DO THE METRICS MAKE THE MISSION?

by

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Since Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, Iraq engaged in wars with Iran, Kuwait, and twice with the United States. The years between the wars with the United States, 1991-2003 were characterized by economic sanctions that destroyed the social fabric the wars had missed. In 2003, after major combat operations were complete, the United Nations created the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to prop up the nation in hopes of returning it to a self-sustaining country capable of managing itself economically and politically.

This thesis assesses the success of the UNAMI based on two metrics relating to effectiveness and efficiency. The first metric hinges on stated objectives compared to goals achieved and the second will examine the three primary human development indicators: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and GDP per capita. The purpose is to determine if the method by which a project is measured determines its effectiveness and efficiency. After reviewing the UNAMI and applying two measures of effectiveness and efficiency, the assessment is that the mission is only partially effective and all aspects are inefficient.
DO THE METRICS MAKE THE MISSION?

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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

On May 2, 2003, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, announced to the world on the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) that major combat operations were over in Iraq.\(^1\) While most assumed that the announcement would be followed by troop withdrawals and subsequent peace in the region, as of this writing, multinational force troops are still on the ground in Iraq. When Saddam was deposed, a power vacuum emerged, and deep-seated anger from the repressed Shiite majority surfaced. Lawlessness followed; in major cities, widespread looting and destruction were directed at museums, markets, and public infrastructure such as oil and electrical sites.\(^2\) The destruction of national sites may have robbed Iraq of its historical narrative; however, the destruction of the infrastructure of oil producing industry, which produced ninety-five percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), deprived the Iraqis of the economic resources to start anew.\(^3\)

The United Nations (UN) recognized the severe humanitarian crisis years of war had created for the Iraqis, and adopted a series of resolutions to help manage the situation. Once the United Nations Assist Mission for Iraq


(UNAMI) was adopted, follow-on resolutions created a strategic framework to partner nations around the world with the interim and permanent government of Iraq during reconstruction. The immediate focus was the development of governance to allow Iraq to manage its political and economic future. Progress in governance appeared swift, as power shifted from the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) to an Iraq Interim Government (IIG) in 2004, just eleven months after Saddam Hussein was deposed. Progress in other sectors of reconstruction did not move forward as originally expected. The lack of progress was attributed to the deteriorating security environment created as Sunni and Shiite militias battled for power. As the multinational forces exercised greater control over assigned areas, the militias turned their hostilities for each other against the occupying forces.

In January 2007, a troop surge was implemented to counter the growing violence in Iraq. By mid-2007, violence had started to decrease, providing an opportunity for the Iraqi government to implement policies to stabilize the country. The improved security situation provided

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optimism for Iraq and the primary stakeholders of the UNAMI, prompting the UN to adopt follow-on resolutions to increase its interactive and proactive role with Iraq while promoting humanitarian assistance.

B. IMPORTANCE

How well the United Nations manages Iraq’s transition and facilitates its successful reconstruction campaign may ultimately define its future role in Peace Support Operations (PSO). Many people have been highly critical of the UN’s handling of PSOs over the years. Those most critical, characterize its practices as ineffective due to “lack of accountability to donors, inability to manage its people, insufficient transparency and accountability.” 6 While Kofi Annan insisted that UN processes had become “more transparent, accountable, and responsive” during his tenure, he acknowledged, “our work is far from complete.” 7 The United Nations, like any large international organization, can always improve its efficiency and effectiveness. From 1948 to 1988, the UN conducted fifteen peacekeeping operations; some of these are still ongoing. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken forty-seven missions, with the most significant increase in troop deployment was between 2000 to 2006 reaching a total of 380,000 personnel. 8

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The UN historically executes operations with a get in and get out mentality, leaving a recently recovered state susceptible to a series of failures, as occurred in Sierra Leone and Somalia.²⁹ The UN cannot turn back the clock; however, it can adopt practices that foster sustainability in recipient nations.

A review of UNAMI’s existing gauge of progress in transformation and reconstruction may provide some insight into its degree of success. Currently, measurements of progress are reported in dollars spent in producing education centers, health facilities, and increases in electricity rather than significant outcomes like literacy rates and increased life expectancy. Reporting progress in terms of dollars spent raises significant concerns regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission.

C. DETERMINING EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The United Nations routinely cites its efficient and effective execution of mandates and work in peace support operations.¹⁰ But those within the General Assembly, and representatives from many nations, have raised concerns over alleged mismanagement and fraud in recent years. Representatives from South Korea, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Finland stated that the volume and complexity of UN PSOs require “strengthening internal control in order to enhance

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¹⁰ The IRFFI WB/ITF sites effectiveness 60 times in the 60 page document. The World Bank, International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq World Bank Iraq Trust Fund, (June, 24, 2008), 1-60.
transparency and accountability,” with the need to “streamline and simplify procurement procedures taking into account best practices.”

The one area critics and supporters can both agree on is that the UNAMI focuses on dollars spent in a particular area of reconstruction as a measure of progress. According to Cohen, one of the challenges to stabilization and reconstruction (S/R) is that “progress is judged on the basis of programs that have been implemented rather than on actual results.” He argues this measure of progress is detrimental to achieving stated objectives and results in excessive spending. The crux of the argument lies in the effectiveness and efficiency in which the mission is administered. Each side has differing views of the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the mission in Iraq.

Civil-military relations scholar Thomas Bruneau distills a useful characterization of efficiency and effectiveness from theorists in physics, economics, and organizational theory. He succinctly defines efficiency as “cost-effectiveness” or the “most efficient use of resources:” in layman’s terms, “more bang for the buck.” The efficiency piece of any mission is difficult to measure,

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particularly in the absence of tangible data such as levels of education or the capability of security forces. Dr. Bruneau defines effectiveness as “fulfilling roles and missions,” or simply “the ability to actually achieve stated goals.”\textsuperscript{14} Downs and Stedman argue that estimating effectiveness is measuring success and it should be measured by “developing one or more outcome indicators, each of which measures the extent to which a goal that is considered central to the operation’s success has been achieved.”\textsuperscript{15} Efficiency and effectiveness are the means through which a mission is achieved. They have little to do with its success, but everything to do with the way the mission is perceived.

\textbf{D. WHAT DOES SUCCESS LOOK LIKE?}

To accurately measure the success of a mission, a number of preconditions should be agreed to before it commences. Haphazardly throwing resources at a mission is a waste of time. Some basic considerations include determining what success looks like, establishing a plan to support the vision of success, and taking into consideration political support and the will of the people to provide troops and resources. The timing of the dispatch of troops and resources is as important as the plan itself. Peace is a precondition for reconstruction missions, meaning financial resources will be squandered or abused if injected prior to


peace. Conversely, if a country lacks the capacity to absorb resources, as occurred during the first years of Iraq’s reconstruction, resources will not be used and remain in an account. Another essential ingredient for success is the presence of troops who will establish and keep the peace.

This thesis will apply two metrics to the UNAMI. The first will review the initial and follow-on UNAMI mandates, and compare the UNAMI’s accomplishments with its objectives. The areas of review will be agriculture, education, and health: areas with considerable transparency relative to other areas. The second metric will compare human development indicators in 2000 and again in 2007, before and after the UNAMI was instituted. The human development indicators are adult literacy, GDP per capita, and life expectancy. The progress in each cluster area will be assessed as to its effectiveness and its efficiency based on the reported achievements within the clusters.

E. THE UNITED NATIONS ASSIST MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI): SUCCESS OR FAILURE

Since the inception of the UNAMI, many have questioned its ability to succeed. Those most critical of the UNAMI say it is ineffective, and they are quick to point out the enormous amount of money the mission consumes without producing tangible progress. One issue is the way in which the UNAMI reports progress in dollars spent rather than objectives achieved. Supporters of the mission argue that the UNAMI is making progress and should be viewed in a broader sense that cannot be measured in the current
setting, but rather must be viewed over time as Iraq’s infrastructure, educational system, economic situation, and governance improve.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1500 and 1546 concerning Iraq, which were adopted in 2004, were ambiguous and open to interpretation. Stedman paraphrases, Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr points of view that, “multidimensional peacekeeping missions are complex with many unknown variables and fall victim to mission creep once a peacekeeping force enters a country.”16 This ambiguity allows the mandate to remain flexible and makes it difficult to qualify the mission as a failure or success. This is particularly troublesome in light of criticism that peacekeeping missions are ineffective.

