THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO STABILIZE LEBANON: PEACEKEEPING OR NATION-BUILDING?

BY

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The Summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War should be seen in the context of the long series of conflicts that have afflicted Lebanon during its modern history. While outside actors have played a major role, the weakness of the Lebanese state is the central issue that lies at the foundation to these conflicts. The Lebanese government has been unable to exercise the most fundamental elements of state sovereignty: the control of its borders and a monopoly on the use of force. Thus, any international effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon in the wake of this most recent conflict must focus on the political objective of strengthening the government of Lebanon. The expansion of the UN peacekeeping force and the U.S. effort to bolster the security arms of the Lebanese government will not result in a lasting peace in Lebanon. To be successful in the long-term, the UN intervention and U.S. approach must change from a force separation and force enhancement mission to a holistic nation-building effort.

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ABSTRACT

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The Summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War should be seen in the context of the long series of conflicts that have afflicted Lebanon during its modern history. While outside actors have played a major role, the weakness of the Lebanese state is the central issue that lies at the foundation to these conflicts. The Lebanese government has been unable to exercise the most fundamental elements of state sovereignty: the control of its borders and a monopoly on the use of force. Thus, any international effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon in the wake of this most recent conflict must focus on the political objective of strengthening the government of Lebanon. The expansion of the UN peacekeeping force and the U.S. effort to bolster the security arms of the Lebanese government will not result in a lasting peace in Lebanon. To be successful in the long-term, the UN intervention and U.S. approach must change from a force separation and force enhancement mission to a holistic nation-building effort.
The Summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War demonstrated that Israel views the problem of Hezbollah geostrategically, as a proxy military challenge by its long-term enemies Syria and Iran. This view led the Government of Israel to attempt to eradicate Hezbollah through the application of overwhelming military force, an attempt that was flawed in design and failed in execution. Similarly, the United Nations has viewed the problem as a conflict between two warring military entities, a problem it has unsuccessfully sought to mitigate since 1978 with the deployment of United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Colored through the lens of the Global War on Terror, the United States also views Hezbollah geostrategically, as a top-tier terrorist organization financed by Iran and supported by Syria. Together, these views led to a delayed implementation of a cease-fire in the misguided hopes that Israel would destroy Hezbollah. After 34 days of air and ground engagements, Hezbollah was not destroyed, thus delivering them a strategic victory. Meanwhile, Lebanon was once again decimated, with over 1200 civilians killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and damage to their economy and infrastructure totaling over $7 billion.1 Despite the collective failure of Israeli, U.S. and UN policy, the post-war response of the UN and the U.S. continues to focus on addressing the symptom (Hezbollah), rather than the root cause that allows it to exist…the weakness of the Lebanese state.

This recent conflict should be seen in the context of the long series of conflicts that have afflicted Lebanon during its modern history. In striking similarity to the current crisis in Iraq, Lebanon has struggled with internal sectarian conflict, the rise of transnational armed groups, foreign occupation, insurgency, and the use of its territory as both a battleground and a launching pad for regional conflicts fought by proxy. While outside actors have played a major role, the weakness of the Lebanese state lies at the foundation to these myriad problems. Built around a confessional compromise that is weak by design, the Lebanese government has been unable to exercise the most fundamental of the elements of state sovereignty: the control of its
borders and a monopoly on the use of force. Thus, any international effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon in the wake of this most recent conflict must focus on the political objective of strengthening the government of Lebanon.

The Expanded UNIFIL²

The United Nations and American-led international response to the Summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War was to pass United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701.³ The central initiative of UNSCR 1701 was the dramatic expansion of UNIFIL and the simultaneous deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to South Lebanon. At the immediate tactical level, the expansion of UNIFIL and the deployment of the LAF enabled Israel to withdraw its forces from South Lebanon without ceding the terrain to its antagonist, Hezbollah. Strategically, the LAF deployment serves the important role of strengthening the sovereignty of the Lebanese government by putting Lebanese soldiers on the border with Israel for the first time in decades. Simultaneously, the expanded UNIFIL deployment is intended to both support the LAF’s southern deployment and to provide a buffer and political space to the Lebanese government as it tries to strengthen its institutions.

