PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: FIGHTING THE WAR OF IDEAS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL A. CEROLI
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
Psychological Operations, when properly organized and executed are the Department of Defense's premier capability to counter our enemy's ideological support for terrorism. This ideological support is defined in the National Military Strategy for the War on Terror as our enemy's strategic center of gravity. This paper recommends an established force structure and coordinating mechanism to attack our enemy's strategic center of gravity while defending ours.
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Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Ceroli
United States Army

Mr. Gordon McCormick
Naval Postgraduate School
Project Adviser

Colonel Charles Higbee
United States Army War College Faculty Mentor

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U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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This paper is dedicated to LTC Charles B. "Chad" Buehring, SPC Adam Kinser, SPC Joe Jefferies, SSG Michael Owens, and CPL Jon Santos. Because of their selfless acts, on this very day, we stand in the Capital cities of those that would do our Citizens harm. May God forever bless you and our great Nation.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: FIGHTING THE WAR OF IDEAS

"If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there" Herbert Altshuler

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the utility of properly organized psychological operations forces coordinating "words and deeds" at the strategic level in countering ideological support to terrorism. This paper will examine tactical and operational cases from Operations Enduring/Iraqi Freedom, and apply the lessons learned from these case studies to the strategic level. It will also recommend a PSYOP force structure to support the tactical to strategic levels of warfare. Lastly, it provides a coordinating mechanism to leverage the full might of the US Government.

In the age of instant communication and 24 hour news coverage, the requirement to communicate with foreign audiences has grown in importance to the point where information is at parity with lethal options. Dr John Arquilla summarizes the observations of many scholars, regarding the increased significance of information in 21st Century warfare. In Athena's Camp, edited by Dr Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, they state, the information revolution, which is as much an organizational as a technological revolution has transformed the nature of conflict from open warfare, to terrorism, crime, and even radical social activism. They continue by recognizing "the internet and other media are greatly empowering individuals and small groups to influence the behavior of states" (Arquilla, p. 1)

Psychological Operations or PSYOP is the Commander's primary tool to communicate with foreign target audiences. Psychological Operations forces are the military organization whose primary mission is to communicate with foreign audiences with the purpose to influence that audience's behavior. The most effective PSYOP programs during OEF and OIF were the programs where commanders were personally involved giving their vision and guidance. This personal
involvement of the commander insured the target audiences selected and themes stressed supported the Commander’s objectives.

Organizational Contingency Theory states to be properly organized there must be a balance between structure, size, technology, and the requirements of the environment. Contingency Theory also states as the complexity of the task increases the organization must decentralize and put into place more mechanisms to insure coordination (Jensan, 24 Apr 07).

Current rules of force allocation provide a Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB) to a Corps, a Tactical PSYOP Company (TPC) to a Division, a Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) to a Brigade, and a Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) to a Battalion (AR 570-4). These tactical PSYOP units are only capable of loudspeaker operations, psychological actions (PSYACTS), and limited print reproduction and product development. The Regional PSYOP Battalion that forms a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force and is capable of planning PSYOP supporting plans at the operational level, developing print and broadcast products, and mass reproduction capability is allocated to the Joint Force Headquarters and Combatant Command.

With the Army's focus on the Brigade Combat Team coupled with the availability of mass media at a global level, we must push more psychological capability to lower levels. Col Ralph O. Baker in his article, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations", states:

Reassess policies and regulations that inhibit our tactical units' ability to compete in an IO environment. The global communications network facilitates the near-instantaneous transmission of information to local and international audiences, and it is inexpensive and easy to access. Our Soldiers must be permitted to beat the insurgents to the IO punch (Baker, p. 10)
Reallocating PSYOP forces and pushing greater capabilities that includes planning and product development to lower levels would better serve the requirement identified in Col Baker’s experience and significantly improve US Forces ability to take the offensive in the information environment.

Based on my two years as the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting Central Command and an additional year in Afghanistan as a staff officer supporting CJSTF-A, the optimal force would be to allocate a Tactical PSYOP Company (TPC) augmented with a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) to the maneuver Battalion level. Under the current rules of allocation, the TPC is allocated to a Division level headquarters. Applying organizational contingency theory to address Dr Arquilla’s information revolution, the proper allocation is assigning the TPC with upgraded print capability down to the Battalion level. The purpose of the TPC is two fold. First, the TPC must establish and run a newspaper in the supported Battalion's area and plan psychological actions (PSYACTS) for the Battalion Task Force to gain the respect/trust of the populace.

The newspaper can be White PSYOP (directly attributed to American Forces) or Grey PSYOP, (with the source unidentified). What I mean by White or Grey is the newspaper can be produced directly by an attached PSYOP unit or a newspaper using host nation assets can be established depending on your situation. The host nation option is attractive because it puts money into the local economy, it is tailored for the local audience in both content and language, and it will facilitate delivery to local key communicators that may be biased against Coalition Forces. A word of caution when using host nation assets, their work must be proof read or else you can wind up with an edition that reads "We'll drive the Zionist invaders into the sea". (Whittaker, 21 May 07).

The host nation option also gives you the flexibility to use your tactical PSYOP unit in direct support of your maneuver operations or face to face communications with key
communicators. The purpose of the newspaper is to establish a credible source of factual information that will add to earning the trust and confidence of the population in your area of operation. Again using Col Baker's experience in Iraq to illustrate the point, he states, "It is imperative to earn the trust and confidence of the indigenous population in your AO. They might never 'like you', but I am convinced you can earn their respect" (Baker, p. 4).

The newspaper must be truthful and accurate to earn the trust of the audience. It is a conduit for the maneuver commander to inform the population of coalition intentions, the community action projects being accomplished by the coalition and host nation forces, managing the expectations of the population, and controlling their actions such as curfews, road closures etc. It is also the Commander's non lethal tool to drive a wedge between the population and the insurgents, who cannot operate without the support of the population. Additionally, a Battalion level newspaper can direct the messages to specific audiences in the commander's area of operation. Summed up by Dr Gordon McCormick, "all insurgencies are local" (McCormick, lecture, 8 Mar).

The 1st Armored Division and 4th Infantry Division in Iraq successfully executed, White PSYOP, "Baghdad Now" developed and disseminated by the 345th TPC, and Grey PSYOP, Al Yoom & Al Sabah newspapers, developed and disseminated by host nation personnel supervised by the 364th TPC.