As the UN’s capacity developed with the UNAMI, it adopted a larger role in the country. UNSCR 1770, adopted in 2007, provided greater detail on the scope of the UN’s mission in Iraq than did the resolutions passed in 2004. The additional resolution gave greater responsibility in the reconstruction effort with an emphasis on humanitarian assistance through capacity and development programs.

1. Critics of UNAMI

A recent Congressional Research Service study examines the reconstruction effort in Iraq and the lack of progress from 2003 through 2006. While this is not a complete list, the following provides a broad flavor of the issues that are hampering progress. Those issues include: 1) Poor

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accountability - a number of projects were badly executed and the resources misused; 2) ineffective assistance - objectives were not met in oil production and electrical power generation; 3) inadequate levels of assistance - excessive spending on security to conduct reconstruction projects created increased overhead costs; and 4) broadly dispersed assistance - the aid attempted to do too much, spanning across the country in areas from health to electricity.\(^{17}\) A more focused approach in specific locations emphasizing a few initiatives would have provided greater tangible success than broadly dispersed reconstruction.

The list provides an overview of the problems hindering progress in Iraq’s reconstruction; however, it fails to succinctly identify the causes of delay. Given the amount of information that was available to Congress in order for it to produce this report, it is surprising that the causes of delay were not identified.

David Walker and Anthony Cordesman are two primary critics of the spending practices of the UNAMI. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, cites three distinct reasons for ineffectiveness in the reconstruction of Iraq: 1) lack of well-defined requirements, 2) inadequate oversight and accountability, and 3) that progress was hindered by “multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction.”\(^ {18}\) Walker states, “The United States is entering its fifth year of efforts to


rebuild and stabilize Iraq, but these efforts have neither consistently achieved their desired outcomes nor done so in an economic and efficient manner."^{19}

Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has been equally as critical of the lack of efficiency in rebuilding Iraq. Cordesman has produced a series of documents that analyze the Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) status reports on Iraq, citing the "inability to account for aid spending in detail, or measure the effectiveness of aid projects with any accuracy."^{20} GAO and CRS reports dating back to 2003 identify the cause of ineffectiveness in Iraq; however, practices remain unchanged, resulting in lessons documented not lessons learned. While the UN has no ties to the Departments of Defense and State, it still must maintain a level of transparency comparable to them in order to maintain legitimacy. The primary thrust of Cordesman’s critique is that the UN is funded and supported by the member nations it represents, and therefore, reporting should be up to Western standards.

2. Supporters of UNAMI

The UN makes claims about the success of the UNAMI through a variety of monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports that chronicle its achievements. While the UN concedes that the mission is not successful in all areas, the list of achievements is considerable. According to the United

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Nations Development Group Iraq Transition Fund (UNDG/ITF) semi-annual reports from 2004 to December 2007, $1.3 billion was deposited into the ITF, of which $1.08 billion were approved for contracts. To date, 56 out of 141 projects were approved, and eight are operationally closed and complete.\textsuperscript{21} The UNAMI successes include providing assistance with drafting the Iraqi Constitution, organizing two rounds of general elections, and assisting in delivering social services comprised of health care, education, water and sanitation, and employment.\textsuperscript{22}

Cluster A, consisting of Agriculture, Food Security, Environment, and Natural resource management, approved funding in the amount of $157.67 million; Of which, $117 million was received and expended at a rate of 74 percent.\textsuperscript{23} The approved funding was used to provide safe drinking water to 15,000 residents in six communities.\textsuperscript{24} Six of Iraq’s nine water-pumping stations were rehabilitated, providing irrigation water for four major provinces.\textsuperscript{25} Over 11,000 acres were cleared, increasing the availability of land for agriculture and grazing.

\textsuperscript{21} United Nations Report to Donors, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (May 1, 2008), iii.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 63.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 6.

Other developments include capacity building projects, through which 460 senior policy staff were trained in areas of environmental, veterinary, and water management in order to increase future development.\textsuperscript{26}

Cluster B, consisting of education and culture approved funding in the amount of $191 million; of which, $150.9 million was received and expended at a rate of 79 percent.\textsuperscript{27} Cluster B accomplishments include rehabilitation of 433 primary schools and reconstruction of an additional 244, procurement and distribution of “nine million textbooks benefitting six million students,”\textsuperscript{28} and the establishment of “17 vocational institutes and equipping 52 others, development of one National Literacy Resource Center, and rehabilitation of seven technical colleges.”\textsuperscript{30}

Cluster D, consisting of health and nutrition, approved funding in the amount of $155 million, of which $117 million was received and expended at a rate of 75 percent.\textsuperscript{31} Cluster D accomplishments include “improvement in sector legislation, strategies, and policies to support health reform process” and “reducing the prevalence of communicable disease.”\textsuperscript{32} Infant mortality rates and children under-five rates have been reduced by 50 percent since 1999. In addition, nearly 25 percent of the population now has access

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., iv.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., v.
to improved healthcare services such as hospitals, maternity units, mental health facilities and training centers.33

The list of accomplishments in each cluster area appears modest based on the considerable funding attached to each area. The latest UNDG report identified lack of security and indecision by the Iraqi government as the two recurring factors that have limited progress.

F. CONCLUSION

This thesis will review the United Nations Assist Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) with a focus on UN-adopted mandates that address the reconstruction of Iraq. By understanding the sequence of events leading up to the development of UNAMI, it is easier to understand the challenges the mission faces today. A brief history of Iraq will be followed by a synopsis of the development of the UNAMI, to include associated mandates, organizational structure, and progress since inception. Once primary achievements are outlined, an assessment of three cluster areas will utilize the two metrics identified above to determine if the method by which a project is measured determines its success.

The thesis will compare the stated objectives of the UN mandates with the achievements of UNAMI as published by the UN. By measuring the results in the specific cluster areas against widely-accepted gauges of effectiveness and efficacy based on an input-output model, one can determine if a mission is meeting its intent. The same cluster areas were measured against human development indicators (HDI)

defined by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). The HDIs are life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, and the standard of living or GDP per capita. The achievements are compared against each model to establish if the method by which a project is measured determines its success relative to effectiveness and efficiency.
II. IRAQ: FOUR DECADES OF MISSTEPS

A. INTRODUCTION

The 1970s was a time of unprecedented economic success for Iraq, in large part due to the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1972, and its subsequent 50 percent increase in oil production within two years. This move appeared fortuitous in light of the oil price spike in 1973 and 1974, when prices increased by over $7 per barrel in less than two years. 34 The significant increase in Iraq’s oil revenue paved the way for infrastructure expansion and military modernization projects. Iraq’s economic boom expanded to every level of society; for the first time in Iraq’s modern history, a middle class developed.35 The economic good fortune would be short-lived, falling victim to political missteps that led to an eight year war with Iran, followed by thirteen years of sanctions and two wars with the United States that left the country occupied.

B. BACKGROUND

In 1968, Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, a leading member of the Baath party, ascended to the presidency of Iraq after a successful coup that removed President Abdul Rahman Arif. A


principal constituent in the takeover was Al-Bakr’s cousin, Saddam Hussein. Hussein was appointed vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), making him second in command.\textsuperscript{36} Over the course of the next decade, Hussein instituted a series of changes that consolidated most of the power and wealth in the country to a few of his closest allies.

In 1973, a failed coup attempt led to constitutional changes that provided even greater power to the President. In 1974, the RCC became the body responsible for making official policy, exercising both executive and legislative power in the country. \textsuperscript{37} During the same period, an initiative to purge all formidable opponents was undertaken; as a result, Al-Bakr’s Baath party dominated the political landscape, with his family members appointed to primary seats in the government.

By the mid-1970s Al-Bakr’s health was failing and he grew dependent on his second in command, Saddam Hussein. As power slowly shifted to Hussein, Al-Bakr’s presence in internal and external political matters faded. By 1976, Saddam Hussein was de facto president of Iraq; however, this did not become official until 1979.

\textbf{C. SADDAM HUSSEIN ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY}

On July 16, 1979, Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein officially replaced him as president of the republic and commander in chief of the


armed forces. In a foreshadowing of events to come, Saddam Hussein called the RCC to a meeting in Baghdad on July 22, 1979, and identified sixty-eight men as co-conspirators in a coup plot to overthrow his presidency. Hussein ordered the public execution of twenty-one of the identified conspirators. Over the course of the next few weeks, hundreds were executed for their role or knowledge of the coup plot.

