FRIENDS INDEED? COALITION BURDEN SHARING AND THE WAR IN IRAQ

VOLUME ONE OF TWO

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degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Government

By

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The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Why do states contribute to ad hoc security coalitions and what factors influence their level and composition of support? What factors influence states’ decisions to contribute and the type of contribution? What motivated countries such as South Korea to contribute significantly to the Iraq War “coalition of the willing” while steadfast partners such as Turkey and Germany resisted U.S. efforts to include them as coalition partners? Given the potential for coalition, rather than alliance military action, coalitions are understudied as a tool of grand strategy. This research examines the conditions that influence state burden sharing behavior for ad hoc security coalitions and examines the decision making model developed by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger.

In an analysis of South Korean, Turkish, and German contributions to the current Iraq War coalition, this research tests an integrative model to explain the spectrum of constraints and opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system, as well as the capabilities to account for domestic political constraints. The leaders of coalition nations must act within the spectrum of constraints and opportunities that are defined by each nation’s domestic political structures. When domestic political considerations are
not included in the study of foreign policy, researchers are limited to developing a set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for foreign policy decision making. Burden sharing is an integral part of foreign policy decision making and hence requires knowledge of the international environment in which states make decisions and the domestic environment where policy makers translate decisions into action. As is readily apparent in the foreign policy literature, but sometimes lacking in the greater international relations literature, states rarely act as unitary actors. State decisions to commit resources to a military coalition are influenced by the ability of the government to extract those resources from the society. Incorporating state-societal measures in theory-making allows one to gain a better appreciation of the size and composition of state resource expenditures.

This study finds that domestic structure—in the form of the relationship between the state executive and legislature—significantly influences a given state’s burden sharing behavior. Executive authority and parliamentary accountability appreciably affects the ability of a state to contribute military forces to an international coalition, especially in instances where threat or collective action pressures are low. States with strong executive power in the area of military oversight are less constrained in providing military forces, while states with considerable parliamentary freedom are likely to show a much lower level of commitment. This study fills a gap in the international relations literature in that it explains the influence of state structure on state coalition burden
sharing decisions and formalizes the influence of domestic structure in the decision making model.
This dissertation required a great amount of burden sharing to accomplish. I can easily say that this work is the culmination of a long effort where I was able to “stand on the backs of others” in an effort to explain the decisions of states to join military coalitions. Many people contributed to this effort and made it a much finer work than it would have been had I accomplished it alone. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to my mentor and research advisor Professor Andrew Bennett, who inspired the idea to work on burden sharing and provided continuous guidance throughout the research and writing process. He provided substantial assistance during an incredible trying time in his life and I am very grateful for his precious time.

I would also like to thank the remainder of my dissertation committee, Professors Robert Lieber and Jay Parker. Professor Lieber provided an excellent sounding board for ensuring that my dissertation would be useful from both a theoretical and policy perspective. He provided feedback that focused me to the task on hand and kept me looking at the end goal—completion. Professor Parker used his extensive contacts with the International Studies Association to put me in touch with scholars such as Patricia Weitsman. He provided excellent guidance on the influence of public opinion on policy, as well as the ability of elites to influence public opinion. As a retired Army Colonel, Professor Parker was an excellent sounding board on numerous military topics. Most importantly both became friends and colleagues whose counsel I will continue to enjoy.
This dissertation was made much easier thanks to my dissertation study group, or DSG. The DSG is wholly responsible for my sanity throughout the writing process. I would especially like to thank Liz Grimm who is the engine behind our study group. Liz is a terrific sounding board and the most tireless editor I’ve met. Liz read every page of this dissertation and surely improved the readability by several orders of magnitude. Sarah Cross provided laser sharp insight and reminded me that there is more to international relations than the realist notions of anarchy and power. John Sawyer remained enthusiastic throughout the many trials and tribulations of the dissertation process and reminded me daily of the joy of discovering something new. I especially enjoyed alliance discussions with Trish Bacon-Gonzales who is applying alliance principles to terrorist networks. Finally, I am indebted to Hamutal Bernstein who brought the tools and techniques of a comparativist to our international relations group. She provided numerous ways to looks at problems that was essential in determining the domestic influences on foreign policy. I am deeply indebted to the DSG; this would not have been such a deep and rewarding experience without the weekly interaction with the group.

This project would have been impossible without the numerous others that made my graduate experience possible. I would like to thank the Air War College for sponsoring my graduate degree. Tom Hughes, Mark Conversino, Colonel Steve Wolborsky, Steve Fought, Colonel Stef Eisen, and Colonel Kurt Schake were noteworthy in encouraging me to pursue a PhD. Dusti Jayne, Angela Varner, and the Air Force
Institute of Technology provided fantastic administrative support. Steven Pennington, Greg Kern, and the Air Force Operations Group provided me with valuable office space and computer support while I have been an “officer without a unit.” I would also like to thank my graduate school colleagues who helped in one way or another on this project. Andy Loomis, Alarik Fritz, and Hyon Joo Yoo provided invaluable material that made my research easier.

Last, and certainly not least, I would like to give special thanks to those that suffered most during the dissertation process. My parents William and Marian Baltrusaitis inspired me to always do my best and gave me a thirst for learning. My children Becky and Melissa, who looked at the back of my head while I was writing and editing, missed numerous fun weekends with dad so that I could finish another chapter or edit. I am immensely proud of the women you have become and your drive to be the best that you can be. I finally want to thank the love of my life Jan who showed amazing patience and always insured that I did not take myself too seriously. I am deeply sorry for the number of weekends that I said “I have to work on my dissertation.” This work is more representative of my family’s love and support than my effort. To all of you I am especially thankful. Of course, any faults are entirely my own.
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CHAPTER ONE

