UNITED STATES MILITARY STUDY OF THE FOURTH ESTATE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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4 April 2008

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### ABSTRACT

Military officers generally and specifically those officer engaged in planning and executing operations do not study and understand the Fourth Estate with a consistency that ensures institution-wide understanding. Clausewitz’ Holy Trinity, provides a framework that suggests the importance of the media inside this relationship. The existence of the press inside the trinity is fact - they are the primary conduit for communication between the Trinity elements. This thesis examines the current joint and service doctrine and training to establish a baseline. While there are high points throughout the department, there is an inconsistent approach.

The results of this study are a qualitative view of the Department of Defense’s policy and training for military officers regarding the press and the procedures to interact with them.

The Department of Defense is on solid footing and positioned to make a logical ‘next’ step to create a consistent policy and training regarding the interaction with the press. Simply taking lessons from some of the existing high points (such as the U.S Army’s Command and General Staff College initiative that places military officers in graduate classes with journalism students) across the services and joint doctrine and education and reapplying them uniformly would pay solid dividends towards improving the military interaction with the Fourth Estate.

### SUBJECT TERMS

Fourth Estate, Media, Press, Planners
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Introduction

*The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.... In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused.*

*T.E. Lawrence*

**Summary of the Problem**

The relationship between the media and the military remains far less than optimized due to a myriad of reasons. In America, there has been some 200 plus years for these two institutions to work out a meaningful relationship. Primarily, United States military officers tend to view the Fourth Estate with disdain, disrespect and distrust. Current day military officers seem to still be reeling from the tumult of failure in Vietnam (though arguably few were in service at that point), the angst of which has been passed down with an almost ceremonial tradition. Similar sentiments exist in the general American public but likely for different reasons. Both have taken advantage of that time to entrench the differences and cultivate their mutual distrust. Fourth Estate news media members take great pride in their distrust and general skepticism of people and institutions. This is ingrained in their ethos and manifested by their self assumed role

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3 Ibid., viii.

of functioning as a check and balance to the power of the government.\(^5\) It is easy to see how this role has mutated to a check against any power source that can affect the citizenry - the Fourth Estate’s ultimate employer.

Nevertheless, a salient root of this distrust simply lies in the roles of each institution. The relationship is symbiotic in that the media needs the information the military provides during times of war in order to publish. Publishing material that the citizenry will read (buy) keeps food on the table. The military uses the media as a conduit to inform the public, which of course influences friendly and enemy policy makers and citizenry.\(^6\) The ‘story’ may well impact the military’s ability to accomplish the mission. Therefore, a conflict is born.

Another likely culprit in this conflict is the lack of understanding of the basic nature of war – on BOTH sides.

The underlying problem is that the military and the media hate each other because neither soldiers nor reporters understand the nature of war. The soldiers understand fighting. The journalists understand communications. Neither group know(s) that the political impact of combat depends on the communication of the fighting…..battle is meaningless until it is credibly communicated to the world.\(^5\)

While the preceding quote is strongly worded, it speaks indirectly to the lack of institutional understanding between the two entities. Clearly there will be individual exceptions to this (and any) rule with respect to the relationship between the Fourth Estate and the military, but the underlying concept holds great validity.


In order to function optimally in the strategic planning of warfare and in order to reap the maximum strategic benefits of favorable and friendly Fourth Estate treatment, the military should reconfigure its modes of operation with regard to the press.

Summary of the State of the Art

Notably in the military staffs, there are experts on the Fourth Estate, and they should be called on routinely in planning vice simply as the action agents for press inquires.

Military staffs typically organize along functional lines around what is termed a general staff. That staff divides the workload of administration, intelligence, operations, training, and logistics, into separate offices. Additional specialties that may be needed by the commander will belong to the commander's special staff. Special staffs can include legal advisors, political advisors and media advisors, referred to as Public Affairs Officers or PAOs. Interaction with the Fourth Estate is managed by the Public Affairs Officer who typically is a special staff member. The military Public Affairs officers are experts on the Fourth Estate, but relatively little military training is dedicated for general operational planners.

What this Research does to Improve the Art

My research suggests that the Unites States military officers are not studied in the composition, functions and motivations of the Fourth Estate and therefore miss tremendous opportunities to positively effect their mission. We will see that a basic

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framework for operational planners to increase their study of the Fourth Estate will facilitate more effective military operational planning.

Much military study of the Fourth Estate is focused on integration of legacy public affairs tactics, techniques and procedures while I suggest that institutional understanding will be a more effective means to improve the relationship between the military and the press. I suggest that integrating an aggressive plan for interaction with the Fourth Estate should be an essential element of any campaign plan.

Limitations of this Study

My work is limited to consideration of the Fourth Estate in two dimensions. The first is the national mainstream media typified by network television news entities, daily newspaper publications, and periodical news magazines. Secondly, the cable news networks, typically running 24 hours per day, are considered in this group also.

There has clearly been a dramatic increase in information that is published on the internet. These sites, ezines, and weblogs and political forums have proven to be effective media to organize and communicate for groups with limited resources and poor access to commercial mass media. They are certainly a factor in this discussion, but are not suitable for the purpose proposed here due to the limited scope of this paper.

Outline of the Study

This treatise begins with brief historical look at the term “Fourth Estate”, its meaning and the circumstances around its origin and usage. Next we include a look at the use of models for study of various topics. The model chosen for its illustrative value while examining this subject is Clausewitz’ Trinity which has immense popularity in military academia and therefore calls for some examination of the context that drove Carl
von Clausewitz to pen this explanation. While there are three elements to this paradoxical trinity, this paper will focus on the army’s interaction with the other elements and only briefly touch on the government’s involvement.6

A review of the various types of military operations and the impact of the Fourth Estate on them follows. The next section looks at the Fourth Estate and its view of itself. A brief review of the state of the art of military interaction with the Fourth Estate completes the background section.

Section four contains case studies of three types of wars (courtesy of Baron von Jomini) and the media impact on these examples. Focus is limited to the United States involvement and this entire paper is admittedly is focused on these issues in the narrow context of the United States

Finally a summary of the effects of the Fourth Estate and military relationship and of its effects on the outcome of military campaigns is followed by recommendations for the improvement of military campaign effectiveness through institutional understanding of and interaction with the press. Additionally some suggestions for future study and a few fringe recommendations to look at complete this effort.

Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.

Thomas Carlyle

Origination of the term “Fourth Estate”

The term "Fourth Estate" comes to us most likely from Edmund Burke, an Irish politician and writer who lived from 1729 (or 1730 depending on the source quoted) to 1797. Burke served in the British House of Commons as a member of the Whig party. Such was his conservatism that, with a slight leap faith, he could get the nod as a plank holder in the modern United States conservative movement.

Authenticating that Burke actually said this is somewhat tricky. He was an author, but he never wrote this comment down. Also Thomas Carlyle (the author who tells us that Burke said this) previously used a similar reference to the “Fourth Estate” in his 1837 work titled The French Revolution: A History, albeit this time with no reference to Burke - and penned four years prior to the Heroes reference. This of course does not mean he was not thinking of Burke's use when he wrote it. So it is that we are left with a plausible original source that if accepted will likely not elicit much ire from the

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8 Ibid., 151.
academic elite. Carlyle was certainly influenced by Burke and elaborated quite eloquently on the concept of the “Fourth Estate” or the “Man of Letters” as he discussed in *Heroes*.

This alleged (but not universally accepted) statement from Burke was made during the time of the French Revolution when there was a robust discussion ongoing about the role of the government and men. Adding to the plausibility, Burke vowed strong contempt for the French Revolution based on his appreciation for order and over disorder; a belief that liberty alone was not worthy of societal destruction. So it is not a distant leap to see Burke reinforcing any entity that may support his premise or simply oppose or create difficulty for his opposition.

Johannes Gutenberg's invention of an early printing press in about 1450 paved the way for a modern Fourth Estate that appeals to the masses. At the time of Burke's pronouncement, the Fourth Estate was made up of periodical newspapers and the less savory pamphleteers. The former were remarkably similar to current day newspapers and the latter irritatingly close to today's tabloids. Workings of the pamphleteers were often funded by groups or persons opposing any of a myriad of issues of the day; the writers

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11 Thomas Carlyle Lecture V, delivered May 19, 1840. Author’s note: These lectures were published by Wiley & Halsted of New York, New York in 1859. It is now in the public domain and has been digitized (23 Nov 2005) and is available on Google Books at [http://books.google.com/books?id=mdvCzrNIkooC](http://books.google.com/books?id=mdvCzrNIkooC). This source was used in this instance.


and printers of the oft salacious products were frequently unemployed authors who would print in secret for anyone with money.  

Of note, the term Fourth Estate has been applied in numerous places since Burke popularized it. More often than not it has referred to the element (of the press) and its informal position in that otherwise formal relationship of government, the people, religion etc.

The Fourth Estate in America

Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.

Thomas Jefferson

In order to consider the Fourth Estate’s relationship in America (specifically with the military arm of the government) today, it is necessary to visit why we have this free press and how it has evolved.

After the American Revolution, the American citizenry essentially decided that there was a need for a federal government. Quite obviously, there was considerable skepticism over the role of this government but at the end of the day they approved of it only if the government was to be accountable to the people (“…of the people, by the people, for the people…”). Naturally, the populace could only hold this government accountable if they had information freely available with which to make decisions on when and why to voice their concerns and desires to those in the government.

17 George Krinsky. “The Role of the Media in a Democracy,” Issues of Democracy 2, no. 1
This concept was codified as the first of 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States in 1791, some four years after the Constitution had been signed.

Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus being articulated in the highest law of the land, attempts by legislators, courts and executives to weaken the intent have routinely been shunned.

A notable exception was occurred in 1861 when then President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus (with public support) and allowed military officers to muzzle certain elements of the press who were impeding the Union’s war efforts.\textsuperscript{19} He commented some years later that a “limb must often be amputated to save a life, but a life should never be given to save a limb.”\textsuperscript{20} To this day that act conjures up strong emotions on the dangers to the health of the democracy of such acts.

The American free press has evolved over the ensuing years from that loosely organized, highly partisan pamphleteering organization to a modern day generally objective institution. Arguably, the current press’ objective nature evolved principally due to market forces. The press lives or dies on acceptance from the citizenry, and that acceptance is demonstrated with purchasing power (i.e. citizens buying the media’s product). Objectivity produces a credible product which begets a diverse group of consumers who are more likely to become repeat customers.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America, 1776 & 1789; repr. (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2002), 43.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{21} Krinsky, 15.
There is a downside to this market approach. Some will argue that as the Fourth Estate becomes a bigger business those business specific interests will conflict with the basic concept of the unfettered press. Additionally, as the business seeks customers, competition occurs. Resultant of that competition is the propensity to provide more salacious entertainment than ‘hard’ news. Adding to this complexity are consumers who have a love/hate relationship over this topic. On one hand, they seek the entertainment, and on the other they resent the lack of seriousness.22

This brings into question the definition of news. The Fourth Estate is basically an unregulated entity.23 Unlike the definition of “lite” or “fat free” on foods (courtesy of the modern day Food and Drug Administration), there is no agreed upon definition of “news.” Hence, two publications may publish articles about such diverse things as two headed dogs or alternatively the current geo-political implications of a coup in a country allied with the United States. Both publications can accurately call themselves newspapers. There are no licenses issued expressly for the news effort nor are there standards (or licenses) for the journalists. Basically there are no external checks and balances whatsoever.