As the 1970s ended, Iraq had been politically and economically transformed. Politically, it had survived a series of failed coup attempts, and the Baath party had maintained a strong hold on resources. Economically, the country was going through a period of unprecedented growth. In 1972, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was nationalized and the following year oil prices exploded. From 1973 to 1975, Iraq’s oil revenue leaped from $1 billion to $8 billion. This rapid increase in revenue spurred the development of infrastructure in every major sector, including social services, production of goods, and expansion and modernization of the military.

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40 The (IPC) Iraq Petroleum Company consisted of five oil companies: British Petroleum (BP), Shell, Esso, Mobil, and Compagnie Francaine des Petroles, plus the 5 percent interest of the Gulbenkians, who led the merger.
D. IRAN-IRAQ WAR

In 1980, Iraq reported oil revenues exceeding $26 billion. The expectation was for further economic prosperity as modernization projects continued in Iraq. The political landscape, however, began to change. In 1979, Iranian influence helped transform Iraq’s repressed Shiite population into an organized faction led by Baqir Al Sadr against the Baath party with principal differences of between the two factions were religious points of view.43 A series of Iranian-backed protests by Shiite Iraqis further increased tensions between Iran and the Baathist party. In the spring of 1980, Sadr launched failed assassination attempts against Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Azizi and Minister of Culture Latif Nayyif Jasim, which prompted immediate action by Iraq.44 Members of the Iraqi Shia with ties to Iran were deported to Iran, and Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of Al-Sadr and his sister.45 The 1975 Algiers Accord, which had temporarily resolved a long history of disputed territory and navigational waterways between Iraq and Iran, was abrogated. A series of border disputes led to an exchange of artillery fire and, by September 1980, Iraqi troops had marched into Iranian territory to begin eight years of war.46

44 Ibid.
Within days after hostilities commenced, the oil-exporting capabilities of both countries were attacked and crippled, including “loading facilities, pumping stations, refineries, terminals and pipelines.” 47 The damage reduced output to a fraction of its prewar levels. To illuminate the devastation and put oil production capacity into context, “output declined from 3.4 million barrels per day (b/d) in August to a mere 140,000 b/d in October.” 48 The excessive damage to petroleum infrastructure forced supply trains to be rerouted, which reduced revenue due to increase shipping costs and further multiplied the economic impact. Prior to the war, Iraq’s GNP had been $39.7 billion; however, one year into the conflict, its GNP had been reduced to $30.1 billion.49

By 1981, Iraq’s oil revenue had been slashed by 60 percent, deeply impacting the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) and leading to an increase in foreign borrowing. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided Iraq with $2 billion per month through the first few years of the war, allowing Iraq to finance the war with Iran while continually modernizing its army and infrastructure.

There was a significant drain of the labor force during the years leading up to and throughout the Iran-Iraq war. It was estimated that two-fifths of the labor force was employed by the agriculture market. In 1978, the armed forces were approximately 140,000 strong; by 1982, they had

47 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,” Third World Quarterly 8, no.3 (July 1986), 873.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
increased to 450,000. Since such a large segment of the Iraqi population had been farmers, the increase in the armed forces left a void in agricultural production. Wheat production dropped from two million to 163,000 tons per year by 1984, and rice production dropped from 965,000 to 95,000 tons per year in the same time.

While agriculture was not the primary source of revenue for the central government, the reduction in agricultural revenue was significant when coupled with the loss in oil production and the increase in foreign debt. These three variables had a negative impact on Iraq’s economy, forcing the country to change spending practices.

Iraq’s economic situation worsened in April 1982, when Syria closed an Iraqi pipeline that flowed through their territory. The pipeline was responsible for transporting 400,000 b/d, or roughly $5 billion in revenue per year. Syria’s action reduced Iraq’s oil exporting capacity to approximately one-fourth its prewar level.

By the mid-1980s Iraq had spent $94 billion on the war effort. Iraq secured all foreign aid support to third world countries, restricted foreign travel, and non-military imports were reduced from $16.8 billion to $6.6 billion. Due to Iraq’s volatile condition, the Organization of Arab

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50 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,” Third World Quarterly 8, no.3 (July 1986), 875.
52 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,” Third World Quarterly 8, no.3 (July 1986), 875.
53 Ibid., 882.
Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC) reduced Iraq’s market share from $26.1 billion in 1980 to $8.4 billion in 1983.\textsuperscript{54}

E. EFFECTS OF WAR

On August 20, 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ended. The war had left both countries in ruins and produced little change in the political or geographic landscape of the region. While there was no clear winner in the eight-year conflict, both sides suffered heavy losses in blood and treasure. The true toll of war would be measured beyond the dead; “experts believed in 1988 that these hardships...would gradually erode what social cohesion and progress had been achieved over the previous decade...”\textsuperscript{55} The war cost Iraq an estimated one million casualties, nearly $500 billion in lost oil revenue and infrastructure damage, and great GNP losses.\textsuperscript{56} Iran’s losses exceeded those of Iraq. Using comparative variables of damaged infrastructure, lost oil revenue, and GNP, the economic impact for Iran was $644.3 billion and one million casualties.\textsuperscript{57}

During the course of the war, the UN passed nine resolutions. The first of these, UNSCR 479, acknowledged the situation between the warring parties, calling on them to “...refrain immediately from any further use of force.”\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,” Third World Quarterly 8, no.3 (Jul., 1986), 882.


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 245.


\textsuperscript{58} UN Security Council Resolution 479, S/RES/479 (September 28, 1980).
Both sides ignored this resolution and continued with escalatory force against one another with each passing year. Reports that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iranians surfaced as early as 1983. On February 24, 1986, the United Nations passed security council resolution 582 calling for an “immediate cease-fire, cessation of all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air and withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay.” 59 UNSCR 582 recognized the atrocities against non-combatants in point two, stating that,

[The international community] deplores the escalation of the conflict, especially territorial incursions, the bombing of purely civilian centers, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.60

Two more years of war would rage before the cessation of hostilities. By 1988, Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons (CW) on Iranians in ten confirmed incidents.61 With no punitive action from the UN for his use of CW, Saddam turned his lethal weapons on internal threats, reportedly killing 8,000 to 24,000 Kurds from 1983 to 1988.62

60 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
Following the war, Iraq’s infrastructure and economy were fractured, war debt from foreign borrowing had marginalized the dinar, inflation was rampant, and the Kurds to the north were rebelling. Saddam Hussein sought to replenish the resources that years of war had depleted. Iraq was heavily in debt to Kuwait as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. A land dispute in the resource-rich region fueled tensions between the two nations. Kuwait was the richest country in the region, creating a target of opportunity for Saddam.

F. PRELUDE TO THE GULF WAR AND THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s army crossed into Kuwait and overthrew the government. The United Nations responded with UNSCR 660, condemning Iraq’s actions and demanding an immediate withdrawal. After four days of Iraqi non-compliance with resolution 660, the UN adopted UNSCR 661, which directed all states to prevent the import or export of all commodities from Iraq or Kuwait, with the only exceptions being medicine and foodstuffs in a humanitarian crisis. The resolution went on to state that no state shall receive or provide commercial, industrial or public utility, economic or financial resources to or from Iraq or Kuwait.63 Over the course of the next three months, eleven resolutions were passed against Iraq, setting additional restrictions on the two countries.64 The impact of the resolutions had an exponential effect on Iraq’s industry, leading to further

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64 A total of eleven UN resolutions ensued following the invasion of Kuwait. The stringent resolutions continued to respond to shortfalls that the previous resolutions overlooked in strangling Iraq’s economy.
declines in the economy. As the majority of Iraq’s economy
was tied to oil, the oil embargo created the largest long-
term impact on the economy. The blockade caused an
immediate impact on food supplies since 70 to 80 percent of
Iraqi food was imported. 65 As food became scarce, the
prices dramatically spiked; in some cases, food prices
increased 1800 percent.66

On November 29, 1990, UNSCR 678 demanded that Iraq
withdraw from Kuwait. If Iraq failed to comply with UNSC
678, the UN would use all necessary means to uphold and
enforce Resolution 660.67 Saddam once again defied the UN.
Therefore, on January 17, 1991, the United States executed a
series of surgical strikes on military targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.68 The initial plan included eight-four targets.
However, by the time operations were underway, the target
set had grown to 400; by the time operation desert shield
was over, 723 sites had been destroyed. 69 Air strikes on
civilian infrastructure, power stations, transport and
telecommunications networks, fertilizer plants, oil
facilities, industrial plants and civilian buildings
destroyed nearly all critical infrastructures. Repairing

65 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990-
2000,” Third World Quarterly 22 no.2 (Apr. 2001): 209. JSTOR. NPS,
Monterey (accessed November 2, 2007).
66 Ibid.
67 On August 6, 1990; four days after Kuwait was invaded, the United
Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 661,
68 President H.W. Bush addresses the nation explaining the reason for
launching strikes against Iraq.
69 Abbas Alnasrawi, "Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future," Arab
the damaged infrastructures were slow and nearly impossible due to lack of available materials created by the UN embargo.\textsuperscript{70} In a relatively short period, the Iraqi army was marginalized. A UN special mission to Iraq noted that, “Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.”\textsuperscript{71}

Following Operation Desert Storm, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, creating a comprehensive set of restrictions that banned the research and development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and deliver systems. The resolution required the implementation of a WMD monitoring program to verify resolution compliance. It also included the establishment of a compensation fund financed by Iraq to settle war claims. Iraq’s failure to comply with the declarations in UNSCR 687 became the justification for limited U.S. air strikes over the next decade.

G. OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

In 1991, reports about the grave humanitarian crisis in Iraq continued. The United Nations took action to address this crisis by proposing UN Resolutions 706 and 712. The resolutions allowed Iraq to sell up to $1.6 billion worth of oil for six months to “mitigate deteriorating human conditions.”\textsuperscript{72} The Oil-for-Food program stipulated that 30 percent of the revenue generated should be earmarked for the


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 209.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 212.
compensation fund and payment of UN transaction costs; Iraq was left with roughly $1.3 billion to finance the import of food, medical, and essential humanitarian goods for 18 million Iraqis. The Iraqi government refused to accept the terms of the resolutions and the humanitarian crisis continued.

In 1995, the UN revisited the Oil-for-Food resolution to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The same provisions as those contained in UN Resolution 706 were provided in UN Resolution 986, along with authorization to sell $2 billion worth of oil. \(^{73}\) Iraq again rejected the terms of the resolution, due to the UN’s insistence on controlling the funds. Finally, in 1996, Iraq accepted the terms of the new resolution.

Over the course of the next few years, the Oil-for-Food program continued to grow, generating greater revenue for Iraq in its attempt to meet its humanitarian needs. By 1998, over $5 billion was authorized under the Oil-for-Food program; however, Iraq had only achieved roughly $3.8 billion in oil sales. \(^{74}\) The program generated $64.2 billion throughout its life, yet humanitarian needs had not been met when the Oil-for-Food program ended in 2003. \(^{75}\) The expectation was that the Oil-for-Food program would alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. However, infant mortality rates continued to increase, reaching 150/1,000,


\(^{74}\) Approximately 97 percent of the revenue from the Oil-for-Food program was earmarked for humanitarian relief during this time.

\(^{75}\) Briefing Paper on the UN OFF Program, “Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program” (October 21, 2004), 6.
or 4,475 deaths a month; by 1996, nearly half a million deaths due to malnutrition had occurred. The continued loss of life throughout the Oil-for-Food era indicated that two sets of sanctions were in place: one imposed by the UN, and another imposed by Saddam Hussein, who withheld resources from the Iraqi people.\footnote{Official UNICEF Country Data website: “Iraq Statistics” http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/iraq_statistics.html (accessed November 14, 2007).}

\section*{H. SADDAM’S DEFIANCE}

During this same period of time, Saddam continued to defy UN Resolution 687 by not allowing the UN weapons inspection teams unfettered access to all sites throughout Iraq. The United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM, charged with inspecting Iraq’s suspected chemical and biological weapons making capabilities, drafted a series of letters to the UN, outlining the challenges imposed by the Iraqi government on the inspection teams.\footnote{UN Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (April 3, 1991).} Throughout UNSCOM’s mission, the Iraqi government would periodically ban them from travel, refused to authorize inspections to predetermined sites, and disrupt or halt disarmament work.\footnote{UN Special Mission Library of Documents, UN Security Council Resolution 1060, S/RES/1060, (June 12, 1996); UN Security Council Resolution 1115, S/RES1115, (June 21, 1997); UN Security Council Resolution 1134, S/RES/1134, (October 23, 1997); UN Security Council Resolution 1137, S/RES/1137, (November 12, 1997); UN Security Council Resolution 1194, S/RES/1194, (September 9, 1998); UN Security Council Resolution 1205, S/RES/1205, (November 5, 1998).} Three additional resolutions were adopted demanding Iraq’s cooperation with UNSCOM inspection teams; however, Iraq waffled on its cooperation and ignored resolutions. Finally, all inspections were halted, and UNSCOM was told to
leave the country on November 13, 1997. 79 On December 17, 1999 the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1284, which established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC would take on the same responsibilities as UNSCOM had been given in UNSCR 687; however, it would be three years before a team was assembled and functional.

On November 8, 2002, UNSCR 1441 was adopted, recalling nine prior resolutions adopted by the UN and accepted by Iraq with the expectation of compliance. By 2002, Iraq had stalled weapons inspection teams for nearly three years. Resolution 1441 "warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations [to allow unfettered access to weapons inspection teams]. 80 UNSCR 1441 would serve as the final warning, and provide ammunition for U.S.-led military action against Iraq a few months later.

I. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

On March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush addressed the nation. He called on Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face military action. The President said,

the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council.

We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned.\textsuperscript{81}

The U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. U.S. Forces met light resistance, and within six weeks, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Iraq’s leader was deposed and all authority had vanished. The violence in Baghdad did not start immediately; first riots and looting commenced in the major cities.

The pillaging caused irreparable damage to Iraq’s electrical producing sites. Prior to the war, Iraq produced 9,295 megawatts (MW) of electricity, while demand was 5,100 MW.\textsuperscript{82} Following the invasion and widespread looting, electrical plants operated at a fraction of their pre-war levels, producing a meager 3,300 MW and thus were unable to meet the needs of the population. \textsuperscript{83} The cascading affects of lack of electricity left areas without water, sanitation, and solid waste disposal systems, creating a growing health hazard. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) reported that one third of the children in the south and central provinces were suffering from malnutrition. Only nine percent of rural areas outside Baghdad had operational sanitation, resulting in raw sewage being discharged into rivers and waterways. Hospitals were looted during the early stages of the occupation as well. Those who were now sick from

\textsuperscript{81} George W. Bush address to the Nation, “President says Saddam Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours” (Washington: The White House, March 17, 2003).
\textsuperscript{82} United Nations/World Bank, \textit{Joint Iraq Needs Assessment} (October 2003), 28.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
contaminated water or malnutrition could not receive treatment since many hospitals had closed and those still open lacked basic medicines.

**J. CONCLUSION**

As 2002 ended, U.S. patience with Iraq’s noncompliance with UN resolutions over the past twelve years had reached its limit. Saddam had refused to comply with UN demands during the Iran-Iraq war. When he refused to adhere to UN demands throughout the 1990s, the results were military action and sanctions that fractured the fabric of Iraqi society, decimating industry and destroying infrastructure. Due to a significant loss in electrical capability, public services did not operate at full capacity, resulting in backed-up sanitation systems and water contamination, which led, in turn, to an outbreak in disease. Hospitals had been bombed, and those that survived were ill equipped to deal with the volume of humanitarian aid required as a result of the previous two decades.

Immediately following the 2003 invasion, the UN and the World Bank undertook a joint mission to assess the situation in Iraq and lay the foundation for a reversal of the humanitarian crisis.
A. INTRODUCTION

Since 1991, the United Nations Office of the High Council for Human Rights (OCHA) has catalogued the longstanding humanitarian crisis in Iraq. OCHA records highlight Iraqi physical abuse throughout Saddam’s Presidency.84 Once Saddam Hussein was deposed and combat operations in Iraq ended in May 2003, the United Nations took steps to reverse Iraq’s situation. With the full support of the international community, the UN adopted a series of resolutions to provide significant resources to reconstruct Iraq. The resolutions emphasized the importance of affording Iraqis the right to freely determine their own political future and control their own natural resources.85

This section will focus on several UN Security Council Resolutions that establish and outline the objectives of UNAMI, along with support documents that provide a clearer picture of the dynamics and growing relationship between UNAMI and support organizations. It will illustrate the maturation of the UNAMI, its organizational structure, the cluster approach to achieving adopted mandates, and the primary areas of focus within specified cluster areas.

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85 UN Security Council Resolution 1546, S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
B. BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2003, the UN adopted UNSCR 1483, lifting thirteen years of sanctions imposed on Iraq and providing a framework that would later develop into the UNAMI (UNAMI).

