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West -Arbeit (Western Operations)
Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89

Turning a Cold War Scheme into Reality
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The Movie Breach: A Personal Perspective
Brian J. Kelley

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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Five Months in Petrograd 1918:
Robert W. Imbrie and the US Search for Information in Russia
David A. Langbart

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Studies in Intelligence

Awards, 2007

Studies in Intelligence 2007 Annual Awards were presented to authors in December 2007 by the Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Morell. The following were honored for unclassified articles:

Dr. Mark E. Benbow was recognized for “‘All the Brains I Can Borrow:’ Woodrow Wilson and Intelligence Gathering in Mexico: 1913–1915,” Volume 51, Number 4. Mr. Benbow worked as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence and then as a support officer in CIA for 15 years before becoming the staff historian at the Woodrow Wilson House Museum in Washington DC. He now teaches history at Marymount University in Virginia.

Mr. Ricky Dale Calhoun received the Walter Pforzheimer award for his essay “Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956,” in Volume 51, Number 2. The Pforzheimer award is reserved for the year’s outstanding essay by a student. Mr. Calhoun is a PhD candidate at Kansas State University, where he is studying history and international security.

Andrew Finlayson received an award for “The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70” in Volume 51, Number 2. Colonel Finlayson, USMC (Ret.) served two tours in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. During one of those tours, he served in the Agency’s Phoenix Program.

David Robarge was recognized for the outstanding book review published in 2007—“A Review of Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying Volume 51, Number 1. Dr. Robarge is the CIA’s chief historian, and he has won several Studies in Intelligence awards for his contributions.
Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89
Beatrice de Graaf

In the year 2000, the case of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had sued the German Office of the Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the German Democratic Republic (BStU) for releasing files concerning his political activities before 1989, invoked new interest in a special category of victims and collaborators of the Stasi, East Germany’s Ministry for State Security (Ministereium für Staatssicherheit—MfS). This category involved West Germans and other West Europeans who were the subject of the Stasi’s West-Arbeit (Western operations).a1

Several studies of the West-Arbeit have been published. Some historians, for example, Hubertus Knabe, mentioned the possibility that 20,000 West Germans may have been spies. Official BStU estimates are much lower, perhaps 3,500–6,000 over a period of 40 years. In 1989, 1,500 of them were still operational. These agents spied on thousands of West German companies, organizations, and citizens, including Helmut Kohl. They also worked against East Germans who were in contact with the West.b2

For the Stasi, West-Arbeit activities im und nach dem Operationsgebiet (in and directed to the target region) were organized not only in geographic terms but in political, organizational, and structural terms. With the scope of West-Arbeit so broadly defined, the boundaries between foreign intelligence and domestic policing could not be discerned clearly in Stasi activities.

Although most of the records of the Stasi’s Main Directorate for Intelligence (the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung—HVA)

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a The BStU (Die Beauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik) is responsible for preserving the records of the Stasi, which had responsibility for both external and internal security. The files on Kohl suggested he had taken bribes from major firms on behalf of his party, the Christian Democratic Union. The BStU’s functions are described on its Web site, www.bstu.bund.de.

b Knabe’s 1999 study was reviewed by CIA historian Ben Fischer in Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2 (2002). It offers a useful overview in English of East German intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Hatred of the enemy was the Stasi's all encompassing idea.

have been destroyed, traces of the West-Arbeit can be found in "domestic" departments of the MfS. Research into this branch of activities is all the more revealing because the files of the West German intelligence and security services remain closed.

The West-Arbeit had a direct relationship to the domestic duties of the Stasi, because the enemy against whom the operations were directed could be located abroad, among foreigners, or within the GDR population itself. As can be deduced from the training manual of the Stasi, Haß auf den Feind (hatred of the enemy) was the organization's all encompassing idea.

Established as the counterpart and junior partner of the KGB and staffed with communist veterans like Erich Mielke, Ernst Wollweber, and Wilhelm Zaisser, the Stasi was a representative institution from its beginnings. Because communism was considered the logical and inevitable outcome of history, shortcomings and conflicts within the system could only be caused by external factors, for example, saboteurs inspired by the great class enemy in the West.

This definition of the enemy evolved over time, but it was still in place during the neue Ostpolitik of 1970–72 of West-German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–74). Brandt's outreach brought the GDR considerable gains: diplomatic recognition (and thus embassies) in the West, economic treaties, technological imports (microelectronics, computers), and loans.

The gains also brought new dangers: East Germany's policy of Abgrenzung (the ideological, political and geographical sealing off of the GDR from the West, in particular from the FRG) began to erode because of the many contacts with the West established during this period. The increased percolation through the Wall of Western influences was mirrored by the growth of the Stasi. The "shield and sword of the party" had to make up for the new openness with a major expansion of its personnel, informal agents (inoffizielle mitarbeiter), and duties. At the same time, the Stasi made good use of contacts fostered by Brandt's Ostpolitik and began new offensives against the West. These were directed mainly against West Germany, but other West European countries, including the Netherlands, also were targeted.

The Stasi's Image of the Enemy, as seen through the Netherlands

Eva Horn (professor of German literature and the theory of espionage) has written that "enemy images" are the backbone of intelligence services, but that these images can have negative effects on their efficiency. With respect to Stasi operations against the Dutch, I will argue that the image of the enemy, conceived through a Marxist-Leninist perspective, drove Stasi actions with apparent success at a tactical level. Strategically, however, the Stasi actions failed to prevent the fall of the regime it was charged with protecting.

In this article, I will investigate what the MfS was after in and against the Netherlands and to what extent these operations were affected by its thinking about the enemy. Information about these operations is available in the archives of the Stasi's HVA (foreign intelligence and counterespionage) as well as its Directorate XX (internal opposition) (Hauptabteilung XX—HA XX), and HA I (military intelligence), which are maintained by the BStU.

Intelligence Requirements Regarding the Netherlands

According to MfS guideline No. 1/79, the Stasi was to concentrate on the following goals:

- neutralizing and combating "political-ideological diversion";
- gathering military intelligence;
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground

• gathering economic intelligence;

• counterintelligence.4

Under these guidelines, at least five MfS directorates—HVA, HA XX, HA I, HA II (counterespionage), and HA XVIII (economic intelligence and security)—ran operations against the Netherlands. Research into BStU holdings reveals a broad range of topics and targets between 1979 and 1989.

HVA (foreign intelligence) files contain intelligence on:

• NATO-deployment preparations, the AFCENT-headquarters in Brunssum and the Dutch position in the INF-negotiations;

• preparations for East German communist leader Erich Honecker’s visit to the Netherlands in June 1987;

• activities of the “hostile-negative forces” in the Dutch peace movement;

• reliability of the employees of the GDR consulate and embassy in the Netherlands;

• the microelectronics program of the Philips Corporation;

• the Dutch civil and military security service (telephone numbers, organization charts, pictures);

• security-related issues, such as activities of right wing groups, and terrorist incidents.5

HA I (military intelligence) collected material on:

• military exercises of the Dutch armed forces;

• The Rotterdam harbour;

HA II and HA XVIII were interested in:

• “operational games” by the Dutch security services against the GDR embassy, consulate, and personnel;

• security issues surrounding the embassy compound.6

HA XX (internal opposition) files contain most of the more elaborate analyses found in these files. These mainly regard the:

• Dutch peace movement;

• contacts between Dutch and East German churches, peace groups, and individuals;

• political positions of the Dutch government concerning detente and the East-West conflict.

Intelligence Assets

East German intelligence in the Netherlands involved the use of open sources (OSINT) and technical and human collection. OSINT was easy to come by: The Stasi collected newspaper dippings, official (government) publications, and “grey” reports on GDR- or security-related issues. The MfS also made good use of articles on Dutch military and security issues published by Dutch left-wing pacifist organizations and parties. The Pacifist Political Party, the PSP, for example, exposed details of the structure and activities of the Dutch security service (the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst—BVD). These were immediately analyzed and sent to Berlin.7

With respect to technical collection, little is known from the existing files. There is some evidence that the MfS made use of Dutch radio and telecommunications, including those of Dutch military radio and satellite installations in Westerbork and Eibergen.8

Humint was the Stasi’s main source for West-Arbeit in the Netherlands. Before the Dutch officially recognized the GDR in January 1973, the HVA made use of the handful of salesmen and church officials who had established contacts in the Netherlands. Because of the proximity of the two countries, these so-called headquarters operations were relatively easy to set up. According to a former Dutch intelligence officer, most of the West-Arbeit against the
On at least three occasions the MfS did run successful operations over a longer period of time.

Netherlands was conducted through headquarters operations.

The agents participating in those operations could be East Germans, but sometimes they had Dutch backgrounds. According to the same Dutch intelligence officer, most East German headquarters operations used Dutch citizens who eventually were doubled by the BVD. New Stasi files suggest this is not the case.

From 1973 on, political and economic relations also provided up-to-date information. However, the MfS was especially interested in non-governmental relations between protestant church congregations and peace groups in both countries. Around 1978, some 100 parish contacts had been established, and by 1984 the number had grown to more than 150. By then, 9,000 to 12,000 Dutch protestants and peace activists were participating in exchange programs.

Diplomatic recognition also enabled the MfS to place at least three “legal” intelligence officers at its residentura in the embassy. Although the BVD kept the GDR embassy under strict surveillance, the MfS residentura was able to run several informal-agent operations from the embassy. The records reveal that the following assets were recruited in the Netherlands (through headquarters operations or by legal residents):

- Three informal agents in the Dutch-East German Friendship Association (a subdivision of the official Liga für Völkerfreundschaft)
- One informal agent and one “prospective agent” from the Horizontal Platform, a Marxist-Leninist offshoot of the Dutch Communist Party.
- Several “contact persons” (not quite “informal agents” but something less committed) inside the Stop-the-Neutron-Bomb campaign and other left wing peace groups.
- At least two informal agents not affiliated with left wing organizations, but recruited because they sought adventure or had financial needs.

The MfS was not allowed to recruit members of the official Dutch Communist Party (they could only be used as contact persons, not as informal agents). Most informal agents and other sources were nevertheless drawn into its service through their sympathy for communist ideals or through their “progressive political convictions,” as Stasi chief Erich Mielke phrased it. As late in the Cold War as September 1988, the resident was complaining about the large number of Dutch citizens who were showing up at the embassy to offer themselves to the service.

On the whole, informal agents like these volunteers were of limited utility as sources. The members of the Friendship Association (the informal agents “Aorta,” “Arthur,” and “Ozon,” for example) or members of other GDR-affiliated organizations were either too old, unemployed, or too suspect to get anywhere near interesting military or political information. The resident came to the same conclusion: Their assets were too “leftist” and attempts to “broaden the contact scope did not produce many results,” he lamented in 1988.

Stasi “Success” Stories

However, on at least three occasions the MfS did run successful operations over longer periods of time: on military intelligence, on the Dutch peace movement, and against a group of Dutch draft resisters with East German contacts.