While no formal regulation exists, informally there are several notable external factors. There are self appointed media monitors; entities who purport to be watchdogs of the Fourth Estate. Libel lawsuits, though virtually nonexistent for public figures, can be employed to rein in excessive media activity particularly in the case of private

23 Author’s note: Broadcast Journalism is regulated and licensed expressly for the purpose of bandwidth management and fairness of access (e.g. public trust status of the airwaves).
citizens. Lastly, competition with its problems noted above, has proven effective at keeping the bar high on media responsibility.

Internally, though few and far between, there are ombudsmen employed by some news media outlets who are charged with watching their enterprise and addressing issues raised about unfairness or inaccuracies in reporting. Also most media outlets publish and observe ethics and standards for their journalism. These often coincide with professional organization published standards of practice.

Since the Fourth Estate is essentially an entity with a haphazard organization (by design), establishing the institution’s introspective self assessment is rather tricky. Some common themes do recur though.

The mission of journalism and mass communications professions in a democratic society is to inform, to enlighten and to champion freedom of speech and press. These professions seek to enable people to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens who mean to govern themselves. They seek to help people protect, pursue and promote their rights and interests in their personal lives and in their work in public and philanthropic service, in commerce and industry, and in the professions.\(^{24}\)

Clearly the American Fourth Estate views itself much akin to a public trust.\(^{25}\) The literal “public trust” relates to the responsibility and power that the public gives to the government for care of their interests. The analogy for the media is that the people have also given them the power and responsibility to be the watchdog over the

\(^{24}\) Author’s note: The “Mission of Journalism and Mass Communications” as stated by the Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications (ACEJMC). The ACEJMC is the agency responsible for the evaluation of professional journalism and mass communications programs in colleges and universities. Retrieved from http://www2.ku.edu/~acejmc/PROGRAM/PRINCIPLES.SHTML on 8 Dec 2007.

government. Of course this is a self appointed role undertaken by the media and given consent (basically via silence) by the people.

Another such theme is the media’s visceral insistence of its independence and its responsibility to the free press. While it is hard to find modern American government leaders who would argue the value of the free press and the primacy of it in this democracy, some media elites take this notion to irrational extremes. Perhaps a most notorious example occurred in 1987 on a Public Broadcasting Service hosted panel titled, *Ethics in America*, which was devoted to war coverage by the press. Guests on this discussion panel included, retired Army General William Westmoreland, retired Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scrowcroft, and veteran reporters Mike Wallace and Peter Jennings.

As the discussion developed the moderator Charles Ogletree Jr. posed a hypothetical situation where a journalist accompanied an American military unit and had knowledge that the Americans were to be ambushed. The question to the members of the Fourth Estate was, “Don't you have a higher duty as an American citizen to do all you can to save the lives of soldiers rather than this journalistic ethic of reporting fact?” Veteran reporter Mike Wallace, with no hesitation replied, "No, you don't have higher duty...you're a reporter."\(^{26}\)

While the aforementioned structure and accountability is clearly missing from the Fourth Estate, the institution does an admirable job in executing its role. When its efforts seem to stray from acceptable standards, the people generally voice their concern – much as they do when the government strays from their desires.

\(^{26}\) Authors Note: This event has been reported in numerous venues over the years. The actual video footage from the exchange is now available on several sources. For transcription and video, visit [http://www.mrc.org/cyberalerts/2006/cyb20060317.asp#5](http://www.mrc.org/cyberalerts/2006/cyb20060317.asp#5) which the author accessed on 15 February 2008.
“I began to recognize that I was operating, for all practical purposes, as a foreign correspondent. I was dipping into a world with a language of its own, with a society of its own, that in every respect paralleled U.S. civil society. But it paralleled it; it was not a part of it. It was separate. It had its own justice system, its own retail system, its own health care system. It’s really important to have reporters on the beat long enough to understand that…."

Los Angeles Times Pentagon correspondent, Melissa Healy

A long recognized (by all parties) weakness of media involves the preparation of journalists for their assignments.28 The level of preparation a journalist has becomes overly evident when they are thrust into a foreign culture. While it may be self evident that it is not a great idea to assign a reporter to a foreign country with no language capability or any other experience in the region, it is not uncommon for journalists with similar lack of credentials to be assigned to cover the military.

This concept ties directly into the lack of external regulation of the industry and arguably to a failure of the industry to regulate itself. With some exceptions, college students pursuing vocational membership in the Fourth Estate are not required to conduct in-depth study in disciplines other than journalism proper. This puts the onus of training the journalist on the either the enterprise who hires them, or the entities they cover.

Miss Healy’s experience (from above) may be the norm but should not be construed (in and of itself) as reason for increased animosity by those being covered. Rather, it presents an opportunity to educate and more effectively get the desired message out.

27 Aukofer and Lawerence, 83.
28 Ibid., 89.
A valid question at this point is simply, “Why should it matter?” Should not the military just do what they are ordered to do by the constitutional authority (President) and let the proverbial ‘chips fall where they may’? This paper will address illustrative examples of this in more depth in Chapter Four but suffice at this point to say that the Fourth Estate is inextricably placed inside the relationships that directly effect success of the army. Their mere physical position in this relationship forces acknowledgement of their influence and power and implores a designated effort to make this additional relationship additive to overall success.

Now with some sense of this American Fourth Estate, a look at the reason this institution is relevant to military success is in order. First let’s examine the relationship as has been historically depicted in a model.

A Model to Assist our Understanding

“I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing.

If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it.”

William Thomason (Lord Kelvin) 29

Of course, Lord Kelvin’s comment above was made in the context of his scientific studies (at that time primarily wave propagation in the atmosphere) but is useful to consider other relationships. Models are simply symbolic representations of selected

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29 Robert Kargon and Peter Achinstein, eds., Kelvin's Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics, Bradford Books - Studies from the Johns Hopkins Center for the History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, September 1987), 206.
aspects or behaviors in otherwise complex systems. Though possibly more often thought of in the scientific vein, models have become universally used to describe numerous systems and ideas.

Models of relationships assist with understanding and hence an investigation of those relationships by placing a visual representation of the intrinsic interaction. It is important to note that especially away from the scientific and mathematic community the model is a mental construct rather than a literal view of reality.

Models and their distant cousins that go by the name Graphic Organizers or Concept Mapping have firmly planted themselves in the academic vernacular. This group plays a vital role in what is now referred to as visual learning. The concept is simply to graphically display ideas and their relationships in order to improve student comprehension.

Any first year college student will most likely finish a 100 series Psychology class with several models indelibly imprinted on his mind. Of note, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs comes to mind. Abraham Maslow was born on April 1, 1908 and died June 8, 1970. He is considered the father of humanistic psychology and is noted for his proposal of a hierarchy of human needs. When Maslow proposed this hierarchy, he did so via a paper published in a professional journal. What is interesting is that he did NOT draw a model of this idea, he simply wrote about the concept. A first year college student will most likely immediately associate the all too familiar pyramid with this

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31 Ibid., 37.
hierarchy. Further, that sex is listed on the bottom of the pyramid as a baseline requirement probably reinforced what natural chemicals were telling him daily.

Clausewitz’ Trinity

An excellent model for the purpose of this discussion of the Fourth Estate is Clausewitz’ Trinity. More specifically, his representation of the relationships between the people, army and government is instructive. The caveats previously discussed regarding models – that they are simply symbolic representations of selected aspects or behaviors in otherwise complex systems - apply with the Trinity - plus other unique caveats.

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope

35 “Maslow's hierarchy of needs,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_hierarchy_of_needs (accessed February 13, 2008). Author’s note: Image digitally reproduced from the reference. Original author is J. Finglestein who grants permission to copy, distribute and/or modify any edits under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts.
which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.\textsuperscript{36}

Carl Von Clausewitz

First, it is important to note that Clausewitz’ Trinity model is again, not so much a literal, undisputable representation as it is a mental construct to study a situation. There is considerable debate amongst historians about the relevance of the people, army and government model. Clausewitz’ stated Trinity speaks to forces prevalent in warfare, and the inevitable struggle, interaction and eventual balancing of those relationship forces.\textsuperscript{37}

Secondly the author did not utilize a drawing of the proposed model or to be more precise, either model. He simply described a relationship and in later times, a diagramed model is often used by professors to assist students with visualization of the concept.

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\textsuperscript{36} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 89.
\textsuperscript{38} Kracke, 9. Author’s note: This table is digitally reproduced from the referenced author’s
Lastly and arguably most importantly, the factors described below (his environment) affect Clausewitz’ presentation of this relationship will speak to its relevance in this discussion. The rich history of the time, both personal and environmental, that he experienced indelibly imprinted on his mind.

Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 and died in 1831. He served in the Prussian Army from 1792 until his death in 1831 except for a two year period between 1812 and 1815 where he joined the Russian Army in order to fight the French – which the Prussians chose not to do at that time. His father had served in the military until an injury forced him into work as a tax collector; work he hated. Clausewitz’ brothers also successfully served in the Prussian Army; Wilhelm, his eldest brother reached the rank of Major General while his next oldest, Fritz, rose to be a Lieutenant General.

At an age thought to be incredibly young by today’s standards, Clausewitz joined the Prussian Army when he 13 years old. Interestingly, he entered service at Potsdam – a place that would host another prominent gathering some 153 years later - the Potsdam Conference of 1945, at which the victorious Allied leaders (Truman, Churchill/Attlee, and Stalin) met to decide the future postwar Europe and Asia.

