Afghanistan, whose borders were demarcated at the end of the 19th Century, borders Pakistan, Iran, China and the former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the summer, Afghanistan is hot and dry, and the weather is harsh; it is a land of harsh conditions and rugged beauty. Water is scarce and the land is mostly barren, resembling a moonscape (Ewans, 2002, p. 2). About two thirds of the country is above 5000 feet, and some of the mountains are among the highest in the world. The dominant terrain feature is the Hindu Kush mountain range, nicknamed ‘the killer of Indians,’ part of which separates Southern and Central Asia.
There are about a dozen passes across the mountains and only one is below 10,000 feet. Despite the extreme conditions, the mountain passes supported migration and conquest through the centuries. The ancient Afghan city of Balkh sat astride one of these passes and was part of the fabled ‘Silk Route’ between China and the Mediterranean (Ewans, 2002, pp. 1-2).

Afghanistan is one of the most invaded countries in history; it has been invaded by Persians, Scythians, Macedonians, Huns, Mongols, Arabs, Turks and Moguls. Although all were able to invade Afghanistan, none were able to permanently subjugate the inhabitants (Roberts, 2003, p. 12). The waves of invasion and migration in Afghanistan left a diverse range of ethnic groups; there are approximately 20 main ethnic groups and over 50 in all. Although there are two primary languages, Dari and Pashtu, Afghanistan has over 30 languages present (Ewans, 2002, p. 3). The largest four ethnic groups are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek. Due in part to the rugged conditions in which they live, the Afghan people are tenacious, resilient, self-reliant, and extremely independent. Historically, most Afghan authority rested not in a central government, but at the tribe and village level. “Afghanistan is a segmented society- perhaps atomized would be a more appropriate description- where loyalties are strongest at the lowest common denominator” (Cogan, 1993, p. 75). While the lack of central authority made Afghanistan easy to invade, its vigorous decentralized resistance made it impossible to subdue (Roberts, 2003, pp. xii-xiii).

In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became the fulcrum of the “Great Game” between the Russian and British Empires. Britain invaded Afghanistan on two different occasions in the mid-1800s with similar, disastrous results. The second Afghan war ended with 16,500 soldiers and civilians retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad; only one survivor safely made the entire journey (Bearden, 2001). The incident inspired Rudyard Kipling’s immortal lines about the role of the Afghan women on the battlefield:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains} \\
\text{And the women come out to cut up what remains} \\
\text{Jest roll to your rifle an' blow out your brains} \\
\text{An' go to your Gawd like a soldier}
\end{align*}
\]
Although Islam is Afghanistan’s strongest unifying feature, some of which contradict the tenets of Islam, have tended to define Afghan society” (Roberts, 2003, p. xiii). Pashtun Afghans live by a tribal code known as Pashtunwali that governs dispute resolution among individuals’ families and tribes. The Pashtunwali code is at least partially responsible for Afghanistan’s reputation as a land of “sadistic brigands who, along with their scheming wives and knife wielding children, delight in plundering hapless travelers when not abusing one another” (Roberts, 2003, p. xiv). Pashtunwali demands appropriate \textit{badal} (Pashtun for revenge) for any violation of personal or familial \textit{nang} (Pashtun for honor). Under Pashtunwali women and children are excluded from becoming the targets of \textit{badal}, but adult male relatives are not. Pashtunwali also has a kinder, less reported, side. \textit{Melmastia} requires hospitality to visitors and guests, even if they are strangers. \textit{Nanwatai} extends hospitality to include asylum for fugitives (Roberts, 2003, p. xiv).

Although never conquered, Afghanistan did cede its authority to conduct foreign relations to the British until 1921 when Afghanistan gained its formal independence. In the treaty of independence the Durand line, which divided the Pashtun people between Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan, was officially declared a “frontier” (Roberts, 2003, p. 41). By calling the Durand Line a frontier the treaty allowed Britain and later Pakistan to treat the line as an international border, an idea never accepted by Afghanistan. In the early 1920s Afghanistan’s government, led by King Amanullah, used its new foreign policy freedom to begin an “on again, off again” relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1921 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship that promised to provide Afghanistan with an annual subsidy and support to its armed forces. When the Soviets failed to live up to most of the agreement King Abdullah supported resistance groups inside the Soviet border until the two countries signed treaty of neutrality and non-aggression in 1926. After the 1926 agreement relations improved between the two countries, and the Soviets helped to construct highways and light industry in Afghanistan (Roberts, 2003, p. 43).

\footnote{99\% of Afghans are Muslims. CIA Factbook.}
The Soviet assisted work projects were part of King Amanullah’s controversial push to modernize the country. Amanullah, trying to emulate the reforms of Turkey’s founder President Ataturk, instituted reforms on the legal system, established schools for girls, introduced secular curricula into the school system, created identity cards, and began enforcing conscription (Ewans, 2002, pp. 94-95). The Afghan people violently rejected the reforms and associated the changes with the king’s Soviet ties (Roberts, 2003, p. 44). Several tribes rose up in rebellion against the king and by January of 1929, King Amanullah was forced to abdicate the throne and flee. After the overthrow of King Amanullah there was a backlash against the Soviets that included a ban on all Communist and Communist affiliated parties, as well as the persecution of known Communist sympathizers (Roberts, 2003, p. 185). Despite the animosity and distrust of the Soviets, Kabul reaffirmed its treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with Moscow in 1931. During World War II Afghanistan officially stayed neutral, but privately favored the Allies. After the war, Afghanistan’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Daoud Khan, tried repeatedly to get American assistance to modernize its military without success. In 1956, after giving up on the United States, Daud negotiated two deals with the Soviets that would profoundly alter the history of Afghanistan. The first deal was a $32.5 million loan for military aid that provided Afghanistan Soviet tanks, planes and helicopters; a move that set Afghanistan on a course of military dependence on Moscow (Ewans, 2002, p. 112). The second provided $100 million worth of economic assistance, including two modern airports and a road north to the Soviet Union—a road whose specifications conveniently matched the tonnage requirements of the heaviest Soviet tanks (Roberts, 2003, pp. 206-207). Daud thought that the risks of the Soviet agreements entailed were outweighed by the benefits, and he believed he could successfully control Soviet influence in Afghanistan. He was wrong. Despite historical Afghan animosity to the Communist Soviets and despite careful maneuvering by Daud to minimize Soviet influence, the overwhelming scope of Soviet involvement in Afghan development opened the doors to decades of Soviet manipulation.

In 1961, following several years of political wrangling led by Daud and border incidents in the disputed Pashtun frontier area, Pakistan instituted an economic blockade on Afghanistan. The Pakistani blockade was devastating to Afghanistan, and in March of
1963, Afghanistan’s monarch, King Zahir Shah, requested and received Daud’s resignation. The following year the king approved a constitution modeled after Western democracies that included separation of powers, secret ballot elections, the right to trial and freedom of the press. The constitution also banned political parties and effectively prohibited Daud from returning to public office. The new government system, devoid of political parties, was ineffective and, when coupled with decreasing aid from the Soviet Union, led to a stagnant economy (Roberts, 2003, pp. 210-211).

In 1965, two of Afghanistan’s leading radicals, Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, secretly founded the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Two years later the party split into two camps, one based around Taraki called Khalq and one based around Karmal called Parcham (Ewans, 2002, pp. 123-134). The PDPA rank and file was filled with Afghanistan’s intellectual elite: military officers, civil servants, teachers, students, and recent graduates (Roberts, 2003, p. 210). The Afghan military, one of the few means of upward social mobility in Afghanistan, had many officers and soldiers that supported radical leftist groups as a result of their contacts with Soviet instructors and communist ideology training mandated by Soviet advisors (Roberts, 2003, p. 212). On July 17 1973, Daud overthrew the king in a nearly bloodless coup with the support of a small number of officers and soldiers. After initially appointing eight PDPA members to his cabinet and increasing Afghanistan’s dependence on the Soviets, Daud backtracked, removing the PDPA members from his cabinet and distancing himself from the U.S.S.R. In just a few short years, Daud had alienated both the right-wing Islamists groups and the PDPA communist factions.

On 27 April 1978, Soviet-trained officers led an armored assault on Kabul, killing Daud and seizing control of the government. The military officers quickly relinquished power to the PDPA, which installed Taraki as president (Ewans, 2002, pp. 135-137). Taraki and the Khalq faction quickly turned on the Parcham group of the PDPA and consolidated Taraki’s power base. Taraki soon began to implement sweeping reforms, including land reform, cancelation of debt, mandatory education for women, and prohibition of arranged marriages. In addition, Taraki changed the flag from its Islamic black-green-red colors to a
Soviet inspired all red color and then proceeded to paint most of Kabul red (Roberts, 2003, p. 214). The reforms, and the reaction of the Afghan people, echoed King Amanullah’s changes in the 1920s. Taraki’s reforms insulted Islam and Afghani tribal values, offended national pride, and instituted harsh repression, resulting in an immediate nationwide resistance. The Afghan people began to view the policies from Kabul as “repulsively anti-Islamic” (Joes, 2000, p. 281). In March 1979, the resentment boiled over in Herat with a massive popular uprising that left fifty Soviet advisors and their families, as well as several hundred PDPA officials, soldiers, and sympathizers, dead. Russian corpses were mounted on pikes and prominently displayed, lining the city streets of Herat. The Kabul government’s response, including merciless bombing by Soviet pilots, left up to 20,000 Afghans dead (Coll, 2004, p. 40). The following month there was an Afghan army mutiny and murder of Soviet advisors in Jalalabad, resulting in the retaliation massacre of several hundred Afghan men and boys (Coll, 2004, p. 45). The insurgency, supported by the wholesale mutiny of some Afghan army units, quickly spread across the country. In an effort to deflect the blame Prime Minister Taraki tried to assassinate President Amin and make him a scapegoat. Forewarned, Amin got the upper hand and killed Taraki instead. Amin assumed control in September 1979 of a country embroiled in civil unrest and on the edge of economic collapse.

The Soviet Union had many resources tied up into a country that was descending into chaos: between 1955 and 1979 the Soviet Union had invested $2.5 billion in Afghanistan. Even before Taraki’s coup, Moscow had over one thousand civilian and military advisors on the ground in Afghanistan (Prados, 2002, p. 466). Unwilling to let a communist regime on its border fail, and concerned that Amin might have ties to the CIA, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 (Coll, 2004, pp. 46-50). Soviet advisors already in the country succeeded in duping Afghan soldiers to store ammunition and vehicle batteries for “winterizing,” while Soviet paratroopers secured key terrain around Kabul and motorized units secured the other Afghan urban areas (Ewans, 2002, p. 147). On 27th of December, several hundred Soviet KGB paramilitaries dressed in Afghan army uniforms assaulted the palace, killing Amin (Coll, 2004, p. 50). Karmal, from the Amin’s rival Parcham group of the PDPA, was placed in power by the Soviets and
assisted by “advisors” in the ministries in Kabul. Despite Karmal’s attempts to placate the Afghan religious leaders and appease the public, the resistance grew and increased in stature (Ewans, 2002, p. 153). “The localism, individualism and readiness to defend one’s honor so characteristic of the Afghan people made them excellent prospects for guerrilla war….,” (Joes, 2000, p. 285). Support for the resistance came quickly with Sunni mujahedin groups organizing themselves in Pakistan to coordinate outside assistance, while Shia groups drew their support directly from Iran.

The initial American support to the mujahedin was provided before the Soviet invasion in a July 1979 presidential finding authorizing $500,000 of non-lethal support for propaganda, psychological operations, radio equipment, medical supplies, and cash to the Afghan rebels. Of foremost concern to the Carter administration, even before the Soviet invasion, was to not provide a level of mujahedin support that could lead to World War III (Coll, 2004, pp. 43-46). While the invasion was still unfolding, U.S. National Security Advisor Brezinski outlined a plan to counter the Soviet invasion that would stand for the next decade. Brezinski recommended 1) providing secret lethal aid, money and technical advice to the resistance 2) encouraging Pakistan to help the resistance, even at the expense of the administration’s non-proliferation policy 3) encouraging the Chinese to help the rebels and 4) working in concert with Islamic countries in a covert action to help the rebels. Brezinski went on to say, that the United States’ ultimate goal should be the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and, failing that, to make the Soviet involvement as costly as possible (Coll, 2004, p. 51). Within days of the invasion, President Carter signed a new presidential finding authorizing expanded support for the mujahedin, now including lethal aid. The first weapons authorized by the new presidential finding arrived in Pakistan just 14 days after the Soviet invasion (Cogan, 1993, p. 74).

Covert American support for the mujahedin was complicated by several factors. The CIA agents working in Afghanistan prior to the invasion had been focused on recruiting Soviet, not Afghan, contacts (Coll, 2004, p. 48). Additionally, Khomeini’s revolution made operating out of Iran impossible. Geography and geopolitics dictated that American support to Afghan mujahedin come primarily from Pakistan, which presented its own problems.
Before the Soviet invasion, President Carter targeted Pakistani President Zia in a high profile human-rights campaign and had cut Pakistan off from all U.S. aid and military cooperation (Crile, 2003, p. 15). The U.S. was forced to placate Zia by agreeing to send all weapons, supplies and equipment to the mujahedin through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and forgoing direct contact with the mujahedin commanders. Zia, the son of an Islamic cleric, was a fundamentalist trying to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state. Zia actively encouraged military officers, including those in the ISI, to become Islamic fundamentalists as well (Winchell, 2003, pp. 377-378). Pakistan’s goals under Zia were 1) an Afghanistan controlled by Pashtun-centered, fundamentalist party malleable to Pakistani manipulation 2) to focus Afghan energies on internal issues 3) and secure Pakistan’s border (Schroen, 2005, p. 45). The ISI’s ability to control the American support for mujahedin groups and its favoritism of fundamentalist groups foreclosed the more moderate political direction that the United States would have preferred (Prados, 2002, p. 468). The ISI’s role as a middleman in the delivery of weapons also allowed it to tax the weapons and equipment as it was being transferred. Despite the considerable drawbacks of the CIA operating through the Pakistani ISI, there would have been little chance of success against the Soviets without Pakistan (Weinbaum, 1991, p. 71).