The UNIFIL mandate and peacekeeping presence has been in existence in various forms since its inception in 1978. Prior to the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, UNIFIL consisted of 2000 lightly-armed peacekeepers.⁴ This force was of insufficient size and capability to provide a credible deterrent to armed forces on either side of the Israeli-Lebanese border, commonly known as the Blue Line. Since the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000, Hezbollah had extensive freedom of maneuver that allowed them to arm and train local village militias and to conduct detailed surveillance of their Israeli adversary. They were also able to prepare an extensive series of fighting positions, weapons caches, and concealed rocket launch sites that proved exceptionally effective during the summer 2006 war with Israel.⁵
UNSCR 1701 not only expanded the size of the UN force dramatically, but also upgraded the force’s capabilities as the primary contributors are “top-tier” military forces, mostly from Europe, but also including China and India. UNIFIL is now structured with military capabilities that are robust by peacekeeping standards, including armored and mechanized formations, artillery, and even air defense (though the only significant air threat is Israeli). The UNIFIL area of operations is comprised of Lebanese territory south of the Litani River up to the “Blue Line” or northern border of Israel (see figure 1).

Despite the UNSCR 1701 mandate for up to 15,000 UN troops in UNIFIL, it has been able to deploy just over 12,000 as of late January 2007. Derived from 28 contributing countries, the force includes over 10,200 troops in South Lebanon and 1,758 troops in a
maritime task force. Major Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and units are displayed at Annex A. While they are short of the number mandated in UNSCR 1701, it is unlikely that UNIFIL’s strength will grow much larger. As UNIFIL Political Advisor Richard Morcienski explained\(^8\), the barracks and infrastructure available to them in South Lebanon are at maximum capacity and the current force structure appears sufficient to conduct its mission. Interestingly, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had originally envisioned a force of 12,000, and UN military officials told me that UNIFIL was only increased to 15,000 upon pressure from the Bush administration. It appears now that the UN included the number that the U.S. wanted to obtain political support for the resolution, but only deployed the numbers that they believed to be necessary.

Perhaps more significant than the increased size of UNIFIL was its new mandate and rules of engagement. UNSCR 1701 specifically charges UNIFIL to:

- Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;
- Coordinate its activities toward a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area (between the Blue Line and the Litani River);
- Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel\(^9\)

The resolution also strengthens rules of engagement by its authorization for the use of force to:

- Ensure its area of operations is not used for hostile activities of any kind;
- Resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties;
- Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, by all necessary means;
- Ensure the security and freedom of UN personnel, humanitarian workers, by all necessary means, within capabilities and within areas of deployment;
- Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence to the extent possible commensurate with capabilities and within areas of deployment;
- On request, support the Government of Lebanon in exercising its authority throughout its territory by deploying additional forces\(^10\)
Both the mission mandate and force authorization in UNSCR 1701 are aggressive by comparison to previous UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, with the implication that this force would be powerful enough to confront Hezbollah militarily, if required. However, eight months into the expanded mission, it is apparent that neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese government possesses the will to directly confront and forcibly disarm Hezbollah. The collective sensitivity against the implied task to confront Hezbollah is inhibiting the forces from executing some explicit tasks found in the mandate. Specifically, UNIFIL has not executed the “accompany and support” mission as directed by their mandate. From the perspective of military tactics, the directive to “accompany and support” requires UNIFIL and the LAF to conduct operations together, in a physically combined patrol or at the very least within direct observation and communication of the other force. According to both UNIFIL and LAF officers, this is not happening, and both UNIFIL and the LAF forces are conducting independent patrols and checkpoints throughout the zone.\(^\text{11}\) The recent exchange of small arms fire between Israeli and Lebanese forces along the Blue Line is a poignant example of the need for UNIFIL forces to fully execute their mandate to accompany and support LAF forces.\(^\text{12}\) UNIFIL must be more vigilant in both its close accompaniment of the LAF and its surveillance of all activities on the Blue Line if future conflict is to be avoided.

The Lebanese Army’s deployment to the Blue Line is a vital step toward the government of Lebanon’s ability to establish control over its territorial borders...a fundamental element of state sovereignty. UNIFIL has enabled that deployment, providing fuel, transportation, and significant logistical support to the desperately ill-equipped Lebanese Armed Forces.\(^\text{13}\) These military activities in support of the Lebanese Army and government are tremendously important toward achieving the “long-term solution” noted in the mandate. It is much more valuable for UNIFIL forces to empower and supervise as the Lebanese Army helps the government to assert its sovereignty, rather than rely on external powers. As T.E. Lawrence would remind us, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it
perfectly.” Yet beyond the provision of logistical support, UNIFIL does not have an explicit mandate to provide military training and assistance that would further enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese force.

