Libya: Background and U.S. Relations

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Summary

Libyan-U.S. rapprochement has unfolded gradually since 2003, when the Libyan government accepted responsibility for the actions of its personnel in regard to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs. In response, U.S. sanctions were gradually removed, and, on May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya’s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, 2006 when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy. Libya was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and states not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in June 2006.

From June 2006 through July 2008, U.S.-Libyan re-engagement was hindered by disagreements over outstanding legal claims related to U.S. citizens killed or injured in past Libyan-sponsored or supported terrorist attacks. Administration officials argued that broader normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations would provide opportunities for the United States to address specific issues of potential concern to Congress, including the outstanding legal claims, political and economic reform, the development of Libyan energy resources, and human rights. However, Congress took several steps to limit U.S.-Libyan re-engagement as a means of encouraging the Libyan government to settle outstanding terrorism cases in good faith prior to further normalization.

On May 29, 2008, the U.S. Department of State and the Libyan government announced that they had begun negotiating the terms of a “claims settlement agreement” for outstanding legal cases. In conjunction with apparent progress in U.S.-Libyan negotiations, on July 31, Congress passed S. 3370, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, which authorizes the creation of an entity with legal immunity to receive settlement funds from Libya and distribute them to U.S. plaintiffs. The Administration’s certification of the receipt of sufficient funds would result in the rescission of the applicability of the provisions of Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, to Libya. Section 1083 altered the legal environment in which terrorism cases involving Libya are being considered by amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611) to make Libyan property subject to attachment in relation to damages awarded to plaintiffs.

The subsequent signing on August 14, 2008 of a bilateral agreement to resolve terrorism-related legal claims and the September 5 visit of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Tripoli appear to have cleared the way for the long-awaited opening of a new chapter in U.S.-Libya relations.

This report provides background information on Libya and U.S.-Libyan relations; profiles Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi; discusses Libya’s political and economic reform efforts; and reviews current issues of potential congressional interest. It will be updated to reflect major developments.
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Recent Developments

On July 31, 2008, Congress adopted S. 3370, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, which states the support of Congress for “the President in his efforts to provide fair compensation to all nationals of the United States who have terrorism-related claims against Libya through a comprehensive settlement of claims by such nationals against Libya pursuant to an international agreement between the United States and Libya as a part of the process of restoring normal relations between Libya and the United States.” The bill authorizes the Secretary of State to create an entity with legal immunity to receive settlement funds from Libya and distribute them to U.S. plaintiffs. President Bush signed the act on August 4, 2008 (P.L. 110-301).

Under the terms of the act, once the Administration certifies the receipt by the claims entity of sufficient funds from Libya, several terrorism liability provisions will no longer be applicable to Libya, including Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008. Section 1083 altered the legal environment in which terrorism cases involving Libya are being considered by amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611) to make Libyan property subject to attachment in relation to potential damage awards. The passage of S. 3370 and the signing of a bilateral claims resolution agreement on August 14, 2008 laid the groundwork for the resolution of outstanding legal claims, which have delayed a full reestablishment of U.S. Libyan relations since Libya was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2006.

Section 654 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764, signed December 26, 2007), prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds “to finance directly any assistance for Libya,” unless the Secretary of State certifies “that the Government of Libya has made the final settlement payments to the Pan Am 103 victims’ families, paid to the LaBelle Disco bombing victims the agreed upon settlement amounts, and is engaging in good faith settlement discussions regarding other relevant terrorism cases.” A certification issued pursuant to S. 3370 would satisfy the Section 654 requirement. Standing terrorism liability provisions will continue to apply to Libya until a certification is issued.

The Administration requested $1.15 million in FY2008 assistance for Libya and is requesting $1.1 million for FY2009 military education and training and border security assistance.

On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement urging “the Libyan government to fulfill their promise to release without condition” prominent political activist Fathi el Jahmi. As of September 2008, El Jahmi remained detained and was reported to be in poor health.
Background and Recent History

The north African territory that now composes the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirriya has a long cultural history as a center of Phoenician, Carthaginian, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya’s distinct regions and tribally-influenced society create a complex political environment that is made up of diverse constituencies from northwestern Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica, and the more remote southwestern Fezzan (see Figure 1). Significant economic and political changes have occurred since Libya became independent in 1951. These changes have been fueled by the country’s emergence from Italian colonization, the discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves, and the domination of political life by the authoritarian government of Muammar Al Qadhafi, who overthrew the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969. The legacies of anti-Italian insurgency and World War II combat, international pressures associated with the Cold War, and complex relationships with Arab and African neighbors have all shaped Libya’s development. See Appendix A for a discussion of Libya’s pre-Qadhafi history, other background information, and a list of historical resources.

Figure 1. Map of Libya

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

1 The Arabic word jamahirriya means “state of the masses” or “peoples’ authority” and was added to Libya’s official name in 1978 by Col. Muammar Qadhafi to reflect Libya’s nominally decentralized political system. The adjective ‘great’ was added in 1986.

2 Multiple spellings of Muammar Al Qadhafi’s first and last names are used in the Western press. This report uses a phonetic spelling; others reflect varying pronunciations.
The Qadhafi Era

On September 1, 1969, a cabal of Libyan military officers led by army Captain Muammar al Qadhafi seized important government institutions in the eastern city of Benghazi and abolished the Libyan monarchy. Facing negligible internal resistance, the leadership of the Movement, known as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), established authority and announced that it would direct the activities of a new cabinet. The RCC also made statements affirming Libya’s Arab and Islamic identity and its support for the Palestinian people. After renaming the country the Libyan Arab Republic, the RCC announced the promotion of Captain Qadhafi to Colonel and named him commander in chief of Libya’s armed forces. Like Qadhafi, the other members of the RCC were pan-Arabist and socialist ideologues from rural and somewhat marginalized communities. The United States did not oppose the 1969 coup, as the RCC initially presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform.

Colonel Qadhafi and the RCC focused intensely in their early years in power on taking steps to safeguard “national independence” and consolidate their rule through populist and nationalist political and economic programs. The members of the RCC were determined to secure the immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970, respectively. Italian expatriates were expelled and their assets were confiscated on October 7, 1970. All three dates subsequently were declared national holidays. The new government also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies to renegotiate oil production contracts and cede a larger share of production revenues. Some British and U.S. oil operations eventually were nationalized. In the early 1970s, the RCC gradually reversed its stance on its initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations, although economic relations, particularly U.S. oil purchases from Libya, remained steady.

The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology. Beginning in the early-1970s, Muammar al Qadhafi and his regime carried out drastic and frequent reorganizations of Libyan political and economic life in line with his “Third Universal Theory.” The theory, which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in Qadhafi’s three volume *Green Book*. The redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions reshaped Libya’s social landscape in line with Qadhafi’s principles. These trends also helped Qadhafi and his supporters maintain political control. Overseas, Qadhafi promoted his political and economic “Third International Theory” as an alternative to the capitalist and communist systems of the United States and the Soviet Union for the developing countries of the Third World. Qadhafi’s confrontation with the United States was both a catalyst for and product of the Libyan government’s violent and destabilizing activities abroad, Qadhafi’s ideological fervor, and his regime’s gradual drift into the Soviet sphere of influence.

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3 Over time, Qadhafi stopped using his military title and identifying himself with a formal government position. Although he retains de facto control over Libya’s affairs, he is now commonly referred to as the “Guide of the Revolution” or “Brother Leader.”
Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States. In line with his ideological precepts, Muammar al Qadhafi long characterized Libyan backing for anti-colonial, separatist, and Islamist movements and terrorist groups around the world as legitimate support for parties seeking self determination. The United States and others categorically and continuously rejected Libya’s policies as unacceptable sponsorship of illegitimate terrorism and subversive violence. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials cited the existence of training camps in Libya and other Libyan government support for a panoply of terrorist groups including the Abu Nidal organization, the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Republican Army. Libyan-sponsored bombings and assassinations also drew sharp international criticism, especially killings of Libyan dissidents and the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772 in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, Libyan-trained individuals led brutal rebel movements across Africa, including Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia.4

Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence. The Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the United States and Qadhafi: Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting armed struggle as the only viable means to end Israel’s occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967. At times, Qadhafi’s positions led to deep bilateral rifts between Libya and Egypt, particularly under Anwar Sadat, as well as confrontations with P.L.O. leader Yasir Arafat. Qadhafi and his security services provided support, training, and safe harbor for Palestinian terrorist groups until the late 1990s. After a temporary reconciliation with Arafat during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, Qadhafi returned to voicing complete opposition to the Oslo peace process and called for Arab leaders to avoid further recognition of or negotiation with Israel.

In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli occupation and settlement activity. He also has called for a “one state solution” based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called ‘Isratine.’ Al Qadhafi restated his opposition to a two-state solution to the conflict during a December 2007 visit to Paris.5

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5 Al Qadhafi was quoted as saying “There should be a single democratic (Israeli-Palestinian) state. Those who call for the creation of two states seek to avoid responsibility in this cause.... It is not possible to create two states in the region... the Palestinians and the Israelis are integrated on the ground... it is not feasible to separate them.” OSC Report (continued...)
**International Isolation and Signs of Change.** Following the imposition of U.N. sanctions in the aftermath of the Libyan-sponsored airliner bombings of the late 1980s, Libya entered a period of increasing international isolation. The compounded effects of a loss of oil revenue, restrictions on the travel of senior officials, an international air travel ban, and an arms embargo brought significant pressure on Qadhafi and his government. Signs of change began to emerge in 1999 when Libya agreed to pay compensation for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and allowed two intelligence agents to stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

Qadhafi’s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and his late 2003 decision to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction and long range missile development programs marked further steps toward new relationships with the United States and the international community. Qadhafi pledged to end his government’s support for violent political movements around the world in December 2003, and the Libyan government has recently participated in peacemaking efforts in a number of African conflicts, including hosting and subsidizing U.N. World Food Program aid flights to Darfur, Sudan from Libyan territory. New oil production agreements and improved relations with the United States and a number of European and Asian countries have demonstrated the tangible benefits of Libya’s apparent new political orientation. Libya was elected as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in October 2007. Libya will hold the seat for 2008 and 2009, and held the Council presidency in January 2008.

