A Balance of Power—Army Transformation and Modernization
in an Era of Persistent Conflict

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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### Title and Subtitle

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### Supplementary Notes

The enduring mission of the U.S. Army is to provide ready forces and land force capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain if the U.S. Army transformation and modernization efforts are truly nested with the higher level security strategies, and likewise if these two initiatives are essential to the Army successfully meeting its mission to the Nation. If the Army’s modernization and transformation strategy fails to balance ways and means to achieve the desired current and future force endstates, it will not be able to justify to Congress and the American people any increase of funding and/or resourcing support for the Army of today and tomorrow. As such, it is imperative that the U.S. Army’s warfighting strategy—with its overarching complementary transformation and modernization plans—balances our current and future capability and capacity needs.
ABSTRACT

The enduring mission of the U.S. Army is to provide ready forces and land force capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain if the U.S. Army transformation and modernization efforts are truly nested with the higher level security strategies, and likewise if these two initiatives are essential to the Army successfully meeting its mission to the Nation. Entering this investigation I started with five assumptions that assisted me in framing the problem. They include:

1. for the next two or more years the economy and the current or potential recession will continue to be the number one issue in the minds of the American populace;

2. historically the defense establishment has paid the bill in decreased spending and/or draw downs during periods of economic downturns, therefore putting DOD at risk for increased funding;

3. OIF and OEF will continue for the foreseeable future, but supplemental funding for those operations will decrease in the coming years;

4. legacy force reset and recapitalization will be a priority effort and compete with modernization efforts in funding;

5. an era of persistent conflict and instability will continue across the globe, and subsequently U.S. forces will be committed to unforeseen contingencies further challenging modernization funding increases.

If the Army’s modernization and transformation strategy fails to balance ways and means to achieve the desired current and future force endstates, it will not be able to justify to Congress and the American people any increase of funding and/or resourcing support for the Army of today and tomorrow. As such, it is imperative that the U.S. Army’s warfighting strategy—with its overarching complementary transformation and modernization plans—balances our current and future capability and capacity needs in order to provide combatant commanders with trained and ready ground forces that dominate in full spectrum operations during an era of persistent conflict.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Strategy—a Point of Embark</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Section of Strategic Theories and Models</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Security Strategy—a Hierarchical Model</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Strategic Guidance—Hitting from the Rough</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Shots to Get It Right—The Rumsfeld QDRs</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR Effects on Joint Doctrine</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Challenges and Needed Capabilities</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Language Skills, Not So Fast</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: A Strategy of Change—DOD Transformation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is Transformation?</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Visions over Time</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation Grounded in Strategic Guidance</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jointness and the Interagency</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: U.S. Army Implementation Strategy—Transformation and Modernization</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Introduction</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Were We Then?</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Are We Now—The 2008 Army Posture Statement</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Modernization Efforts—Not Just About the Toys</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Are We Going with the FCS Brigade Combat Team?</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Spectrum Operations—a Capstone Update</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing Solutions—Additional Supportive Updates</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation for Stability and Reconstruction</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Way Ahead</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.  Department of Defense and Army Outlays as a Percentage of GDP. ............ 4

Figure 2.  President’s Key Points, DoD FY 2009 Budget Request................................. 5

Figure 3.  The Bartlett Model for Strategy................................................................. 14

Figure 4.  Hierarchical Nature of Strategy and Levels of War....................................... 16

Figure 5.  NMS Execution Chart 2005................................................................. 17

Figure 6.  Priority Efforts in Relation to Security Challenges................................. 23

Figure 7.  Force Design and Size........................................................................... 37

Figure 8.  Army Global Commitments as of Feb 2008........................................ 49

Figure 9.  Restoring Balance within the Army......................................................... 50

Figure 10.  Full Spectrum Operations—the Army’s Operational Concept............. 62

Figure 11.  The Elements of Full Spectrum Operations......................................... 63
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army today is a battle-hardened force whose volunteer Soldiers have performed with courage, resourcefulness, and resilience in the most grueling conditions. They’ve done so under the unforgiving glare of 24-hour news cycle that leaves little room for error, serving in an institution largely organized, trained, and equipped in a different era for a different kind of conflict. And they’ve done all of this with a country, a government—and in some cases a defense department—that has not been placed on a war footing.¹


In 1944 my eighteen year old father served as a “tin can” sailor on a destroyer that saw action in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operation. I have always been humbled, appreciative and proud that my dad served our Nation during the greatest struggle our country and the free world had arguably faced up to that point in history. His generation—those serving both abroad and on the homefront during World War II—established a level of national commitment and sacrifice that has yet to be repeated in scale. U.S. citizens of that bygone era have rightly earned the “Greatest Generation” moniker.² Since 1945 the United States has continued to experience conflicts of varying natures and degrees across the world, and millions of Americans have likewise answered the call to serve our country during it’s time of need. Their service has enabled our country to survive through both the good and bad times, and for that we should all be grateful. Gratitude though can come in many forms. I believe that the types most appreciated by military professionals are clear guidance and adequate resourcing.


Today we again find our Nation engaged in a global war, initiated after the deadliest attack on United States soil since December 7th, 1941. Secretary Gates quote at the beginning of this section gave me pause to reflect on the global war today and compare it to the global war of my father. Two thoughts came to mind, one of comparison between those citizen-soldiers who took up the uniform in the early 1940s and those professional soldiers proudly wearing them today, and one of contrast between the national levels of commitment both then and now. First I arguably concluded that the current generation of post 9/11 volunteers and their families who have or are serving in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and across the other branches of our government compares quite nicely to the Greatest Generation of old, based on their selfless service, sacrifice, dedication and commitment to the United States, their mission and each other. Following numerous conversations with my father, uncle and other veterans of that era, I have consistently heard agreement with my observation. In a recent ceremony honoring U.S. veterans of the “war to end all wars,” Army Secretary Pete Geren compared the sacrifices of World War I veterans with those serving now by offering that, “Today, young men and women from our generation, the best of this generation, too, are joined in a war in a far-off land that will shape their future and the world’s future for decades to come.”  

In contrast to World War II and the reality of today, Secretary Gates’ acknowledgment of a fact well known by those across the service, “that the level of national commitment in support of the war effort and national security as a whole is

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sorely lacking,”\textsuperscript{4} remains an alarming reality in a dangerous and globalized world. During World War II, “the scope of the national involvement was reflected in numbers: by 1944, twelve million Americans were in uniform; war production represented 44 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)...the nation was immersed in the war effort at every level.”\textsuperscript{5} Although I am not advocating a present-day need to add millions of uniformed service members to the ranks, a wholly unfeasible thought with an all-volunteer force, I do believe that the size of our force structure is low for the nature of today’s security environment and our government’s commitment of forces across the globe.

With the military being the most frequently used tool in the government’s kit bag of national power instruments, the United States must continue to invest in the maintenance and improvement of this precious resource. With the U.S. role in the world as the lone superpower and our military’s role within U.S. strategy and as an instrument of policy, there must be an increase in DODs budget to a percentage of the Gross Nature Product that is closer to the six or seven percentile level such as was seen during the Reagan Administration. Within that DOD increase the Department of the Army’s budget percentage should likewise grow to offset previous years of shortfalls, rebuild our legacy force as needed, and increase both the capacity and capabilities needed for the future. Figure 1 graphically depicts the historical trends since World War II.

\textsuperscript{4} APS 2008, 1.

\textsuperscript{5} Brokaw, 11.
This debate for an increase in funding and resourcing of the military is ongoing by influential leaders both in and out of uniform. Former Army Chief of Staff and current AUSA President Gordon Sullivan provides a strong voice of support for increasing the size of our ground forces—the Army, the Marines, and the special operations forces—who he says, “…constitute the central military arm of an effective national security strategy.” General Sullivan likewise ties his argument for a substantial increase in military capacity with, “…an accelerated development of a new national strategy that is based on the realities of the international environment and the efficacy of the instruments of national power available to us,” as well as the current and next presidential administrations and Congress making “…the hard resource decisions growing the defense budget with a substantial increase to the land forces [paraphrase].”

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8 Ibid.
President Bush’s administration has clearly supported the military over the past seven years, but this fact may or may not continue with the impending change in administrations and the challenge for resources across the whole of government during a period where security appears to be a secondary concern to the slowing economy. The Army is not alone in its budget needs. Figure 2 highlights the President’s key points for the 2009 budget submission, which reflects the funding challenges representative across DOD. Every service branch faces aging equipment and resource shortfalls, and each have crucial modernization programs that are both service specific and linked cross-service in joint application constructs, but the Army is disproportionately stressed and facing a higher level of critical, time-sensitive requirements tied to dollars.

At the 2007 AUSA annual meeting Secretary Gates further specifically emphasized crucial U.S. Department of the Army (DA) budgetary and resourcing shortfalls stating that,

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America’s ground forces have borne the brunt of underfunding in the past and the bulk of the costs—both human and material—of the wars of the present. By one count, investment in Army equipment and other essentials was underfunded by more than $50 Billion before we invaded Iraq. By another estimate, the Army’s share of total defense investments between 1990 and 2005 was about 15 percent. So resources are needed not only to recoup from the losses of war, but to make up for the shortfalls of the past and to invest in the capabilities of the future.10

In contrast, there are dissenting opinions being offered to Congress by influential non-partisan beltway “think-tanks” regarding the need for increased funding for DOD that do not conform to the positions of Secretary Gates, GEN Sullivan and others in the defense community. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is one such organization that has recently questioned DOD’s budgetary assessment and needs, and argued those points before Congress.11 In recent testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services the CSBA vice-president stated that, “…the Service’s appear to have (or be receiving) funds sufficient, or perhaps in excess, of those needed to repair or replace all of the equipment that has been destroyed or worn

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11 Taken from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Mission Statement on their website, http://www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/index.shtml (Accessed 12 March 2008). CSBA is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions in matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security establishment. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end.
out in Iraq or Afghanistan.”12 He likewise opined that, “…it is questionable whether the proposed expansion of the U.S. military represents a cost-effective investment.”13 He lastly concluded in testimony before Congress that there is a perceived disconnect between the military capabilities requirements needed to respond to the security challenges outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the “Service’s very costly [modernization] plans that may not be focused to address those actual requirements.”14

So who is right? Are the services resourced adequately? For a nation purportedly at war with a security environment that is perhaps more complex than any other seen in our history, why has the percentage of funding for defense not shown any discernable increase as one would expect? Is the funding in synch with the strategy that finds our ground forces heavily engaged across the globe, and likewise does DA have a sufficient transformation and modernization plan that focuses its efforts on the National Command Authority (NCA) vision and goals and implements those policies as directed by the current strategic level guidance? If not, then potentially the CSBA opinion and others of the same vein may prove to be the deciding voices in the congressional halls regarding the continued and increased budgetary support requested by our President and DOD. CSBC questions and comments are thought-provoking and warrant further examination and discussion to ensure that the Army’s transformation and modernization plans are in

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13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 2.
sync with our national security strategy in light of the current and future threat environments.