The ISI’s preference for supporting fundamentalist groups was echoed by the mujahedin’s other main sponsor, Saudi Arabia, which agreed to match the United States dollar for dollar for the mujahedin resistance. China, wanting to prevent its encirclement by the Soviet Union and concerned about its crucial ally Pakistan, also participated in the operation (Hilali, 2001, pp. 323, 328). China provided weapons, training and allowed the overflight of U.S. airplanes supporting the resistance (Hilali, 2001, p. 339). The British played a minor but important role in supporting training and operations, particularly with Massoud. Ironically, the Israelis may have helped the mujahedin holy warriors as well (Coll, 2004, pp. 75,81).

the time of the Soviet invasion, Massoud had a formidable guerrilla force capable of raiding Soviet and Afghan convoys on the nearby Salang highway, the primary overland route between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. With very little outside support, Massoud became such a threat that the Soviets targeted him with six large-scale assaults in the Panjshir valley between 1980-1982. The Soviets inability to stop Massoud quickly made him a national hero, earning him the nickname “Lion of the Panjshir.” By 1983 the Soviets devastating scorched earth policy and partially effective blockade of the valley convinced Massoud to broker a peace deal. Massoud agreed to allow an Afghan army base at the Southern end of the valley in return for no attacks on the Panjshir Valley (Coll, 2004, pp. 118-119). While tactically sound, Massoud’s deal was a blow to the morale of the Afghan resistance and its supporters. Massoud used the next year to stockpile food and weapons, build new alliances with other mujahedin commanders outside the valley, and attack his rival Hekmatyar. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun, was a rabidly anti-Western Islamist mujahedin leader that was ruthless and highly effective; naturally the ISI and Saudi Intelligence services favored him (Coll, 2004, p. 119). Operating in the Pashtun frontier area on both sides of the border, Hekmatyar gladly accepted millions of dollars worth of indirect American support despite any personal misgivings he might have had. After determining that Hekmatyar’s fundamentalist forces were the most effective and organized in Afghanistan, the CIA rationalized its ISI controlled heavy support of Hekmatyar. Besides the CIA’s strong inclination to defer to the ISI, Massoud had quit fighting and was not seen as reliable.

By the spring of 1984 Massoud’s peace with the Soviets broke down and the Soviets planed another major offensive into the Panjshir. Massoud’s sources reported to him the Soviets’ plan to subject the valley to a week’s worth of aerial assaults and then sow the bomb-tilled soil with landmines, making the valley uninhabitable for years to come. Massoud ordered the evacuation of the valley, and when the Soviet ground forces entered the valley they found it in ruins and almost completely disserted. Massoud carefully returned with small bands of fighters to shoot down at the helicopters in the valley from ridgelines, ambush the enemy, and create diversions (Coll, 2004, p. 122). While the Soviets failed again to destroy Massoud, they did introduce more effective tactics that year. 1984
saw a huge increase in the number of helicopter based air assault operations using Soviet special forces called Spetznatz. “The importance of attack and transport helicopters in combating the insurgency cannot be overstated” (Westermann, 1997, p. 40). Using transport helicopters for air assault operations, the Spetznatz would swoop in and aggressively pursue the mujahedin on foot up ragged cliffs. The Spetznatz had close air support from the heavily armed Mi-24D Hind attack helicopter, essentially a “flying tank.” The helicopter was devastatingly effective and its belly was sufficiently armored to protect it from almost all of the mujahedin’s anti-aircraft weapons. Tactically, the fight was shifting in favor of the Soviets. Even Massoud was reeling, admitting that the Soviets were fighting much better than before (Coll, 2004, p. 122). The Soviets were also aided by the widening feud between Massoud and Hekmatyar, which undermined the overall effectiveness of the resistance.

By 1985 the mujahedin had improved their techniques for combating the Soviets air assault techniques, particularly in the Panjshir valley, where Massoud successfully withstood another major Soviet led offensive. Massoud struck back that same year by overrunning a five hundred-man fort in Pechgur, where he captured most of the troops and many weapons (Joes, 2000, p. 303). As the war progressed the Soviets came to understand the critical nature of intelligence and expanded the Afghan intelligence ministry to 30,000 employees and 100,000 informants by 1985. While the Soviets never had intelligence equal to the mujahedin, government informants periodically provided actionable intelligence for deadly air assault operations. The Soviets also employed signal intercept technology and thousands of soldiers in a vain attempt to seal the border with Pakistan (Coll, 2004, p.133). In 1986 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped the mujahedin operating in the frontier area withstand the deadly Spetznatz assaults by developing infrastructure such as caves and new roads (Coll, 2004, p. 156). Arab investment, some of which was directly coordinated by Osama Bin Laden, was very important for developing supply lines between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, p. 157). Despite Soviet willingness to conduct limited attacks across the border into Pakistan, the CIA was confident by mid 1985 that the Soviets were unwilling to launch a large scale invasion of Pakistan. With the diminished Soviet threat against Pakistan the U.S. was now willing to introduce American weapon systems and forgo
the pretense of deniability. In early 1986 the Americans introduced the single most decisive weapon system in the war, the Stinger missile. Easily portable in the most difficult terrain, simple to operate, the Stinger’s—fire and forget—heat seeking missile devastated Soviet and Afghan aircraft. On 26 September 1986, the Stinger missile made its first tactical appearance, successfully destroying three aircraft in a single attack (Coll, 2004, p. 149); “The military dynamic had shifted” (Kuperman, 1999, p. 235). By November of 1986, Secretary General Gorbachev announced to the Soviet leadership that the strategic goal of the Soviet Union was to get out of Afghanistan in 1-2 years (Coll, 2004, p. 158). Although the Soviets continued their brutal campaign for another year and a half, they were looking for a way out. On April 14, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. establishing the terms of the Soviet withdrawal. On 15 February 1989 the last Soviet soldier walked across the bridge and left Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, pp. 176, 185).

After the signing of the Geneva Accords infighting within the resistance increased dramatically, with Hekmatyar systematically eliminating smaller rivals. The long-standing feud between Massoud and Hekmatyar became a raging civil war that distracted the resistance from coalescing into a united front (Coll, 2004, p. 206). Deteriorating relations between the United States and Pakistan was also starting to affect the support for the Afghan resistance. After the CIA reported to the American Congress that Pakistan was on the cusp of producing a nuclear weapon, U.S. law prohibited any military and economic assistance to Pakistan, further worsening the relations between the two countries. In early 1991 the CIA was successful; however, in recovering some of Iraq’s Soviet made tanks in the aftermath of the Gulf War and funneled them through Pakistan to the mujahedin. The resistance, under the supervision of the ISI, was able to seize Khost with the new armor (Coll, 2004, pp. 226-227). In late 1991 Moscow and Washington signed an agreement of so-called negative symmetry to stop supporting both sides of the conflict, leaving Kabul and the mujahedin to their own devices (Cogan, 1993, p. 77). At the beginning of 1992 the government of Afghanistan and the mujahedin were at an uneasy standstill until a major defection turned the tide. In February of 1992 General Dostrum, an Uzbek fighting for Kabul with a sizeable militia, suddenly withdrew his support of the communist regime and aligned with Massoud.
(Coll, 2004, p. 234). The defection of Dostrum, who had his own armor, artillery and aircraft, effectively ended the Communist government’s chances of survival. Massoud and Hekmatyar led competing efforts to secure Kabul, with Massoud narrowly edging out Hekmatyar. Massoud and Hekmatyar’s rivalry outlasted the communist control of the country and helped drive the state into a civil war. The Afghan civil war raged on until 1996, when the ISI supported Taliban seized control of the government.

C. THE PRINCIPLES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1. Security

The rebellion in Afghanistan was a rural insurgency which gave it inherent advantages in security. Unless the mujahedin were massing for an attack, the fighters were dispersed into the countryside and sometimes in caves. Without standardized uniforms and little if any record keeping, identifying who was an insurgent and who was not was a nearly impossible task for the Soviet and Afghan armed forces. Unable to find cooperative sources in the local population, the Soviet and Afghan intelligence agencies routinely detained and tortured civilians. The intelligence services eventually penetrated mujahedin groups by planting agents in the refugee camps in Pakistan (Coll, 2004, p. 133). Even when the Soviet and Afghan intelligence services successfully penetrated resistance groups with an agent, the fragmented nature of the groups severely limited the amount of information that the agent could discover (Joes, 2000, p. 287). Mujahedin commanders counteracted the threat of informants by using forces from outside the local area and concealing their operations from the civilians in the target area until after their attack (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 44).

The Soviets were at an extreme disadvantage in destroying the mujahedin: the Afghan resistance never had anything approaching centralized leadership; it was more characterized by disunity, with old disputes continuing on despite the war (Dick, 2002, p. 2). In essence, the Afghan mujahedin were never organized enough to require the development of the cellular structure commonly found in insurgencies. The disunity of the resistance movement, while making cooperation difficult, assisted significantly in the maintenance of security.
2. Networking

Fortunately for the resistance “(a) staggeringly large percentage of the army felt more allegiance to the rebel leaders … than they did to their own leaders.” (Coll, 2000, p 117) In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion, there was a massive wave of defections to the mujahedin, including Afghan intellectuals, civil servants, and athletes (Coll, 2000, p. 58). Some of the mujahedin commanders, such as Massoud, wisely directly well placed defectors to remain where they were—inside Soviet controlled units; the new recruits were more valuable as informants spread across the Afghan society. The Soviets believed, with good reason that even the highest-ranking officers in the Afghan army were collaborating with the resistance. The mujahedin maintained contacts with the Afghan army and agents near assembly areas to provide timely information on the location and disposition of both Afghan and Soviet military units (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 41). Some mujahedin operations were supported by collaborators in the Afghan army that led the resistance through their base defenses to kill or capture soldiers in the collaborator’s unit (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 77). Some resistance sympathizers killed their communist officers during mujahedin attacks (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 120). The infiltration of the Afghan army was so complete that the Soviets eventually took away the remaining tanks and heavy weapons from the Afghan army (Joes, 2000, p. 293). Despite providing Afghan army soldiers higher salaries than was available in comparable civilian jobs, the Soviets could not maintain a reliable Afghan army. Even militias sponsored by the Communist government were secretly supporting the mujahedin (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 81).

3. Purpose

The mujahedin in Afghanistan had a huge advantage in purpose: the master frame was already made. Before the Soviets invaded in 1979, the entire country was in an uproar over the drastic changes that Taraki and his communist government were imposing. The changes were so unpopular and viewed as so un-Islamic that almost the entire country was unified by purpose to rebel against the government, even if the rebellion was badly fractured and disorganized. The mujahedin were able to tap into the “elemental power of outraged religion” (Joes, 2000, p. 285). The Soviets and the Afghan Communists made no effort to
win the hearts and minds of the countryside. Reverse engineering Mao, the strategy of the Soviets was to drain the sea of people that the insurgents swam in. Soviet and Afghan forces destroyed villages, crops, and irrigation systems and mined fields and pastures (Dick, 2002, p. 6). With insufficient forces to secure the entire country and often operating “blind” without adequate intelligence, the Soviets tried to pound Afghanistan into submission (Dick, 2002, p. 8). The tactics of the Soviets did little to deter the stoical and courageous mujahedin that had been raised in a culture flush with violence and tribal honor. The deeply held Islamic beliefs and ingrained code of the Pashtunwali demanded the unrelenting and unbending will to drive the Communists out of Afghanistan. However, at the operational level the mujahedin commanders were not completely and unequivocally focused on the overthrow of the Communist regime; the mujahedin commanders were often distracted by and sometimes consumed with competing with each other. This was the biggest weakness of the mujahedin resistance and collectively its biggest deviation from the theory of Unconventional Warfare.

4. Indoctrination

The Afghan people’s indoctrination began long before Taraki instituted a communist government or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The vast majority of Afghanistan’s population lived outside of urban areas in harsh, relatively primitive conditions that imbued a rugged individualism. Afghanistan’s tribal values demanded revenge for any violation of honor and the Afghan’s Islamic faith required that they fight to protect the faithful from invaders. Afghanistan was not immune from the new, more radical interpretations of Islam emanating primarily from Egypt in the 1960s. While attending the Kabul Polytechnic Institute, a young Ahmed Shah Massoud joined the Muslim Youth Organization where his faith became more conspiratorial and militant. Massoud advocated waging war on the increasingly prominent Communists in Afghanistan before they controlled the government (Coll, 2004, p. 110).

After the Soviets invasion, displaced Afghanis began to pour across the border into Pakistani refugee camps. The refugee camps provided the resistance “a place to shelter their families, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty to support their families, rest
and exchange tactical information and intelligence” (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 339). The Pakistani safe havens also provided a receptive audience to the numerous fundamentalist Islamic *madrassas* (Arabic for school) that were built along the border. The indoctrination in the *madrassas* not only supported the continuing will to fight the Soviets, it also led directly into the development of the Taliban.

5. **Influence**

With near uniform rejection of Communism, even by people working within the Communist Afghan government, the *mujahedin* had to do little to influence the population to fight Communism. Sustaining the Afghani will to fight, however, required a campaign of actions. Attacks in the capital provided clear evidence that the government did not have complete control over the country. In April of 1980 the resistance bombed the Radio Afghanistan building, knocking out radio and television broadcasting for a time (Jalali & Grau, 1995, p. 368). The *mujahedin* created a myth of invincibility by closing the Gardez to Khost road, forcing the government to resupply the Khost garrison by air. Despite repeated attempts to open the road, the longest the Soviets and the Afghan army were able to keep the route open, was 12 days (Jalali & Grau, 1995, pp. 165-173). Another symbol of *mujahedin* invincibility was the massive supply base and training center four kilometers from Pakistan called Zhawar. Zhawar was a vast permanent *mujahedin* base that included a hotel, mosque, small arms depots, repair shops, a garage, a medical center, a radio center and a kitchen, all concealed in at least 11 tunnels dug into the Sodyaki Gar Mountain. Despite a massive attack by the Afghan army in September of 1985, the *mujahedin* held their base (Jalali & Grau, 1995, pp. 315-321).

6. **Agility**

At the ground level, the *mujahedin* were masters of agility. The entire countryside had successfully achieved cognitive liberation before the Soviets invaded in 1979. With their way of life threatened, the Afghan people understood not only that they could do something, but that that they must do something. The agility at the local level was strong and widespread enough to have a punishing effect on Communist forces.
D. DETERMINING RELATIVE SUPERIORITY

1. The Initial Conditions: 27 April 1978

In late April 1978, Afghani officers trained by the Soviet Union, seized control of Kabul, killed President Daud, and installed Nur Muhammad Taraki as President of Afghanistan. Taraki, an Afghani politician heavily steeped in Communist Marxism, introduced and instituted a series of “reforms” in order to bring Afghanistan into the modern age and under the influence of the Soviet Union. The Afghani insurgency was born in reaction to these reforms, which the insurgents saw as “un-Islamic” and intolerable. The insurgency however, was far from unified, and was made up of disparate tribes and militias with competing interests and philosophies.

In the early days, the different insurgent groups possessed no shared or strategic level of intelligence but maintained a distinct tactical advantage in their respective villages and districts. The insurgents in this case would get a score of “2.” The state on the other hand, possessed a robust intelligence organization that was ill suited for counter-insurgency; rather the state’s intelligence resources were focused on other “state-like” entities (such as Pakistan) and internal political opposition (such as Hafizullah Amin). The state in this case would receive a score of “1” for intelligence due in no small part to its lack of focus.

Like most typical insurgencies, the insurgents were initially disadvantaged with no outside support in the form of resources. The insurgents were forced to rely on what meager resources their pastoral existence could spare and the equipment provided by defectors, the resource score for the insurgents would reflect a value of “1”. The state on the other hand, far from being wealthy was, nonetheless, much more powerful than the combined weight of the various insurgent groups. With Soviet Union backing, the State scores a “3” in the resources portion of the equation.