**Current Issues in U.S.-Libyan Relations**

The relationship between the United States and Libya has been tense for much of the last thirty-five years but has normalized gradually since late 2003. The Libyan government’s past support for international terrorism, its history of intervention in regional conflicts, and its now-abandoned pursuit of weapons of mass destruction proved to be persistent points of contention with the United States. The Libyan government has long taken issue with what it regards as unbalanced U.S. military and financial support for Israel and what it describes as unwarranted U.S. intervention in the affairs of Arab states. In the past, these differences led to a number of confrontations and engagements between U.S. and Libyan armed forces, the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions by the United States, and, reportedly, some limited, covert U.S. efforts at regime change. As sanctions were removed in recent years, a number of U.S. oil companies successfully bid for reentry into Libya’s energy market, and other U.S. businesses resumed trade relationships with Libyan firms.

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5 (...continued)
FEA20071212451188, December 12, 2007.

The restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya in 2006 was expected to open a new chapter in the bilateral relationship and bring a long period of U.S.-Libyan confrontation to a close. However, until recently, U.S.-Libyan relations remained clouded by mutual frustration. Libyan officials expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and scope of normalization with the United States and alleged that Libya had not gotten what was promised when it decided to abandon weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in 2003. Considerable discontent also remained apparent in some quarters, including among some Members of Congress. New terrorism concerns delayed Libya’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list until 2006, and Libyan engagement with legal counsel and U.S. officials on terrorism cases led to charges that Libya was not acting in good faith to resolve outstanding claims.

Throughout this period, some participants on both sides supported efforts to find an agreeable formula for resolving outstanding issues so that the United States and Libya can reap the potential benefits of a fully normalized relationship. Bilateral negotiations over the terms of a comprehensive settlement agreement bore fruit in the form of a bilateral agreement which Congress has supported by authorizing the creation of an independent entity to manage settlement funds and conditional legal immunity for Libya. The Bush Administration continues to view Libya as a model for potential rapprochement with other state sponsors of terrorism and has sought to establish and expand counterterrorism, military, and economic cooperation with Libyans through foreign operations budget requests. Congress may influence future developments through its consideration of the Administration’s FY2009 foreign operations budget request for Libya, the standing nomination of the U.S. Ambassador-designee to Libya, and future plans to construct a new U.S. embassy in Tripoli.

Reestablishing Normal Bilateral Relations

The reestablishment of normal bilateral relations between the United States and Libya has proceeded incrementally in the wake of Libya’s December 2003 decision to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

- On February 11, 2004, the United States opened a two-person interest section at the Belgian embassy in Tripoli, which was expanded to a larger Liaison Office in June 2004. The White House announced several measures on February 26, 2004, including rescissions on bans on using U.S. passports to travel to or through Libya, and U.S. citizen expenditures in Libya.

- On September 20, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13357 that ended most economic sanctions against Libya, allowed air flights between the two countries, permitted Libyan purchases of U.S.-built aircraft, and released approximately $1 billion in Libyan assets that had been frozen in the United States.

- On September 28, 2005, President Bush issued two waivers of Arms Export Control Act restrictions on the export of defense articles to Libya. The waivers allowed U.S. companies to “possibly
The C-130s remain in storage at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia. They reportedly remain militarily useful, but will require technology upgrades and significant repair. The Administration reportedly has declined to release the planes, but may plan to allow their sale and the return of the proceeds, minus repair and storage costs, to Libya. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Bound to the Ground: Libyan C-130s Still Parked 30 Years After Purchase,” May 2, 2004; and, Renae Merle, “After 30 Years, Libya Can’t Get Its Planes, Might Get Repair Bill,” Washington Post, August 18, 2006.

- On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya’s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to Embassy status.

- On June 30, 2006, one day after the 45-day congressional notification period for the rescission of Libya’s terrorism-related designations ended, the remaining restrictions on U.S. trade with Libya were removed, including the ban on the export of U.S. defense articles. Certain dual-use technology exports remain restricted under revised U.S. Commerce Department national security guidelines.


Prior to the announcement of plans to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya, some Members of Congress vocally supported further U.S. engagement in response to Libya’s decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile development programs. Many Members have welcomed the announced changes, although some Members have been vocal in calling for the Administration to obtain assurances from the Libyan government that it will adequately resolve the outstanding claims of some U.S. terrorism victims. Efforts

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7 The C-130s remain in storage at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia. They reportedly remain militarily useful, but will require technology upgrades and significant repair. The Administration reportedly has declined to release the planes, but may plan to allow their sale and the return of the proceeds, minus repair and storage costs, to Libya. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Bound to the Ground: Libyan C-130s Still Parked 30 Years After Purchase,” May 2, 2004; and, Renae Merle, “After 30 Years, Libya Can’t Get Its Planes, Might Get Repair Bill,” Washington Post, August 18, 2006.


9 After an August 2005 visit to Libya, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Lugar called Libya “an important partner for [the United States] on the war against terrorism,” and indicated that he would “work constructively on the assumption that it’s in our best interest to normalize the relationship, to get an embassy there, to get an ambassador.” Representative Lantos introduced the “United States-Libya Relations Act of 2005” (H.R. 1453) calling for the dispatch of a charge d’affaires to Libya, the negotiation of an agreement for the establishment of a full U.S. embassy in Tripoli, and a number of cooperative security, economic, and cultural initiatives. Sylvia Smith, “Libya Wins Lugar, Souder’s Praise,” Fort Wayne Journal Gazette, September 25, 2005.
to further normalize relations remain on hold pending the fulfillment of a “claims settlement agreement” for outstanding legal claims related to U.S. victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism attacks and Libyan civilians killed during U.S. military retaliations (see below).

**Congressional Efforts on Behalf of U.S. Terrorism Victims**

Congressional concern over the outstanding legal claims of U.S. terrorism victims has accompanied efforts to restore full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya for several years. Congressional concerns relate to a number of claims, including some related to prominent cases such as the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and the 1989 bombing of French airline UTA Flight 772 over Niger. In response, some Members of Congress have taken steps to delay the construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and postpone the confirmation of the Administration’s nominee for the U.S. ambassadorship to Libya. Congress also has enacted legislation to prohibit U.S. foreign assistance to Libya for FY2008 and to alter immunity and damage award provisions relating to Libyan-sponsored acts of terrorism.

**Background: Pan Am Flight 103.** On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am flight 103 en route from London to New York, killing all 244 passengers and 15 crew on board and another 11 people in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. On November 14, 1991, the United States and Scotland indicted two Libyan intelligence agents for their alleged roles in the bombing: Abd al Basset Ali al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah. Under a U.N.-negotiated agreement, Fhimah and Al Megrahi were tried on murder charges under Scottish law in The Hague beginning in 1999. Fhimah was acquitted and Al Megrahi was convicted: he is currently serving a life sentence in a Scottish prison.

Al Megrahi is appealing his conviction and the length of his 27-year sentence before the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). Some observers in the United Kingdom, including lead Scottish Lockerbie investigator Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, have questioned Al Megrahi’s conviction and argued that the Lockerbie investigation should be reexamined. Claims have resurfaced that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command may have planned the bombing for Iran in retaliation for the downing of an Iranian airliner by the U.S. Navy in 1988. In November 2006, the Scottish commission ruled that Al Megrahi’s appeals could be heard in Scottish courts, and in June 2007, the SCCRC granted Al Megrahi the right to a second appeal of his conviction. (For more on the appeal, see **Lockerbie Appeal**, below.)

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In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility “for the actions of its officials” and agreed to a settlement agreement that called for successive payments to the families of Pan Am 103 victims following the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions. As of October 2005, Libya had issued payments of $4 million per victim following the termination of U.N. sanctions in September 2003 and a second payment of $4 million to each victim’s family following the termination of bilateral U.S. sanctions in September 2004. The Libyan government withdrew funds for a final payment of $2 million from a designated escrow account after several deadline extensions because of delays in the United States government’s rescission of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The previously negotiated final round of $2 million payments would be worth an estimated $500 million. Recent reporting suggests that under the terms of a comprehensive settlement agreement, Libya would transfer the funds for the final Lockerbie payment to an independent entity under the supervision of the U.S. Secretary of State.


16 See Robert Lee Beecham, et al., v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 01 CIV 02243, District of Columbia Circuit.

**Background: La Belle and UTA Flight 772.** Compensation claims for U.S. victims of the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin and the 1989 Libyan-sponsored bombing of a French passenger aircraft also are pending in U.S. courts. Two U.S. servicemen, Sgt. Kenneth T. Ford and Sgt. James E. Goins, were killed in the La Belle bombing, and 80 other U.S. servicemen and women were injured. Some were permanently disabled. On September 19, 1989, a mid-air explosion killed 171 passengers and crew of the French airline UTA flight 772 over Niger in western Africa, including seven U.S. citizens. On March 10, 1999, a French court found six Libyans guilty in absentia for bombing the DC-10 aircraft. In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was directly responsible for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the families and estates of six U.S. victims of the attack.