THESIS

The enduring mission of the U.S. Army is to provide ready forces and land force capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.\textsuperscript{15} If the Army’s modernization and transformation strategy fails to balance ways and means to achieve the desired current and future force endstates, it will not be able to justify to Congress and the American people any increase of funding and/or resourcing support for the Army of today and tomorrow. As such, it is imperative that the U.S. Army’s warfighting strategy—with its overarching complementary transformation and modernization plans—balances our current and future capability and capacity needs in order to provide combatant commanders with trained and ready ground forces that dominate in full spectrum operations during an era of persistent conflict.

\textsuperscript{15} APS 2008, 1.
CHAPTER 1: STRATEGY—A POINT OF EMBARK

Strategy is a practical business and the Holy Grail is not perfect knowledge or elegant theory, but rather solutions to real-world problems that work well enough.16

Colin Gray

So what is strategy? As a term, it is thrown around often but rarely understood. Colin Gray comments that, “many American defense professionals do not really know what strategy is or how it works.”17 For this reason, finding a common framework for strategy as a concept and as it relates to U.S. security and defense is the dual purpose for the first chapter of this paper. In the first section a number of strategic models are highlighted including definitions and concepts that are published or being taught in military institutions such as the Army War College. Educators and scholars at our premier senior level military colleges are greatly influencing the way we think about strategy in the military. The intent of this section is not to compare and contrast theories but to offer the reader a variety of thoughts on the topic as a baseline to frame the problem.

Section two expands on the premise offered in the first section regarding the hierarchical relationship between national security, defense and military strategies in order to trace the path from higher level vision and policy to the ultimate implementation strategies and plans being executed by the Department of the Army and Joint Combatant Commanders (COCOM). This hierarchical relationship between layers of strategy is


17 Ibid., 4.
essential, and a failure at any one level will likely produce severe inefficiencies, unintended outcomes and/or potential failure as a whole.

CROSS-SECTION OF STRATEGIC THEORIES AND MODELS

Strategy is the prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.¹⁸

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02

The conceptual understanding of strategy varies across the government and military. A minimalist may view strategy as merely using resources to achieve desired ends, but is that view sufficient enough for our needs? The excerpt cited above from JP 1-02 expands on a broader definition of strategy beyond just the armed services to include other elements of national power that are most likely outside the scope of military control but are definitely enablers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.¹⁹

¹⁸ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 October 2007), 518.

¹⁹ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 February 2008), II-1, II-2, II-3. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. The President establishes policy; the SecDef translates it into national strategic objectives that facilitate theater strategic planning. Combatant Commanders (CCDR) usually participate in strategic discussions with the President and SecDef through CJCS and with allies and coalition members. Military strategy, derived from national strategy and policy and shaped by doctrine, provides a framework for conducting operations. Operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and conduct of operations using operational art — the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (TFs).
That joint publication definition has utility in that it recognizes the whole of government approach to strategy which is a key element at the national security level. It rightly stresses that the military is but one of the means of power available to the government. At the joint doctrine level it displays a willingness to look outside our core competencies to other elements of national power such as the diplomatic, informational, and economic realms, when pursuing a strategy that feeds down through the levels of war into actions. This joint doctrine definition talks directly to strategy being in the realm of the national command authority as the level to implement the various instruments of national power. Early 20th Century strategic theorist Liddell Hart would likely concur with of the joint definition framework based on his belief that military strategy is, “only concerned with the problem of winning military victory,” while, “grand strategy must take the longer view—for its problem is winning the peace.” 20

Contemporary strategic theorist and historian Colin Gray has written extensively on the topic and emphasizes that same element of national level authority as it relates to strategy. In a monograph written for the Strategic Studies Institute Gray suggested four overlapping ingredients that constitute his “Essence of Strategy.” Within each of these ingredients there is an element touching on the relationship between the military and policy makers and the importance of dialogue between the two, since strategy is about the threat and use of force to achieve policy. 21 Quoting Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz throughout the text, Dr. Gray reminds us that “War is simply a continuation


of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” 22  But warfare alone has not proven to always be successful in achieving the ends of the political strategy. History is replete with examples none more recent than our ongoing conflicts in the War on Terror (WOT), and in Iraq and Afghanistan. One historian notes that, “the nature of U.S. military operations in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan has achieved dramatic military vehicles but has failed to deliver the political aims of the conflicts.” 23

Educators associated with the U.S. Army War College define strategy in two ways; first in the relationship among ends, ways and means which was advanced by Dr. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., 24 and second in application as a strategic art by the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests. 25

Dr. Harry R. Yarger, Professor of National Security Policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and student of Arthur Lykke provides additional insight into the topic by stating that, “in simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist.

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by chance or at the hands of others.” 26 He goes on to outline that this simplistic view and the one offered in joint doctrine are not expansive enough for our security needs. He additionally offers that strategy is,

the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means. 27

Professor Yarger also makes a distinction between strategy and planning, although both are subordinate to the nature of the environment and each use ends, ways, means and the assessment criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. 28 Strategy, he writes, is more of the long-term view and therefore differs in scope from planning, although it enables planning by providing the overarching structure. Whereas planning is more cause and effect, strategy is a process that interacts with the strategic environment and therefore must be inherently flexible in order to adapt to an ever-changing world. 29

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27 Ibid., 1. Doctor Yarger’s Little Book provided me considerable insight and context on the topic of strategy, and I specifically referred to Chapter V where he succinctly summarized his theory of strategy.

28 Ibid., 70. Definitions for: Suitability—Will the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner stated accomplish the strategic effects desired? Feasibility—Can the strategic concept be executed with the resources available? Acceptability—Do the strategic effects sought justify the objectives pursued, the methods used to achieve them, and the costs in blood, treasure, and potential insecurity for the domestic and international community’s?

29 Yarger, 47-48.
In figure 3 an additional congruent strategy model to Doctor Yarger’s is offered in the *Bartlett Model*. Of note with this model is the idea and reality of constrained resources, which is an essential consideration for the military and other government agencies competing for limited funding, especially during an economic downturn such as the one occurring in the U.S. today. Although the model is but a slight deviation from others outlined, the inclusion of resource constraints and the security environment particularly resonate as a better and more realistic strategy development approach for DOD and DA in the 21st century.

![Figure 3. The Bartlett Model for Strategy](image)

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Beyond descriptive or illustrative strategic models an additional tool to aid in developing, analyzing and/or assessing particular strategies centers around answering a series of inter-related questions which include:

1. What do we want to do (policy objectives)?
2. How do we plan to do it (strategic execution)?
3. What we are up against (threats, vulnerabilities, challenges, and opportunities)?
4. What is available to do it (unilateral or multilateral choices, alliances or coalitions or alignments, international institutions, viable defense forces, economic or political or diplomatic or informational instruments)?
5. What are the mismatches (risks, deficiencies, vulnerabilities, unforeseen outcome, cultural blinders)?
6. Why do we want to do this (strategic goals, desired and demanded)?  

In Chapter V of his book Yarger likewise provided a similar series of in-depth questions to assist the strategy makers and analysts. Both sets of questions are great examples of enabling tools available to the strategist practitioner.

**U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY—A HIERARCHICAL MODEL**

Dr. Yarger asserts that strategy is hierarchical which allows the political leadership to maintain its control and influence over the instruments of national power. In the U.S. this premise is clearly evident through the series of security related strategy documents that are published periodically through the course of a president’s administration. One of requirements resulting from the enactment of the Goldwater-

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31 Ibid., 2.
32 Yarger, Chapter V.
33 Ibid., 10.
Nichols Act of 1986 was the formalized requirement for the President to submit to Congress a published National Security Strategy (NSS).\(^{34}\) History has shown the NSS to be a thematic and broadly focused document that outlines the security environment and provides overarching guidance on the use of all elements of national power in support of our national interests and the defense of our country. Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchical nature of strategy within the U.S. security apparatus and the relationship between the levels of war.

![Figure 4. Hierarchical Nature of Strategy and Levels of War.](image)

From this starting point of presidential vision and guidance, the Secretary of Defense is obligated by statute to submit his National Defense Strategy (NDS) which addresses budgetary concerns, and outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests.\(^ {35}\) Likewise, every four years DOD is required by law to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is a comprehensive review of the

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nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget. From the NSS and the NDS the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develops the National Military Strategy (NMS.) The NMS is guided by the goals and objectives in the NSS and serves to implement the NDS. Specifically the NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from which the service chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk.

Figure 5 conveys this relationship:

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Additionally there are a number of other area focused security strategies such as the National Strategies for Homeland Security\textsuperscript{39} and Combating Terrorism\textsuperscript{40} that are inserted into the process as implementing strategies. They provide more specificity in their areas of concern than is found in the broader published NSS, NDS and NMS. Military service chiefs likewise publish service specific strategy and force planning initiatives intended to set the branches on nested implementation courses to achieve the visions outlined through the path of the hierarchical strategies. Combatant commanders also develop theater security strategies specific to their theater of operation, as well as Campaign level planning as directed by Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the Joint Security Cooperation Plan (JSCP).

**CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The intent for this first chapter was to provide a brief overview on strategy utilizing recognized experts in the field who currently hold key positions in our government and academia, and who as strategic theorists and educators are influencing the way our senior leaders conceptualize problems and process solutions that are wide in aperture. The two major takeaways include the relationship between ends, ways, means, risk, resources and strategic environment as the framework for the way to look at strategy as well as the proposition that there exists a hierarchical relationship between national level security strategy and subordinate strategies and plans. But how well is the idea of strategy truly understood by our senior leaders and planners? Are these basic concepts


resident in the minds of decision-makers? Not so much, if you adhere to Colin Gray’s comment that, “American understanding of strategy, and sound practice of it, is almost desperately rare.”

The fielding of an army—both the size and type—and utilizing it in a manner to assist in achieving political desires are all a part of a country’s national security strategy. Our government codified the requirement for an Army in United States Code, Title 10, and specified four tasks specific to the organization which include,

1. Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

2. Supporting the national policies;

3. Implementing the national objectives; and

4. Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that impair the peace and security of the United States.