Military Reconnaissance—“Abruf”

The MfS was first of all interested in political and military intelligence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the main enemy of the Warsaw Pact. Within pact collection arrangements, the GDR was responsible for collecting intelligence concerning the areas associated with NATO Army Group North and Army Group
The BVD, however, was a formidable adversary for the HVA.

According to the MfS residen-
tura in The Hague, the BVD conducted so many unfriendly acts of surveillance and recruiting activities against the embassy, against East German citizens in the Netherlands, and against "friendly" organizations, such as the Friendship Association GDR-Netherlands (Vriendschapsvereniging Nederland-DDR), that they threatened to "obstruct the positive effect of the socialist detente politics concerning disarmament questions." That is, the Stasi blamed the BVD for deteriorating East-West relations and troubled disarmament talks.  

However, at least one Dutch informal agent of the 1980s, whose codename was Abruf ("on call") was not discovered. Abruf was run by a case officer code-named Hilmar, who was a member of the legal residen-
tura of the military intelligence department of the East German Army and worked in close cooperation with the MfS staff at the East German embassy. Hilmar had recruited Abruf in November 1983 at a meeting of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) that he, as a comrade and embassy official, could legally attend.  

Hilmar described Abruf as young, unemployed, unhappy with the perceived rightist poli-
cies of the Dutch government, frustrated by the NATO-modernization decision, and a staunch supporter of commu-

As his codename implied, Abruf was used as a freelance agent. He received instructions to photograph Rotterdam Harbor, the Schiphol and Zestienhoven airports, industrial plants in the region, and military compounds. He also col-
lected material on NATO Exercise REFORGER in 1985. After 1985, he was told to move to Woensdrecht, a site then being prepared to receive new NATO missiles.

A Abruf received payments of 100 Dutch guilders for every task he carried out. Contact with his case officer was made through dead drops and in short meetings (after long, fran-
tic diversions and smoke screens) in crowded places, such as the Jungerhans depart-
ment store in Rotterdam. To some of these rendezvous he brought his girlfriend.  

A Abruf's employment ended after three years, in 1986, after an assignment in 1985 raised suspi-
cions. In that year, he was ordered to Coevorden, Ter Apel, and Vriezenveen, where he was told to locate military depots, and to Woensdrecht, where he was to photograph the deployment site. On 25 February 1986, the BVD paid him a visit.
Interest in the Dutch peace movement and its church grew out of opposition to the planned modernization and expansion of NATO's intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles.

and asked about the trip to Vriezenveen and about his contacts with the GDR embassy. The BVD had stumbled across Abruf while they were following Hilmar. At the time, Dutch security did not seem to know much about Abruf's history and actual activities as an agent. Hilmar had already been replaced by an MfS case officer codenamed Haupt. The BVD visit alarmed both Abruf and the residentura, and the relationship was mutually terminated two days after the inquiry.

Informal agent Abruf had provided the Stasi with useful reconnaissance material on Dutch military and economic capabilities centering around the Rotterdam region. His cover was never really blown, and the BVD did not uncover his real activities. After 1989, he left the Netherlands and disappeared.

What Abruf provided was typical of the many reports on Dutch military matters, sometimes via open sources, sometimes of obscure origin, found in Stasi files. One of the showpieces is a detailed description of the organizational structure—telephone numbers included—of the intelligence department of the Dutch land forces. The Stasi and the Dutch Peace Movement

Files unearthed in the BSTU archives also provide insight into another type of intelligence activity, covert influence operations. The Stasi focused in the late 1970s and 1980s on the Dutch peace movement and churches and invested heavily in them and selected leaders. Ironically, the East Germans would find their efforts turned against them as circumstances in Europe and the Soviet Union changed with the introduction of perestroika and other reforms in the region.

East German interest in the Dutch peace movement and its church grew out of West European and Dutch opposition to the planned modernization and expansion of NATO's intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles in Western Europe in 1977. By the early 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Dutch people would demonstrate to attempt to force the government to postpone or cancel the deployments.

The opposition spawned new opportunities for Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders, and the official communist World Peace Council and its suborganizations were used to wage open and covert campaigns to capitalize on the protests. Between 1977 and 1979, the ruling East German Socialist Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands—SED) and the peace council were responsible, among other things, for financial and logistic support of the "Stop the Neutron Bomb" campaign—a Dutch communist front organization that cost East Berlin around 120,000 Dutch guilders (110,000 West German DM).

In addition, the Stasi influenced the foundation Generals for Peace—a well known and respected anti-nuclear peace organization of former West European generals, with Dutch General Michiel von Meyenfeldt (former chief of the Dutch Royal Military Academy) as secretary. To support its perspectives, the Stasi gave it 100,000 West German DM annually.

Even more potentially useful, it seemed to the Kremlin and East Berlin, was the expansion of the support base of the peace movement in the Netherlands to include churches and the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad—IKV), which had started a campaign for unilateral atomic disarmament in the Netherlands. All influential Dutch churches participated in the IKV, and the organization succeeded in mobilizing large parts of Dutch society. East German leader Erich Honecker believed that the Dutch "religious powers" were the main cause of turning the anti-nuclear campaign into a mass movement, and invitations
would follow to a variety of church officials to visit like-minded groups in East Germany.

However, Stasi sympathy for the Dutch peace movement started to turn sour after 1981. After Polish government repression of the independent trade union Solidarity in Poland and after exchanges with members of the Czechoslovak dissident group Charter 77, the IKV radically altered its positions and began to target not only NATO missiles but those of the Warsaw Pact and demanded that all member countries start dismantling nuclear missiles on their own territories rather than pointing fingers at other nations. In effect, this meant the end of a purely anti-NATO campaign.23

To make matters worse for the communists, the IKV extended its contacts with dissidents throughout Eastern Europe and declared that repression in the East was a major political cause of the arms race and not the other way around. The IKV planned to organize a peace movement “from below” to confront both superpowers at grassroot levels.24

A four-part campaign against the IKV was begun. First, the Stasi activated its church agents to force the abandonment of the platform.26 Second, it started a smear campaign against the IKV. IKV Secretary Mient Jan Faber and other officials of his group were registered as persons of criminal intent.27 Party and state officials, newspapers and front organizations were instructed to depict the IKV as a divisive force within the West European peace movement and Faber as an arrogant bully.28 Third, Faber himself was barred from entering the GDR.29 And finally, the existing contacts between Dutch reformed parishes and East German congregations were threatened. The Dutch working group within the East German churches was told that the obstructions were caused by the state’s misgivings about the IKV. Several visits of Dutch
delegations to East Germany and vice versa were cancelled.  

These measures were informed by the strategy of “differentiation” (Differenzierung), which was a very subtle method of alienating “divisive” and negative elements from their own base. The Stasi sorted out which IKV and church members disliked Faber and invited them to East Berlin. It succeeded in manipulating the president of the IKV and reformed church official Jan van Putten, General von Meyenfeldt—he was also an advisor to the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands and a board member of the IKV—and lower-ranking IKV members. IKV officials, Dutch church groups and journalists were led to believe that the IKV’s secretary was no longer in favour in East Europe or with the Protestant churches in the GDR.

In line with this strategy, the Stasi also tried to recruit agents in the Netherlands. IKV Secretary Janneke Houdijk, IKV’s coordinator for East Germany, was approached—in vain. She did not recognise the attempts for what they were and remained loyal to Faber.

In the end, however, the efforts bore fruit. East-German churches detached themselves from their IKV contacts and froze most exchange activities. In the Netherlands, many Dutch church leaders and local groups were convinced that Faber was a threat to stability and East-West relations. Faber was threatened with dismissal. Local IKV groups and parishes sent angry letters to IKV headquarters and demanded that Faber stop meddling in internal East German affairs, let alone lead a campaign for human rights. The envisaged Peace Platform never came into being, frustrated in advance by the Stasi, which was helped, knowingly or unknowingly, by Dutch and East German church leaders.

Ironically, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist enmity towards a democratization approach faded away. The new leadership in the Kremlin even developed sympathy for it, and, in 1988, Faber and British peace activist Mary Kaldor were invited to Moscow to observe the dismantling of SS-20 rockets. The same year, an IKV delegation visited Moscow, invited by the Kremlin itself. The GDR, however, stuck to its rigid policy. The Stasi was appalled by the tolerance of Soviet communists toward Dutch peace activists and did not adapt itself to the new liberalism. Indeed, it continued the struggle against the IKV and even started a new action...
against it in 1988. Operations were only aborted after the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989.

Operation “Bicycle Tour”

Groups other than the IKV tried to establish exchange programs with East German peace activists, and in doing so generated a Stasi response that illustrates the entanglement of foreign and domestic intelligence activity in East Germany. In 1981, a group of draft resisters from the northern Dutch city of Groningen founded an organization called the Peace Shop (Vredeswinkel). The entity functioned as a communication centre for peace activists from the region. Through existing church contacts and the War Resisters International, the leaders soon contacted a construction branch of the East German army known as the Bausoldaten, that had since 1964 been offering the possibility of completing obligatory military service not with arms but with the spade. This alternative had been provided at the urging of East German protestant churches, which represented about 45 percent of the GDR’s population.

As a grass roots organization, the Peace Shop organized bicycle tours through East Germany as a joint venture of Dutch, East German, and, when possible, Czechoslovak and Polish conscientious objectors. The Dutch entered the GDR as private visitors, gathered at prearranged addresses, and, with East Germans, cycled to rural parts of the GDR and discussed world politics and disarmament initiatives.

In 1985, IKV Secretary Faber and East German Vicar Rainer Eppelmann (a prominent figure in the East German opposition scene) concluded a personal contract to work together for peace. Many participants in the Groningen-GDR exchange decided to do the same and committed themselves to not using violence against each other in case of a war. According to the signatories, in doing this, they contributed to “detente from below.”

Although their activities were relatively low-profile and not aimed at threatening the GDR system, the cycle tours were betrayed by their own success as the Stasi got wind of them. Large international groups peddling, for example, from Karl Marx City (Chemnitz) to Stralsund, could not stay unnoticed, especially after their frequency increased to three or four times a year.

Veterans of the Bausoldaten were suspect to begin with in the eyes of the MfS, especially when they organized meetings with other Bausoldaten and Western draft resisters. Indeed, the Stasi had been carrying out operations against the idea of “social peace service” as an alternative to military service since at least 1981. (Vicar Eppleman, in fact, had been a leader in the “social peace service” effort.)

HA XX, the department charged with dealing with the churches and opposition circles, learned that Dutch participants planned to publish stories about their bicycle tours and experiences in the GDR in Dutch church and peace magazines, and, in 1984, Peace Shop members initiated a letter campaign on behalf of Amnesty International for the release of arrested East German dissidents.

Such activity fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies conspiring to create domestic unrest.
The bicycle tours fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies conspiring to create domestic unrest.