The second purpose of allocating a Tactical PSYOP Company to each maneuver battalion is to provide the appropriate level PSYOP leadership to properly integrate PSYOP into each operation. This would go a long way in addressing the shortfall in psychological operations that Dr Chris Lamb's, "Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience", describes as,

Attitudes about the ability of PSYOP to create effects remain mixed. It is not surprising that in combat, many commanders will place greater confidence in kinetic
weapons with which they are more familiar and which have more easily demonstrated effects. For many, substituting kinetic options with PSYOP products amounts to target on faith, since their effects are so difficult to observe and quantify. (Lamb, p.14)

A vignette demonstrating the effectiveness of newspapers and the value of a PSYOP element is the success of the Joint Interagency Task Force on the Former Regime Elements (JIATF-FRE) operation to capture Fadhil Ibrahim Habib al-Mashadani, a known financier for the insurgency. The Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) working for Multi National Force-Iraq and running the majority of newspapers in the urban areas of Iraq placed in the Baghdad newspapers pictures of al-Mashadani and detailed his actions against the people of Iraq. A local national reported al-Mashadani to local authorities, bringing the PSYOP advertisement with him. Al-Mashadani himself saw the ad and fled to a new safe house on the outskirts of Baghdad. His movement was noted by yet another local national who recognized him from the same JIATF-FRE product and reported him to authorities in accordance with the instructions provided in the newspaper article. Al-Mashadani was then captured by Coalition Forces.

This is a solid demonstration of what Dr Gordon McCormick describes in his theory of the "mystic diamond" as a "type one" activity, deriving information about the enemy from the population and attacking the enemy with that information (McCormick, lecture 1 Mar 07).
The psychological act or PSYACT exploiting al-Mashadani's capture based on information from the populace was to announce his capture during the TV show "Iraqi Justice" broadcast on the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). This show began as a result of a psychological operation target audience analysis that indicated the Iraqi's possessed an intense desire to see those responsible for the violence and bloodshed brought to justice. As a result, "Iraqi Justice" is the most popular TV show in Iraq (Repass, 2 Jun 04). This vignette clearly demonstrates the utility of psychological operations and a requirement for a unit responsible for planning and executing those operations.

At the Brigade level the same principles of gaining the respect of the population through an increased level of experience and capability to deal with the increased utility of information on the battlefield and the decentralization recommended by organizational contingency theory.

(Fig 1)
The appropriate level of support at the Brigade is a Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB) with a Deployable Audio Production System (DAPS), Fly Away Broadcast System (FABS), and Target Audience Analysis Detachment (TAAD). This provides the Brigade a radio development and broadcast ability to cover its area of operation. The Brigade radio is used to reinforce the general themes used by the Battalions. Repetition is key to getting a message to resonate with an audience. Additionally, the Brigade Commander must insure deeds and actions support words.

A PSYOP Battalion is required at this level to accomplish two critical tasks. First, the increased importance of synchronizing information and additional capability requires the experience of a lieutenant colonel, Battalion Commander. A Battalion Commander provides the Brigade Combat Team the requisite level of experience, capability, and responsibility to plan PSYACTS supporting the Brigade Commander's vision, execute the radio broadcasts in support of the subordinate battalion newspapers, and coordinate with the higher headquarters. The PSYOP Battalion Commander is the commander responsible to prevent "information fratricide" in the brigade's subordinate battalions, the brigade radio broadcasts, and higher level psychological operations.

The PSYOP Battalion commander is also responsible for what Ralph Baker identified as the mission essential task for information, to insure the radio broadcasts as well as your print material first be truthful and factual to build trust with your audience. Second, actions speak louder than words. Themes, should be simple and limited to two or three to influence your audience (Baker, p6).

Secondly, the battalion is the first level in the PSYOP structure with the requisite intelligence staff and target audience analysis detachment to assess the effectiveness of PSYOP programs and products. The Lamb report states unequivocally, "much more could be done to
systematically assess PSYOP effects through dedicated intelligence support and interrogation of target audiences" (Lamb, p. 23).

The PSYOP Battalion Commander supporting a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), would have the ability to conduct polling, product testing, establish focus groups, and market surveys to produce the measures of effectiveness to determine if the actions and words were achieving the desired target audience behavior.

The power of radio was displayed by the effects generated by the PSYOP radio station in Fallujah during the battle for that city in Feb 2005. The Marines, following Galula's principle of isolating the population from the guerrillas, effectively controlled the civil populace in Fallujah by instructing the non combatants on how and where they could leave the besieged city (Galula, p. 115). Once the populace was no longer the target audience to be influenced, PSYOP exploited the fissures between Abu Musab Zarqawi's foreign fighters and the Salafist Iraqi fighters; highlighting the fact that Zarqawi had run away from the impending battle in Fallujah and had left the Salafists to fight on their own. Figure 2 is a snapshot of the radio programming used to support operations in Fallujah.
The effectiveness of this program can be measured directly by counting the 70,000 people that followed the instructions issued via the PSYOP radio and the number actually carrying the leaflets advertising the radio station dropped over the city. Indirectly, the program can infer success by the number of Zarqawi foreign fighters found by the Marines who died of bullet wounds to the back of their heads fired from close range (Ceroli, 2004).

Additionally, the program’s effectiveness can be measured from intercepts of enemy communications that were best summed up by Mouwafak al-Rubaie, Iraqi National Security Advisor, stating during a press interview, "We have concrete information that a sharp division is now broiling between Iraqis waging a nationalist war and foreign Arabs spurred by militant Islam. They are more divided than ever. Zarqawi was of little help during the attack on Fallujah. Zarqawi
and his group fled Fallujah and let the Iraqis face the attack alone”. (al-Rubie, Feb 05 IMN interview). To properly plan, develop and produce the products, and execute this type of coordinated multi media PSYOP program, a hybrid PSYOP Battalion that possesses the planning and product development capabilities of a PSYOP Regional Battalion, the broadcast capability of a PSYOP Dissemination Battalion; and the loudspeaker capability of a PSYOP Tactical Battalion is required. The first level in the PSYOP structure that this capability resides is the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), currently allocated to the Joint Force Commander. In order to achieve information dominance or even parity, the PSYOP force must be organized to provide this capability below the level of the Joint Force Commander.

The appropriate level of psychological operations support and capability at the Division level is an Army PSYOP Task Force (ARPOTF) commanded by a Colonel. The capabilities the ARPOTF provides the Division Commander the ability to plan, coordinate and disseminate psychological operations at the tactical and operational level. Production and dissemination assets must include a Modular Print System (MPS), Deployable Audio Production Suite (DAPS), and Special Operations Media System - B (SOMS-B), which together provide the supported Division with a terrestrial TV and radio capability.

The Division level is a critical level in shaping the psychological sphere of warfare. It is at the cusp of the tactical and operational levels of warfare. It possesses organic air assets to disseminate PSYOP products and has the first general officer headquarters in the chain of command that possesses approval authority for new PSYOP products (Ceroli, 2004). To provide the Division Commander the advice and counsel for the psychological dimension of warfare requires an ARPOTF Commander with experience and seniority on par with the other major subordinate commanders. This would equate to a Colonel PSYOP Group Commander.
The ARPOTF Commander is responsible for the same basic missions as the PSYOP units supporting the brigade and battalion level. The ARPOTF Commander's task is to gain information dominance for the distinct purpose of gaining the respect and trust of the population. Another essential task for the ARPOTF Commander is to prevent information fratricide across the Division battle space.