COALITIONS: ENDURING, BUT UNDERSTUDIED

Why do states contribute to ad hoc security coalitions and what factors influence their level and composition of support? What factors influence states’ decisions to contribute and the type of contribution? What motivated countries such as South Korea to contribute significantly to the Iraq War coalition while steadfast partners such as Turkey and Germany resisted U.S. efforts? This research examines the conditions that influence state burden sharing behavior for ad hoc security coalitions. Significant international relations scholarship has focused on burden sharing decisions; however, the majority of this canon is based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) experience. This highly institutionalized model may be insufficient, since Post Cold War experience suggests that ad hoc coalition, rather than alliance, burden sharing is becoming increasingly important. Although these terms are used interchangeably throughout international relations literature, significant differences exist between the two terms.¹ Coalitions, typically, are defined as ad hoc and temporary. This short nature of coalitions distinguishes them from relatively permanent, treaty-based alliances or standing international institutions.²

¹ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan argue that the lack of accepted definition of alliance is an indication that there is a lack of scholarly agreement on the characteristics of alliances, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 3.
Several factors influence the proliferation of military action within coalitions rather than alliances. First, the United Nations Security Council has become more active in collective security and peacekeeping operations. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have approved numerous operations that would have previously garnered a veto. These United Nations (U.N.) authorized security missions are typically implemented through ad hoc coalitions since the U.N. maintains no standing security agreement. Second, with the end of bipolarity and the superpower standoff, the United States has been more active in its use of military power to resolve disputes. Finally, the increasing number of democracies in the post-Cold War era may also contribute to the use of coalitions rather than alliances. The ratification process required for democracies to enter treaties may lead states to consider coalitions, which carry little legislative burden compared to formal alliances.

Given the potential for coalition, rather than alliance, military action, coalitions are understudied as a tool of grand strategy. Most examinations of coalitions have remained in the military realm with military officers writing operational level doctrine to codify the tactical difficulties of multinational operations. This thread of literature addresses the operating challenges in coalition warfare rather than the strategic

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motivations of why states choose to join that coalition in the first place.\textsuperscript{5} However, little scholarly research exists to address state motivation to support coalition operations.

This research seeks to fill the gap in burden sharing literature by applying the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security burden sharing model to explain state burden sharing behavior in the 2003 Iraq War coalition. Recognizing the failure of alliance literature to explain burden sharing outcomes in the first Gulf War coalition, Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger proposed a multi-level security decision model that considered international, domestic, and cognitive factors affecting coalition burden sharing decisions.\textsuperscript{6} They argued that existing alliance burden sharing literature failed to incorporate sub-systemic causal factors and thus lacked explanatory value. To that end, they employed structured, focused, case studies of the policy processes of the major contributors to the 1991 Gulf War coalition using the dominant realist, neo-liberal, and cognitive-driven theories as an analytical framework. Significantly, they found that no single theoretical strand could explain every state’s burden sharing motivations. Parsimonious explanations ranging from balance of power theory to domestic bureaucratic theory could not singularly explain state burden sharing motivations.


Their research did not discredit any theory of alliance, since each theory explained its most likely case. The United States case was the collective action theory most likely case for contribution and the U.S. did commit to defend Saudi Arabia before the international community pledged to help. Balance of threat theory helps explain the lack of free riding from the Gulf States. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, all provided robust support in part due to the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. Finally, the alliance dependence hypothesis helps explains the participation of states that experienced no direct threat from Iraq. Germany, Japan, and South Korea all contributed to the U.S. led coalition with expectation of support in regional alliances.\(^7\)

However, the burden sharing outcomes observed challenged the literature in that existing theory did not adequately explain other than the most likely cases. First, though collective action and balance of threat theories explained some Gulf War contributions, they did not explain other key contributions from major participants. Despite a real and proximate threat, Iran and Jordan elected not to contribute. More significantly, countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway contributed to the coalition despite the lack of any significant threat from Iraq. Second, due to the uncertainty in the international system after the Cold War, Bennett, et al, found a very strong incidence of alliance dependence, based on expected future benefits of being part of a U.S.-led global bloc Instead of acting out of threat, or a need for collective action, states allied with the

United States for hedging motivations. Hedging states were showing a commitment to the U.S. with the expectation that their support would curry favor while ensuring that potential rivals were blocked. Third, domestic politics theories, seldom seen in alliance theorizing, possessed causal significance in explaining the timing and type of contribution. Finally, systemic and state-level variables interacted to shape coalition contributions heretofore unanticipated by existing theory. The Bennett, et al, model thus attempted to capture these interactions by integrating the major theoretical threads into a single explanatory and predictive framework.

**Coalitions – Many Faces, Many Motives, Differing Contributions**

The military, economic, and diplomatic coalition contributions highlight the significant differences between the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraq War saw limited or no participation from states that were significant contributors to the first effort. Additionally, a large portion of those that did participate in the second coalition had no direct stake in the conflict. Why was the burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq War markedly different from Operation Desert Storm? In the current conflict, Persian Gulf War contributors were not only absent, but also actively tried to disarm the second intervention. Typically staunch allies, Germany, and Turkey made active efforts to derail U.N. passage of a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, while Japan aggressively lobbied Security Council members for passage. What motivated countries

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such as South Korea and Poland to contribute significantly to the current effort, while steadfast partners such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia resisted the United States? Why were former Soviet republics unanimously in support of military intervention? This study aims to explore state motivations to participate in the U.S. led Iraq War coalition.

In 1991, the first Bush administration led a coalition, under a United Nations mandate, to war against Iraq after its unlawful invasion of Kuwait.\(^1\) The coalition that freed Kuwait was diverse in composition and level of support. This coalition included significant military partners such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as partners that contributed outside of the military realm. Financial partners such as Japan and Germany significantly contributed to the coalition by providing financial support for the United States and its military partners. This diversity of burden sharing support shows the many methods in which states can and will contribute towards a security goal. Many states contributed primarily military resources. Table 1 illustrates the top five military

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
<th>% Total Active Armed Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>697,000</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
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Note: Saudi Arabian percentages reflect the need for both nations to generate reserves for operation Desert Storm.