The heavy structure of UNIFIL also presents several problems for the legitimacy of both the UN mission and the Lebanese government. First, the heavy organization and weaponry of the intervention force resembles that of a peace enforcement operation, where the intervention units use force or threat of force to coerce compliance of warring parties. This gives credence to Hezbollah claims that UNIFIL’s deployment is intended to attack Hezbollah and forcibly cause it to disarm. As one well-respected observer told the author, “Hezbollah sees that UNIFIL deployed with 12 tanks, while Israel has 2,200 tanks; so then against whom will they use the 12 tanks?” Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the heavily armed presence is likely to generate hostility among the Lebanese population in South Lebanon. UNIFIL mounted patrols of heavy tracked wheeled vehicles have caused further damage (in addition to recent combat) to the road network in the South. The image of the mounted UN peacekeeper, laden in body armor and ballistic eyewear, is similar to that of U.S. forces in Iraq, who are widely viewed by the population as an “occupation” force. UNIFIL deployed without any organic civil affairs or information operations units, leaving them without a structured means to interface with local leaders, to craft and disseminate messages, or to leverage information and the influence of local leaders. Information operations are vital, as locals who perceive that the deployed force is providing them a tangible benefit are much more likely to inform the force of dangers and plots by spoiler groups. To their credit, UNIFIL has been able to provide limited medical and veterinary care to the population of the south, with one Level II hospital established by Belgium in Tibneen. This effort has been extremely popular, as access to western-quality medicine is extremely rare in South Lebanon. UNIFIL must do more along those lines to avoid being perceived as an “occupier” that is merely preparing to destroy Hezbollah. For the Lebanese people in general, and the Shi’a community in particular, the term and image of occupation is
decidedly negative (built upon the decades of Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and enduring today in the occupation of Palestinian territory) and generates widespread sympathy for armed “resistance.” No group has more effectively built upon popular sympathy for “resistance” better than Hezbollah. Thus, to the extent that UNIFIL looks and behaves like an occupying force rather then a peacekeeping force, it emboldens the call for resistance and legitimizes Hezbollah’s justification to retain its armed capabilities.

**Defining and Dealing with Hezbollah**

Hezbollah has many labels and identities: Terrorist group, political party, social welfare organization, Shia advocate, Iranian proxy, Syrian ally, defender of Lebanon, and the most prominent Lebanese (and perhaps also Muslim and Arab) symbol of resistance to Israel. While one could dismiss many of the labels as created by supporters or opponents, the range of labels is indicative of Hezbollah’s complexity and depth as a movement and organization. This complexity and depth result from 25 years of development since their beginning in 1982, and understanding that development yields clues to policy makers who wish to modify their behavior.

Inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah emerged in 1982 in response to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Professor Augustus Richard Norton recently stated that “if Iran was the mother of Hezbollah, Israel was its stepfather because Israel’s two-decades long occupation fostered and honed Hezbollah.” I would go further to state that the weak Lebanese government was its nurse-maid. Trained and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah began as an exceptionally violent and ideological organization that eschewed politics and extensively employed terror (most notably kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide bombings) to weaken its opponents. As President Bush pointed out in his 2007 State of the Union address, Hezbollah is only second to al-Qaeda in the number of Americans killed by terrorism. Yet since its murderous beginnings in the 1980’s, Hezbollah has grown in
both its base of support and its complexity of operations, and has moderated its behavior.

Beginning in 1992, Hezbollah made a strategically significant decision to participate in parliamentary elections,\(^2^2\) thus (at least partially) resorting to peaceful political process to obtain its goals, which were becoming increasingly national and less ideological in nature.