If Dr. Gray is correct there is potentially a catastrophic deficiency or disconnect between the NSS and DA since the strategy informs the type and size of the army to be built, and when, where and why it is to be used to achieve the military objectives in support and pursuit of overarching national interests. Defense of the Homeland and security of our national interests are not exclusive to DA; they are shared tasks across DOD and the government as a whole. Title 10 tasks the Army to preserve the peace and security and provide for the defense, but in execution it does so as part of a joint force. Alone, DA may win battles but it is improbable that it can singularly win wars, and it

41 Gray, Irregular Enemies, 3.

42 U.S. Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle B, Army, Chapter 307, The Army, Section 3062, Policy; composition, organized peace establishment.
cannot in and of itself win the peace. But the Army does provide the preponderance of ground forces required by combatant commands and the Commander-in-Chief to achieve military objectives in support of our national policy and security strategy.

Grand [national] strategy, as was shown in figure 4 and referenced earlier in a quote by Liddell Hart, is the concept of an all-encompassing national-level strategy that sits as the foundation for all other strategies that emerge. Grand strategy is defined by the Army War College as “…a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system. Good grand strategies include all or at least some of the elements of national power.”43 For the purposes of this paper, the premise offered by U.S. military doctrine which distinguishes the elements of national power as diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) will remain. In these regards, although many equate the president’s National Security Strategy as grand strategy, it is not a single source strategic document or vision that encompasses all the elements of national power in one overarching, supportive strategy.

The following chapter will outline the hierarchical nature of U.S. security strategy from the president through DOD to Army specific implementation strategies and plans. The intent is to trace the path of published strategy to ascertain the level of consistency in the nesting of visions and goals to ends, ways and means. Although there are many avenues of security guidance outlined in the higher echelons of national security strategy, the subsequent discussion will focus primarily on defense transformation which has been one of the more enduring strategic themes in DOD and the DA since the end of the Cold War.

43 Bartholomees, 84.
CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC GUIDANCE—HITTING FROM THE ROUGH

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is part of the continuum of transformation in the Department. Its purpose is to help shape the process of change to provide the United States of America with strong, sound and effective war-fighting capabilities in the decades ahead. As we continue in the fifth year of this long global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.44

QDR (2006)

The 2002 NSS outlines the President’s vision on national security. It contains very broad guidance to DOD and other security agencies on his priorities. One area of emphasis outlined in the strategy is the transformation of our maneuver and expeditionary armed forces to achieve continued success in homeland defense and in the pursuit of national interests. Likewise, President Bush stated that for our military to be effective it must assure our allies and friends, dissuade future military competition, deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.45 Although this document expresses measures and direction outside the privy of DOD, it is the base strategic level document that informs subsequent security focused strategies and plans down the hierarchical chain.

The March 2005 edition of the NDS provided the strategic foundation for the 2006 QDR. The strategy dissected the national security threats into four main areas which cover traditional forms of warfare—an area of U.S. dominance in the world but believed to be the least likely form to occur—and three asymmetric threats which include


irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. Both state and non-state actors are expected to participate in all four types of warfare against the U.S. depending on their own capabilities, capacities and desired methods. Irregular warfare includes terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare, such as that which is being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Catastrophic includes the pursuit of WMD by both states and non-state actors, which could be used for intimidation or mass murder in a terroristic attack. Disruptive warfare is concentrated on capabilities being pursued that would counter or negate our traditional military advantages, such as cyber warfare against our networks.46

To operationalize the NDS, the Department’s senior civilian and military leaders identified four priority areas for examination during the QDR:

1. Defeating terrorist networks.
2. Defending the homeland in depth.
3. Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
4. Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.47

As depicted in the figure 6, senior military and governmental officials analyzed the four priority efforts versus the four primary threats in an attempt to assess the overall strategy and associated force structure plans that could effectively address the challenges. Evident from this analysis is the reality that there is no single solution set to the multifaceted problem. Our national security structure requires a multi-dimensional, flexible and adaptive approach which includes an equally multi-dimensional set of military capabilities.

46 NDS 2005, 2-3.
47 QDR 2006, 19.
TWO SHOTS TO GET IT RIGHT—THE RUMSFELD QDRs

The 2006 QDR is a supportive update to its 2001 predecessor as evidenced by much of the early portions of the document reading more like a report card or compilation of successes achieved since the last review rather than any adapted or refocused strategy. In these regards, the bulletized listings appear to be anchored in the operational and tactical versus the strategic levels of war. 49 Former Secretary Rumsfeld points out that the QDR is not a programmatic or budget document, but instead reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense. 50 Although the 2006 QDR is not considered a tasking document, it is based on the 2005 NDS and both are intended to provide strategic level guidance across DOD that in turn feeds the operational and tactical level courses of actions that ultimately become

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., vi-ix.
50 Ibid., v.
actionable tasks. It likewise provides purpose, such as, “the QDR sought to provide a broader range of military options for the President and new capabilities needed by Combatant Commanders to confront asymmetric threats.” The question is, has it?

The QDR’s terms of reference drew much criticism from the senior level DOD officials causing a growing consensus that, “the QDR ultimately lost its strategic focus.” In the process of analyzing the challenges posed by the construct, the number of lower level issues began to overwhelm the work, and ultimately muddled the focus in the lower operational, tactical and institutional levels. Within defense circles there was good reason for high expectations for the 2006 QDR. It was to be the first review and assessment since the 2001 QDR. Since Secretary Rumsfeld was very experienced in his position and had the time to focus his priorities and team, many thought this go around of the QDR would have much substance and be “an engine of continued transformation.”

There is growth resident in the verbiage of the 2006 QDR. The increased focus and emphasis on the role of the Combatant Commander is one of the key transitions from the previous assessment. By transforming our planning model away from threat-based to a capabilities-based planning construct, DOD focused more on the joint-force capabilities requirements needed by the Combatant Commanders rather than individual service stove-piped programs that do not provide optimal joint interoperability. From this emphasis on supporting the joint warfighter and the Combatant Commanders one can draw a line to

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51 Ibid., 1.
52 Flournoy, “Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right,” 72.
54 QDR 2006, 4.
the nested Army transformation and modernization strategies laid out in the 2007 Modernization Plan and 2008 Army Posture Statement.

The initial conceptual thinking behind the four quadrants was highly consistent with the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) assessment of future security concerns through 2020.\textsuperscript{55} The implication of the four challenges showed that although the military is well formed to dominate in the traditional realm, it would need to invest itself in the other three in order to build capacity and capability to dominate in those areas as well. The four quadrant model also emphasizes and promotes a more robust effort across the other elements of national power, and is a recognition and promotion to our elected officials that DOD cannot do it all alone. This construct screams “inter-agency and coalition support.” The obvious challenge to this premise is the acknowledgement that outside DOD the other security-concerned U.S. governmental agencies have desired and needed capabilities but are lacking in capacity, therefore causing DOD to shoulder more of the burden in pre- and post-conflict situations. Prime example of this dynamic is the U.S. Department of State (DOS) who has far too few Foreign Service officers and a miniscule budget for the capability they bring to our security efforts. As a result, DOD developed political reconstruction teams (PRT) to backfill a lack of DOS capacity.

As far as military capabilities are concerned, the QDR provides a laundry list of needs to address the four priority areas of defeat terrorist networks, prevent acquisition or use of WMD, defend the homeland in depth, and shape choices of countries at crossroads.\textsuperscript{56} Most of those capabilities listed are offensive in nature, in the sense that we

\textsuperscript{55} Flournoy, “Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?, 70.

\textsuperscript{56} QDR 2006, vi-ix.
will attempt to shape, deter, and defeat forward in a continual process of engagement with both our adversaries and friends. This is an important concept for force planning and the weapons systems being developed in pursuit of a more robust expeditionary army.

**QDR EFFECTS ON JOINT DOCTRINE**

In line with thought processes conveyed in the QDR and NDS, and to establish uniformity within the joint world, DOD published or revamped 25 joint publications in 2006. Much of these changes reflected guidance outlined within the 2006 QDR, most notably introducing the term irregular warfare into joint doctrine.\(^{57}\) The revisions of Joint Publication (JP) 3.0 (Joint Operations), and JP 5.0, (Joint Planning), added a range of military operations that includes security cooperation and deterrence, crisis response contingencies, and major operations and campaigns, as well as a new six-phased model of operational plans.\(^{58}\) The new operational level campaign planning construct includes Shape (0), Deter (1), Seize Initiative (2), Dominate (3), Stabilize (4), and Enable Civil Authority (5) phases. Important to note with this model is that the military is arguably the main effort during Phases 2, 3 and the early stages of Phase 4 in a security role, but otherwise finds itself supporting other U.S. government agencies, coalition partners or the host nation in the remaining phases of the operation.

By introducing the four challenges of traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic, DOD leadership publicized that warfare and the necessary capabilities to

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\(^{58}\) Ibid.
successfully execute it varies. The strategy to apply military force as an instrument of policy must take into account the nature of the war, and therefore must build those adaptive capabilities in its armed forces or risk unintended results and/or failure to achieve the political ends. Clausewitz talked about this in On War.

[T]his way of looking at it [war as an instrument of policy] will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test [political motives behind policy] the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.  

Although the excerpt conveys the theme of the use of force as an instrument of policy, it also prompts analysis of the strategy for the use of force, and the type and size of the armed forces that are developed, equipped, trained and educated to build adaptive capabilities that are flexible in thought and execution.

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND NEEDED CAPABILITIES

The common thread in conflict—be it conventional, irregular, counter-insurgency or stability operations—is people. Colin Gray states that the U.S. military among other things is “technologically-dependent” and “focused on firepower.” While advanced technology and the pursuit of such technologies has and will continue to provide DOD and our partners better capabilities that increase overall effectiveness and efficiency, the importance of investing in “people focused” capabilities cannot be taken lightly especially after consideration of the strategic environment and in light of the recently

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59 Clausewitz, 88-89.

60 Gray, Irregular Enemies, 35-38.
published field manuals focused on counter-insurgency and stability operations. As one author noted, “boots on the ground are essential in securing large areas, patrolling hot spots and providing presence. Those goals cannot be achieved by gear, hardware, or stuff. They can only be accomplished by large numbers of well-trained troops, thoroughly educated in the local culture, serving enough time in a specific op area to learn the lay of the land: physical, social, and environmental.”