Legal representatives of the La Belle victims and representatives the Libyan government met several times in 2006 to discuss settlement terms, and reached an agreement in which the victims and their families relinquished further claims against Libyan government in return for a Libyan commitment to make specified settlement payments. The U.S. parties signaled their acceptance of the agreement by signing
and transmitting to Libyan government representatives legal documents known as Release of Claims forms. To date, the Libyan government has not made the payments described under the terms of the agreement, and the U.S. parties have filed a motion before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the settlement agreement. In early July 2007, President Bush reportedly identified the resolution of the La Belle settlement as an issue of importance for further consolidation of U.S.-Libya relations in a letter to Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi. Libya has made payments to German and French victims for the two bombings and has called for compensation to be paid to Libyan victims of the 1986 retaliatory U.S. air strikes on Libya, which killed civilians, including Qadhafi’s adopted infant daughter.

Recent reporting on comprehensive settlement agreement negotiations suggests that the LaBelle and UTA plaintiffs would receive compensation, as determined by the State Department. However, the UTA plaintiffs have expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangements, stating, “The courts have decided that Libya carried out the UTA 772 attack, and has awarded us compensation under the rule of law. This bill (S. 3370) will invalidate the court's judgment, and allow Libya to avoid a court judgment.”

**Settlement Agreement.** On August 14, 2008, Libya and the United States signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement that will establish an international Humanitarian Settlement Fund to receive donations that will cover outstanding claims of U.S. terrorism victims and Libyans claims related to U.S. retaliatory military strikes in 1986. According to Assistant Secretary of State David Welch, an agreed upon but as yet undisclosed settlement figure, if delivered, would be “sufficient”. Welch also has emphasized that “obligations on the United States, or on Libya, ...to satisfy the claims, to remove the law, to restore Libya’s immunity as a normal state, will not be triggered unless the agreed amounts are received.” U.S. State Department officials report an informal expectation that sufficient funds will be made available to the Fund within a period of six weeks from the signing of the agreement, which would be at the end of September or beginning of October.

**FY2008 Foreign Operations Request and Assistance Prohibition.** The Administration requested $1.15 million in FY2008 Foreign Operations funding

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17 At issue is the question of whether the Libyan representatives who participated in the meetings with the U.S. parties when the terms of the agreement were outlined has “apparent authority” to represent the Libyan government and commit to binding agreements on its behalf. See Robert Lee Beecham, et al. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 01-2243 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

18 Libya paid a total of $33 million in compensation to the victim’s families in July 1999. France re-negotiated the settlement in 2003 and received about $1 million for each victim. See Robert L. Pugh, et al. v. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 02-2026, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.


20 CRS Analyst conversation with State Department official, September 9, 2008.
to support the introduction of new programs for Libya. 21 Section 654 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764, signed December 26, 2007), prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds “to finance directly any assistance for Libya.” Section 654 shall no longer apply if the Secretary of State certifies “that the Government of Libya has made the final settlement payments to the Pan Am 103 victims’ families, paid to the LaBelle Disco bombing victims the agreed upon settlement amounts, and is engaging in good faith settlement discussions regarding other relevant terrorism cases.” As required, the Administration reported to Congress in July 2008 on actions taken by the Department of State to facilitate a resolution of the outstanding cases and U.S. commercial activity in Libya’s energy sector. 22

**New Embassy Construction Delayed.** In conjunction with the restoration of full diplomatic relations, the United States has upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy, which has moved to an interim location. Libyan demonstrators attacked and burned the former U.S. Embassy in December 1979. Plans to procure property for a new U.S. embassy have been placed on hold, after delays in securing funding and approval complicated negotiations during 2007. 23 The Administration had requested $109.9 million in FY2008 Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) funds for property procurement and construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The Senate report on the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (S.Rept. 110-128, H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) did not include the requested ESCM funds. Section 697 of the Senate version of H.R. 2764 would have prohibited the use of appropriated funds for “construction of a new United States embassy in Libya; activities in Libya related to energy development; or activities in Libya which support investment in Libya’s hydrocarbon sector, including the processing of applications for dual-use export licenses.” The State Department’s FY2009 budget request indicates that FY2009 ESCM funds may support the acquisition of property for a future new embassy compound in Tripoli.

**Ambassador Nomination Held.** In July 2007, President Bush nominated Gene A. Cretz as U.S. Ambassador to Libya-designate. Mr. Cretz is a career Foreign Service Officer, most recently having served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. To date, his confirmation hearing has been delayed in response to congressional concerns about the progress of negotiations regarding
the settlement of outstanding terrorism claims by Libya. If confirmed, the nominee will be the first U.S. Ambassador to serve in Tripoli since 1972.24

**Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181.** Legislation enacted in January 2008 altered the legal environment in which some outstanding terrorism cases are being considered, and further complicated U.S.-Libyan relations. Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 4986, signed January 28, 2008) amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611) in order to provide a federal cause of action to sue foreign governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism for damages (including punitive damages) arising from terrorist acts committed or supported by that state.25 The provision includes measures designed to facilitate the enforcement of judgments by allowing a claimant to subject foreign government assets to liens of *lis pendens* as soon as a suit is filed and by permitting the attachment of indirectly held property to satisfy a final judgment. It also permits the refiling of certain dismissed cases, nullifying certain legal defenses that might have been available to defend against them, and permits the filing of new cases related to previously filed cases that would otherwise be time-barred.

As such, the provisions could prove applicable to Libya because Libya was previously designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and remains subject to lawsuits by victims of terrorist acts that were committed or alleged to have been committed by agents of Libya. Nearly $1.7 billion has been awarded against Libya, with an additional $5.3 billion awarded against certain named Libyan officials,26 with some twenty additional cases pending. As long as there are pending claims or outstanding judgments against Libya under the terrorism exception to the FSIA, U.S. companies doing business with Libya may be subject to litigation by judgment creditors who believe the U.S. company is in possession of Libyan property that is subject to execution on a terrorism judgment.27 Since January 2008, legal representatives of U.S. terrorism victims reportedly have filed liens of *lis pendens* on Libyan assets

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24 Various chargés d’affaires represented the United States in Libya until December 1979, when a Libyan mob attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. All remaining U.S. diplomats in Libya were recalled in May 1980.


26 For legal analysis, see CRS Report RL31258, *Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism*, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

27 The new legislation addresses the rights of third parties who have an interest in property that may be subject to levy in execution on a judgment. The conference report for H.R. 1585 (H.Rept. 110-477) applies to P.L. 110-181 and states the conferees intention with regard to the application of Section 1083 was to “encourage the courts to protect the property interests of such innocent third parties by using their inherent authority, on a case-by-case basis, under the applicable procedures governing execution on judgment and attachment in anticipation of judgment.”
related to current contracts with legal and lobbying firms such as Blank & Rome, the Livingston Group, and White & Case.28

President Bush vetoed the original version of the bill (H.R. 1585) on December 27, 2007, based on concern that potential court proceedings related to Section 1083 of H.R. 1585 could tie up billions of dollars in Iraqi government funds in the United States, thus undermining efforts to rebuild Iraq and train Iraqi security forces. Conditional waiver authority for Iraq was included in H.R. 4986 and subsequently exercised.29 However, no specific provisions were included to limit the applicability of the provisions to Libya. In March 2008, the Administration proposed amending Section 1083 to include a new waiver provision to permit an exception with respect to all states whose designation as sponsors of terrorism have been rescinded if the President determines that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.30 Under the terms of the Libya Claims Resolution Act (S. 3370, P.L. 110-301), once the Administration certifies the receipt by the claims entity of sufficient funds from Libya, several terrorism liability provisions will no longer be applicable to Libya, including Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008.

Analysis and Potential Impact. From 2007 through mid-2008, an atmosphere of brinksmanship characterized U.S.-Libyan engagement, particularly with regard to outstanding terrorism claims. Some terror victims’ families, associated legal counsel, and some Members of Congress sought to leverage remaining symbols of diplomatic normalization and new U.S.-Libya economic ties to pressure Libya to resolve pending cases. The Libyan government responded with increasingly direct statements warning that if its relations with the U.S. government and U.S. business community remain complicated by outstanding terrorism claims, U.S. companies may miss opportunities to bid on lucrative Libyan government contracts to refurbish and expand the country’s infrastructure. The Administration and the U.S. business community supported normalization with Libya while continuing to engage Libya on outstanding terrorism claims.

The enactment of Section 1083 and the awarding of significant monetary damages to the families and estates of U.S. victims of the 1989 bombing of UTA


29 The waiver authority provided in Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 requires the President to determine that a waiver for Iraq is in the national security interest of the United States and will "promote the reconstruction of, the consolidation of democracy in, and the relations of the United States with, Iraq." The President also must determine that Iraq continues to be a reliable ally in combating international terrorism. President Bush waived the application of Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 to Iraq on January 28, 2008, by issuing Presidential Determination No. 2008-9.

30 Text of the Administration proposal was included in the correspondence from U.S.-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leaders Harry Reid, et al., March 18, 2008.
Flight 772 heightened the intensity of U.S.-Libyan engagement from January 2008 onward. Libyan Ambassador to the United States Ali Aujali characterized the enactment of Section 1083 as “a great setback” for U.S.-Libyan relations and argued that Libya was “not getting what we deserve.” Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam’s described the UTA judgment as “blackmail and terrorism in the name of the law.” Economic actors in the United States stated their belief that U.S. companies stand to lose opportunities to foreign competitors as Libya proceeds with awarding infrastructure development and other state contracts. U.S. companies received contract awards during the latest round of Libya’s natural gas licensing process in December 2007, although, to date, no announcements of U.S. involvement in major infrastructure contracts have been made.