Such activity fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies conspiring from outside the system to create domestic unrest, and the bicycle tours thus became objects of intensive surveillance. In 1983, the Stasi started several Operative Vorgänge (intelligence operations aimed at arresting dissidents) against former Bausoldaten who had participated in the tours. HA XX recruited several East Germans as informal agents “mit Feindkontakt” (in contact with the enemy), who reported on all the meetings and preparations.42

Although bicycle tour participants kept their distance from IKV officials, HA XX and the HVA nevertheless increasingly suspected them of being partners of the IKV and executors of the IKV’s grand strategy of developing a “pseudopacifist, bloc–transcending peace movement.” By way of confirmation of this, one Stasi report quotes a Dutch activist as saying “When there are no soldiers on both sides, there will be no weapons used.”43

In the belief that the Peace Shop was helping dissidents, the Stasi was not mistaken. The activists had indeed given their East German contacts a typewriter and helped finance Bausoldaten activities with 2,000 Dutch guilders.

With growing Dutch contacts in the so-called Political Underground Forces (Politische Untergrundtätigkeit—PUT), which the East German authorities saw as a threat to communist rule, increased international pressure on the GDR, and a perceived potential for embarrassment during Erich Honecker’s planned June 1987 visit to the Netherlands, the MfS tried to obstruct and manipulate cross-border exchanges. HA XX began an Operativer Vorgang against the Dutch organizer of the bicycle tours, Bert Noppers, who was described as the inspirator and organisator of the PUT tours.

As part of its attack on Noppers, HA XX used a letter from Noppers to an East German friend in which he wrote that Dutch intelligence had tried to recruit him in 1983 to report on his East German contacts. Although Noppers stated in his letter that he refused, the HA immediately listed him as a probable foreign intelligence agent. It then attempted to collect evidence to indict Noppers for hostile agitation against the East German state and for disseminating information to foreign intelligence agencies or other foreign organizations to discredit the GDR. If convicted, he faced two to 12 years of imprisonment.44

Notwithstanding such threats, the Peace Shop organized a protest against East German border controls in 1987, building a model Berlin Wall of cardboard boxes through Groningen and drawing media attention to the condition of their dissident friends in the GDR. Although the peace
activists also criticized the West European and Dutch contribution to the armaments race, these acts had no impact on the activities of HA XX.45

Stepped-up HA XX activities included the recruitment as informal agents of three GDR participants in the Peace Shop exchanges. Codenamed Karlheinz, Betty, and Romeo, they reported all of their activities to HA XX. Romeo was sent abroad to visit the Peace Shop in Groningen in July 1988. However, the department could not find enough evidence to prosecute the East German participants or arrest the Dutch organizer.

Even by the standards of the East German Penal Code, the activists were just not subversive enough. The Dutch activists did not advocate open criticism or revolution. As Noppers put it during an interview in 2006, “If the East Germans wanted to topple the regime, they had to do it by themselves. We came from abroad and did not want to tell them what to do. And although we were no friends of communism, we had enough criticism to pass on capitalism and materialism at home.”46 Moreover, the East German government did not want the MfS to make random arrests, since that would cause too much damage to the economic and political relations the GDR had established by then.

Nevertheless, MfS surveillance continued. HA XX ordered continuation of the operations against Noppers, inspired by the same suspicions against the Dutch activist.47 Although the MfS knew that Moscow had shifted policies and now aimed at cooperation with the IKV and other West European peace organisations, HA XX was still plotting in April 1989 to use intercepted inquiries by the Peace Shop to members of the East German network to recruit more informal agents.48

Only in October 1989 were the Operative Vorgänge against the East German Bausoldaten and against Noppers called off. They ended partly because of a lack of evidence and partly because the Stasi had already begun cleaning up its files in the face of growing unrest and pending revolution. On 24 November 1989, 15 days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Stasi finally closed its files on Noppers.49

In Sum: Tactical Gains, Strategic Loss

During the last decade of its existence, the MfS was successful in tactical terms. It succeeded in running one operation to collect military intelligence, managed to infiltrate and manipulate most IKV contacts in the GDR, penetrated the Peace Shop, and started an Operative Vorgang against the Dutch coordinator of East European peace tours. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the MfS employed more Dutch informal agents in the 1980s than are discussed here but whose records remain undiscovered.
During its last decade, the MfS had tactical success. Strategically, however, it failed to preserve the security of the GDR.

In the overall, strategic setting, however, the Ministry of State Security failed in its mission to preserve the security of the GDR.

- First, by entangling its foreign intelligence operations with domestic security interests, the Stasi focused on the foreign inspiration of domestic opposition at the expense of understanding that dissent in the GDR drew on the system's own economic, social, military, and political weaknesses and the government's abuses of its population.

- Second, the MfS itself became part of the problem instead of part of the solution, as the expansion of the security apparatus from the 1970s on acted as a driver for even more protests.

- Third, activities of the IKV and other Dutch peace initiatives like the Peace Shop were blown up out of proportion, and those in the GDR who were in touch with them were deemed to be guilty of high treason. In this intellectual strait-jacket, the Stasi was blinded to useful insights and could not see that the Dutch movements gave the Soviet bloc opportunities to exploit genuine divisions in NATO.

- Finally, when the Stasi got it right, it could not persuade its leadership. In May 1987, the HVA issued an study of Dutch foreign and military policies before Honecker's state visit to the Netherlands. The analysis precisely listed the deviations of Dutch politics from the US and NATO lines. (The Dutch denounced SDI, favoured a nuclear test ban and prolongation of the ABM treaty.) Honecker, however, made no effort to play into these differences and only uttered the usual clichés about peace-loving socialist countries. To him, the Netherlands remained part and parcel of the imperialist block. Painfully collected and sound intelligence was made useless by incapable and ideologically deformed party leaders.

Endnotes


2. Hubertus Knabe, Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasi im Westen (Berlin, 1999); Helmut Müller-Enbergs, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Teil 2: Anleitungen für Arbeiten mit Agenten, Kundschaftern und Spionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1998); Müller-


5. Vgl. Query in the SIRA database 14, Druckauftrag Nr. 12839, AR 7/SG03, Nr. AU 2585/05 Z.


8. For example “Jahresabschlussbericht 1981 über die Ergebnisse der Funkabwehrleistung,” 16 November 1981, in which West German, British and Dutch radiocommunications are mapped. BStU MfS HA II 25043, 1–39.


12. HA I 1682, S. 11.


31. Clemens Vollnhals, Die kirchenpolitische Abteilung des Ministeriums für Staats sicherheit. BF informiert 16/1997 (Berlin 1997). Concerning the strategy of differentiation, the following orders were relevant: Richtlinien zur Bearbeitungs Operativer Vorgänge (RL 1/76), Operative Personenkontrollen (RL 1/81), Direktive zur IM-Führung (RL 1/79).


34. BStU MfS Abteilung Rostock, OV “Integration” 3/92.


36. All letters at the (Dutch) International Institute for Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, Box IKV 455; “Verslag Oost-Europadiscussie op de Campagne raad van 26 februari,” in Kernblad 3, March 1983, IISH Box IKV 453.

37. Interview with Mient Jan Faber, 10 September 2001, The Hague.

38. Interview with Bert Noppers (former participant in these contacts and supporter of the Peace Shop), 20 March 2006, Utrecht.


46. Interview with Bert Noppers, 20 March 2006, Utrecht.


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Turning a Cold War Scheme into Reality

Engineering the Berlin Tunnel

Fifty years ago, the CIA embarked on a project to intercept Soviet and East German messages transmitted via underground cable. Intelligence was collected to determine the best place to hit the target, and then concrete planning for a new collection site was begun.

Early in 1951 when I was working in the Engineering Division of the Office of Communications, I received a message from some people in the office of the Deputy Director of Plans—specifically the chief of Foreign Intelligence/Staff D (FI/D), and a member of his team—requesting a meeting. The meeting was short. The only question they asked was whether a tunnel could be dug in secret. My reply was that one could dig a tunnel anywhere, but to build one in secret would depend on its size, take more time, and cost more money. After the meeting, I was transferred to FI/D. Thus began planning for the construction of the Berlin Tunnel.

We started building the tunnel in August 1954 and completed it in February 1955. It was 1,476 feet in length; 3,100 tons of soil were removed; 125 tons of steel liner plate and 1,000 cubic yards of grout . . . . This was not a small operation!

Debate has swirled around the net intelligence value of the operation. But the completion of this demanding project—accomplished in secret and under exacting conditions—is a tribute to the resourcefulness and expertise of an outstanding team of professionals.

Learning as We Went

Prior to this project, my tunnel experience was limited to several night-shift visits to the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel as a student civil engineer. Constructed in 1948 and somewhat unique, the tunnel extended from Battery Park in lower Manhattan to South Brooklyn. It was designed for two 18-foot bores, which were mostly blasted and drilled in solid rock. The East River crossing presented a problem, however.

1 Accounts of the tunnel project covering its conception and execution, its compromise by British spy George Blake, and Moscow’s delay in closing it down include: David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994); David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); and David Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2003).
At the confluence of the East River and the Hudson River, there was a deep submarine canyon, a leftover from the extensive land erosion caused by the violent runoff of melt waters from the retreating Continental Glacier. The canyon was filled with the muck and detritus of eons of erosion. This fact required that a pressurized shield, solely for the prevention of blowouts on the East River crossing, had to be moved the entire length of the tunnel. The concept of such a shield surfaced in design discussions for the Berlin Tunnel project. The Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel demonstrated the magnitude of the job of marshaling the experienced personnel, materials, and equipment for the huge task of constructing a tunnel and disposing of the excavated soil. Work on the 18-foot bore tunnel could not have been done in silence. These matters were a warning, because silence would be a top priority in constructing the Berlin Tunnel in secret.

Design Decisions

Once the Berlin project received a green light, design specifications had to be determined; men and materials assembled; and questions of site selection, training, and transportation answered. The big question that loomed was how to dispose of the tons of soil that would be excavated! Rough calculations showed that the amount of soil expected to be brought out from the tunnel and vertical shaft would fill to the brim more than 20 living rooms in an average American home! Security and silence dictated that not one cubic foot of soil be removed from the site. A warehouse, with a basement for the storage of the excavated soil and a first floor reserved for recorders and signal equipment, was the solution.

My task began with an inspection of existing tunnels in the Washington, DC, area, which included utility bores, pedestrian walkways, storm drains, and railroad maintenance tunnels. From this research, I concluded that our tunnel should be 6 feet in diameter with a structure of steel-flanged corrugated liner plates—the 6-foot diameter would provide a comfortable working room at the tunnel face. Next came research at the Library of Congress to check the available literature dealing with earth pressures on tunnels. I already had two textbooks and found three relevant papers published by the American Society of Civil Engineers. Together, these provided the procedures I needed to start the mathematical analysis of the tunnel structure.

In the spring of 1953, I flew to Frankfurt, Germany, to meet with a senior case officer at the CIA station. The officer told me that the tunnel site had not yet been selected. He also advised me that Lt. Col. Leslie M. Gross had been selected as the tunnel’s resident engineer. He expressed regret that I had not been selected. I told him not to worry.3

The next subject we discussed was a meeting with the British in London. We would attend this meeting with Bill Harvey, chief of our Berlin base. At the beginning of the meeting, I started to discuss some notes I had on the unfinished mathematical analysis of the tunnel structure. Clearly the attendees were not interested in mathematics. The discussion turned to the matter of the form of the tunnel design. The British proposed using heavy concrete blocks, which were common in the London Underground. I countered with the idea of using steel liner plates, which would be lighter and easier to use in the tunnel and at the tunnel face. This proposal was accepted.