What is the strategy to build these so-called pentathletes, multi-skilled army leaders and soldiers who are competent in their warfighting and peace-building skills? Although DA has a construct outlined in the 2007 Modernization Plan, a balance must be struck across DOD between investing in technology and investing in service members through training and education. Knowing that the military does not have the capabilities in all areas of those QDR identified challenges, and that other governmental organizations that have the required capabilities many times fall short in capacity, leads one to believe that in the near and mid-term efforts our best risk mitigation is to invest in training and education as the highest priority. Since DOD has the overwhelming capacity and capability across the whole of the U.S. government it is reasonable to assume that we will continue to lead the counter-insurgent and stability operations efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (in coordination and cooperation with host nation and coalition partners), as well as any other contingencies that arise in the near-term. This likelihood will continue until other government agencies build capacity, provided that future administrations and Congress make this requirement a priority and apply funding and resources to the quest.

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In support of the people first proposition, subsequent sections of the QDR expand on capabilities needed in each of the four areas of focus, with education and training related capabilities being resident throughout. The guidance specifically notes the following people related capabilities that are required:

1. Human intelligence to discern the intentions of the enemy

2. Multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations

3. Language and cultural awareness to facilitate the expansion of partner capacity

4. Security cooperation and engagement activities including joint training exercises, senior staff talks, and officer and foreign internal defense training to increase understanding, strengthen allies and partners, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives and intent. This will require both new authorities and 21st century mechanisms for the interagency process

5. Considerably improved language and cultural awareness to develop a greater understanding of emerging powers and how they may approach strategic choices. 63

Although the DOD’s pursuit and achievement of these capabilities would greatly assist U.S. defense and security, the possibility for successfully reaching each of these goals remains questionable. Considerable resourcing and time at the military institutional level is required to educate and train soldiers in order to increase the overall language and cultural awareness abilities of the force. Likewise, being a military engaged in kinetic and stability operations does not easily lend itself to the long-term commitment that is necessary. Although some may argue that our soldiers are learning many cultural lessons during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to remember that those cultural

63 QDR 2006, 23-35.
lessons are unique to that area and the persons within, and may not transfer globally. Although real-world experience provides area specific lessons; it is training and education that enables our soldiers to adapt and apply lessons learned to other situations.

BUILDING LANGUAGE SKILLS, NOT SO FAST

DOD has been wrestling with this increased language capability requirement since the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks, and struggling to get an achievable program online. It took over two years from November 2002 to the published date of January 2005 for the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to even draw up the initial plan which they titled the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.64 The roadmap consists of four overarching goals,

1. Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.

2. Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.

3. Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing level 3/3/3 ability (reading/listening/speaking ability).

4. Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).65

These goals were based on four assumptions:

1. Conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting

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multi-national missions—especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.

2. Changes in the international security environment and in the nature of threats to US national security have increased the range of potential conflict zones and expanded the number of likely coalition partners with whom US forces will work.

3. Establishing a new “global footprint” for DOD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21st century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force.

4. Adversaries will attempt to manipulate the media and leverage sympathetic elements of the population and “opposition” politicians to divide international coalitions.66

In light of these four assumptions a cross section of the desired outcomes included:

1. … personnel with language skills capable of responding as needed for peacetime and wartime operations with the correct levels of proficiency.

2. The total force understands and values the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language.

3. Regional area education is incorporated into Professional Military Education and Development.

4. The Department of Defense has the ability to provide language and regional area expertise support to operational units when needed.

5. Military personnel with language skills and FAOs are developed and managed as critical strategic assets.67

Meeting the Defense LanguageTransformation Roadmap goals and desired endstates have proved to be a challenge not yet tackled, but one that must continue to be addressed

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66 Ibid., 3.

67 Ibid., 4-8, 13.
and successively executed sooner rather than later. With our forces engaged in counter-insurgency and stability operations, as well as conducting theater cooperation engagements globally, we are at a crisis action stage for the capabilities this program hopes to deliver. The problem with the roadmap is that the tasks directed within it deal more with the establishment of the language management system, not anything that will actually begin improving the skills that are needed now.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{CHAPTER SUMMARY}

Following the hierarchical flow of President Bush’s NSS and DOD strategy as outlined in the NDS and QDR there was much discussion on the diverse security challenges that face our country. A common theme promoted throughout those documents that would improve DOD capabilities to respond to threats is the concept of transformation. Transformation is an implementing strategy that various departments and agencies in DOD are pursuing. How successful is this pursuit, and who is managing it? There are potentially disconnects at the senior levels that do not bode well for the synchronization of efforts across DOD and the interagency. Consideration of Secretary of Defense Gates statement that “even parts of the Defense Department are not on a war footing,”\textsuperscript{69} supports this premise. When considered in light of the CSBA proposition that the military is overfunded or on the wrong paths for the future, the situation is even more troubling. If this is indeed the case and parts of the DOD (or more specifically the DA) are not on a war footing, then what is our senior leadership—both in and out of uniform—doing to rectify the situation.

\textsuperscript{68} Kaplan, \textit{How Many Government Agencies Does It Take To Teach Soldiers Arabic}.

\textsuperscript{69} APS 2008, 1.
CHAPTER 3: A STRATEGY OF CHANGE—DOD TRANSFORMATION

Some believe that with the United States in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe that the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.\(^{70}\)

Former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2003)

There is no little danger that the American military transformation now underway may disappoint in the benefits it confers. The principal problems will be neither the cunning asymmetrical enemies, nor even a shortage of funds to carry it along. Instead, the prospective gains from America’s military transformation will be limited, if not frustrated, by the working of the American public, strategic, and military culture.\(^{71}\)

Colin S. Gray (2006)

Using the lessons learned from the first chapter regarding theories and frameworks for strategy development and laying out the hierarchical construct of strategy guidance from the Commander-in-Chief to the service component level, this chapter delves more specifically into transformation as an over-arching strategic theme that transcends across all levels of guidance from top down. The first section speaks broadly on transformation as a concept, while following sections outline some of the early history of current DOD transformation initiatives, to include highlighting specific and implied tasks and guidance from the various change agents who initiated the programs.


WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION?

With interpretations varying across the government, a consensus response to the above question is unlikely. Is it an ongoing “Revolution in Military Affairs,” as some have attested or just a natural evolutionary path that all armed forces travel over time?

Starting broadly, one could consider the following definitions to assist in framing an understanding of transformation.

Evolution: noun, 2 a: a process of change in a certain direction: unfolding, c (1): a process of continuous changes from a lower, simpler, or worse to a higher, more complex, or better state: growth.

Revolution: noun, c: activity or movement designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation, d: a fundamental change in the way of thinking about or visualizing something: a change of paradigm, e: a changeover in use or preference especially in technology, ie. the computer revolution.

Transform: transitive verb, 1 a: to change in composition or structure, b: to change the outward form or appearance of, c: to change in character or condition.72

Although these definitions may not fully clarify or further advance the argument between dissenting camps in our military community, they do display a theme or commonality that is important as it is simple, change.

MULTIPLE VISIONS OVER TIME

How does this concept of change translate within the Defense Department and the Army? Just as change has been a constant throughout history, so too has change been a constant in the military. There are many reasons why change may be required, although the end of the Cold War paradigm and our struggle to define our structure to meet the

complex challenges of the future was the initial spur for this most current effort. The
terrorist attacks directed against our homeland in 2001 added further emphasis for the
change that had already started previously. DOD’s change management or the lack
thereof, is at the core of the transformation debate. To facilitate and synergize the efforts
across the military, senior leaders in the past decade have provided their visions and
directed higher level strategies which enabled subordinate agencies and organizations to
likewise develop internal strategies into executable plans. Have those efforts been
synchronized to better facilitate our growth as a joint force? Has strategic level guidance
remained consistent or has it stagnated since the end of the Cold War? What kind of
affect did operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the attacks on 9/11, OEF, OIF and
others, have on transformation concepts and efforts?

Although our current path of transformation appeared to gain more structure early
in President Bush’s administration, DOD transformation as a whole has been discussed
and debated since the early 1990s. It was during that period of military drawdown where
the Revolution in Military Affairs pundits argued the merits of technology, championing
the need for the Pentagon and our government to focus budgets and resources on
innovation, research and development for the future, versus entangling overseas
engagements like those in Somalia and Bosnia.73 Policy makers, defense analysts, and
strategists at that time predicted that the post-Cold War era would be initially peaceful,
but also that the future likewise held a complexity not seen in the past. Those groups
conducted numerous reviews and assessments in an attempt to define the post-Cold War

73 Michele A. Flournoy ed. QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security (Washington, DC:
capabilities and capacity requirements that were needed in light of the new world order. Some of those reviews included the Base Force Review in 1991, the Bottom-Up Review in 1993, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces in 1993, the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997 and the National Defense Panel in 1997. Throughout that period of debate and discussion our armed forces remained engaged across the globe, albeit not to the level of intensity or commitment seen in our current conflicts following September 2001.

TRANSFORMATION GROUNDED IN STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan, and before September the 11th. . . . What’s different today is our sense of urgency – the need to build this future force while fighting a present war. It’s like overhauling an engine while you’re going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice. 74

President George W. Bush (2001)

Starting with the Bush Administration, the framework described in the 2001 QDR was built around four defense policy goals which were likewise reflected in the 2002 NSS:

1. Assuring allies and friends.
2. Dissuading future military competition.
3. Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests.
4. If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

The 2001 QDR described a capabilities-based approach to defense planning that provided broader military options across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict.

operations. The force-sizing construct – 1-4-2-1 – took into account the number, scope and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military in sizing forces for defense of the U.S. homeland (1); for forward deterrence in four critical regions (4); to conduct simultaneous warfighting missions in two regions (2); all while preserving the President’s option to call for decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1), as well as continued participation in multiple, smaller contingency operations. Figure 7 captures both the goals and force planning construct guidance in an illustrative form.