The widespread implementation of modern concepts and ideas grated roughly against traditional Islamic culture, thereby reducing consensus and increasing POS for the insurgents. The only advantage the state possessed at this time was that these policies were in fact implemented by other Afghans, thus at least giving a meager measure of
accommodation to traditionalists. Another key point to consider was the competing POS in traditional Afghani life. The state did not, nor could not; implement truly coercive controls across the entire countryside to unify the various insurgents. Instead, POS were divided into tertiary or competing spheres of influence. These factors would give the insurgency and the state a score of “2” in POS. The remaining POS would be squandered in traditional tribal conflict and politics that remained pervasive in the Afghani culture. The initial equation would look like this:

\[
\begin{align*}
I^2_{(i)} & \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \\
2^2_{(i)} & \times 1_{(i)} \times 2_{(i)} = 1^2_{(g)} \times 3_{(g)} \times 2_{(g)} \\
8_{(i)} &= 6_{(g)} \\
I > G &= 1.3
\end{align*}
\]

As evidenced above, the “near neutral” score reflects the history of Afghanistan during this period. Both sides were relatively equal, the state controlling the urban areas, and the insurgents dominating the much larger yet sparsely populated countryside. While the term “near neutral” suggests that the opponents, insurgents and state, are equally matched, the contest would still prove to be quite bloody over the next 18 months. In addition to a growing insurgency, the Taraki regime would also face significant internal political divisions, separate from the insurgency, which would eventually cost Taraki his life in a coup lead by his deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin. The USSR was clearly uncomfortable with Amin and his perceived pro-Pakistani / pro-USA ties and quickly deposed him with Soviet Special Operations Forces. Amin was replaced in mid December 1979 with Babrak Karmal, an exiled Afghani living in the Soviet Union, who then promptly asked for massive Soviet aid, in the form of military assistance. The military aid package turned out to be over 100,000 troops, tanks, and aircraft that would significantly change the relative superiority equation.

2. Soviet Invasion: 24 December 1979

Just one day prior to Christmas in 1979, the USSR cited the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness to send over 100,000 troops to install the Karmal as
head of the Afghani government. The Soviet intervention stripped native Afghani people away from critical and key positions of government and replaced them with agents that were under direct control from Moscow. This action significantly changed the intelligence aspect of the equation. Previously, intelligence assets that had been in place prior to the invasion relied on traditional ties that cut across politics to keep insurgents informed. Now with Soviet agents in place and in control, the insurgency could only “see” what overt actions and intentions a totalitarian regime allowed. The Karmal government was also blind to the growing insurgency and instead was still more concerned with internal political struggles and other state-like entities. Therefore, each opponent would receive a score of “1” for intelligence.

The Soviet intervention obviously did not help the insurgency’s resources score, thus leaving the insurgents an unchanged score of “1”. The USSR’s assistance added to the states resources in the form of troops, equipment, and financial aid, boosting the states resources score from a “3” to a “4”. For the first time, Kabul could theoretically send troops and police forces into the countryside to govern by force. The invasion did have one major advantage for the insurgency; it unified the bulk of the disparate insurgents against a common enemy, thus increasing the POS score for the insurgents from a “2” to a “4”. The state, on the other hand, would lose their proverbial fig leaf, using Afghans to implement reform, and see their POS score drop from a “2” to a “1”. Thus the equation would now be reflected below:

$$I^2_{(i)} \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)}$$

$$I^2_{(i)} \times 1_{(i)} \times 4_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times 4_{(g)} \times 1_{(g)}$$

$$4_{(i)} = 4_{(g)}$$

$$I > G = 0$$

Again the neutral relative superiority score does not reflect the absolute hardships and appalling loss of life suffered by both sides in the growing conflict. The state with its superior resources began to engage in a war of attrition against the lightly armed insurgents. The Soviets used heavy handed troops, aerial bombing, heavy artillery, and armored forces to accomplish their political objectives. The insurgent’s greatest weapon, at this time, was
their monopoly on the Afghani POS and the attention the revolution began to draw from the worldwide community: in particular two benefactors—Pakistan and the USA. The equation would remain fairly stable until Ahmad Shah Massoud, “The Lion of Panjshir”, would strike a deal with the Soviet Union with strategic consequences.


Massoud was a significant problem, both tactically and operationally, for the Soviet Union. Though flush with resources, the Soviet Union offered Massoud a truce in the spring of 1983. Massoud accepted the treaty, despite heavy criticism from fellow insurgent leaders, and used the time to significantly rearm, refocus, and extend his influence outside the Panjshir area. During this “truce” the mujahedin became masters of intelligence at the local level, and were able to completely penetrate Soviet advised Afghan military units with agents. This action moving the original insurgent’s intelligence score from a “1” to a “4”. Also, during this time, Pakistan’s ISI and the USA’s CIA began to funnel money (estimated to be well over $600 million annually) and supplies into the insurgency, moving the insurgent’s resource score from a “1” to a “2”. The Soviet lead state during this time was unable to alter their side of the equation in any of the three categories—leaving that side of the equation static. Thus the equation now reflected the following:

\[ I^2_{(i)} \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 4^2_{(i)} \times 2_{(i)} \times 4_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times 4_{(g)} \times 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 128_{(i)} = 4_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 32 \]

For the first time in over five years, the insurgency was able to gain relative superiority over the state. The equation would remain stable until hostilities resumed in 1984.


Massoud’s reorganization and rearmament became apparent quickly as the Soviet controlled state resumed hostilities. The Communist government controlled less than 20%
of the country, effectively ceding the remainder of the countryside to the insurgents. Periodically, the state would strike out from heavily controlled urban areas and fortified bases using large numbers of troops, predictable routes, and heavy equipment to hunt for the elusive insurgents now known as the *mujahedin*. The insurgents, being heavily engaged and suffering significant casualties, began to lose a level of relative superiority as a direct result of Soviet air-mobility and intelligence practices.

Typically, Soviet officers would fly and man key equipment in order to keep mission essentials secret. The Soviet intelligence system, understanding the need for intelligence built up a substantial human intelligence network of at least 100,000 people. However, the cellular structure of the insurgents and their unpredictable day to day lives negated some of that penetration. What little intelligence penetration actually occurred by the State primarily enabled the Soviets to play one insurgent organization against another. The State was rarely able to get detailed tactical, operational, or strategic access to the insurgents. By improving their intelligence capability, the state moved their intelligence score from a “1” to a “2”.

The insurgents’ side of the equation remained static. The equation is reflected below:

\[
I^2_{(i)} * R_{(i)} * POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} * R_{(g)} * POS_{(g)}
\]

\[
4^2_{(i)} * 2_{(i)} * 4_{(i)} = 2^2_{(g)} * 4_{(g)} * 1_{(g)}
\]

\[
72_{(i)} = 16_{(g)}
\]

\[
I > G = 8
\]

The decreasing relative superiority of the *mujahedin* drew more and more attention from the international community. The insurgents’ dire straights emboldened one of its chief sponsors, the USA, to provide a significant resource—the stinger missile—thus altering the equation once more.

5. **Introduction of the Stinger: 26 September 1986**

The unmistakable backfire signature of an American made FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile system heralded a significant change to the relative superiority equation. On 26 September 1986, the first stinger missile attack was launched and successfully destroyed three Soviet helicopters. The introduction of this weapon system meant that previous air
supremacy by Soviet Air Forces were now exceedingly vulnerable to the mujahedin. Soviet tactics, which challenged and chased insurgent forces, relied heavily on the swift mobility provided by large numbers of helicopters and heliborne troops. This missile system now rendered those tactics risky and large scale Soviet losses soon began to occur.

While intelligence and POS remained constant for both sides, the resources score for the insurgents moved from a “2” to a “3” while the state went from a score of “4” to a score of “3” to reflect the reduction of utility of rotary wing aircraft. The equation now looked like this:

\[ I^2_{(i)} * R_{(i)} * POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} * R_{(g)} * POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 4^2_{(i)} * 3_{(i)} * 4_{(i)} = 2^2_{(g)} * 3_{(g)} * 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 192_{(i)} = 12_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 16 \]

By now, the insurgents had firmly re-established relative superiority over the state. The Soviet Union, recognizing the seriousness of the situation, worked as quickly as possible to shift responsibilities of security and stabilization to indigenous Afghan forces. The goal was to put an Afghan face to the Afghan problem and allow the Soviet Union to withdraw with some measure of dignity. While sound in theory, the inclusion of Afghans in previously Soviet only leadership positions had significant second order effects that ultimately aided the insurgents.


In 1988, the Soviet made a concerted effort to hand the Afghan problem to the Afghan Army. The unexpected second order effect was that those same Afghan forces were heavily infiltrated by mujahedin elements and were able to pass on timely accurate intelligence directly to insurgent forces. Ultimately, the Afghans were loyal to other Afghans with roots reaching back before the formation of the Soviet Union.
While insurgent resources and POS remained the same, the intelligence score climbed from a “3” to a “4”. The state’s scores remained constant, lacking all but the most rudimentary intelligence and POS. The equation now looked like this:

\[ I^2_{(i)} \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 4^2_{(i)} \times 3_{(i)} \times 4_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times 3_{(g)} \times 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 192_{(i)} = 3_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 64 \]

Mohammad Najibullah, elected as the President of Afghanistan, in a Soviet engineered election in November 1986, was faced with a significant problem. While he theoretically was the elected leader of Afghanistan, the Soviet forces which established and protected him were now withdrawn—along with a significant portion of resources that the Communist Afghanistan government had relied on. The gradual collapse of the communist Afghani government became tied to the level of support that Moscow could deliver through Bagram Airbase.

7. Fall of the Afghanistan Government: 16 April 1992

Although there were several tactical victories on the side of the state, most notably Jalalabad, the State was fighting a losing battle. Najibullah quickly put an end to mass attacks against the cities and other heavy handed Soviet strategies. In addition there was an attempt to include moderate elements of the mujahedin into the political process in the attempt build consensus. In the end, the ideas fell on deaf ears and, as the old adage goes, “too little, too late.” By late spring 1992, short of fuel, funding, and support from Moscow, Najibullah resigned on 18 March in order to make room for a neutral interim government. By April 16th, with the fall of Bagram Airbase—the sole line of support from Moscow—the Communist Government of Afghanistan collapsed.
The insurgents during this time period remained constant, but the state would lose one point in resources thus altering the equation one final time.

\[ I^2_{(i)} \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 4^2_{(i)} \times 3_{(i)} \times 4_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times 2_{(g)} \times 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 192_{(i)} = 2_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 96 \]

8. Relative Superiority Over Time

Graphically depicting relative superiority against time for the entire conflict would look like this:

Figure 4. Relative Superiority in Afghanistan
E. CONCLUSION

The graph above illustrates the steady climb and victory taken by the USA and Pakistan through the *mujahedin* over the Soviet Union and the Communist government of Afghanistan. At the beginning of the conflict, the various insurgents that were fomented into action often fought each other as often as they engaged the Communist government forces. The divisive practices changed with the introduction of Soviet forces; while the insurgency continued to have significant fault lines and divisions, they were unified against the much larger and secular opponent.

The *mujahedin*, through cultural lifestyles, centuries of warfare, and natural distrust, regularly practiced most of the principles of UW. In the attempt to modernize and secularize Afghanistan, the Soviet Union provided a clear strategic frame, unifying all those that felt some sort of affinity for the Islamic faith into the insurgency, leaving a significant minority for Communist cooperation. The USA and Pakistan’s support for the *mujahedin* used fault lines between groups in order to further their goals. By the insurgency essentially employing a “zone defense,” each disparate group could be manipulated to engage the Soviet forces in a manner that was conducive to local leadership. In addition, the locals—whose very families were involved—felt a significant kinship, both literally and figuratively, to the insurgency thus provided security and support that was crucially needed.

The introduction of the Stinger missile system signaled the beginning of the end for the state. With the loss of air supremacy, the state lost its main advantage—unfettered access to difficult terrain in pursuit of insurgents. This allowed the insurgency to develop and establish safe areas from which to train, rest, and recuperate. The state was able to exist in spite of a lack of relative superiority as a result of its authoritative rule—the populace had no choice. As long as the Soviet Union had the willingness and the resources to expend—the conflict would continue. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces, though a logical step in attempting to defuse the insurgency, was ineffective. The primary reason for failure is that even though President Najibullah was an Afghani, he was viewed as a Soviet agent, thus an extension of the conflict. The insurgency accelerated during this time frame as a direct result of the State losing what advantage it maintained—resources.
The *mujahedin*’s victory, however, was short lived—the disparate groups of insurgents, welded together by their dislike and contempt for Soviet and un-Islamic policies gave way to internal squabbles and factional infighting. Though successful as an insurgent or resistance organization, the *mujahedin* failed in the ability to govern in a peaceable manner. The vacuum of leadership and clear purpose (beyond the destruction of the Soviet state), gave way to the lawlessness and chaos in everyday Afghani life. In this anarchy the Taliban would take root and rise to power, establishing a neo-Islamic fundamental society.
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IV. CUBA’S LOSS: CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA

A. INTRODUCTION

No life is totally wasted, one can always be a bad example.

—Best one liners 7: More of the best stupid and witty one liners

Cuba’s attempt to export “the revolution” via Che Guevara in Bolivia may well be the genesis for the quote cited above. At the time, Che was considered a subject matter expert on revolutionary ideas, guerrilla warfare, and, in general—a figure of some international status (Selvage, 1985). “Che choose Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons. First, Bolivia was a lower priority than the Caribbean Basin countries to U.S. security interests and posed a less immediate threat. Second, Bolivia’s social conditions and poverty were such that Bolivia was considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology. Finally, Bolivia shared a border with five other countries, which would allow the revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas were successful” (Kornbluh). Despite what appears to be an easy target of Che’s signature “foco” revolution, the Bolivian Government beat back this notorious revolutionary’s efforts in less than a year. An analysis of Che’s activities using the theory of UW will show that his failure was not an aberration or lucky strike for the Bolivian Government, but a mathematical certainty.

B. BACKGROUND

Bolivia is a landlocked and geographically diverse country with soaring mountains, high plateaus, and steep lush valleys dividing the country into several distinctive regions. The people are no less diverse; over 50 percent of the population is derived from multiple native Indian tribes with separate individual languages and cultures independent of the ruling Spanish speaking elite. In 1966, Bolivia was struggling to return to an open democratic government after being “rescued” by a military coup in 1964. Even though René Barrientos won 62 percent of the vote in a fair election by all observers, Bolivia was still considered a troubled country with many problems—specifically unemployment, strikes, riots, and national identity (Selvage, 1985).
Che Guevara infiltrated Bolivia in November of 1966 through the capital airport of La Pez travelling under a forged Uruguayan passport. Che was expedited through Bolivian Security by a well placed and developed support apparatus that had been operating for at least two years. He then departed the capital city with several previously infiltrated Cuban agents, driving across the Bolivian countryside to a purchased farm in Nancahuazu, a mountainous region in the south-west region of the Santa Cruz Province. The guerrilla base was situated along a rocky canyon almost twelve miles in length and over 300 feet deep. The location provided plenty of wild game, thick overhead cover from vegetation, and a steady supply of water (James, 1968).