\(^{1}\) United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, by a vote of 12-2-1 demanded that Iraq comply with Resolution 660 by withdrawing its forces from Kuwait, and set the deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply. The resolution requested all states to use all necessary means to uphold Resolution 660.
contributors to the Persian Gulf War. This table shows that although the United States provided a significant element of military capability, the regional forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, as well as the United Kingdom robustly provided military capability.

In addition to military participation, the Persian Gulf War coalition displayed a robust level of economic compensation to the United States for leading the collective action. Table 2 illustrates the top five financial contributors to the Persian Gulf War coalition. Japan and Germany, who were constitutionally limited from supplying military forces, supported the coalition by underwriting a significant portion of the expenses for military action. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that burden sharing contributions may have several dimensions. States that offer financial offsets to allies making military contributions, or those that give assistance to allies that are hurt through trade disruptions with the adversary; all make key contributions to the coalition objectives. Military participation describes only one dimension of state support.

This robust coalition of diverse states conflicted with realist and liberal theories concerning alliance formation and burden sharing. Realist theories of balance of power and balance of threat predict that states would be hesitant to join U.S. efforts to check

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Iraqi aggression. Since the U.S. possessed ample military capability alone to stop Iraq, realist theory would expect rising powers such as Japan and Germany to sit on the sidelines rather than join the U.S. effort. Britain, Germany, and Japan neither balanced against U.S. power, nor possessed a direct reason to balance against Iraq as a threat; but they contributed significantly to the coalition. Arab states such as Egypt and Morocco bandwagoned with the United States although they suffered no direct threat from Iraq.

Liberal and institutional theories of alliance also failed to explain the first Gulf War intervention. Constructivist theories argue that alliance formation is deeply related to the ideational structure domestically as well as internationally. These theories suggest that like-minded states will ally against a potential aggressor because of a threat to international norms and beliefs. These theories however fail to explain why states with differing norms and beliefs would participate in a security coalition. Illiberal monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, and dictatorships, such as Syria aligned with the democratically liberal U.S. to reinstate an illiberal monarchy. Clearly these states joined the coalition for different normative interests. Interdependence theories also argue that states that trade, or have like interests such as collective security interests, are likely to ally against threats to

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that trade.\textsuperscript{13} Interdependence theories fail to explain why states like Syria, which had little trade with the U.S., participated in the coalition. Overall, states that should have supported collective security arrangements were slow to act and required U.S. pressure, while other states that had marginal stake in the credibility of international institutions but had significant private incentives, such as Syria, participated robustly in the coalition.

Twelve years after Desert Storm, events in Iraq precipitated an international crisis and a U.S.-led security coalition. The coalition composition for the 2003 Iraq War differed significantly from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2003, the international community was unified in its assessment that Iraq had violated its Security Council mandate to disarm, but was divided on the appropriate course of action. Security Council Resolution 1441 directed Iraq to allow weapons inspections warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences if it continued violations of its obligations to disarm.\textsuperscript{14}

Although this resolution passed unanimously, the United States was later unable to convince the Security Council to authorize the use of force to disarm Iraq. Coalition patterns and burden sharing in Operation Iraqi Freedom exhibited a marked difference from Desert Storm. The United States commenced combat operations in Iraq on March 19, 2003 with a “coalition of the willing” comprised of 40 countries that publicly


committed to the war effort. This coalition provided a variety of support, including logistical and intelligence support, over-flight rights, or humanitarian and reconstruction aid. The support from the “coalition of the willing,” however, did not necessarily include direct military support for combat operations. Table 3 illustrates military contribution to the coalition for combat operations. Only six coalition members (besides the United States) provided military support to conventional combat operations, and only four committed troops to combat.


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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>150*</td>
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*Provided non-combat mission support outside Iraq such as chemical decontamination and logistic support units.


The military contribution to the 2003 Iraq War again highlighted several anomalies not explained by existing alliance theory. Once again, since the United States showed a willingness and capability for unilateral action, therefore collective action theory predicts that the coalition should see numerous instances of free riding. Although free riding was much more prevalent, some states provided significant military

contribution to the effort. Most significant in this regard, the United Kingdom provided a considerable portion of its military capability to the military coalition. The British contribution of 45,000 troops was equal to its contribution to Desert Storm. This represented a six percent larger fraction of its total active duty armed forces compared to Desert Storm. Significantly, this military burden was greater for the British armed forces than for the U.S. military, in terms of percentage of active force deployed. Another observation is the lack of direct military support from robust supporters of Desert Storm, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was the most significant contributor based on economic and military contributions in the Persian Gulf War, but chose to play at best a secondary role in the 2003 Iraq War.16

Duration of a military conflict is likely to affect the level of burden sharing support. Democratic states must continually justify putting citizens at risk for coalition goals. Public support for the coalition is expected to wax and wane over the length of a prolonged operation revealing coalition dynamics that are not present in shorter operations.17 One critique of the Bennett, et al, analysis of the Persian Gulf War was that it failed to test for coalition dynamics over the length of a prolonged operation.18 The duration of the Persian Gulf War was so short that burden-levels were relatively static from the initiation to termination of the conflict. The Iraq war presents an opportunity for

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examining the effect of war duration on burden sharing. Figure 1 presents the aggregate military support for stabilization operations in Iraq since May 2003. These data reflect coalition support to Iraq stability operations after the conclusion of conventional combat operations and the fall of the Hussein regime. By May 2003, the United Kingdom and the United States had redeployed significant combat strength on the assumption of a pacific occupation. Figure 1 aggregate troop levels show the level of material burden of the Iraq War between the United States and its coalition partners. These data show that while U.S. forces responded to changing security conditions in Iraq, non-U.S. coalition contributions remained relatively steady. U.S. burdens fluctuated to the security
situation, while coalition partners were insulated from these changes and maintained a steady level of burden.