It is not unusual that Clausewitz’ very being was influenced by the world he lived in. As an Army officer, the best and worst of the impacts of men and their governments

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40 Ibid., 329.
42 Ibid., 222.
44 Parkinson, 22.
45 Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 19.
46 Parkinson, 19.
were indelibly imprinted on him and shown through in his writings. He was writing at a
time that Europe was recovering from the impact of the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{48}
Retrospectively the French Revolution began in 1789 and ended in 1799. However, at
the time, Clausewitz (and possibly many others of that era) did not separate periods
within the French Revolution or even Napoleonic periods after the Revolution. More
likely, he saw the actions of France as a detestable yet logical evolution that resulted from
the turbulence of the time.\textsuperscript{49} In the early 1820s he noted that Revolution came about for
two primary reasons. The first encompassed the abuse of peasants by the nobility and
general strained relations between the classes, and the second was the inefficiency of the
government.\textsuperscript{50}

The time period that Clausewitz operated in (and consequently wrote about) also
covered a change in the much of the methodology of warfare and functioning of the state.
As a thoughtful foot soldier he observed this first hand, much of it through his experience
in fighting against the French. “I grew up on the stage of great events, where the fate of
nations was decided.”\textsuperscript{51} Clausewitz’ experience in the brutality of war and his youthful
desire to seek out the so-called glamour of battle coexisted with his intellectual need to
place a framework of understanding as to why the action of war was undertaken.\textsuperscript{52}

As he continued to accrue wartime experience and the maturity of time, his
reflections took shape. He noted that ‘old war’ rules and geometry no longer had a place

\textsuperscript{48} Paret, \textit{Clausewitz and the State}, 21.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{50} Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel
\textsuperscript{51} Paret, \textit{Clausewitz and the State}, 34 (this is quoted from correspondence from Clausewitz to his wife
Marie of 9 Apr 1807).
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 34.
in military study. His concepts of passion, friction and chance replaced the ‘old thought’.  

Clausewitz’ central claim in his magnum opus, *On War*, is that warfare is a social undertaking. “War does not belong in the realm of arts and science; rather it is part of man’s social existence.” He further notes that we find the origination of war in politics.

Clausewitz’ interests and consequently writings were not solely dedicated to the warfare end of the spectrum of politics. While writing about politics is wholly out of the realm of current day expectations for American military officers, he wrote prolifically about the politics of the time also. Some of his writings seemed prepared for publication while others appear as notes or a diary of sorts and still others are letter conversations that he had.

So this Trinity that Clausewitz wrote about to describe the interactions of men and their institutions during war has defined that relationship for a large portion of the art of professional military study. That he did not address the Fourth Estate is somewhat perplexing, because the pamphleteers certainly existed during his time. His commentary on war as an extension of politics and further that the nature of war would change as the nature of politics changed is the best we will do in our search for the Clausewitzian stance. Obviously, the nature of politics has changed in that it has become (and arguably continues to become) more and more executed in the media.

So, as we have seen in Clausewitz’ background, he is a strong product of his environment. He was writing during the time of the French Revolution. Political discourse was ongoing regarding the degree of public involvement in political-military

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53 Parkinson, 312.
54 Clausewitz, 149.
decision making. The nation-states were able to field larger and more complex armies and hence many chose to pursue warfare closer to the total war (vice limited war) end of spectrum. In concert with a Clausewitzian point, day to day politics effected warfare less when the nature of that warfare was conducted on a larger scale. When the belligerents sought total defeat of each other, the political debate decreased under the pressure of the mobilization. Also the public sentiment held high possibly simply due to the threat against the survival of the state.

So while popular sentiment was increasing as an important source of military power and thus a limiter of that power, it was somewhat easier to raise with the threat to survival.

In our American case, our post World War conflicts were generally limited wars and therefore opened the flood gates for a greater degree (very likely appropriately so) of political debate over the conflicts and in a public sphere (media). As we see, the perceived threat to national survival was not as great.\textsuperscript{56}

This set of dynamics creates an opportunity for the American Fourth Estate to rise to a position not directly foreseen by Clausewitz. However indirectly, he clearly was aware of the potential for change in the relationships. If he were here today, he may just argue that his model remains correct because even with respect to the American Experiment, no one has removed the potential state versus state warfare, military peer competition and hence American total war.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 45.
Chapter 3

Review of the State of the Art

Doctrine - fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

Policy - a high-level overall plan embracing general goals and acceptable procedures

How DOD promulgates policy and doctrine
The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for tying joint doctrine to the national security strategy and describing the military’s role in the development and execution of national policy and strategy. This effort is done in several tiers by the various entities of the department.

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57 Joint Publication 1 - Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), I-1.
Figure 3-1 DOD Organization

The highest tier is the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) followed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Though not in a vertical chain of command, the Services and the Combatant Commanders follow. Here are the main players who will articulate policy, doctrine, and procedures for military interaction with the Fourth Estate.

Doctrine covering the interaction with the media is promulgated via Public Affairs (PA) policy and doctrinal publications. PA has several tentacles of which one involves the Fourth Estate specifically however the model is not limited to separate lanes and the Fourth Estate is involved in each. Those lanes are:

1. The internal audience – service members and their families. Supplying the internal audience with accurate and timely communication on the institution is vital to service member retention and morale.\(^{58}\)

2. The external audience – the prime avenue of the media. This audience is largely the American public and Congress. Again accurate and timely information is vital but for a different outcome. Free flow of information is a tenant of the American Democracy and anything less is not generally tolerated.\(^{59}\)

3. Community Relations – this area of the discipline is best summarized as the “good neighbor” policy. Activities range from civic action in the local community to processing noise complaints from the community.\(^{60}\)

Naturally, the Fourth Estate crosses all of these lanes but the focus here is the interaction aimed at the external audience.

\(^{58}\) Joint Publication 3-61 – Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), III-4. (Author’s Note: Further references will be notated as JP 3-61)

\(^{59}\) Ibid., III-3.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., III-5.
Beginning at the top, the SecDef is the principal defense policy advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DoD, and for the execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense. The principal staff element of the SecDef is known as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This staff does the yeoman’s work of policy development, conducting planning, managing resources, and evaluating programs. Typically this tier is the civilian control element of the DoD, though there are uniformed members assigned to OSD. This is the first tier of documented guidance on Fourth Estate interaction.

The vehicles used by the SecDef and OSD are collectively referred to as Department of Defense Issuances and include Department of Defense Directives (DoDD), Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI), Department of Defense Manuals (DoDM) and Directive-Type Memorandums (DTM). Primarily, the SecDef will establish policy, delegate authority, and assign responsibilities via DoDDs. These are typically short (eight pages or less) documents signed by the SecDef or his immediate assistant. These SecDef missives may apply to any element of the DoD for which he is responsible, though in this case, they apply to the OSD staff, military departments and CJCS.

Upon receiving authority and responsibility via the DoDD, the applicable OSD Component will then issue a DoDI that further assigns responsibilities and defines the authorities of subordinate officials or elements. The DoDI may also provide general procedures for carrying out that policy. In the case of the Fourth Estate interaction the
SecDef has issues a Directive DoDD 5400.13P and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has issued a DoDI 5400.14P.

The SecDef issued DoDD 5400.13P identifies the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) as the OSD component responsible for spearheading the Public Affairs effort and further directs the Services to train, equip and provide Public Affairs personnel to the Combatant Commanders when directed. Additionally the Combatant Commanders are directed to conduct public affairs activities, thereby eliminating any possibility that a subordinate element may decide to simply not participate with the Fourth Estate. Most notably the SecDef guidance adds, …” the Combatant Commanders shall grant the news media, both civilian and military, access to unclassified joint, combined, and unilateral operations, consistent with operations security and prevailing public affairs guidance (PAG). Concern over the personal safety of journalists shall not be a factor in deciding the degree of access.”

The ASD(PA) has in turn promulgated more specific guidance and procedures in the DoDI 5400.14P. Specifically ASD(PA) reiterated much of SecDef’s guidance but has added The DoD Principles of Information and the DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations for further edification. Also the procedures added in this issuance speak to one of the principle elements in the DoD – Fourth Estate relationship, that is a “ground up” planning effort (e.g. plan begins from the lowest unit and is forwarded via the chain of command to the to the highest; often for approval). This is referred to a Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and is submitted (as Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)) from the lowest applicable echelon. The prevailing thought in this

system is that those closest to the event will have the best assessment of how to articulate it. As is normally the case, the higher echelons will have veto authority if overriding concerns unknown to the submitters exist.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 added the responsibility for developing joint doctrine for employment of the United States military to the CJCS. The “Joint Staff” is the staff element that supports the CJCS in accomplishing his responsibilities. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. (The Marine Corps makes up about 20 percent of the total number allocated to the Navy.)

The CJCS publishes guidance for the services and combatant commands in the form of CJCS Instructions, CJCS Manuals, and CJCS Notices. Primarily CJCS Instructions will apply to those entities outside the Joint Staff (services, COCOMS etc). Joint Doctrine is published in Capstone and Keystone Publications, Joint Doctrine Publications and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures publications. The CJCS has distributed Joint Publication 3-61 “Public Affairs” establishing joint doctrine for interaction with the Fourth Estate.

Joint Publication 3-61 is essentially a compilation of the aforementioned guidance with a few notable additions. It is about 100 pages in length and is organized into four chapters with several appendices. In the first chapter that deals with mission doctrine, this publication offers sage advice for commanders in the form of five fundamentals:

(1) Tell the Truth.

(2) Provide Timely Information.

(3) Practice Security at the Source. (i.e. classified information should be protected at the source where the media may be exposed to it – vice expecting someone in the chain of command to intercede and ‘cleanse’ the media product of that information)

(4) Provide Consistent Information at All Levels. (i.e. this concept drives the actual execution of media interaction at the combatant commands which will be addressed later).

(5) Tell the DOD Story. (e.g. All members of DoD, military and civilian, are charged to help provide accurate information about the Department and its defense operations to the public. While specific personnel are designated to serve as official spokesmen.)

Additionally this document takes great pains to delineate the difference between Information Operations (IO) and Public Affairs, speaks to resourcing the PA effort and addresses some of the unique nuances of PA activities during Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations.\(^\text{64}\)

Information operations are defined as, the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.\(^\text{65}\) However, not all IO involves lying! So naturally, it comes to mind that this effort could well be executed via

\(^{64}\text{Major Tadd Sholtis, USAF. “Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success,” Air and Space Power Journal XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 98. Author’s Note: Major Sholtis was referring to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum titled “Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations and to JP-3-61.}\)

\(^{65}\text{Joint Publication 3 - 13 – Information Operations (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), GL-9.}\)
interaction with the Fourth Estate. This creates a dilemma for those operating in this environment and therefore the doctrine and guidance at all levels reiterates the mandate to avoid active use of the Fourth Estate in Information Operations.