Rhetoric and warnings aside, the enactment of Section 1083 appears to have signaled to the Libyan authorities and the Administration the urgency of the need to resolve outstanding claims. Confidential negotiations began in early 2008 on a comprehensive settlement, while the Administration publicly underscored its desire “to show the Libyans that they made the right decision” in abandoning weapons of mass destruction and eschewing terrorism. Negotiations continued through mid-2008, and the prospect of success led to collaboration between the Congress and the Administration aimed at providing potential relief for Libya from the liability changes created by Section 1083 in the event of a finalized claims settlement agreement.

**FY2009 Foreign Operations Request**

The Administration has requested $350,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for Libya to “educate and train Libyan security forces as well as create vital linkages with Libyan officers after a 35-year break in contact.” Proposed training would include English language education and “seek to identify candidates for specific courses” on civil-military relations, border security, and counter-terrorism. Participation in the IMET program would make the Libyan government eligible to purchase additional U.S. military training at a reduced cost.

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31 In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was directly responsible for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the families and estates of six U.S. victims of the attack.


36 Section 21(c) of P.L. 90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET (continued...)
recipient countries are eligible to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended the AECA to provide this reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. At present, the “incremental rates” applied to the FMS training purchases of IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712).

Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which involves all of Libya’s neighbors, except Sudan and Egypt.38

Libya has taken direct action to limit the activities of known Al Qaeda associates within its borders, including elements of its own Islamist opposition allied with Al Qaeda. In October 2004, Libya transferred the then-deputy commander of the GSPC Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak al Para, to Algeria, where he was wanted on terrorism charges. Saifi had been in the custody of the rebel Chadian Movement for Democracy and Justice, with whom Qadhafi reportedly maintains a close relationship. Qadhafi has urged other Arab governments to extend full counterterrorism cooperation to the United States. Libya is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

**Libyan Foreign Fighters in Iraq.** A 2007 U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) report concluded that an “apparent surge in Libyan recruits” to serve as foreign fighters in Iraq since late 2006 may have resulted from an “increasingly cooperative relationship” between the LIFG and Al Qaeda. Documents found by U.S. forces in Iraq suggest that 137 of 700 foreign fighters brought into Iraq by a single Al Qaeda-affiliated smuggling operation between August 2006 and September 2007 were Libyan nationals.39 The CTC report highlighted the relatively large percentage of Libyans reflected in the seized records (over 18 percent), noting that “no previous study has indicated that more than 4 percent of [foreign] fighters [in Iraq] were Libyan.”

The records suggest that many of the Libyan nationals traveled from the country’s northeastern coastal region, especially from the cities of Darnah and Benghazi, to Iraq via Egypt and Syria. Both cities are known as strong bases of Islamist and opposition sentiment and reportedly have been the site of clashes between government security forces and armed opponents in the past.40 Although some Libyan officials have been outspoken in their criticism of U.S. policy toward Iraq, available reporting does not suggest that the Libyan government is in any way involved in encouraging or facilitating the travel of Libyan nationals to Iraq to serve as combatants.

**Lockerbie Appeal.** Proceedings for the second appeal for Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi opened in October 2007, and preliminary hearings continue to be held in an effort to determine the scope of his appeal. Defense attorneys are seeking access to classified information regarding key pieces of evidence, reportedly including classified intelligence documents related to the supply of timers by a Swiss company to the Libyan intelligence service. The documents reportedly originated with a third country’s government, and that government has refused to grant permission for the documents to be made available to the court by British authorities.\(^{41}\) In May 2008, the British government filed a Public Interest Immunity (PII) order with the Scottish court seeking to keep the documents secret, but the court ruled that the government was required to “produce for the court the documents in question... subject to appropriate security measures.”\(^{42}\) In June 2008, the prosecution reportedly argued to restrict the appeal to the original terms under which the appeal was granted, while the defense reportedly argued that new evidence should be considered. Reports now suggest that a special defense attorney will be appointed for Megrahi by the court to review the secret material in question, leading some observers to question the fairness of Al Megrahi’s appeal.\(^{43}\)

In July 2007, Muammar al Qadhafi’s son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi stated that Libya “had nothing to do with Lockerbie” and said that Al Megrahi’s release was “top of [Libya’s] priority.”\(^{44}\) During a December 2007 visit to France, Muammar al Qadhafi stated that,

“There are people who have been accused or found guilty in these cases [the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772]. This does not concern the Libyan state, it concerns individuals.... The state cannot assume responsibility for what individuals do, and this is true of Libya. Libya has never committed any terrorist acts.”\(^{45}\)

**The Return of U.S. Oil Companies**

Following the lifting of U.S. sanctions in 2004, Occidental Petroleum and the so-called Oasis group, which consists of Amerada Hess, Marathon, and ConocoPhillips, have engaged in negotiations with Libyan officials regarding the full resumption of their production activities. The issuance of Executive Order 12543 in January 1986 forced the companies to abandon their Libyan operations. During the sanctions era, the companies’ holdings were managed by a subsidiary of the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) and all revenue from the sale of oil produced from the


concession areas accrued to the Libyan government. The NOC made some attempts to open the areas held in trust for the U.S. companies to foreign investment.

A two-step process required the review of the existing production agreements with the NOC and the ratification of new agreements by Libya’s political leadership. Officials from the NOC and the Libyan government approved the terms of Occidental Petroleum’s reentry as of July 1, 2005, paving the way for Occidental to resume operations in its old concession areas. The members of the Oasis group reached an agreement with Libyan officials over the terms of their proposed re-entry in December 2005. Under the terms of the agreement, the Oasis group’s Waha concessions in Libya’s Sirte basin will be extended for 25 years, and the NOC will hold a 59% interest in the venture. The group members agreed to make a one-time $1.3 billion dollar reentry payment and to contribute $530 million toward the cost of investments made by the Libyan NOC since 1986. Libyan officials had expressed their opinion that the reentry of the U.S. oil firms would support their government’s efforts to secure Libya’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. Occidental renewed expiring contracts in 2007 under new terms that lowered its production share in line with new Libyan standards.

Political and Economic Profile

Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile

Muammar al Qadhafi was born in 1942 near the central coastal city of Sirte. His Arabized Berber family belongs to the relatively small Qadhafa tribe, and his upbringing was modest. As a young man Qadhafi identified strongly with Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies espoused by leaders such as Egypt’s Gamel Abdel Nasser. Although he was excluded from the elite Cyrenaica Defense Forces on a tribal basis during the Libyan monarchy period (see Appendix A), Qadhafi was commissioned as a regular army captain following stints at the Libyan military academy in Benghazi and the United Kingdom’s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Following his return to Libya, he led the September 1, 1969 overthrow of the Libyan monarchy with a group of fellow officers. He was 27 years old.

Qadhafi has proven to be a controversial, complex, and contradictory political survivor during his long reign in Libya, in spite of numerous internal and external challenges to his rule. He has exercised nearly complete, if, at times, indirect political control over Libya over the last thirty-plus years by carefully balancing and manipulating complex patronage networks, traditional tribal structures, and byzantine layers of national, regional, and local governance. Libya’s foreign and domestic policies nominally have been based on his personal ideology. In the past, Qadhafi and his supporters have imposed his theories with realistic purpose and precision, not hesitating to crush coup attempts, assassinate dissidents abroad, or sponsor violent movements and terrorist attacks against Libya’s perceived external enemies.

Personally, Qadhafi often is described as mercurial, charismatic, shrewd, and reclusive. He is married and has eight children: seven sons and one daughter. An April 1986 U.S. air strike in retaliation for a Libyan-sponsored anti-American
bombing in Berlin hit one of his homes in Tripoli, killing his adopted infant daughter and hospitalizing members of his immediate family. The incident continues to be a source of personal anger and resentment for Qadhafi: he has preserved the bombed out ruins of the home in the military compound where it stood, and he remarked on the death of President Ronald Reagan in 2004 that the former U.S. president had died before he could be prosecuted for the “ugly crime that he committed in 1986 against the Libyan children.”

Political Dynamics

Libya’s often contradictory political dynamics are a product of competing interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian political system and amid Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Elements of Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology permeate political discourse on many security and foreign policy issues, while in other cases, such as economic reform, new frameworks are being embraced to meet society’s current and changing needs. The legacies of colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence continue to influence Libyan politics; rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements. Most Libyans also accept a prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life: Islam is the official religion and the Quran is the basis for the country’s law and its “social code.”

Tribal relationships remain important, particularly with regard to the distribution of leadership roles in government ministries and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties remain strong within and between branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafi, hold many high ranking government positions, reportedly including key positions in the air force. Members of larger, rival tribes, such as the Warfalla, have opposed the regime on grounds of tribal discrimination. Some Libyan military and security officials staged limited, unsuccessful coup attempts against Qadhafi in 1993 and 1996 based in part on tribal and familial rivalries. The Qadhafi government has performed periodic reassignments and purges of the officer corps to limit the likelihood of organized opposition reemerging from within the military. However, these political considerations have affected the military’s preparedness and war fighting capability.

Political parties and all opposition groups are banned in Libya under Law number 71 of 1972. Formal political pluralism is frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as an increasing number of regime figures advocate for greater popular participation in existing government institutions. Opposition groups, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, appear to have shifted their political strategies toward gradual attempts to influence national policy making in contrast to others’ confrontational efforts to change the makeup of the regime. Prominent figures in Libyan politics include Muammar al Qadhafi’s son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi.


