Framing the Cultural Training Landscape: Phase I Findings

Amy Alrich
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PREFACE

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under IDA’s independent research program. The objective of this document is to describe the existing cultural awareness training programs, tools, and approaches in use or in development by military Services, as well as civilian organizations. This document examines the programs and tools in use, especially by the Army and Marine Corps, the ways in which the existing programs address the needs, what groups have access to these programs, the complex issues surrounding measures of effectiveness, and areas where there may be room for improvement. In surveying this landscape, this document also addresses issues surrounding definitions and prioritization of efforts, as well as areas of controversy.

Technical review for this document was provided by Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, USN (Ret.).
FRAMING THE CULTURAL TRAINING LANDSCAPE:
PHASE I FINDINGS

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SUMMARY

A. BACKGROUND

U.S. engagement in asymmetric military operations against unconventional, often transnational, non-state actors is unlikely to diminish radically in scope or scale. That involvement is likely to shift primarily to non-kinetic, stabilization and information operations, focused on a long-term strategic approach to areas of instability; these operations will involve engagement with hostile non-state actors, coalition partners, host nation forces, and a gamut of civilian and semi-civilian players from unfamiliar areas and with whom we have had little experience dealing. This lack of experience places us at an incredible disadvantage when it comes to collaboration, coordination, or dispute resolution.

How does cultural awareness contribute to current and future operations? Gaining an understanding and appreciation of what motivates people, what binds them together, and what constitutes “tipping points” in our relationships is essential when seeking to counter non-state actors linked together in disparate networks that shift and reconstitute and adapt in an organic fashion but are based upon long established bonds that allow them to act with agility when operating against coalition forces.

Deployed military and civilian personnel are now interacting with enemy operatives, their sympathizers, as well as “fence-sitters,” with increasing frequency. Deployed personnel are not only typically bound by the rules of engagement under which they operate but also by their own world view and perceptions; they are, across the entire force structure, also unprepared for the different social structures, power relationships, and layers of identity that determine how people from other countries think and act. This is a matter of not only our lacking linguistic skills but, and maybe more importantly, our basic inability to comprehend that these people have a different world view, different experiences, and different backgrounds. This lack of appreciation of what matters to them and what motivates them is only now beginning to be taught in pre-deployment programs and manuals. As one might expect, there are successes and failures in this cultural training landscape, as well as a continually moving target that must be addressed.
This paper documents the research involved in this 2008 central research project, which involved scoping the existing training programs, tools, and approaches in use or in development by military Services, as well as civilian organizations. The focus was on identifying cutting-edge programs, ranging from the TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca to the Cross-Cultural training efforts in use by the Peace Corps. We sought to identify both best practices as well as potential gaps that are present in the existing ad hoc framework that has been developed without any synchronization across the Services or the civilian agencies. Quite a number of cultural awareness training programs have valuable pieces and parts of the overall puzzle; however, none address the entire gamut of needs. Thus, this paper includes an examination of the ways in which the best practices of the existing programs address the needs, what groups have access to these programs, the complex issues surrounding measures of effectiveness, and how to identify and collect such information.

The core hypothesis behind this project initially, that there was a lack of cultural training programs, proved to be inaccurate. The cultural awareness training landscape is diverse, with an array of textures, colors, and hues. Proverbially speaking, what is missing from the picture is the frame.

The colorful and crowded cultural awareness training landscape features a range of diverse programs and initiatives from the Services, academia, private sector, and centers of excellence, all with workshops, symposia, and a multitude of training offerings. In addition to the vastness of the landscape with respect to the programs and initiatives, the variety of emphases and missions cannot be overstated. Whether the emphasis is on “Big L” Language, or nonverbal and other “little l” aspects of language, or “Big C” regionally specific Culture, as opposed to “little c” culture, delineates both the problem and the solution set for these programs. Although it would oversimplify the landscape to say that there are four hermetically sealed camps, it is accurate to depict the proponents of the different solution sets as sometimes engaging in a certain parochialism and defensiveness when it comes to their concepts of operation, chosen definitions, prioritizations, and the resulting programs. An additional oversimplification would be to emphasize the divisions between the programs; there are examples of cooperative involvement and sharing of ideas.

Issues of audience add further complexity. Just as each Service comes with unique attributes and concerns, the diversity of the background of users of the training tools and programs varies according to Service, roles, missions, rank, individual abilities, and background. Of course, these training programs swim in a vast sea of other training
programs; whether the individual, faced with limited time and resources, prioritizes cultural and language training is also a factor.

Which programs really address the needs of the Servicemen and -women? What are those needs? Is there an easily identifiable finite set of needs? The Defense Language Office (DLO) is working with a panel of experts to whittle down the answers. But the fact that there are so many programs, so many diverse directions and definitions – complementary as well as overlapping and competing efforts – demonstrates there is little or no synchronization across Services or civilian agencies. Does this landscape need a frame as a means of having some designated body with the ability to exercise oversight and to coordinate efforts? Will the diverse players in this field of cultural training, some of whom have already been working these issues for 3 or 4 years, welcome management from above?

B. APPROACH

When it became clear that resources and manpower would prohibit site visits to all facilities where cultural training programs exist, we made an effort– in consultation with subject matter experts resident at IDA, as well as based on a literature and program website review – to narrow the list to the programs that are well-established and feature cutting-edge approaches to the culture problem.

Table 1 lists the facilities visited and the interviews conducted during the course of this research project. During site visits, we attempted to find out about all relevant training efforts, gather materials about the programs, and learn about actual teaching tools. When possible, we observed training exercises. We gathered more valuable material than we could possibly represent in a short paper summarizing findings. Should this project continue into Phase II, these materials and the valuable insights gained will be made available in some form.

It must be emphasized that the apparent ground forces bias stems both from time and resource constraints as well as from the fact that the Army and Marine Corps efforts with respect to cultural and language training were established already in 2004 and 2005,
respectively, and had full-fledged programs in place at the time this research was conducted.

**Table 1. Site Visits and Interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Specifics</th>
<th>Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview, 11 June 2008</td>
<td>Major Alfredo Ferrer</td>
<td>Discussed Arabic Cultural Awareness Training, Third US Army, US Army Central, Jordanian Armed Forces, at the Peace Operation Training Center (POTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow on Interview, 14 July 2008</td>
<td>Major Alfredo Ferrer</td>
<td>Follow on questions about the POTC program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Visit, 2 October 2008</td>
<td>Quantico</td>
<td>USMC Center For Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Military Intelligence Cultural Awareness Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview, 31 October 2008</td>
<td>Sally Caldwell, Chief of Overseas Training Division Peace Corps</td>
<td>Discussed Peace Corps approaches to Overseas Training; referred to Shilpa Hart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview, 3 November 2008</td>
<td>Shilpa Alimchandani Hart, Peace Corps</td>
<td>Discussed Cross-Cultural and Diversity Training used in training their volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit, 17 to 20 November</td>
<td>Fort Huachuca</td>
<td>Discussed programs at the TRADOC Culture Center, Mobile Training Teams, and other training programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit, 23 to 26 November</td>
<td>Fort Leavenworth</td>
<td>Discussed Leadership Training programs at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI); JCIFSA Deployed Adviser training programs; also discussed activities at the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, training and selection of the Human Terrain Teams, and other TRADOC programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit, 10 December 2008</td>
<td>Glenn Nordin, Office of the Under Secretary if Defense for Intelligence</td>
<td>Foreign Language and Culture Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit, 12 December 2008</td>
<td>Defense Language Office, Brad Loo</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Culture within the DLO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 represents the programs and individuals who need to be included in this program review and site survey if the research is to be complete. In addition to emphasizing the need for site visits to the other services’ culture centers, subject matter experts have also suggested the study should be expanded beyond general purpose forces, to include cultural training efforts underway at Fort Bragg. Given that the manner with which they handle culture in the Special Forces is more organic – culture was not tacked on to existing training, but rather is more or less woven throughout – there would be great
utility to examining their programs. Thus, it must be emphasized that findings included in this paper are the first part of what ideally will be a two-phase effort.