Citing Ralph Baker's experience in Iraq, he applies the old adage of, "the one that arrives the 'firstest' with the 'mostest' usually wins, and this applies to information operations" (Baker, p.3) To gain the trust and respect of a populace, especially a hostile or at best neutral populace your facts must be timely, accurate, and consistent. Robert A. Cialdini in his book, "Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion" notes,

> Very often in making a decision about someone or something, we don't use all the relevant available information; we use, instead, only a single, highly representative piece of the total. And an isolated piece of information, even though it normally counsels us correctly, can lead us to clearly stupid mistakes - mistakes that, when exploited by clever others, leave us looking silly or worse (Cialdini p. 274)

Cialdini goes on to say, "When we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indifferent, distracted, or fatigued, we tend to focus on less of the information available to us (Cialdini p. 275).

The PSYOP Group/ARPOTF Commander is the commander responsible for insuring the facts are correct and disseminated in a timely manner. Colonel Baker had a similar experience in Iraq:

> Our brigade IO effort did not begin as a centrally coordinated program within my BCT but, rather, evolved as our understanding of the importance of synchronized IO activities matured. Initially, well-intentioned commanders, many of whom lacked clearly defined brigade guidance, had independently arrived at the same conclusion: they needed an IO plan. Each had therefore begun developing and executing his own IO effort...Unfortunately, because our activities were not coordinated and synchronized, we often disseminated contradictory information" (Baker, p3.).

Col Baker continues,
One of our major objectives was to earn the Iraqis’ trust and confidence. If we continued to contradict ourselves or provide inaccurate information, we would never achieve this goal...A major IO goal at the tactical and operational levels is getting the citizens in your AO to have trust and confidence in you” (Baker, p3.).

By providing a commander to accomplish this task the PSYOP community insures the accuracy of the message, the intrinsic value of getting our message out first, and takes the lead in the psychological "Battlefield Operating System" (BOS). Additionally, the PSYOP Commander frees the Division Commander to focus on a wider range of events by taking this task off his plate while keeping him informed and involved.

With the increased importance of using information in support of military operations the PSYOP Brigade or ARPOTF Commander would take the lead in what this paper labels the psychological battlefield operating system (PBOS). The Army has identified "major functions, performed by the force on the battlefield to successfully execute Army operations in order to accomplish military objectives directed by the operational commander" (FM 100-5, "Operations", 14 June 93). The battlefield operating systems include maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support. Taking into account the information revolution addressed by Dr John Arquilla’s, In *Athena’s Camp*, "Whether in military or social conflicts, all protagonists will soon be developing new doctrines, strategies, and tactics for swarming their opponents - with weapons or words, as circumstances require" and the realization that "information and knowledge are becoming the key elements of power", information should become its own Battlefield Operating System (Arquilla, p.1).

Establishing the Psychological Operations Battlefield Operating System (PBOS) and establishing responsibility for it at the Division level addresses the issue of "Leadership priority" identified in the Lamb report as flag officers view psychological operations as "faith based" (Lamb,
p. 14). Marshal Foch said in World War I that it required 14,000 casualties to train a general officer in maneuver warfare. By supporting a Division Commander with a PSYOP Brigade/Group Commander and placing the responsibility for synchronizing the PSYOP BOS with the other battlefield operating systems provides an opportunity for a Division Commander to gain the experience necessary to train him in psychological warfare. This synchronization does not occur at the present due to the lack of PSYOP experience at the division level. With only a Tactical PSYOP Company, commanded by a Major, supporting a division, there is not the experience or manpower available to conduct the necessary coordination.

The other issue identified in the Lamb report that can be addressed at the Division level is the criticism that slow or unresponsive product approval process renders many products irrelevant. It was my experience as the JPOTF Commander in CENTCOM from Jun 2003 to Apr 2005 that the problem was two fold. The first problem was a training and experience issue. Young, inexperienced PSYOP officers would request approval for every new PSYOP product they developed instead of looking at the pre approved themes. By pushing more experienced officers and capability to lower levels we can alleviate this training issue. Again this goes back to Dr Lamb's issue of flag officer attitudes. Since they have not been trained on psychological operations, they do not realize every operation has an approved themes list and a list of themes to avoid. Unless you are attacking a political figure, a bordering nation, or violating the Geneva Convention, chances are the theme of the product has already been approved.

The most difficult part of the slow approval issue is what this paper believes should be called a slow program approval process. While a PSYOP product is a single print or broadcast product, a PSYOP program is the overarching PSYOP plan designed to induce a specific behavior from a specific target audience. The PSYOP program identifies the psychological operations
objectives (POs) and supporting objectives (SPOs), the conceptualization of multiple series of PSYOP products, the construction of specific product prototypes, as well as recommended actions to influence the beliefs of the target audiences all intended to illicit a desired behavior (FM 3-05-301, p 1-3). During my tenure as the JPOTF Commander, approval for PSYOP programs was held at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). This issue may be what Dr Lamb refers to as the lack of national level themes. Regardless, with the approval authority for PSYOP programs residing in the Pentagon, PSYOP program approval is not timely (St John, Apr 07).

By supporting the Division with an experienced PSYOP Colonel as a Commander, the ARPOTF Cdr will have the experience to understand the issues at the DoD and Joint Staff level. He will also have access to the Division Commander who would be required to influence an issue at that level. The current support of a PSYOP Major at the division level simply does not provide the experience to deal with issues of this complexity.

The argument supporting the requirement to support a Division with a PSYOP Bde level commander is the case of the defiled Koran in Guantanamo Bay. In May 2005 Newsweek published a story claiming an "American interrogator flushed a copy of the Koran down a toilet" (Washington Post, 17 May 05, p. A03). Agitators began to foment civil unrest in Kabul and outside the American Base in Baghram. Being proactive to prevent a growing disturbance, the CJTF 76 Commander looked at his PSYOP Commander to use the Afghan-wide radio system "Merlin" to "calm the situation", only to find that the radio content for "Merlin" was developed and controlled by the PSYOP Group Commander at Ft Bragg, NC. Unfortunately, the Group Commander knew nothing about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. Due to the difference in time zones and work schedules, "Merlin" content did not address the Koran issue for 72 hrs (JPOTF sitrep, 21 May
The civil unrest grew into riots and at least 16 people were killed (Washington Post, 17 May 05). By that time COMCJTF76 lost faith in the Merlin radio system and ordered all PSYOP products to be produced with organic assets already located at Baghram Airbase.

The PSYOP community missed an opportunity in the Afghan case study to demonstrate its effectiveness to a flag officer. If the CJTF Commander had been provided a PSYOP Brigade Commander, the riots may well have been quelled or even prevented by radio broadcasts of the facts surrounding the incident. There would have been less damage to the Coalition's respect amongst the Afghan people, and a flag officer would have had an experience with psychological operations was positive and not "faith based".