Over the course of the next several weeks, the core cadre group would be slowly infiltrated by pairs into Bolivia and then discreetly delivered to the Nancahuazu farm. This was done to gradually increase the size of the fledgling guerrilla force without raising any undue attention. The farm meanwhile was undergoing a significant change of its own. Che and his men began to dig several tunnels and caves to cache incriminating passports, documents, and equipment. The progress was slow but steady with the camp completed by mid January 1967 (James, 1968). Relations with the local communists, however, did not proceed as smoothly. At the end of December 1966, the Bolivian leader of the Communist party, Mario Monje, visited the camp and talked with Che about the delicate issue of Command and Control. Monje wanted to exert influence to control all aspects of the revolution, to include military operations—Che flatly refused.

On February 1, 1967, Che notes in his diary, “The first stage is completed” (James, 1968, p. 108). With this statement, the insurgents moved into what Che terms “the consolidation and purification phase” (James, 1968, p. 134). This phase consisted of a series of long marches to accomplish three major tasks: first, to toughen the fledgling guerillas to the rigors of field operations; second, to explore the countryside that they would begin to operate in; and third, to ignite the revolution by attracting local peasants to the guerrilla force (Selvage, 1985). On March 11, with the main body still conducting its series of long marches, two men (raw recruits) abandoned the camp, presumably to hunt, and proceeded to Camiri, fifty miles to the south. There, the men attempted to sell their weapons and were subsequently arrested by the police. During their interrogation, the
detainees gave up volumes of information on Che and the activities of the fledgling guerilla organization. As a result, the police forwarded this information to the military, and a subsequent aerial mission was launched to validate the detainee’s claims. On March 17, the Army investigated the camp by ground forces and uncovered a plethora of documents, including diaries and photos (Selvage, 1985). During their investigation, a soldier was shot and killed by an unknown insurgent guarding the base camp.

The guerillas returned to the base in Nancahuazu on March 19, only to find out the Bolivian Army had discovered and investigated the camp. Additionally, the long patrol did not go well, “trouble dogged them (the guerillas) all through the 48 days the march lasted—nearly twice as long as planned” (James, 1968, p. 36). The hike took longer than expected due to the extremely difficult terrain, hunger, disease, injuries, and two fatal drownings. On top of it all, this phase failed “…to achieve the objective of winning peasant support. Not a single peasant they encountered showed any real sympathy for their cause, much less joined them” (James, 1968, p. 36).

On March 23, as a direct result of the killing of the single soldier days prior, the Army sent out a much larger contingent, a platoon, to further investigate the area (James, 1968, p. 39). The guerillas successfully ambushed the 32-man Bolivian Army patrol, killing seven, wounding six, and capturing eleven (James, 1968) without loosing a single man. Besides the overwhelming victory, the guerillas captured 16 rifles with over 2,000 rounds of ammunition, three 60-mm mortars with 64 rounds, a 30-caliber machine gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, two light machine guns, two machine pistols, two radio sets, and operational plans (James, 1968, p. 37). This ambush marks what Che would refer to as the “…beginning of the struggle phase” (James, 1968, p. 134). It also signaled conclusively to the Bolivian government that Che Guevara was operating in their own backyard (James, 1968, p. 39).

Despite what seemed like an enormous victory for the guerillas, there were serious issues yet to be resolved. The insurgents had serious problems with deep internal divisions, issues regarding security, and they had failed to attract any significant number of recruits. Even Che notes in his diary, “Evidently we will have to get going before I had thought and expected…the situation is not good” (James, 1968, p. 134). On the last note, the Bolivian
Government agreed and immediately began to take steps to increase the military’s ability to counter Che’s forces by asking for assistance from the U.S. Government and, specifically, the 8th Special Forces Group. In part the memo requesting assistance, dated April 26, 1967, read, “Recognizing a possible threat to the internal security of the Republic of Bolivia…it is agreed that a rapid reaction force of battalion size capable of executing counterinsurgency operations in jungle and difficult terrain throughout the region will be created…” (Kornbluh, Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Activation, Organization, and Training of the 2nd Ranger Battalion — Bolivian Army).

Che, on the other hand, did not sit idly by. He took the opportunity to deliberately abandon the compromised guerrilla base and take the fight to the Bolivian Army. The guerrilla force at this time, in terms of numbers, consisted of “43 combatants, which included 17 Cubans (including Che), 23 Bolivians, and 3 Peruvians” (Selvage, 1985). Despite these small numbers, the guerrillas roamed and struck at will along a 75-mile wide corridor 200 miles in length (James, 1968, p. 40), severely demoralizing the Army, Civilians, and the Bolivian government.

Yet, regardless of a record of near perfect ambushes and raids, two significant problems faced the insurgents. First, Che committed a serious error by dividing his forces on 17 April 1967 (James / Selvage). In a hamlet called Bella Vista, Joaquin and fourteen other guerrillas were ordered to stay behind while the main group went forward to the town of Muyupampa (Selvage, 1985). This decision would prove to be very costly because the two groups never were able to link up again, and the Bolivian Army soon picked off the smaller element—adding more information to their improving picture of Che and his intentions, strength, and resources. Second, Che notes in his monthly analysis for April, May, June, July, and August, a lack of peasant recruitments (James, 1968, pp. 164, 176, 190, 202). The insurgents, though seemingly victorious on the battlefield, fail to win the support of the local population, and, as a result of combat actions, the insurgents continued to be slowly attrited through battles, disease, and accidents.

Meanwhile, the Bolivian Army began to train in earnest under the tutelage of a 16-man Mobile Training Team (MTT), Commanded by Major Ralph “Pappy” Shelton from the 8th Special Forces Group. The training camp was set up near the city of Santa Cruz by April
1967, and was comprised of a single 19-week program training the 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion. The intensive course focused on “…training in weapons, individual combat, squad and platoon tactics, patrolling, and counter-insurgency. The Bolivians responded well to the training and quickly developed into a spirited, confident, and effective counter guerrilla unit” (Selvage, 1985).

The insurgents, on the other hand, were also busy with their two primary goals during the summer months of 1967: first, to attract new recruits, and second, to link up the two wandering elements; they accomplished neither. The smaller element, led by Joaquin, moved north from their initial location in Bella Vista with the Army following directly. On July 9, Joaquin’s element was ambushed by Bolivian forces, who captured several important intelligence items, among them diaries, pictures, code books, and a complete list of the members of their group. A day later, the Bolivian forces again attacked the guerillas, killing one and capturing two deserters from the wayward insurgent force. These deserters confessed and led the Army to the remaining supplies that Che had hidden at the original Nancahuazu Camp (Selvage, 1985). On August 31, 1967, Joaquin’s force would be completely and utterly destroyed while attempting to cross the Masicuri river.

While Joaquin’s element moved north, Che’s forces journeyed southward towards the towns of Florida and Moroco. “On July 27th and again on the 29th, the guerrillas [Che’s] clashed with the army. Both sides suffered casualties. More significantly, in the confusion of the second encounter, Che lost the tape recorder used to record coded messages from Cuba.” (Selvage, 1985). The loss of the tape recorder and the radio, combined with the exploitation of the remaining cache by the deserters from Joaquin’s group, fully cut Che Guevara off from the outside world. At the end of August and early September 1967, Che began to understand the gravity of his situation. He heard radio reports of Joaquin’s element being destroyed and the discovery of the last of his supplies. Che wrote in his diary, “It was without a doubt the worse month we have had so far in this war. The loss of all the caves with the documents and the medicines was a hard blow, especially psychologically…the difficult march…brought out the worse in my men. We are in a period of low moral and revolutionary spirit” (James, 1968, p. 202).
Finally, by mid September 1967, the 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion’s training was completed and the newly taught unit was deployed into the region to hunt down and capture the remaining insurgents. On 26 September, the peasants that Che’s forces so desperately needed now began to report the insurgents’ movements to the Bolivian Army. The 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion was deployed as a screen to trap Che’s men as the 8th Bolivian Army Division kept up constant pressure. By the end of the first week of October, Che and what remained of his forces were pinned in the steep canyon of Quebrada del Yuro. As morning dawned on the 8th of October, Che’s men looked up to see Army patrols along the ridges where they had slept the night before. The actual battle started around 1:30 pm and lasted for two hours. By 3:00 pm, the Army had captured a wounded Che Guevara and all but destroyed his entire force—only 5 members would eventually escape: 3 Cubans and 2 Bolivians. Although there are conflicting reports of exactly how and who Che Guevara was killed, there is no dispute that he was executed the next day, 9 October 1967 (James, 1968, pp. 54-58).

Why did Che Guevara fail? There are several good reasons, but germane to this thesis is this assertion: Che failed because he violated nearly every principle of Unconventional Warfare and lost the modest relative superiority he enjoyed at the start of the conflict.

C. THE PRINCIPLES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1. Security

Che initially had a well developed security apparatus when he arrived in Bolivia. The “foco” revolution relied on detailed and extensive clandestine cover networks that ran back to Cuba. The security system supplied the budding insurgency with false passports, radios, supplies, land, and even expediters to escort Che off the plane, past police, and military forces (James, 1968, p. 11). In fact, security was so tight “…that some of his own guerrilla followers did not know who he was” (James, 1968, p. 11). Che and his men quickly and quietly established a secure camp dug deep into the Bolivian jungle to cache supplies, weapons, and important documents. By early January 1967, Che and his “foco” revolutionary force numbered approximately 51 men and had just begun to train in earnest when the guerrillas prematurely ambushed a 32 man Bolivian Army patrol (James, 1968, p.
37), thus confirming reports of Che’s insurgency to the security apparatus of Bolivia. Even Che seemed a bit taken back by the acceleration of events. In addition to the active combat operations, Che’s guerillas suffered a series of defections and captures—thus seriously damaging the foundation of security that was so painstakingly laid out.

One significant source of information for the Bolivian Government, ironically, was the diaries that Che and his followers kept. Every single diary eventually found its way into Bolivian custody and was exploited to the fullest extent. By the middle of the summer (1967), with the loss of his last cache, radio, and tape recorder—Che was completely cut off from any external security system that could warn the guerillas of any operational or strategic intentions by the Bolivian Army. Tactically, Che failed to make inroads with any of the local peasants and thus even was denied a modicum of near security.

In the end, it was the Bolivians that leveraged the principle of Security; they quickly uncovered the diaries, revealing identities, intentions, dispositions, contacts, and resources, revealing operational and strategic plans. They further expanded that advantage by working with the natives and using their local knowledge to the fullest extent possible in a tactical environment. Even Che remarked in early October, after paying an old woman for silence, there was “little hope she will keep her word” (James, 1968, p. 223).

2. Networking

Originally, the Cubans laid out a very well established, well-connected network—it was Che himself who first began to burn bridges early in the insurgency. On the strategic realm, in December 1966, the Bolivian leader of the Communist party, Mario Monje, visited the newly established camp to begin a collaborative effort to liberate Bolivia. Monje came to join forces with the Cubans and use his “network” (Bolivian Communist Party). With Monje vying for the delicate issue of command and control of the insurgency, Che flatly refused and noted, “I could not accept it under any conditions” (James, 1968, p. 96). The meeting ended with in a stalemate with the Bolivian communist party giving only “lip service” to the campaign and actively refusing to support further operations (Selvage, 1985).

Another networking failure was much more tactical—Che completely misjudged the peasants that were supposed to support his insurgency. Bluntly put, there was not a single
member of the insurgency that could actually speak to the villagers in their native tongue. The insurgents could only communicate in the language of the ruling elite—Spanish (James, 1968, p. 60). Even the few native Bolivians recruited from the urban areas bore little resemblance physically or culturally to the peasants they were trying to reach. To the average villager, there was physically no difference between Che and the Government of Bolivia. Finally, what contacts the insurgency did have with the peasants was through Moises Geevara. Moises provided Che with recruits that Che looked upon with scorn and contempt. Che would characterize them as “generally of low grade…quitters and…and slackers” (James, 1968, p. 134). The final proof of Che’s failure to network is the fact that not a single peasant joined the insurgency after the March ambush of the Bolivian Army—and this was the insurgency at its best.

The Bolivians, on the other hand, networked extensively throughout the area. The Bolivian government made an active effort to recruit, equip, and train soldiers from those very regions to guard their own homes. “When a peasant told a soldier…where he had spotted the guerillas, he was talking to his own kind, and in some cases to a recruit from the same or neighboring region” (James, 1968, p. 61). In fact some of the earliest resistance to the March ambush didn’t come from La Paz, it came from peasant organizations banding together to organize a resistance to the invaders—Che’s insurgency. Conclusively, the insurgency did not network as evidenced by their lack of recruitment.

3. Purpose

Che’s stated purpose was simple and grandiose. In a piece later to be remembered as “Two, Three, many Vietnams,” Che establishes that the “U.S. imperialism is guilty of aggression” (Guevara, 1967). The solution he writes is “getting the enemy out of its natural environment, forcing him to fight in regions where his own life and habits will clash with the existing reality” (Guevara, 1967). His purpose is to create as much conflict as possible so that “should two, three, or many Vietnams flourish throughout the world…their everyday heroism (insurgents) and their repeated blows against imperialism…will…increase the hatred of all peoples of the world” (Guevara, 1967). In essence, Che wanted to use Bolivia as a tinderbox to ignite a worldwide revolt against the United States.
In practical terms, this meant that Che was less concerned about the Bolivian people as much as he was concerned with the overthrow of the United States: Bolivia was the means, the insurgency was the way, and the United States was the ends. This was clearly reflected in the makeup of the insurgent force—professional Cubans dominated nearly every major position of responsibility and leadership; additionally, they comprised the bulk of the force. At the end of the day, the people he needed probably saw through his appeal and simply did not want to be a “tool” in the hands of someone with whom they had no connection.

The Bolivian government, on the other hand, had in recent years had taken serious steps to try and connect with its constituents. The Bolivian government lobbied successfully and received more than $450 million dollars in aid from the United States since 1946, and nearly $40 million in 1966 alone. Additionally, since 1954, Bolivia was the single greatest recipient of U.S. aid in all of Latin America (Selvage, 1985). The aid money was used by the Bolivian government to fuel economic, social, and land reforms. One such reform was the Agrarian Reform Decree, “which distributed large amounts of church and ranch lands to peasants, as well as establishing quasi-private landholdings with the incorporation of wage labor” (Johnson, 2006, p. 30).

For the first time, Bolivian farmers were able to farmland they owned—revolutionary in concept and practice in this region. Further monies were spent building the Armed Forces that were centered on individual districts and villages, providing a dual purpose—putting people to work and using locals to police locals. Though there was clearly much work to be done, the people of Bolivia could see real purpose from the central government; in essence—the Bolivian people already had a revolution, why fight for another (Selvage, 1985)?