47 For a detailed profile of Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and a discussion of questions about the possibility of his succeeding his father, see Yehudit Ronen, “Libya’s Rising Star: Said Al-
General People’s Committee Secretary Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi, National Oil Company chief Shukri Ghanem, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam, and prominent members of the security establishment, including intelligence chief Musa Kusa and army leader and original RCC member Abu Bakr Younis Jaber.

**Government Structure**

Libya has a unique political system composed of nominally decentralized and participatory levels of government. Muammar al Qadhafi and his closest supporters exercise final authority over domestic and foreign policies by means of their control of the implementation mechanisms of the national government — the sizeable military and security apparatus and a handful of powerful ministries. Qadhafi’s ideological emphasis on “the authority of the people” is the stated basis for the operation of Libya’s multiple levels of government. Although participation in these institutions is mostly open and political leaders routinely encourage citizens to take part in their deliberations, most external observers regard Libya’s political system as largely authoritarian and undemocratic. The U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports document ongoing restrictions on political life and human rights in Libya.

The “Authority of the People”. A hierarchy of “people’s congresses” make up Libya’s government and serve as venues for the exercise of “popular authority” as defined by Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology. At the local level, citizens meet in Basic People’s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and ultimately the national General People’s Congress. Participation in the basic congresses is open to all Libyan citizens, although participation rates are notoriously low and Qadhafi regularly makes public statements expressing his disappointment with participation levels and urging broader popular involvement in public affairs. At the March 1, 2000, session of the General Peoples’ Congress, Qadhafi abolished the positions of 12 General People’s Committee (cabinet-equivalent) secretaries and reassigned their duties to provincial committees. Secretariats of foreign affairs, justice, public security, and finance remained under the authority of the centralized General People’s Committee. Some experts have argued that the decentralization was designed to deflect popular criticism from the central government and further dilute political opposition within the country.

In March 2006, the Libyan government announced the replacement of Secretary (prime minister-equivalent) of the General People’s Committee Shukri Ghanem by former Health Minister Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. A cabinet reshuffle and the creation of seven new ministries also were announced. The replacement of the reform-oriented Ghanem has been interpreted by some observers as an effort by conservative and hard-line elements of the Libyan political establishment to reassert control over the speed and direction of Libya’s reform efforts. Ghanem now serves as the director of the National Oil Company, where he is involved with ongoing international bidding for oil exploration and production-sharing agreements.

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47 (...continued)
In March 2008, Qadhafi announced his intention to dissolve most government administrative bodies and institute a plan whereby state oil revenues would be distributed to citizens on a monthly basis for them to administer personally, in cooperation, and via local committees. Citing popular criticism of government performance in a long, wide-ranging speech, Qadhafi repeatedly stated that the traditional state would soon be “dead” in Libya and that direct rule by citizens would be accomplished through the distribution of oil revenues. Defense, foreign affairs, security, and oil production arrangements reportedly will remain national government responsibilities, while other bodies are to be phased out beginning in January 2009. It remains unclear whether and how the proposals will be fully implemented.

**Opposition Groups**

The government has dealt harshly with opposition leaders and groups over the last three decades, establishing special “people’s courts” and “revolutionary committees” to enforce ideological and political discipline and to punish violators and dissidents. Abroad, Libyan intelligence personnel have monitored, harassed, and, in some cases, assassinated expatriate dissidents, some of whom were referred to as “stray dogs.” Libya’s myriad opposition movements can be categorized broadly as Islamist, royalist, or democratic in orientation. However, their activities and effectiveness have been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological differences. New efforts to coordinate opposition activities have begun in response to Libya’s reintegration to the international community and the emergence of a broader political reform debate in the Arab world. However, most observers do not regard any of Libya’s current opposition groups as a serious threat or alternative to the current government.

**Exiles.** In the past, government officials and intelligence operatives have monitored and taken violent action against expatriate opposition groups and leaders, including in Europe and the United States. Clandestine opposition groups also have carried out assassinations and attacks against Libyan government officials abroad. Opposition groups in exile include the National Alliance, the Libyan National Movement (LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally, the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. A royalist contingent based on the claim to the throne by Mohammed al Sanusi, the grandson of the former king, is based in London. These groups and others held an opposition conference in July 2005 in London and issued a “national accord,” calling for the removal of Qadhafi from power and the

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establishment of a transitional government. A follow-up meeting was held in March 2008.

In a September 2005 interview, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam characterized some of the regime’s expatriate opponents as individuals who fled the country after committing economic crimes or collaborating with foreign intelligence services. He then invited any expatriate dissidents who had not committed crimes to return to Libya. In August 2005, the government announced the return of 787 exiles who agreed to reconcile with the Qadhafi regime. Regional observers characterized the return of prominent dissidents in August 2006 as evidence of an ongoing, unofficial reconciliation program between the Libyan regime and its expatriate opponents.

The Muslim Brotherhood. Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood members and activists were jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and operated as a clandestine organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second round of mass arrests took place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested. Several reportedly died in custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison. The government announced a retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in March 2006, the group’s 84 remaining imprisoned members were released. The controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, describes the Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has called for the cancellation of laws restricting political rights. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has reached out to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood by publicly characterizing the organization as nonviolent and non-seditious. Abdel Qader responded to political

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reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi in 2007 with calls for more inclusive, consultative decision making.56

**Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).** The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is a violent Islamist movement opposed to the Qadhafi government and allied with Al Qaeda and other international jihadist groups. According to the Department of State, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi, most recently in 1996, and may have participated in the planning of the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco.57 In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al Libi announced the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed as having political rather than operational relevance.58 Al Libi was killed in an air-strike in Pakistan in February 2008.

The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001, and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the LIFG.59 Some observers have characterized the designations as a gesture of solidarity with Libya and have argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may be limited. Others claim that LIFG fighters have allied themselves with other violent Islamist groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cite evidence of Libyan fighters joining the Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.60 Reports suggest that eastern Libya may be a stronghold for LIFG members and other extremist groups that could pose a threat to Libya’s security.

In mid-2005, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi referred to plans to release some jailed members of the LIFG and other violent Islamist groups from prison, following their renunciation of violence and pledge to participate in society peacefully.61 Press reports suggested that Libyan officials released up to 60 members of the LIFG in January 2007 as part of ongoing negotiations for the group’s disarmament.62 Press

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61 “Libyan Leader’s Son on Call to Reopen Human Rights Files,” OSC Document GMP20050620537003, August 20, 2005.

62 Camille al Tawil, “Libya: 60 ‘Fighting’ Group members released: Negotiations continue (continued...)
Political Reform and Human Rights

The U.S. Department of State has characterized Libya’s human rights record as “poor.” A January 2008 Human Rights Watch report argues that in spite of “some improvements” in Libyan human rights policies in recent years, “serious rights abuses persist.” Annual reports on political and human rights conditions from the U.S. State Department and international groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have catalogued a broad range of recurring abuses including arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture, a general ban on political opposition, and official limitations on public speech, assembly, and press activity.

Since 2003, Libyan political figures, including Muammar al Qadhafi and his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, have made a series of public statements and policy announcements in an effort to repair Libya’s reputation with regard to human rights practices. Some tangible steps have been taken, and Libyan authorities report that legal reforms are under way that may improve the protections and rights afforded to citizens. Judicial entities associated with human rights abuses and political control in the past, such as “revolutionary courts” and “people’s courts,” reportedly have been dismantled. As a result, some observers have expressed cautious optimism that political, social, and religious freedom may be improving in Libya. Others continue to warn that such reforms may be merely cosmetic and meant to support the government’s efforts to improve its domestic legitimacy and international standing. In March 2008, the U.S. State Department report on human rights in Libya stated that “the government’s human rights record remained poor” and that “security personnel routinely tortured prisoners during interrogations or as punishment.”
Legal and Institutional Reform. Libyan law prohibits the activities of all political opposition groups and restricts the free exercise of speech and the press. Since Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, little legal recourse has been available to citizens accused of political crimes. Nevertheless, officials have announced plans to embark upon a full review of the country’s Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to eliminate restrictive laws regarding political activity. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi also has called for a constitution to clarify the power of different legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in Libya and has endorsed ongoing legal reforms as a means to “provide a free environment that is suitable for a normal political life.” He renewed these calls in an August 2007 speech and indicated that a constitutional drafting process may begin soon. The speech called for the guarantee of “independent institutions,” including the central bank, the supreme court, the media, and civil society. He also outlined four “red lines” to guide reform efforts: Islamic law, the territorial integrity of Libya, security and stability, and “Muammar al Qadhafi.”

In support of the reform efforts, some institutional changes have been instituted to improve political and human rights conditions. In March 2004, the General People’s Committee Secretariat of Justice and Public Security was split into two separate secretariats in an effort to establish greater judicial independence. In January 2005, the General People’s Congress approved a law abolishing judicial institutions known as “people’s courts” and “revolutionary courts” that tried suspected regime opponents, sometimes in secret. International human rights organizations welcomed the abolition of the people’s court system as an “important step” and urged Libyan authorities to grant new trials to prisoners convicted by the courts, including several who were convicted in late 2004.