Despite its foray into politics, Hezbollah maintained an emphasis on armed resistance. Benefiting from support of Iran and Syria as well as years of combat operations against Israeli forces in south Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military wing became increasingly more professional and capable. Simultaneously, Hezbollah developed a very important political base through the provision of social services to the neglected and impoverished Shia community, as well as the development of a world-class television and internet media operation called Al-Manar (Arabic for the Minaret, or tower used by a mosque for the Muslim call to prayer).\(^2^3\) With powerful political and military capabilities developed through the 1990’s, the organization began to resemble a classic nationalist insurgency, not unlike that of the Irish Republican Army and its political wing Sinn Fein. Even after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israel’s retention of the disputed Shaba’a Farms area and the inability of the Lebanese government to extend its control to South Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to continue to its attacks against Israel through border skirmishes, rocket attacks and the preparation of extensive defensive positions.

Hezbollah’s exceptional preparation of defense-in-depth proved formidable in the July 2006 War, and contributed to Israel’s failure to destroy Hezbollah.\(^2^4\) Simultaneously, Israel employed a strategy of using punishing aerial and artillery attacks to devastate South Lebanon and to sever lines of communication with Syria. Israel thought if they could inflict pain on the Lebanese people as a whole, the populace would turn on Hezbollah. Yet, Israel’s over-reaction and wanton destruction only consolidated popular support for Hezbollah’s resistance, particularly among the Shia community, but also among Lebanese who had traditionally opposed Hezbollah. Among both Israelis and Lebanese, the war is viewed as an Israeli defeat.\(^2^5\) Thus,
the July War gave Hezbollah further legitimacy and political clout, as now this non-state actor had repelled the invader and (by not being destroyed) defeated Israel on the field of battle.

With the cessation of hostilities and UNSCR 1701’s expansion of UNIFIL, Hezbollah has now shifted its efforts toward reaping additional political power. Politically allied with the Christian party of Michel Aoun, its boycott of the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and its subsequent demonstrations are challenging the Government of Lebanon’s ability to retain power. The Hezbollah-Aoun alliance is vehemently opposing the Siniora government’s pro-western agenda, most notably the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Emanating from the UN investigation of Serge Brammertz, a criminal tribunal has the potential to threaten Syria, Hezbollah’s local sponsor. Since the walkout of five Shi’a ministers and a Christian cabinet minister in November 2006, the Hezbollah-Aoun alliance has used public demonstrations and an extensive media campaign to pressure the government into meeting their demands. Specifically, the Hezbollah-Aoun alliance is seeking early parliamentary elections and the formation of a “national unity government,” in which their political bloc would have at least one-third plus one seat, guaranteeing them the ability to block objectionable legislation (such as acceptance of the Hariri tribunal). While Aoun has a history of opposition to Syria, his alliance with Hezbollah is a pure political power-play, designed to position himself as the Christian Presidential candidate of an opposition government. Aoun has “burned his bridges” with the anti-Syrian bloc, and thus will likely maintain his alliance with Hezbollah to ensure his political survival.

While these machinations should be seen as yet another phase of an on-going insurgency to gain political power, it is extremely important to note that Hezbollah has not (as of now) utilized their extensive lethal capabilities to realize their goals. Having demonstrated lethality against a highly trained and equipped Israeli force, Hezbollah has military capabilities that are superior to the Lebanese Army. Rather than pursuing a violent overthrow to establish an Islamic state, Hezbollah’s leadership has clearly articulated its goal to work within the current
government framework, rather than attempting to replace it. It is also instructive that they are willing to ally themselves politically with a Christian party to attain power. This is not the same group that called for the establishment of a Shia Islamic theocracy in the 1980’s. While retaining their armed wing as a hedge, their political arm seeks increased political representation commensurate to the growing population of Shia in Lebanon.

Once one recognizes Hezbollah as both a military and political insurgency, then any proposed strategy to effectively contain and/or end this insurgency must be based on sound counterinsurgency principles. One of the most widely accepted principles is that counterinsurgency operations should focus on developing effective governance and enhancing the government legitimacy in the eyes of the population.29