4. Indoctrination

Che’s basic philosophy towards indoctrination and training is quite different from most professional organizations. In his view, new guerillas needed to receive fundamental training from the “…experience they receive in battle and the informal information they receive from their seasoned cohorts” (Clark, 1988), in other words, the ultimate “on the job
training.” Che believed this baptism of fire could weld together groups of partisans into a successful fighting force. As time progressed, Che believed “A school for recruits should be established…when a base area is secure and sufficient personnel are on hand to supervise the training without degrading the combat force” (Clark, 1988). Furthermore, this school “must be capable of providing for its own support and dedicate a major portion of its curriculum to imbuing the recruits with a clear understanding of the aims of the insurgent movement, an elementary understanding of the history of their country, and the facts that motivate the movement's historic acts” (Clark, 1988).

While this planning appears romantic and sound in nature, its implementation was quite at odds with both what he practiced in Bolivia and the theory of UW. Che took essentially untrained personnel into a very austere and demanding environment, under the tutelage of Cuban “experts,” and unsurprisingly, found a tremendous amount of difficulty. Che notes in his diary that the Bolivians did not hold up well (James, 1968, p. 119). Che continues to note problems with insubordination, discipline, and poor attitudes. In effect, Che’s guerrillas cleaved into in-groups and out-groups based along national identities. Part of the problem is because of his failure to adequately motivate his men with a sufficient purpose. Although Che gives a nod towards an insurgents’ national history and culture, in practice Che was more concerned with the United States than he was the Bolivian people. David Snow⁹ would probably argue that instead of a single Master Frame, Che had instead splintered his message, thus dividing what scant people he could mobilize. The evidence bears this out; all of Che’s defections and deserters turned out to be Bolivians who became disillusioned with the Cubans.

In the end, Che failed to indoctrinate his people. Che wanted to rely on a romantic notion of a greater Latin American culture and identity that the Bolivian insurgents simply could not accept. Finally, taking raw personnel unaccustomed to the rigors of field life into the jungle was questionable at best.

⁹ Referenced earlier with the concept of Master Framing.
The new recruits were unprepared for that type of living and frankly began to see the Cubans not as allies, but as tormentors. The insurgents quickly began to fracture along nationalities, thus dividing what scant personnel the insurgency could offer.

5. Influence

Che probably understood this principle above all others. Che recognized that while numbers count, the message could make up for that shortage under the proper conditions. Indeed, the second principle of the “foco” theory of revolution asserts that, “It is not necessary to wait for all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.” (Johnson, 2006, p. 27). The only problem with Che’s implementation is that he was unable to manage the effects of his influence and adjust them accordingly.

For instance, in the early spring and summer of 1967, Che and his guerrillas were thought to number far more than the fifty-odd men that were actually present. “The high point (for the guerrillas) came on July 6, when the band audaciously entered and took Samaipata, on the key Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway, and blockaded the road itself. The dramatic episode, coming on the heels of a string of unbroken victories for the guerrillas, had a profoundly demoralizing effect” (James, 1968, p. 40). The effect would ripple through schools, communities, and the tin mines, causing general uprisings, strikes, and sympathy for the insurgency. “Many Bolivians got the impression that the guerrillas were about to over-run the entire southeast, while some elements of the international press inflated the event to proportions of a near-Armageddon for the Bolivian government” (James, 1968, p. 47). During this time, the Bolivian military and police forces were actually redeployed to mines and schools instead of being used to actively pursue Che and his forces (James, 1968).

Che, on the other hand, was completely unaware of the implications of his actions. His true intentions, at the time, were simply to occupy the small town long enough to procure pharmaceutical supplies for himself and his forces and then leave. Although Che knew the news of his actions would spread like fire (James, 1968, p. 180), he was unable to capitalize on them. If the foco insurgency had possessed a secure “feedback” mechanism, the insurgency might have done infinitely more damage by exploiting or managing the
“actions, behavior, opinions” of the populace and press. In this case, influence worked against the insurgency because it motivated the Bolivian government into action, taking the insurgency seriously, and focusing their resources into training the 2nd Ranger Battalion to counter the threat. Che and his insurgency were defeated, in part, to the misapplication of influence and their ability to manage the effects.

6. Agility

Che’s actions do support the Theory of UW that asserts in the final phase, execution, the insurgents should be able to launch “…hit-and-run mobile warfare tactics…attacking here then there; engaging the enemy at its weak points and avoiding his force concentrations; fighting incessantly where victory is possible but rapidly disengaging when the enemy has a clear force superiority; feinting an attack on the enemy's left flank before striking on his right” (Clark, 1988). Even though both theories, Che’s foco theory and the theory of UW, agree what should occur—in practice, Che was unable to implement this principle.

This failure is due, in large part, to three basic reasons. First, the insurgent force became active in combat operations much too soon. Second, the insurgency was simply too small at the time for active combat operations; the guerillas only numbered 51 actual combatants. Third and finally, the insurgents quickly lost their base of support and security apparatus. After the March ambush, the guerillas were fighting with limited intelligence and with no secure place to stage from. In essence their ongoing struggles became one of survival—not revolution. The insurgency fought not battles of their time and choosing, but rather on terms that became dictated by the Bolivian military.

D. DETERMINING RELATIVE SUPERIORITY

1. The Initial Conditions: 7 November 1966

There is evidence of a well-established network in place when Che arrived (James, 1968). Che’s organization realistically had a fairly good capability to gather intelligence with regards to the Bolivian Government, due in no small part to the open society that the Bolivia society presented. However, the insurgency did not have any effective intelligence
on the “inside,” and all of their insight came from second hand knowledge or overt observations. The Bolivian government on the other hand, had no knowledge of Che’s presence, only rumors that could not be confirmed until the 23 March 1967 ambush. Therefore, the insurgents would get a score of “4” and the state a score of “1.”

For resources, the insurgents were relatively well supplied with money, weapons, and qualified people. Fidel Castro had networks in place well before Che arrived and had established several means of secure communications for requesting additional supplies. The state, on the other hand, had exponentially more resources in terms of money, manpower, and equipment. Therefore, the insurgents would get a score of “2” and the state a score of “4.”

In POS, “Bolivia in 1966 appeared to be so fragmented in all respects that it could not possibly put together” (James, 1968, p. 18). The tin industry, which dominated the national economy, was in a serious slump with diminished profits (James, 1968). This slump fueled a rise in violent demonstrations and strikes, which necessitated the use of military and police forces to quell the unrest. Consequently, the insurgents would get a score of “3” and the state a score of “2.” The initial equation, as of November 1966, would look like this:

\[
\begin{align*}
I^{2(i)} * R^{(i)} * POS^{(i)} &= I^{2(g)} * R^{(g)} * POS^{(g)} \\
4^{2(i)} * 2^{(i)} * 3^{(i)} &= 1^{2(g)} * 4^{(g)} * 2^{(g)} \\
96(i) &= 8(g) \\
I > G &= 12
\end{align*}
\]

This would place the insurgency “relatively superior” to the state. This condition would remain essentially unchanged until the 23rd of March, 1967.

2. **Nancahuazu River: 23 March 1967**

In early January 1967, Che and his “foco” revolutionary force of approximately 51 men had just begun to train in earnest when the guerrillas ambushed a 32-man Bolivian Army patrol (James, 1968, p. 37). This premature action rashly announced the guerrillas to the security apparatus of Bolivia. In addition to the active combat operations, Che’s
guerillas suffered a series of defections and captures—thus seriously damaging the foundation of security that was so painstakingly laid out. The loss of the security also led to the military locating and exploiting the insurgent base camp, thus cutting off a major source of resources and supplies for the guerrillas. The loss of supplies, specifically the radio, also significantly limited the insurgent’s ability to acquire updated intelligence. More importantly, the state acquired a massive intelligence coup when it uncovered detailed information concerning communications, photos, and plans of Che Guevara’s insurgents. While these actions did not impact the POS, it significantly changed intelligence and resources for both sides. The equation would now look like this;

\[ I^2_{(i)} \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 2^2_{(i)} \times 1_{(i)} \times 3_{(i)} = 3^2_{(g)} \times 4_{(g)} \times 2_{(g)} \]

\[ 12_{(i)} = 72_{(g)} \]

\[ I < G = 6 \]

The state now had the relative superiority advantage. Additionally, the Bolivian Government took steps to contact outside allies for help, specifically the United States through the use of the 8th Special Forces Group. The 8th Special Forces Group dispatched a Mobile Training Team specifically designed to partner up with Bolivian, 2nd Ranger Battalion. The entire training mission centered on jungle warfare, counterinsurgency methods, and small unit tactics. This training would pay off after the next major encounter, which was at the Masicuri River.

3. Masicuri River: 31 August 1967

Bolivian military forces, based on intelligence gained from recently recovered diaries and documents, began to encircle Che’s forces. Joaquin’s guerillas were ambushed crossing the Masicuri River. This clash afforded the government two major windfalls: first, it cut Che’s forces by nearly a third, and, second, it strengthened the Bolivian Government’s intelligence picture of the guerillas by recovering several important caches and diaries. Furthermore, the action cut Che’s last link with outside help with the loss of several long-range and tactical radios. Che, meanwhile, had little luck in expanding his manpower
through recruiting local peasants. In truth, most members of his band did not speak the local language, much less share any significant ideological frame. As time wore on, the populace began to inform on Che’s movements to the military, due in no small part to the state using locally recruited forces to maintain order in their own districts. In other words, the State had the home ground advantage and were able to paint Che as the obvious outsiders that the insurgents were. This caused the equation to shift once more;

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma_{(i)}^2 \cdot R_{(i)} \cdot \text{POS}_{(i)} &= \Gamma_{(g)}^2 \cdot R_{(g)} \cdot \text{POS}_{(g)} \\
\Gamma_{(i)}^2 \cdot 1_{(i)} \cdot 3_{(i)} &= 4_{(g)}^2 \cdot 4_{(g)} \cdot 2_{(g)} \\
3_{(i)} &= 128_{(g)} \\
I < G &= 42.6
\end{align*}
\]

The state had the clear “relative superiority” and pressed the advantage home with an unrelenting campaign to surround, harass, and pursue the beleaguered guerillas. The guerrillas fought a losing game and made a final stand when cornered at Quebrada del Yuro on 8 October 1967.

4. **Quebrada del Yuro: 8 October 1967**

“As October began the guerrillas were forced to hide during the day and move only at night” (Selvage, 1985). Che’s forces were whittled down to less than 17 effective combatants and were forced to avoid the local population for fear of being reported. The guerrillas had no effective network to gain intelligence, resources, or recruits. Their stated purpose became one of simple survival. Any message of liberation was now silent in the attempt not to draw any further undo attention. What remained of the cadre fought amongst themselves over petty items like clothing, duties, and food—the ideological indoctrination had failed. Finally, the insurgents lost all hope of regaining the offensive—they were simply looking trying to survive. The final battle “…reads like a scenario out of a U.S. army counter-insurgency manual” (Selvage, 1985). Che and his guerillas became pinned down in a valley and were quickly surrounded and captured by the recently trained 2nd
Ranger Battalion. Che was executed the next day. A small element of Che’s guerrillas did manage to escape, and over the course of several months, they slowly work their way back to Cuba.

The Bolivian government’s image was actually strengthened as a result of defeating Che Guevara and resulted in an even larger POS for the state. The final equation is show below;

\[ I^2_{(i)} * R_{(i)} * POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} * R_{(g)} * POS_{(g)} \]

\[ I^2_{(i)} * I_{(i)} * 2_{(i)} = 5^2_{(g)} * 4_{(g)} * 3_{(g)} \]

\[ 2_{(i)} = 300_{(g)} \]

\[ I < G = 150 \]

5. Relative Superiority Over Time

Graphically depicting relative superiority against time for the entire conflict would look like this:

Figure 5. Relative Superiority in Bolivia
E. CONCLUSION

The graph above depicts the decent taken by Che Guevara and his “foco” revolution. It demonstrates the state’s relative superiority over the insurgency, even though the insurgency initially had the upper hand. Che Guevara failed in his attempt to start a revolution for a number of reasons. First, he failed to adequately safeguard his security and, therefore, increased the government’s ability to acquire intelligence on his organization. Second, he failed to network. Officially or unofficially, the military “foco” revolution was almost entirely comprised of Cuban professional soldiers and revolutionaries. The guerrillas were never able to tap into the local populace and failed to leverage any significant mobilizing structures. Che did have a stated purpose, but it failed to get any traction with the locals, and as combat operations began to increase in frequency, the message was lost in the attempt to simply to stay alive. There was a weak attempt to conduct limited strategic framing, but again, the message was lost on a population that his insurgents could not connect with. In fact, the population eventually turned against him and began to report the insurgent’s movements to the local authorities. In the end, Che violated most of the principles of UW, lost the initial relative superiority, and failed in a spectacular manner. The most enduring message Che may have left is a good example of what not to do in an Unconventional Warfare campaign.
V. IRAN’S DRAW: HEZBOLLAH IN LEBANON

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1982 Hezbollah (Arabic for Party of God), a Shia insurgent organization\(^{10}\) was created in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon. Despite their ideological differences, Syria and Iran found an overlapping area of interest, countering Israel, so they agreed to cooperate in the development of Hezbollah. Syria agreed to provide a secure area and help with logistics; Iran agreed to provide Hezbollah with training, weapons, salaries and benefits (Harik, 2004, p. 39). With the support of Syria and the sponsorship of Iran, Hezbollah grew into a powerful non-state actor that eventually drove Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 and again in 2006 (Helmer, 2007, p. 49). Despite Hezbollah’s considerable success, including providing many of the functions of the government in three geographical areas of Lebanon, it has failed to wrest control from the established political system and create an Islamic state in Lebanon. An analysis of Iran’s support to Hezbollah demonstrates that Unconventional Warfare can lead to a protracted struggle with no clear winner or loser—a draw.

B. BACKGROUND

Lebanon is a small country located on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea and borders both Syria and Israel. In 1943, Lebanon gained its independence from France and established a government based on a confessional system that guaranteed the senior positions in the government would be distributed proportionally to the ethnic and religious group’s size in Lebanon (Lowther, 2007, p. 83). The initial distribution was decided based on the most recent census, conducted in 1932.

The Shia population, with its much higher birthrate, was increasingly disadvantaged by the confessional apportionment frozen in time. In conjunction with political sidelining,

\(^{10}\) In many ways, Hezbollah defies conventional labeling. Hezbollah has been described as a resistance organization (Jaber, 1997, pp 20-21), a terrorist organization (state.org), a revolutionary movement (Ranstorp, 1997, p.194), a revolutionary proletarian party (Salamey & Pearson, 2007), an insurgent organization (Byman, 2001, p. 14), a zakat-jihad activist insurgency (Claessen, 2007, pp. 92-93), and “the world’s best guerrilla group” (Helmer D., 2007). For the purposes of this thesis, we will simply call Hezbollah an insurgent organization.
the Shia dominated parts of the country received much lower levels of service from the state compared to the other parts of the country (Jaber, 1997, pp. 10-11). In late 1959 or 1960, the most important pre-Hezbollah figure in the Lebanese Shia community arrived from Iran, the Imam Musa al-Sadr (Fuller, 2006, p. 142). While the traditional role of the Shia in Lebanon was “political submission and lament, the advent of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s charismatic leadership over the Shia community transformed it into one of rebellion and social unrest” (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 29).