These data also illustrate a steady decline of non-U.S. military contributions since December 2005. As of May 2007, the number of coalition forces has declined by 47.5 percent, from a high of 24,000 in December 2003 to 12,600 in May 2007. Figure 2 shows the percentage of the military burden shared by the coalition partners. Non-U.S. coalition contributions peaked at 17.3 percent of the total effort in February 2004 and steadily declined to 7.5 percent by May 2007. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the costs of the operation were exceeding the benefits for participating nations. An alternative explanation may be the increasing capability of Iraqi military capabilities; however, one would also expect a drawdown of U.S. forces if Iraqi
military capability were replacing coalition capability. If Iraqi military capability was substituting for coalition military capability, all forces in Iraq should be drawing down. Therefore, these data indicate that the mild support for nation building operations is suffering under the weight of an ongoing military operation. The United States seems to be suffering from the “classic” collective action predicament; because it has significant military forces in Iraq, it is expected to maintain a disproportional amount of military burden.


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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, Multiple Issues

Coalition support has not only decreased over the duration of the conflict, but coalition composition has also significantly changed. Table 4 illustrates the level military support, by year, of the top contributors to the Iraq coalition. Appendix A shows all non-U.S. participation to the Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), from December 2003 through May 2007.
As evidenced by these data, the military coalition has evolved over the life of the Iraq War. The United Kingdom rapidly downsized its 45,000 strong invasion force and installed a relatively stable, yet significantly smaller, contingent of peacekeepers in the south. Poland robustly supported peacekeeping operations initially— even leading coalition operations south of Baghdad— but since has reduced its support to providing a battalion sized combat element and a divisional headquarters. Spain also initially provided robust support to the reconstruction effort, but terminated that support following the March 2004 Madrid train bombing when the Socialist government of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected into power on a pledge to pull Spanish troops from Iraq. South Korea has remained a firm supporter of military operations; however, recent events suggest that their support is beginning to wane. The above discussion on coalition contributions and timing suggest that the Iraq War should provide a robust test of the Bennett, et al, security model due to the variation of military support over the duration of the coalition.

23 Ibid.
Bennett, et al, found that financial support is also an essential element of coalition burden sharing. They demonstrated that states would support military efforts financially when they are domestically unable or unwilling to contribute military forces. During the 1991 Gulf War, Japan and Germany, constitutionally limited from deploying military personnel, were the third and fourth largest financial contributors to the coalition, underwriting many U.S. military expenses. Financial support by coalition partners varied significantly in the second conflict. The limited support the United States has received financially for the current Iraq War stands in stark contrast to the 1991 Gulf War. In that conflict, the U.S. was reimbursed almost entirely for its military expenses. The U.S. collected approximately $74 billion in 2007 dollars from coalition partners for U.S. military support. In contrast, the U.S. is directly bearing the costs for its current military operations in Iraq. In contrast to the first war, the U.S. is not only funding its own operations, but it is also directly funding several coalition partners’ participation.

Table 5 presents a list of countries receiving U.S. assistance to participate in the military coalition. These countries that provided personnel to the multinational force in Iraq were not financially able to support their troops in the field for extended periods and therefore required financial assistance to prepare their troops for the operation. Since 2003, the

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United States has provided approximately $1.5 billion to 20 countries to support non-U.S. coalition troops in Iraq.  

**Table 5. U.S. Support to Non-U.S. Coalition Troops**  
**March 2003-March 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total (Millions)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>$988.4</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$295.0</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>$63.1</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>$12.5</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>$2.0</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nations</td>
<td>$123.3</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,494.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Funding to Poland included funding for troops operating under its command.  
Source: GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007)

The current coalition also requires a significant financial investment for the reconstruction of the government and infrastructure of Iraq. The United States not only had to assemble a military coalition to topple Saddam Hussein, but also had to build a financial coalition to rebuild the war-torn state. Table 6 illustrates the major financial donors to Iraq reconstruction. International donors other than the U.S. have pledged approximately $14.9 billion to support Iraq reconstruction. This total is significant, however, worldwide pledges do not even equal the $18.6 billion that the United States alone pledged towards Iraq reconstruction, and pale in comparison to the $189 billion that the U.S. has budgeted in 2008 for military operations and reconstruction.  

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Approximately $11 billion, or 70 percent, of the $14.9 billion pledged is in the form of loans. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Iran, and Japan are the major contributors of loans for reconstruction.

### Table 6. Major Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Madrid Pledge (Millions)</th>
<th>Post Madrid Pledges and Donations (Millions)</th>
<th>Form of Pledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>$18,649</td>
<td></td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$4,914</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,500 Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,400 Loans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$1,000 Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>$452</td>
<td>$198 Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>$220</td>
<td>$28 Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$236</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$215</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td>$200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>$236</td>
<td>$687 Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>$2,550-4,250</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>$3,000-5,000</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007); The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, January 19, 2005. Note: **Bolded** countries also contributed troops to the multinational coalition.

Donors have provided about $2.3 billion in bilateral grants to Iraq for reconstruction.

The grants include $1 billion from Japan, $775 million from the United Kingdom, $153 million from South Korea, $110 million from Canada, and $100 million from Spain.28

These contributions show a high level of international commitment, but in comparison to

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the Persian Gulf War, the United States is shouldering the majority of the economic burden.

Diplomatic support also varied across the coalition. The United Kingdom and Spain were strong advocates in the Security Council for military intervention in Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair significantly influenced U.S. war deliberations, convincing the Bush administration on the need for a Security Council Resolution in order to garner domestic and international legitimacy for the use of force. British and U.S. efforts were critical in garnering a unanimous consensus for Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002), which called Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. This resolution put the onus on Iraq to prove that it did not have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.\(^\text{29}\) This resolution solidified international support to engage Iraq, but left doubt on the meaning of “serious consequences.” The unanimous vote on Resolution 1441 disguised a number of fundamental policy differences among the Security Council Members.