The psychological operations requirements at the operational level of the Corps or Joint Task Force level continues to focus on gaining the respect of the populace but in a much wider region. The Corps must also focus on sustaining the support of Coalition and partner nations. With this wider and outward focus the experience level required is at the general officer level commanding a Combined Joint PSYOP Task Force (CJPOTF). Additionally the assets the CJPOTF brings to the fight are a Theater Media Production Center (TMPC), Media Operations Center (MOC), Modular Print System (MPS), and a portion of the Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) providing video, radio and print development and production.

As the synchronizer of the PSYOP Battlefield Operating System (PBOS) a flag officer would have prevented the case of the Lincoln Group "Information" fratricide. As a flag officer, the staff section responsible for the Lincoln Group, also known as Iraqex would have had to prebrief the JPOTF Commander on their plan to pay newspapers already owned and operated under the guidance of the PSYOP Task Force. The newspapers had been established by the PSYOP Task Force under owners friendly to the Coalition. Using Cialdini's principal of reciprocation, the
owners and editors operated on thematic guidance from Coalition PSYOP where the host nation staff would write articles supporting Coalition objectives using the local dialect and colloquialisms (Cialdini, p17-19). Iraqis, being entrepreneurs, were only too happy to get paid by the Lincoln Group to place articles already written in their newspaper, even if they were poorly written (Marx, pp 51-59).

The first word the PSYOP Task Force and MNF-I Strategic Communications had of the Lincoln Group placing articles in local newspapers was when the story broke in the press. With a flag officer commanding the CJPOTF, this fratricide would have been prevented with a simple pre-brief.

The production capability at the operational level must be "industry standard" quality. The TMPC with support from the Media Operations Center, a fixed site at Ft Bragg, NC, provides the JTF with a commercial broadcast production capability and allows the JTF to disseminate products via satellite TV. Satellite TV is critical to shaping opinions in the Middle East.

A 2004 study conducted by Bates Pan-Gulf, a Middle East advertising firm, for the JPOTF revealed during Operation Desert Storm that CNN was the only station capable of disseminating to the entire region. The remaining stations were State run terrestrial stations with limited range. Since the mid 90's the growth of satellite TV was explosive rising from none to over 200 stations (BPG, p. 8). To compete in this market, it is essential to produce industry standard broadcast quality products. Additionally, the most efficient means to compete in this market is to purchase air time on existing satellite stations.

A general officer as the CJPOTF Commander is required due to the authorities required to shape a regional audience and its associated cost, the experience level required to develop a
"marketing" plan of this scope, the politics of operating in a coalition environment, and establishing an equitable commander to commander relationship with the joint force commander.

Satellite TV gives the CJPOTF a regional dissemination capability that requires regional authorities. The greatest factor limiting the conduct of psychological operations in support of OEF/OIF was the limited authorities approved by the Joint Staff. For these operations, PSYOP was limited to within the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq only. This was a significant mistake on the part of the Joint Staff that prevented PSYOP from conducting their core mission of counter propaganda. With satellite TV broadcasts on Al Jazeera and Al Arabia disseminating hostile and at times blatantly false information that inflamed the "Arab Street", psychological operations did not have the authorities to counter the false information shaping attitudes outside Afghanistan and Iraq.

A General Officer as the CJPOTF Commander would have the trust of the Joint Force Commander, experience with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and interpersonal relationships to deal directly with the Joint Staff and the US Ambassadors to target audience countries to gain the authorities required for the successful prosecution of a counter propaganda supporting plan.

A General Officer, with Pentagon experience, may have been much more successful in gaining the regional authorities finally granted in 2005 necessary to shape the Operational Commander's area of influence. Dr Lamb notes in his 2003 study of psychological operations that, "serious consideration should be given to creating a flag officer for PSYOP to support the commander" (Lamb, p.31).

Additionally, the expense of a regional PSYOP plan to shape the attitudes of the regional populace requires the influence of a flag officer. By comparing the marketing campaigns of Microsoft, Citicorp, and Lemay International, the JPOTF determined in order to establish what is known as your "brand", the initial cost is sixteen to twenty million dollars for the first year and
dropping to 6 million per year thereafter. This level of funding buys the "brand" coverage of the entire Middle East. It also delivers the "brand" to eighty percent of the 13 to 26 year old male target audience five times per week. This provides the 1200 group reference points (GRP) required to establish the "brand" in the subconscious of the target audience. The GRP requirement drops to 400 after a one year period and can be purchased for six million in subsequent years (JPOTF brief to CENTCOM, 7 Feb 05).

In order to gain that level of funding for a sustained period, a flag officer with significant Pentagon experience is required. The JPOTF initiated the regional psychological operations initiative in 2004. The initiative was finally approved for execution the beginning of 2007 and is still waiting funding.

The third area establishing the flag officer requirement is operational experience. The experience in marketing and mass communications required for this level of psychological operations planning is not taught in any military education institution. It is only obtained as a Fellowship or training with industry. Even the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for Information Operations does not offer any courses in marketing or mass communication theory nor do offer a degree in either discipline.

An additional requirement for a flag officer exists due to Coalition operations. Operating as a CJPOTF, the psychological operations commander will be required to coordinate with Multi-National Forces to synchronize themes and PSYACTS, insure authorities of Coalition Nations are harmonious with US authorities and brief operations to coalition nations Ministries of Defense. Additionally, a flag officer brings to the table a greater worldview, understanding of foreign policy, and clout to deal with the international issues that occur at this level.
Lastly, a flag officer provides a more equitable Commander to Commander relationship at the Joint Task Force level. LTG Sanchez was the only JTF Commander I had a one on one relationship with during my two years as the JPOTF Commander in Iraq. Gen Sanchez had a solid grasp of the psychological aspect of warfare. He was one of the few flag officers that provided personal direction to the JPOTF, resourced the JPOTF to create an Iraq wide dissemination capability, and insisted the US Embassy measure PSYOP effect through their on going polling. The limiting factor in this Commander to Commander relationship was the exponential experience difference between a Lieutenant Colonel, Battalion Commander and a Lieutenant General, Corps Commander. In 2006, the Commander of USSOCOM requested a PSYOP officer be selected for flag rank to address this and other the issues identified in this paper (St John, Apr 07).

Two operational vignettes that demonstrate the effectiveness of psychological operations at the operational level are the Afghan Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Reconciliation (DDR) and the program separating Abu Musab Zarqawi from the "Arab Street".

The DDR plan develop by Dr Eshan Entezar of the 4th PSYOP Group's Strategic Studies Group (SSD) was coordinated by the JPOTF Military Information Support Team (MIST) through the US Embassy in Afghanistan with the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai. Dr Entezar had direct access to President Karzai due to their childhood friendship. The purpose of the DDR was to assist Mr Karzi consolidate the central government's power base using what Joseph Nye describes as "soft power" (Nye, International Herald Tribune, 10 Jan 03). By attracting and persuading the regional warlords to adopt President Karzi’ goals, he was able to strengthen the central government and remove the threat of powerful regional warlords. The DDR accomplished this objective through a series of actions starting with the least influential warlord and working its way to the strongest. The actions included providing political offices to former warlords, bringing demobilizing soldiers from
Warlord armies into the Afghan Army and Police forces, and an amnesty program, all designed to promote National Reconciliation. The measure of effectiveness (MOE) for this program is the coalition government built under Karzai's leadership and continuing today.