**Table 2. Additional Site Visits and Interviews Needed Before Research Can be Complete**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Specifics</th>
<th>Recommended by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact Pauline Kusiak</td>
<td>USD(P), Minerva</td>
<td>DLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Visit</td>
<td>Fort Monroe</td>
<td>Fort Leavenworth, Fort Huachuca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact M. McFate</td>
<td>IDA, Fort Monroe, TRADOC HTS</td>
<td>Fort Leavenworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Allison Abbe</td>
<td>Army Research Institute for the Behavioral</td>
<td>CAOCL, ARI, DLO, and based on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Social Sciences</td>
<td>readings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact W. Wunderle</td>
<td>Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy</td>
<td>Based on readings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directorate (J5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit</td>
<td>DEOMI</td>
<td>DLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit</td>
<td>Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and</td>
<td>DLO, G. Nordin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture (CLREC), Center for Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominance (CID) Corry Station, Pensacola, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site visit</td>
<td>Air Force Culture and Language</td>
<td>DLO, G. Nordin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center, Maxwell Air Force Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phase I surveyed programs associated with ground forces. Phase II, should it take place, will round out the research with an examination of the efforts underway within the Air Force and Navy programs and will include interviews with several key subject matter experts. Finally, although it was intended for Phase I, time constraints made it impossible to schedule a site visit with Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). Therefore the information contained in this paper about DEOMI is based on insights from individuals interviewed at other facilities, as well as published materials.

The Discussion contains four sections, followed by a conclusion. Section A examines the DoD efforts with respect to cultural training efforts; although the emphasis is on cultural efforts, language is included as it relates to the emphasized initiatives. Section B surveys the programs in place through the Services – as previously indicated, the ground forces receive special emphasis in Phase I of this project. Section C examines the issue of culture and the military from a historical perspective; in this context, it is shown that this issue is not new. In addition, the current controversies also have a long history. Section D contains a brief discussion of the issues surrounding definitions and the camps that have emerged based on prioritization of problem areas, emphases in terms
of approach taken, and theoretical underpinnings. Section E, the conclusion, both draws on some existing independent assessments of the cultural training landscape, as well states the findings of this research project, including next steps for this examination of the cultural training landscape.
DISCUSSION

A. DoD BACKGROUND

The Defense Science Board’s (DSB) “2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities” reflects on U.S. military effectiveness in post-conflict operations in the context of a range of historical case studies. Drawing on both Thucydides and Clausewitz, the members of the DSB conclude that the “Emerging World” will face a set of “old” constants: war, violence, uncertainty, and friction will be familiar features of this new world. In addition, “religious and cultural motivations [will be] crucial.” According to the DSB, two additional “old” factors the emerging world will face include both the fact that “Americans don’t understand ourselves and how different we are,” as well as the fact that “our ignorance of our own history, as well as of others, is extraordinary.”

In reflecting on “the events in Iraq,” the authors of the DSB report emphasize that post-conflict planning is essential; understanding how culture and religion shape the environment will contribute to the success of that planning. “We must be able to travel in the minds of our opponents. They are already traveling in our minds. Don’t begin military conflict unless the post-conflict plan and resource commitment is secure.” That post-conflict plan and the resources needed in theater as the forces carry out that plan will draw upon a broadly defined combat skill set, which, according to the DSB, includes not just the ability to operate weapons systems, but also cultural and language-based capabilities.

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This 2004 DSB study sets a context for the subsequent DoD and Service initiatives that involved a language and/or cultural focus. While the DSB proclamation that culture and language need to be treated as combat skills requisite for meeting objectives resonated in some circles, the concepts remained fuzzy and proved difficult to implement.

Contemporaneously, DoD began tackling the language problem. In 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established Senior Language Authorities – individuals in each Service, the combatant commands, and certain agencies who would assess the language needs of their respective entity, evaluate the skills present, determine how to bridge the gap to meet the needs, and develop policy requirements.

In early 2005, DoD issued the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, which established a set of strategic planning goals and guidelines for building requisite language skills within the Services. Although the roadmap includes “cultural expertise” and references “regional studies” alongside language acquisition, the focus of the goals and guidance provided is – as the title suggests – on strengthening the language skills of the Servicemen and -women. A November 2008 House of Representatives Subcommittee report states that of the 43 tasks assigned in the roadmap, DoD reports that “about 88 percent” of them have been accomplished. Both the subcommittee report and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review conclude that the roadmap establishes goals and addresses the need for a strategy but does not itself constitute a strategic plan, the absence of which will hinder a successful transformation.

The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap also announced the creation of a new entity, the Defense Language Office (DLO), which would reach full operational status in 2005. The DLO is situated within the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA) a DoD Field Activity, of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD (P&R)). According to its website, the DLO “ensures a strategic focus on meeting present and future requirements for language and regional expertise, among


military and civilian employees.”7 The DLO is involved in the annual review of the Strategic Language List, the Capabilities Base Review, and the DLO Language Readiness Index, a strategic management tool that will enable the identification of areas of expertise and strengths resident in the Services, as well as shortfalls in areas where greater proficiency is needed. The DLO, in congruence with the roadmap, as well as with DoD Instruction 5160.70, has also been working to strengthen the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program and establish incentives for foreign language proficiency, such as the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (2006).

The DLO has also been active in holding and participating in summits and roundtables. In 2007, the DLO held a senior-level department-wide summit, “Regional and Cultural Expertise Summit: Building a Framework to Meet National Defense Challenges.” The purpose of this summit was to develop a framework to enable a synchronization of efforts.8 “Summit participants agreed that an intense focus on regional and cultural capabilities is critical if we are to grow leaders, operators, and analysts who understand both the broader regional, as well as the cultural contexts, in which they perform their jobs.”9 The white paper, which published the findings of the summit, established five action items:

- ACTION: Build a DoD Regional and Cultural Capabilities Strategic Plan.
- ACTION: Establish common terminology and a typology for identifying, developing, measuring, and managing regional and cultural capabilities.
- ACTION: Define and prioritize the Department’s strategic and operational demands for regional and cultural capabilities.
- ACTION: Operationalize the Department’s regional and cultural needs.

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ACTION: Partner with the public and private sectors in solutions.\textsuperscript{10}

The DLO summit white paper contended that globalization is ultimately what lies behind the impetus transform in this way.\textsuperscript{11}

Moreover, according to the paper, since significant progress has already been made in language, it is now time to turn to culture and regional expertise: “Now that we’ve made good progress in implementing the National Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities initiatives, it is time to address regional and cultural capabilities. We know from first-hand accounts of military operations around the world that the ability to converse in a foreign language must be accompanied by an understanding of the cultural context of both the language and the people who speak it. ... We must ensure that language, regional and cultural competencies become a fundamental component of the Department’s DNA.”\textsuperscript{12}

In seeking to reach their goals with respect to this transformation, DoD, and especially the DLO, have partnered with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). OSD approached DEOMI and asked them to draw on their diversity strengths and propose capabilities they could provide to advance cultural awareness training. Daniel P. McDonald, Director of Research at DEOMI, explains what he sees as institute’s particular strength in this area: “Awareness of diversity and equal opportunity issues, in addition to associated skills such as cross-cultural communication within this institutional context are highly transferable to the international context.”\textsuperscript{13}

This collaboration between DLO and DEOMI draws also on the academic community at the University of Central Florida. In an August 14, 2008, press release, McDonald states specifics about this work: “Since then researchers at the institute have


embarked on a six-year, multi-million dollar program with the DoD that will ensure cultural readiness through informed policy, valid research, effective training, shared information and integrated programs across the Services.” 14 McDonald explains how DEOMI will assist OSD: “Cross-cultural competencies are the set of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that enable an individual or unit to adapt and operate effectively within any multi-cultural context.” 15 Thus, by drawing on their proven record with respect to diversity training, complemented by this cross-cultural competency approach, the DEOMI seeks to be a core part of DoD’s solution to the culture problem. In this capacity, DEOMI has also interfaced with the Services and existing culture centers.