In April 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) which updated the vision for transformation and put DOD on its current course of change. This publication defines transformation as, a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against

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75 NMS 2004, 18.

our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world. 77

Former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Rumsfeld was the initial authoritative change agent that put the formal transformative initiative in motion. In 2002 the SecDef designated Admiral (ADM) Arthur K. Cebrowski to lead the transformation effort as the initial Director of the Office of Force Transformation. ADM Cebrowski believed that the transformation process contained certain key, immutable elements. He saw transformation foremost as a continuing process without an end point, which is meant to create or anticipate the future by dealing with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and technology. He further believed that change in any one of these areas necessitated change in all, as well as the potential to create new competitive areas and new competencies. Likewise he felt that transformation was meant to identify, leverage and even create new underlying principles for the way things are done, as well as identify and leverage new sources of power. The Admiral concluded that the overall objective of these changes is simply—sustained American competitive advantage in warfare. 78

Since the SecDef assigned specific roles and responsibilities in the 2003 TPG to various individuals and agencies including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs, and provided each with strategic level tasks to execute and measures to accomplish which when cumulatively completed would maintain the military’s preeminence in the 21st Century, it appeared that there would be an integrated and synchronized effort within

77 TPG 2003, 1.

DOD and across the services.\textsuperscript{79} As it relates to the overarching guidance directed in SecDef’s 2003 TPG Appendix 3 of that guide directs the following:

\begin{quote}
…the Services and Joint Forces Command will build transformation roadmaps to achieve transformational capabilities (as represented in the six operational goals) in support of joint operating concepts and supporting operations. The transformation roadmaps will plot the development of capabilities necessary to support these concepts and will serve as baseline plans for achieving the desired joint operating concepts. They will outline the concrete steps organizations must take in order to field capabilities for executing Joint and Service concepts. \textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

Based on this guidance the Department of the Army published a transformation roadmap in 2003 and updated it as required in 2004, although it appears that there were no roadmaps developed in the subsequent years since. Transformation does remain a primary focus in the annually published Army modernization plans and is reflected in Army posture statements to Congress. Regardless, it is interesting to note that the 2004 Army level transformation road map is the last one found on record which begs the question, did events in Iraq or Afghanistan place less emphasis on formal transformation processes? Although OFT maintains a website, Joint Forces Command has taken the lead role in joint transformation…but are the services linked in their efforts, or are they pursuing diverging paths at the expense of future joint independency? The answers remain unclear.

In 2003 much of defense transformation centered on information domination through network centric warfare and effects based operations, concepts that remain resident today. Technological superiority is inherent in these concepts. The Office of Force Transformation concluded that Transformation is yielding new sources of power,

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 12-13 and 23-26.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 29-30.
with one such source being information sharing through robust networks.\textsuperscript{81} That agency stated that the emerging way of war, as developed by the U.S. Armed Forces, will feature some of these characteristics:

1. Increased focus on highly networked, small, but broadly skilled and highly trained units whose extensive knowledge and easier insertion give them greater power and utility than other formations deploying from remote locations,

2. Expeditionary character

3. Forces capable of applying information-age techniques and technologies to urban warfare in order to deny enemy sanctuary

4. Surveillance-oriented forces to counter WMD so that unambiguous warning will not come too late

5. Interagency capabilities for nation building and constabulary operations, so that our forces do not get stuck in one place when they are needed in another\textsuperscript{82}

A central element of transforming our force is joint interoperability--the ability to bring all relevant information and assets to bear in a timely, coherent manner, as well as the relationship with other governmental agencies beyond DOD. Much of the focus related to the goal of joint interoperability deals with technological linkages, such as networking and information dominance. The Army has since moved beyond just interoperability and discussed Joint Interdependence in its most recent capstone Field Manual (FM) 3.0 Operations. Within transformation as it relates to the interagency, the relationship is centered on the capabilities and capacity required beyond DOD that enables mission success in full spectrum operations.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 35.
JOINTNESS AND THE INTERAGENCY

Since DOD transformation is overarching across the service branches, any lack of oversight does not bode well for our movement towards interagency and joint interoperability or interdependence. The 2003 TPG emphasized joint operating concepts and the development of capabilities to support these concepts, but the nature of this guidance necessitates coordination, collaboration, integration and synchronization of both concept development and capability procurement across the services, joint staff, and the regional and functional commands, as well as the interagency. A challenge for DOD is that the responsibility remains with the National Command Authority not the military, and the level of focus, effort and resourcing to achieve this goal is administration dependent. Although much discussion and some initiatives have been started since 2001, much more work needs to be done, and the future presidential and congressional prioritization in these regards remains uncertain.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Transformation has been in the Defense Departments vernacular since the mid-1990s and received Executive Branch and Defense Secretary emphasis from the very start of President Bush’s administration. The rapid defeat of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 using precision weapons from the air, and Northern-Alliance forces supported and led by CIA and U.S. Special Operators on the ground, emphasized the concept of rapid and decisive operations enabled by technology. Since the TPG was published prior to full engagement in counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq, it lacked in the people related capabilities needed in stability operations. Regardless, the 2003 TPG
guidance was in line with the four pillars of transformation as they were laid out in the 2001 QDR, which included:

1. Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint training, and an expanded joint forces presence policy;

2. Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as standing joint forces through wargaming, simulations and field exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities;

3. Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through multiple intelligence collection assets, global surveillance and reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination;


The Army was on board from the start, starting first in 1999 under the auspices of the Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and continuing to this day. Or has it? The next chapter will specifically address Army Transformation initiatives using the Army Modernization Plan and Army Posture Statement to gauge the level of commitment to this effort. The intent is to understand the key points involving Army transformation and modernization in order to judge if the pursuit of each is in line with the guidance put forth in the hierarchical chain of national strategy, while taking into account resources available and in light of the contemporary operating environment.
CHAPTER 4: U.S. ARMY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY—TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION

The no-name post-Cold War era is well and truly over: it detonated on September 11, 2001 (9/11). For a decade, the threat board had been misleadingly naked of major strategic menace. Without the True north of the Soviet threat by which to set a reliable guiding vector, the American defense community did not really know what it was about or, more important, why it might be about it.84

Colin Gray (2006)

The Army…lives by adapting and it dies by failing to do so.85

General William E. DePuy
First Commanding General, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (1973-77)

CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

The main focus for this final chapter is an analysis of transformation and modernization implementation strategies that are resident within the 2008 Army Posture Statement (APS) and the 2007 Modernization Plan. The analysis of these two documents in respect to the previous discussions on higher level strategy and transformation initiatives, informs the thesis conclusion since these two current army publications and the programs contained therein provide a sense of the direction that DA has taken to execute the strategy as laid out by the national command authority and the DOD.

WHERE WERE WE THEN?

The groundwork laid for the Army’s current transformation started in the 1990s during President Clinton’s Administration. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and

84 Gray, Irregular Enemies, 3.

the tremendous operational and tactical victories achieved during Desert Storm, the Army experienced a drawdown in forces. There was much optimism that we had entered a new era of world peace, but this contrasted greatly with an increase in operations tempo (OPTEMPO) in support of contingencies in such places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The RMA and increased focus on technology and information superiority gained ground during this time period. With a reduction in forces in the 1990s, the strategy shifted focus to one that was “technologically” heavy. There were many major defense reviews conducted in that decade leading up to the end of the 20th Century that offered differing views on how our force should be structured and what technologies should be pursued based on the then understood threats to our national security.

Although numerous defense and force planning reviews were conducted during a period of heavy engagement by the Army in stability and reconstruction type operations, it still found itself primarily structured in a Cold War configuration.

The Army conducted extensive experimentation during this decade to measure new concepts and innovations centered on new technologies and digitization. From the Army After Next (AAN) was born the initial theoretical requirements of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the operational concepts of a future ground force that has the potential to operationally maneuver from strategic distances. In the interim, the Army realized that it needed a strategically responsive mechanized force since the traditional heavy forces could not quickly get to the fight, and the light forces that could were lacking in lethality, maneuverability, and force protection. From this requirement, the concept of the Stryker Family of Vehicles concept was created in 1999, with the first
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) deploying to Iraq in 2003.\textsuperscript{86} The champion and primary Army change agent in this effort was then Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki. During a speech on “transformation” given at the 1999 AUSA Annual Convention, General Shinseki focused attention on the need for a medium-weight combat vehicle to provide the Army a much needed capability.\textsuperscript{87}

In Transforming America’s Military author Hans Binnendijk points out that the Army was embarking on the most ambitious transformation of any of the Armed Forces; taking it from a post-Cold War mission of tank warfare on the European plains to rapid and decisive operations in distant and hard-to-reach theaters.\textsuperscript{88} The Army vision articulated by Gen Shinseki and then Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White in 1999 and again in 2003 was, "Soldiers, on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations."\textsuperscript{89} It was additionally envisioned that this “full-spectrum” force would not only be dominant in war, but likewise excel at peace-keeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster assistance operations.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 6-7.
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Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001, transformation continued to be stressed as the DOD and Army’s main effort to provide a 21st Century globally dominant force. In the 2003 Army Posture Statement the Army Secretary and Chief stated that the,

…attacks against our Nation on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism validate The Army's Vision - People, Readiness, Transformation - and our efforts to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.91

Although acknowledging that the country was engaged in Afghanistan and in a Global War on Terrorism,92 the 2003 APS likewise emphasized that the Army continued to be engaged in a profound transformation. The three major initiatives of the 2003 APS were Army readiness and dominance, bridging the operational gap with the Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and fielding the Objective Force to fight in the decades to follow.93

With the first SBCT in its final testing and evaluation phase prior to being mission ready there was much emphasis placed on jump-starting the Objective Force concepts and development, and a great deal of optimism in the Army community that technology would be advanced sufficiently to field the first Objective Force unit by 2010. Secretary White and General Shinseki closed the 2003 APS Introduction with the following assertion, “we have achieved sustainable momentum in Army Transformation; the framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded, this decade.” 94

91 APS 2003, Introduction.

92 note: this assertion occurred prior to execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

93 2003 APS, Introduction.

94 Ibid.
The Objective Force would ultimately transition in name and concept to the Future Force with FCS equipped BCTs as the cornerstones of the agile, expeditionary force that could deploy in 96 hours, travel strategic distances from the continental US (CONUS) via military airlift, arrive ready to fight, and sustain itself until follow-on forces arrived.\textsuperscript{95} This was in line with the Commander-in-Chief’s guidance—the same guidance which had remained consistent with the president’s vision as far back as 1999—where he saw a future force defined, “…less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.”\textsuperscript{96} The 2003 APS maintained this vision and set a mark on the way predicting that by 2010 the Army's Objective Force (Future Force) would be organized, equipped, and trained for ground dominance, and in conjunction with cyber-warfare and space exploitation, provide the Nation capabilities it must have to remain the dominant global leader.\textsuperscript{97} The Army’s position was in synch with OSD transformation guidance in 2003 where the SecDef’s vision statement stated that,

\begin{quote}
Military transformation will enable the U.S. Armed Forces to achieve broad and sustained competitive advantage in the 21st century. It comprises those activities that anticipate and create the future by coevolving concepts, processes, organizations, and technologies to produce new sources of military power. The transformation of our armed forces will dramatically increase our strategic and operational responsiveness, speed, reach, and effectiveness, making our forces increasingly precise, lethal, tailorable, agile, survivable, and more easily sustainable.\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{95} Nardulli and McNaugher, 112.