Table 1. UNSCR 1483

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSCR 1483 Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Lifts the sanctions burden on the Iraqi people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Encourages the international community to assist in helping the Iraqi people build a better future for their country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Establishes the position of a UN Special Representative who will play a vital role in all aspects of Iraq’s reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Winds down the Oil-for-Food program (OFF) over a six-month period, while providing for the continued delivery of priority civilian goods approved and funded and Oil-for-Food to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Supports Iraqis in charting their own political and economic future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Reaffirms the Coalition’s commitment to work with the UN and an Iraqi Interim Administration to transition authority to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq as efficiently and effectively as possible. 86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A select group of reconstruction experts in economics, government, and infrastructure from around the world traveled to Iraq to identify shortfalls and to propose options for reconstruction. 87 On July 15, 2003, recently appointed UN Special Representative to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello reported the group’s findings to the UN. Noted problems included neglected maintenance on infrastructure and investment, buildings, pipelines, communication equipment and transportation links all damaged from years of

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87 United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (October 2003), V.
war. Other problems apart from those involving infrastructure were neglect of health and education systems, and environmental degradation caused by draining the southern marshes, which increased the threat to health, livelihood, and economic progress. Significant contributions and commitment by the world community were required in order to reverse two decades of political and economic missteps by Iraq.\(^8^8\)

C. UNAMI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

On August 14, 2003, the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1500, thereby by establishing the UNAMI. The resolution was modest in content, depending heavily on UNSCR 1483 as a strategy to support the specifics outlined in the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA).\(^8^9\)

On August 19, 2003, before significant work could begin to address Iraq’s humanitarian crisis and infrastructure woes, a bomb-laden cement truck exploded beside the UN headquarters building in Iraq, killing, Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one others.\(^9^0\) The bombing caused the UN to withdraw from Iraq and operate from a headquarters in Jordan. Even though Vieira de Mello was only at his post for a short time, he was instrumental in developing the JNA. The JNA was a combined project, funded by the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank (WB). Staff members


\(^8^9\) UN Security Council Resolution 1500, S/RES/1500 (August 14, 2003).

from the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), UNDG, WB, and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) evaluated the results from the JNA to determine their role in each province of Iraq. Security and oil were excluded from the priority list by request of the CPA.

The JNA originally consisted of fourteen priority sectors and three cross-cutting themes applied as categorical checklists across the eighteen provinces of Iraq.\(^{91}\) In subsequent years, the fourteen sectors and cross-cutting themes would collapse to seven clusters as interdependence became obvious; for example, electricity and water were categorically placed under infrastructure rehabilitation. Table 2 provides a codified list of the former fourteen priority sectors and cross-cutting themes; Table 3 lists the seven clusters used at the time of this report.

\(^{91}\) PCNA Review Phase One: Iraq Needs Assessment Case Study (July 2006), 3.
Table 2. 14 UN Priority Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14 Priority Sectors 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education: Primary, Secondary &amp; Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Water Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, Sanitation, Solid Waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Telecommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Housing &amp; Land Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Institutions, Civil Society, Rule of Law, Media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Cross-cutting Themes

| Human Rights                                                                             |
| Gender                                                                                   |
| Environment                                                                             |

Table 3. UN Cluster Approach and Lead Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Approach 2008</th>
<th>Cluster Coordinators, UN Country Team, Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Food Security, Environment and Natural Resources Management</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Culture</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Human Development</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The elements highlighted in Table 3 will be discussed at greater length in the next section, when Agriculture, Education, and Health will be assessed in the input-output model and human development indicator model in Chapter 4IV.

The JNA identified the immediate reconstruction needs for 2004 and medium term needs for 2005 through 2007. The findings of the JNA were used to attract funding at a series of donor conferences. The JNA provided the first written table of objectives that would eventually become the foundation for most reconstruction projects.

The UNAMI formally commenced September 1, 2003. The UNAMI originally consisted of sixteen primary UN agencies, two affiliated bodies, and two donor managers. To date, the number of primary UN agencies has grown to twenty. The twenty primary UN agencies supporting UNAMI are identified with cluster coordinators in Table 4. The two affiliated bodies are the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Bank (WB). The IOM’s role is to address the increased transitory and internally displaced persons issue in Iraq since the spike in violence in 2004. The WB’s mission is to “help Iraq build efficient, inclusive, transparent, and accountable institutions as needed for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health and Nutrition</th>
<th>World Health Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Rehabilitation</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs/Electoral Assistance Division 92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

stability, good governance, and sustainable economic prosperity.”

The WB manages the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) and United Nations Development Group Iraqi Transition Fund. The IRFFI allows donors to provide funds with earmarks for a specific use or without earmarks for general-purpose use. The ITF is a partnership with the World Bank that allows donors to fund their projects through a single channel, thereby reducing donor transaction costs.

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Table 4. Primary Agencies Operating with the UNAMI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary United Nations Agencies Operating with UNAMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Telecommunication Union (ITU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Fund for Advancement of Women (UNIFEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs/Electoral Assistance Division (UN DPA/EAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Program (UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Program (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization (WHO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On October 23 and 24, 2003, the UN hosted a reconstruction conference in Madrid, Spain. The goal of this initial conference was to build political support and secure pledges while linking reconstruction needs to humanitarian needs. The JNA report requested $35.819 billion; the international community confirmed its support.

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by pledging $33 billion in grants and loans. Since that initial conference, six additional donor conferences have been held in Tokyo, Japan (2004), at the Dead Sea, Jordan (2005), Amman, Jordan (2006), Istanbul, Turkey, Bari, Italy (2007), and Baghdad, Iraq (July 8, 2008). The purpose of these subsequent donor conferences was to discuss the progress made between meetings and to envision future projects, while continually raising funds to continue reconstruction in Iraq.

97 PCNA Review Phase One, 3.
As of October 2007, the GAO reported that international donors had pledged an additional $16.4 billion in grants for Iraq’s reconstruction.98

D. UN MANDATES

On June 8, 2004, the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1546,

welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004.99

The United Nations continued to position itself to play a major role in the reconstruction of Iraq; the specifics are outlined in Table 5. UNSCR 1546 provided amplifying information as to the mission in Iraq that had been authorized by the initial mandate, UNSCR 1500. However, ambiguous language left the mission without a clear path to follow.

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Table 5. UNSCR Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSCR 1546 Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Assist in convening a national conference in July 2004 to select a Consultative Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Promote national dialogue and consensus building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Advise the Government of Iraq on the development of effective civil and social services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. The Iraqi request for continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfill its role in assisting the Iraqi people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-The mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution. This mandate will be terminated earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of decisions important to the reconstruction of Iraq were delineated in UNSCR 1546. This thesis will focus on points 5 and 6, which deal with the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance missions, and their maturation from 2004 to the present.

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100 UN Security Council Resolution 1546, S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
On August 10, 2007, the UN adopted UNSCR 1770, thereby expanding its role in Iraq and providing greater clarity to its mission there. UNSCR 1770 empowered the UN to utilize the infrastructure that had been developed since UNSCR 1546 was adopted.

UNSCR 1770 is broken down into three main parts. The first section centers on advising, supporting, and assisting Iraq to increase political dialogue and national reconciliation, summarily focusing on governance. Section 2 seeks to promote, support, and facilitate human rights and social service development in coordination with the government of Iraq. Section 3 is brief but worth mentioning, because it is mutually supportive of section two through the promotion of “human rights and judicial and legal reform to improve the rule of law.” ¹⁰¹ The primary points of section 2 are provided in Table 6.

Table 6. UNSCR 1770 Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSCR 1770 Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly, and voluntary return, as appropriate, of refugees and displaced persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The implementation of the International Compact with Iraq, including coordination with donors and international financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The coordination and implementation of programs to improve Iraq’s capacity to provide essential services for its people and continue active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance programs through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economic reform, capacity building and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and international financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The development of effective civil, social and essential services, including through training and conferences in Iraq when possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The contributions of UN agencies, funds, and programs to the objectives outlined in this resolution under a unified leadership of the Secretary-General through his Special Representative for Iraq. 102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On August 8, 2008, the UN adopted Resolution 1830, which extended the mission in Iraq for twelve months. This is the most recent in a series of yearly extensions that have occurred since UNAMI began in 2003. The expectations of greater progress in reconstruction in the coming year are optimistic due to the improved security situation and special attention from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

E. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ

Secretary Ki-moon and the Iraqi government worked in tandem to complete the International Compact with Iraq in

May 2007. Its purpose was to “establish a framework for Iraq to realize its National Vision.”  