The DDR program demonstrates the need to synchronize actions and words for an exponential effect. The point of this vignette is to demonstrate the utility of psychological operations, but more importantly to demonstrate the requirement for access to decision makers.

Without the interpersonal relationship between President Karzai and Dr Entezar, the DDR would have not have been implemented. In the future the PSYOP community cannot rely on interpersonal relationships to conduct effective operational PSYOP. A flag officer commanding the Combined PSYOP Task Force provides the access required to conduct operational and strategic psychological operations.

The second vignette demonstrating the requirement for a flag officer to conduct operational/strategic psychological operations is the PSYOP plan to change the Iraqi and "Arab Street's" perception of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ). In the words of BG Mark Kimmitt, Director of Strategic Communications for MNF-I, "this program was the most successful strategic psychological operation planned and executed by the JPO TF" (MNF-I brief, 7 Oct 04).

At the time Zarqawi had earned the reputation of the Robin Hood of the Arab Street. He was the only figure effectively standing against the Coalition. This brought him significant support in the Sunni community and the Arab Street especially after Saddam, "the Lion of the Arab World", surrendered without a fight to Coalition forces. The operation against AMZ began with the interception of the letter pledging allegiance to Bin Laden and Al Qaida. The operation consisted of psychological "words and deeds". It was synchronized with the matrix depicted in figure 3.
**Zarqawi Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>POC</th>
<th>Suspense</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>Press Conference</td>
<td>PAO (CPA/CJTF-7)</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Weekly (Reseed</td>
<td>Published after Press Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPA Press Release</td>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Monthly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CJTF-7 PSA</td>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper Adverts</td>
<td></td>
<td>D +1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Inject on IMN, IQD</td>
<td>CPA PSA</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>2 Day for 7 days,</td>
<td>Delivered after Press Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inject on SOMS-B Local Radio</td>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Then 1 Daily</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-Face</td>
<td>Tribal, political and religious leader</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>TP's in FRAGO issued in adv MSCW/TPTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engagements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populace engagements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Border Patrols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Press Conference</td>
<td>PAO (CPA/CJTF-7)</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSA/Report on IMN</td>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handouts</td>
<td>Leaflets</td>
<td>CJTF-7 FSE</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepared in advance for circulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wanted Posters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudspeakers</td>
<td>TPT LSAs</td>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>PSYOP Product</td>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>Reseed Monthly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Fig 3)

The information aspect consisted of the JPOTF exploiting every act of violence against the Iraqi People perpetrated by AMZ. Through a series of OPEDs and political cartoons written by our Iraqi writers, the psychological task force was able to engage Zarqawi in a dialogue as he responded via internet postings with his manifesto stating he did not kill fellow Muslims. The cartoon at figure 4 was one of a series of cartoons publish in the JPOTF owned newspapers and quickly picked up in numerous regional media outlets appearing in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, and UAE to name a few.
The information campaign also consisted of satellite TV public service announcements (PSAs). The PSAs subtly and indirectly depicted Zarqawi's violence on Iraqi's to include Sunni and Shia alike. These commercials aired on Al Jazeera, Al Arabia, and the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) through airtime bought by an intermediary in Dubai's Media City and broadcast throughout the Arab World. The story board for a TIPS line PSA recreating a well known and gruesome attack perpetrated in al Hilla by the AMZ Network is depicted in figure 5.
IRAQ TIPS HOTLINE: 60 SECS TVC  (ARABIC & KURDISH)

Creative strategy:

Our aim is to tap into the ordinary Iraqi who desperately wants to see an end to the violence and further destruction of his beloved country. This is compounded with the daily slaughter of his/her fellow countrymen.

The message is clear. Terrorism is the warfare of weak and desperate cowards, perpetuating violence for a cause they cannot win by conventional means.

The objective is to educate the ordinary Iraqi in the street to take action against the inhumane and senseless killing of Iraqi people by terrorists, and not the so-called “freedom fighters.”

For the future of Iraq, it's your duty as a human being to help rid Iraq of the terrorists who kill Iraqi citizens.

For Iraq’s sake, open your eyes. Be vigilant. Report any suspecting terrorist activity.

Call the TIPS HOTLINE. It’s a confidential and trustworthy organization put in place to gather information to capture terrorists.

Concept:

The aim is to indirectly pin-point the HVTs we are seeking. These HVTs are responsible for the major terrorist attacks in Iraq killing innocent Iraqis, creating mayhem and political unrest, disrupting the democratization process. The campaign idea is to recreate the most remembered scenes of recent terrorist attacks in Iraq and establish the fact that the terrorists are targeting innocent Iraqi citizens and their acts are not acts of courage or nationalistic honor. These are cowardly acts by cowards, who are continuously fracturing Iraq’s security and social stability. They are in fact, ‘anti-Iraq.’ Therefore as concerned citizens we must act to put an end to their crimes. We must assist the MOI by sharing critical information. That’s the only way to create a better future for us, our children and our Iraq.
We open on a typical bustling Iraqi market place at morning time. There are the familiar sounds of market traders and customers chatting and bartering.

A trader walks by pushing a trolley, laden with boxes of vegetables.
Another trader pulls up the shutters from his shop. Another can be seen hanging baskets and other goods outside his shop.

Camera pans up to show the busy market getting crowded by the minute.
Frame: 5

Cut to a high angle shot of a dimly lit back-street garage. Camera slowly pans down to show a man tampering under the bonnet of the car.

Frame: 6

From inside the garage, we cut to a lower angle shot of a man getting into a car.

The car door slams shut.
Frame: 7

Cut to the silent atmosphere inside the car. A trembling hand adjusting the rear view mirror. We catch a glimpse of the side of the man's head in the mirror.

The mirror shows the perspiration on the man's forehead.

Frame: 8

Cut to a trembling hand inserting key into ignition.

Shot of hand turning key in the ignition.
Frame: 9

Cut to trembling hands gripping the steering wheel. Another pair of hands appear and tie the gripping hands to the steering wheel.

Shot of hands on steering wheel.

Frame: 10

Cut to the car slowly exiting the garage.

The man pushing a trolley, laden with boxes of vegetables is viewed through the front windsreen of the moving car.
The car picks up speed and accelerates through the crowded market. We view people through the windscreen of the moving car.

Frame: 12

TERRORISM. DON'T LET IT BE YOUR FUTURE.

The scene freezes. Super appears in the windscreen space. SUPER: TERRORISM. DON'T LET IT BE YOUR FUTURE.
Fade to close-up shot of a phone and a hand dials a number.