\textsuperscript{97} APS 2003, 2.

\textsuperscript{98} Cebrowski, 4.
In 2003 and prior to full-scale operations in Iraq, Army senior leaders clearly understood the importance of assessing risk and monitoring the operational environment in order to defend the Nation, while simultaneously maintaining the commitment to transform and modernize its capabilities in support of Combatant Commander’s requirements. The Army Posture Statement that year elaborated in this manner:

These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between current and near-term readiness and our Transformation to meet future challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the mid-term in order to fund our Transformation to the Objective Force. To avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current operational situation as we support the Combatant Commanders in the war against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term effort to defeat transnational threats.99

The realities of Phase 4 stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and subsequent counter-insurgency operations quickly elevated the risk of maintaining transformation to the Objective Force as the primary effort.

WHERE ARE WE NOW—THE 2008 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

Transformation requires a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, how we train, how we modernize, develop leaders, station our forces, and support our Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Transformation is a journey, not a destination.100

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr. (2007)

The 2008 APS reflects the focus of an Army at war. Initially reminding the reader that the Army’s mission is to provide ready forces and land force capabilities to

99 APS 2003, 5.

the Combatant Commanders in support of the NSS, NDS, and NMS, it then highlights that the Army must be adaptable to the changing world security environment. This linkage back to the Nation’s senior level strategy documents, and the further discussion of framing the problem in the strategic context of an “era of persistent conflict,” displays the dutiful effort of nesting Army strategies to the higher vision. The 2008 APS likewise maintains continuity with the 2007 APS.

Figure 8 reflects the Army’s level of troop commitment across the globe. This level has grown since 2001, and has been steadily maintained since that time resulting in extreme stress on Army personnel and equipment readiness. The 2007 APS states that, “this sustained demand for Army forces continues to exceed the demand envisioned in the National Defense Strategy established during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense

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101 APS 2008, 1.  
102 Ibid., 4.
Furthermore it states that “to be able to execute the National Defense Strategy—which includes the military requirements of the National Military Strategy—the Army must maintain readiness to deal with current challenges, while developing the capabilities to be ready for future challenges.”

Even between the short time period between 2007 and 2008, the language within the recently published APS reflects the growing cause and effect of continued engagement by the Army. The 2008 APS succinctly focused on two critical challenges that the Army is wrestling with—restoring balance in the force and funding. This does not indicate that the Army is changing course on its transformation or modernization initiatives from prior years, but the realities of today contribute to the need to re-balance efforts in the near term as is depicted in Figure 9.

![Figure 9. Restoring Balance within the Army.](image)


104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.
Although President Bush and Congress have supported the troops in contact with supplemental funding the past few years, there is no guarantee that the next administration will continue to display this level of support. It is likely then that funding for OIF and OEF will come at the cost of future modernization. APS 2008 outlines the belief that the Army plan to mitigate near-term risk and restore balance by 2011 through four imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset and Transform, is unachievable without continued support. As a key element of national power and working with our brethren across the services and branches of government to protect our homeland and shape the strategic environment for the better good, any decrease in presidential or congressional support following President Bush’s administration will have catastrophic repercussions for the nation in this era of persistent conflict.

ARMY MODERNIZATION EFFORTS—NOT JUST ABOUT THE TOYS

If current trends continue, the United States could enjoy a period of relative strategic calm in which no single foreign power could threaten our vital interests with conventional military forces.

Army Modernization Plan (2001)

As the 2007 Modernization Plan points out in its opening paragraph, “within six months of the release of the 2001 edition, any prospect of that relative strategic calm dissolved.” The past seven years of global commitments and specifically OIF and OEF have severely taxed the Army Active, Reserve and National Guard forces and

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108 Ibid., 1.
equipment. The two major operations have surpassed the total time of World War II in number of years, with the commitment of virtually all the Army’s operational brigades engaged, recovering or preparing for combat or stability operations overseas or forward deployed in friendly countries as deterrence to conflict in those regions.¹⁰⁹

The 2007 Modernization Plan along with the 2008 Army Posture Statement constitutes Army-centric complementary implementation strategies and plans to achieve the objectives and endstates found throughout the various national level strategies and policy directives. Imbedded within those Army strategies and plans are the adaptive and continued complementary efforts of transformation and modernization. The main effort for Army transformation in 2007 is the ongoing modular conversion from division to brigade combat team (BCT) centric units, with the purpose of building a strategically responsive, campaign-quality Army that is dominant across the range of military operations and fully integrated within the Joint, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Framework.¹¹⁰ That future force will provide the Combatant Commanders with a wide range of capabilities based on a total force consisting of Future Combat System FCS BCTs, Heavy BCTs (HBCT), Infantry BCTs (IBCT), and Stryker BCTs (SBCT). The non-FCS BCTs will likewise be FCS-enabled which will allow those forces to interoperate and integrate actions using FCS capabilities.¹¹¹

All told, the Army plans on building a rotational force pool of 76 BCTs with 48 being active component and 28 being National Guard, which is an increase from the 2006

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Army Modernization Plan 2007, 3.

¹¹¹ Ibid.
QDR plan for 70 total BCTs. The Army plan to manage the rotational unit readiness for those modular BCTs is spelled out in another transformative action known as the Army Force Generation Model or ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN is defined as “the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of combatant commander requirements.”¹¹² This model is based on a three year generating structure of a reset and trained pool, ready pool, and available pool, but has yet to be fully realized due to the ongoing one year rotational deployments followed by a one or less year of reset and training in preparation for a subsequent deployment to OIF or OEF. Ultimately, it is believed that this model will provide significant advantages to the Joint Force by better managing the unit training and availability for future steady-state and contingency operations, as well as increased predictability, stability, and unit cohesion at Army unit level.

Another transformative initiative outlined by the 2007 Modernization Plan is the Army Global Force Posture. The goal for this is to accelerate the Army’s strategic responsiveness in line with the overall mission of building a more expeditionary and campaign quality force for the joint combatant commander. Inclusive steps are a reduction in Cold War-era force posture in Europe and Pacific theaters in lieu of stationing forces in one of three types of locations: Main Operating Bases, which are enduring, large sites with permanently stationed Soldiers and families (predominately CONUS-based), Forward Operating Sites, which will be smaller but expandable sites that

¹¹² Ibid., 4.
can support rotational forces, and Cooperative Security Locations, which will be small rapidly expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence.\footnote{Ibid., 7.}

Other additional actions planned to increase our strategic responsiveness are the reconfiguring of current pre-positioned equipment into modular sets, the building of modular capabilities for reception and logistics forward in theater, and improving infrastructure at critical power projection platforms to increase rapid deployment of active forces, and mobilization, deployment and demobilization of reserve forces.\footnote{Ibid.} All of these actions and those previously cited under Army Transformation, are nested and support strategic goals and initiatives outlined in the NSS, NDS and NMS.

Likewise, the Army views its modernization plan as going hand-in-hand with its holistic transformation. Central to this relationship is the linkage between modularization of units and the FCS technologies and concepts. These two elements vastly improve our expeditionary capabilities and provide the President with ground-focused deterrent options. FCS is seen as the “centerpiece of our modernization strategy, critical to the Army’s relevance in the 21st Century.”\footnote{Ibid., 8.} Initially the plan is to field the first of 15 FCS BCTs starting in the 2015 time-frame, but likewise fielding mature FCS technologies to the current force as they become available in order to enhance capabilities now so that we maintain our technological overmatch on the battlefield. The Army will reap additional long-term benefits to the overall FCS program by delivering mature “spins out” to the current force. Besides getting beneficial technologies in the hands of soldiers engaged
overseas, the lessons learned through experimentation by the highly experienced noncommissioned officers and soldiers of the Army Evaluation Task Force will enable adjustments to be made when required, and inform senior leadership and Congress as to the worth of these technologies in full spectrum operations. Likewise, providing FCS enabled technologies as they mature shortens the training and familiarization period for the future force, allowing for more rapid integration of those technologies as they become more common-place in our arsenal.

The 2007 Army Modernization Plan encompasses Army’s efforts to continue to “transform our doctrine, organizations and best practices to better address our current and future requirements.” The initiatives cross all facets of Army doctrine, training, leader development, material, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF) as our Army’s senior leadership remains committed to, “investing in the right technologies, equipment, and support infrastructure that will empower our most important asset—the Soldier.” In a recent article for Army Magazine the authors noted that, “a strategic environment of persistent conflict requires continuous modernization to stay ahead of our enemies whose asymmetric attacks have demonstrated their great adaptive abilities.” Citing the ends, ways, means and risks components of strategy they added that, “the “end” of our modernization strategy is to sustain the Army as the dominant landpower in the world,


117 Ibid.

To achieve this end the Army modernization strategy is focused on four initiatives:

1. Rapidly field the best new equipment to the current force.
2. Upgrade and modernize existing systems so that all soldiers have the equipment they need.
3. Incorporate new technologies derived from FCS research and development.
4. Field the FCS brigade combat teams.

The authors note that, “the means required to realize this modernization strategy is sufficient Congressional funding for continued research and development.” While the loss of support by the administration or Congress is, “the greatest risk to the program.” This is a real concern. Resulting from recent budget reductions and future fiscal guidance, the Army was forced to reduce the scope and delay the schedule of fielding FCS putting at risk the ability to reach full tactical and operational potential as envisioned. A secondary and related risk is a loss of support for the Future Force due to the high costs of the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though the Army’s modernization plan balances both current and future force needs.

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119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 32-36.
121 Ibid.
WHERE ARE WE GOING WITH THE FCS BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM?

I am convinced that the Future Combat System[s] is the full spectrum combat Force that we need for the 21st century.

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr.

A FCS proponent might answer the question posed in the Section Header by stating, “Anywhere it is needed.” The FCS Brigade Combat Team is expected to be a versatile organization that operates across diverse environments. The FCS Program Manager’s (PM) office published a White Paper in 2007 that detailed the technologies under development. This document lists a series of “facts” regarding FCS stating that it is,

…adaptable to traditional warfare as well as complex, irregular warfare in urban terrains, mixed terrains such as deserts and plains, and restrictive terrains such as mountains and jungles. It can also be adaptable to civil support, such as disaster relief. It is a joint (across all the military services) networked (connected via advanced communications) system of systems (one large system made up of 14 individual systems, the network, and most importantly, the Soldier) connected via an advanced network architecture that will enable levels of joint connectivity, situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations heretofore unachievable. When fully operational, FCS will provide the Army and the joint force with unprecedented capability to see the enemy, engage him on our terms, and defeat him on the 21st century battlefield.