However in actuality, the dilemma is primarily in the perception of media. As an example, if friendly forces were seeking to deter an adversary from attacking they could feed the press lies about friendly capabilities or intentions with the knowledge that the adversary would consume this and alter his actions. This would clearly violate the rules and hurt the overall effort by reducing credibility of friendly statements and increasing skepticism of the reasons for friendly actions. The key point here is that this would hurt the overall effort and would therefore be a poor choice for the military. Media interaction can and is complementary to IO though. In another perhaps more realistic example (using the same endstate of deterring an attack by an adversary) the IO tactic may be to broadcast radio messages to the adversary (via organic DoD hardware) on the futility of military operations against a superior military force. The supporting PA tactic could be to demonstrate friendly military resolve by promoting media coverage of the deployment of combat-capable forces to the region including significant (yet unclassified) background on specific capabilities resident with the forces.\footnote{Sholtis, 99.} So the issue of separation of IO from PA is largely a perception issue that has little bearing on the overall relationship between the military and the Fourth Estate especially given the context of Clausewitz’ Trinity. That certainly does not diminish the potential impact of souring the relationship, it merely means that there is in fact an overall objective of military involvement in situations and as such regardless of where the delineation of PA and IO exists, there will be similar ends with both.
The Military Departments

The Military Departments are the Departments of the Army, Air Force and Navy with the Marine Corps residing under the Department of the Navy. The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to Unified Combatant Commands. Part of that organize, train and equip mandate includes establishment of doctrine for employment of the forces. As such, each service has developed and promulgated doctrine (listed below) guiding interaction with the Fourth Estate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Doctrinal Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
<td>AFDD 2-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Army</td>
<td>FM 46-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
<td>MCWP 3-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Navy</td>
<td>SECNAVINST 5720.44B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3-2 Service Public Affairs Doctrine*
The United States Air Force addresses air and space doctrine in three different levels and/or depths. The highest level doctrine is referred to as Basic Doctrine and is published in a single Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD 1) that is also notes as 1 Series. This most primary publication describes the basic properties of air and space power and provides the airman’s perspective on the proper use of that power. Next the Operational Doctrine is addressed in 2 Series with AFDDs and Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTPs). Operational doctrine describes the best organization and employment of air and space forces with respect to objectives and operational environments. Lastly Tactical Doctrine is articulated in the 3 Series via Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTPs). This level of doctrine details Air Force employment solutions to specific tactical objectives under various conditions and
The Air Force has articulated doctrine for interaction with the Fourth Estate in AFDD 2-5.3 Public Affairs Operations. Interestingly, AFDD 2-5.3 is a sub document to AFDD 2-5 Information Operations. Accompanying Public Affairs are AFDD 2-5.1 Electronic Warfare and AFDD 2-5.2 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations. This organizational construct best articulates the unique outlook that the Air Force views in the media relations realm. Simply put, the Air Force embraces the commonality between IO and PA and speaks to the similarities, where as the Joint Publication 3-61 emphasizes the differences. It states that PA operations are an integral military capability of both informational flexible deterrent options (IFDO) and IO. IFDOs are a wide range of scaled responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions tailored to produce a desired effect. The planning construct for IFDO is the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model of available national powers routinely included in the joint operation plans.

AFDD 2-5.3 opens with the reiteration of higher doctrine to include addressing the IO – PA relationship in similar terms to JP 3-61. But it quickly departs from that line of thought and enters into a description of global information environment (GIE). This GIE is a combination of all individuals, organizations, and/or systems that collect, process, and distribute information. These actions in the GIE are likely to directly affect military operations and therefore the 2-5.3 suggests that the Fourth Estate is the key actor in the GIE. Additionally, it suggests that the public’s voracious appetite for information presents an opportunity for the Air Force to satiate that need with information that will facilitate Air Force ends. This sets the stage for the full chapter treatment given to the PA interplay with IO and its subsets of counterpropaganda and psychological operations.
The PA effort is seen as able to influence the information environment’s effect on military operations. The Air Force primary tasking in that realm is that PA is the lead for counterpropaganda in the public information environment by countering adversary propaganda and maintaining public support and trust for US military operations. Psychological Operations are seen to support PA in this effort and the ethics of crossing the two are articulated in order to keep the trust and confidence of the public and the media.

Lastly for the AFDD 2-5.3, there are several references to the PA effort in maintaining public will for national involvement in combat. This suggestion will be addressed later in this paper.

![Army Doctrine Hierarchy](3-4 Army Doctrine Hierarchy)
The United States Army’s hierarchy for doctrine is organized into two tiers (I and II). Tier I contains the Capstone and Keystone documents while Tier II contains all other documents. Field Manual (FM)-1 The Army and FM 3-0 Operations are the two Capstone FMs that link Army doctrine with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The remaining members of Tier I are the Keystone documents that offer broad perspectives on Army operations in Joint campaigns.

Tier II contains lower-level organizational FMs that are narrower in scope than Tier 1 FMs, and address subjects in varying levels of detail, depending on the subject, type of force and echelon.

The Army’s PA doctrine is embedded in FM 46-1 Public Affairs Operations which is a Tier I Keystone document. This 1997 document is approximately 80 pages in length and is supplemented by a Tactics, Techniques and Procedures publication entitled FM 36.1.

The Army begins with an estimate of the situation with respect to global rapid change as a norm to be considered. Then they frame the overall context as it relates to the Army and its success in peace and battle. The principles of PA are also placed under the context of the principles of war which is helpful for ground oriented warriors.

The Army focuses place PA in a large overall comprehensive construct. Beginning with the precursor concepts of Information Warfare and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) they have articulated PA as a subset of Information Operations as a part of a set that includes C2W, Civil Affairs, and PA.\footnote{Author’s note. The IO discipline emerged from earlier concepts such as "Command & Control Warfare" and "Information Warfare". These originated in the 1990s and considered lessons learned from the Gulf War such as the "CNN Effect". The FM 100-6 is a 1997 document and that likely explains the reference to these ‘dated’ concept titles.} These are interrelated
Information Operations conducted to support the objective of achieving information dominance.

**Figure 3-5 Marine Corps Doctrine Hierarchy**

The Marine Corps as the smallest of the armed services and arguably the most paranoid, has for years felt the need to advertise itself to the American public and especially the Congress in order to avoid being eviscerated or wholly eliminated. The infamous Joe Rosenthal picture of the flag raising on Mount Suribachi has taken a place in history and catapulted the Corps into a very successful public affairs outfit.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs) are high order doctrinal publications that are divided into Capstone and Keystone Publications. There are four Capstone Pubs (MCDP 1, 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3) and they contain the fundamental and enduring beliefs of warfighting held by the Marine Corps. Keystone Publications
activities (MCDP 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) serve as the guiding doctrine for the conduct of major warfighting.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs) have a narrower focus detailing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by the Marine Corps in the prosecution of war and other assigned tasks while Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs) contain general reference and historical materials.

The Corps places its PA doctrine in operational doctrine as MCWP 3-33.3. This is a 2000 document that is 106 very small pages and reads more like a commander’s guide than the other services’ publications. The four chapters address the information environment, PA policies and principles, commander responsibilities and approach and most notably a dedicated chapter to the Fourth Estate (titled “The News Media).

The effort to educate readers on the Fourth Estate describes the evolution of the media’s coverage of military matters beginning with World War II and on through the Marine involvement in Somolia. Next the chapter delves into the needs and motivators of the media. Guidelines for Commanders to consider follow this introductory material. The framework is much like the Air Force from the perspective that this relationship is an opportunity to advance the Marine Corps’ mission. Overall the Marine Corps doctrine takes lessons learned from Desert Storm where the Corps was aggressive at hosting Fourth Estate members and was rewarded for this in the viewers’ eyes. It is also instructive that the Corps has historically enjoyed great success in peace time by telling “the Marine Corps Story” thereby keeping a positive image of the Corps in high esteem amongst policy makers and the public at large. It is almost a natural transference to place

68 Author’s Note. The Marine Corps as a part of the Department of the Navy is also subject to the guidance contained in SECNAVINST 5270.44B. In one of many inconsistencies between the Services, the operational Navy has not yet written a doctrinal Public Affairs publication per se.
those same values into the combat environment to effectively continue the self-preservation effort and to reap the combat advantage that all services seek in conflict.

![Navy Doctrine Hierarchy](image)

**Figure 3-6 Navy Doctrine Hierarchy**

Unlike the other Services, the U.S. Navy has not yet published a traditional doctrinal publication solely on PA. However they have addressed PA in several other venues and intend to publish a stand alone doctrinal PA document in the future. This doctrine will likely be placed with other Operational Doctrine in the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) family.

The Department of the Navy has two military services, the Navy and the Marine Corps which can result in different execution of doctrinal matters. The Secretary publishes department wide guidance and policy via Secretary of the Navy Instructions (SECNAVINST) or Notices. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) articulates execution
of that guidance by publishing Operational Navy Instructions (OPNAVINST) or and the Commandant of the Marine Corps publishes his articulation via Marine Corps Orders (MCO). Doctrine for the Navy resides in Naval Warfare Publications and as previously mentioned the Corps uses MCDPs.

The only PA specific publication for use by Naval personnel is SECNAVINST 5270.44B Department Of The Navy Public Affairs Policy And Regulations. PA is addressed in several other doctrinal publications as relates to the PA effect on that particular discipline. Notably, the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-13 Navy Information Operations directly addresses PA,

“PA plays a large role in supporting IO in all operations. A commander can utilize PA to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information to a real or potential adversary. IO coordination with PA may include ensuring critical information protection for a certain period of time in order to minimize the risk to friendly forces, or countering adversary Propaganda.”

However SECNAVINST 5270.44B proves to be a voluminous and authoritative document that guides all of the Naval service and provides sufficient information to obviate the need for the standalone doctrinal publication. This 120 (full sized) page document has 12 chapters covering the gamut of policy related PA topics such as community relations procedures, print, visual and broadcast products, crisis communications, information release policies and a short chapter on public affairs in military operations.

There are two sections listed of note to this topic area. First is “Understanding and Analyzing the Media”, and secondly, “Managing Media Relations.” These sections are promulgated separately from the Instruction as “Supplemental Guidance."

The first supplement on understanding and analyzing is a one page long very general overview of the types of media, possible responses to inaccurate reporting and some other brief nuances of the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) relations with the media. The second supplement is a slightly more in depth primer on issues such as attribution, ground rules, operational security and rules of first inquiry etc. Both of these sections are very short but offer some view of the institution of the Fourth Estate.

Otherwise, the tenor of the Instruction is that of policy guidance vice a doctrinal context. It addresses the policies and procedures as extrapolated from higher guidance, deals with tactics and techniques for crisis communications (focused on peace time accidents etc), and administration of the PA effort. There is chapter dedicated to PA in military affairs though its main thrust is on resourcing the PA effort. It also addresses embedding media personnel with military units and has a robust section on the IO and PA relationship. Here the Navy separates from the other services somewhat by delineating more aggressive separation between the two. “PA activity is separate from IO activity. It is neither combined with nor subordinate to IO activity.”

The Unified Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them. They have military forces assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense to accomplish specific directed missions. Unlike the services, the COCOMs do not promulgate doctrine, they execute it. They have two primary venues to provide media interaction guidance to those
assigned military forces. The primary means is to include in operations plans an annex that establishes public affairs guidance and organizations and structures for specific scenarios. Secondarily and less frequently they publish local orders and guidance separate from the operations orders.