In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, thousands of Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon and became deeply involved in the internal politics of Lebanon. By 1968 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) began conducting raids from Southern Lebanon into Israel (Jaber, 1997, pp. 11-12). “After the 1970 PLO defeat in Jordan, the bulk of the PLO fighters relocated to south Lebanon, where they proceeded to supplant the legitimate authorities” (Norton, 1987, p. 43). The strife, intrigue and violence associated with the PLO aggravated the increasingly tense relations between the different sects. Civil war erupted in Lebanon in 1975, leading to partial occupation by Syria in 1976 and Israel in 1982. As a result of the civil war al-Sadr established the Afwaj al-Muquawamah al-Lubnaniya militia, also known as Amal (hope). While al-Sadr was not predisposed to violence, Amal did participate in, and suffered disproportionately from, the civil war (Norton, 1987, p. 49). In 1978 while on a trip to Libya, Musa al-Sadr disappeared, never to be seen again. Al-Sadr’s disappearance became a key factor in the further radicalization and mobilization of the Shia community in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 29).

In 1982 the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) invaded and subsequently occupied southern Lebanon in pursuit of the PLO. The IDF successfully drove the PLO from southern Lebanon and continued until it reached Beirut, but the invasion dramatically altered the balance of power in the country (Lowther, 2007, p. 85). The majority of the Shia in the area were relieved by the expulsion of the PLO and at least sympathetic to Israel (Kepel, 2002, p. 126). When it became apparent that Israel was not leaving, the euphoria of the PLO’s eviction soon changed to resentment and militancy (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 30). The turning point for the IDF was an unintended confrontation between an IDF convoy and a Shia religious procession commemorating Ashura, the most sacred religious festival in Shia
Islam (Wege, 1994, p. 153). The IDF killed two in the incident, leading to a Shia community backlash against the Israelis who had already overstayed their welcome (Jaber, 1997, p. 18). Inside Amal, there was significant infighting on how to respond to the Israeli occupation and whether to create an Islamic Republic of Lebanon similar to Khomeini’s Iran. Some of Amal’s members split off and created Islamic Amal while others were recruited into the newly formed Hezbollah (Hajjar, 2002, p. 5).

The Israeli 1982 invasion of Lebanon provided a window of opportunity for Iran and was the principal cause of Hezbollah’s creation (Hajjar, 2002, p. 2). Syria, threatened by the close proximity of the IDF, agreed to Iranian entreaties and signed a military agreement with Iran. Syria agreed to allow the Iranians a base on the Syrian side of the border in Zebdani to facilitate the transshipment of Iranian personnel, weapons and supplies (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 34). Additionally, Syria agreed to provide security in the Bekaa valley of Lebanon, which it occupied, and support logistics. Iran agreed to provide military advisors, trainers, weapons, equipment, salary and benefits (Harik, 2004, p. 39). Iran sent in unconventional warfare specialists from the al-Quds unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); 800 IRGC personnel were deployed to the town of Baalbek and 700 were spread out to small villages along the Bekaa valley. The IRGC forces were primarily instructors and fighters, but their ranks also included Iranian clergy for religious indoctrination (Ranstorp, 1997). IRGC operations supporting Hezbollah were conducted under the supervision and direction of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Iran’s ambassador to Damascus (Norton, 1991, p. 11).

The IRGC has its roots in the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution (MIR), a splinter group from the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK). The MEK was an insurgent group opposed to the Shah that fragmented when it became more communist and less Islamic. The MIR served as guerrilla fighters supporting Khomeini and helped to secure the streets after the Shah’s regime collapsed (Katzman, 1993, p. 32). After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the MIR morphed into the IRGC, where it served to solidify Khomeini’s hold on the country (Katzman, 1993, p. 33). Locally based, highly fragmented, and without a nationwide command structure, the IRGC was forced to change and grow rapidly after the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran (Katzman, 1993, p. 391). The IRGC developed conventional
capabilities that were used in the war with Iraq as well as unconventional capabilities that were used for internal security, specifically in a counter-insurgency role against the MEK. The IRGC dispersed to achieve maximum penetration of the civilian population and developed a complex intelligence organization focused on organized opposition to the regime. After the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the Guard was also charged with mobilizing the “20-million-man army” of Iranians. The guard established recruitment centers in “local mosques, schools, factories, and government facilities” (Katzman, 1993, p. 83). Thus, the IRGC had the unique experience as an insurgent guerrilla organization, an internal security / counter-insurgency organization, and mobilizing organization before deploying to Lebanon. This broad range of experiences would serve the IRGC well in Lebanon.

From the beginning of their operations in Lebanon the IRGC used a long term approach to developing Hezbollah. Operating from the Syrian secured safe haven in the Bekaa valley, the IRGC and Hezbollah used Baalbek as their main base after driving the Lebanese army out of the Sheik Abdullah barracks in Baalbek. The IRGC took control of Hezbollah’s security and resistance operations as well as its training. In addition to in-country training, members of Hezbollah were secretly transported through Syria to Iran to complete IRGC training in Iran (Jaber, 1997, p. 51). Recruiting and religious indoctrination were highly successful thanks to substantial financial support from Iran through the IRGC. Fighters were paid good wages and were given excellent educational and medical benefits. Monies spent on social welfare projects such as religious schools, clinics, hospitals and welfare boosted the popularity of the pro-Iranian movement and indirectly assisted in recruiting. With Iranian financial support Hezbollah was able to provide services that the other militias and the state were not able to provide. Many fighters from the more secular Amal organization were lured into the ranks of Hezbollah by the considerable benefits (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 36). As Hezbollah developed, it expanded out in three phases to different geographical areas: Phase I Bekaa valley, Phase II Beirut, Phase III southern Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 34-40).

As Hezbollah’s groups began conducting operations, they kept Hezbollah’s existence a secret by operating under such names as Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese National Resistance. Although Israel actively targeted the leadership of these new and
deadly groups, the IDF was unable to degrade Hezbollah shadow organizations’ capabilities because Hezbollah’s decision making was by committee and not by a single commander (Jaber, 1997, p. 51). Beginning in 1982 and lasting for ten years, a collection of obscure organizations that were “seemingly loosely or indirectly affiliated” with Hezbollah conducted spectacular suicide missions and “political acts of hostage-taking against Western citizens”\(^{11}\) (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 60). The suicide bombing missions included the 1982 attack on the IDF in Tyre, the 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy, and the near simultaneous attacks on the U.S. and French military barracks in October of 1983.

From 1982 – 1985 Hezbollah militiamen became increasingly visible by wearing green bands around their heads, but Hezbollah’s leadership remained cloaked in secrecy. Their influence was noticed on the street as women were pressured to wear attire that is more conservative and shops that sold alcohol were driven underground. Hezbollah remained active but still very secretive until Israel announced its withdrawal to the south of the Litani River. On 16 February 1985, Hezbollah went public by publishing its manifesto as an open letter. The manifesto announced that Hezbollah’s aim was the complete overthrow of the Lebanese confessional system and the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 47). Hezbollah also forswore peace agreements with Israel and blamed the United States for all the region’s catastrophes (Jaber, 1997, pp. 54-60). Even after Hezbollah published its manifesto, it remained a shadowy organization that concealed the identities of its leaders (Jaber, 1997, p. 61). With the aid of IRGC training, Hezbollah became an increasingly effective and sophisticated fighting force from 1985-1990 (Helmer, 2007 p. 53). Hezbollah became so effective that it almost defeated its Syrian sponsored rival Amal, but Iran intervened at Syria’s request and spared Amal from certain destruction in 1988 (Samii, 2008).

\(^{11}\) Hezbollah’s exact role in these missions is debated to this day. According to Wege Hezbollah was actively involved in the hostage taking with Iran (Wege, 1994, pp. 154-156). According to Kfoury Hezbollah was “linked” to the kidnappings. (Kfoury, 1997, p. 138). According to Jaber “many clues pointed to Hezbollah’s involvement” with hostage taking (Jaber, 1997, p. 99). Ranstorp’s book examines in detail the hostage crisis in Lebanon “perpetrated by the Hezbollah organization” (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 3).
Unable to crush the Syrian protected Amal and unable to expand beyond the Shia areas of Lebanon, Hezbollah eventually entered into the Lebanese political system for survival. Tensions spiked between Hezbollah and Syria from time to time, but the relationship remained stable over time because of their common enemy, Israel.

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June of 1989, Iran’s policies changed almost immediately. The more radical factions lost power and Iran began negotiations with the West for the release of hostages (Jaber, 1997, pp. 150-151). In October 1989, Syria succeeded in getting the Ta’if Accord signed, effectively ending the Lebanese civil war and granting Syria a special role in Lebanon. Although the accord called for all militias to demobilize, Hezbollah was able to maintain its weapons under a deal between Iran and Syria signed 21 April 1991. Syria, under severe pressure over its association with Hezbollah during the hostage taking, signed the deal with the understanding that Hezbollah would help secure the release of western hostages12 (Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 105-106). In May of 1991, Sheikh Abbas al-Masawi was elected Secretary General of Hezbollah. al-Masawi, considered more pragmatic than his predecessor, maintained a militant stance against Israel while entering Hezbollah into the Lebanese political process. When al-Masawi was assassinated by Israel in February 1992, his successor, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, kept the same policies and peacefully returned the Sheikh Abdullah barracks back to the Lebanese army. In 1992 Hezbollah participated in Lebanese elections for the first time and won 12 seats out of 128 available. After the 1992 elections, Hezbollah continued participating in the government of Lebanon and kept a standing militia as a “resistance movement” against Israel. Although Iran withdrew the last of the IRGC in 1998, it still continued to provide Hezbollah money and supplies. Hezbollah had successfully worn down the Israelis until they fully withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, giving Hezbollah a huge boost in popularity across Lebanon. In 2006, the IDF again invaded Lebanon after Hezbollah kidnapped two of their soldiers in an attack. Israel withdrew from Lebanon after 33 days of fighting without the soldiers’ remains and without destroying Hezbollah.

12 Terry Anderson, the last Western hostage was released 4 December, 1991.
Although most Lebanese were initially angry at Hezbollah for instigating the invasion, their anger soon turned to Israel for what was viewed as an extreme over-reaction (Norton, 2006, p. 67).

To date the problem of Hezbollah has not been resolved. Although Hezbollah has become part of the Lebanese government, it still has its own armed militia in defiance of UN Resolution 1701. When the government of Lebanon tried to shut down Hezbollah media outlets in 2007, fighting broke out in the streets and the government was forced to back off. For its part Hezbollah has failed to spread the Khomeini’s revolution by creating an Islamic state, the original goal of Hezbollah and its IRGC advisors. How did the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah and Lebanon end up in a draw? An examination of the principles of Unconventional Warfare will shed some light on the subject.

C. THE PRINCIPLES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1. Security

When the advisors from the IRGC arrived in Lebanon, they had a distinct advantage in security. Syria was already occupying the Bekaa valley as a result of the civil war, and the Lebanese government was preoccupied with the Israeli invasion and occupation. The Bekaa valley was one of the long neglected Shia portions of the country, and the civil war had made the Lebanese government incapable of performing basic functions. Most security considerations, normally paramount in an insurgency, were not relevant because Syria controlled the Bekaa valley and the Israeli invasion provided a significant distraction. Hezbollah members and their IRGC counterparts were visible from 1982-1985, but they kept a relatively low profile and concealed their intentions (Wright, 1989). During this time period Hezbollah participated in the bombings and kidnappings of Western targets, but never took any credit for itself; instead Hezbollah front organizations or organizations under the Hezbollah umbrella took credit for the operations. The groups that conducted and supported the kidnappings maintained almost complete security surrounding their identities and their operations (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 62). Hezbollah’s security during these operations was so good that the EU to this day refuses to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization (Hajjar, 2002, p. 31). From the very beginning, the IRGC developed Hezbollah into an
extremely close knit, cellular organization capable of conducting successful covert operations (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 64). Communications were sometimes conducted by having local Imams say code words during their sermons. People outside of the specific cell intended for the message, including the Imam and other Hezbollah cells, would have no idea what the significance of the words were (Helmer, 2007, p. 51).

The IRGC was very competent at guerrilla security operations and passed those skills on to Hezbollah. Some of the key personnel in both the IRGC and Hezbollah had cut their teeth working for the PLO’s security organization in Lebanon during the 1970s (Katzman, 1993, pp. 96-97). Some of the most troublesome security risks for Hezbollah and its advisors, such as resupply and communications, were significantly reduced by the Syrian provided security and tacit support. The nearby Syrian border also provided a safe haven and enabled transshipment of items into Lebanon. Despite all these security advantages, Hezbollah and its IRGC advisors were still both careful and patient. It was not until February of 1985 that Hezbollah revealed itself to the world as an organization through its manifesto. Hezbollah’s open letter manifesto, while announcing its intentions, still did not provide any indication of its leadership, thus preserving some of the organization’s veil of secrecy.

2. Networking

Hezbollah began with a huge advantage in networking. Many of the IRGC’s fighters sent to Lebanon were trained by the PLO in Lebanon during the reign of the Shah (Wege, 1994, p. 154). Some of the members of Hezbollah’s Special Security Apparatus (SSA) had also worked with the PLO in Lebanon, specifically the PLO intelligence and security organization known as Fatah Force 17. This common background and operational experience in with the PLO allowed the IRGC to facilitate relations between the Palestinians and the Islamist Shia movement, as well as provide Iranian derived intelligence (Wege, 1994, p. 154). In addition to Hezbollah’s Iranian sponsor, Syria periodically provided Hezbollah with intelligence, sometimes as a conduit for the Soviets, when it was in their interest (Jaber, 1997, p. 81).
Hezbollah also had a networking advantage with Imams and clerics. The two leading Hezbollah sheiks, as well as the current Secretary General, spent years studying in Najaf, Iraq (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 46). The credibility in the Shia community associated with studying in Najaf, particularly under Ayatollah Khomeini, helped to bring in a number of Lebanese (Shia) clergy, along with their followers, into Hezbollah (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 37).

Hezbollah’s networking was not dependent on the work of established PLO networks or the Syrian and Iranian organizations. From the beginning, the IRGC and Hezbollah tapped into several clans and family networks that provided a high degree of loyalty (Jaber, 1997, pp. 117, 142). In the early 1980s when members of Amal were breaking off to join the Party of God, Hezbollah directed some of its sympathizers to remain in Amal to transform (and likely to report on) Amal for Hezbollah (Jaber, 1997, p. 54). Some of Hezbollah’s fighters only work as full time fighters for three months out of the year; the rest of the year they are integrated into everyday Lebanese society (Jaber, 1997, p. 93). Hezbollah also has numerous business interests including bookshops, farms, fisheries, factories and bakeries (Jaber, 1997, p. 152). Every Hezbollah fighter, employee and supporter that was dispersed and integrated into society contributed to a readymade reporting apparatus.