Although there are many who remain skeptical that FCS will deliver the synchronized and collective technologies as advertised along the time-line that has been

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123 Program Manager, FCS Brigade Combat Team, FCS Smart Book, 22 August 2007, 4. Note the reference that all modular BCTs have utility in stability and reconstruction operations.

briefed,\textsuperscript{125} the continued development and pursuit of those individual technologies and capabilities is essential for our current and future expeditionary Army. A future force envisioned by FCS technologies and delivered as promised has the potential to dominate the traditional or conventional battlefield much as we did in the 2003 roll up to Baghdad with Army and Marine heavy forces. But, will the FCS equipped Brigade Combat Team be more effective in stability and reconstruction operations or in a counter-insurgency fight? One historian believes that the American way of war is so infused with technology that it is incapable of effectively conducting stability operations required to translate military victory into political success.\textsuperscript{126} There are related concerns that winning too quickly could ultimately be detrimental to the overall desired political endstate. Some analysts conclude that a rapid and decisive conventional military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict environment, and in fact could make the stabilization phase even more challenging.\textsuperscript{127}

One of the primary concepts of FCS is the use of “the network, sensors, unmanned air and ground systems…to detect the enemy while our forces are beyond


October, 2007: AETF begins testing and evaluation of "Spin out 1," first set of prototypes.

February 25-March 25, 2008: First technical field tests of "Spin out 1."

2009: Congressionally-directed decision on whether to proceed with Future Combat Systems.

2011: Completion of critical design review.

2012: First major test of network with majority of prototypes.

2013: Initial production starts.

2015: The first brigade combat team equipped with complete Future Combat Systems.

2017: Army goes into full-rate production.

2030: 15 brigades equipped with complete Future Combat Systems.

Sources: GAO, Congressional Budget Office, Army, military historians, military contractors.

\textsuperscript{126} Kagan, 4.

detection range,” so that we can “develop situational awareness out of contact to engage on our terms.” This “out of contact” concept is counter to the need for engaging and interacting with local populations in stability, reconstruction and counter-insurgencies. As current operational doctrine points out, “…soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts.”

So why pursue this expensive and expansive modernization program if we already have forces that dominate in the traditional realm of warfare as evidenced by Desert Storm and OIF? The difference between then and now involves the FCS modular brigade’s ability to deploy strategically, and fight and sustain itself operationally. This reality provides both the President and COCOMs with a strategically responsive and lethal ground force capable of shaping the environment through flexible deterrence, seizing the initiative prior to a Phase 3 fight, dominating in traditional warfighting scenarios, and supporting an influx of additional friendly ground forces and other government agencies needed to execute stability and reconstruction operations.

These new technologies enhance our military’s effectiveness in traditional and stability operations when those capabilities are utilized as enablers within the operational design of campaign plans and execution of operational art. For instance, it is reasonable and does not take too much imagination to visualize FCS BCTs as the vanguard forces executing Phase 3 dominance over an adversary, plowing a path and developing situational awareness for scores of follow-on security and civil affairs forces riding in

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128 FCS Smart Book, 8-9.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) prepared to execute a synchronous Phase 3 to Phase 4 transition within the campaign plan. Those MRAPS would not only carry additional light infantrymen for security but likewise shelter stability and reconstruction partners from the interagency, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations who would provide capabilities and resources needed in the post-conflict environment. For the military contribution to such an operational design, commanders and soldiers require a framework for training and planning and look to doctrine as the overarching guide.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS—A CAPSTONE UPDATE

As stated earlier, Army transformation includes all facets of DOTLMPF. Regarding changes in doctrine, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander GEN William S. Wallace emphasizes four major points in the forward of the recently published update to the Army’s Capstone doctrine manual, FM 3.0 Operations. They include:

1. Our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of “persistent conflict”—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends,

2. …an operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force…

3. A doctrinely based Army that will achieve victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict only by conducting operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts

4. Although the strategic environment and operational concepts have changed, soldiers remain the centerpiece and foundation of the Army.130

130 Ibid.
This newest addition of the Army’s operations manual updates the previous shift in doctrine that was started by the 2001 publication of FM 3.0, and which now finds itself included within joint doctrine. Specifically the manual highlights full spectrum operations as the key operational concept which is the core of its doctrine, and frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations.131

The conventional Army has historically been equipped, trained and educated to fight against nation-states and win the traditional offensive or defensive fight. Our core competencies reside in these conventional warfare areas. Colin Gray supports this assertion with his suggestion that, “the traditional American way of war was developed to defeat regular enemies,” and that “…one military style does not suit all kinds of warfare equally well.”132 With the changing nature of the strategic and operational environment, threats now recognized and which must be planned against include adversarial nation-states, organizations, people, groups, conditions, or natural phenomena able to damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. Full spectrum operations require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks, with the relative weight of effort between the tasks being dependent on the mission, as depicted by figure 10.

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131 FM 3-0 Operations, 3-1.

This edition of FM 3.0 also links back to higher level strategic publications by re-addresses the four security challenges—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive—which were outlined by the most current QDR and the NDS. The operational concept of full spectrum operations talks to the “goal of applying land power as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish the conditions to achieve the joint force commander’s end state.” Full spectrum operations involve continuous interaction between friendly forces and multiple groups in the operational area which, in addition to enemy forces and the local populace, could include dealings with multinational partners, adversaries, civil authorities, business leaders, and other civilian agencies. In order to realize this vision, the Army must educate and train soldiers in a broader, cultural context and develop more wide-ranging capabilities across DOTLMPF that increase its flexibility and adaptability within the contemporary operating environment.

133 FM 3-0 Operations, 3-1.

134 Ibid., 1-4.

135 Ibid., 3-1.

136 Ibid., 3-2.
FRAMING SOLUTIONS—ADDITIONAL SUPPORTIVE UPDATES

To address the changing strategic and operational environments the Army has been updating its doctrine to address the complex challenges and threats it will face as the preeminent land force for our nation. DA has elevated stability operations and civil support operations to an equal level of importance with the more traditional conventionally focused mission. Stability operations are conducted outside the United States such as in the case of Phase 4 operations in Afghanistan, in contrast to Civil Support which is internal to our country such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. Additional full-spectrum operations keystone manuals, FM 3-07 Stability Operations and FM 3-28 Civil Support Operations are being developed with publishing release dates scheduled later this year. The publication of these manuals and increased focus by

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137 Ibid., 3-7.

senior Army leadership on other than conventional warfare doctrine is a positive step towards balancing our understanding on where we are expected to conduct operations and what our core competencies should entail. The follow-on steps must then focus on the execution of educating and training our soldiers across the full-spectrum of operations to build an Army that is versatile, adaptive and prepared.

In a joint venture with the U.S. Marines, Army TRADOC Command published FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency to fill a void in doctrine that has been resident since the end of the Vietnam War. Although published earlier than FM 3.0, FM 3-24 states that, “all full spectrum operations executed overseas—including counterinsurgency (COIN) operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state.”\textsuperscript{139} The “shock and awe effects” and “rapid and decisive maneuver” capabilities of our armed forces are not necessarily decisive in COIN operations, which centers on the struggle for the support of the populace. COIN is by nature, a protracted and extremely complex type of warfare. This aspect has not shown itself to be particularly palatable in the United States. Gray writes that, “American public, strategic, and military culture is not friendly to the means and methods necessary for the waging of warfare against irregular enemies.”\textsuperscript{140} In the United States, counter-insurgencies such as Vietnam and ongoing operations in Iraq are fought on two fronts—one at home and one abroad—with the will and support of the people being the decisive element in achieving the political endstate.

\textsuperscript{139} U.S. Department of the Army, \textit{FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-19.

\textsuperscript{140} Gray, \textit{Irregular Enemies}, 5.
*FM 3-24* provides a framework to understand the challenges related to COIN operations. It reflects that even though our military is a key component in COIN for security and to assist in the protection of the population, it is most likely in a support role working with non-military participants whose efforts are required to achieve the desired political endstate. Those organizations besides U.S. military forces may include “…multinational and/or host nation security forces, U.S. Government agencies, other governments’ agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), intergovernmental organizations (IGO), multinational corporations and contractors, and host nation civil and military leaders (including local leaders).” 141 Regardless of nature of the operation with the military force either supporting or being supported, *FM 3-24* reflects that there must be a unity of effort to achieve the desired endstate. These affairs place less emphasis on firepower and more on cerebral engagement. COIN warfare is akin to a “thinking man’s war,” requiring sufficient analysis and fore-thought in correctly defining the problem and identifying the actors and their pressure points, in order to apply the appropriate lethal and non-lethal measures in an integrated fashion with partner stakeholders that ultimately lead to a successful endstate. Victory over the insurgents must be sufficient in nature to enable successful stability and reconstruction efforts.

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141 *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 2-4 thru 2-9.
TRANSFORMATION FOR STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction operations.142

Hans Binnendijk

The phase 3 offensively oriented successes that quickly resulted in the defeat of the Taliban and regime change in Iraq, have ultimately settled into the present day, ongoing counterinsurgency and stability and reconstruction operations, that continue to tactically and operationally challenge our forces in theater, and strategically challenge senior leadership within the D.C. beltway. FM 3.0 points out that although winning battles and engagements are important, those successes alone are not sufficient. Shaping the civilian situation is just as important to success.143 The manual cites current DOD policy which states:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities to include doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.144

DODD 3000.05

As previously noted, DOD has placed stability operations conducted outside the U.S. and Civil Support operations within our country on par with the traditional offensive and defensive military operations. Adapting our normal core competency focus is not an

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142 Binnendijk and Johnson, pxiii.

143 FM 3-0 Operations, vii.

overnight action; it involves an all-encompassing strategy, time and resources. Risk is entangled throughout this evolutionary path as the transformation moves forward. Although unilateral military action of a “soft” nature is always an option, the best possible answer to achieve the desired ends in stability and civil support operations is a concerted effort with host nation, coalitions, and other government and non-governmental agencies. This intended goal may not always be possible due to capability, capacity, and/or timing issues, as well as the political realities between nation-states and diverging national or organizational will and desires.

At the operational level, the transitional period from phase 3 dominate to phase 4 stability operations may be blurred or the other instruments of national power may not be able or in position to lead the Phase 4 effort, requiring DOD forces to continue as the lead in stability operations, such as which occurred in Iraq after Baghdad fell. Therefore it is a recognized imperative that the Army develops greater capabilities, builds capacity and rebalances combat support functionalities within active and reserve components in areas that contribute to the non-lethal fight. The 2008 Army Posture Statement reflects those requirements and outlines the actions being pursued to address them.