Human Rights Monitoring. The Libyan government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights organizations but invited international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to Libya for the first time in 15 years. In late 2004 and early 2005, representatives from both organizations toured various security facilities and prisons and met with selected imprisoned dissidents. A January 2006 Human Rights Watch report based on research conducted during the visit concluded that “Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi and his inner circle appear unwilling to implement genuine reform, especially in the areas of free expression and association,” although the Libyan

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67 According to the U.S. State Department, Libyan law provides for freedom of speech “within the limits of public interest and principles of the Revolution.” In practice, criticism of the government and Qadhafi are restricted and often punished. By law, print and broadcast media in Libya are owned and operated by government authorities. Satellite and Internet access are limited and partially censored.


government has taken “some positive steps” to improve human rights conditions since 2003.\textsuperscript{70}

Since 2004, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has publicly supported a pro-human rights agenda and has created an official human rights monitoring body under the auspices of the Qadhafi Development Foundation. The foundation’s Human Rights Society now operates a national hotline for Libyans to report cases of unlawful detention, seizure of property or assets, and death or injury at the hands of security personnel.\textsuperscript{71} Reports also suggest that the government intends to review all reported cases of human rights abuses and property crimes and to compensate victims as part of a national reconciliation program.

\textbf{Fathi al Jahmi.} Human Rights Watch reported in May 2006 that Fathi al Jahmi, Libya’s most internationally recognized political prisoner, may be facing a death penalty sentence on charges of belonging to, supporting, or calling “for the establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law.”\textsuperscript{72} Al Jahmi was imprisoned in 2002 after publicly calling for elections and press reforms and for criticizing Muammar al Qadhafi and the government. President Bush praised Al Jahmi’s subsequent release in March 2004 under a suspended sentence, but Al Jahmi was soon rearrested after he repeated his calls for reform and expanded his criticism of Qadhafi in interviews with regional satellite channels, including U.S.-funded \textit{Al Hurra}. Al Jahmi has been detained since late March 2004 and may be in ill health. In an on-the-record briefing on May 15, 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Welch called the Al Jahmi case “troubling” and indicated that U.S. officials continue to raise the issue with their Libyan interlocutors.\textsuperscript{73} In November 2006, a State Department spokesman said, “We continue to urge the Libyan government to release [Al Jahmi] and will continue to do so.”\textsuperscript{74}

During a December 2007 visit to Paris, Muammar al Qadhafi stated that “there is not a single political prisoner in Libya.”\textsuperscript{75} Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch reportedly raised the “specific case” of Fathi al Jahmi with Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam, during the foreign minister’s January 2008 visit to Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{76} Following Foreign Minister Shalgam’s return to Tripoli in January 2008, an unnamed ministry source issued a denial that human rights had been on the U.S.-Libyan agenda and stated that U.S. Secretary of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{70} Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Words to Deeds The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform,” Volume 18, No. 1(E), January 2006.
\bibitem{71} Brian Whitaker, “Libya: Getafe’s Son Sets Up Human Rights Hotline,” \textit{The Guardian} (London), September 17, 2005.
\bibitem{73} Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya On-the-Record Briefing Washington, DC, May 15, 2006.
\bibitem{75} U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report FEA20071212451188, December 12, 2007.
\end{thebibliography}
State Condoleezza Rice “does not have the right to discuss this issue and she knows that well because Libya is not the kind of country that allows intervention in its internal affairs.”

On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement urging “the Libyan government to fulfill their promise to release without condition” prominent political activist Fathi el Jahmi.

Dr. Scott Allen, an adviser to Physicians for Human Rights who examined Al Jahmi in March 2008 stated that “Even though [Al Jahmi’s] health improved in the last few months, he remains very ill. He’s stable and can be treated as an outpatient.”

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly discussed el Jahmi during her September visit to Tripoli. As of September 2008, El Jahmi remained detained and was reported to be in poor health.

**Libyan Foreign Policy**

Libyan foreign policy since the 1990s has been defined by a shift from engagement with other Arab states to a greater focus on Africa. The prominent role played by Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi ensures that foreign relations remain personality driven, somewhat unpredictable, and characterized by close relationships with non-state actors and opposition movements in a number of neighboring states. In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli military occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank. He also has called for a “one state solution” based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called ‘Isratine.’ Qadhafi has criticized the Arab League’s Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it does not represent the views of all Arabs and would be detrimental to the interests of Palestinians.

Qadhafi’s diplomatic engagement in Africa remains active, particularly his efforts to mediate between governments and rebel factions in neighboring Sudan, Niger, and Chad and his proposals for the establishment of an United States of Africa, which many African leaders consider quixotic and regard with suspicion. Libyan defense officials have informed their U.S. Defense Department counterparts that the Libyan government opposes the establishment of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) because it could introduce a significant non-African military presence on the continent. Libyan officials reportedly support AFRICOM’s proposed security capacity building mission, if only in general terms.

The Arab Maghreb Union, of which Libya is a member, rejected the presence of foreign military forces on its members’ territory at a recent summit in Rabat, a move seen as underscoring

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80 Testimony of Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa before the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 2, 2007.
Libya’s opposition to stationing of U.S. forces in North Africa under the new command. AFRICOM’s Deputy for Military Operations, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, recently stated that, “the U.S.-AFRICOM does not need to station large operational units across the African continent,” and that “small numbers of forces will come to the continent to do a particular activity and then... depart.”

**Energy and the Libyan Economy**

Until the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya’s economic viability was seriously questioned by many outside observers. Foreign aid and subsidies largely supported the national budget, until the introduction of massive amounts of oil revenue transformed the country’s economy and social fabric. Following the September 1, 1969 military coup, Qadhafi and his government restructured Libya’s economy along socialist lines, placing a heavy emphasis on national management of industry and resource allocation. However, the economy remained highly dependent on oil revenue and thus highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. The government has announced its intention to reverse state ownership trends associated with the country’s long experiment with socialism. Economic diversification and resource management remain challenges for the government and private sector as they seek to revive the economy and capitalize on interest from foreign investors.

Oil revenue has been the lifeblood of the Libyan economy and government since exports began in 1961, accounting for 95% of Libya’s annual foreign currency earnings and 75% of annual government revenue in recent years. Since 2001, rising oil prices have led to a tripling in Libyan oil revenue, moving from an estimated $11.7 billion in 2001 to an estimated $38.5 billion in 2007. The increase has spurred corresponding growth in the economy. Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi has stated that Libyans are “very happy” with higher price levels in the global oil market, although he has underlined the importance of creating alternative sources of revenue and economic growth in public statements.

**Economic Reform and Infrastructure Development.** Pressure for economic reform in Libya traditionally has coincided with periods of weaker oil

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81 Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam stated, “The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) will not allow the presence of any foreign soldier on its soil, because people in this region object to that, the authorities are not thinking of such presence and even others are aware of the fact that this region will not accept the presence of any kind of foreign troops on its territory.” “Libyan Foreign Minister on Maghreb Union, US Military Command in Africa,” OSC Document GMP20071201950028, November 30, 2007.


85 Economist Intelligence Unit estimates as of November 2007.

export revenue, although the emergence of a younger, technocratic leadership group in recent years has sustained reform efforts during the current period of increasing oil returns. The centerpiece of Libya’s current economic reform efforts has been a national economic strategy development project involving Libyan government planning authorities, the Qadhafi Development Foundation, the U.S.-based Monitor Group, and the London-based Cambridge Energy Associates. To date, the project has produced an assessment report known as “the White Book,” which continues to be evaluated for implementation by a steering committee led by Prime Minister Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. World Bank and International Monetary Fund initiatives have also assessed Libya’s economic status and made recommendations for reform.

Other economic reform and infrastructure development initiatives include an ongoing privatization program and have announced plans for billions of dollars worth of railway hospitals, airport, school, and road construction projects. Plans also have been announced for the creation of a free trade zone on the Mediterranean coast east of Tripoli and a $6.5 billion social and economic development investment fund designed to create greater income and economic equality among the Libyan population. In designing and implementing reform efforts, Libyan officials must balance concerns about unemployment and social equity with longer term concerns for diversification. Some observers believe that high oil revenues will lessen pressure for structural reform, in spite of the opportunity that surplus revenues may create.

**Oil Reserves and Production Capacity.** Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 41.5 billion barrels (ninth largest in the world). Libyan officials estimate that over 60% of the country has yet to be surveyed for oil and gas deposits, which could hold an additional 76 billion barrels of oil.\(^\text{87}\) The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages oil production activity and negotiates exploration and production agreements with foreign companies. Oil exploration and production are carried out on the basis of a 1955 oil law, and Libyan authorities reportedly are drafting a new law to govern production activities and reform the foreign investment approval process. Foreign investment is regulated through exploration and production agreements negotiated by foreign companies and the NOC. In September 2006, Libya established a Council for Oil and Gas Affairs to regulate oil and gas exploration and production and to approve decisions about the development of the oil and gas sector.\(^\text{88}\) Most of Libya’s oil is exported to Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. However, following the resumption of crude oil exports to the United States

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\(^\text{88}\) The prime minister serves as the chairman of the Council. Other members include outside experts, the head of the NOC, the ministers of economy, trade, employment, finance, and the central bank governor. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi reportedly attended Council meetings held in September 2006 to discuss the ongoing third round of new exploration and production sharing agreement bidding. Vahe Petrossian, “Libya Sees Panel on the Fast Track,” *Upstream*, September 15 2006; and, Reuters, “Libya Oil Licensing Round Attracts Many Offers - NOC,” September 26, 2006.
in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refiners have increased, from 56,000 barrels per day in 2005 to an average of 116,000 barrels per day in 2007.89

Until recently, Libyan oil production had steadily declined from its peak of 3.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1970 due to the deterioration of production equipment and infrastructure related to strict investment controls and international sanctions. Libya produced an average of 1.84 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2007, which officials have stated is currently the sector’s maximum capacity. Since the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has sought foreign investment to rehabilitate and expand its oil production capacity and expected $11 billion in oil production related investment from 2005 to 2015. Current government production targets are 3 million b/d by 2012.90 Libya has signed Development and Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) contracts with several foreign companies interested in rehabilitating existing production facilities and areas.