The greatest PA effort put forth by the COCOMs is the ongoing day to day interaction with the Fourth Estate. They are charged to develop and submit to the Joint Staff, operational public affairs policy that recommends the policy approach (active or passive) and they routinely establish Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs) to serve as focal points of interface between the joint forces and the news media. Those JIBs are staffed by personnel sourced from the services who are at the front line of implementing the command’s guidance. Hence, the COCOM is in the day to day business of execution and not a source for doctrine or study of the Fourth Estate.

Two prevalent themes emerge from the review of the Joint and Service Doctrine. The first is the relation of the PA effort to the IO effort and the second is consideration of the Fourth Estate in the documentation.

While all services and the CJCS address the obvious relationship between PA and IO, each applies its own flavor to that discussion. JP 3-61 and the Navy apply considerable effort to iterate the distance between the two while AFDD 3-61 embraces the commonality and encourages very close coordination. The Army takes a comprehensive view and acknowledges the interdependence of all information activities while steering clear of encouraging PA and IO collusion. The Marine Corps’ treatment is similar to the Army’s with a description of the Global and Military Information
Environments and a description of the PA effort in that context and no significant grand
standing on the separation of two.

Second, and most related to this thesis, is the general neglect of a discussion on
the Fourth Estate as an entity. The Marine Corps is the only service to offer commentary
on what the Fourth Estate is and what motivators tend to affect its actions.

If there is negligible writing in doctrinal material on the make up of the Fourth
Estate, then the other source that should reflect the importance of this entity would be the
training programs of instruction.

How does the Military Train to the Doctrine

"Experience is a hard teacher because she gives the test first, the lesson
afterward."

-- Vernon Law

Training and education in DoD is embodied in the overall category of

Professional Military Education (PME). The responsibility for training military
personnel in DoD is specified in United States Code, Title 10 as a task to each of the
service secretaries.\textsuperscript{70} The CJCS also has Title 10 tasking for coordinating military officer
training policy and he promulgates that in CJCSI 1800.01C.\textsuperscript{71} The division of labor in
this relationship generally results with the services conducting the majority of training
and the CJCS imposing guidelines over officer training that will ensure an officer corps
able to excel in joint warfighting. The National Defense University (NDU) system is the

\textsuperscript{70} United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 303, Section 3013, Chapter 503, Section 5013, Chapter 803,
\textsuperscript{71} United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 5, Section 153(a)(5)(C),
only PME school not owned by a service. NDU acts directly under the authority and direction of the SecDef.\textsuperscript{72}

The PME concept for DoD officers is viewed as a continuum with five military educational levels aligned the five significant phases of an officer’s career. Those levels and phases are:

(1) Precommissioning. Entry level training and education received while potential officers are in college.

(2) Primary. Training and education typically focused preparing junior officers to serve in their assigned military specialty. This curriculum is primarily Service oriented and addressed at the tactical level of war to officers from 0-1 to 0-3.

(3) Intermediate. Training and education typically focused at officers in the grade O-4. This operational level of war is taught here along with introductions to strategy and joint warfare.

(4) Senior. Training and education typically focused at officers in the grades O-5 or O-6. Strategic leadership and campaign planning is addressed at this level.

(5) General/Flag Officer. Training and education for officers from 0-7 through 0-10. High level joint, multinational and interagency training and education takes place at this levels.\textsuperscript{73}

In order to investigate the study of military interaction with the Fourth Estate, the training and education focus will be on those levels of officers who will reasonably do the planning of such operations. This includes the Intermediate and Senior levels

\textsuperscript{72} United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 108, Section 2162, \texttt{http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_10.shtml}. Author’s note: The statute also adds, “with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff…”

\textsuperscript{73} Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP,) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01C (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), A-A-2-A-A-4.
mentioned above. Listed below are the schools we will review along with the school’s sponsor and those personnel eligible to attend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Eligible Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>0-4, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War College (AWC)</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Command and General Staff College (ACGSC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>0-4, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College (USAWC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC)</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
<td>0-4, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) at the Naval War College</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>0-4, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Naval Warfare (CNW) at the Naval War College</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War College (NWC)</td>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)</td>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at the JFSC</td>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>0-4, 0-5, 0-6, U.S. Gov Civilian Equivalents</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-7 DOD Officer Professional Military EducationVenues

It is worthy to preface this review of the aforementioned schools with several data points. First, attendance at resident professional military education by officers is not mandated in law as a requirement for advancement. Nor is completion of the correspondence versions of these courses. Statute actually precludes the service secretary from mandating these (or anything else not expressly directed by the Congress) for
advancement. However, the reality is that competitiveness amongst the officers makes promotion very difficult without completion of the requisite education.

Responding to instances of unacceptable joint military performance (such as the Desert One Rescue attempt and the invasion of Grenada), the Congress has, however, written into law that officers must have joint service and joint education in order to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General (0-7) or Rear Admiral (0-7). Tying the education to the experience is a new requirement (National Defense Authorization Act 2007), while the joint experience requirement was implemented with the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

In a related effort, the Congress directed the SECDEF to establish criteria to certify the service schools to meet the joint education requirement. This resulting impact is that there is a further standardizing of the curriculum that mandates the joint nature of the training which is the intent of the Congress.

Also, it is worthy to note that there are a few other international schools that this population of officers can attend and meet their PME requirements. The total population of U.S officers attending these schools is small and the U.S. cannot impact the curriculum in a meaningful manner therefore these schools are not part of the sampling for this chapter. In addition to the international schools, there are a few other programs that will

count towards this PME requirement. Again, this is a small population and these schools are not considered here either.

Air Force Officer PME

The U. S. Air Force’s Officer PME programs are delivered from the Air University located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This institution began in 1946 and now delivers the full spectrum of Air Force education, for officers and enlisted Airmen including accredited degree programs. Their Command and Staff Program is the Intermediate level course that is focused on teaching the skills necessary to conduct joint air and space operations in support of a Combatant Commander’s campaign. While their Air War College is the Senior level course that aims toward coalition warfighting and national security issues, with emphasis on the effective employment of aerospace forces in joint and combined combat operations. Both of these schools are one year in duration when taken in residence. Correspondence versions of the course have various deadline for completion.76

The Air Force Command and Staff College offers an elective course that deals with the Fourth Estate/Military relationship. This elective is titled, “The War for Public Opinion: Public Information, Propaganda and the Military-Media Relationship,” and entails 31 classroom hours and requires a 20-25 page independent research paper.77 The theme of this offering is summed up with the following quote from the syllabus:

**Thesis and Scope:** This course treats public opinion as shaped by the media as a strategic center of gravity. The historical and current case study approach aims to provide the students with some working hypotheses by which they may evaluate the relationships and tensions between the military,

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the media, and the national will of a population as well as examine perceive tactical events that have had strategic communication implications.

There are approximately 15 seats available in this elective and it is taught once per year for the students attending Air Command and Staff College. This elective course directly addresses the media as an institution and seeks to provide the student with a well rounded understanding of those who make up the institution and their motivators.

The Air War College also has an elective offering in this genre, however the focus isn’t as pointed towards the Fourth Estate as was the Air Command and Staff College elective. Air War College’s elective is titled, “Communicating for Effect: Winning in the Information Battlespace.” This is a 15 session elective that requires a book report and final exam for evaluation. From its course description quote below we see the warfare focus of this course.

This elective provides a broad-brushed approach to how strategic communication operations, specifically Public Affairs, contribute to exploitation of the information environment in successful military operations.

There are approximately 15 seats available in this elective and it is taught once per year for the students attending Air War College. This elective course focuses the student on the spectrum of information warfare and guides the practicalities and legalities of military interaction with the Fourth Estate with respect to activities in the venue.

Army Officer PME

78 Ibid., 2.
80 Ibid., 1.
Next we will examine the U. S. Army’s efforts. The Command and General Staff College contains several entities of which we are concerned with the Command and General Staff School which is the Intermediate level course that educates and trains “Army Officers, International Officers, Sister Service Officers and Interagency leaders”81 to operate in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments in support of Combatant Commanders’ campaign plans. The Army Command and General Staff College is located in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas while their War College is located in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.82

The Army War College is the Army’s Senior level course that prepares military, civilian, and international to employ landpower in a “joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment…with and aims toward coalition warfighting.”83 Both of these schools are one year in duration when taken in residence. Correspondence versions of the course have various deadlines for completion.

The Command and General Staff School is aggressive on exposing the students to media issues. They have built the following into their core curriculum:

- There are two lessons (~2 hours each) on media and the military which require the student to prepare for and conduct a media interview which is critiqued by faculty,
- All students are required to be interviewed by actual media, or speak to a public group,

82 Ibid.
- Media players are injected into all exercises and conduct interviews and publish their stories on internal TV and newspapers. Each encounter is critiqued by faculty.

- Lastly, the school has a working professional journalist on contract as a senior media mentor. He addresses every class on media and the military, advises on curriculum, and chairs a panel of selected notable media for Q&A with the entire class.84

Additionally, this school offers two (24 hour) electives specifically addressing the media. The first “Media Operations for the JTF Commander” is taught in house and seeks to provide the students with the necessary tools to successfully plan for and conduct media operations for a Joint Task Force (JTF). This course requires the student to complete a final project that could be either presentation to the class of an approved research project or participation in a media interview or press conference.85 If you consider training and education as a continuum, this elective sits more towards the training end of the spectrum with a noble goal of vesting the student with capabilities to execute media operations for a JTF.

The second elective is titled “Military and the Media, Bridging the Gap” and is a joint elective taught at the University of Kansas Journalism School. This course is very notable in that it commingles advanced journalism students with military Command and Staff School students in order that each will better understand the others organization.

From the Course Description we see:

85 Media Operations for the Joint Task Force Commander and Staff, Instructor Stephen Kerrick, Course Syllabus - Course Number: A 751 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 1.
This course provides students perspectives necessary to understand competing professional requirements and successfully plan for media-military events through exploration of the following:

(1) Frank and open discussions regarding requirements, expectations, organization, culture and anticipated future interactions between the two professions.

(2) An appreciation of the issues surrounding the primary requirement to keep the American people and the world public informed of military affairs.

(3) The challenges associated with journalists assigned to military operations.

(4) Case studies and practical exercises where journalists participate as embedded media and prepare actual personal interest stories.

(5) Military officers will gain advanced insights into preparing both oral and written communications to clearly focus their themes and messages to keep the public informed.

This elective, albeit small in scale, is clearly a stellar achievement in an effort to educate DoD personnel on the Fourth Estate as an institution. The chosen vehicle adds the benefit of exposing prospective media members to military officers also which will impact their future attitudes as well.

**Navy Officer PME**

The Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island is home for the U.S. Navy’s Intermediate and Senior officer PME. This College opened its doors 1884 and now provides education programs designed to build trust and confidence amongst joint service, international military officers, and U.S. Government officials and to instill operationally and strategically thinking and proficiency in order to ensure success on the battlefields of today and tomorrow. The College of Naval Warfare is the Senior Level school and provides students with “executive-level preparation for higher responsibilities.”