Frame: 14

CALL
000 0000

Super: CALL 000 0000
MINISTRY OF INTERIORS unit appears below
Cut back to car in the market scene. The car continues to speed towards the people. Suddenly two police cars intercept it. Picture fades as hurried footsteps of the police are heard.

Frame: 16

FOR IRAQ’S SAKE...
OPEN YOUR EYES.

Super: FOR IRAQ’S SAKE... OPEN YOUR EYES.
VO: For Iraq’s sake... Open your eyes.
The actions supporting this program were the creation of the Iraqi TV program "Iraqi Justice" and
the National TIPs line.

"Iraqi Justice" was the product of a target audience analysis that revealed a desire to see
criminals and "perpetrators of violence" publicly punished. This desire transcended Sunni, Shia,
and Kurdish ethnicities and stemmed from Saddam's public punishments for criminals (Ceroli,
2003).

The PSYOP Task Force was unable to get this concept approved by the JTF-7 lawyers. This
PSYACT required the influence of then, MG Petreaus. MG Petreaus briefed the concept to the
Iraqi Ministry of Justice who developed the concept with minimal US PSYOP assistance into the
most watched TV show in Iraq (Repass, 2 Jun 04).

An additional PSYACT supporting the Zarqawi program and linked to "Iraqi Justice" was
the establishment of the National TIPs line. The TIPs line established by the PSYOP Task Force
personnel supporting the American Embassy in Iraq provided the most scientific measures of
psychological effectiveness to date. The call center allowed Iraqis to anonymously call in with
information on suspicious or criminal activity. The calls were answered by Iraqis operators trained
by American FBI and Treasury agents on how to handle the calls. The information gained from the
calls was sent to the Combined Coordination Center (CCC) where the decision was made who
would take action. Some actions went to the Iraqi Army or Police, others went to Coalition forces
for action. GEN Peter Pace described the TIPs line as the greatest measure of effectiveness in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Pace, Meet the Press interview, 5 Mar 06).

Advertising the TIPs line during and after "Iraqi Justice" was critical to the success of the
TIPs line and a clear indicator of a successful psychological operation. The commercials told the
Iraqis to make their Nation better they had to take action. The action they were to take was to call
the TIPs line with information on suspicious activities. The TIPs line had been advertised in print and radio broadcast media prior to the TV commercials. The night of the first TV commercial spot during "Iraqi Justice" the number of call to the TIPs line increased 200%. Figures 6 and 7 depict a snap shot of the effectiveness of the TIPs line and in turn the psychological operation that generated the program. It was a call to this TIP line that eventually led to bombing raid that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

(Fig 6)

(Fig 7)
This PSYOP program coordinated with an External Information Plan (EIP) through MNF-I, the US Embassy in Iraq, US Treasury Dept, the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, and Iraqi National Security Advisor was by definition strategic. JP 3-53 defines strategic PSYOP as:

International information activities conducted by US Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts. (JP 3-53, p. xi).

The effect was measurable in Iraq by the fissures it widened in the Iraqi Insurgency:

As of early Jan 2005, Salafist elements were going to clash with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi loyalists in Ramadi on or about 05 Jan. These elements have historically been allied in their resistance to MNF-I. The reason for the dispute was Salafist frustration over Zarqawi supporters complete disregard for the lives of innocent Iraqis. The Salafists insisted that the Iraqi police (IPS) and the Iraqi National Guard (ING) be allowed to continue to function in their capacities, maintaining order in the city. The Salafists planned to provide armed escort for salary payments to the IPS and ING from Baghdad to Ramadi. Zarqawi supporters; however, did not wish to relent in their assaults on the IPS and ING. Tribes in Ramadi supported the Salafists’ view, that Zarqawi has gone too far in attacking IPS and ING. (MNF-I situation report).

Additionally, Mouwafak al-Rubaie Iraqi National Security Advisor commenting on the PSYOP program stated,

We have concrete information that a sharp division is now broiling between Iraqis waging a nationalist war and foreign Arabs spurred by militant Islam. They are more divided than ever. Zarqawi was of little help during the attack on Fallujah. Zarqawi and his group fled Fallujah and let the Iraqis face the attack alone.

An open letter to Osama Bin Laden from the Islamic Army in Iraq has,

demanded that the al-Qaeda led alliance reform its ways and stop its attacks on Sunni Muslims and rival jihadi groups". The letter continues stating al-Qaeda "went too far by killing 30 mujahideen brothers" and criticizes al-Qaeda for extorting money from the wealthy, killing civilians, demanding women cover their faces and calling anyone who opposes them "infidels" (al Badil, 2 Apr 07).

A recent article by Brian Bennett cites,
The Anbar Salvation Council, fed up with al-Qaeda's indifference to civilian deaths and hard line enforcement of sharia law in their hamlets, and has been given a free hand to push the network out of Anbar (Bennett, Time, 6 Apr 07).

The sheik heading the Anbar Salvation Council stated after the council killed four al-Qaeda operatives, "our work continues until we finish them all" (Bennett, Time, 6 Apr 07).

Internationally, the perception of Zarqawi moved from the only man capable of standing against the coalition to the man responsible for the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims around the world. At one point AMZ was warned in a letter from Amin al-Zawahiri to stop posting executions on the internet and slaughter of innocent civilians. Zarqawi was no longer the "Robin Hood of the Arab World". He was now reviled internationally, and at odd with the organization he pledged his allegiance to in October 2004 (Seattle Times, 8 Jun 06).

This strategic PSYOP program demonstrates what Joint Publication 3.0 defines as:

Planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audience to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objective. (JP 3.0, p. III-35).

The Zarqawi PSYOP program was successful due the direct involvement of two flag officers and the External Information Plan (EIP).

Applying the lessons learned at the JTF level to the Combatant Commander level, the capability required is a Combined Joint Psychological Task Group (CJPOTG) commanded by a flag officer. The media capabilities required are satellite television and internet content. The CJPOTG would be supported by the Media Operations Center (MOC), the 4th PSYOP Group's Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) at Ft Bragg, NC, and the commercial production capability of USSOCOM's Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE). The responsibilities of the CJPOTG would be to develop the strategic "marketing" plan to "sell" the regional audience the Combatant Commander
and US Government's values, intentions, goals and end state. The CJPOTG must also possess the capability to design and contract regional polls measuring the attitudes and beliefs of the regional populace.

Due to what Dr Chris Lamb describes as a historical "lack of national-level themes to guide message formulation" a flag officer is critical as the CJPOTG develops the strategic marketing and advertising plan to inform selected target audiences of the combatant commander's objectives (Lamb, p. 10). In the process the CJPOTG's external information plan will generate and recommend the National level themes.

A flag officer commanded CJPOTG is the appropriate level of strategic leadership required to develop a supporting plan for a combatant commander’s campaign plan. A two star is required for the skill set of operational experience, the professional knowledge on how to coordinate at that level and the political vision required as plans at this level may generate US policy.

As the owner of the PBOS, the CJPOTG provides the Combatant Commander the single commander at the strategic level dedicated to the task and responsible for “telling the whole message”, determining “who gets credit”, and “how do we leverage the situation” (Altshuler, Sep 06).