In support of their project on “Cultural Readiness” for the DLO, DEOMI, in collaboration with the local academic community, has issued a number of papers to explore definitions, needs, and requirements. In 2007, DEOMI paired with professors from the University of Central Florida, Department of Psychology, and published a framework for the DEOMI culture program: “An Initial Framework for Enhancing Cultural Competency.” 16 This document explores the existing theoretical background for what the authors term “the science of cultural readiness,” which they demonstrate is very complex, particularly if one is trying to devise a manner of measuring “complex phenomena.” Termed “future directions,” the authors conclude the paper with a call for: research on “perceptual and attitude change,” “attitude change in association with career performance and promotion record,” cultural typologies, the “drivers of cultural evolution,” “pair-wise comparisons across specific culture characters,” case studies of “zones of cultural conflict,” and finally research on the “genesis of cultural identification,” assimilation into groups, and the developmental aspects of cultural change. 17 Based on an examination of the 2008 publications, it appears they are emphasizing typologies, definitions, and measures for assessing competence.

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14 DEOMI researchers take on cross-cultural research and development program to enhance operational readiness, Release No. 08-08-06, August 14, 2008.
15 Donald quoted in, DEOMI researchers take on cross-cultural research and development program to enhance operational readiness, Release No. 08-08-06, August 14, 2008.
DEOMI’s 2008 papers emphasize cross-cultural competence. In “Toward an Operational Definition of Cross-Cultural Competence from Interview Data,” K.G. Ross preliminarily defined cross-cultural competence as “the development of knowledge and skill through experience and training that results in a complex schema of cultural differences, perspective-taking skills, and interpersonal skills, all of which an individual can flexibly (or adaptively) apply through the willingness to engage in new environments even in the face of considerable ambiguity, through self-monitoring and through self-regulation to support mission success in a dynamic context.” In terms of operationalizing cross-cultural competence, Ross summarizes the key factors. These factors include ethnocultural empathy, experience with people from another culture, flexibility, interpersonal skills and communication, mental model/perspective-taking, metacognition/self-monitoring, willingness to engage/openness, tolerance for ambiguity, relationship building, self-efficacy, and self-regulation or emotional regulation. Ross based this list of factors on existing literature and theory, and confirmed them with nine recently deployed individuals she interviewed.

In addition to the work the DLO is doing with DEOMI, other OSD initiatives include increasing the budgets of the Service Academies to enhance what Gail McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans and the Department of Defense Senior Language Authority, terms “pre-accession language and cultural knowledge.” These pre-accession initiatives, made possible by increased budgets, include summer immersion programs, exchange opportunities, and more language courses and teachers. Similar efforts have also been funded for ROTC programs.

Also encouraged by OSD’s increase of their budget, the Army’s Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) has been able to expand its programs in length, intensity, and number of students. DLIFLC also offers Field Support Modules through their Curriculum Development Division that are available for download through their website.\(^{23}\) These modules range from the Countries in Perspective “Orientation Guides,” which they have available for 30 countries, to PDA downloads and language guides.\(^{24}\) DLIFLC also deploys Mobile Training Teams, Language Survival Kits, and other long-distance language training instructional materials.\(^{25}\) Another DLIFLC recent initiative is “Headstart,” a computer-based individualized language program, using avatars and geared toward military content.\(^{26}\)

In addition to those efforts already described, OSD and the DLO in particular have advanced language endeavors that draw from the talent pool in the national community.\(^{27}\) Heritage Speaker Recruitment, for example, the Army’s 09L Interpreter/Translator Program, is an example of drawing on the skills already resident in the population. In addition, as part of the National Security language Initiative (NSLI), OSD has supported the National Security Education Program (NSEP), the National Flagship Language Programs, and the National Language Service Corps (NLSC), in order to enhance linguistic capabilities of students at various levels, develop language proficiency, and also establish a “cadre of 1,000 highly proficient people, in ten languages by 2010.”\(^{28}\)

The individuals leading the OSD and DLO efforts began their portion of this training transformation with a strong focus on developing language skills. Through the work of subject matter experts resident at Service culture centers and other institutes –

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\(^{27}\) Please note that this survey is not exhaustive. Examples of initiatives have been presented here.

and in consonance with the DEOMI’s emphasis on cross cultural competency – DoD and the DLO have begun expanding their lens to include culture and a greater emphasis on regional expertise.

In September 2008, the DLO created the position Deputy Director for Culture within their office. This deputy director currently serves as a one-man shop, a shop that does bring several – unfilled as of the writing of this report – billets with it. This Director of Culture holds a position that is potentially as exciting as it is daunting. As the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations concluded in their November 2008 report, both coordination and a unified comprehensive strategy are needed; however, DoD and the Services might not agree on the means to achieve the ends or even the ends to be achieved.

B. THE SERVICES’ INITIATIVES

Although OSD began talking about cultural and language initiatives early on, starting this discussion about cultural awareness training with a survey of the DoD efforts contrasts with the chronology of events in terms of actual program and tool development. Given the unique training, roles, and mission sets, it may be regarded as appropriate that the first efforts to develop cultural awareness training appeared in the Services and in particular the Army. Using an analogy from the medical community, theory precedes practice. OSD began to talk about culture and especially language; the Services, especially the Army and the Marine Corps, felt the need for such training and had to act whether or not the theoretical framework and bureaucratic apparatus were firmly in place.

1. Army

According to the statement by Brigadier General Richard C. Longo to the House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, on September 10, 2008, the “Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy” (ACFLS) as of late 2008 is in draft form. Longo explained that this strategy will provide a framework for Army training programs both in development, as well as those programs established well before

29 Author’s conversation with DLO Director of Culture, Brad Loo, 12 December 2008.
the strategy will be published; the goal will be to enable a synchronized and coordinated “holistic” approach that will lead to a strengthening of Army capabilities in these areas.31

As stated in the Army Information Paper, “Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities,” updated in July 2008, “cultural capability enables Soldiers and leaders to understand the ‘how and why’ of foreign cultures and the roles that culture, religion, and geography have in military operations. Foreign language capability reaches beyond the roles of linguists, intelligence analysts, and interrogators to every Soldier and leader; language can be a survival tool as well as an entrée to the cultural capability that is crucial to every Soldier and leader. The human dimension in which the Army must operate as part of today’s complex environments necessitates that Soldiers at all levels possess some cultural and foreign language capability.”32

The Army has several key well-established early initiatives to integrate into their strategy. Spanning the full range of ranks of general purpose forces, Army cultural and language training offerings are divided between two key facilities, with Mobile Training Teams (MTT) available. Training for captains and below is available at Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center (TCC) established in late 2004 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. According to Colonel John Bird, Director, Training, Support and Development, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, the manner in which Fort Huachuca “got into the culture business,” started with a phone call from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC): “Do you guys at the MI [Military Intelligence] School teach culture?” “Yes, of course, intel prep of the battlespace.” CAC replied: “MI School, you’re now in charge of culture training.”33


33 Author’s paraphrase, Colonel John Bird, 18 November 2008.
The efforts of Fort Huachuca’s TCC span every dimension of language and culture training. They are working with both the DLI and Jabra Ghneim’s Global Language Solutions to develop effective language immersion programs to meet the needs of the Servicemen and -women. With the MI School collocated at Fort Huachuca, there is an international student presence from which they can draw. According to Colonel Bird, they typically have 75 to 100 international students, and the leadership utilizes every opportunity to leverage their experiences. Colonel Bird emphasizes that getting these international students, mostly officers, into classrooms to talk about where they come from and who they are, helps the students learn about everything from their native food and dancing to their perspectives on military training, as well as their experiences in the Fort Huachuca community.34

In addition to their language programs, the TCC has developed a DVD with a range of materials, including region-specific culture products as well as general culture tools. The DVD is in wide use across the Services, and at DEOMI. Bruce Wood, the TCC director, explains that they encourage broad dissemination and use of their materials. 35 Kate Smith, one of the TCC instructors, indicates that the TCC gladly adopts useful tools and concepts developed elsewhere; she termed it “harvesting.” For example, she regularly uses some of the exercises from the Peace Corps Culture Matters workbook in the classroom.36

Fort Huachuca’s TCC uses an approach they call “Train-the-Trainer” as a means to refine and improve the content of their tools and materials, as well as a way to get the new trainers actively engaged in learning and teaching the material. The sessions involve several days of small group instruction, covering both region-specific cultural and historical background information on key countries, as well as cross-cultural competence (3 Cs) training, which begins with exercises that address cultural self-awareness. Colonel Bird suggests that the 3Cs represents a paradigm shift in the way culture is trained. After the sessions of instruction, the new trainers teach the materials back to those trainers who gave the instruction. This train-the-trainer approach ensures that the content is accessible and establishes an iterative process for active learning and refinement of the materials. The train-the-trainer approach is now in use across the Services, at other culture centers, and at DEOMI.