While the U.S. saw Resolution 1441 as a stepping-stone for military action, France and Germany interpreted the resolution as a pretext for more aggressive weapons inspections. In early March 2003, the governments of France, Russia, and Germany informally rejected a second U.S.-British draft resolution advocating the use of force.

\(^{29}\text{United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441.}\)
Germany initially led international efforts against a war. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder won reelection in national elections the previous September based on his rejection of U.S. adventurism in Iraq. He undermined U.S. efforts to build a military coalition by rejecting German participation in a war even with a Security Council Resolution. France supported diplomatic action and weapons inspections, but eventually joined with Germany in a diplomatic blocking effort in the Security Council, once it was clear that war was likely. In the diplomatic buildup to the second resolution, Germany and France applied significant pressure on the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe to repel U.S. advances to participate in a coalition.

In a late January 2003 rebuke of the assertion that Germany and France were speaking for Europe, eight NATO members issued an open letter of support for U.S. policy towards Iraq. The eight included Great Britain, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Portugal. The letter from the NATO-Eight was followed by another endorsement from Eastern European nations aspiring to NATO and EU membership. The group, known as the Vilnius 10, included Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In an open letter, dated February 5, 2003, the group declared, “Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our

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shared values.”\textsuperscript{32} They claimed that it was already clear Iraq was in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. The Vilnius group gave the Bush administration a diplomatic boost by stating, “In the event of non-compliance, we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.”\textsuperscript{33} The former Communist States provided necessary support to U.S. efforts to build a large diplomatic coalition.

Japan was very supportive of this “second” draft resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq and launched a diplomatic effort to persuade undecided members of the Security Council to support the resolution. Tokyo warned France on the dangers of splitting the international community and the Security Council over the resolution. In an official statement Japan warned, “[i]f the international community divides, it will not only benefit Iraq, but also place in doubt the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{34} Japan also offered financial assistance to states bordering Iraq, including $1.3 billion to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.\textsuperscript{35}

The second resolution became a “trial of strength” between Paris and the United States. France went to great lengths to dissuade the U.S. and U.K. from presenting a

\textsuperscript{32} Pauly and Lansford, \textit{Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War}, 96.
\textsuperscript{34} Quoted in Pauly and Lansford, \textit{Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War}, 97.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
second resolution to the Council. In the end, the diplomatic efforts of France and Germany—and to a lesser extent Russia and China—assured that the second resolution was not brought to a vote. The coalition formed without a U.N. mandate for the use of force to disarm Iraq.

This summary of military, economic, and diplomatic contributions to two U.S. led coalitions in Iraq highlights the significant differences burden sharing outcomes in the two conflicts. The 2003 Iraq saw limited or no participation from state that were significant contributors to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Additionally, the U.S. gained numerous coalition partners that had no direct stake in either conflict. Puzzling was the drastically different coalition makeup in the second effort, even though many major structural factors were similar to the first. A striking feature of the second coalition is the lack of Arab participation and the limited amount of coalition military participation for the initial invasion. Local participation from states that should be considered threatened by Iraq was fairly absent. On the other hand, states that should have had no overt interest in participation were partners in the second coalition. This dissertation aims to explain these variations by the U.S.’s coalition partners.

Security Coalitions as a Field of Study

Military coalitions are an enduring feature in international relations. From Athenian and Spartan participation in the Peloponnesian War to American involvement

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in the current Iraq War, great powers have often conducted warfare as members of multinational coalitions and alliances. U.S. military operations since World War II demonstrate that the United States typically engages in military operations within some type of coalition. Recent U.S. security doctrine underscores the need for multilateral capability to face the problems of arms proliferation and terrorism. The 2006 National Security Strategy stresses the need to address these problems through “effective international action,” but at the same time cautions, “the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads.” Military doctrine also highlights the enduring requirement to operate multilaterally. U.S. military doctrine instructs commanders to “be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition.” One feature of these multinational efforts is that they are often executed in the framework of ad hoc coalitions rather than standing military alliances. Significantly, the United States has fought only two military actions since World War II as a member of a standing military alliance. Rather it chooses to engage in military action unilaterally or as a member of a coalition.


40 The U.S. participated with alliance partners in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, even these actions were somewhat ad hoc since Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was not activated. Participation by NATO states was voluntary for these military actions. Terry J. Pudas, "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 3 (1993/1994). In non-Article V operations no one can know with certainty the
The termination of Cold War alignments and alliances will continue to contribute to a less rigid and more dynamic structure of international security favoring coalition versus alliance military action. “Coalitions of the willing” will need to be formed to answer to security dilemmas not anticipated by formal alliance structures. When a sense of urgency combines with sufficient international support for undertaking joint military action, coalitions, rather than alliances are more likely to distribute costs among military members, and politically provide a sense of legitimacy and common purpose for a given action.41

Significant scholarly attention in international relations focuses on alliance formation, and a smaller amount on alliance burden sharing; however, the large majority of this canon fails to answer the question of why – and how much – do states contribute to ad hoc coalitions. In addition, why do states fail to contribute when they have an immediate stake in the outcome?

The inability of alliance literature to explain coalition burden sharing is partially due to its overemphasis on capability aggregation. The capability aggregation model – where states ally to increase power capability – dominates the theoretical focus of literature on alliances.42 George Liska argues, “states enter into alliances with one

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another in order to supplement each other’s capability.”43 Kenneth Waltz’s structural balance of power theory argues that “imbalances” in the balance of power are corrected through the capability aggregation of alliances. “External balancing” involves increasing one’s overall capability by including the capabilities of an ally.44 Stephen Walt further states “The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’ capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests.”45 When studied as an aggregation problem, the differences between alliances and coalitions are minor. However, the capability aggregation model overlooks the fact that that alliance and coalition membership can serve state interests tangentially to the immediate military crisis.46 The current Iraq conflict highlights the fact that coalitions are often formed for reasons other than capability aggregation.