**Strengthening the Lebanese Government**

If good governance and enhancing governmental legitimacy are key to defeating an insurgency, then the long-term solution to the Lebanese cycle of violence will require more effort in sectors other than military security, such as economic development, social reconciliation, and the enhancement of government capacity. A senior diplomat in Beirut explained, “the Government of Lebanon governs Beirut, but doesn’t govern in the South, the North, or in the Bek’a Valley.”30 The government’s inability to fully exercise its writ and provide services outside the capital creates essentially ungoverned spaces that allow organizations such as Hezbollah to thrive. While Hezbollah is the strongest non-state actor, it is not alone in challenging the state’s monopoly of force: sectarian militias, armed Palestinian groups, and new Sunni extremist groups inspired by al-Qaeda all have established presences in the rural regions of Lebanon.31 Many of these rural areas receive little or no essential services from the government, such as basic education and health care. Particularly in South Lebanon, where whole villages were obliterated by the July War,32 there is a great opportunity for the government to step in and make a difference. Despite the widely-publicized Hezbollah
payments (funded by Iran) to those who lost their homes, that money did not put all those villagers back to work or fully restore their livelihood.\textsuperscript{33}

Unfortunately, the Lebanese government and their international patrons have been slow to mobilize reconstruction efforts, thus allowing Hezbollah to lead the footrace for hearts and minds. The government’s failure to respond quickly is perceived as apathy and disregard for Shia welfare, and ignites the long-held and legitimate grievances of a marginalized community.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, much of the initial United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reconstruction efforts and funds have gone to rebuilding infrastructure in greater Beirut, and comparatively little has gone to the devastated South.\textsuperscript{35} In fact, the January 2007 Economic Reform Program submitted to international donors by the Siniora government states its intention to offset expenditures by “closing the Fund for the Displaced and the Council of the South,”\textsuperscript{36} which was created as the government’s vehicle to reconstruct South Lebanon. If the Siniora government and the international community want to separate the insurgency from the population, it has to be able to compete with resources and services.

The slow and disjointed nature of the stabilization and reconstruction effort is symptomatic of a fundamental lack of unity of effort. On the political front of the United Nations effort, there are at least four different high-level UN political envoys to Lebanon, and none of them has clear authority to oversee and coordinate the actions of the many UN organizations working in Lebanon. Geir Pedersen, formerly the Envoy for South Lebanon, was recently named the Special Coordinator for Lebanon. While his new title is encouraging, a mandate that delineates lines of authority and provides appropriate staff is required if he is to fill the current political void. Terje Roed-Larsen remains the Special Envoy for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, a resolution whose sole remaining requirement is the disarmament of militias.\textsuperscript{37} In perhaps the most politically visible UN initiative, Serge Brammertz serves as Commissioner of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission into the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Finally, Michael Williams is the Special Advisor for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701.

While there are many areas of overlap to the political portfolios of the UN leaders above, none has clear authority to orchestrate the actions of UNIFIL and the myriad other UN agencies working in Lebanon: UN Development Program, UN Truce Supervision Organization, UN Mine Action Centre, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, World Food Program, World Health Organization, and more. Each of these entities reports to its home office at United Nations Headquarters in New York, including the UNIFIL Military Commander, who reports to a Strategic Military Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Further, the structure squanders resources that should be directed at reconstruction that are instead spent on multiple layers of bureaucracy. In other post-conflict interventions, the UN has named a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) with a mandate to coordinate all UN activities (including military operations) in an integrated mission, but has not provided similar leadership and headquarters structure for the Lebanon effort. Improved leadership and headquarters structure in Lebanon would both enhance the effectiveness of UN operations and provide a nexus of coordination for international donors.

The compartmentalized nature of the UN organizational structure in Lebanon detracts from its ability to formulate and execute a coherent strategy to bolster the Lebanese government. It indicates a view that the mission to separate warring factions (Hezbollah and Israel) is a mission fully separate from and unrelated to the mission of providing humanitarian aid or to the mission of investigating the Hariri murder. In fact, these missions are all interconnected facets of a single nation-building mission in the midst of an insurgency.

The U.S. effort to bolster the Lebanese government suffers from similar problems of focus, as well as an inability to deliver timely aid. Seeing the Lebanon-Hezbollah-Israel
problem through the prism of the Global War on Terror, the U.S. response in the aftermath has channeled aid to military security and to humanitarian relief, but has provided few resources to strengthen the Lebanese government’s non-security institutions. In August 2006, President Bush pledged $230 million in assistance to Lebanon and the U.S. did an admirable job of providing immediate humanitarian relief. However, as of January 2007, the U.S. government had only delivered $120 million of the initial $230 million pledged in August 2006. The remaining funds are awaiting the completion of a Fiscal Year 2007 budget and/or the fulfillment of long lead-time equipment orders. At the height of the Siniora government political crisis in January 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced an additional $770 million in assistance at the Paris III conference. Yet the $770 million in newly pledged funds is buried in an FY2007 Global War on Terror (GWOT) Supplemental budget request submitted with the Fiscal Year 2008 International Affairs budget request. In the most optimistic scenario, these funds will not be approved and released until later this year, and there is a very real danger that they will not be approved at all (as happened when the U.S. Congress did not pass a Foreign Aid appropriation for Fiscal Year 2007) or be severely reduced as Congress deals with competing priorities.