34 Author’s paraphrase, Colonel John Bird, 18 November 2008.
35 Author’s paraphrase, Bruce Wood, 18 November 2008.
36 Author’s paraphrase, Kate Smith, 18 November 2008.
For later levels of training and an emphasis on leadership training, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has a variety of programs and initiatives. Many of these programs are organized under the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). Gary Phillips, Acting Director of TRISA, explains that their mission is to apply the operational environment to the education and training, leadership development, studies, wargaming, and modeling and simulation programs within TRADOC. In so doing, TRISA leadership hopes to teach the Army how to think at an operational level and think deeply about the issues essential to their mission.

For example, within the TRISA framework, the Human Terrain System (HTS) program was created to address the U.S. Military’s insufficient understanding of the target area; shortly after the Iraq war began, commanders on the ground said they needed to improve their capability to understand what kind of people they were dealing with. The initial DoD response to this request was to build databases with information. Commanders reacted by saying that they needed someone on the ground with them; culture is local, so you need an expert at your side. The concept plan for HTS came out in 2006. The program involves the creation of a Human Terrain Team (HTT), consisting of two general types of social scientists: one type has relevant region-specific training; the other has training and experience in a field such as ethnography. A Team Leader, who comes from the unit, acts as the bridge between the social scientists and the military. The entire team attends training sessions together prior to deployment. During this training, over the course of multiple months, they build team cohesion as they learn about ethnographic and region-specific topics, and research tools and methods; the social scientists even receive a sort of primer on military command structures and other issues that will help familiarize them with the military milieu. Steven Rotkoff, HTS Deputy Program Manager, explains that “an effective HTT is a force multiplier; but it’s personality dependent. Some teams are better than others.” There are prejudices and biases on both sides that have to be overcome. “Whereas soldiers act, social scientists seek to understand.” The potential for miscommunication and friction is great. Rotkoff explains that they have anecdotes to demonstrate success, but Measures of Effectiveness are not feasible. He estimates that “fifty percent of HTTs are doing heroic work” and are regarded as invaluable. “Thirty percent are problem children”; the likely situation is that personalities on one or both sides are causing problems. “Twenty percent are adequate, not great but more or less marginally effective.” Rotkoff suggested that when a
commander reports back that kinetic ops decreased by 60 to 70 percent as a result of the HTT presence, then that is a measure of some success.37

Several other TRISA efforts focus on a Red-Teaming approach. The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) educates Red Teamers how to break from their own cultural mindset and think from an adversary’s perspective. The emphasis is on avoiding mirror imaging, group think, and simplistic approaches to the enemy’s operating environment. In conjunction with UFMCS, TRISA features a wargaming section with well-trained, experienced red commanders.

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) is an open-source research center that produces books, papers, journal articles, using all-source materials, especially foreign sources. They collaborate with local universities, as well as European Universities, holding seminars and symposia. They support operations by providing pre-deployment briefings and online materials. Rob Kurz explains that their focus with respect to research products is on “Geospatial Expeditionary Research,” which means they identify countries at zero phase and work with host nation academics and contractors to collect multiple layers of data down to a very granular level. With respect to training, they provide Servicemen and -women with Open Source Intelligence Research and Analysis (OSIRA.) They have also developed ROTC programs that provide OSIRA training, as well as culture and language programs.38

Among the initiatives housed at Fort Leavenworth, the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) has developed a wide range of training concepts and designs. The ARI emphasis is on leadership and influence, which means that many of their programs address general cultural concepts and cross-cultural competency implicitly. Army Excellence in Leadership (AXL) is geared toward junior officers, the so-called “strategic corporals.” As a training tool, AXL seeks to improve the user’s leadership skills, including the ability to establish credibility, to build trust, to resolve conflicts, and to cooperate and communicate with others. The initial inputs for the program came from interviews with soldiers coming out of Afghanistan; inputs were also gathered from soldiers who had recently deployed to Iraq. In an iterative process, the inputs were refined at multiple stages by captains out of West Point. The actual product is in the form of case studies with accompanying exercises.

37 Author’s paraphrasing, Steven Rotkoff, 25 November 2008.
ARI worked with the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) to develop Hollywood-style films that draw from these inputs and show the participant film adaptations of actual experiences. The first film in the AXL series, *Power Hungry*, came out in 2004 and depicts soldiers’ leadership experiences in Afghanistan. *Tripwire* depicts experiences in Iraq. These short films, constructed on the basis of actual experiences, depict soldiers in challenging situations making tough decisions and mistakes. The accompanying exercises are designed so that they can be completed with or without facilitation. If a facilitator is involved in the process, they will find a highly customizable interface. The AXL interface has a multimedia design that emphasizes interactivity. ARI’s focus was on utilizing a constructivist approach to learning; people are not passive receptacles for information; they need to be actively engaged in the synthesizing and transmission of information. The interactive modules include fact-checking questions, open-ended questions, questions that can be used in a group setting, as well as exercises involving reflection. There is a heavy emphasis on perceptions and perspectives, as well as second and third order outcomes.\(^{39}\)

ARI is also involved in a project with the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). JCISFA is the center of excellence for developing doctrine and lessons learned for security force assistance for foreign security forces. Security force assistance refers to advisors who serve on transition teams. These advisors come from general purpose forces and are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for one tour to advise host nation security forces. A tour as an advisor can be a source of tremendous stress; responsibilities are numerous, yet authority is limited.

At the time of the writing of this report, advisor selection was primarily based on who had not yet served in this capacity. The training provided may or may not be adequate, especially considering the selection process. Major Thomas Chalkley, now with JCISFA, served in a prior tour as an advisor and reports that he received a total of 5 days of training for the role. Master Sergeant Michael Beemer indicates that they are regularly contacted by individuals who will be deploying for a tour as an advisor who feel they have had inadequate preparation.\(^{40}\)

ARI’s role in the advisor program involves interviews and surveys they have conducted with returning advisors. The ARI behavior analysis project involving advisors

\(^{39}\) Session with Michelle Zbylut and Kim Metcalf, ARI, 24 November 2008.