The incredible operational and tactical successes achieved by our military in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 provided strong evidence in support of transformation initiatives to build a force structure and concepts that enabled our units to rapidly deploy from strategic locations and execute decisive operations with quick defeat of our adversaries. As a result it has been noted that, “the very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with an
end of major combat.”145 To achieve such synergy, the “planning for stabilization and reconstruction must take place concurrently with the planning for war.”146

In 2004 the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University published a collaborative study that outlined a number of observations, conclusions and recommendations for the required military capabilities necessary to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. The volume cited specific historical case studies where the U.S. conducted post-conflict stability and/or reconstruction actions as well as outlining the need for a linkage in the relationship of military campaigns to political-military objectives that ultimately achieve the political strategic endstate. The authors noted that, “the key to success in post-conflict settings is understanding two interrelated points: that no military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and that persistent conditions of insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development.”147

145 Binnendijk and Johnson, pxiii.
146 Ibid., 9.
147 Ibid., 17.
CONCLUSION

If one does not really “do strategy,” it will not much matter whether one’s armed forces are transformed or not. The issue is not only, or not primarily, How good will U.S. forces be tactically and operationally? Rather is it, How will they be used? And to achieve what ends will they be committed? Will those ends be selected and exploited by a coherent theory of victory so as to promote a desirable postwar political context?  

Colin Gray (2006)

The Defense Department and specifically the Department of the Army is revisiting a strategic crossroads on a well-traveled path. As one of our democracy’s critical sources of national power, we once again find ourselves over-tasked, undermanned and underfunded. Although it may not resonate with the average person on the street, our nation is at a crisis point regarding the capability and capacity of the Defense Department and its ability to meet current and future challenges in the realm of national security. The men and women who volunteer to serve our nation for a period of time or as their life’s calling, and the citizens reaping the rewards of their sacrifices, deserve the very best efforts from our elected officials. As good stewards with our tax dollars, they must properly but sufficiently plan for and resource our military for the numerous tasks it executes in support of our nation’s interests. To effectively employ the military and other elements of national power there must be thorough and conscientious formulation of strategy that maintains balance between the ends, ways, and means.

Traditionally our governmental leaders have imparted their vision and focus for national direction using many methods of communication including both verbal and written policy, strategies and plans. There are numerous codified strategic documents that provide our nation’s security forces with a long-term vision for the future. They

include the President’s National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense National Defense Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review to name just a few. In broad terms, the guidance outlined therein provides guidelines for national security and defense, but not always the specificity or the resources across the whole of government that is required to execute a comprehensive and coordinated collective effort between the various U.S. governmental agency security partners.

As Doctor Gray points out, “if America performs poorly at the strategic level, much of the cost and effort of the Army’s transformation will be wasted on efforts ill suited to the political tasks prescribed by policy.” In an era of persistent conflict within a complex strategic environment consisting of de-stabilized nations, anti-U.S. state and non-state actors across the globe, and facing traditional, disruptive, catastrophic and irregular security challenges, there is a great need for the creation of a truly “grand” national strategy and an authoritative official or agency to oversee its execution. This would be in addition to a revised national security strategy that provides clear direction and has congressional funding support for implementation. Some of the essential elements of the new national security strategy should be the initiation of a whole of government approach that implements the ideals of improved interoperable and/or interdependent joint, interagency, and coalition activities, as well as provide a well-thought out and communicated plan that enables the necessary funding to execute it. Until such time it is highly likely that the armed services and specifically the Army, will continue to be employed in scenarios that are best solved by a total government team.

149 Ibid., 52-53.
beyond DOD. Regardless, DOD and other security agencies must formulate subordinate strategies that provide, “…solutions to real world problems that work well enough.”

The pursuit of the latest technological advances in warfare is but one of the ways in which the U.S. will maintain our warfare dominance. But technology alone does not guarantee success in war, since it will only go so far in the relationship centric engagements that encompass stability and reconstruction operations. The human dimension is much more decisive in this arena, and requires that our soldiers develop a level of sophistication in people skills that enables them to bridge the cultural gap that exists during these type operations. Since the late 1970s our military has owned the night due to a technological edge over our adversaries. In today’s full spectrum operational environment the Army must put forth a concerted effort to improve our “day vision” capabilities so that we can better understand today’s strategic environment complexities and substantially improve our capabilities in irregular warfare and stability operations.

Our Army has been historically structured to fight and win on the conventional battlefield. Colin Gray notes that, “although the U.S. Army has an extensive background in irregular warfare, it has never accepted it as a core competency, choosing rather to improvise and therefore relearn lessons.”

He adds that, “in the past stability operations have been viewed as an unfortunate diversion from conventional or “real” war.” Although this may be true in the past, it appears that this negative trend is righting itself as the Army continues to adapt and learn while simultaneously being engaged in a

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150 Ibid., 7.
151 Ibid., 32.
152 Ibid.
counter-insurgent fight, stability and reconstruction operations, as well as transforming across the DOTLMPF in order to dominate throughout the breadth of full-spectrum operations.

The previously cited NDU study offered recommendations on force size planning, organizational changes that complement stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), and additional educational and technological initiatives that are intended to assist the military in achieving balance between lethal and non-lethal operations. In almost all of those cases, the Army has outlined initiatives within these categories, to include growing the Army in both capacity and capability, force modularization, and the continued technological research and development needed for the future force. The report offered that, “Stability and reconstruction operations are support resource intensive, requiring increased levels of military police, civil affairs, PSYOP, engineers, and medical capabilities.”153 The Army recognized this fact and had already started to grow higher levels of these specialties either through initial training and/or restructuring military occupational specialties. This reality of trying to balance the force displays the complexity of building an adaptive Army that meets the Combatant Commander needs across the full spectrum of operations.

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153 Binnendijk and Johnson, 7. The army has already transitioned many soldiers from other military operational specialties (MOS) such as air defense and armor, to those where we had shortened capacity such as in our military police corps and civil affairs. Although I am uncertain if the army used this publication as a source study for transformation efforts related to stability and reconstruction operations, there appears to be a great similarity between conclusions and recommendations from the author of that book and the initiatives started by the army.
THE WAY AHEAD

Your Army is a resilient organization, and while it is unquestionably stressed and stretched, it remains the best in the world, and we are that way because of our values, because of our ethos, and because of our people.154

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr.
National Press Club Briefing (2007)

With recent and impending updates to its capstone doctrinal manuals, the Army is philosophically moving in the right direction for the future. In an era of persistent conflict marked by diverse security challenges from both state and non-state actors, it is pursuing a course of action that addresses the current and future force needs across DOTLMPF. This course is challenged by the heavy commitment of forces across the globe, and the associated price tag which has a real potential to divert transformation and modernization funds away to pay for current operational costs. In this campaign, the DA can be its own worst enemy if it fails to sufficiently analyze and build actionable strategies and plans for the 21st century. Those strategies must be feasible, suitable and acceptable to ensure victory in conflict, and to gain concurrence with our government, our people and hopefully the support of our allies around the world. Therefore it remains an imperative that the U.S. Army’s strategy balances our current and future capability and capacity needs in order to provide combatant commanders with trained and ready ground forces that dominate in full spectrum operations.

It likewise remains a national imperative that our elected leaders provide our soldiers with the guidance, funding, and resources necessary to successfully fulfill those obligations and execute those tasks set forth in Title 10, United States Code 10. Those

154 Casey, “Army Chief of Staff”s Remarks at the National Press Club.”
same elected officials are morally obligated to provide the most technologically advanced tools to our service members in order to maintain our dominance in full-spectrum operations while simultaneously protecting the force. For the Army those technologies equate to the future combat systems and other complementary programs. Provided that senior military leadership balances current and future force requirements in a holistic and well-thought out strategy, Congress should then fully fund the Army’s modernization efforts.

After reviewing DA transformation and modernization efforts it appears that Army senior leaders have captured the essence of Colin Gray’s comment on strategy that, “… it is practical business…in search of solutions to real world problems that work well enough,”155 The Department of the Army’s service strategies and plans provide logical and adaptive solutions that operationalize and implement the very broadly scoped national strategic strategy. These solutions are in line with the President’s national security goals of maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, while providing the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends.156 But as noted, the continuation of Army transformation and modernization remains at risk. The nature of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the funding to support both may ultimately cause the pause or end of transformative and modernization initiatives that our country’s armed forces need both now and in the future.


156 NSS 2002, 30.
Our senior leaders in and out of uniform have some difficult resourcing choices to make, and if DOD budgetary support wanes in Congress or with the next administration it will come at great cost to national security. History has shown that following the end of major conflicts, DOD budgets and force size have been cut. Although we are heavily engaged in the GWOT, Iraq and Afghanistan, in this era of persistent conflict and instability it is likely that next security challenge lays just over the horizon. The Army strategy outlined by its senior leadership attempts to balance the force, both for the here and now and for the future. If the Army’s current strategy progresses towards meeting the vision and goals laid out by our civilian and senior military leadership, but is derailed by a lack of support in the next administration or in Congress, then what?

In a quote attributed to Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto following the successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor he reportedly stated that, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."\(^{157}\) This prophetic announcement—albeit potentially fictional—captures the essence of what is needed across the United States today to provide the appropriate capacity and capability levels that will enable our military and other security agencies to successfully defend our homeland and protect our national interests both today and in the future. America, the sleeping giant, must once again be roused to level of support appropriate to winning the long war and helping to build a strategic environment of stable partner nation states across the globe.

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VITA

Major Matthew S. Kinkead is currently enrolled in residence at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. JAWS educates selected O-4s, O-5s and O-6s, interagency civilians and selected international officers in the art and science of joint, interagency and multinational planning and warfighting at the strategic-operational level of war as directed by the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy. JAWS awards Service Intermediate (Staff College) or Senior Level College (War College) credit (based on student rank and experience) as well as single phase Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I & II). JAWS graduates earn a fully accredited Masters of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

Major Kinkead initially served in the enlisted ranks with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Richardson, Alaska. He received a regular Army commission as a Second Lieutenant, Armor Branch, in May 1995. He has served in numerous operations at various ranks and positions to include Operation DESERT STRIKE (Kuwait), INTRINSIC ACTION (Kuwait), Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR 1A and KFOR 4A), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. His next assignment is with 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.

He is married to the former Jennifer Drennen of New York and has one daughter, Katelyn. Mrs. Kinkead is currently pregnant and scheduled to deliver a boy in July 2008.