Even for the relatively meager funds already allocated to Lebanon, the U.S. has been challenged to quickly turn those funds into “deliverables,” actual items or programs on the ground. The U.S. Foreign Military Financing program was not designed as a rapid-response system, and the arcane process from apportionment of funding to actual delivery of an item can take up to 18-24 months, dependent on technology transfer approval, availability, production schedules, and available transportation. To make matters more difficult, the current effort to equip the Lebanese Armed Forces has suffered from competition for scarce resources with U.S. forces that are building and reorganizing for combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, some of the most immediate needs of the LAF have been mundane items trucks and ammunition, both items that are in very tight supply due to war demands. In order to make possible a
symbolic initial delivery of 20 of the 285 trucks promised to the LAF, the U.S. had to take them out of war reserves. The remainder will await production and shipping some many months later.46

Aside from the lethargic pace of aid delivery, the majority of U.S. funds for Lebanese post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are targeted to instruments of force. As the table below demonstrates, 60% of the $770 million in new U.S. assistance will go to fund the military and police aspects of the effort, while allocating only 40% to humanitarian, economic and social support programs.

<table>
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<th>Funding in 2007 GWOT Supplemental Request</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Support Funds (ESF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Amount</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>$220 million</td>
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<td>$60 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>$5.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>$184 million</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status/Comments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases Equipment and Training for Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases Equipment and Training for Lebanese Internal Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. pays 25% share of UNIFIL costs</td>
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If the Lebanese government’s inability to provide essential services is the driving force of popular support for its political opposition, then a primary focus of the strategy to empower the government must be expanding its capacity to govern and serve its constituency. The proponents for heavy military assistance point to the need to stabilize the security situation first,
but the provision of jobs and services has proven to be an essential part of the security equation of post-conflict intervention.\textsuperscript{47}

The impact of targeted security assistance on internal Lebanese politics must also be considered. During the opposition-led Beirut demonstrations in January 2007, most local observers regarded the Internal Security Forces (ISF) as dominated by Sunni groups and partial to the ruling March 14 coalition.\textsuperscript{48} Thus the recent U.S. delivery of riot-control gear and vehicles to the ISF may be viewed as empowering the Sunnis to take on the Shia, thereby exacerbating the sectarian aspect of the internal conflict.\textsuperscript{49} The Lebanese Army, on the other hand, is widely viewed as an impartial, cross-confessional, national institution (despite a high number of Christians in the senior officer ranks). The LAF Commander, Lieutenant General Michel Suleiman, is a protégé of pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, yet has urged the Army to exercise restraint and neutrality in the face of protests.\textsuperscript{50} This restraint and neutrality is important to enabling the Lebanese Government to gain further legitimacy in the face of sectarian challengers.

As discussed earlier, the deployment of the LAF to the Blue Line is an important step to enhancing the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government. However, the LAF must not only take control of the country’s borders, but both their training and equipment must improve qualitatively in order to be seen as a capable replacement for Hezbollah’s role as the “resistance” and “defenders of Lebanon.” For example, a ubiquitous reminder of Lebanese vulnerability to its Israeli neighbor is the overflight of South Lebanon and Beirut by Israeli warplanes. These overflights reduce the legitimacy of both the Lebanese Government and the LAF, and make UNIFIL appear ineffective in its enforcement of UNSCR 1701. The Israeli Air Force can overfly Lebanon with impunity, as the LAF has virtually no organized air defense capability.\textsuperscript{51} While the U.S. has agreed to provide the LAF with a wide range of lethal military systems for defensive purposes, the U.S. has not yet approved the transfer of technology such as air defense weapons or anti-tank missiles that could potentially alter the tactical balance of power against
Israeli forces. Meanwhile, Hezbollah demonstrated impressive anti-tank missile capability during the July War\textsuperscript{52} and is now reported to be acquiring advanced man-portable surface-to-air missiles from Iran.\textsuperscript{53} If the strategy to minimize or eliminate Hezbollah is to empower the LAF and the central government, then it must demonstrate real (and thus truly threatening to Israel) capability.