3 Time magazine of 7 May 1956 reported that some Army people saw “friends whom they knew to be engineers appearing in Berlin wearing the insignia of the Signal Corps.”
The next subject was a question of using a shield. I did not offer an opinion because it was a topic that I felt should be discussed with Les Gross. Bill Harvey got the impression that I did not know the difference between a shield and a coat-of-arms. When we returned to Frankfurt, it was suggested that I make a drawing of a shield. Normally, a shield—such as the one used on the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel—would not be used in a tunnel as small as 6 feet. Other methods, such as poling, would be used to prevent a collapse of the tunnel roof. However, I drew an engineering plan for a 6-foot shield, and Bill Harvey later used the drawing in his request for final approval of the tunnel.4

I had my first meeting with headquarters. A short conference resulted in an agreement that a shield should be used. A shield would have the added advantage of keeping the alignment of the tunnel on course.

We selected a prime contractor for the liner plates and shield, negotiated a classified contract, and work commenced.

Assembling Men and Materials

Working out of an office in one of the World War II temporary buildings along the Reflecting Pool near the Lincoln Memorial, Les started the process of recruiting his team. He selected Corps of Engineers officers and non-commissioned officers. He also began to look into a site out West where the liner plates and shield could be assembled for training for the upcoming real thing.

Les left the structural analysis to me. Ordinarily, earth pressure on a tunnel is figured at four points: the overhead, both sides, and the invert. This technique did not seem adequate. I spent nearly a week at the Library of Congress searching for a better way of analyzing earth pressures. I found two technical papers that offered a better approach. The papers discussed the “circuit method” of computing earth pressures on tunnels. It was a sort of circumferential calculus. The downside was that the circuit method of calculation required solving six simultaneous equations! Perhaps this sophisticated method was a bit of overkill; however, the design assumptions called for precise planning. The tunnel not only needed to be able to withstand a dead load of 10 or more feet of soil overburden, but also had to bear a potential surcharge load—to wit, Soviet or East German 60-ton tanks riding down Schoenefelder Chausee or maneuvering around the open field above the tunnel.

While Les narrowed the search for a site to test the installation of the shield and liner plates to New Mexico, I flew back to London for a meeting with Bill Harvey. We traveled with one of Bill’s British colleagues to a location to view the operation of the vertical shield needed to gain access to the Soviet communications cables. The vertical shield was demonstrated by the British sappers who would operate it at the site. This was a process that required extreme patience and skill. During the motor trip, I suggested that as a cover for the tunnel site, we should build one or two communications stations that would exchange false traffic. This idea was met by icy stares.
Site Preparation

Drawing on the clandestine sources of the Berlin base, Bill Harvey decided to locate the operation in a rural area of the American Sector southwest of Berlin known as Altglienecke. The target cables—two estimated to be in good shape, and a third, in poor shape—ran in a ditch on the west side of Schönefelder Chaussee in the Soviet Sector. The aiming point for the tunnel was about 300 yards north of a graveyard.

Tunnels are usually kept on line and grade by surveys conducted in the tunnel and on the ground above it by transits and calibrated steel tapes. A surface survey, however, was obviously inappropriate for a secret tunnel. Having no lasers, we had to use other methods.

Drawing on the best technical resources of the time, several photographic over-flights were ordered. One flight used glass plates for maximum accuracy. The glass plates were sent to the Agency’s fledgling air photogrammetry unit. They conducted air-photogrammetry studies to determine distance and elevation. The engineering and geologic analysis of the other photographs showed the site to be underlain by well-drained deposits of sandy loam. There was a possibility of encountering some “perched water tables”—where a layer of impervious clay traps a small quantity of water—but this was not considered a problem.

We also used a newly developed electronic distance measuring system (EDMS). An agent faked a flat tire on the side of the road by the aiming point. While working on the tire, he placed a small device on the hood of the car. The device received and transmitted data in the EDMS system. Thus, air photogrammetry and electronic measurement fixed the coordinates of the target cables.

Next, under the supervision of a Berlin-based Corps of Engineers unit, the requisite “warehouse” was constructed on the site, using mostly local contractors and available materials. Keeping the plans secret was a constant challenge. Time magazine reported that a civilian engineer had quit the construction project in disgust because the blueprints seemed crazy. “Why build a cell big enough to drive through with a dump truck?” he asked. Good point. Warehouses were usually built on reinforced concrete slabs poured on well-drained, compacted sub-bases. A warehouse with a basement normally would require columns and beams, which were not incorporated into our plans. Our intention was to use the basement for the storage of the excavated soil, so columns and beams ultimately would not be necessary. The civilian engineer who quit was not the only one to raise an eyebrow. The Army Chief of Engineers finally resolved the design controversy. Calling it an “experiment,” he ordered the warehouse built as planned, with a basement and no columns and beams.

From Training to Action

The two British sappers who would play a key role in the tunnel construction were invited to the New Mexico test site to observe the operation of the shield in conjunction with the liner plates. The time had come to demobilize the test site and ship all of the equipment to Berlin. The last step was to pack up all of the unit’s files—consisting of requisitions,
Two British sappers, who would play a key role in the tunnel construction, were invited to the New Mexico test site.

The most secret cargo was transported to West Berlin on an ordinary goods train—no armed guards or security arrangements of any kind. The cargo arrived in West Berlin without incident.

The dig began in August 1954. A 10-foot-diameter vertical shaft, 10 feet deep, was excavated 15 feet inside the warehouse foundation. The shield was assembled in this shaft below the basement floor. The excavation of the tunnel started with a sequence of push, dig, retract, assemble liner-plate ring, and repeat. An unanticipated messy problem developed about 10 feet beyond the tunnel portal when the shield passed under the leach field of the compound's sanitary system. The drainage problem was quickly solved with a pump. History does not record what was used to alleviate the odor!

The dig proceeded. A wooden-rail track was built to keep the forklift on course. About one-eighth of the spoil never left the tunnel. Sandbags were filled and stacked halfway up the sides of the finished tunnel. They were secured with steel cables and gave the tunnel cross section a T-square look. The benches formed by the sandbags were used to support and store air-conditioning ducts and power and message cables running back and forth between the equipment-room amplifiers and the Ampex recorders, which packed the first floor of the warehouse.

The operation of the shield resulted in an overcut of 2 1/2 inches. This provided space for the liner plates, but left a 1/2-inch void between the tunnel and the undisturbed earth above. This void had to be filled in order to prevent subsidence of the earth above the tunnel. About every fourth liner-plate ring had "grout plugs," threaded cores that filled holes used for pumping grout into the void. The plugs were screwed...
out, grout under high pressure was pumped in, and then the plugs were replaced. The grout selected was called “Vollclay,” a molecular composite of clay, minerals, and other ingredients. Once, a full boxcar of Vollclay disappeared between Chicago and Baltimore! It took five days for the Office of Logistics to find the shipment, but the grout reached Berlin without delaying the progress on the tunnel.

The British team of sappers started—and completed in the spring of 1955—the construction of the vertical shaft needed to gain access to the Soviet communications cables. This was the most delicate and tedious job in the entire process. The vertical shaft was carved out using a “window blind” shield: A slot was opened and about an inch of soil was removed; then that slot was closed and the next one opened. This sequence was repeated until the target cables were reached, a process that required extreme patience and skill.

The tap of the first cable was completed in May 1955. A team of British specialists started the work of transferring the cable voice and signal circuits to the recording equipment. The full tapes were collected and sent to London and Washington.

**Unexpected Development**

On two occasions, I was invited to visit the tunnel site. I declined, suggesting that, without a good reason for such a visit, we might be turning the tunnel site into a tourist attraction. Then, a good reason surfaced.

The electronic equipment room, located under the roadway, was jammed with amplifiers, transformers, and tuners. All of these devices used vacuum tubes—"valves," under British nomenclature—that were high heat generators. The maximum expected heat load of these generators had been used to calculate the required level of air-conditioning. Something was wrong, however, because the temperature in the equipment room was rising.

This problem had to be solved before winter set in. Some cold morning, a frost-free black mark might appear on the roadway over the equipment room, perhaps extending into the field between the road and the warehouse, calling attention to something strange occurring below the surface. Emergency action was needed.
A chilled-water air-conditioning system was the only solution because there was no room for extra ducts on the sandbag benches. Such a system, including about 1500 feet of newly developed 3/4-inch plastic irrigation tubing, was shipped to the site. The tubing fitted nicely alongside the existing air ducts.

We still needed a way to monitor the temperature in and above the tunnel. With assistance from the Office of Logistics, we checked out a company in New Jersey named Wallace and Tiernan Products, Inc. Primarily a manufacturer of altimeters and surveying equipment, the company also made a remote temperature recording system consisting of sensors, a data-recording station, and connecting cables. We purchased the system and shipped it to Berlin.

As the Washington “expert,” I followed with an engineering drawing of the planned locations and elevations of the sensors that were to go into the earth above the tunnel. The first job was to install the sensors, since the plan called for statistical analysis to determine if observed differences in temperatures were random or significant. The grout plugs now had a second purpose. A number were removed and holes were drilled in each to accommodate a sensor and its cable. Eleven sensors were used: one in the tap chamber, four in the equipment room, three in the tunnel, and three at the tunnel portal. The tunnel portal sensors served as controls for comparative analysis. When the sensors were in place and the plugs restored and sealed, the connecting cables were run back to the entrance shaft.

The next step involved getting the cables up through the basement floor of the warehouse and connected to the recording station. This required pounding a hole through 16 inches of reinforced concrete with a star drill and hammer! It took three days before the cables were connected and operating.

The first readings showed that the temperatures in the ground above the tunnel were in general agreement with the readings from the sensors at the tunnel portal; however, temperatures in the ground over the equipment room were indeed elevated. Later, data sent to CIA headquarters showed that the temperatures over the equipment room were dropping, almost certainly due to the supplemental cooling system.

Further monitoring of ground temperatures became irrelevant when the tunnel was discovered in late April 1956. A team of East German telephone workmen unearthed the tunnel while inspecting the cable system. That spring had been unusually wet and we had overheard numerous conversations about flooded cable vaults and the need to fix the problems and restore communications.

Reflection

Over the years, the Berlin Tunnel project has been heatedly debated. Opinions have ranged widely—some favorable, some resentful of its success, some political, and many just plain wrong. Most of the controversy has centered on differing interpretations of net intelligence value of this costly, time-consuming, and technically challenging project. The simple truth, however, is that Leslie M. Gross and his Army Corps of Engineers staff, along with the British sappers, built the tunnel and tap chamber in SECRET!!

Hand salute, gentlemen, hand salute.

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Intelligence in the Public Media

The Movie Breach: A Personal Perspective

Brian J. Kelley

Nothing has been debated as vigorously as the question of why Hanssen was able to elude detection for two decades.