\(^{40}\) Session with JCISFA, including Major Thomas Chalkley and Master Sergeant Michael Beemer.
asks them to assess the importance of particular skills and behaviors with respect to their ability to perform their job as advisors effectively. Of the 151 behaviors outlined in this research, some of the behaviors deemed most essential included establishing credibility and being considerate and respectful. The results of the ARI advisor study show that proficiency in language is not ranked as essential by the returning advisors. The participants in the study indicated that, although it was essential to have some common words and stock phrases in their vocabulary, communicating through an interpreter was adequate; working with an interpreter was more feasible than was achieving proficiency in the language. If there were a revision of the selection process for advisors, the ARI composite results would be of value in determining both who serves in this capacity, as well as what to prioritize in terms of training.41

Other ARI initiatives include an assortment of projects on issues relating to cross-cultural competence, communication, and interaction. Social Perspective Taking examines developing modules for training perspective-taking. Nonverbal Behavior Training emphasizes training for reading cues and gestures, especially as it relates to change detection. The project entitled Interagency Consensus Forum focuses on knowledge management, tools, and computer-based instruction that seeks to enhance interagency coordination and interaction. Allison Abbe’s Cross Cultural Toolkit is a project currently in Phase II that will assemble a suite of tools that focus on interpersonal skills, coping strategies, and perspective-taking techniques. For the project Scenario Training for Agile Teams, ARI developed a hip-pocket guide with exercises and strategies that emphasize team building. The design of the guide facilitates ease of use in any environment or setting.42

Created in 2003 as part of the Theater Support Cooperation Program, the Arabic Cultural Awareness Training is an immersion course held and facilitated by Third U.S. Army, U.S. Army Central, and Jordanian Armed Forces, at the Peace Operation Training Center in Jordan. Initially the program involved 300 soldiers, and three classes per year. Program capacity has doubled to 600 personnel (1,000 signed up). The course instruction is performed almost exclusively by Jordanians, who also review the course content and oversee curriculum. The course involves intensive language training in Modern Standard Arabic, region-specific cultural instruction, the TCC DVD as a sort of textbook, role playing exercises, and cultural tours. The program is open to all Services, including

active and reserve component. In feedback collected by the program, participants reportedly regard the training as invaluable for their deployment experience and suggest that it enabled them to perform their roles more effectively.43

As mentioned earlier, the Army’s DLIFLC also offers a wide range of language training opportunities, as well as online resources and a host of region-specific cultural guides. In addition to the tools and guides available through the DLIFLC, the Army has also made Rosetta Stone© available through its Army e-Learning website.

2. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps emphasizes what they term “operationally relevant culture,” which refers to the aspects of cultural knowledge and the related skill set most relevant to conducting military operations. In his statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Brigadier General Richard Lake highlighted the “heritage and expeditionary nature” of the Marine Corps to explain their longstanding interest in cultural and linguistic training; more so than other general purpose forces, Marines have historically worked in close proximity to local populations. Already in January 2003, General Michael Hagee issued planning guidance linking language, cultural, and counter-insurgency skills together and calling for these areas to receive emphasis as a means of increasing irregular warfare capabilities.44

As Barak Salmoni describes in his 2006 article on “Predeployment Culture Training,” initially the Marine Corps emphasized “cultural sensitivity” as they began to conceive of training agenda. Into 2004, the shift to “cultural awareness” training took place. “Operational culture” training emerged as the primary training concept at the same time that the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) was established, in mid 2005. Salmoni characterizes the shift in emphasis as follows: “The focus shifted from not offending people (a negative incentive) to grasping local human dynamics in order to accomplish the mission (a positive incentive). Thus, culture

43 Conversation with Major Alfredo Ferrer, 11 and 14 June 2008.
knowledge – knowledge applied toward achieving mission goals – became an element of combat power and a force multiplier.”

The CAOCL, located at Quantico, Virginia, serves as the central coordinating and planning entity for Marine Corps operational culture and language training programs. George Dallas, Director of CAOCL, views the center as enabler to operational forces, with a strong emphasis on operational. In addition to ensuring that operational culture is integrated into both predeployment training and Professional Military Education, CAOCL is developing additional regional culture and language learning opportunities for officers over the course of their career. Through their Mobile Training Teams, the Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRC) at all Marine Corps installations, and distributed learning interactive computer-based simulation programs such as their Tactical language Training System (TLTS), the Marine Corps has been able to expand the geographical radius of Marines who have access to training. CAOCL is also tasked by the Marine Corps to interface with culture centers at other services in a collaborative manner.

Separate but also located at Quantico, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) conducts all-source intelligence analysis and provides culture smart cards, cultural intelligence studies, and other handbooks and resources to the Marine Corps, DoD, and the intelligence community. Within MCIA, the Cultural Intelligence Division works with CAOCL and other Marine Corps entities to develop cultural intelligence training modules.

Issued in June 2008 by Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. Conway, the “Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025” identifies the key role the Marine

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46 Author’s paraphrase, CAOCL session 2 October.


Corps plays in future military operations and highlights the centrality of “the cultural terrain.” “As difficult as the physical aspect of operations in this environment will be, the cultural terrain will be more complicated to navigate. The ability to comprehend and effectively “maneuver” in the cognitive and cultural dimension of the modern battlespace is paramount.”

As they repeatedly emphasize, their expeditionary nature and their Service’s history gives the Marines particular credibility in the culture training arena. But as General Conway states in the Vision and Strategy 2025 document, although they have made much progress, their skillsets in this area still need work: “Our language and cultural communication skills require considerable enhancement and must become integral to our training and education programs.”

In part to address that need, the Marine Corps, through CAOCL, will be making Rosetta Stone® available.

3. **Air Force**

The Air Force’s Air University Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), established in April 2006 at Maxwell Air Force Base, has as its mission to develop “expeditionary airmen” by integrating culture and language training throughout the Air Force’s professional military education system; moreover, the AFCLC will synchronize Air Force training and education and serve as a “one-stop shop” for Airmen. AFCLC focuses on three primary training areas: “four Air Force strategic languages,” region specific culture, and “cross-cultural competence.” According to an interview with Dave Harwood, the deputy director of the center, “being able to understand how others think and act is vital as expeditionary Air Force operations ranging from combat to humanitarian aid missions [sic].” He indicated that they are currently working to delineate “what constitutes cross-cultural competence” but added that the cross-cultural competence the center will provide Airmen “will become a set of tools that can be applied through education, at all levels of service, to better equip folks to communicate, to build relationships, to negotiate and to influence others they deal with by understanding their culture-related [differences].”


52 Ashley M. Wright, Air University Public Affairs, “Air University Culture, Language Center Prepares for New Mission, Name,” Maxwell-Gunter Dispatch VOL. 61, NO. 47, November 30.
Delineating cross-cultural competence and assessing the needs of Airmen as the transformation to an expeditionary Air Force takes place will be informed by a forthcoming RAND study, “Cultural Skills for Deployed Air Force Personnel: Defining Cultural Performance.” This as yet unpublished study will include the results of a survey analysis RAND conducted with 6,000 recently deployed Airmen; the basic findings, as reported by Brigadier General Lake, indicate that recently deployed Airmen contended that cultural and region specific cultural training outweigh language in utility with respect to performing their jobs in the environment during deployments.53

4. Navy

The Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (CLREC), established in 2006, in Pensacola, Florida, through the Center for Information Dominance, is in the process of being fully developed in order to meet the training needs of the Navy in every role. The CLREC was established in order to facilitate and coordinate culture training within the Navy’s education system. The emphasis of the CLREC’s efforts is on pre-deployment culture training; although the focus is on culture and region-specific culture over traditional language training, there are language tools available. The CLREC will seek to use existing tools and work with other Services’ culture centers.

The U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy (LREC), published in January 2008, emphasizes the expeditionary aspect of Navy missions and diplomatic role played by the Navy with respect to Phase 0 operations. According to Rear Admiral Daniel P. Holloway, the Navy’s “preferred end state is language fluency for some, but not all; regional expertise for some, but not all; cultural awareness for all.”54


54  (Emphasis in original) Rear Admiral Daniel P. Holloway, USN, Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (OPNAV N13). Statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: 10
C. NOT NEW, BUT OFTEN CONTROVERSIAL

The concept of culture having something to do with the military is not new. Whether the issue is language training (for purposes of everything from espionage to interrogations to communicating with the host nation), region specific culture, or what is now termed cross-cultural communication, the problems are not new and neither is the search for a solution.

The fact that some of the current solutions to the military’s culture problems are surrounded by controversy probably stems from multiple factors. One example of something possibly fueling such controversy would be the long-standing cultural and political divide between the military and academia. Another example might be the fact that certain social circles have a fundamental distrust of the military as a tool of the government. Here, too, there is nothing new. What follows is not an attempt at an exhaustive survey of the linkages between culture, anthropology, language, and academia on the one hand, and the Government and/or military on the other. These serve as examples and illustrations that neither the problems nor the solutions are new.