Iraq’s National Vision was outlined in twenty-two parts focusing on political, security, and socio-economics. For brevity and applicability to this thesis, only general information is provided on the first nine parts of Iraq’s Nation Vision report, which dealt with political and security concerns. The crux of the report focuses on the socio-economic context. The National Vision for Iraq as outlined in the ICI can be summarized as follows:

1. The political context consists of national dialogue and reconciliation, implementation of political and legislative timetables, and regional and international cooperation and integration.  

2. The security context encompasses building up forces and security, assuming responsibilities and working with friends and allies, and disarming, disbanding, and re-integrating militias. The goals of human rights development are found in the security context;  

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104 Ibid.
these involve establishing a comprehensive human rights regime countrywide, establishing and implementing effective rule of law and institutions and policies, and establishing effective transitional justice mechanisms.105

3. The socio-economic context is vast in nature, with specific interest in managing Iraq’s oil revenue and natural resources, developing agriculture and water management strategies, and developing policies for economic agility at the national and regional levels and promoting private sector development. Additional measures include strengthening institutions and improving governance throughout civil service reform, and engaging civil society by implementing policy that will stimulate public participation. Lastly, the ICI addresses human development and human security, citing that they, “are some of the main outcomes of the Compact and will serve as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the entire process.”106

The ICI aligns its principal visions with those found in UNSCR 1546, the first document to define the role of UNAMI. But the ICI provides more than clarity; it provides hard objectives and associated benchmarks to measure progress. One example can be seen in the goal to improve adult literacy and school completion by 25 percent by 2011. To achieve this goal, Iraq agreed to increase its education budget from 3.5 percent to 5 percent of its GDP. 107

106 Ibid., 18.
107 Ibid., 18.
tangible characteristics of the ICI, which align with UN mandates, are important steps toward assuring mutual support of a common goal.

F. CONCLUSION

The UNAMI started as an ambitious mandate and increased over time. The complexities of rebuilding Iraq were reflected in the architecture developed by the UN and World Bank in order to support the mission. The assist mission included varying degrees of reconstruction, from basic life support services to industrial projects, making it arguably the most challenging reconstruction operation ever undertaken by the UN. In the wake of the U.S.-led invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein from office, the international community provided assistance by forgiving foreign debt and providing grants and loans as financial means to reconstruct Iraq. The UN adopted mandates in 2004 and follow on mandates to the present in order to adapt to the conditions on the ground. A solid foundation was created for the UNAMI to carry out a successful reconstruction campaign in Iraq. In order to conduct the mission effectively and efficiently the UN and government of Iraq together in partnership must exercise leadership, ownership, and oversight.
IV. ASSESSING UNAMI

A. INTRODUCTION

This section will discuss the progress the UNAMI has achieved over the past five years by reviewing three cluster areas with special emphasis on agriculture, education, and health. The progress made in each element of the cluster areas will be measured by comparing stated objectives with what was accomplished. Next, a series of human development indicators from 2000, before UNAMI, and 2007, after the mission was established and operating will be reviewed to identify progress in the stated objective areas. The human development indicators are life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, and GDP per capita. By integrating and evaluating the applicable elements of the classic approach and human development indicators to UNAMI’s objectives and outcomes, one can examine whether or not the manner of measuring progress affects the results.

B. PROGRESS 2003-2008

The first UNAMI donor conference was held in Madrid, Spain, in October 2003, and the first donation was received in the ITF and IRFFI in early 2004. In the spring of 2004, initial contracts were awarded and the reconstruction of Iraq commenced according to the prescription of the 2003 JNA. Since that time, the IRFFI and ITF have funded nearly $821 million in reconstruction projects out of the $1.08
billion available.\textsuperscript{108} As of March 2008, 2155 contracts had been awarded to 47 different countries participating in the UNAMI.\textsuperscript{109}

A number of challenges in project implementation still remain, with security continuing to be the primary hindrance to reconstruction projects. Appreciation of the Iraqi Dinar, the weak banking system, and a lack of available goods have also contributed to the delay of many projects. Other challenges include the lack of individual and institutional capacities to complete agreed-upon contracts in a timely manner. Finally, the government of Iraq (GOI) was indecisive on the priority and scope of proposed projects; this led to delays and lost opportunities due to the unpredictable security situations.\textsuperscript{110}

The emphasis throughout this section is on the progress and setbacks in clusters “A,” “B,” and “D.”

C. CLUSTER “A” - AGRICULTURE

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead UN organization for cluster “A,” due to its vast experience in working with the UN in Iraq since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{111} The FAO works on all aspects of agriculture for the UNAMI, including policy reform, capacity building, and investment programs.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{111} Food and Agriculture Organization, \textit{FAO-IRAQ: From Emergency to Development: Medium-Term Strategy for FAO Assistance to Iraq} (2008), 5.
Policy reforms are mechanisms to sustain agricultural development by defining the roles of the state and the private sector through decentralization, “emphasizing planning, programming and executing role of the local authorities.”\textsuperscript{112} The goal is to establish and reform policies that promote land and water management. The policies focus on increasing distribution channels through marketing networks that align with WTO standards. Another aspect of policy reform includes an assessment of rural financing policies and their ability to meet the needs of the agricultural sector.

Capacity building seeks to improve agricultural institutions through “research, technology transfer, adaption, and extension in order to increase productivity and establish mechanisms for sustainability.”\textsuperscript{113} Capacity building includes “building up of farmers’ groups, local associations” and “the development of traditional products for which Iraq has a comparative advantage.”\textsuperscript{114} Finally, capacity development hinges on education in the agriculture sector to replace the effects of the brain drain caused by years of war. The goal is to create enough capacity in the agriculture sector to enable it to become self sufficient and reduce Iraq’s dependence on food imports.

Investment for agricultural development is extensive, and is the most tangible of the pillars. Agricultural development consists of “rehabilitation of the irrigation

\textsuperscript{112} Food and Agriculture Organization, \textit{FAO-IRAQ: From Emergency to Development Medium-Term Strategy for FAO Assistance to Iraq} (2008), 13.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
network, water quality monitoring and rehabilitation of drainage infrastructure, seed production to include cereals, vegetables, and potatoes." 115 Other aspects include animal development, fresh and saltwater fishery development, and agro processing infrastructure for crops and livestock products which will provide processed products for urban markets.116 In other words, the goal is to treat crops with pesticides and fertilizer, and vaccinate livestock before it is sent to the market. Additional aspects of agriculture include fertilizers, agro-chemicals, and marketing and distribution chains.

1. Progress in Agriculture

Since 2007, the improved security situation has afforded an opportunity for the UNAMI to make progress in agricultural development. While not every project contracted for was completed, every pillar in agricultural development has made progress since May 2007.117

In the policy pillar, dialogue was established with neighboring countries that share water resources from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 118 The goal was to bring positive inputs to the ongoing diplomatic negotiations among neighboring countries. If regional actors can share water resources, over time, they may be able to expand their

116 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
economic ties and develop foreign policies based on common interests (similar to countries in the oil sector) rather than focus on their differences.

In the capacity development pillar, a group of 300 Iraqi water experts received advanced training in water resource management (WRM). Following the advanced training, eighteen training courses and six workshops were organized and held in partnership with five Iraqi universities on a variety of WRM topics. The 300 Iraqi experts were part of the collaborative effort; their participation gave them buy-in in the training of their countrymen. To further agricultural investment through capacity development, a feasibility study for irrigation schemes was completed that identified fourteen pumping stations requiring rehabilitation, fifty km of drainage canals requiring remodeling, and 115 km of irrigation canals requiring rehabilitation. The next phase in the water development initiative will be to identify or train experts for project implementation.

In the agricultural investment pillar, increasing development capacity in agriculture will reduce dependency on foreign imports in the short and medium term. A series of programs were implemented in livestock development to investigate, diagnose, and provide oversight to eradicate brucellosis disease. To assist in this measure, one central and eighteen governorate laboratories were

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120 Ibid., 2.
121 Ibid.
established. Additional laboratories were established to increase livestock herds through artificial insemination; these facilities were staffed with personnel trained in embryonic transfer technology. To date, 1,000 sheep and 200 goats have lambed and kidded. A “train the trainer” program was implemented to educate farmers on improved techniques for breeding and vaccinating cattle. Since the vaccination program was implemented, over “nine million heads of livestock have received immunization.”