The manner in which the U.S. administers economic and humanitarian assistance to Lebanon must also consider the strategic goal of strengthening the government. To its credit, the U.S. has done much in the aftermath of the July War to provide immediate humanitarian relief, such as providing food aid, de-mining funds, and funding for water, sanitation, and health projects. However, 90\% of $108 million that the U.S. has obligated in Fiscal Year 2006-2007 for Humanitarian Assistance was disbursed to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Mercy Corps, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, as well as to various UN relief agencies. Only the remaining 10\% went directly to aid to the Government of Lebanon or for administrative costs.\textsuperscript{54} While NGOs may be the most expeditious and cost-effective way to dispense relief in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the almost exclusive reliance on western aid organizations does little to enhance Lebanese government capacity or its legitimacy in the eyes of its population. In the context of the larger strategic problem of empowering the Lebanese state, future assistance to Lebanon must serve dual purposes of providing services and increasing the Government of Lebanon’s role in distributing those services.

**Recommendations:**

**United Nations:**

Unity of effort is essential to the successful stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon. The best means to create this unity is for the United Nations to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) with a mandate to establish an integrated mission that would directly coordinate all UN efforts in Lebanon, including UNIFIL. If the UN
goal is the “territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,” then a more holistic and integrated approach that addresses all aspects of stabilization and reconstruction is required.

Second, UNIFIL must coordinate more closely with the Lebanese Army, specifically by ensuring all operations are combined (UNIFIL and LAF) operations. This change will meet the requirements of UNSCR 1701’s mandate to “accompany and support,” and minimize the likelihood of future “accidental” engagements between the Lebanese Army and the Israeli Defense Forces along the Blue Line. UNIFIL should also bolster its ability to advise, train, and assist the Lebanese Army within its sector. In addition to traditional military training, the advice and assistance should empower and encourage the Lebanese Army to focus on assistance to the local population in South Lebanon. The LAF and UNIFIL should work side-by-side to run field hospitals, provide medical and dental services, conduct civil engineering projects, and other provide other types of assistance that give tangible benefits to both the LAF and the local population. Over time, a coordinated effort to train and equip the Lebanese Army will serve two strategic goals. It will empower the Lebanese Army to capably replace both the need for UNIFIL and Hezbollah, as the LAF will be fully capable of defending the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Simultaneously, these actions and capabilities will demonstrate Lebanese government commitment to the welfare of the impoverished south, enhance the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government, and diminish the population’s reliance on Hezbollah for social support.

United States:

The most important step the U.S. can take to support the Lebanese government is to expedite the delivery of promised funds and assistance. Rather than relying on wartime supplemental funding legislation to fund immediate aid projects, the President and the Congress must reconsider both the size of the Foreign Operations budget and the annual timeliness of its
passage. While the Department of Defense (DoD) has recently been given limited new authorities to reprogram funds to meet emerging regional requirements, the Department of State (DoS) has been given no such authorities. In both the case of DoD and DoS, the severe lag in delivery of funds and equipment puts the Lebanese Government at risk of not existing in its current, pro-U.S. form by the time our assistance arrives.

While the effort to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces is strategically important, the U.S. should weight future assistance to the Government of Lebanon in favor of economic versus military assistance. The ratio of security assistance to economic support funds should be 1:2 (a reversal of the current ratio). This ratio is required to address the dire condition of the Lebanese economy and to provide tangible benefits to the population that ameliorate the conditions that allow the insurgency to thrive. More importantly, the bulk of the economic support funds that the U.S. provides should be administered through the Government of Lebanon versus a direct contract to a western NGO. Regimens and conditionality can be emplaced to inhibit corruption, but it is imperative that the U.S. use its assistance to empower the Government of Lebanon to build governmental capacity, serve its people, and take responsibility for providing those services.