In what may be regarded as an ironic precedent, one of the earliest examples of a controversy that emerged as a result of some linkage between academics and the Government/military took place just following World War I. On December 20, 1919, well-known American Anthropologist Franz Boas publicly – in the form of a published letter to *The Nation* entitled “Scientists as Spies” – accused several fellow anthropologists of spying for the American government while they conducted research in Central America. In his letter, he decried the academic who “uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist.” Whatever Boas’s reasons for rallying against these unnamed anthropologists, his actions were denounced by the American Anthropological Association (AAA). The association removed Boas from the “governing council and

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threatened with expulsion from the Association itself.”

Many decades later, on June 15, 2005, the AAA membership voted to rescind the censure of Boas.

In her discussion of the connection between anthropology and counterinsurgency, Montgomery McFate traces the early history of anthropology back to the practice of British colonial administration in Africa, calling it “a tool of empire.” She elaborates: “Anthropology actually evolved as an intellectual tool to consolidate imperial power at the margins of empire.”

McFate also discusses the role of anthropologists in World War II. She cites examples of anthropologists who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), as well as others who served in combat and forward deployed intelligence units, particularly in Japan. For example, Margaret Mead contributed to efforts that assisted the Office of War Information and OSS, and conducted a study for the National Research Council.

Other perhaps unexpected individuals served valuable roles in World War II in a cultural capacity. A group that became known as the Quiet Men worked at an interrogation facility at Fort Hunt, code-named P.O. Box 1142. The Quiet Men, many of whom were German refugees, were selected based on having fluency in the language and even a technical background in the area of expertise of the prisoner of war with whom they would work. The interrogations were typically conducted with captured German scientists and submariners or other individuals with knowledge valuable to the war effort. The interrogation techniques used by the Quiet Men involved anything from playing chess, to sports activities, to having nice dinners; the underlying principle of the Quiet Men program was that the essential information could best be obtained by having someone fluent in the language and possessing a culturally similar mindset speak to them.

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in a friendly manner, engaging them intellectually about their area of expertise. According to an NPR *All Things Considered* report, “transcripts show that interrogations at Fort Hunt were usually straightforward, almost cordial affairs. Veterans say they often got their best information just by being friendly. Some prisoners were even wined and dined to soften them up.”

Another group who performed valuable wartime roles in which they drew on their heritage were the Nisei who served on Language Special Teams. These young men volunteered or were drafted to serve in the military and then, on the basis of their backgrounds, taken to Camp Savage, Minnesota, where they attended intensive language courses at the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS). Sus Toyoda recorded his experiences as a young man drafted into the program: “Our studies included the study or review of the Japanese language, order of battle of the Japanese military forces, prisoner of war interrogation, radio intercept and many other subjects that could be of value in the field. Just to illustrate how intense our course was, the kanji (ideographs) instructor would make us memorize 75 characters a day just to make sure we remembered 50 for the next day’s test. Many of us studied using flashlights under our blankets after lights out at 2200 hours. Saturday mornings were devoted to examinations. Many of us woke up early, about 0400 hours, went to the latrine, sat on the commodes and studied for the tests under the meager lighting. The competition was so keen in our class that our class grade average was in the mid-nineties.”

Takejiro Higa also reported on his experiences as part of a Language Special Team. When he heard that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was rounding up Japanese people in the community, he and his brother volunteered for the Army, thinking they would then avoid internment. His brother was selected for service, and he was selected to be one of the “Japanese-language soldiers.” In the interview, Takejiro Higa describes the teachers in the program. They were Nisei who had attended a Japanese University, with backgrounds appropriate for intensive language training. These MIS Nisei, as students like Takejiro Higa were then called, performed intelligence gathering and analysis and also communicated to Japanese civilians who were in the area of fighting.

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Following World War II, the connections between academia and both the military and Government continued. One prominent example is Anthropologist Edward T. Hall, who was selected to lead the new Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the State Department in the early 1950s. FSI, the training branch of the State Department, under the direction of Hall had what he called an “intercultural” focus. His emphasis in terms of training was not only to “understand the mentality of complex cultures,” but also to focus especially on perceptions and motivations, “what people took for granted and did not verbalize.” Hall’s *The Silent Language* (1959) contains many of the concepts he was developing at FSI; for example, people from different cultures view time and space in particular ways, often unique to that culture, without being aware of these perceptions and how fundamental they are to communication and interaction. Hall’s work with FSI ended during the span of time during which Joseph McCarthy selected the State Department for “special treatment.” According to Hall, internal bureaucratic directives to “clean out the anthropologists” and external pressures from McCarthy led to an end of his work with FSI.

In the 1960s, unbeknownst to him, one of Halls’ projects was funded by a program behind which stood the CIA. As a result, Hall was interviewed by Patricia Greenfield, for her article “CIA’s Behavior Caper.” Hall stated that had he been aware it was CIA funds, he would have refused the money. But he contended that his work promoted understanding and improved communication, and he felt that was valuable almost no matter the sponsor: “In general (to) the degree to which people read each other accurately, they tend to make more valid decisions. I don’t care who you’re talking about. Promoting better and more accurate communication is an end in itself. As soon as these start being stated politically, then all sorts of things begin to happen. I’m an apolitical person.”

Project Camelot has reached a level of notoriety that many people speak of it without really having much awareness of what it is. It has become a symbol for the very worst outcome of the marriage of social science and the Department of Defense. The

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Special Operations Research Office (SORO) was established in 1964 at American University in Washington, D.C., in order to provide a vehicle for research and development of “local human terrain” in support of counterinsurgency operations. Staffed with a range of social scientists, SORO developed reports, performed commissioned research, and also conceived of the now notorious Project Camelot. According to a letter from the Office of the Director of SORO sent to interested social scientists, the objective of Project Camelot was “to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world.”

During Project Camelot’s brief existence, the emphasis was on data collection and counter-insurgency missions in Latin America. One social scientist involved apparently used his academic credentials to gain access to data, declined to disclose any connection with the Department of Defense, and when the link to DoD was leaked, the press coverage exceeded all expectations, and diplomatic relations became strained. In 1965, following congressional hearings on the event, Project Camelot was canceled.

An ongoing effort, sometimes likened to Project Camelot, is the Minerva Initiative. According to the National Science Foundation (NSF) synopsis,

NSF and the Department of Defense (DoD) are initiating a university-based social and behavioral science research activity, as part of the Minerva Initiative launched by the Secretary of Defense, that focuses on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. NSF and DoD intend 1) to develop the DoD’s social and human science intellectual capital in order to enhance its ability to address future challenges; 2) to enhance the DoD’s engagement with the social science community; and 3) to deepen the understanding of the social and behavioral dimensions of national security issues.

The call for projects and tools that address those areas ended in late 2008.

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70 Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation (NSCC) Program Solicitation, NSF 08-594, 08/06/08.
Although much remains unclear about the Minerva Initiative, some academics voiced concern immediately. Anthropologist Hugh Gusterson, one of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists organizers, indicated that “for some anthropologists, any program supported by the Pentagon would be problematic,” and worried that “Pentagon control of the program could diminish its effectiveness.”

The most severe ongoing controversy connected with the collaboration between social scientists, specifically anthropologists, and DoD and the Services is TRADOC’s Human Terrain System (HTS). While there are some concerns raised about the credentials of the individuals hired to serve on the Human Terrain Teams (HTT), the major sources of controversy are two recent news stories. On November 4, 2008, HTT member, Paula Loyd, was set on fire in Kandahar, sustaining serious injuries. Later that same month, Issam Hamama, a contractor working as part of an HTT, was arrested and charged with espionage; he had apparently worked for Saddam Hussein.

The Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) has issued a petition, “Pledge of Non-participation in Counter-Insurgency” that indicates discomfort on the part of the anthropological community that may stem from the same kinds of concerns that arose in the aftermath of Project Camelot. An excerpt from this petition indicates that NCA sees no role for anthropologists in support of U.S. military missions:

U.S. military and intelligence agencies and military contractors have identified “cultural knowledge,” “ethnographic intelligence,” and “human terrain mapping” as essential to U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. Consequently, these agencies have mounted a drive to recruit professional anthropologists as employees and consultants. While often presented by its proponents as work that builds a more secure world, protects U.S. soldiers on the battlefield, or promotes cross-cultural understanding, at base it contributes instead to a brutal war of occupation which has entailed massive casualties. By so doing, such work breaches relations of openness and trust with the people anthropologists work with around the world and, directly or indirectly, enables the occupation of one country by another. In addition, much of this work is covert. Anthropological support for such an enterprise is at

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72 Noah Shachtman, “‘Human Terrain’ Contractor Indicted as Saddam Spy,” Wired, December 01 2008. See also, Dan Vergnano and Elizabeth Weise, “Should Anthropologists work alongside soldiers?” USA Today, December 08 2008.

73 NCA, [http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/](http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/)
odds with the humane ideals of our discipline as well as professional standards.\textsuperscript{74}

The \textit{USA Today} article from December 8, 2008, “Should Anthropologists Work Alongside Soldiers?” reports that more than 1,000 anthropologists have signed this petition.\textsuperscript{75}

D. \textbf{JUST SEMANTICS?}

In surveying the literature on cultural awareness and associated training, it appears that few people are satisfied with existing definitions of “culture”; as a result, they create their own. Already in his 1959 \textit{The Silent Language}, anthropologist Edward Hall wrote: “Culture is a word that has so many meanings already that one more can do it no harm.”\textsuperscript{76} His definition in \textit{The Silent Language} emphasizes that culture is a “complex series” of interrelated activities with great breadth and tremendous historical depth, saturated with emotions as well as “out-of-awareness” actions and experiences.\textsuperscript{77} Hall defines culture as communication, by which he means “a wide spectrum of communication events.”\textsuperscript{78} This kind of definition could include language, nonverbal communication, region specific cultural artifacts, as well as perceptions and motivations and other general cultural components.

This section will neither exhaust the existing literature on “what is culture,” nor will it seek to answer the question. Rather, the purpose of introducing this issue here is to point out two of the potential areas of concern. The first issue this section will address relates to the propensity the communities involved in the cultural training arena have for debating semantics. Secondly, the messy segmenting of the training efforts into four camps based on what is prioritized and how culture is defined may sometimes hinder communication and collaboration.

\textit{Culture Matters}, the workbook for Peace Corps Trainees and Volunteers originally published in 1997, contains activities and accompanying text examining the concept of culture, while eliciting student reflection and interaction. According to


\textsuperscript{75} Dan Vergnano and Elizabeth Weise, “Should Anthropologists work alongside soldiers?” \textit{USA Today}, December 08 2008.


Culture Matters, “culture is a complex concept, with numerous dimensions and facets.” The Peace Corps designates four key building blocks of culture:

- Concept of the Self
- Personal vs. Societal Obligations
- Concept of Time
- Locus of Control.79

The issue of defining culture is presented in a manner that elicits user interaction. While the Peace Corps supplies a glossary with a succinct definition of culture in their trainer’s guide, the Culture Matters workbook provides students an array of definitions from leading anthropologists. The definition offered as the Peace Corps’ statement on culture, as presented in the trainer’s guide glossary, is: “The fundamental values, belief, attitudes, and patterns of thinking that are embedded in a society’s or region’s view of how the world works and of how individuals and groups can and should operate in the world. And the resulting behaviors of these individuals. [sic]”80

Examples of the leading anthropologists’ definitions users of the workbook see in the margins of Culture Matters include the following:

- “Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group from another.” –Geert Hofstede 81
- “Culture is the shared set of assumptions, values, and beliefs of a group of people by which they organize their common life.” –Gary Wederspahn 82
- “Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting. The essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values.” –Clyde Kluckhohn83
- “Culture consists of concepts, values, and assumptions about life that guide behavior and are widely shared by people....[These] are transmitted generation

81 Culture Matters, The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook, Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange, T0087, p 6 (margin.)
82 Culture Matters, The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook, Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange, T0087, p 8 (margin.)
83 Culture Matters, The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook, Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange, T0087, p 12 (margin.)
to generation, rarely with explicit instructions, by parents...and other respected elders.” –Richard Brislin and Tomoko Yoshida

- “Culture is the outward expression of a unifying and consistent vision brought by a particular community to its confrontation with such core issues as the origins of the cosmos, the harsh unpredictability of the natural environment, the nature of society, and humankind’s place in the order of things.” –Edward Hall

- “Culture is an integrated system of learned behavior patterns that are characteristic of the members of any given society. Culture refers to the total way of life for a particular group of people. It includes [what] a group of people thinks, says, does and makes – its customs, language, material artifacts and shared systems of attitudes and feelings.” –Robert Kohls

“Defining Culture” is even an example of an exercise in *Culture Matters*. They ask users to go back through the workbook and note the key concepts and repeated words in the definitions provided. The “insight” they hope to emphasize with this exercise is: “While culture has many definitions, most observers agree on certain fundamental characteristics.” They also provide a possible list in the answer key: “List of characteristics of culture: 1. culture is collective, shared by a group; 2. culture is learned; 3. it has to do with values, beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, and feelings; 4. it involves customs and traditions; 5. it influences or guides behavior.”

As stated, no effort will be made here to list exhaustively all definitions. Referencing the group of definitions provided by the Peace Corps *Culture Matters* workbook provides a representative sampling.

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84 *Culture Matters, The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook*, Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange, T0087, p 13 (margin.)


86 *Culture Matters, The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook*, Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange, T0087, p 18 (margin.)


89 The author spoke to both Shilpa Hart and Sally Caldwell about cross-cultural training and community-based training. In addition to learning about their impressive pedagogical methods, the author gathered information on how they handle the region-specific, as well as more general cultural training, in addition to language. Sessions on 31 October and 3 November 2008.
The DoD and NATO approved joint definition of culture is as follows: “A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.” This definition is contained in the “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.” In terms of scope, this definition is certainly one of the more constrictive.

Beyond the issue of definitions of culture, the fact that cultural and language training efforts segment into roughly four camps based on what is prioritized and how culture is defined deserves attention. Once again it must be noted that the treatment here will neither be exhaustive nor comprehensive. The goal for Phase I is to establish examples in order to represent the camps in the culture and language training landscape. The literature on the subject has also not been exhaustively consulted. Generally speaking, one training entity will have tools and programs that fall into every category or camp, but they will have one area they emphasize above others.

The “big L” Language camp emphasizes traditional formal language instruction. The DLO started out in this camp. In very broad terms, OSD efforts in general seem to favor traditional language instruction.

The “little l” language camp, in contrast, focuses on nonverbal communication, gestures, perspective taking, perceptions, and what Edward Hall terms “out-of-awareness.” ARI, MCIA, CAOCL, TCC, and the Navy and Air Force centers all certainly emphasize “little l” language, although not excluding other categories or camps of culture.

The “little c” culture camp overlaps somewhat with the “little l” language camp. This category emphasizes the general culture issues, such as awareness issues and “cross-cultural competency.” Allison Abbe, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, and Brian Selmeski, the AFCLC Director of Cross-Cultural Competence, have both written in depth in this area and have ongoing projects further developing their concepts and tools. In “Cross-Cultural Competence in Army


Leaders,” Abbe et al suggest that “cross-cultural competence refers to the knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enable individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments. Cross-cultural competence is defined here as an individual capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular intersection of cultures.”92

Finally “big C” Culture refers to, for example, region-specific culture, discussions of artifacts specific to a particular group, and features of their particular human terrain. Smartbooks and handbooks often feature this kind of knowledge.