In April 2007, government and private sector seed growers, breeders, and entrepreneurs gathered for the first national seeds workshop. The meeting focused on formulating and reviewing legislation in order to adopt a policy that would allow for “sustainable seed development.” A number of overseas study tours were undertaken by senior staff of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in order to increase their knowledge in a variety of areas, including seed policy, foreign regulations, laws, and quality control measures.

Five senior fisheries officials have been trained. Procurement of equipment, fish feed and brood stock is in progress, while 1,500 fish pond owners have been supplied with fish fingerlings. As a result, fish production has increased to 4,000 kg/ha/year.

Agriculture is the one program out of the three analyzed that has some promise. “Agriculture is Iraq’s

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122 United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report, Part Two, 1
124 Ibid., 3.
125 A metric unit of area equal to 100 ares (2.471 acres). United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report, 2.
largest employer and second largest contributor to GDP, and an effective engine for promoting stability through private sector development, poverty reduction and food security.”  

The largest problem in agriculture, as with all UNAMI programs, is its inability to address short-term needs. Livestock and rice can be produced to meet the next season’s requirements, but not more immediate needs.

D. CLUSTER “B” - EDUCATION

Before the economic sanctions of the 1990s, the education system in Iraq was considered one of the best in the region. After years of neglect, however, the education system took a turn for the worse. Only one in six children had textbooks, teachers went unpaid, and looting stripped the schools of basic supplies. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has estimated that 6 million Iraqis are illiterate. USAID and the Ministry of Education (MoE) have joined ranks to return the quality of education to the level of the 1980s. USAID assisted in refurbishing more than 3,000 schools as of 2004, and more than 6,700 schools as of 2008.

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128 Ibid.

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) is the lead UN organization in Iraq for cluster “B” due to its experience over the past half decade as the champion for children’s education. UNICEF has partnered with GOI to establish policy, build capacity for sustainability, and develop institutions to support the educational needs of Iraq. UNICEF’s goals are to

...enhanced access and quality of education at all levels starting with early childhood and progressing to the primary, secondary, technical/vocational and tertiary levels of education; increased participation of various national and intentional stakeholders and increased internal and external efficiency rates at all levels of education, particularly in vulnerable geographic areas and amongst neglected population groups.130

The UNAMI seeks the following outcomes, which align with Iraq’s long term national goals: “to enhance access to all levels of education, with special reference to disparity reduction,” to “strengthen the institutional and human capacity of education,” and finally, to “enhance policy formulation and curriculum development.”131

1. Progress in Education

As in the agriculture cluster, progress in the education cluster can be separated into three distinct

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categories: policy development, capacity initiatives, and education investment. In policy development, a baseline early childhood development (ECD) survey was conducted in early 2008.\textsuperscript{132} The purpose was to examine child-rearing practices in Iraq and develop policies that would promote an increased capacity for learning in the development trajectory of young children.\textsuperscript{133}

After years of rehabilitation of neglected school buildings and construction of new facilities, the focus has now shifted to equipping and supporting these facilities. UNESCO, working with the GoI Ministry of Education, has put forward three new programs with a cost of $11 million. The three programs focus on strengthening capacity by delivering primary, secondary, vocational, and advanced education.\textsuperscript{134} These programs will purchase new textbooks, provide training for educators, and construct an Education Information Management System (EMIS).\textsuperscript{135} EMIS is used as a tracking tool to collect data on demographics, attendance, course information, etc. Ongoing projects include training teachers for sustained quality education, sending teachers abroad to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (May 1, 2008), 76.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{135} United Nations Educational Science Cultural Organization, Executive Board Hundred and Seventy-Seventh Session 177 EX/64 Rev., Report by the Director-General on the Cultural and Educational Institutions for Iraq (Paris: October 3, 2007).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
study secondary education, training for technical institutions, literacy, and basic life skills development projects.\footnote{136 United Nations Educational Science Cultural Organization, Executive Board Hundred and Seventy-Seventh Session 177 EX/64 Rev., Report by the Director-General on the Cultural and Educational Institutions for Iraq (Paris: October 3, 2007).}

The educational investment sector reported an increase in net enrollment for primary age children, from 79 percent in 2004 to 85.8 percent in 2008.\footnote{137 United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report, 77.} The secondary education enrollment level increased as well, from 36 percent in 2003 to 40.1 percent in 2008.\footnote{138 Ibid.}

E. CLUSTER “D” - HEALTH

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the lead UN organization in Iraq for cluster “D,” due to its extensive experience in dealing with health crises throughout the world since 1948.\footnote{139 World Health Organization, “Working for Health: An Introduction to the World Health Organization,” World Health Organization website (2007), 4. http://www.who.int/about/en/ (accessed September 10, 2008).} The Iraq National Health Care strategy, implemented in collaboration with the WHO and UNAMI, is to “[s]trengthen the national healthcare delivery system, and reorient it from being hospital-focused to being based on primary health care delivery,” and to “strengthen emergency preparedness and response in order to address the needs of Iraqis, especially vulnerable populations, while promoting a healthy living environment.”\footnote{140 United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report, 77.} The WHO supports the Iraq National Healthcare Strategy by working toward specific outcomes; these include “reducing infant,
under five, and maternal mortality,” while “[i]ncreasing access to quality health care services; enhanc[ing] emergency preparedness and response, disease prevention and control;” as well as “enhancing healthy living environment and promotion of healthful lifestyles.”\textsuperscript{141} In order to make progress in those areas, a number of incremental steps have been taken to lay the foundation for sustainable health care.

In 2006, a family health survey was conducted to identify daily habits that may impact an Iraqi’s health. Categories surveyed were nutrition, vaccination, health care availability, and tobacco use, among others.\textsuperscript{142} From that report, a series of policy changes occurred through the development of legislation to improve health and nutrition. The legislation also included a basic health services package to fund the rehabilitation and equipage of Primary Health Care facilities PHCs.\textsuperscript{143}

Iraq’s capacity development continues to grow, with training in health care leading the charge. The PHC training manual has been finalized and adopted, and will be used to educate PHC providers in standard practices.\textsuperscript{144} As of this writing, ten nurse training centers, nineteen PHC training centers, and twenty-five continuing education centers at teaching hospitals have been established.\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{142} United Nations, \textit{Seventh Six-Month Progress Report}, 115.
\bibitem{143} Ibid., 116.
\bibitem{144} Ibid.
\bibitem{145} Ibid., 122.
\end{thebibliography}
Nearly 15,000 Iraqis have been trained in different sectors to increase the staffing capacity in PHC, health economics, and nursing. The Ministry of Health (MoH) invested in the training of over 600 medical staff in maternal and child health and PHC services. Other significant education and training events that occurred since the May 2007 UN report to donors included “twelve two days National workshops for 180 health professionals including physicians, refractionists, and nurses in the area of blindness and primary eye care.” Additional capacity development initiatives included “19 National workshops on the integration of non-communicable diseases into primary health care with 475 PHC doctors and nurses in attendance.” The adoption of policy in tandem with capacity building measures in rehabilitating PHCs and training health care providers, created opportunities for development in healthcare investment in a number of areas.

Specific accomplishments resulting from healthcare investment included significant reductions in cases of polio, measles, and malaria, and the near-eradication of cholera, which had been widespread prior to 2004. In September and October 2007, “Polio National Immunization days were held, reaching 4.6 million children under five years of age,” or roughly 96 percent of the target group. For the first time since 2003, the MoH procured sufficient

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147 Ibid., 122.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 122.
150 Ibid.
vaccines to immunize 100 percent of its population against MMR and 80 percent against polio, highlighting its commitment to its population’s health.\textsuperscript{151}

F. THE UNAMI SHORTFALLS

A considerable amount of work and progress has been made in the highlighted cluster areas; however, progress has often been overshadowed by the volatile security situation hindering reconstruction projects. As discussed above, appreciation of the Iraqi Dinar, a weak banking system, shortages of required goods, a lack of both individual and institutional capacity, and GOI indecisiveness on the priority and scope of proposed projects, all provided challenges to implementation.\textsuperscript{152} “Agencies indicated in October 2007 that project implementation often required an additional 12 to 24 months beyond the original end date to achieve 100 percent implementation.”\textsuperscript{153} The delays in decision-making by government institutions were the result of several layers of bureaucracy coupled with “frequent changes in personnel within agencies.”\textsuperscript{154} The MoH and MoE failed to cooperate or reach an agreement on a number of elements within projects, such as committee positions, scope of work, and time of completion, resulting in gridlock in capacity development.\textsuperscript{155}

The security situation hampered the operations. Projects could not be completed on time due to delays in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} United Nations, \textit{Seventh Six-Month Progress Report}, 108.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 14.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 12.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 12.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 13.
\end{itemize}
supply delivery, which resulted in warehouse overload. This had a cascading effect on the distribution system; additional supplies could not be ordered until the supplies on hand were delivered. 156 Once projects were completed, they could not be adequately verified due to lack of safe transportation; this often resulted in poor workmanship. The security situation also increased project costs since meetings and training were moved to a safe zone in Jordan.157

Finally, the delays in determining the scope of work, the problems with supply delivery, and the dangerous working conditions made it difficult to recruit and maintain senior UN staff to complete complex projects.158 Iraq simply lacks the internal technical expertise to complete large scale projects in any of the cluster areas highlighted. As a result, Iraq is dependent on outside expertise for the short and medium term.