**New Exploration and Production-Sharing Agreements.** In addition to negotiating the return of U.S. oil companies to their former production areas, Libyan officials are presiding over a bidding process for new exploration and production-sharing agreements. Known as “EPSA IV,” the fourth round of foreign agreement bidding since the process began in 1979 is opening large areas of onshore and offshore Libyan territory to new oil and gas exploration and production. In January 2005, Libyan officials announced the results for the first fifteen EPSA-IV exploration blocks, which cover an area of 51,000 square miles. Of the 63 international firms that were approved by Libyan authorities and submitted bids, U.S. firms won exploration licenses for 11 of the 15 blocks, whether as sole producers or as members of consortia. Occidental Petroleum, which has secured a return to its former concessions, led the U.S. companies with nine successful bids, and Amerada Hess and Chevron Texaco also secured new licenses.

Winners of the second batch of EPSA IV bids were announced on October 2, 2005. European and Asian firms received most of the licenses, and Exxon-Mobil was the sole U.S. license recipient. A third bidding round was held for 12 offshore and 29 onshore blocks, and a fourth round for 41 blocks concluded in December 2007. Some oil and gas market analysts have speculated that the approval of the majority of production licenses for U.S. companies in the first EPSA-IV round may have been intended as an economic reward to the United States for agreeing to lift its bilateral sanctions against Libya. Others have argued that U.S. firms were successful because of their willingness to agree to production share terms that heavily favored the Libyan government and agreed to pay large signing bonuses. European and Asian oil companies have expressed strong interest in participating in new Libyan ventures and are expected to continue to submit competitive bids. Libya has renegotiated production sharing agreements with Italian company Eni, Petro-Canada, Occidental Petroleum, and Austrian company OMV, to secure a larger production share for Libya in exchange for lower taxes and long term commitments for the companies.

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**Natural Gas.** Libya’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be 52 trillion cubic feet, although, like the country’s oil reserves, Libya’s gas holdings may be significantly higher given the generally under-explored status of Libyan territory. As with oil production, the development of natural gas production and export capacity has been limited by restrictive investment policies and international sanctions. Nevertheless, Libya has been able to use natural gas for some domestic power generation and for limited exports to some European countries. Shell has reached an agreement with Libyan authorities to explore for natural gas deposits and to upgrade Libya’s aging liquefied natural gas plant at Marsa al Brega.\(^91\) Libyan authorities also are reportedly pursuing pipeline agreements with neighboring North African states to improve export access to European markets. In May 2007 representatives from British Petroleum (BP) announced the signing of an extensive natural gas exploration and LNG export agreement with Libya. In July 2008, representatives from Russia’s Gazprom visited Libya and expressed interest in purchasing Libya’s natural gas exports and cooperating with Libya on new natural gas export pipelines to Europe. According to Gazprom, Libya and Gazprom decided “to initiate the thematic negotiations on the purchase of the currently available hydrocarbon volumes from the Libyan party.”\(^92\)

### Military Profile and WMD Disarmament

#### The Libyan Military

**Structure, Training, and Equipment.** Libya’s mostly conscripted military forces are small relative to the large amount of weaponry at their disposal (see Table 1 below). Most outside military analysts regard the training and leadership of Libyan forces as poor and identify a lack of combined arms and joint service planning as factors that limit their overall effectiveness. The Qadhafi government historically has made the acquisition of weapons and equipment a higher priority than training or creating high-quality military support infrastructure.

Libya’s army, navy, and air forces are equipped with a broad range of aging Soviet and Eastern Bloc equipment, although the country’s poorly maintained inventories also include some U.S. and western European arms, including French Mirage fighters and U.S. C-130 transports.\(^93\) Libya’s exorbitant military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s yielded an unmanageable crop of diverse weapon systems from various sources and manufacturers. Purchases declined significantly during the 1990s because of international sanctions, which limited the revenue available for defense spending. Libya’s current military leadership presides over a

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largely stored and surplus catalogue of weaponry with poor maintenance records. The military also lacks sufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate the military equipment currently in its possession.

**Table 1. Libyan Military Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Guard Corps</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Militia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>119,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Arms Sales.** The subject of renewed arms sales to Libya remains a sensitive subject in the United States and some European countries whose citizens were killed in Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks during the 1980s. The European Union lifted its arms embargo against Libya in October 2004. The U.S. ban on export of defense articles lapsed at the end of a 45-day congressional notification period, on June 30, 2006. Qadhafi reportedly has expressed interest in procuring U.S., European, and Russian weapon systems. France, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia are among the countries reportedly interested in refurbishing and replacing Libya’s weapon stocks. The United Kingdom’s Defense Export Services Organization (DESO) reportedly has labeled Libya a “priority” market in documents promoting exports by U.K. arms manufacturers, and press reports have detailed frequent meetings between DESO representatives and Libyan authorities since 2004.

In August 2007, the European aerospace and defense group EADS signed a contract to provide Milan anti-tank missiles to Libya in the wake of a visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to negotiate the release of imprisoned Bulgarian medics. The contract is being investigated and both sides have denied any quid pro quo arrangement. A potentially larger sale reportedly remains under negotiation: press

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94 Senior Middle East security analyst Anthony Cordesman has described Libya as “the world’s largest military parking lot.” For a more detailed profile of the Libyan military, see Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 15, 2004, pp. 79-85.


reports suggest that Libyan and French officials continue to negotiate the terms of a multi-billion dollar arms sale that could send new fighter jets, helicopters, patrol boats, armored vehicles, and air defense upgrades to Libya. France also may agree to upgrade several 1970s era F1 fighters in Libyan possession.\(^\text{97}\) In conjunction with a state visit by then-Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2008, a number of potential arms sales were discussed by the Russian press, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and sophisticated air defense missiles.\(^\text{98}\)

## WMD Programs and Disarmament\(^\text{99}\)

### Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs.

Despite Libya’s membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi made several efforts to acquire nuclear weapons related technology assistance, beginning in the early 1970s. The most renowned was his reported unsuccessful request for a working nuclear weapon from China in the 1970s. Other unsuccessful attempts to acquire nuclear energy technology useful to the development of nuclear weapons were subsequently made through contacts with the Soviet Union, the United States, France, India, Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina.\(^\text{100}\) Nonetheless, most experts agree that Libya never had a dedicated indigenous nuclear weapons program. Over the next 25 years, Qadhafi made several public statements in which he argued that Arab states were compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons capability in response to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons.\(^\text{101}\) Libya established a small nuclear research reactor at Tajura in 1979 with Soviet assistance, and entered into several rounds of negotiations with Soviet and French authorities for the construction of large nuclear power facilities that were never concluded.

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\(^\text{97}\) “Under the negotiated deal, France would supply Libya with 14 Rafale aircraft as part of a larger arms package valued at between $5.7 billion and $6.4 billion. *Forecast International Defense Intelligence Newsletters*, “Deadline for Libyan-French Arms Package Negotiations Likely to be Extended,” June 12, 2008.

\(^\text{98}\) Tor-M1 air defense missiles were reported as part of the potential package along with MiG-29SMT fighter interceptors and Su-30MK multi-mission fighter aircraft. ITAR-TASS World Service (Russia), “Russia-Libya military cooperation increasing,” April 17, 2008.


\(^\text{101}\) In 1987, for example, Al Qadhafi said that, “Now that the Israelis possess the atomic weapon, the Arabs have nothing before them except to work day and night to possess the atomic weapon in order to defend their existence.” *Reuters*, “Gaddafi Urges Arabs to Develop Nuclear Weapons,” September 2, 1987. See also *San Francisco Chronicle* “Khadafy Wants Arab A-Bombs,” June 23, 1987; and *Agence France-Presse*, “Libya Urges Arabs to Get Nuclear Arms,” January 27, 1996. Qadhafi made similar remarks in a March 2002 interview: “We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have ... Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon.” John Bolton, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 6, 2002.
According to several press accounts, Libyan officials reached an agreement with Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1997 for Khan and his illicit proliferation network to provide the Libyan government with a nuclear weapons design and the uranium enrichment technology it desired. These accounts and International Atomic Energy Agency reports describe how, over the next six years, a complex network of companies and individuals in Malaysia, Switzerland, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, South Africa, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates supplied Libya with uranium enrichment components.\(^{102}\)

Libya’s chemical weapons programs were more advanced and independent than its nuclear weapons development activities. In 1986 and 1987, U.S. officials suspected Libya of using Iranian-supplied chemical weapons against military forces in neighboring Chad and provided the Chadian military with protective equipment to guard against further Libyan attacks.\(^{103}\) During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Libyan government developed chemical weapons production facilities at Rabta, Sebha, and Tarhuna with technology acquired from a number of western European and Asian firms.\(^{104}\) The plants produced large amounts of chemical weapons and components, including 23 tons of mustard gas. Libya’s ballistic missile program relied on foreign technical assistance to produce Scud-B and a limited number of Scud-C missiles but was limited by a lack of indigenous technical skill and ineffective management.\(^{105}\)

**Termination of WMD and Missile Programs.** In 1999, Libyan officials approached the Clinton Administration and offered to dismantle Libya’s chemical weapons programs in exchange for a loosening of U.S. terrorism sanctions. The offer was rejected in an effort to maintain pressure on Libya to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands in the Lockerbie airliner bombing case. Following the Lockerbie settlement, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and intelligence chief Musa Kusa re-engaged with U.S. and British intelligence authorities beginning in March 2003 regarding Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The October 2003 naval interception of the freighter BBC China, which was carrying centrifuge components

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to Libya, accelerated negotiations and led to assessment visits by U.S. and British personnel later that month and in early December 2003.