3. Purpose

When Iran sent the IRGC to Lebanon in 1982 it had two basic goals: to establish a counter to its bitter geopolitical enemies Israel and the United States, and to spread the Khomeini revolution to the Shia population in Lebanon. Despite the considerable religious rhetoric coming from Iran at the time, Iran’s primary goal for the IRGC can be determined by Iran directing its support not to the Shia political goals, but against Israel and the United States (Wege, 1994, p. 157).

Hezbollah’s purpose was very clear to those inside the nascent Hezbollah organization: first expelling Israel from Lebanon and second the spread of the Khomeini revolution. Hassan Narallah, the current secretary general of Hezbollah, admitted in an interview that Hezbollah’s initial goal was a revolt against the 1982 Israeli occupation (Jaber, 1997, p. 20). In its open letter published in February of 1985, Hezbollah formally
introduced itself to Lebanon, explaining Hezbollah and its purpose. The letter was written
by Hezbollah’s founding Shia clergy and was heavily influenced by revolutionary Iranian
thinking (Hajjar, 2002, pp. 6-7). According to the letter, Hezbollah identified itself with the
Iranian revolution and claimed to takes its commands from Ayatollah Khomeini. Despite
the strong Shia connection, the letter claimed that Hezbollah was not a closed organization,
but rather linked to all Muslims (Jaber, 1997, pp. 54-54), and called for the establishment of
Sharia law (Harik, 2004, p. 67). The letter identified the USA as the major “abomination”
and described Israel as the “Zionist entity usurping the holy land of Palestine” (Harik, 2004,  
p. 67). Hezbollah called for the “confrontation” with Israel to continue until it was
eliminated from existence without cease-fire or peace treaty. “The group vowed never to
participate in any of the (Lebanese) government’s institutions, so long as the current
decaying sectarian system exists, emphasizing that no measure of reform would be
considered sufficient to remedy Lebanon’s political establishment” (Jaber, 1997, p. 61).

Despite Hezbollah’s manifesto, it did indeed participate in the government of
Lebanon. By late 1989, Hezbollah was faced with a choice between compromising its
purpose, or else risking the loss of support from both its protector, Syria, and is sponsor,
Iran. Hezbollah chose the path of survival. Hezbollah changed its strategic framing to a
much more nationalistic focused message, that of protector of Lebanon from Israel.
Hezbollah’s new emphasis had a wider appeal in Lebanon and was reinforced by Israel’s
2006 invasion.

4. Indoctrination

Iranian clerics accompanying the IRGC contingent began recruiting and
indoctrinating residents with the Iranian Revolutionary message as soon as they arrived in
Baalbek in 1982. Strict Islamic dress and behavior was enforced by both Hezbollah and the
IRGC in the Bekaa valley (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 35). While the imposition of strict Islamic
behavior was very popular with some portions of the Shia community, supporters of the
more secular Amal and non-Muslims residents were turned off by the strict requirements
imposed by Hezbollah.
After 1985 Hezbollah’s attempts at mass indoctrination were curbed and more effort was put into influencing non-Hezbollah supporters while simultaneously indoctrinating Hezbollah supporters.

Hezbollah style indoctrination began at an early age; young children were continually drilled on the merits of self sacrifice, with paradise as the reward for death in battle (Jaber, 1997, p. 89). Children were shown video of suicide bombers (in at least one case their parent) conducting an attack over and over (Jaber, 1997, pp. 1-6). Some Hezbollah initiatives blur the lines between indoctrination and influence. Hezbollah built better schools than the government and included “Islamic studies” into their program of instruction (Jaber, 1997, pp. 162-165). Numerous mosques have been built or repaired, providing another venue for the reinforcement of Hezbollah’s message (Jaber, 1997, p. 166). Hezbollah has consistently provided a steady diet of indoctrination from childhood all the way through the training of its fighters, and this indoctrination has been effective enough for adults to voluntarily commit suicide attacks (Jaber, 1997, pp. 1-6).

5. Influence

Hezbollah and the Iranian clerics’ ability to influence the population were initially limited to grass roots interaction, sermons at select mosques, and word of mouth. Over time Hezbollah developed more sophisticated means of changing people’s belief patterns and behaviors. Hezbollah launched its newspaper, al-Ahed (Arabic for The Pledge), before it had even released its manifesto. Hezbollah’s radio station, al-Nour (Arabic for The Light), was launched during the 1987-1989 battles between Amal and Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s television station, al-Manar (Arabic for The Beacon), made its first broadcast during Ayatollah Khomeini’s funeral in 1989 (Jaber, 1997, p. 42). In contradiction to its normal committee planned, decentralized manner of doing business, Hezbollah put its Information Department that controls its radio, television, and newspaper sections directly under the control of the Secretary General in 1989 (Harik, 2004, p. 54). Hezbollah also extended its influence by conducting rapid reconstruction and repair after Israeli attacks, building quality health care facilities, and by developing a welfare-like program (Jaber, 1997, pp. 157-161). These state like services were not just limited to Hezbollah members or
even Muslims; anyone who followed their moderate Islamic dress code was welcome to receive their services. After backing off from its earlier imposition of strict behavior restrictions in the early 1980s, Hezbollah was able to skillfully leverage the goodwill of its services to influence non-Hezbollah supporters. For example, when a family receives assistance from the Hezbollah relief committee, a sermon always accompanies the assistance (Jaber, 1997, pp. 160-161).

6. Agility

Hezbollah has never been able to reach the final phase, agility, against the Lebanese state outside of Shia dominated areas because it has been unable to destroy its primary competitor in the Shia population of Lebanon, Amal. Hezbollah was stymied in its consolidation of power by Iran and Syria, who were both more concerned with their respective strategic interests than Hezbollah’s interests. For example, whenever Hezbollah attempted to challenge Syria’s authority in Lebanon, Syria instituted a blockade of Hezbollah and brought Hezbollah back in line (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 132). In 1989, Syria brokered the Ta’if Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war and required militias to disarm. Syria was determined to see the accord succeed, even at the expense of Hezbollah (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 127). Also in 1989, Iran’s support of Hezbollah’s more aggressive and politically sensitive operations, such as kidnapping westerners, dried up after the death of Khomeini. In April of 1991 Iran and Syria made an agreement that drastically changed Hezbollah’s room for maneuver. Syria agreed to allow Hezbollah to remain armed as a “resistance movement.” In exchange, Hezbollah would facilitate the release of western hostages in Lebanon and operate within both Iranian and Syrian interests (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 105).

Hezbollah, now hemmed in by both Syria and Iran, was compelled to compete in the 1992 elections. Sheik Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah at the time of the elections, described Hezbollah’s political participation as a calibrated move, part of an incremental strategy to challenge and overthrow the government of Lebanon from within (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 76). Despite Nassrallah’s assertion, Hezbollah participated in and cooperated with the Lebanese government. In 2000 when Israel made its complete
withdraw from Lebanon, the state could not control the vacated area, so it deferred to Hezbollah (Harik, 2004, pp. 112-113). Hezbollah was given credit and widely celebrated across the country for Israel’s withdraw from Lebanon. Although many outside the Shia community began to question the need for Hezbollah to remain armed, in 2005 Lebanon endorsed Hezbollah’s right to keep its arms as a resistance movement. In return, Hezbollah agreed to participate in the Lebanese government (Norton, 2006, pp. 54, 60). Hezbollah’s role as a resistance movement was reinforced again in the eyes of many Lebanese in 2006 by the “Summer War” invasion by Israel. In May of 2007, after calculating that Hezbollah was weakened from its fight with Israel, Lebanon tried to shut down Hezbollah’s media outlets and remove the Beirut airport security chief because of alleged sympathies to Hezbollah. The government’s actions sparked gun battles between pro-government militias and Hezbollah that claimed at least 60 people’s lives. The violence ended only after the government agreed to reverse its anti-Hezbollah initiatives and deployed the Lebanese army to establish order. Hezbollah and the militias appeared unwilling to attack the Lebanese army, the only institution capable of inspiring a sense of Lebanese national unity (Hartwell, 2007). This action clearly demonstrates Lebanon’s desire, and its inability, to assert its supremacy over Hezbollah. It also demonstrates a desire on Hezbollah’s part not to fracture the state of Lebanon and create a new civil war. Thus both the state of Lebanon and Hezbollah are stuck in an uneasy and sometimes unstable relationship, a draw.

D. DETERMINING RELATIVE SUPERIORITY

1. The Initial Conditions: 6 June 1982

Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, ostensibly to rid itself of the PLO threat, is the genesis for Hezbollah. It is in this crisis that Iran and Syria agreed to the formation of this insurgency in order to accomplish two major tasks: one, to counter Israeli military power and two, to export and establish the Iranian Revolution in Lebanon, replacing its secular government. The insurgency initially found a foothold in Southern Lebanon under the direction of the IRGC, which operated from secure bases in Syria. In the earliest stages, the insurgency did not have any intelligence networks, due in no small part to the actual invasion itself by Israel. Life, communities, and infrastructure were significantly disrupted,
for quite some time, by combat activity and occupation. The Lebanese state on the other hand, was likewise completely incapable of monitoring, much less controlling, any insurgency or militias during this time frame as a result of the Israeli occupation. The de facto state at this time in the area of concern was the Israeli military. The Israeli forces also lacked good tactical intelligence and simultaneously founded the South Lebanon Army (SLA) to counter that problem. The SLA’s primary task was to locate and destroy, with the help of Israeli military power, the PLO or any other threat. Since both the insurgents and the de facto state, Israel, were equally uninformed, they would each receive a score of “1.”

For resources, the insurgents were funded heavily from Iran. The insurgency used the money to not only to pay and train their fighters well, but were savvy enough to spend large sums of money in funding numerous schools, clinics, and hospitals during this time frame. On the other hand, the Israeli military, the de facto state, lacked almost nothing in the terms of money, men, or equipment. Therefore, the insurgents would get a score of “2” and the state, in this case, Israel, would get a score of “4.”

The Israeli military occupation, by definition, gave the insurgency the upper hand in POS. The large coercive military apparatus used to maintain law and order was initially welcomed by the Shia. However, when it became apparent that the Israeli military was settling in and not leaving anytime soon, attitudes soured quickly. Therefore, the insurgents would get a score of “4” and the state, in this case, Israel, would get a score of “1.” The initial equation, as of December 1982, would look like this:

\[ I_{(i)}^2 \cdot R_{(i)} \cdot POS_{(i)} = I_{(g)}^2 \cdot R_{(g)} \cdot POS_{(g)} \]

\[ I_{(i)}^2 \cdot 1_{(i)} \cdot 4_{(i)} = I_{(g)}^2 \cdot 4_{(g)} \cdot 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 4_{(i)} = 4_{(g)} \]

\[ I = G = 0 \]

This would place neither side, Hezbollah nor Israel, “relatively superior” to the other. This condition would gradually change over the next three years as Hezbollah, using the principles of UW, began to build their organization in a clandestine and covert manner until the release of their Manifesto in 1985.
2. **Hezbollah’s Manifesto: 16 February 1985**

With the publishing of the Manifesto, Hezbollah announced its true *raison d'être*: the destruction of the government of Lebanon, the establishment of an Islamic government founded on Sharia law, and the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese soil. Previous to this announcement, Hezbollah had been secretly building its networks for intelligence and support by infiltrating the Shia community via the clinics, schools, and hospitals it had established years prior. Hezbollah, while actively expanding its network, remained shadowy and worked behind the scenes, avoiding Israeli and Lebanese intelligence agents. Hezbollah used numerous front organizations to carry out limited attacks with well-constructed cutouts and dead ends. This increased intelligence changed Hezbollah’s intelligence score from a “1” to a “3” in three short years, while the de facto state, Israel, never progressed beyond a “1.”

The resources portion of the equation also changed during this timeframe. IRGC training and funding intensified, and as a result, Hezbollah became a sophisticated and lethal insurgent organization, shedding its previous civic actions for a more aggressive role against Israel. Hezbollah’s resources moved from a score of “1” to a “2.” Despite the increase in Hezbollah’s lethality, Israel continued to dominate the resources portion of the equation, with an overwhelming advantage and, thus, maintained their score of “4.”

Political Opportunity Structures continued to work against Israel due to the increasing resistance to the occupation. However, there was competition for the remaining POS amongst the various militias that came into being as a result of the occupation, Hezbollah being only one of many. Hezbollah used the manifesto in part, to announce to the Lebanese people its intention to get a monopoly on the divided POS.
At this time, Hezbollah scored “2” with the remaining POS essentially lost to tertiary and competing organizations. The equation would now look like this:

\[ I_{(i)}^2 \times R_{(i)} \times POS_{(i)} = I_{(g)}^2 \times R_{(g)} \times POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 3^2_{(i)} \times 2_{(i)} \times 2_{(i)} = 1^2_{(g)} \times 4_{(g)} \times 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 36_{(i)} = 4_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 9 \]

This would indicate the insurgency had gained “relatively superiority” to the de facto state, Israel in the southern and occupied sections of Lebanon. This condition would essentially remain unchanged until the signing of the Ta’if Agreement in 1989.

3. Ta’if Agreement: 22 October 1989

The Ta’if agreement, ostensibly forged to end the Lebanese Civil War and return Lebanon to a state of normalcy, had several major second and third order effects. First, the agreement effectively eliminated all Lebanese militias save Hezbollah, thus leaving the Lebanese people a single source to turn to for help against the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah was quick to capitalize on this windfall and rapidly absorbed the remaining militias, arms, networks, and intelligence agents. Second, the accord stipulated that Syria and Syrian influenced militias would withdraw from Lebanon. This again had the effect of “pooling all available resources” into a single basket for Hezbollah to use. As a result of this activity, Hezbollah continued to increase their intelligence advantage from score of “3” to a “4.” Israel on the other hand, finally had a single target to focus its proxy militia, South Lebanese Army (SLA), against, thus increasing their intelligence score from a “1” to a “2.”

While Israel continued to maintain a clear distinct advantage over resources with a score of “4,” Hezbollah continued to make strides and consolidate previous competitors’ men, weapons, and equipment into their organization, moving the insurgent’s resource score from a “2” to a “3.”

The same principle outlined above also held true for POS. Hezbollah was now able to capitalize on nearly all available POS, due to the lack of competitors, and unify them.
against the Israeli militia and occupation, raising Hezbollah’s score from a “2” to a “3.” Israel continued to use coercive measures to maintain their control on the population and maintained their score of “1.” The equation would now look like this:

\[ I_{(i)}^2 * R_{(i)} * POS_{(i)} = I_{(g)}^2 * R_{(g)} * POS_{(g)} \]
\[ 4^2_{(i)} * 3_{(i)} * 3_{(i)} = 2^2_{(g)} * 4_{(g)} * 1_{(g)} \]
\[ 144_{(i)} = 16_{(g)} \]
\[ I > G = 9 \]

The net result of the Ta’if agreement allowed Hezbollah to maintain its relative superiority even in the face of proxy militias.