Additionally, the Joint PSYOP Task Group (JPO) would be responsible for developing and executing the Theater PSYOP plan and corresponding External Information Plan (EIP). This HQ would also be responsible with coordinating supporting actions thru the J3 with subordinate component commanders.

Combatant Commands (COCOM) rarely request Interagency Strategic Communications (SC). COCOMs do not understand the process and assume they will receive no support. Additionally, the Interagency does not understand or have little experience supporting COCOMs
(Jones, 21 Sep 06). Therefore, the Joint PSYOP Task Group, develops the EIP to request support from the interagency system.

The EIP recommends National level themes if none are present, coordinates and synchronizes existing themes, messages and proposes interagency or allied actions. It creates synergy among participants and accesses external conduits of influence and actions. This will forge a vital link between the diplomatic, informational, political, economic, and military entities of the US Government, key allies and partner nations. Most importantly, the EIP, frames the message first. Given the Army adage of "being there first, with the most, wins" gives the Combatant Command an intrinsic value and puts the adversary on the defensive.

Figure 8 depicts the External Information Plan developed and implemented by the 4th Psychological Operations Group to support Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

**Operational Example: Haiti External Information Plan (EIP)**

**Objectives**

*.... Prioritized by Phase... Submitted in advance... Used daily to synchronize interagency, DOD and JTF actions*

- **Phase I – Pre-intervention**
  - (a) Set expectations (b) Demonstrate US resolve

- **Phase II – Intervention**
  - (a) Develop foreign support (b) Identify mission objectives

- **Phase III – Steady State**
  - (a) Restore public security (b) Identify project parameters (c) Identify Haitian Military and Police reorganization and other reforms

- **Phase IV – Redeployment**
  - (a) Publicize Host Nation successes (b) Engender public confidence in, Prepare for and Facilitate transition plans to UN operation
### Phase I

**PSYOP Objective 1:** Set expectations for future US/UN/UNOS actions and demonstrate resolve.

**Target Audience:** De facto Haitian military and political leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Series of Public Statements</td>
<td>NCA, UN, OAS, DOS, “4 Friends”</td>
<td>US goals clearly defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Set Deadline for Political Resolution</td>
<td>NCA, UNSC, DOS, Robert Malini</td>
<td>Time is Running Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSYOP Action 1.1:** Increase the frequency of public statements relating international determination to restore representative government in Haiti.

**Target Audience:** De facto Haitian military and political leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Series of Public Statements</td>
<td>NCA, UN, OAS, DOS “4 Friends” (US, Canada, France, and Venezuela)</td>
<td>The US/UN/UNOS is committed to restoring representative government in Haiti. The defacto powers are to blame for continuing misery and human rights violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Set Deadline for Political Resolution</td>
<td>NCA, UNSC, DOS, Robert Malini</td>
<td>Time is Running Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rationale:** Economic misery and human rights violations are increasing in Haiti. Public condemnation by the above actors should increase in intensity and frequency to match current trends in Haiti.

**Description:** Any opportunity to make these public statements in person rather than simply in press guidance should be exploited. Press conference and radio and TV interviews should be used.

**Cautions:** The person issuing these statements should state that increased US concern about Haiti derives from conditions in the country, not from a sense of increasing US belligerence.

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### Phase I (Continued)

**PSYOP Objective 2:** Demonstrate US resolve.

**Target Audience:** De facto Haitian military and political leaders (primary); other concerned groups (secondary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Show of Force</td>
<td>USACOM, USAF</td>
<td>Demonstrate US capabilities and resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Amphibious exercises</td>
<td>US forces at NAVBASGTMO</td>
<td>Time is Running Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSYOP Action 2.1:** Flyops from GTMO Naval Base to within sight of Port-au-Prince and for amphibious exercises with neighboring nations (but not the Dominican Republic).

**Target Audience:** De facto Haitian military, Haitian politicians (primary); other Haitians and foreigners (secondary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Amphibious exercises</td>
<td>US forces at NAVBASGTMO</td>
<td>Time is Running Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rationale:** De facto Haitian authorities’ awareness of unusual military activity in the region may encourage a greater willingness to support a political solution. Another possibility is that US military activity may be an excuse to trigger international instability that would make an intervention easier to justify to the world. The US would go in better prepared and with greater justification.

**Description:** A Press Pool or PAO personnel at all levels can publicize the exercise option. US camera crews and foreign reporters in Port-au-Prince would quickly pick up and transmit news about American overflights.

**Cautions:** This exercise option should not occur until just before Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It should place the FAdH and their armed auxiliaries on a high state of alert. It would be better to let the implications sink in for awhile or to conduct repeated exercises that will put Haitian officials off their guard if they do not step down.
**Phase II**

**PSYOP Objective 1:** Develop Foreign Support  
**Target Audiences:** The leadership and public in selected nations around the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Conduct diplomatic and public relations offensive aimed at regional nations and OAS | DOS, USA, OOD | US Forces are in Haiti only to restore order and democracy  
US is acting to protect the people of Haiti and the region  
US forces are not in Haiti to establish a permanent military presence |

**PSYOP Action 1.1:** Conduct diplomatic and public relations offensive regional nations and the OAS  
**Target Audiences:** The leadership and public in regional nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Show of Force | USA, US, US forces at NAF/EBT/NG, PAO, US Regional Embassies | The US forces are present only to provide conditions that will ensure the reestablishment of stability and democratic government in Haiti.  
The US is acting to protect the best interests of the people of Haiti and the international community. |
| 2. Amphibious exercises | USA, US, US forces at NAF/EBT/NG, PAO, US Regional Embassies | |

**Rationale:** Regional and OAS support for the operation will add legitimacy to US military operations and may help to reduce internal resistance in Haiti during this phase.

**Description:** Have US Country Teams in the region marshal their resources to emphasize these themes in both their public and private pronouncements. They should aggressively seek out opportunities to place the message before the local public, schedule news conferences, and ensure the theme appears in the local press.

**Cautions:** Regional nervousness about the operation and rationalized propaganda about US intervention and “Big Stick” or gunboat diplomacy are likely to appear. Fitting hard on the themes mentioned above and emphasizing collective regional responsibility to solving the Haitian dilemma are the best way to overcome or prevent official and public hostility.

**Phase III**

**PSYOP Objective 1:** Restore public security  
**Target Audiences:** All audiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Emphasize impartial use of force</td>
<td>PAO, DoJ, USM</td>
<td>US will respond with force to rioting or resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identify/deceive well-known moles and other resisters who are in custody</td>
<td>Same, US will respond</td>
<td>Encourage Haitians to restore security by identifying resisters and criminals to JTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promote, through all available information conduits, the desire to improve the human rights situation</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>US concerns about human rights and dignity in Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSYOP Action 1.3:** Promote, through all available information conduits, an appreciation that the US is strongly motivated by the desire to improve the human rights situation of all Haitians  
**Target Audiences:** All

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Same for OBJ 1 above</td>
<td>USA, US, PAD, Haitian and US journalists</td>
<td>The US is deeply concerned about human rights and human dignity in Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rationale:** Human rights violations have plagued the Haitian body politic for years. The army and police on one side, and Aristide supporters on the other are guilty of human rights excesses. The US is committed to treating Haitians with respect and to helping ensure that Haitians respect each others' rights. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of human rights in troop briefings, and the theme should be highlighted to outside audiences as a means to bolster support.