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86 Military and the Media: Bridging the Gap, Instructors Stephen Kerrick and Dr. Tom Volek, Course Syllabus - Course Number: A 752 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 1. Author’s Note: This is a joint class developed and taught with the William Allen White School of Journalism at the University of Kansas. Mr. Kerrick is a staff member of the Command and Staff College while Dr. Volek is a member of the University of Kansas staff.


88 “College of Naval Warfare,” Naval War College,
provides the initial level professional military education offered by the Navy. Both of these schools are one year in duration when taken in residence. Correspondence versions of the course have various deadlines for completion.

The College of Naval Warfare joins with the Naval Command and Staff College to offer an elective course on the Fourth Estate. The Course Description (below) reflects a holistic approach that seeks to provide the student with background on who the media is and tools to successfully interact with the media. There are eight lessons in this elective.

A. Course Description. This course will provide students with an in-depth understanding of the workings of the media today and its role in shaping public opinion surrounding the military. The course traces the evolution of the relationship between the military and the media from the perspective of journalists. The focus of the course will be on fostering an understanding of the “media mindset” and how to best use that understanding to build relationships and achieve balanced fair stories. Key areas of study will be successful messaging, strategies for handling the media in crisis situations, and on camera techniques. The course will additionally explore the existence and implications of bias in the media.

This course also takes the students into the field to visit newsrooms and brings in professional journalists for question and answer sessions. After the initial lecture session that addresses the Fourth Estate as an institution the course settles in to allow the students practice in handling crisis events. There are numerous “on air” interviews that are critiqued and the students prepare a plan to deal with the media and present that the class.

Marine Corps Officer PME

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90 Military and the Media: A Practitioner’s Perspective, Instructor, Dyana Koelsch, Course Syllabus (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2007), 1.
The Crossroads of the Corps\textsuperscript{91} is located in Quantico, Virginia. This is where the Marine Corps University is located; an institution whose roots hearken back to 1891 when the School of Application was established as the first resident school for Marine Corps officers. Officially the University was established in 1989 in an effort to place all existing education efforts under one command for efficiency and effectiveness. From the Marine Corps University Strategic Plan Purpose we see a concise statement of the intent held by the university.

\textbf{Statement of Purpose.} As the Marine Corps’ proponent for PME, MCU develops the professional competence of Marines and other leaders. The University’s curricula focus on the development of leadership, warfighting, and staff operations skills. Graduates are prepared to perform in appropriate service, joint, interagency and multinational environments at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.\textsuperscript{92}

The Marine Corps War College and the Command and Staff College place Fourth Estate education in the core curriculum. Both schools follow a similar program that consists of one day of lectures and a follow up day of panel discussions with professional journalists and military public affairs personnel. Additionally, students will conduct mock interviews (for later critique) at various times throughout the school year. The syllabus succinctly articulates the goal with the following statements taken from the Introduction portion of the class syllabus:

….. More importantly, the military must understand how to work with the media to benefit their mission – it must be integrated as a weapon in their arsenal – not one that is used against them. Public affairs play a crucial role in bridging the knowledge gap, especially as we enter an era when fewer Americans (including elected officials) have military expertise….. Lastly,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Author’s Note: “Crossroads of the Corps” is an informal nickname for the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. This is noted on signs at the base entrances and simply refers to the notion that all Marines will move through Quantico or be impacted by work done there.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Marine Corps University Strategic Plan (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2007), 2, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/mission\_vision/MCU\_StrategicPlan\_signed%20070831.pdf (accessed January 27, 2008).
\end{itemize}
during this block of instruction, students will explore and discuss the overall relationship between the military and the media. While the perception of the media among most military officers today continues to be somewhat negative, the overall relationship has generally improved since the Vietnam War era…  

Secretary of Defense Sponsored Schools

In 1976, The National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) were brought together to form the National Defense University (NDU). In 1981 the Armed Forces Staff College, now known as the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) joined the NDU. There are several other schools under the NDU umbrella but these three remain the bedrock Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and operate under the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The NWC was formed in 1946 and "is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources necessary to implement that strategy..." It is located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. and is a full year, master’s level program.

Also at Fort McNair is the ICAF which holds it origin from 1924 and the Army Industrial College. In the aftermath of the mobilization challenges America faced during World War I, the Army Industrial College was formed to focus on wartime procurement and mobilization procedures. In 1946, the college was moved to its current location and reflagged as a Joint institution under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ICAF is a full year, master’s level program that continues the original study theme of education

93 Art of Command VI: Media Operations – the Dual Edged Sword, Course Syllabus (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2004), 6.
officers to evaluate, marshal, and manage resources in the execution of national strategy.\textsuperscript{95}

NDU’s newest member of the full year, master’s level officer PME is in Norfolk, VA at the Joint Forces Staff College. The Staff College got its start as an institution focused on training staff officers in the art of joint planning. Since its inception the roles have opened and most notably included the 2004 introduction of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). From the vision statements we see that preparation of planners or staff officers remains the focus in this course also.

“JAWS is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and Combatant commands with officers expert in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations.”\textsuperscript{96}

The NWC and ICAF share an electives system which, with one minor exception, is where the study of the Fourth Estates resides in their curriculum. The ICAF has a part of their core curriculum that conducts study on industry. A student could select an element of the Fourth Estate for that portion of the study. JAWS’ location precludes sharing of electives with its sister courses, and neither places Fourth Estate study in the core or elective curriculum. Some media topicality however, does appear in the JAWS Information Operations course work.

NDU at Fort McNair has two principle electives (available to students of NWC and ICAF) that offer study of the Fourth Estate. The first is titled 6020 The News Media and is a twelve session (two hours per session) elective under the National Defense University Special Offerings electives block that requires the student to produce one paper on a topic assigned by the professor. The sessions begin with a constitutional

baseline and then delve into journalists of particular medium and journalistic culture. The course then shifts to studying the manner which the services tackle the Fourth Estate and concludes with interviewing skills. There are approximately 15 seats for each session of this annually scheduled elective.\(^97\)

The second elective is 5326 Lines of Battle: Media, the Military and War and it is offered annually as a part of the NWC’s National Security Decision-Making (NSDM) block of electives. This is a 12 session elective with each session lasting two hours. The students are required to study a military conflict (from a list provided by the instructor) and present a short oral discussion on the media and military relationship impacts of that event. Also the students must write a short paper on another media/military topic of their choosing.

This course addresses the “uneasy but necessary alliance between the military and the media, especially during war.”\(^98\) The instructor takes the students on a comprehensive march addressing the role of the media in shaping public opinion and government action then moving to a historical perspective of war correspondence.

Of note, the course delves into the media as an institution. From the second of the four listed focus areas of the course we see:

2. Changes in Media, Changes in War. How do American media work? Who are these journalists? What is their culture and how do they define their role in American life? How is the national security story covered? How is the Internet changing journalism? How are changes in the nature of war making war correspondence more dangerous and more vital?\(^99\)

\(^99\) Ibid., vi.
There are typically 15 seats available in this course. As of this writing (early 2008) this course is taught by a published author with experience as a journalist, documentary producer and a Department of State Foreign Service Officer; making a unique match of experiences to provide insight to military students.
Chapter 4

Case Studies of Media influence on military operations

“For a politician to complain about the press is like a ship's captain complaining about the sea”

*Enoch Powell*

Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s types of military operations

In this chapter we will look at three case studies of American military action and the Fourth Estate’s impact on that action. This effort is wholly focused on viewing that there is an impact vice an assessment of the qualitative and or quantitative nature of such impact.

There are numerous defined types of military operations that have been written about over time. To ensure we have not overly focused on a particular genre of military actions, we will pick actions that align with the different definitions that Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s defined in his treatise, *The Art of War*.

Baron Jomini was born in 1779 to a modest family in Switzerland. He was well educated as his family was one that placed high value on his schooling. Like others of his time, the French Revolution stirred his interest in soldiering, and his intention was to

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enter a military academy at age 12. His family’s circumstances precluded their ability to purchase him a commission in the Swiss Regiment.

A somewhat reluctant Jomini was then sent to business school, and by his 16th year had gained employment in the financial industry and was on his way to a fruitful career in finance. He later recalled that the French Army successes of 1796 and 1797 under General Bonaparte greatly stoked his interest in military theory.

However the 1798 French invasion of Switzerland (at the behest of French-speaking factions in Vaud intent on ending their “feudal” relationship with Berne) and the subsequent Swiss Revolution, provided the catalyst for Jomini to leave the finance industry and pursue the art of soldiering. This vocation change lasted until his death some 70 years later in 1869.

Jomini parlayed his knowledge and experience of the finance and business arena to a position with the Swiss War office (of the Helvetica Republic) where he reorganized the ministry, standardized procedures, and experimented with organizational systems and strategies.

An alleged request from Jomini for a bribe from a contractor landed him back in the civilian workforce in 1801 and a subsequent (1804) request by him to Napoleon seeking French annexing of Switzerland got him tossed out of the country.

In 1803, Marshall Ney had become aware of Jomini’s writings and funded his publication. The first volume of *Treatise on Grand Military Operations* was in fact

103 Encyclopedia of World Biography: Jomini, Antoine Henri (1779-1869).
104 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 146.
107 Encyclopedia of World Biography: Jomini, Antoine Henri (1779-1869).
published in 1804, and Ney brought Jomini onto his staff in 1805. He continued his service to Ney until 1813 where tumult caught up with him. He was forced from French service by others angered with his arrogant attitude and the preferential treatment he had received. Jomini was humiliated and switched allegiances, leaving France, and joining the Russian Army. He retired from active soldiering to Brussels in 1836 where he continued writing and consulting.

The fruits of Jomini’s labors are many – he authored some 25 major military works in his life. Arguably, his writing is easier for the reader to follow than that of Clausewitz as he forms his arguments in an ‘easier to read’ prose. This is the case in his Chapter One Articles of The Art of War. He first defines the “art of war” then places it in the context of statesmen and finally presents the various types of war in the articles of the chapter.

CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.

ART. I.—Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.
ART. II.—Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a Military View.
ART. III.—Wars of Expediency.
ART. IV.—Wars with or without Allies.
ART. V.—Wars of Intervention.
ART. VI.—Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other Causes.
ART. VII.—Wars of Opinion.
ART. VIII.—National Wars.
ART. IX.—Civil and Religious Wars.
ART. X.—Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.

110 Ibid.
111 Author’s note: The logical response to this suggestion is that Clausewitz’ “On War” was not prepared for publication and therefore cannot meet the same readability standards. The point made for this discussion is simply the bottom line reality, today, for the reader of each work. Of course, Jomini made the same points when he was alive also.
Jomini identifies ten types of wars (noted above) that states may involve themselves in and discusses the merits and challenges of each. For the purpose of this thesis discussion, the focus will remain on articles seven through nine (Wars of Opinion, National Wars, and Civil and Religious Wars).