In conclusion, returning to Edward Hall’s definition of culture from The Silent Language – which looked at culture as a “complex series” of interrelated activities with great breadth and tremendous historical depth, saturated with emotions, as well as “out-of-awareness” actions and experiences93 – it is possible to combine these four categories or camps into one very broadly defined concept, embracing language, nonverbal communication, region specific cultural artifacts, as well as general cultural components and cross-cultural competency. Segmenting, as the Services do, these pieces into manageable portions across the force – where, for example, only some Servicemen seek language proficiency, but all seek at least some level of cross-cultural competency – may be an approach that is inclusive of the concerns and interests of the diverse cultural training landscape and yet still establishes an attainable goal.

E. CONCLUSION

The findings of Phase I of this study of the cultural awareness training landscape, albeit limited to ground forces, include concerns about theory versus practice, prioritization, communication, the absence of an overarching strategy, the absence of a Military Occupational Specialty for culture, as well as concerns about whether – despite all the efforts already made – the right people really understand why culture matters.

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The U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations November 2008 report, “Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DoD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment,” surveys this landscape and points to some areas for improvement. Among these recommendations, they call for the OSD to develop a comprehensive culture and language strategy with prioritization of resources and efforts; in addition, the Committee report states that “DoD should clarify its policy characterizing foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as critical or core competencies essential to DoD missions.” These two recommendations would likely address the committee’s stated concern about the divide between DoD and their language emphasis on the one hand and the Service focus on culture. “The Department must work even more closely with the Services to achieve a common understanding of the language skills needed in today’s force.”  

Given the existence of a number of well-developed culture and language programs, there is the potential for resistance to DoD directives issued that may contrast with efforts already underway. Glenn Nordin, Foreign Language and Area Advisor, draws on an analogy to highlight the positive aspects of the current landscape: Let one thousand flowers bloom; the Services’ culture centers are these flowers. Out of all these flowers, something good will come, from below, not directed from above. Moreover, Nordin contends that no matter how good the roadmaps and papers, culture cannot simply be instilled into the troops.

It must also be emphasized that there is not one solution to this problem. The multiple solutions, in Nordin’s view, have to come from the bottom, from the colonels. He explains his view that OSD’s role should be to support the existing training centers and programs; make them joint where possible. OSD should, according to Nordin, advocate and defend what exists already.

Brad Loo, DLO’s newly assigned Deputy Director for Culture (September 2008), indicated that his office is the central point of contact for the DoD culture program and

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95 Author’s paraphrase, Conversation with Glenn Nordin, 10 December 2008. Note, this analogy draws from a speech delivered by Mao Tse-Tung.

96 Author’s paraphrase, Conversation with Glenn Nordin, 10 December 2008.
has taken positive steps to define how the office will lead and manage these efforts. With respect to the Services’ culture centers, how should the DLO operate? Should the DLO serve as a representative body with oversight over these existing programs? Should the DLO establish a separate center of excellence that presides over all efforts, issuing directives and threading them together into a unified DoD-led effort? Loo suggests that these are questions, among others, the DLO is currently addressing.97

Nordin also points to an area of concern even more basic: Standing in the way of progress in the culture and language training arena is a fundamental lack of understanding of what culture is and why it is important. Many leaders in these communities where these training initiatives are most needed do not, at a very basic level, truly understand the purpose for culture training.98

Kerry Fosher, Command Social Scientist from MCIA, elaborates on the issue of definitions as a source of difficulty. According to Fosher, at symposia and other technical workshops, once the subject of definitions is broached, whatever the purpose for the meeting, participants often become mired in a turf war.99 Perhaps buried under the overwhelming number of definitions and contentious dialog that takes place between the various camps and cliques, lies a clear articulation of the purpose for culture training.

Nordin used the one thousand flowers blooming analogy to describe the Services’ culture centers. He did, however, point to one area where they might have room for improvement. The Services’ culture centers offer an impressive array of tools and programs for Servicemen and -women. They collaborate and share techniques and procedures, even drawing on tools developed externally, such as the Peace Corps’ Culture Matters, yet there are potential users who lack awareness of the offerings and how to access them. Nordin suggested outreach efforts such as at the American Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meetings or even setting up a biannual kiosk in the Pentagon concourse. Through such means, the Services’ culture centers could adveritize their wares to the community and draw attention to their impressive efforts. In addition, such outreach efforts might bring greater clarity and understanding to key players within the community of the value of the kind of training they offer.100

97 Author’s paraphrase, Conversation with Brad Loo, 12 December 2008.
98 Author’s paraphrase, Conversation with Glenn Nordin, 10 December 2008.
99 Author’s paraphrase, CAOCL session, 2 October 2008.
100 Author’s paraphrase, Conversation with Glenn Nordin, 10 December 2008.
An additional concern raised by many subject matter experts and committees who are involved in this area extends well beyond the Services and DoD. In the “Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military,” the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations addresses the fact that the lack of adequate culture and language education is not limited to DoD and the Services, but is a broader social problem; they call on DoD to “place greater emphasis on critical language and cultural programs in its own K-12 school system to make these a model for producing students with higher proficiency levels in critical languages.”

It is indeed striking how many industries currently have initiatives in the works or underway that address language skills and especially cross-cultural competence. In the medical community, social welfare arena, educational system, commercial enterprises, and business conglomerates, the number of programs available to employees to assist them in developing such skill sets is startling. In the majority of cases, the initiatives being proposed are for education programs and tools for employees already finished with their formal education. If these industries, as well as the DoD and Services, all feel the need further to educate their adult, already educated, workforce, then one is left asking the question: why start so late? Why should these efforts start from scratch only after formal education of their workforce is complete? Among all of the requirements for basic education, why is there no slot for cross-cultural competence alongside the other curriculum guidelines established for high school systems? Language requirements are underway, but as many groups contend, language is only part of the solution. No effort was made as part of this project to examine the literature to see how America compares in terms of ethnocentrism and cultural arrogance, but, returning to the Defense Science Board’s 2004 study, it is telling that the committee referenced their view that “Americans don’t understand ourselves and how different we are,” as well as the fact that “our ignorance of our own history, as well as of others, is extraordinary.”


102 Defense Science Board, “2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities,” Supporting Papers, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2005, 67. This is not just a military problem. Globalization and the growing number of nations engaged as power brokers in the increasingly interdependent economic system are factors that may lead to multilingual societies having a comparative advantage. In “Tongue-tied, Americans lack the multi-lingual edge,” Whitney Jackson cites David Gray, former acting assistant secretary for policy from the Labor Department, who expressed such concerns: “In a more competitive market where
Deficits in this study include the obvious omission of the Air Force and Navy efforts, as well as DEOMI among the site visits. In order to complete this study, those additional site visits must be completed. Relying on published materials and second-hand accounts leaves this report uneven in terms of the research conducted. In addition, the Special Forces approach to culture training needs to be investigated. From discussions with Nordin, Fosher, and other experts, the Special Forces have an organic approach to culture training. They have cultural training infused throughout their exercises. Should this project continue into Phase II, this additional research would round out the study, and the findings would be presented comprehensively.

products are increasing in quality,’ said Gray, who now works at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, ‘we need to be able to compete on relationships and service, (and) languages are an important factor.’” Jackson suggests that both technology and globalization play a role in increasing the number of players, many of whom come from traditionally multilingual nations. Whitney Jackson, “Tongue-tied, Americans lack the multi-lingual edge,” Medill Reports, December 18, 2008.
This project scoped the existing cultural awareness training programs, tools, and approaches in use or in development by military Services, as well as civilian organizations. The focus was on identifying cutting-edge programs, ranging from the TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca to the Cross-Cultural training efforts in use by the Peace Corps. We sought to identify both best practices as well as potential gaps that are present in the existing ad hoc framework that has been developed without any synchronization across the Services or the civilian agencies. Thus, this document includes an examination of the programs and tools in use, especially by the Army and Marine Corps, the ways in which the existing programs address the needs, what groups have access to these programs, the complex issues surrounding measures of effectiveness, and areas where there may be room for improvement. In surveying this landscape, this document also addresses issues surrounding definitions and prioritization of efforts, as well as areas of controversy.
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