The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 had a significant impact on Hezbollah. It allowed Hezbollah to move away from its stricter strategic framing of Sharia law to one of more tolerance and inclusion. Hezbollah also took an unprecedented move and ran in the 1992 Lebanese elections and secured 12 seats in parliament. This act cemented “the resistance” as permanent members of the Lebanese society. Hezbollah continued to maintain their significant intelligence advantage by deliberately taking steps to thwart Israeli and Israeli proxies. For instance, Hezbollah used committees, thereby diffusing the risk to its leaders from Israeli operations. While intelligence and resources scores remained the same for both sides, the greatest change occurred in the POS.

With the blurring and de-emphasis of the hard core Shia and Sharia law, and the recent national elections in 1992, Hezbollah was finally able to gather up all tertiary and unclaimed POS that were lost to political and religious infighting. For the first time, Hezbollah could unify that advantage against the Israeli occupation and its proxy army the SLA.
This consolidation would change Hezbollah’s score from a “3” to a “4,” leaving Israel with its coercive score of “1.” The equation would now look like this:

\[
I^2(i) \times R(i) \times POS(i) = I^2(g) \times R(g) \times POS(g)
\]

\[
4^2(i) \times 3(i) \times 4(i) = 2^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 1(g)
\]

\[
192(i) = 16(g)
\]

\[
I > G = 12
\]

This effect would continue to wear away at the de facto state, Israel, until its withdrawal from Lebanon 10 years later.

5. Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon: 24 May 2000

Hezbollah, in a position of relative superiority, concentrated its efforts at the destruction of the Israeli intelligence net and proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army. In January, Hezbollah assassinated Colonel Aql Hashem, the Commander of South Lebanon Army’s Western Brigade. This act disrupted what tenuous and limited intelligence Israel could produce in the area. This act shifted Israel’s intelligence score from a “2” back to a “1” and solidified the insurgent’s score of “4.” Resources and POS would remain essentially the same during this time frame. Despite Israel’s significant—nearly unlimited—resource advantage, Israel would withdraw from Lebanon on the 24 May 2000, nearly six weeks ahead of schedule, leaving behind a victorious Hezbollah. The equation would now look like this:

\[
I^2(i) \times R(i) \times POS(i) = I^2(g) \times R(g) \times POS(g)
\]

\[
4^2(i) \times 3(i) \times 4(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 1(g)
\]

\[
192(i) = 4(g)
\]

\[
I > G = 48
\]

Hezbollah clearly developed and maintained a distinct relative superiority over Israel. However, with the shift from an occupied territory to one of Lebanese control, Hezbollah would be constrained by some of the very advantages that caused it to flourish.

With the Israeli withdrawal from the southern portions of Lebanon, Hezbollah transitioned from “resistance fighter” to “insurgent” as it faced its new opponent, Lebanon. The Lebanese government could not control the Shia strongholds that Hezbollah had defended and “liberated” from Israeli control. Likewise, Hezbollah, though wildly popular as a resistance organization against Israel, found little support in Sunni, Christian, and secular areas of Lebanon. In essence, Hezbollah had reached the upper limits of its strategic framing; this was a direct result of the insurgency’s original roots in Iran and its 1985 manifesto. Though the government of Lebanon understood that Hezbollah’s political participation was part of an incrementally strategy to overthrow the government, Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to maintain its weapons and military in order to keep the insurgency at the political table.

For the intelligence score, Hezbollah’s distinct advantage against Israel eroded when the network was turned on its fellow “countrymen.” Likewise, Lebanon found it difficult to penetrate an organization that was wildly regarded as heroes.

In the end, Hezbollah was able to maintain a score of “3” by relying on its extensive networks and by taking advantage of the political process while the state, incapable of significantly penetrating Hezbollah, scores a “1.”

The resources portion of the equation favors the state. Though the state of Lebanon is clearly inferior in resources to the state of Israel, Lebanon is capable of bringing significantly more forces to bear as a result of being the legitimate government of the state of Lebanon. During the peak of the Israeli invasion, the Israeli armed forces never positioned more than 5-6,000 soldiers inside of Lebanon. The Lebanese government on the other hand, controlled over 70,000 members of its armed forces—in essence, Hezbollah’s “enemy” traded a technological advantage (Israel) for a significant numerical advantage (Lebanon). This left the numerical scores of “2” for Hezbollah and a “4” for Lebanon.

Though Hezbollah maintained 12 seats in parliament, they lost POS as a direct result of Israel’s withdrawal. Formerly unified, Sunni, Christians, and secular Lebanese who fought with Hezbollah, now questioned the need for its existence as an armed force inside
the territorial boundaries of Lebanon. Hezbollah would see its POS drop from a “4” to a “1.” The State, in its bid to be inclusive of varying sects and cultures, would score a “4.” The equation now looked like this:

\[
I_2^{(i)} \times R^{(i)} \times POS^{(i)} = I_2^{(g)} \times R^{(g)} \times POS^{(g)}
\]

\[
3^2(i) \times 2(i) \times 1(i) = 1^2(g) \times 4(g) \times 4(g)
\]

\[
18(i) = 16(g)
\]

\[
I > G = 1.13
\]

7. **Israeli Invasion: 12 July 2006**

Hezbollah transitioned from insurgent to resistance fighter on 12 July 2006 when Israel crossed the Southern Lebanese border. On the surface, Hezbollah attacked Israel in order to secure four Israeli soldiers to gain concessions over stalled negotiations. Israel justified the invasion as a means of creating a rift between the people of Lebanon and Hezbollah. Neither side achieved their stated purpose, but the invasion clearly altered the relative superiority equation.

Once again, Hezbollah immediately gained an intelligence advantage over the Israeli forces, thus receiving a score of “4” to the Israeli’s score of “1.” While Hezbollah lost some of its intelligence advantage over the years, the organization was surprisingly well equipped and stunned not only the Israeli forces, but the world when it launched well over 4,000 rockets into Israeli towns and positions. In addition, Hezbollah was armed with state of the art anti-tank missiles, and well equipped with modern heavy weaponry from Syria and Iran. Though Hezbollah was at a slight resource disadvantage when compared to Israel, it still earned a score of “4” equal to the de facto state of Israel’s score of “4.”
In terms of POS, Hezbollah rocketed straight to the top as a direct result of heavy coercive Israeli methods and bombings; Hezbollah immediately jumped back to wartime score of “4” to an assisted preference score of “1” under Israeli control. The equation looked like this:

\[ I^2_{(i)} \cdot R_{(i)} \cdot POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \cdot R_{(g)} \cdot POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 4^2_{(i)} \cdot 4_{(i)} \cdot 4_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \cdot 4_{(g)} \cdot 1_{(g)} \]

\[ 256_{(i)} = 4_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 64 \]

The 2006 conflict dramatically shifted Hezbollah from a near neutral position with regards to Lebanon, into one of relative superiority over Israel in only 33 days.

8. The Present Situation: Fall 2008

With the absence of an occupying Israeli military, Hezbollah once again turned its attention to local politics and increased their 12 seat membership in parliament to 14 on the coattails of the 2006 invasion. In 2007, the Lebanese army failed in their attempt to disable some of Hezbollah’s media outlets. The resultant violence highlights the stalemate in which Lebanon and Hezbollah find themselves. Hezbollah, with its Iranian and Sharia law roots, found sympathy and POS among the Shia population in specific strongholds. Yet that same sympathy and support end at political boundaries controlled by Christians, Secular Lebanese, and Sunnis. The relative superiority equation once again reverts back to the pre-2006 levels depicted below:

\[ I^2_{(i)} \cdot R_{(i)} \cdot POS_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \cdot R_{(g)} \cdot POS_{(g)} \]

\[ 3^2_{(i)} \cdot 2_{(i)} \cdot 1_{(i)} = I^2_{(g)} \cdot 4_{(g)} \cdot 4_{(g)} \]

\[ 18_{(i)} = 16_{(g)} \]

\[ I > G = 1.13 \]
Lebanon is unable to make headway into Hezbollah territory, and Hezbollah’s own strategic framing limits its capacity to dominate the Lebanese country writ large. In essence, Lebanon and Hezbollah are at a draw, until something alters the equation once again.

9. **Relative Superiority Over Time**

Graphically depicting relative superiority against time for the entire conflict would look like this:

![Figure 6. Relative Superiority in Lebanon](image)

E. **CONCLUSION**

Figure 9 depicts the relative superiority of Hezbollah concerning its two opponents, Israel and Lebanon. The obvious conclusion is that as a resistance organization, Hezbollah quickly gains relative superiority over Israel because of the methodical manner in which it adhered to the principles of UW; security, networking, indoctrination, influence, and agility.
Hezbollah is capable of unifying the Lebanese people in a methodical manner and defeating the Israeli armed forces—something no other Muslim nation has ever done.

Hezbollah, as an insurgent organization fighting the Lebanese government, missed an opportunity with a limited strategic framing message in its purpose. By trying to export the Iranian revolution, Hezbollah may have over reached its ability for find common ground and consensus with Sunni, Christian, and secular Lebanese people. Similarly, the Lebanese government finds itself in an uncomfortable position. The state cannot get relative superiority over Hezbollah in Shia dominated areas in large part because Hezbollah uses its resources not only to train and equip militias but to fund hospitals, schools, and rebuild homes—thus securing the local population’s support.

The interesting conclusion for Israel to avoid further military incursions into Hezbollah dominated areas and strengthen its ties with the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government, though lacking relative superiority, at least does not strengthen Hezbollah’s position or influence. In the end, it is clear, that Lebanon, Israel, and Hezbollah are at a draw, neither side capable of dominating the other except where one side attempts to intrude into the others’ boundaries.
VI. IN RETROSPECT: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

William H. McRaven codified a theory of Special Operations that explained how a numerically inferior group of individuals could overcome and defeat a unit in the defense, thus apparently defying two well-established and time-tested principles of warfare. McRaven explains his theory through a concept he referred to as Relative Superiority and its six associated principles. In his thesis, McRaven suggests that his Theory of Special Operations is applicable across the spectrum of Special Operations, which according to U.S. SOCOM includes Unconventional Warfare. While the theory has gone on to be highly influential within the broader Special Operations community, this theory fails to address Unconventional Warfare for a variety of ways.

The Theory of Unconventional Warfare advanced by the authors of this thesis compliments, but does not supplant, the Theory of Special Operations by taking into account the unique and different environment within which that this type of warfare occurs. Relative Superiority, according to the Theory of UW, is defined mathematically by comparing three necessary conditions, intelligence, resources, and political opportunity structures, as they exist for both the state and the insurgent, to determine which contestant is relatively superior.

We hypothesize that relative superiority in an unconventional conflict is built upon six principles: Security, Networking, Purpose, Indoctrination, Influence, and Agility. These principles are, in turn divided into three distinct phases, resembling a triangle. The side with that observes these principles and achieves relative superiority will win according to the Theory of Unconventional Warfare.

The first phase, planning, is the most secretive and is done in a clandestine environment. The goals for this stage, quite simply, are to lay the foundation for the insurgency and allow the movement to grow. The budding insurgency should focus all its efforts on establishing and maintaining security, while using mobilizing structures, or networks, to infiltrate and expand into every corner of society. All of this activity needs to
be figuratively welded to a purpose that finds resonance and traction with the very people the insurgency seeks to mobilize. Che Guevara’s foco revolution is a perfect example of what not to do when attempting to operate in this phase. Che failed to maintain security, cut off potential networks, and did not develop a purpose that the local populace found attractive or pertinent.

The second phase, preparation, involves using what Snow et al refer to as Strategic Framing. The strategic frame, or message, both defines what constituents are available to support the revolution and which groups are the targets of the insurgency. This process is done using two principles, indoctrination and influence. This phase is done in a covert manner gradually becoming more and more overt as time and relative superiority are gained. Insurgencies that fail to properly develop a broad enough strategic frame risk limiting their assets, resources, and political reach with artificial boundaries. A good example of an insurgency with these types of artificial boundaries is Hezbollah in Lebanon. The message from Iran, through the IRGC was one of support, not for the broader Lebanese population, but for a specific sect—the Shia and those willing to live in under sharia law. The Iranian backed insurgency spread securely, using available networks, with a unifying purpose—defiance of Israel. However, the revolution has reached the limits of the artificial boundaries created by the constraints of fundamentalist Shia framing and it currently finds little resonance with the Sunni, Christian, and secular Lebanese. These artificially constructed boundaries, explain the current “draw” and waning influence and control that Iran finds in Lebanon.

The third phase, execution, is comprised of a single principle—agility. While actual identities and tactical operations are concealed, the insurgency will conduct the majority of its operations in an overt manner. The goal at this stage is to build on the two previous phases and begin to conduct what Robert Taber would refer to as “the war of the flea.” The insurgency should be utilizing all available networks, synchronized with a common unifying purpose. The revolution should have constructed a Strategic Frame, or message, that is as inclusive as possible and narrowly focusing all of its attention on the existing state. This final phase taps into McAdam et al.’s Cognitive Liberation; the understanding of the problem and the belief that individuals can do something about it. An example of an
insurgency that successfully applied these principles is the U.S.-backed mujahedin in Afghanistan. The insurgency beat back the Soviet Union sponsored Communist Afghani government by conducting these types of operations. Each insurgent cell operated independent from each other to avoid compromise and maintain security. The revolution transcended tribal differences and united disparate groups under a common strategic frame. The framing utilized both formal and informal networks to mobilize a very broad base of support, both internal and international, with a single unified focus that ultimately defeated a numerically superior enemy in the defense.

The theory of UW gives planners a predictive utility to understand where potential UW campaigns are headed: success, failure, or a draw. As previously mentioned, the UW principles work together to establish a mathematical equation comprising three necessary conditions: intelligence, resources, and political opportunity structures. What is important when considering relative superiority is not the actual numbers of the mathematical equation per se, but understanding the nuances and the variables involved. It is critical for government policy and decision makers to understand that in an Unconventional Campaign, a priority of effort should be spent on gaining access to intelligence, which has an exponentially greater impact, rather than on fixating increasing levels of men, weapons, and technology. Simultaneously, it is imperative to recognize that this war will also need to be fought in the political realm—the military does not have all of the solution sets.

It is essential for the state that military effort be coupled with political reform to reduce the amount of political opportunity structures available for the insurgency to exploit. A good example was the 1960’s Bolivian government’s use of local militias to self police dissent, combined with real land reform. This moved the populace to a more consensus based society, giving Che Guevara scant room to maneuver with his revolution. On the flip side, it is important for military leaders planning an Unconventional Warfare campaign to thoroughly study a potential target. Security is of the upmost importance and should not be sacrificed early on for short-term political points. It is imperative for the insurgents to make their strategic frame appeal as broadly as possible, avoiding artificial boundaries like Hezbollah did in Lebanon.
In the end, it is clear, both mathematically and practically, that a small group of insurgents can defeat a numerically superior entity in the defense. Success for sponsored insurgents is achieved not by defying the principles of war, but by observing the principles of Unconventional Warfare and by gaining relative superiority over the state.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California