The impact of the Fourth Estate on the various types of war is unique. The impact is real and other factors can additively form synergy, but a look at each kind of war articulated by Jomini will reveal the notable differences.

“Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.”

Wars of opinion may be internal to the state, internal and external to the state or exclusively external with no linkage to the state. Jomini notes that wars of opinion originate in dogma and that makes them the most “deplorable" because the dogma will elicit the most extreme passions amongst the belligerents. He further adds that the dogma can in fact be an ally to the state by garnering popular support.112

National wars deal with the attack on a state (referred to as invasion) when all of the populace understand that their state and way of life is in danger of being destroyed and therefore the people oppose the belligerents with a vengeance. Jomini cautions that the ‘national war’ he refers to is much more than simple response to orders (e.g. in defense of the nation) – this is truly a fight or die mood for the populace.113

Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion are grouped together based on their occurrence inside a state. “Intestine wars” or internal wars generally occur in a state where there is

113 Ibid., 29.
conflict over politics or religion. On occasion though, the conflict is stimulated by an outside source. Baron Jomini cautions that religious wars are above all the most deplorable, and history has proven him correct on this assertion.\textsuperscript{114}

From Jomini’s categories we will briefly examine the media and the American involvement in Vietnam. More specifically we will focus on the media during the Tet Offensive which occurred in 1968. The United States experience in Vietnam falls into Jomini’s class of wars of “intervention.” Next we will look at the media during World War II followed by a view of the American Civil War and media involvement.

\textbf{American Civil War}

"Had there been no slavery, there would have been no war."

\textsuperscript{115} Sydney E. Ahlstrom

The American Civil War had at its roots an inhumane, immoral method of building an economic livelihood for the American South - Slavery. However to suggest that slavery was the single cause would be wrong at worst and an oversimplification at best. Nations go to war for complex reasons and an internal war may have multiple layers of complexity woven into the causal factors.

Prior to the outbreak of the War Between the States, there had been and ongoing debate on the role of the federal government. There were two primary opposing views (with numerous variations) on this issue. Federalists believed that the federal government needed to maintain a strong and vigorous power in order to insure the survival of the union. Anti-federalists believed that the key to the new nation’s strength

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 35.
would be a power balance favoring the states within the new nation. This struggle will surface as additional fuel for the impending Civil War.

The Southern states economic vitality garnered a tremendous boost in 1793 when Eli Whitney invented the Cotton Gin. This increased efficiency by reducing the time required to separate seeds from raw cotton. This gain in efficiency increased profitability of that crop and served to increase in the number of farmers dedicating land to growing cotton. This profitability grew the industry and need for a large quantities of cheap labor - slaves. Thus, the southern economy became dependent on slavery to keep the cotton crop profitable. If that system was to be pushed out of balance, (e.g. by replacing slave labor with competitively paid labor) the southern socio-economic was at risk of collapse.

The Northern states’ economy was based more on industry than agriculture. Some of that industry actually used raw cotton from the south to produce finished goods. This was not sufficient reasoning in the abolitionists minds to support the morally repugnant practice of slavery. Also the north’s economic attitudes were shaped by city life and a society that evolved with people of different cultures and classes working and living closer together which was very dissimilar to the southern experience.116

This struggle between Federal and state power combined with economic survival (of the south) and the moral sense of the North culminated with the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as the 16th President of the United States in 1861. South Carolina was the first to act when it saw Lincoln’s impending presidency. They viewed Lincoln as an anti-slavery and pro Northern interests President and issued a “Declaration of the Causes of Secession” which was effectively a declaration of independence. Other southern states

followed quickly and the newly minted President now had a country to rescue and reunite vice to simply lead. Within two months the federal garrison at Fort Sumner was attacked by Confederates and the American Civil War had begun.

This conflict created an insatiable appetite for news by the populace. The Northern newspapers benefited more with a vastly expanding circulation and accompanying advertising. This provided financial capacity to support around 500 journalists to cover the war. Some 150 of those covered the war from the field with the soldiers. Additionally, the telegraph added a technological advance that permitted reporting from the battlefield with timeliness never before experienced.

The Southern press did not fare as well during this time. They did not have resources to invest in the coverage and the Confederate military was even less gracious in hosting reporters than was the North.

On total however, during the Civil War era, literate Americans had a greater choice of newspapers (daily and weeklies) than did the citizens of any other nation. The large market also kept the issue prices down. The market was full of party political sheets; highly partisan publications typically owned by the various political parties. There were independent, non-aligned papers and they were growing in number and influence but the staple of the American reader remained the partisan newspaper.

With the situation and players set we will now look at an example of the interaction of these players.

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118 Aukofer and Lawrence, 36.
119 Ibid., 37.
120 Carwardine, 4.
President Lincoln clearly understood the influence and power of the Fourth Estate. His previous Senate campaigns pitted him against a democratic opponent and the press entities aligned against him. Upon his taking office as the President some years later, and facing a fractured Union, he made a wise choice in hiring two personal secretaries, John George Nicolay and John Milton Hay. Nicolay had excelled in the Fourth Estate working as an newspaper editor and Hay (who served as Nicolay’s assistant) was adapt at writing and repartee. With the wisdom and the tools, President Lincoln set out to further his agenda by influencing and using the media as a tool in his kit bag. While Lincoln held no great affection towards the press, he pursued an inclusive approach to use the press from as many angles as he could.  

Unfortunately, Lincoln was unable to influence all of his generals to take his comprehensive and inclusive approach to the Fourth Estate. Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman would agree wholeheartedly with the President on the influence and power of the press. The manner that he would deal with it was not even close to the President’s though.

Sherman was perhaps the most notorious of the Fourth Estate haters in the Union Army. He had experiences that drove him to believe that Fourth Estate was not a coveted part of the fledgling American Democracy but was actually a danger to the livelihood of the Union. He argued that there was a direct correlation between censorship and military success.

With a first amendment to the Constitution of the United States specifying that the Congress cannot make laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”, it seems

121 Ibid., 2-5.
odd that anyone could actively seek to stifle the press. Here enter the experiences of Sherman that set him on that hard lined approach.

A glaring example was published on 17 July 1861 in the New York Times. They said, “the army in Virginia today took up the line of march for Richmond via Fairfax and Manassas. The force starting out today was fully fifty thousand strong.” Four days later, after initial successes the Federal forces were in a hasty retreat from the battlefield. The Confederates with the able Stonewall Jackson turned the tide and routed the Federals.

Some short time later, a newly promoted Sherman was notified that he would be visited by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron at Sherman’s residence in Louisville, Kentucky. Sherman was not told that a reporter (from the New York Tribune) was joining the lunch party and he spoke freely to the Secretary. During a particular exchange between the General and Secretary, Sherman said that he needed 60,000 troops to clear Kentucky of insurgents and 200,000 to go on the offensive. Cameron misunderstood and thought Sherman was saying he needed 200,000 to keep Kentucky from seceding. He promised more troops but felt the estimates were absurd.

On 30 October, the New York Tribune published a story detailing the Federal order of battle in Kentucky and Sherman’s ludicrous manpower requests. It also suggested that he may be somewhat mentally “unbalanced” or “unsteady.” Sherman was embarrassed to read this account and this likely added to his bellicose attitude towards the Fourth Estate.122

Whether the press was looking to discredit a non-supportive (of the press) General or they were reporting facts as they knew them is somewhat unclear. However it is clear

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that a feud is now underway and there is little chance that Sherman is going to be able to
capitalize on the power of the Fourth Estate like Lincoln does. Sherman’s outlook on
total war includes a vehement belief that any news of the war effort could aid the enemy
and therefore should not be allowed. In a letter to his wife he wrote that “Napoleon
himself would have been defeated with a free press.” He felt his views were justified
and in the best interests of his country.

Major General William Tecumseh Sherman clearly understood the power that the
Fourth Estate held in the relationship between the Trinity members, but he took an
overly idealistic and rancid view on that relationship and missed out on opportunities
to advance his own agenda.

Vietnam War

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

President John F. Kennedy

As a result of the Potsdam Conference of 1945 (where the victorious allies
primarily met and decided the how to administer the defeated Nazi Germany), Vietnam
was divided in half at the 16th parallel. Chinese Nationalists would occupy and disarm
the Japanese north of the parallel while the British would do the same in the south. At
the conference, the French requested and was granted the return of all of her pre-war

124 John F. Kennedy, Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1961,
colonies in Southeast Asia (Indochina). Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia will once again
become French colonies following the removal of the Japanese.

Once the Japanese had surrendered a series of events unfold that keeps Vietnam
divided with the French in the south and communist rule in the north. This begins the
French struggle to regain control of their colony and provides a fertile ground for a proxy
struggle between the Soviets and the United States that continues through the French
departure in 1954 and in to the American involvement and eventual departure.

The primary United States military involvement in Vietnam was between 1964
and 1975, though the proxy battle between the U.S. and communism had been ongoing
since President Truman was in office. The impetus for U.S military action occurred due
the Kennedy administration’s belief that the spread of communism posed a sufficient
threat to the U.S to more than justify action if not intervention. This communist
influence expansion was clearly the burgeoning conflict between the Soviet Union and
the United States

This policy was a close descendent of the Truman Doctrine that advocated
supporting free people’s efforts to resist subjugation.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures.

President Harry Truman

Tet Offensive

The Tet Offensive was a series of battles undertaken by the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) also known

125 Harry Truman, speech delivered to a joint session of Congress, 12 March 1947,
as the Viet Cong (VC) beginning during the early morning hours of January 31, 1968.

“Tet” refers to the lunar New Year’s Day which was traditionally a day of truce during war in Vietnam. This offensive involved attacks in almost every major city in southern Vietnam and on the US firebase at Khe Sanh. The NVA suffered a heavy military defeat but scored a priceless propaganda victory.126

At a July 1967 meeting the Communist Party leadership recognized their lack of current lack of success and decided to re-orientate their operations to target two U.S weaknesses. The first was the divide between the US public and the US government over support for the war and its actual progress. Second was the ongoing tension between the US military and their Vietnamese allies. They hoped that these items would combine with a popular uprising amongst the South Vietnamese to regain their momentum. In addition to being a total tactical failure, uprising completely failed to occur.127 However, all of these events played out in the media and the results would not entirely be considered a failure.

In 1968 there were approximately 179 accredited media personnel in South Vietnam.128 About 60 of those personnel were actual news writers from major American media outlets, with the remaining being camera operators and other support personnel and a few stringers.129 There were over 525,000 American troops in Vietnam deployed across and area the size of Washington State.130 The members of the Fourth Estate faced

129 Ibid., 10.
a major challenge from the sheer physical magnitude of the task at hand. The hub they operated out of was generally Saigon, which was the location of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). This was where General Westmoreland commanded from and the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JSPAO) was located.