Another influential body of literature has sought to explain state alliance burdens in terms of economic factors, particularly the economic incentives that are created when a common interest is pursued collectively. The economic theory of alliances is an offshoot of collective goods literature and was first used by Mancur Olsen and Richard Zeckhauser to explain NATO burden sharing.47 The collective goods hypothesis offers an explanation for two important aspects of alliance burden sharing. First, it explains the tendency for the larger and wealthier members to supply a disproportionately large share

44 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 161-70.
of the defense burden. Second, it explains the tendency against collective action unless a powerful actor can generate initial support. Olsen and Zeckhauser, along with successive collective security theorists, argue that small states will tend to free ride or contribute minimally to an alliance because their limited resources will have little impact on the amount of security provided, while large states will shoulder the majority of defense burdens. Additionally, they argue that no collective action is likely amongst equals in a collective arrangement because of the large amount of resources required to begin the collective effort. Pure collective action requires a hegemon that can provide incentives or costs to encourage participation.

The existing collective security literature has two empirical weaknesses when explaining the burdens of an ad hoc security coalition. First, the theory was intended to describe burden sharing in the broad definition of alliances that would include ad hoc coalitions as well as treaty-based alliances. However, empirical analysis has concentrated predominately on burden sharing in alliances more rightly defined as international organizations or regimes. Existing burden sharing literature is almost exclusively based on NATO, which assumes a formal alliance structure to provide mechanisms for sharing costs among states. Alliance structure, combined with a high level of institutionalization, guarantees that group members make some contribution to a common effort. They help to embed international commitments in domestic politics and

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institutionalize cooperation. They also provide a focus for pressure on reluctant governments by agreeing to norms and targets of support. These structures provide a means to persuade domestic political actors to provide the necessary resources. Burden sharing in a coalition environment is not necessarily shaped by these same institutional dynamics to share costs. Ad hoc coalition leaders must convince participants that the military adventure is worth the domestic costs. Burden sharing research thus needs to be extended into less institutionalized settings.

The second empirical weakness is that the existing burden sharing literature examines only military defense spending and ignores contributions to distinct events. Mechanisms for burden sharing are couched in an overall defense burden rather than costs associated with a particular military operation. This anomaly exists because collective action literature assumes that “deterrence” and “defense” are the collective goods rather than an “offensive” goal such as regime change or Middle East stability. Since collective action theory is based largely on the NATO experience, this assumption is logical. However, burden sharing literature needs to account not only for alliance defense burdens, but also for the operational burdens of a specific contingency. The Bennett et al. security model is the first attempt to explain security burdens for specific contingent events.

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51 Several recent efforts have aimed to expand burden-sharing to individual operations. See Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."
Are Coalitions Different From Alliances?

The terms *alliance* and *coalition* are often used interchangeably, which causes confusion and misspecification when used by political science scholars for theoretical analysis. Although these terms are often used synonymously throughout international relations literature, significant differences exist between the two terms.\(^{52}\) Both terms refer to forms of multinational military cooperation, yet neither term has a commonly accepted definition. This section explores the differences between alliances and coalitions and proffers the theoretical differences based on these distinctions.

Alliance study has long been a staple of international relations scholarship, but the term describes a wide range of alignment behavior from loose security alignments to institutionalized international organizations such as the NATO. Scholarly literature typically highlights two commonly accepted differences between alliances and coalitions.

First, alliances are generally characterized as more formal arrangements than coalitions. The major works regarding alliance characteristics emphasize the formal nature of alliances. Robert Osgood in his study of alliances and American foreign policy remarks that alliances are, “a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states…”\(^{53}\) Hans Morgenthau stresses that an alliance adds precision – in terms of a formal agreement – to an existing

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\(^{52}\) Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan argue that the lack of accepted definition of alliance is an indication that there is a lack of scholarly agreement on the characteristics of alliances, see Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, 3.

community of interests. According to Morgenthau, an alliance “makes policy and action explicit and operative.” Osgood stresses that alliances “pledge states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states.” Alliances oblige one or more of the signatories to use force, or threaten to use force, in specified circumstances. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, in their exhaustive study of alliances, stress that an alliance must be made by formal treaty so that it can be separated from accidental or temporary coordination of foreign policy acts. Finally, Glenn Snyder, in his authoritative work on alliance politics defines alliances as, “the result of a formal agreement of some sort that makes explicit the contingencies in which military cooperation will occur.” Snyder underscores that alliances must be theoretically separate from less formal arrangements because it is useful to stipulate their different obligations. Formal alliances introduce an obligation on the signatories that is not present in a tacit arrangement. The formalization adds elements of specificity, obligation, and reciprocity that are lacking in informal arrangements. Reneging will severely damage the credibility of future promises to allies.

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55 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 17.
56 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 3-4.
58 Ibid., 6-8.
formal contract itself but in the expectations that are supported or created by that contract.\textsuperscript{60}

Other scholars conflate alliances and coalitions; coalitions are seen as the younger, less developed sibling of the alliance. Stephen Walt, in his seminal work \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, defines an alliance as, “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”\textsuperscript{61} Barnett and Levy offer a similar definition in their study of domestic factors that influence alliance decisions.\textsuperscript{62} These scholars assume that coalition behavior is structurally similar, and therefore, interchangeable with alliance behavior. Scant scholarly effort has been expended to bridge the gap in theoretical reasoning and explore their differences.

One would expect the dynamics of burden sharing to be different in an ad hoc situation compared to a highly institutionalized alliance such as NATO. NATO has developed an accepted process for assessing burdens on member states. Although compliance with burden assessments is somewhat questionable, NATO maintains a formalized process to adjudicate defense burdens.\textsuperscript{63} NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Defense Review Committee oversee the force planning process and coordinate national defense plans towards NATO Force Goals. Allied defense planning

\textsuperscript{60}Interestingly, Stephen Walt, in one of the most notable works on alliance behavior, deviates from this tradition and defines an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. Although he does not stress the formal nature of the agreement, he does stress that an alliance assumes some level of commitment. Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, 1.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{63}Thies, \textit{Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO}. 