G. ASSESSMENT

Taking into account the progress and shortfalls highlighted and comparing them to UNSCR 1548 and 1770, Table 7 assesses effectiveness and efficiency in each of the three cluster areas. Efficiency and effectiveness are defined as the most efficient use of resources and the ability to actually achieve stated goals, respectively. In the agriculture, education, and health clusters, the UNAMI is assessed as partially effective because the mission is making progress. Progress may not be at the expected level,

156 United Nations, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report, 120.
157 Ibid., 14.
158 Ibid.
but the mission is progressing. The mission is assessed as ineffective due to the delays in projects and the continual rise in their costs as a result of fluctuations in the value of the Iraqi dinar together with the list of shortfalls previously addressed.

Table 7. Stated Objectives V. Accomplishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Efficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Partial</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Partial</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Partial</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second metric applied is the HDI approach. HDIs are life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and GDP per capita. The degree of change from 2000 to 2007, roughly four years after the UNAMI commenced, indicates a negligible difference in each category. The most significant variance between the two data sources was in adult literacy; however, since the sample size for each source was unavailable, the large disparity cannot be explained. This speaks to one of the core issues with the UN: its lack of transparency and consistent reporting. In Table 8, the data from multiple sources are averaged since reliable and consistent data could not be retrieved, with the exception of the GDP per capita category.
Table 8. Human Development Indicators for Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2000 AVG</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2007 AVG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(both sexes)</td>
<td>67 (a)</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>56 (a) (2006)</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66 (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>69 (b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy +15 years,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total%</td>
<td>74 (a)</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>74 (c)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>64 (b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$2700 (b)</td>
<td>$3600 (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3600 (b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United Nations Development Program adopted the HDI index as a tool to measure human development. The data needed to evaluate the progress achieved in each cluster area were not available through the lead agency reports. The data were found on a number of websites; they were relatively consistent but still have a range large enough to create credibility issues. After the data were reviewed and the most credible information was chosen, the results indicated incremental progress in GDP per capita and a reduction in life expectancy, with literacy rates holding constant.

It appears that the $1.08 billion contracted through the UNDG/ITF and IRFFI did very little to improve human development in Iraq. The original criticism by Anthony Cordesman, in a 2007 report for the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), asserting that the UNAMI quantifies progress in dollars spent rather than objectives achieved, appears to be true.

H. CONCLUSION

A careful review of the policy, capacity, and investment development side of each cluster area has highlighted a significant amount of work done by and progress made by the UNAMI. The original mandate, UNSCR 1546, called for progress in the political and economic areas of reconstruction. In UNSCR 1770, the focus was to “implement programs to increase Iraq’s capacity to provide essential services to the population.” 160 Unfortunately, the UNAMI has incrementally progressed, but lacks efficiency. Therefore, the UNAMI can only be assessed as partially effective in achieving the stated objectives. The HDI assessment demonstrates regression in two of the three HDIs. This clearly shows that the UNAMI has not been effective in these areas.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

What is clear is that the UNAMI lacks efficiency in policy, capacity, and investment development, making effective progress unachievable. The primary reasons why the UNAMI is inefficient are due to a lack of oversight, weak indicators of progress, its goals and means misaligned, a lack of interagency cooperation, and poor buy-in from international partners and the Iraqis themselves. From the UNAMI experience, with emphasis on agriculture, education, and health clusters, I have made the following recommendations.

Oversight on the UNAMI spending must be improved to eliminate abuses and waste. For example, Parsons Corps was awarded the contract to build 142 primary health care facilities. After completing just twenty PHCs, they walked away from the contract and kept the $200 million. The contracts have been re-awarded to Iraqis as part of a self-reliance initiative. The upside is Iraqis are rebuilding Iraq, the downside is US$200 million gone and additional funds are required to pay for the remaining PHCs. A series of steps could increase oversight to ensure that this does not occur in the future. In order to make oversight proactive instead of reactive, oversight committees should periodically inspect projects and validate progress. If benchmarks are not being met, other reliable contractors should be used to complete the job in a timely manner. In other words, every project should have a set of benchmarks.

to help the project along and force objective oversight. The validation of progress and authorization of additional funds should be coordinated through a command and control element in charge of security. Other options include an innovative recommendation by Carlos Pascual to get rid of account structures and “create incentives for the interagency [groups] to come together.” His point was that there are too many individual accounts within each organization - the UN included, this leads to ineffectiveness that focuses on dollars spent rather than an indication of progress.

The UNAMI must have firm and clear indicators of progress for every program it administers to ensure the maximum utility of every dollar spent. Determining what to measure is the most difficult when deciding how to measure progress. As indicated, the UN only provides completion numbers to indicate progress. For example, the UN indicated total number of schools rehabilitated or animals vaccinated but failed to provide the baseline. How many schools require rehabilitation? Is the objective to rehabilitate every school? What does vaccinating 4.9 million livestock do for the objective? If there are 20 million heads of livestock this number is mediocre, if there are 5 million heads of livestock this number is exceptional. Indicators of progress should include; beginning strength - how many widgets are working now, end strength - how many widgets

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will work when complete, and essential tasks that must be completed to incrementally measure progress with clear indicators.

To achieve the level of effectiveness and efficiency defined by civil military relations scholar Thomas Bruneau, they need to come into alignment with one another. This is especially true in complex operations with multiple principal-agent relationships, as found in the UN. To foster effectiveness and efficiency a system of measurements and indicators should be developed to encourage progress that supports domestic and international goals. Currently, a metric does not exist to determine the progress of UN PSO. A number of reports continually reinforce the fact that they are unable to determine if the UNAMI is progressing effectively due to the lack of an ability to measure its performance. The GAO stated, “Inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact” of reconstruction efforts in Iraq.163

Domestic and international goals must be aligned and supported with resources. Resources include money, international community support, troops on the ground, and time to see the mission to completion.164 Troops and a “workable political settlement” in tandem are necessary conditions for successful reconstruction.165 One without the other will not work. For example, in 2003, the UNAMI

165 Ibid.
mandate was adopted; however, two years passed before the ICI and Iraq’s National Strategy proposed its goals and aligned with the UNAMI, further delaying progress.

An optimistic view of capabilities is essential. When the UNAMI was adopted the UN did not have the capability to address the complex issues facing Iraq. Ambassador Dobbins characterized the early reconstruction efforts in Iraq as “amateur hour that created a good deal of early confusion and setbacks which have made it so difficult to make meaningful progress.” 166 Over time the capabilities to address some of the issues have been developed, but more to the point, the capability to conduct reconstruction operations at the magnitude required in Iraq still does not exist.

The UNAMI also needs to work better with the other international agencies, both within and external to the UN. A revolving theme is solving the interagency issue to allow resource sharing to multiply capabilities. General David Barno, an Afghan expert concluded, “unity of effort between the civilian component and our operation and the military components needed some degree of strengthening.” 167 Indicating that planning is priority for the military and conducted before human resources are deployed while civilian response forces deploy without prior planning and adjust to the day to day needs of the operation. By effectively

fusing the military planning and operational capacity with the unique skill sets civilian response teams provide the results would increase effectiveness in the UNAMI.

Finally, for the reconstruction mission to succeed the Iraqis themselves must take an invested interest approach. It is understood that decades of repression have created a society of indecisiveness. However, Saddam Hussein has been deposed for four years and the country has made marginal progress in its evolution to legitimate statehood. Each recommendation for change can be implemented but without Iraqis rebuilding Iraq, reconstruction efforts are futile. In the past year the true successes in reconstruction and building a better Iraq have come from grass roots initiatives in which community groups have access to funds for projects. By continually empowering the masses at the local and provincial levels, the national government can focus on regional partnerships to foster regional stability and put an end to the cycle of violence that has plagued Iraq.
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