**Description:** In policy statements, briefings at VM and DSS, and press releases to international media, the US should emphasize, as a motive for intervention, the importance of Haitian human rights and the need to correct abuses in the country. Country teams can also support this theme in their public statements and private conversations. Haitians and foreign audiences should be made aware that establishing a safe environment in which human rights can flourish is a high priority JTF mission.

**Cautions:** The apparent lack of concern - or at least lack of action - by the US on the issue of human rights in Haiti may be raised. Information managers should also be prepared to answer allegations that the US itself demonstrated a lack of regard for human rights in its efforts to interdict the outflow of illegal immigrants.
The process for submitting the EIP would be simultaneous submission to both CJCS and SECDEF and subsequently into the interagency. The EIP would spell out clear prioritized objectives, target audiences, actions, actors, and themes (Jones, 21 Sep 06).

Using the Zarqawi program as a model, an EIP in the Central Command area of responsibility could be developed to bring dissemination assets outside of DOD and the USG to serve as the key communicators in the fight against Islamic extremists. This is based on the fact that a good part of the world sees the US in a less than favorable light. Allies and partner nations must be in the lead of the communications effort in order for the USG to have the greatest effect. The purpose of this External Information Plan would be to create opportunities for the anti al-Qaeda debate to expand, exploit UBL visions of Islamic Rule, exploit Muslim on Muslim violence created by al-Qaeda, and to clearly state American goals and intentions.

Some proposed actions recommended in this EIP would be to “create space for the anti extremist/anti AQ debate” to flourish. An example of this is Al Jazeera talk show hosted by “Sheikh Qaradawy” (Gregg, 15 Mar 07). Another opportunity to gain the desired behavior is to place that behavior in an Egyptian or Lebanese soap opera. If you truly want to change a behavior in a culture the place to accomplish that task is in the popular soap operas (Levitz, Feb 04). The third opportunity that is not currently being explored is promoting the desired behaviors in popular regional music.

There is strong criticism of the extremist ideology in the Islamic world, however those that condemn extremism are also often anti USG. When the USG openly supports a moderate voice, that voice loses credibility (Robinson, 13 Feb 07). By "creating the space" for the debate to flourish with partner nations, the moderate voices are not receiving American support.
Using an EIP coordinated through the Interagency process and synchronized with allies and partner nations, to promote the anti al-Qaeda debate and promoting the desired behaviors Centcom supports the CJCS plan for Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CJCS, 7 Jun 05). This would insure extremist ideology remains out of the mainstream and eventually dies.

Additionally, an EIP could also take the offensive with information against AQ in both the White and Grey spectrum. Extremists are extremely vulnerable in the two areas. UBL and Zawahiri avoid stating their vision of the “Caliphate” is a Taliban-like Islamic Nation under strict sharia law. They deliberately keep this out of their public statements as it would detract from their support base. By publicizing their vision using Bin Laden's and Zawahiri's own writings a coordinated psychological operations plan may cause additional fissures in al-Qaeda's support and increase the volume of the ongoing debate against their extremist ideology.

The third area of exploitation is Muslim on Muslim violence. The JPOTG would continue to link UBL to AMZ and exploit AMZs beheadings and other Muslim violence. The EIP should also stress the fact that AMZ took action while UBL and Zawahiri continue to hide behind statements.

Using Grey and Black PSYOP, the JPOTG using an EIP would sow distrust into the AQ network similar to the efforts against Abu Nidal organization.

Lastly the JPOTG's EIP needs to explain US goals in the war on terror. If we do not explain our goals, extremists will explain them in their terms to the target audience. The goal would be to separate extremists from their support base and insure extremist ideology remained out of the mainstream.

To measure the strategic effect of the EIPs "words and deeds" the CJPOTG would also be responsible for establishing base line polling in the target area. This polling provides a start point
on local attitudes toward the host nation government, USG, and US Objectives. This polling must be continued over time to see the effect of the campaign.

It may be possible to use the many polls that currently exist or one may be specifically developed to support the EIP’s objectives.

In addition to developing the psychological operations supporting plan the JPOTG would insure the supporting plan is specified in paragraph 3 of the campaign plan.

In conclusion with an Army that has downsized from 960,000 to 485,000 personnel, the military can no longer rely on mass alone to achieve US military and diplomatic objectives. By restructuring current psychological operations forces to provide greater capability and more experienced personnel to lower echelon military forces the US Military can take greater advantage of the information revolution enabling military commanders to achieve their objectives with less mass. This capability expansion provides not only a greater ability to conduct core psychological operations; it also provides the maneuver commander a headquarters responsible for synchronizing the Psychological Battlefield Operating System (PBOS), and insuring "deeds match words". This increased capability must be organic to the maneuver commander and located in Theater to provide timely and accurate support. Lastly, through the use of the external information plan (EIP), psychological operations can take the offensive with information by establishing historically lacking national level themes or at the minimum begin the debate.
FOOTNOTES


3. Army Regulation 570-4, Manpower and Equipment Control, Manpower Management, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC 8 Feb 06, p. 20.


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14. Ceroli, Michael A., Joint PSYOP Task Force Commander, Jun 2003 - Jun 2005. As the Marines cleared the city of Fallujah they discovered numerous enemy casualties shot in the back of the head at close range. Sensitive sources identified the enemy casualties as Zarqawi's foreign fighters who were killed by Sunni Nationalists as the Marines entered the city.

15. al-Rubie, Mouwafak, Iraqi National Security Advisor, interview, Iraqi Media Network, Feb 05


19. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


26. St John, Christopher, Col (Ret), Commander, Joint PSYOP Task Force, interview, 29 Apr 07.


34. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, briefing to Central Command, Tampa, FL, 7 Feb 05, slide 1.

35. St John, Christopher, Col (Ret), Commander, Joint PSYOP Task Force, interview, 29 Apr 07.


37. Multi National Force -Iraq, briefing on Strategic Communications, Baghdad, Iraq, 7 Oct 04.

38. Ceroli, Michael A., Joint PSYOP Task Force Commander, Jun 2003 - Jun 2005. A target audience analysis conducted determined Iraqis wanted to see the criminals responsible for the violence held responsible for their actions. This was determined using focus groups of Sunnis, Kurds, and Shias.


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52. Gregg, Heather, Professor, personal interview, Naval Postgraduate School, 15 Mar 07.

53. Levitz, Paul, President and Publisher, DC Comics, meeting, Feb 04.

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