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is reviewed annually and given direction by NATO Ministers of Defense in an Annual Defense Review. The Annual Defense Review assesses the contribution of member countries in relation to their respective capabilities and constraints in the context of the Force Goals assigned to them. Specific defense planning targets for each member country are developed based on this ministerial level guidance. Member states implement agreed defense planning procedures, which provide the methodology for determining and reporting on the forces levels necessary to implement Force Goals. The NATO international staff monitors and assesses countries’ actions in response to the required forces and capabilities placed on them by this force planning process and reports to the Defense Planning Committee on state compliance.64 NATO’s highly institutionalized process insures that states have a forum for addressing defense burden targets. Although states attempt to “burden-shift” within the NATO force planning process, a governing process exists for addressing defense burden issues.

Ad hoc coalitions, on the other hand, have no equivalent process for establishing defense burdens for a particular operation. In contrast to the highly institutionalized process seen in NATO, ad hoc coalition burdens are determined as a result of a bilateral bargaining process with the coalition initiator. Rather than addressing burdens within a committee structure, burdens are determined individually on a case-by-case basis. Since coalitions tend to be in response to an already ongoing crisis, potential allies will have significant leverage against the coalition initiator to extract concessions for their support.

States bargain their support levels in a bilateral environment rather than through a bureaucratic structure.

Second, whereas the structure of ad hoc coalitions is different from alliances, so is their purpose. Alliances are typically formed in the anticipation of future events, while coalitions are formed in response to a specific crisis that has already emerged. Osgood indicates that alliances pledge state action to cooperate in circumstances that are specified in advance.65 Bueno de Mesquita and Singer extend this argument by stating that alliances are “for the putative purpose of coordinating their behavior in the event of specified contingencies of a military nature.”66 Glenn Snyder argues that alliances are formal agreements to use military force “in specified circumstances.”67 Common in the definition of alliance is the assumption that the alliance function is to prepare its members for a future contingency that may or may not occur. Alliances may be designed to deter aggressors, to defend in the event of war, or to initiate military action; however, their temporal function is future oriented. Alliances are considered state level “promises” or pledges of future cooperation.68

Coalitions, on the other hand, are by definition ad hoc and temporary. The short nature of coalitions distinguishes them from relatively permanent, treaty-based alliances.

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65 Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 17.
68 Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances."
Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs."
or standing international institutions.\textsuperscript{69} States form coalitions to address a particular crisis, with no expectation of broader cooperation in other areas or continued partnership once the immediate situation is resolved. States are free to join and exit at will; therefore, coalitions are far less restrictive or inhibiting than alliances.

Having highlighted the differences between an alliance and coalition, for the purposes of this study, a coalition is defined as \textit{a grouping of states that provide political, material, or military support to meet a specific contingency at a particular time in the absence of an alliance requirement to do so, with no commitment to a durable relationship.}\textsuperscript{70}

Since coalitions and alliances differ in formality and duration, the following assumptions apply to coalitions. First, a coalition is more likely to have members enter and exit – based on short-term costs and benefits – since transaction costs are not locked in by a long-term agreement. A significant cost in a standing alliance is the risk of having to come to the aid of an ally when one would not normally have done so in the absence of commitment. Breaking an alliance commitment involves high audience costs since treaty based alliances are formal regimes. On the other hand, it should be less costly to break a commitment to an informal coalition since there is no formal obligation.


\textsuperscript{70} This definition incorporates the significant facets of DOD, Pierre, and Sprowls definitions. This definition captures three critical features of coalitions for this study, (1) the arrangement is ad hoc and temporary, (2) the main actor is the state, and (3) aid can be financial, political, or material.
to act. Cooperation does not cast the long shadow of the future as in an alliance; therefore, coalitions should be less entangling.

Second, potential coalition partners will have significant bargaining leverage over the coalition leader due to the short timeframe generally available for coalition building. Relative bargaining power will turn on perceptions of comparative dependence and intensity of interest in the bargaining situation. A coalition, in most instances, will need to be assembled quickly since it is in response to an existing crisis, therefore, a bargainer who wants an agreement soon will be at a disadvantage in dealing with someone who has a temporal advantage.

Finally, since coalitions have less time to prepare, capability aggregation will be less effective than in formal alliance. Coalitions have much less time to prepare operational plans and train as a coherent force. As preparation time decreases, military efficiency decreases due to a lack of time to reconcile different doctrines and coordinate campaigns.

This section is not intended to build a comprehensive theory of coalitions; rather it is to highlight the critical distinctions between alliances and coalitions. For the purposes of this dissertation, these distinctions between alliances and coalitions are crucial. The factors which influence burden sharing, in a time critical crisis situation, are

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72 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 75.
expected to differ from those that influence standing alliances. Leaders in democratic states may find it easier to commit their armed forces to coalitions rather than alliances. Even though leaders must still legitimize their decisions to the public, media, and government, the deployment of armed forces is likely through an expedited process compared to treaty ratification. Coalition burden sharing becomes an area of negotiation between states that is not governed by a standing agreement. Burden sharing behavior should be different based on the formality of an agreement. Finally, coalitions form for more than aggregated military capability. The U.S. coalitions of the last two decades were influenced more by the political need for legitimacy rather than inherent military capability of any individual coalition partner. The addition of the Egyptians and Syrians to the Desert Storm coalition had less to do with capability and more with the political goal of participation. In this instance, the level of burden sharing is less important than the legitimizing effect of claiming coalition partners.