FBI Supervisory Special Agent Robert Philip Hanssen was a reprehensible traitor. Off and on for more than 20 years, he spied for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), the KGB (Soviet state intelligence service), and the SVR (Russian intelligence service). Hanssen’s espionage career came to an abrupt end when he was arrested on 18 February 2001, just after he had placed a tightly wrapped package containing highly classified intelligence documents into a dead drop under a footbridge in Foxstone Park in Vienna, Virginia.

Hanssen was certainly one of the most complex and disturbing spies of our time. An enigmatic loner, Hanssen spent most of his 25 years in the Bureau specializing in Soviet intelligence matters on assignments in New York and in Washington DC—at FBI headquarters and as the FBI’s representative to the State Department. A senior agent once said of Hanssen, “I can’t think of a single employee who was as disliked as Hanssen.”1 One of the FBI’s foremost authorities on technical intelligence, Hanssen understood how technical applications could be brought to bear on the Bureau’s most challenging operational initiatives. Moreover, Hanssen knew how to navigate the bureaucratic labyrinths of the FBI, and, as a certified public accountant, he understood especially well how work on the Bureau’s most sensitive and high-profile cases were funded.

Arguably the most damaging spy in US history, Hanssen repeatedly volunteered his services to Moscow’s intelligence services, cloaking his activities in a fictitious persona (Ramon García) and adamantly refusing to reveal to his handlers the identity of his genuine employer. By all accounts, Hanssen was arrogantly confident in his ability to “play the spy game” according to the rules he created and employed. He gambled that he could deceive the FBI and the Russians and avoid being compromised by any US agent that might have penetrated Moscow’s services.


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Many vexing questions exist about Hanssen’s rationale for acting as he did for as long as he did. But nothing has been debated as vigorously as the reasons why he was able to elude detection for two decades. Attempts to confer on Hanssen the mythological status of a “master spy” (e.g., CBS’s made-for-television movie Masterspy: The Robert Hanssen Story) are not supported by the facts of the case, and the key question remains: Why did it take so long for the FBI to catch a mole that had operated with impunity within its ranks for such a long period of time?

Breach, a fast-paced movie directed by Billy Ray, attempts to answer some of these perplexing questions. The movie covers only the last six weeks of Hanssen’s two-decade-long espionage career, opening in the late fall of 2000, when Hanssen first came under the investigative microscope. According to David Wise, author of one of the best of several accounts of Hanssen’s life and perfidy, a successful joint CIA-FBI initiative obtained a package containing a portion of an operational file pertaining to a mole deeply embedded in the US counterintelligence community. In addition to the file, the package contained three other exceptional pieces of evidence: an audio tape containing two brief telephone conversations between the mole and a KGB interlocutor in 1986, copies of letters written by the mole during 1985–88, and two partial fingerprints lifted from a plastic garbage bag the mole had used to wrap a delivery to Moscow. Wise wrote that the purchase price of the package was $7 million.

It did not take the FBI long to piece together the shards of evidence and come to a stunning conclusion: The mole was one of their own special agents. Equally shocking to the FBI was the realization that the person its investigators had firmly believed to be the mole, a senior CIA counterintelligence specialist who had been the object of an extraordinarily invasive counterintelligence investigation over the previous five years, was innocent. Despite the absence of evidence, the FBI had convinced CIA officials that it had good reason to believe that one of CIA’s officers had been responsible for compromising more than 50 compartmented FBI operations against the Soviet and Russian intelligence services operating in the United States during the period 1985–2000.

During those five years, the FBI invested a staggering amount of technical and human resources to try to obtain evidence to corroborate its suspicions against that officer. He was placed under 24-hour surveillance, his home and work spaces were covertly searched, and computers and telephones in both his home and office were put under technical surveillance. Even an elaborate “false flag” operation was run against him—it proved no guilt; the officer dutifully reported the unsolicited contact. On top of that, the officer was subjected to a ruse polygraph administered by a senior FBI polygrapher.

The results of all these efforts revealed nothing pointing to the officer’s guilt. Moreover, the senior FBI agent who administered the polygraph was adamant that the examination determined without a doubt that the alleged CIA spy registered a “no deception indicated” response. With nothing to substantiate contentions that the CIA officer was a “master spy” who somehow managed numerous acts of treason without leaving behind any clues and who always stayed a step ahead of their efforts, frustrated FBI counterespionage investigators took to calling the officer the “Evil Genius.”

The information contained in the acquired package, while damning to Hanssen, was only enough to support charging Hanssen with relatively minor offenses, and the FBI wanted to build an

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3 Many of the details of this case were published in the unclassified US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General report, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, August 2003. Fuller accounts were published in Secret and Top Secret versions.
Ironclad case that would lead to the death penalty. To do this, Hanssen had to be caught in flagrante in an operational activity involving his Russian intelligence handlers. Time was of the essence, as Hanssen was facing mandatory retirement in less than six months.

To buy time, the FBI concocted a plan to lure Hanssen back to FBI headquarters from his position at the State Department. Knowing Hanssen’s frustration with and professional disdain for the FBI’s antiquated computer systems, the FBI created a bureaucratic entity called the “Information Assurance Division,” complete with a well-appointed office, and offered him a promotion to the senior executive service. The FBI also offered to waive Hanssen’s mandatory retirement if he agreed to take the apparently prestigious position. Hanssen agreed to the challenge and was told that the FBI had already selected a young FBI surveillance specialist, Eric O’Neill, to be his first employee. What Hanssen did not know was that O’Neill had been assigned to report on Hanssen’s activities inside their office.

Breach compellingly portrays much of the above. As the movie opens, O’Neill, played by Ryan Phillippe, is summoned to FBI Headquarters and informed that he is being reassigned from surveillance duty to an office job in the Hoover Building. Senior FBI officials inform O’Neill that he will work for a Special Agent named Robert Hanssen to monitor his questionable sexually “deviant” behavior, which O’Neill is told “could be a huge embarrassment to the Bureau.”

Hanssen: You know what is going on behind those doors?

O’Neill: No, sir.

Hanssen: There are analysts looking for a spy inside the Intelligence Community. Highest clearances but there are no CIA officers in there. You know why?

O’Neill: No, sir.

Hanssen: Because it is a CIA officer we’re trying to build a case against. Now, could the mole be someone from the Bureau and not CIA? Of course. But are we actively pursuing that possibility? Of course not. Because we are the Bureau and the Bureau knows all.

As the innocent CIA officer alluded to in that dialogue, I felt chills through my body when I saw that scene, and it triggered immediate flashbacks to that two-year period in my life, when the FBI intimated to me, my family, and friends that I would be arrested and charged with a capital crime I had not committed.

The scene and the dialogue in Breach were fictional, but official retrospectives on the Hanssen case suggest that the scene was a completely apt characterization of the perspective of the FBI team investigating the case. (See passage from the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General report on the next page.)

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In the commentary on the film that accompanies its CD release, O’Neill says that in reality he was told that Hanssen was the subject of a counterintelligence investigation, but he was not told of the acquisition of evidence against him.
In this brief segment, director Billy Ray perfectly captured the arrogant, snarling Hanssen flaunting his “I’ve got a secret” attitude that he inflicted on those he felt were below his intellectual station in life. As I was later to learn from many who worked with him, Hanssen’s frequent sarcastic comments were often laced with veiled references showing utter disdain for what he believed to be the FBI’s hopeless ineptitude in the field of counterintelligence.

What the scene also revealed was that even though he was assigned to a backwater position in 1995, Hanssen knew details of the highly compartmented hunt for the alleged CIA mole. The FBI later determined that, starting in the spring of 1999, Hanssen had made thousands of unauthorized probes into the FBI’s investigative records system called the Automated Case Support System (ACS) and was preparing to reenter the spy world he had abruptly left in December 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To ensure that the FBI was not tracking him, he had taken to querying the databases for his name and home address. In one of his forays into the ACS he stumbled onto what should have been highly compartmented reporting detailing the FBI’s intensive investigation of me. His later inquiries at FBI headquarters yielded my name as the subject of the investigation.

I first met Hanssen in the early 1980s, when we worked together on some sensitive counterintelligence matters of common interest to the FBI and CIA. We once lived on the same street and took official trips together. He once visited my office at CIA, when he was negotiating the placement on my staff of one of his senior analysts. I was told he was shocked to learn that the FBI believed I was a master spy. Ironically, he downloaded relevant investigative reports on me from the ACS and included them as part of his initial communication with the SVR.

People who have lived events that are about to be portrayed in films have every reason to worry about what the films will contain. I was no different. Some months before the film was finished, a contact in Hollywood sent me a copy of the original screen play. I felt it was appallingly poorly written, and in my mind, the movie had the makings of a disaster as bad as the much ballyhooed The Good Shepherd, which promised much but delivered little. With some trepidation, I attended a pre-launch showing of Breach as the guest of a media acquaintance. I fully expected the movie to sacrifice reality to a skewed Tinsel Town vision of real life. To my great surprise, 20 minutes into the movie, I realized I was very wrong.

After the showing, I was introduced to Director Ray, who was interested in my opinion of his production. He was pleased to hear my positive response. After I remarked on the SCIF scene, he told me he knew the basic outline of my story but could write no more about me than was contained.

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6 USDOJ, IG Report, 15.

In Watching the Movie Breach

In a closing scene, Hanssen has a discussion with a senior FBI official as he is being transported to jail after his arrest:

Can you imagine sitting in a room with a bunch of your colleagues, everyone trying to guess the identity of a mole and all the while it is you they’re after. It must be very satisfying, don’t you think?

The scene was fiction, but it, too, was very believable and haunting. No one should feel sorry for the likes of Hanssen, who caused the deaths of several Soviet intelligence officers. We must be reminded of two comments in Hanssen’s sentencing memorandum:

Even though Aldrich Ames compromised each of them [executed Soviet Intelligence officers], and thus shares responsibility for their executions, this in no way mitigates or diminishes the magnitude of Hanssen’s crimes. Their blood is on his hands....That we did not lose the Cold War ought blind no one to the fact that Robert Philip Hanssen, for his own selfish and corrupt reasons, placed every American citizen in harm’s way.8

Breach is not a perfect movie but it hammers home how precious our freedoms are and how vulnerable we are to potential traitors within.

Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps, Richard A. Posner
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, Hans Born and Marina Caparini (eds.)
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2nd edition revised, Robert M. Clark
The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies, Athan Theoharis
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.)
Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11, Amy B. Zegart,

General Intelligence

Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook, J. Ransom Clark

Historical

Comrade J: The Untold Story of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War, Pete Earley
The FBI: A History, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
Intelligence, Statecraft and International Power, Eunan O’Halpin, Robert Armstrong and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.)
Living With the Enigma Secret: Marian Rejewski 1905-1980, Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski (eds.)
Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services, Michael Salter

Intelligence Services Abroad

Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss, K. Sankaran Nair
Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, B. Raman
The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane, B. Raman
The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists, Michael Ross with Jonathan Kay

Correction: The review of Enemies: How America’s Foes Steal our Vital Secrets (Bill Gertz) in the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” of Studies Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007) may have led readers to infer that Gertz lifted material about Ana Montes from Scott Carmichael’s biography of the Cuban agent, True Believer. Carmichael’s book, also reviewed in the issue, appeared after Enemies, and the review meant only to point out that Enemies included unattributed material on Montes that True Believer would confirm.
Current


Journalists and academics with no direct experience in the intelligence profession often do not let their lack of knowledge of the subject stand in the way of making critical analyses of the profession’s performance. Richard Posner acknowledges that though criticism of the intelligence business by a federal judge might seem presumptuous, but “an outsider’s perspective can be valuable.” He is right, of course, and in *Countering Terrorism*, his third book addressing intelligence reform, he argues provocatively that “Kulturkampf [culture conflict]...is the biggest impediment to improving domestic intelligence, dominated by the FBI despite the bureau’s permeation by a culture of criminal investigations that is incompatible with the effective conduct of national security intelligence.” (xii) In short, he recommends that a separate MI5-like organization be formed to meet “the growing danger of homegrown terrorism.” The FBI is not suited to the task, he suggests: “Criminal law enforcement...has shown that it has only a limited value against terrorism.” The role of the FBI, with its arrest powers, should be similar to that of the British Special Branch.(xii)

Posner questions the view that because we are at war “we simply don’t have time to establish a new national security agency.”(12) Precedent, he argues, suggests otherwise. The creation of OSS, NSA, the National Counterterrorist Center, Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence during periods of conflict makes his point.

The balance of the book discusses the organizational, managerial and leadership problems that would have to be overcome to achieve his goal. He presents a series of benchmarks in the form of questions that have to be answered before a decision is made; e.g., is the proposed change an improvement over what currently exists? His answer is yes because “we are overinvested in criminal law as a weapon against terrorism. Excessive legalism in the form of what I call warrant fetishism is also preventing us from dealing imaginatively with privacy and civil liberties concerns that domestic electronic surveillance arouses.” Judge Posner concludes by providing answers to his benchmark questions. His judgment is that the FBI and DHS do not “understand that intelligence is an alternative, as well as an adjunct, to law enforcement and military force” and that “congressional oversight of the reorganized system” is not adequate. In sum, Posner is convinced that creating a new MI5-like organization with only a security

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
and counterintelligence mission is necessary to achieve effective domestic counterterrorism efforts. One aspect not considered is the level of personal and organizational disruption that creating another new intelligence organization would entail and the time required for it to become proficient.

Countering Terrorism is a thoughtful and very detailed explication of Judge Posner's position; it is worth very serious consideration.


Cicero, the Roman lawyer and orator, wrote "In time of war, the laws fall silent." Editors Born and Caparini have recast this view in modern terms, asking: "whether protecting the security of the state should trump all other objectives and values in society...and preclude any constraints on it?" (4) Nine of the 15 articles in the Democratic Control of Intelligence Services examine the issue from the viewpoints of four Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Norway) and five from the former Soviet bloc (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). Two articles discuss the fundamental principles of oversight—the law, accountability, freedom of information, data protection—and the need for intelligence. With regard to oversight, which is defined broadly as "management," they stress the importance of internal controls by inspectors general, as well as those applied by the executive and congressional or parliamentary committees.

The chapters on the former Soviet bloc countries are particularly interesting. They discuss the degrees of progress made since independence, emphasizing the extent to which the principles above have been achieved in each nation and what remains to be done on domestic security and foreign intelligence reforms. The chapters on the Western countries review the procedures and institutions in place to assure democratic control of intelligence and the problems that led to their creation. With the exception of France, each country formed parliamentary oversight committees after questionable conduct by one of its intelligence agencies. In France, while the need for such oversight is recognized, the National Assembly has not endorsed the formation of an oversight commission.

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The final chapter reviews the common problems of implementing effective democratic and parliamentary oversight of intelligence, the need for international cooperation, and the lessons learned from the accounts presented. It concludes with proposals for strengthening oversight while maintaining a balance between secrecy and transparency.

While the Democratic Control of Intelligence Services looks closely at what has been and what needs to be done, it does not address the practical problem of the qualifications of those doing the oversight. Nevertheless, it is a valuable book that demonstrates the difficulty of acquiring needed intelligence while protecting basic human rights.


Joseph Stalin rejected intelligence analysis: “Don’t tell me what you think, give me the facts and the source!” CIA analyst Sherman Kent countered: “There is no substitute for the intellectually competent human..., who through firsthand knowledge and study” recommends what facts should be presented to the decisionmaker. Kent went on to say his criterion applied to collectors and analysts. Dr. Robert Clark, a former CIA analyst, takes the next step with his target-centric approach—a collaborative analytical network for successful analysis involving contributions from all “stakeholders” associated with the target issue. His approach begins with an explanation of a model that describes what is known and not known about the target’s functions or behavior. The concept of a model is illustrated using a WW II operation made famous in Ewen Montagu’s The Man Who Never Was. In that case, the Germans, convinced of the veracity of inaccurate data deceptively supplied by British intelligence about the invasion of Sicily, altered their troop dispositions. For the operation to have worked, MI5 planners had to model how the Germans thought and operated and the most likely conditions that would lead to the desired German responses.

The second part of the book discusses methods for creating a model—some quite complex, though well illustrated. It also examines sources of data, the techniques of data evaluation, the risks of deception, and the importance of validation. The third part includes six chapters on predictive analysis and cover techniques, organizational issues, and technological aspects. The final chapter deals with the qualities that analysts and customers must have to increase the likelihood of understanding, if not agree-

ment. This is a matter of speaking truth to power when the superiors with whom analysts must work think of themselves as analysts of at least equal ability. The two appendices illustrate the importance of differences in analytical approach in two National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs): one from 1990 on the future of Yugoslavia, the other from October 2002 on WMD in Iraq that was based on inadequate treatment of multidisciplinary factors and poorly validated evidence.

Intelligence Analysis is a fine treatment of contemporary analytic trade-craft that makes clear why the analyst has one of the toughest jobs in the profession.


Marquette history professor Athan Theoharis introduces his new book by agreeing with the 9/11 Commission that CIA and FBI failures to cooperate, share information, and analyze intelligence properly were among the factors that contributed to the disaster. But he strongly opposes the corrective action recommended—“a more centralized bureaucracy, headed by a DNI.” (4, 267) Theoharis views such an approach as part of the “quest for absolute security,” a phrase never used by the committee, that would place undesirable limits on human rights. (4) History, he suggests, does not support the commission’s conclusion on centralization. On the contrary, he claims, increased centralization will only lead to more abuses by the intelligence agencies. The balance of the book attempts to make the point. It fails.

The Quest for Absolute Security begins with a summary of the national security background that led to the creation of the FBI. Succeeding chapters review well-known espionage cases, civil rights policies, congressional investigations, and bureaucratic rivalries associated with the coming of WW II, the Cold War, the post–Cold War period, and 9/11. Professor Theoharis discusses each era’s many failures, violations or abuses attributed to the Bureau and, to a lesser extent, OSS and CIA. But he presents nothing to demonstrate that either the successes or mistakes cited actually occurred in the search for “absolute security,” an objective even the author admits is unrealistic. Moreover, he offers nothing to suggest that the many difficulties he recounts resulted from centralized control and are thus likely to be repeated under a DNI. Poor management, political interference, frequent mission modifications, fluctuating budgets, and long learning curves are equally likely explanations for the problems he cites though none are mentioned. To avoid the problems he foresees under the new centralization, Professor Theoharis offers a solution: “stricter congressional oversight.” He will probably see that happen, but not for the reasons he suggests.
Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.), *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 385 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

The need for intelligence reform in democratic nations is an unchallenged assumption of *Reforming Intelligence*. The editors point out that there are no studies or benchmark models for determining when the reformers have got it right. They propose applying a modified version of the familiar “civil-military relations (CMR)” model to civil-intelligence relations as a framework for analysis and judgment. The need for modification follows because only two of the three basic elements of CMR—civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency—can be applied; efficiency cannot be assessed because of “the essential, fundamental requirement for secrecy” applied to budgets and related potential performance measures. The 13 chapters of the book are written by a mix of academics and intelligence officers. They include a review of the processes by which information becomes intelligence in democratic societies, followed by studies that discuss democratic control and effectiveness in three Western nations—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—and seven “new democracies”—Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, Romania, South Africa, Russia, and the Philippines. Three chapters are devoted to the United States. They discuss oversight—internal, congressional and judicial—and obstacles to reform. The final chapter compares the “development of controls” and the effectiveness achieved among the various countries dealing with reform.

The problems discussed are different for each nation as indicated by the following examples. Oversight in France, as Professor Douglas Porch points out, is restricted by the persistence of traditional military influence over its intelligence agencies. Romania, according to Cristiana Matei, has yet to break free of “the cultural legacy of prior regimes.” Civilian control in Russia, as described by Mikhail Tsypkin, is complicated by terrorism and “a KGB/FSB/SVR mindset.” In each case, the general solution suggested is an informed populace, better oversight, and accountability. For comparison, former CIA general counsel Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Bryan Pate provide a detailed historical review of oversight in America that suggests the possible need for permanent judicial review commissions that “might enhance public confidence.”

*Reforming Intelligence* does not demonstrate that the CMR model is any help in solving intelligence reform issues. And its claims that assessing performance is greatly limited by secrecy are not supported. To its credit, the book leaves no doubt about the complexity of oversight issues. It is well documented, well written, and should serve as a foundation for studying this persistent problem.

In her first book, *Flawed By Design*, UCLA professor Amy Zegart argued that the CIA “was never supposed to engage in spying,”(163) that “the agency was given no authority to engage in covert activities of any sort be it collecting intelligence or conducting subversive political activities abroad,” (187) and that “CIA failures were an inevitable consequence of the way [it was] structured” at the outset. (231)6 Citing statutory evidence, historians promptly noted that the first two propositions were flawed by inaccuracy.7 But the idea that organizational structure was the principal determinant of CIA failures could not be disproved and had daunting implications as a harbinger of failures to come.

Professor Zegart returns to this topic in *Spying Blind*. She begins by defining organization as having three components, “cultures, incentives, and structures...that critically influence what government agencies do and how well they do it.”(1) Zegart then develops a model for making comparisons with three performance factors: “the nature of organizations, rational self interest, and the fragmented federal government.”(Chapter 2) She then loosely applies the model to the CIA and FBI before 9/11, allowing for influences by contributing factors such as their failure to adapt to change, congressional interference, budget cuts, staff reductions, and mission realignment. In the case of the CIA, Zegart finds that “the agency did not miss some of the eleven opportunities it had to potentially disrupt the September 11 attacks. They [sic] missed them all.”(119) She treats the FBI similarly but more gently. It had “twelve known chances to follow leads that hinted at impending disaster. In each case, FBI officials missed the lucky break.”(168) How did this happen? Zegart’s answer for both cases is “organizational weakness” or “organizational factors.” But she does not offer convincing evidence, e.g., bureaucratic fragmentation or frequent managerial change, to prove these assertions or to make them more convincing than explanations rooted in poor decision making by analysts and managers.