While U.S. funds and equipment are vitally important to the effort to bolster the Lebanese Army, the U.S. is in a less favorable position to provide training within Lebanon, as this would raise the public profile of Americans in Lebanon. A more viable approach would be to financially support a UNIFIL-led training assistance mission. As the effort to train and equip the LAF matures, the U.S. should consider modifying arms transfer policy red lines to allow the LAF to field basic defensive weaponry (i.e. air defense and anti-tank guided missiles) that will provide a credible defensive deterrent to foreign aggression. A credible deterrent capability is key to the LAF’s ability to replace Hezbollah as the resistance and defender of the Lebanese people.
Finally, there is no doubt that Lebanon’s neighbors must play an important role in the international community’s effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon, particularly Syria and Iran. Both the UN and the U.S. must make a concerted diplomatic effort to engage Syria and Iran on the subject of Lebanon within the greater context of Middle East peace. Recent Bush administration decisions to talk directly with North Korea and to participate in direct talks with Syria and Iran on the subject of Iraq provide a promising precedent of dialogue with political adversaries. While the problems of Lebanon will not be solved outside of Lebanon, recent history has shown that outside influence can either exacerbate or mitigate those problems.

Conclusion

The provision of more and better-armed peacekeepers and the significant bolstering of the security forces of the Lebanese government will not result in a lasting peace in Lebanon. To be successful, the UN intervention must change from a force separation mission to a holistic nation-building effort. This nation-building must recognize the insurgency that exists within Lebanon and develop an integrated campaign to address the conditions which give rise to that insurgency. First and foremost, the integrated campaign must bolster the legitimacy and capacity of the Lebanese government to provide good governance and services to its people. Adapting the U.S. foreign aid program to support a UN-led integrated effort will be the most effective use of funds and will provide a positive example of the “carrots” that the U.S. offers to accompany the many “sticks” it wields in its war on terror. Without a more holistic approach, Lebanon will certainly return to the cycle of conflict from which it has suffered for the past 30 years.
### UNIFIL Ground Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troop Contributing Country (TCC)</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Status/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Engineer Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level II Hospital</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level II Hospital</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Engineer Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Joint Landing Force</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation Detachment</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Guard and Admin Company</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Enhanced Logistics Unit</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Engineer Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigade Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Military Police Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Engineer Company</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (as of January 2007)

**TABLE 1**
Annex A to The United Nations and United States Efforts to Stabilize Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building? (Continued)

### UNIFIL Maritime Task Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troop Contributing Country (TCC)</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Troops/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1 Ship</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2 Ships</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Task Force Commander)</td>
<td>8 Ships</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 Ship</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5 Ships</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 Ship</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 Ship</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 2**
Endnotes


2 The new force is also referred to in government circles as UNIFIL II.


6 From a UNIFIL briefing given to the author during a January 2007 visit to Lebanon.


8 Interview conducted by the author in Beirut in January 2007.

9 Paraphrased for clarity from UNSCR 1701, paragraph 11.

10 Paraphrased for clarity from UNSCR 1701, paragraph 12.

11 Interviews conducted by the author in Beirut in January 2007.


13 Interview with a senior LAF general officer in January 2007.

14 T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, Article 15.


16 For an excellent illustration of the relationship between the provision of basic services for the local population and force protection for the deployed force, see MG Peter Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July/August 2005), 4.
17 Per a UNIFIL briefing I received in January 2007 in Lebanon. In medical terminology, a Level II hospital is one capable of providing initial definitive trauma care, but may lack the full array of specialty care available at a full hospital.


24 Exsum, “Hizballah at War,” p.3


27 International Crisis Group, “Lebanon at a Tripwire.”


29 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, paragraph 1-113.

30 Interview conducted by the author in Beirut in January 2007.

31 From an interview with a humanitarian relief official who has worked in rural Lebanon for over 9 years.


The author has extensive experience with the process, having managed a $750 million Foreign Military Financing portfolio while serving with the Military Assistance Program Office at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan from 2000-2002.

From an unclassified review of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted by a team led by U.S. Central Command in September 2006.


Interviews conducted by the author in Beirut in January 2007.


From an unclassified review of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted by a team led by U.S. Central Command in September 2006.

Exsum, “Hizbollah at War,” figure 1.


UNSCR 1701, para 5.

Specifically, Sections 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act allow the Department of Defense to transfer limited funds and training to foreign countries to build partner capacity for the Global War on Terrorism. In U.S. government circles, these funds have become known as “1206 funds” and “1207 funds.”