To simply get out to the field and cover an actual operation and file a story could take up to 72 hours (There was little to no embedding done during that timeframe). Therefore much of the reporting was done from Saigon. These factors on the ground in Vietnam were combined with an American President who was up for reelection and did not aggressively step forward to handle the perceived overseas crisis. The Fourth Estate editors in America over-reacted with the first stories that came off of the wire (e.g. Associated Press, United Press International, etc.) which began a cycle of drama chasing in Washington.

The mix created what Peter Braestrup calls “an extreme case of crisis-journalism” in his seminal work, “Big Story”, on the Fourth Estate during the Tet Offensive. The result added up to a “portrait of defeat for the allies” while most historians and even journalists acknowledge that Tet was a military and political setback for Hanoi.

World War II

The front-line soldier wants it to be got over by the physical process of his destroying enough Germans to end it. He is truly at war. The rest of us, no matter how hard we work, are not.

Ernie Pyle

World War II originated from two separate conflicts begun by two separate belligerents - Germany and Japan in the late 1930s.

131 Braestrup, 512.
132 Ibid, 527.
133 Ibid, 508.
Germany had been forced to capitulate after World War I and sign a treaty (Treaty of Versailles) they found distasteful and which effectively created the fertile grounds for a backlash against the punitive powers. Adolf Hitler fueled those flames and rose to power to begin to reclaim the “rightful place” for the German People. Part of that position did not include Jewish people. Hitler sought a "Final Solution" to the existence of Jewish people in Germany; he would to force Jews to emigrate out of Germany. His motivation seems to have been two-fold: to ensure the racial purity of Germany and to create lebensraum or "living space" for German nationals of "Aryan" blood. Leading up to this “Final Solution”, he established policy aimed at stripping Jews of citizenship, economic and political rights. He sought a complete dehumanization of the Jewish people.

Hitler had successfully (in the eyes of his followers) blamed all of the political and economic woes of Austria and Germany from the end of World War I on the Jewish people. And so began Hitler’s expansionism of sovereign countries (in what the United States would eventually place as the number one priority for success and come to call the European Theatre) – allied with Italy and supported by several self serving or simply maligned agreements with other European powers.135

I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.

Sô Yamamura136

136 “Memorable quotes for Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970),” The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066473/quotes (accessed February 25, 2008). Author’s Note: Sô Yamamura played Vice-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in the 1970 movie Tora! Tora! Tora! This quote has been attributed to Admiral Yamamoto but is the point of some conjecture by some academics. For the purpose of this paper, the movie quote is what is referenced.
The lower priority for the United States would be the Pacific Theater. Here the Japanese had visions of hegemony in Asia and began their quest to accomplish just that by confronting and creating a war with China. This effort became stalemated in 1940 and Japan then turned to extending their defensive perimeter throughout the Pacific. This perimeter would enable them to garner much needed resources for their burgeoning economy. Part of their plan to establish that defensive perimeter included eliminating the United States Pacific Fleet and declaring war on the United States. So it was that on 7 December 1941, the Japanese attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the United States counter declaration of war against Japan and the subsequent iterations in the European theater brought the United States out of an isolationist bent and head long into World War II.\(^\text{137}\)

The press involved in reporting World War II had new technologies at their fingertips such as newsreels and radio but they essentially functioned under the same Fourth Estate policies as did their contemporaries during World War I. They were subjected to heavy censorship and close control by the government and since they viewed themselves as part of the war effort, they generally accepted the censorship unchecked.\(^\text{138}\)

In fact, many wore military uniforms and were thought of by some military officers including Genera Eisenhower as “…quasi staff officers…” with a primary duty being that of a military duty.\(^\text{139}\)

Almost unthinkable in today’s paradigm, but movie makers in Hollywood also enlisted in the war effort – on the side of support! They participated in two distinct areas, the first being production of patriotic themed entertainment movies, War Department

\(^{138}\) Kracke, 25-27.
training films and documentaries. The second involved individual stars participating in recruitment and bond drives and traveling to entertain the troops. Morale of the public and the troops was the primary Hollywood target and that coincided with their core competencies.

This image of Fourth Estate coverage and participation is starkly different from the press coverage President Roosevelt had been receiving only a few years prior to the American entrance in the war.

Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency amidst an economic depression and likely garnered a somewhat longer honeymoon from the Fourth Estate due to the challenges he faced. Additionally, he was a charming character and set out to work some magic on the Fourth Estate by promising and honoring a commitment to hold two press conferences per week, enlarging the press room at the west wing of the Whitehouse, providing Whitehouse correspondents with tables, typewriters, and even a poker table, and hosting social events with reporters invited as guests (vice to cover the event). In a further attempt to seed success in some of his New Deal initiatives, there were many jobs for public affairs personnel which were filled by former press corps members.  

Roosevelt combined his overt cultivation of the Washington Press corps with the recent technological capability of commercial radio to round out his efforts to spread his intended message to the people. His *Fireside Chats* were in fact an important change in the power structure in that he could bypass the press in no small manner.

The potential irrelevance of the press was a factor that began the change of coverage of the president. More influential was the general discomfort felt throughout

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the newspaper publishers over the changes coming with the New Deal. Publishers, such as William Randolph Hearst, were angered by the change and the power that Roosevelt represented. They stepped up their involvement in shaping the discourse (which was the common case of the day) over Roosevelt and his actions.

By the time Roosevelt bypassed Congress to begin the Lend Lease Program that assisted Britain in the European theater of war, he was now also marked as a war monger.¹⁴¹

This Fourth Estate shift is most likely rooted in the type of war America was engaged with. The December attack on Pearl Harbor shifted public sensibilities in almost palpably into a fight or flight mode. America’s existence was threatened and the nation chose to fight. Everyone ‘bought it’ and enjoined the effort.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 224-228.
Chapter 5

Summary and Recommendations

“Good news seldom sells papers; dull news never does. So, inevitably, our news is everlastingly sensationalized.”

Summary

The challenge facing military planners is remarkably simple in character yet ferociously complex in reality. The military operates as an entity that is interconnected with and relies upon others. This set is most commonly described in Carl Von Clausewitz’ holy Trinity of the Government, the Army and the People. While Clausewitz did not discuss a Fourth Estate in this model he did acknowledge two themes that speak to our discussion.

First he said that there must be a balance between these Trinity members. Effectively, the model of a triangle would move with adjustments of the influence of the three while remaining connected. Visualization might portray one member actually moving in between the other two to illustrate one element interfering with the interaction of the other two elements. Or, more commonly, the size of one entity might increase with a noted decrease in the others’ size. Again, these movements would be considered in a time dimension and generally the model would seek to return to equilibrium.

Secondly, Clausewitz comments that the nature of these relationships would change over time. While it might be easy to dismiss this concept as overly simple, it remains powerful advice to the student of warfare and directly applies to the thesis here.

The change here is that this other entity, known as the Fourth Estate, has effectively positioned itself in the center of Clausewitz’ Trinity. Our modern day press is in fact the primary conduit of interaction between the Trinity Members. Certainly there are avenues for direct communication, as President Franklin Roosevelt proved with his Fireside Chats, but the primary bandwidth to carry the communications is the press.

On the macro level, the press serves the American democracy remarkably well. Further, the formal (via the First Amendment to the Constitution) and informal (via a concerted effort to condition the public on how important they really are) power of the press is unquestioned. Successful confrontation with the press remains elusive and while there may be anecdotes where the public rebukes particular press actions, like a parent to a rebellious child, the public quickly returns to pre-hostility adoration of the press.

On a micro level, the interaction with press can be anything but smooth. The first and foremost challenge is determine who or what the press is – on the day that you are considering them! With effectively, no standards, certification of definition, the challenge is daunting. Like a punk little sister, in one moment the press might well take blatant advantage over their subject, and in the next moment they can squeal like a pig that someone is taking advantage over them. In the publics’ eyes, and very likely fortunately for democracy, they will be acquitted of the former (or quickly forgiven) and provided sympathy for the later.
Recommendations

So it is that this prickly relationship exists. Much like a military commander should never attempt “wish away the enemy”, the Fourth Estate should be accepted, with its strengths and weaknesses as a part of the operational environment. If commanders do not anticipate this unwieldy beast of the Fourth Estate, they are doing a disservice to themselves, their troops and frankly to the democracy. Ostensibly, they will also be doing a service for the enemy – the recent enemies of the United States full well understand the press and seek to use the press as an element of their operational design. To follow are a few recommendations that flow from this study.

From the study we see notable instances of doctrine and education that promise to bear fruits to the institution. The United States Army’s Command and General Staff program highlights a highpoint in the attempt to study and understand the press. This mixing of military officer/students with graduate journalism students is such a logical tactic that it questions why it is not more prevalent. Additionally, the National War College elective that is taught by a Department of State staff member with personal experience with the Fourth Estate and the government joins the previous effort as eminently logical and good. Throughout the Services and these efforts should be studied and reapplied in other areas.

Additionally, the services should seek media outlets as venues for fellowships of senior officers. The possibility of this fellowship relationship exists under the auspices of other fellowship programs (e.g. existing fellowship program happens to select a media
outlet as the locale for service) but more likely the existing programs point fellow
towards more traditional industries or even think tanks.

Lastly, the educational efforts on the Fourth Estate do not have consistent
application throughout the officer education system. There are solid examples of
exemplary efforts as noted in Chapter 3, however, too many of the highpoints were
electives only available to a few officers. In depth study of the Fourth Estate should be in
the core curriculum of all of the officer schools. Clausewitz’ Trinity is the most
commonly discussed model of these higher relationships. It is factual, not conjecture,
that the press also exists in this model and Clausewitz acknowledges that possibility.
Therefore, that existence should be included and folded into the curriculum.

Recommendations for Further Study

The United States Air Force’s acknowledgement is service doctrine (as discussed
in Chapter 3) that Public Affairs is key component of Information Operations brings a
contentious issue to light. The institutional drive to disavow any kinship between
Information Operations and Public Affairs is admirable but it is folly. They are related!
The key remains that lie or deceit to the Fourth Estate is the ultimate sin.

As a practical matter, the overriding aversion to any connection of these two
disciplines has at its core an assumption that the press trusts the military now. Trust at
the micro or tactical level exists between individuals and granted it seems to be strong.
That trust is based on personal relationships and truthfulness of the participating parties.

But at the institutional level, the press cannot trust anyone - that simply is in line
with their purpose of checking the power of the government or other entities of power.
So at higher levels the organizational change would result in no tangible variation in the relationship.

Hence, a ripe subject for further study would be to do a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the subsequent order effects that would occur if DOD were to subordinate Public Affairs under operations along with Information Operations.

Another area for examination would be to see the potential of divesting the services of any public affairs related to strategic acceptance. Their role would simply be to inform the public about the service members. The Department of Defense level Public Affairs officers would be solely responsible for any sort interaction with the Fourth Estate that was focused on generating support for U.S. intervention.
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