The final chapter summarizes her views on the unsettled Intelligence Community. In the process she introduces topics not dealt with in depth previously. For example, she calls for “fundamental changes in analysis,” though she offers no specifics. As to human intelligence capabilities, which she does discuss briefly in chapter 4, she claims that there has been “little progress since 9/11...because the agency’s approach to improving human intelligence has focused primarily on increasing the number of spies rather than on improving quality or dramatically increasing nontraditional recruitment models to penetrate terrorist groups.” Here too she offers little

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evidence. In short, while she has enumerated some problems facing the Intelligence Community, their causes and her recommended solutions to them remain problematical. Few will challenge her basic conclusion that “organization matters.”(196) That was a given from the outset. But the “why and how” it matters more than or as much as other competing parameters is not proved.

At no time does Professor Zegart question the need for intelligence agencies. Her conclusion is that “The United States’ ability to protect itself hinges on whether U.S. intelligence agencies built for a different enemy at a different time can adapt.”(197) Spying Blind is a thought-provoking, detailed analysis of current problems that takes historical precedent and the judgments of many distinguished thinkers into account. Whether it is a correct assessment of cause and effect and the solutions it recommends is a question that remains unanswered.

General Intelligence


This supplement to the 2,444 entries in the second edition of Whaley’s Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception adds 253 new items and revises 49 others. Several of the new entries in the supplement are themselves bibliographies, and they contain 4,000 more titles on various topics, for example, counterfeit coins and paper currency, mimicry, true names of authors of anonymously written works, and myth and fraud in archeology. Several entries discuss instances in which previous claims about fakes and forgeries were incorrect. Whaley notes in the introduction that while many titles are seemingly redundant, his annotations identify the “more accurate and detailed pieces that contribute fresh data, new methods, or original theories.” He adds that the noticeable variance in formats of the entries is intentional in order to avoid the loss of data that might occur if a standard format were introduced. Other entry features include a five-star rating system and keywords that indicate the “styles of logical detection” in the item. For example, the word medicine indicates an analogy with medical practice; the word fiction indicates an entry in which a fictional story is used to make a point. A searchable CD of the Supplement is included at the back. This is another valuable contribution from the pre-eminent bibliographer in the field.

Former CIA officer Ransom Clark has written a book with the intention of providing "those who are interested in watching or even participating in the intelligence business enough background and context to assist in making reasoned evaluations of on-going and future activities." (vii) *Intelligence and National Security* does just that. It is a primer that discusses the definition of intelligence; its historical evolution since the Revolutionary War; how it is collected, analyzed, and disseminated; the security and counterintelligence aspects of the process; and the role of covert action. Examples and brief case studies are included on each topic. The final chapter, "Where Do We Go From Here," addresses accountability, the role of Congress, and the impact of recent reforms. Clark concludes by noting that "structural and substantive changes are two different matters. New boxes on organizational charts do not generate new intelligence or change mindsets in evaluating data. New layers of bureaucracy do not speed up the flow of information." Improvements in these areas require good people. Clark has provided a sound basis for assessing the controversies surrounding intelligence today. It is a valuable contribution that should be very helpful to those studying or anticipating a future in the profession.


Second editions can result from demand pressures, changes in subject matter detail, and/or the availability of new material. This anthology responds in part to the latter two criteria. It has changed its name;8 added two articles, increasing the number to 38; and deleted some earlier contributions while adding new ones on satellite surveillance, warrantless wiretaps, and events since 9/11. The other nine parts address definitions—still no consensus here—the functions described in the so-called intelligence cycle as applied by selected intelligence community organizations, plus politicization, counterintelligence, accountability, oversight, and covert action. The new article on "warrantless wiretaps" deserves attention although it has little to do with wiretapping, and everything to do with electronic intercepts. But it does present a variety of viewpoints, including those of Alan Dershowitz.

Two areas were neglected in the new edition. The first is the index, which does not include the additions. The second is articles in need of updating. For example, the article on open source intelligence makes no mention of

the new Open Source Center created under the DNI, but it does state that the DNI “has chosen to remain focused on secrets for the president,” whatever that means. More generally, this article does not reflect a grasp of the current or past approach to open source information. Another example is the article on counterintelligence, which still has a correctable definitional problem. Executive Order 12333 has defined counterintelligence and security as distinct functions, but the description given in this volume subordinates security to CI.

This anthology is not a collection of the “right” answers to persistent and often controversial intelligence issues. But it does lay the foundation for sensible discussion, and that argues strongly for reading it closely.

**Historical**


Sergei Turanov, Comrade Jean, and Comrade J were among the codenames used by Sergei Tretyakov, a KGB and SVR intelligence officer until he defected to the United States in October 2000 with his wife and daughter. KGB defections were not uncommon during the Cold War, although they dropped sharply as their utility diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new Russian government abolished the KGB and established a separate foreign intelligence service now designated the SVR. Sergei Tretyakov is the first member of this service to defect to the United States. He sought out Pete Earley to tell his story because Earley had written two fine books about American traitors, John Walker who was a KGB agent, and Aldrich Ames, who spied for the KGB and the SVR.

In *Comrade J*, we learn that Tretyakov’s childhood goal was to be a KGB officer like his father. To this end, he learned French and English, graduated from the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages, where he was spotted by the KGB. Formally recruited after graduation, he joined the CPSU and attended the Red Banner Institute, where he learned the tradecraft of his chosen profession. After a boring assignment in Moscow, where hard work and additional duties for the party earned him good marks, he was sent to Canada. Inspired by the Gorbachev reforms, he succeeded in recruiting several important agents and gained the attention of the right people at KGB headquarters. After the coup of 1991, his dissatisfaction increased and in Canada he and his wife considered not returning to Russia, an option they at first rejected because of the impact the move would have on family members at home. After a year back in Moscow during which he watched as several of his colleagues were arrested and executed as CIA agents (thanks to Ames), Tretyakov was assigned to the New York Residency in April 1995. He never returned to Russia.
For the traditional reasons of security, the details of his defection are not revealed in Comrade J. Earley does describe some of Tretyakov's operations in Canada and America with emphasis on sources developed and agents recruited, some of whom he names. In the category of "special unofficial contact," he mentions former US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbot, stressing that Talbot was not an agent and implying that the SVR did not realize that their contacts with him were routine, not secret communications. Tretyakov also reported on the SVR penetrations of the United Nations and the operations and personnel of the SVR residencies to which he was assigned. Tretyakov's descriptions of bureaucratic infighting and his functions as deputy resident and later as acting resident suggest that in some respects the profession has changed little from KGB days.

Of particular interest from the US point of view, the book reveals that for three years before his defection in October 2000 Tretyakov worked for the FBI, providing details of residency operations and personnel. Ten months before his defection, the FBI encouraged him to leave but could not tell him the reason: it was hunting a mole who might learn about him. When Tretyakov's defection became public on 30 January 2001 and Robert Hanssen was arrested on 18 February 2001, the press presumed Tretyakov was the one who gave him up. The FBI assured Earley that this was not the case.

Finally, as with all unsourced defector memoirs, one must deal with the question of accuracy. In this case, the narrative contains two technical errors worth noting: (1) reference to Tretyakov as a double agent is incorrect, and (2) the statement that the CIA calls its employees "agents" is wrong.(48) Recognizing that independent assessment of Tretyakov's story is desirable, Earley includes a chapter with comments from "a high-ranking US intelligence official" that addresses the kinds of material Tretyakov provided and affirms that it included names and "saved American lives." Further detail is attributed to other "intelligence sources," as, for example, the fact that the bug planted in the State Department conference room in the late 1990s had a "miniature battery...recharged with a laser beam."(323) If correct, someone would have had to have line-of-sight access to the battery, but no comment is made on this point.

In the end, although Earley has provided another well told espionage case study, he leaves the curious hoping for a second volume containing more details of Tretyakov's work for US intelligence.


Herodotus, Cicero's pater historiae, is said by modern historians to have been generally "fair-minded and balanced...if not always entirely accurate," even though there is not a source note in Herodotus's book, The His-
The FBI: A History has source notes and still meets these criteria, with one significant revisionist exception. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, a professor of American history at Edinburgh University, begins by noting the "richness as a source" of the FBI case files and then writes, "I have tried to produce a work from the standpoint that is liberated from the bureau's filing system...in the context of broader historical currents." The currents he chooses are racism and civil liberties. And to show that both have long been driving factors in Bureau history, Professor Jeffreys-Jones changes the date the FBI was formed as the Bureau of Investigation, from 1908 to 1871!(3) This liberty is justified, he tells readers, because the Bureau "has long been...an unjust organization," where "prejudice ran deeper than the nation at large." The first two chapters of the book use this historical sleight of hand to discuss "Bureau history" over a period of nearly 38 years before it was formed.

The remaining chapters of The FBI present a balanced review of the FBI's organization and functions from its creation in 1908 to the present. Its scope is broader than that of Raymond Batvinis's The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, which focused on counterintelligence until mid-WW II. But it is topically similar to Athan Theoharis's The Quest for Absolute Security (see above): bureaucratic battles, espionage, security, political surveillance, communist threat, Cold War, post-Cold War change, and possible 9/11 reforms. One exceptional topic is race relations, which Jeffreys-Jones mentions from time to time, although not nearly as often as his introductory remarks suggest. For example, both Theoharis and Jeffreys-Jones discuss adjustments in the FBI counterintelligence mission that President Roosevelt approved in 1939. Theoharis sees the consequences in terms of actions against subversives. Jeffreys-Jones, on the other hand, suggests that "historians must try and gauge the significance of the 1939 reform, not just for the FBI, but for the history of race relations."(98) In the realm of civil liberties, Jeffreys-Jones is overly concerned about the impact of a "Gestapo Factor"—fear of knocks on doors at night and unlawful surveillance—that some in the United States expressed after WW II.

Jeffreys-Jones devotes considerable attention to investigations from the Church Committee to the 9/11 Commission and how Hoover's successors tried to implement reforms, a task complicated, he suggests, by frequent unplanned high-level personnel changes in the Intelligence Community. To be fair, The FBI: A History, also mentions the FBI's achievements, the role of Robert Lamphere in the VENONA case being a good example. But some of the book's claims are factually incorrect: the FBI did not initiate the investigation that uncovered Aldrich Ames; it joined in after the CIA had done so.(223) With respect to the Robert Hanssen case, Hanssen was not arrested at "a dead-drop site in Tysons Corner"; Vienna, Virginia, de-

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serves that honor. Likewise, Hanssen did not ask, “What took you so long?” when captured. (226) Finally, the Wen Ho Lee case was not a product of racial bias. (224)

Jeffreys-Jones is not optimistic about the FBI’s future. The organization, he asserts, has “always been a showcase for human frailties and bitter controversies, and no reformer could reasonably expect to change that.” (253) What he does not seem to recognize, however, is that operational success is at least as dependent on professional competency, which even he admits is high. In short, the Bureau’s track record does not support the professor’s assessment.