On December 19, 2003, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam read a statement on Libyan national television announcing the government’s decision to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs and to invite international inspectors to Libya to remove materials and perform verifications. Qadhafi publicly endorsed the statement, paving the way for the removal of WMD-related equipment from Libya in January and March 2004. Subsequent reviews of seized material and interviews with Libyan officials indicated that Libya remained far from developing a nuclear weapons capability, although A.Q. Khan sold Libya a crude nuclear weapons design and some components necessary to begin a uranium enrichment program. However, as of late 2003, Libya had not obtained key pieces of equipment, such as a sufficient number of high precision rotors to power its enrichment centrifuges.

Motives for Disarmament. Officials and independent observers have attributed Libya’s decision to end its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to a number of factors. Administration officials have argued that U.S. military action in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated to Libya the resolve of the Bush Administration to eliminate perceived threats to U.S. security posed by states associated with terrorism and in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, Libyan officials have denied that external pressure or threats influenced their government’s decision making processes and have characterized the decision as a sovereign initiative to restore Libya’s ties with the international community and improve its security and economy. Most independent observers have argued that Libya’s decision was a calculated move designed to extricate the country from the international sanctions regime that was limiting its economic activity and contributing to the deterioration of its vital oil and natural gas infrastructure. Libyan officials have pointed to the financial and economic rewards associated with its international re-engagement, although, prior to and following the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the United States, Qadhafi has stated his belief that Libya should be more directly and substantively rewarded for its decision to disarm and re-engage.

International Controls and Inspections. Libya acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Libya’s nuclear research facility at Tajura has been subject to IAEA safeguards since 1980. Since Libya announced its intent to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

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Weapons (OPCW) have monitored and assisted in ongoing disarmament activities. Libya signed an “additional protocol” agreement in March 2004 granting IAEA inspectors greater access to its nuclear facilities. The IAEA continues to evaluate Libyan disclosure statements related to the scope of its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development activities, particularly with regard to the sources of the materials Libya acquired from the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. As a result of the 2003 WMD disarmament decision, Libya signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2004. Libya also committed to eliminating all its ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms and agreed to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Libya, the U.S., and the UK established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee (TSCC) to oversee the elimination of Libyan WMD and MTCR-related missile programs in September 2004.

As of October 2005, all materials and components associated with Libya’s nuclear weapons development program had been removed and all associated activities had stopped. Libya returned highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies weighing 17 kilograms from its Tajura research reactor to Russia in 2004, and Russia replaced them with low enriched uranium fuel in December 2005 as part of a program co-sponsored with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy.108 During the summer of 2006, Libya returned a further 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Tajura reactor to Russia.109

Libya has signaled its desire to continue its nuclear energy and materials development plans under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). France signed a nuclear energy agreement with Libya in July 2007 that could result in the construction of a nuclear reactor to fuel water desalinization plants. In August 2007, Libyan officials confirmed that they are negotiating with unspecified foreign governments for the sale of 1,000 tons of uranium yellow cake ore stored at a former nuclear facility in Sebha.110

Libya has submitted an inventory of its chemical weapons and related activities to the OPCW and has destroyed over 3,600 munitions designed to disperse chemical agents. The OPCW has verified Libya’s inventory of 23 metric tons of mustard gas and over 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals and approved the conversion of a chemical weapons facility into a pharmaceutical plant for the production of HIV/AIDS and malaria medication. The Department of State began retraining

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Further Reading and Historical Resources


Economist Intelligence Unit, Libya: Country Report 2007


Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval Institute Press, 2003

Appendix A: Libya’s Pre-Qadhafi History

Libya’s Colonial Experience

The Ottoman Empire and Qaramanli Dynasty. Ottoman forces first occupied the coastal regions of the territory that now constitutes Libya in the mid-16th century. However, Ottoman administrators faced stiff and near constant resistance from tribal confederations and a rival independent state in the Fezzan region, all of which limited the Ottomans’ political influence. Beginning in 1711, a semi-independent state under Turkish official Ahmed Qaramanli emerged in Tripoli and established control over the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with Fezzan remaining contested. The Qaramanli family maintained its power and independent rule until the early 19th century through naval privateers and pirates under its control who were used to collect tribute and ransom from merchant vessels seized in the Mediterranean Sea.

“The Shores of Tripoli”. The Qaramanli naval forces of Tripoli formed one component of a regional grouping commonly referred to as “the Barbary pirates,” which played a pivotal role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the young United States. Beginning in the late 1780s, a series of confrontations between U.S. merchant ships and naval raiding parties from Tripoli and other neighboring city-states such as Algiers and Tunis led to the destruction of U.S. maritime cargo and the seizure of U.S. hostages. Subsequent negotiations between the United States and the governments of the Barbary states concluded with the signing of some of the first bilateral treaties in U.S. history, including U.S. agreements to pay tribute to Tripoli in exchange for the safe passage of U.S. vessels off what is now the Libyan coast.

Disputes over the terms of this bilateral agreement and continuing attacks on U.S. merchant ships impressed upon the U.S. government the need for a naval protection force to safeguard U.S. commercial activity in the Mediterranean. This need eventually was satisfied by the creation of the United States Navy by Congress in April 1798. An attack on the U.S. consulate in Tripoli in 1801 and further attacks on U.S. ships sparked open hostilities between the newly commissioned light naval forces of the United States and the privateers of Tripoli. Frequent naval engagements from 1801 to 1805 were often won by U.S. forces, but one skirmish in 1804 ended with the grounding of the U.S.S. Philadelphia and the capture of her crew. The conflict culminated in the overland seizure of the eastern Libyan city of Darnah by U.S. Marines and a team of recruited indigenous forces in 1805 - the basis for the reference to “the shores of Tripoli” in the Marine Corps hymn. The fall of Darnah compelled the Qaramanli leadership in Tripoli to relent to demands to ransom the U.S. prisoners and sign a “treaty of peace and friendship.” Efforts to repatriate the remains of U.S. personnel killed in these early 19th century military engagements with Tripoli are ongoing.113

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The decline of Qaramanli naval power following the confrontation with the United States contributed to the dynasty’s steady loss of political power. Ottoman authorities reoccupied Tripoli in 1835 and began a campaign to pacify and coopt the region’s tribal confederations. The Ottomans solicited the cooperation of the leaders of a conservative revivalist Sufi order known as the Sanusiyah based in Cyrenaica, which they allowed to raise an independent militia and participate in a tacit ruling partnership. Although the Ottoman administrative structure imposed in the 19th century formed the basis for a centralized state, the penetration of Ottoman political power remained incomplete and regional resistance to Ottoman reforms and central authority persisted into the 20th century.

Italian Annexation and Post War Uncertainty. Italy annexed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, and the Ottoman Empire’s subsequent release of its claim to its territory in 1912, marked the beginning of a violent twenty-year period of resistance to Italian rule led by the Sanussi order and local tribes. The Italian occupation authorities dismantled the remaining Ottoman governing structures and disrupted the activities of social and cultural institutions across Libya. Sanussi resistance fighters were defeated during World War I, and the international community formally recognized Italian control over the territory in 1924. A second round of anti-Italian insurgency spurred a violent crackdown by Italian forces under Mussolini, who renamed the territory Libya in 1929. Resistance based in Cyrenaica was worn down and ultimately crushed by 1931. In 1934, Italian peasant colonists began entering the provinces, leading to the displacement of local farmers and the uprooting of established agricultural communities across the country. The population of Cyrenaica remained hostile to Italian rule and its Sanussi leaders allied themselves with British colonial forces in neighboring Egypt.

During the Second World War, Libya served as a staging ground for Italian and German attacks on French North Africa and British-held Egypt. Pivotal battles took place in Cyrenaica from 1940 to early 1943, when German and Italian forces were forced from Libya by British troops under General Bernard Montgomery. British-organized Sanussi fighters played a role in supporting allied operations against German and Italian forces. Following the war, Libya’s provinces were divided under British and French protection until the disposition of Italy’s former colonies could be negotiated. Protracted and complex negotiations continued for years. In November 1949, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 289 declared that the three disparate regions would be united in a single, independent state. The resolution also dispatched a United Nations Commissioner to assist a national assembly representing the regions in creating institutions for a new state that was to assume sovereignty no later than January 1, 1952. The strength of tribal and regional identities complicated the subsequent negotiations and strongly influenced the new government following independence.

Independence and Monarchy, 1951-1969

A constitution agreed to by the U.N.-assisted National Constituent Assembly in October 1951 established a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris As Sanussi I and legislative authority vested in a Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral legislature. On December 24, 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became one of the first independent states in Africa. The
first parliamentary election was held in February 1952, one month after independence. Political parties were banned by the king shortly after independence was declared, and Libya’s first decade of independence was characterized by continuous bargaining and rivalry among the provincial governments over taxation, development, and constitutional issues. In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a unitary monarchy that centralized royal authority, in part to streamline the development of the country’s newly discovered oil resources.

Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government was largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance it received from international institutions and through military basing agreements with the United States and United Kingdom. The U.S.-operated air base at Wheelus field outside of Tripoli served as an important Strategic Air Command base and center for military intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Oil wealth brought rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in the 1960s, but the weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites’ growing identification with the pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the gradual marginalization of the monarchy under King Idris. Popular criticism of U.S. and British basing agreements grew, becoming amplified in wake of Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War. King Idris left the country in mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup in September, led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qadhafi.