In 2005, the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences sponsored a conference at Trinity College in Dublin on intelligence from ancient to contemporary times. This volume contains 15 of the papers presented. Three of the authors are from the United States, one is from Scotland, and the balance from Ireland. All are academics with solid credentials. Seven articles discuss the history of Irish intelligence over four centuries, a fascinating topic little reported in literature. One on Anglo-Scottish relations in medieval times considers the familiar question: Did intelligence matter? Another describes intelligence during the last Chinese dynasty, which ended in 1911. Others include intelligence in India at the turn of the 20th century, in Rome during the reign of Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98–117), Stalin’s use of intelligence in WW II, British covert action against Egypt after the Suez crisis of 1956, and the role ambassadors played in intelligence in Renaissance Italy. The final contribution deals with intelligence during the current conflict in Iraq.

It should come as no surprise that espionage in ancient times has many similarities to today’s enterprise, although the penalties for an agent’s failure are less drastic now. Likewise, as Christopher Andrew notes in his foreword, speaking truth to power, whether in Soviet times under Stalin, in Saddam’s Iraq, or during the war on terror, has always been a challenge for those in intelligence work. The broad historical perspective of this volume on what works and what does not in intelligence will be of value to students of the profession as they search for answers to today’s intelligence problems.

With the publication of The Ultra Secret in 1974, the world learned that British codebreakers had broken the secret traffic produced by the German Enigma machine. This achievement aided the British victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, allowed the allies to monitor German military movements, and made possible the successful Double Cross operation that identified all German agents in Britain and allowed MI5 to turn many into double agents. What was not reported then and not formally and officially recognized until 2005, was that three Polish cryptographers had broken the code in 1933 and given their results to the British just before WW II. One of the cryptographers was lost in France before he could get to Britain. The other two worked with the British throughout the war. One stayed in Britain after the war, where his contributions went unacknowledged. The third, Marian Rejewski, returned to his family in Poland where he hoped to finish his PhD, but the communist government prevented him from achieving this goal. He died in 1980.

Living With the Enigma Secret is a collection of reminiscences in Rejewski’s honor. A contribution by Rejewski’s daughter gives biographic details and reveals that her father wrote and published an article in 1967 about his breaking the Enigma: no notice was taken. Then, in 1973, French cryptographer Gustave Bertrand published a book telling of Rejewski’s role. It too went unnoticed in the West. Other articles in this book describe the role of the Polish security services prior to WW II, provide details of just how the Poles contacted the British and made available the Enigma secret, and reveal Rejewski’s treatment by the Polish communist security services. French historian, Colonel Frederic Guelton, adds a short piece on the French participation in the Polish “cracking the Enigma.” (265) The final article, by David Kahn, explains the value of Enigma in the Battle of the Atlantic. The book concludes with a detailed chronology of Rejewski’s life.

Living With the Enigma Secret is an important, long overdue contribution to the history of cryptology and sets straight the record of Marian Rejewski’s role.

Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of

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Strategic Services (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 458 pp., footnotes, bibliography, appendix, index.

At first glance the idea that OSS played a role in the Nuremburg war crimes trials seems an impossibility since the organization was abolished before the trials began. But in a sense it is accurate. During the war, OSS established a war crimes staff that grew to 130 analysts and assembled data on individuals that might be tried after the war. This staff remained in Nuremburg after the war as part of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) that replaced OSS. Most of this very detailed book dwells on its contribution and the participants involved. One of its major themes is the controversy surrounding the granting of immunity to suspected war criminals who might have been of help to the Allies in the post-war world in which the Soviet Union was viewed as the next threat. One example looked at in detail is the case of SS General Karl Wolff, who cooperated with Allen Dulles in Operation Sunrise, an operation that was intended to bring the war in Italy to a close before a German surrender. For his efforts, Wolff escaped trial at Nuremberg, and this book examines “the trenchant moral judgments regarding Wolff’s alleged immunity from prosecution” (5) in terms of evidence found since the decision was made.

The book details the involvement in Nuremberg of OSS Director William Donovan, who during the war planned on an OSS role in any war crimes trial. After his dismissal in 1945, Donovan was assigned to the Nuremberg trials as deputy to Robert Jackson, the principal trial judge. Donovan had definite views on the trials’ handling, and they conflicted sharply with Jackson’s. For example, Donovan argued that the basis for prosecution of military war criminals should be documents and direct testimony, an approach Jackson rejected for the use, inter alia, of films of the concentration camps. The book mentions that former OSS officer Franz Neumann helped Donovan in these matters, although Salter does not point out that Neumann was a Soviet agent.

According to Salter, before the differences with Jackson led to Donovan’s dismissal, he conducted a series of one-on-one negotiations with Herman Goering. Salter alleges that Donovan urged Goering to accept responsibility for all the Nazi war crimes in order to expedite Goering’s sentencing and execution. The top leaders would be tried at Nuremberg while most former Nazis would be tried under German law by German courts. The idea is said to have been unacceptable to Jackson. Unfortunately this story, while interesting, is not well documented.13

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13 The source Salter uses for this story is Richard Dunlop, DONOVAN: America's Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982). Unfortunately Dunlop does not document this point. Neither Slater nor Dunlop explains how Donovan, who did not speak German, could have had “one-on-one” conversations with Goering, who did not speak English.
Nazi War Crimes is an unexpected and important contribution to OSS history. It is comprehensive and with the exception noted, thoroughly documented with primary sources. And it adds a new chapter to the life of the legendary “Wild Bill” Donovan.

Intelligence Services Abroad


K. Sankaran Nair, Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss (New Delhi, Manus Publications, 2008), index.

History has always been important to retired Indian intelligence officer B. Raman. In Kaoboys of R&AW, citing the CIA “historical division” precedent, (27) he reveals that in 1983 Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of India’s foreign intelligence service—the Research & Analysis Wing—established a historical section. Unfortunately, it was abolished in 1984 when Kao left office. Raman was not surprised; he knew that in India organizational change often followed new leadership. Raman had joined the Indian Police Service in 1961 and was transferred in 1967 to the External Division of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), then India’s foreign intelligence element. He became a Kaoboy when R&AW was established as an independent entity in 1968. After assignments in Paris and Geneva, he headed the Counter-Terrorism Division from 1988 to 1994 and then retired to accept a cabinet secretariat position, where he served on various antiterrorism commissions and testified twice before the US Congress. After his permanent retirement, citing the precedents set by retired CIA officers, he decided to write these memoirs.

Kaoboys of R&AW tells about India’s struggle to develop a full range of intelligence service capabilities while at war with Pakistan and China and while managing conflicts among religious factions and dealing with tribal disputes on its borders. Raman also examines charges of CIA disinformation campaigns and covert action operations against India, R&AW efforts to counter domestic and foreign terrorist acts, and the constant turf battles with the Indian domestic intelligence service, the IB.

The book has two central themes. The first is the relationship of R&AW to the prime ministers under which it served, and the problems created when two of them were assassinated. Those unfamiliar with India get a sense of its political history. The second theme is the pervasive threat to national security from Pakistan and separatist groups as well as the actions taken to deal with provocations and incidents. Raman does not provide opera-
tional detail in terms of tradecraft or case studies. There is a chapter on R&AW relations with foreign intelligence agencies that concentrates on high-level contacts with the CIA and French services. An example of the latter is a visit to the CIA by Kao where he is received positively by DCI George Bush. He views the relationship with the CIA as a mix of cooperation when interests coincide and the reality of the operational imperative. As an example of the latter, he mentions instances in which the CIA recruited two R&AW officers. He does not mention the reverse possibility.

Kaoboys of R&AW gives a good high-level overview of the formation, evolution, and current status of the Indian intelligence services.

In his earlier book, Intelligence, Raman presents a survey of Indian intelligence from colonial times, when the IB was created (he calls it the “world’s second oldest internal security agency”—the French being the first)—to the present eight intelligence agencies that form India’s intelligence community. His approach is topical, covering all elements of modern intelligence—military, political, technical, collection, analysis, covert action, counterintelligence, oversight, and management of the intelligence process. For comparison, he often refers to the experience of US intelligence agencies and the commissions formed to investigate them. For example, as a basis for establishing India’s military intelligence element, he cites in great detail the precedents of DIA’s formation and its evolution. (31–36) Similarly, the NSA, NRO, NGA and related agencies provide the rationale for counterparts in India. When discussing the requirement for good counterintelligence, examples from the UK are cited and the Aldrich Ames case is analyzed as an exemplar of what should and should not be done.

In short, Raman’s Intelligence is a textbook by an experienced intelligence officer who certainly understands the fundamental elements of the profession and provides a framework for successful operations, not only in India, but in any democratic society.

K. Sankaran Nair’s Inside IB & RAW does not deserve the professional attention Raman’s books have received. Although the dust jacket claims Nair served as a head of R&AW, in fact, he held the post for less than 3 months in the 1970s. (174) He spent more time in the IB, and the book has some interesting stories about his attempts in the 1960s to advise recently formed African nations about security services. Overall, though, he provides little beyond anecdotal “scribblings”(95) focusing on personal episodes and dealings with his superiors that are of no great intelligence value. It is a memoir covering his entire life, and while it no doubt recounts some impressive political accomplishments, it is primarily of local interest and a minor contribution to the intelligence literature.

When in 1992, Victor Ostrovsky attempted to publish By Way of Deception, a book that revealed his adventures as a Mossad officer, the Israeli government obtained an injunction against the Canadian publisher. The process was repeated for an American edition. Ostrovsky fought back, and both editions were eventually published. The publicity made them best sellers and confirmed his former status. Now, Michael Ross, claiming the same credentials, has followed a similar path, but with no comment from Israel.

Volunteer is the story of Canadian Michael Ross, who went to Europe to see some of the world after completing military service. On impulse he went to Israel. There he worked on a kibbutz, learned Hebrew, converted to Judaism, married an Israeli, and was recruited by the Mossad in 1988 where he served until 2001. Ross tells in considerable detail of his training before describing missions in Africa, Europe, South East Asia, and the United States. There also were missions in the Middle East against terrorist groups “to foil attempts by Syria, Libya, and Iran to acquire advanced weapons technology.”(vii) He describes assignments at Mossad headquarters and as liaison with the FBI and CIA, in which he has unflattering remarks to make about the late CIA officer Stan Moskowitz that suggest Ross did not know him at all.

Life in the field was too much for Ross's marriage, and he divorced, became estranged from his children, and suffered “depression, anger, compulsive behaviors, posttraumatic syndrome, and general alienation.”(viii) But, he tells the reader, he still admires the Mossad and all it stands for. Ross says at the outset that much of his book is “nominally secret,” adding, with a touch of arrogance, that his former colleagues need not worry, as he has left out anything that in his “judgment” might “compromise” them.(viii)

Volunteers has been published in the United States and in Canada, but the latter version lacks a chapter titled, Failure To Launch, that tells of Ross’s work against Hamas with FBI-CIA contacts. No explanation is given. Both editions lack documentation. We are left with a well written story book that asks the reader to “trust me,” but provides little reason to do so.

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