Summary

This dissertation is aimed at discovering if the Bennett, et al, security model is generalizable to situations in which international support was lacking and the United States was willing to act more unilaterally. The 2003 Iraq War provides a unique opportunity for testing the security decision making model. In both the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the current Iraq War, the U.S. was the hegemonic leader of a coalition, but U.N. approval and war legitimacy differed. In both conflicts, the U.S. military possessed enough military power to pursue objectives unilaterally, but the current conflict showed
many more instances of free riding. The dependent variable – amount of material, financial, and diplomatic support to the coalition – varies from the first to second conflict among the major contributors and varies longitudinally across the Iraq War. The Iraq War coalition provides an excellent situation to test the robustness of the Bennett et al. security model in explaining coalition burden sharing decisions. As there were significant cases of non-participation and “free riding,” along with different political motivations for participating in the coalition, I expect different causal paths to be excited in the model, testing its explanatory power and validity.

Chapter two presents the theoretical framework for analyzing ad hoc security coalitions. It traces the development of the burden sharing canon with a literature review of the existing economic theory of alliances. Once the limitations of an economic only approach are illustrated, the chapter continues with a wider review of alliance and coalition literature and demonstrates that the existing theoretical structure makes unjustified assumptions about the similarities of alliances and coalitions. Finally, the chapter proffers an integrated solution to studying coalition behavior, which explains divergent state motivations for burden sharing choices, where international pressures are influenced by domestic politics.

Chapter three then presents a detailed discussion of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security decision making model. The theoretical foundation and contingent predictions of the model are explored. Alternate predictive frameworks for analysis as well as limitations to the Bennett, et al, model are also discussed. Chapter three
concludes with a methodological discussion about the cases selected for detailed analysis. This discussion includes a methodology for determining the influence of international legitimacy on the model assumptions.

The next four chapters provide an empirical analysis of the security decision model. Chapter four presents an analysis of South Korea’s support of the coalition. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was the third largest provider of military forces for a significant portion of the stabilization effort. Korea’s economic participation was also significant. Korea’s contribution of over $250 million to the Iraq reconstruction fund marked it as a significant donor, within the top ten states providing monetary support to Iraq.

Chapter five presents an analysis Turkey’s decision to remain on the sidelines of the Iraq War effort. The Turkey case provides a robust test to coalition burden sharing theory because its contribution to the Iraq War was markedly different from the Desert Storm coalition. Turkey was a key state in the U.S. strategy for regime change in Iraq; however it maintained preferences opposite of the first war under intense pressure from the U.S. The Bush administration’s inability to win Ankara’s approval for a northern front in the Iraq War significantly affected U.S. Iraq war plans and dealt a serious blow to U.S.-Turkish relations.

Chapter six analyzes the German decision to lobby against the U.S. position concerning Iraq. Within a year of declaring Germany’s unqualified support to the U.S. global war on terrorism, he became the first Western leader to issue a categorical “no” to
the Bush administration for participation in the Iraq War. The Schröder government not only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war in 2003, but moreover engaged in active counter-coalition-building by lobbying France and Russia to support Germany’s resistance to the U.S. “adventure.” Germany abandoned its traditional policy of balancing between Washington and Paris, and instead created a counter-coalition with Russia and France against the United States. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led coalition, regardless of the Security Council’s position, seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq.

Finally, Chapter seven discusses the major theoretical implications of this research. The evidence provided in the empirical chapters demonstrates that the Security Decision Model is a valuable tool for analyzing coalition burden sharing decisions. This research had two significant findings. First, state burden sharing decisions are influenced by a complex interaction between international and domestic factors. Burden sharing is an integral part of foreign policy decision making and hence requires knowledge of the international environment in which states make decisions and the domestic environment where decisions are translated into action. Second, as is readily apparent in the foreign policy literature, but sometimes lacking in the greater international relations literature, states rarely act as unitary actors. State decisions to commit resources are always based on the ability of the government to extract resources from the society. By incorporating state-societal measures in theory-making one can gain a better appreciation of the size
and composition of state resource expenditures. The Security Decision Model is a useful tool for determining the significant elements that affect burden sharing behavior.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING COALITION BURDEN SHARING

A profusion of scholarly attention focuses on alliance formation - a smaller amount on alliance burden sharing – yet the vast majority of alliance theory fails to answer the question of why and how much states contribute to security coalitions. This chapter summarizes the common theoretical arguments concerning alliances and coalitions. Each school of thought has important insights regarding alliance formation and burden sharing, however, this dissertation argues that understanding coalition burden sharing behavior requires an integrative theory that draws on the insights of these competing research programs, specifying the contingent conditions when each research program provides explanatory power for predicting and explaining outcomes. Integrative models, arguably, better reflect the complexity of real-world decisions. They provide the means to advance theoretical debates by building bridges across existing theories. This integration of theories provides a more accurate means for explaining coalition dynamics and provides a predictive framework for policy decision and analysis.

I start with a review of the burden sharing literature and argue that the dominant collective action -- or economic approach -- to explain alliance burden sharing fundamentally ignores other causal factors that influence a state’s level of burden in security operations. This discussion highlights the tendency for economic approaches to assume a formal alliance structure containing treaty or institutional mechanisms that affect state burden sharing levels; mechanisms that may be much different in less
formalized security arrangements. In order to provide a more complete picture of the influences on state burden sharing behavior, I then examine the broader canon on alliances – based primarily on realist assumptions of power, threat, and material capability – that characterizes alliances as a means to manage anarchy in the international system. The discussion of realist approaches illustrates the role of threat on state motivations for forming and participating in security arrangements. However, due to the realist overemphasis on material capability motivations for alliance behavior, the realist argument overlooks other motivations for coalition formation and participation, such as international legitimacy. Another weakness of the realist approach is its relative ignorance of domestic factors that serve as important influences on coalition behavior. The review of realist theory demonstrates the need to account for these weaknesses to explain state-level decisions on burden sharing. I then review the emerging literature on the influence of domestic politics and decision making influences on foreign policy outcomes. This theoretical review challenges the traditional chasm between international and domestic theoretical approaches and demonstrates that international and domestic politics are intertwined; each contributes to state foreign policy making. I argue that no single theoretical approach is sufficient to explain state-level policy and a multi-causal, integrated model is necessary to explain the complexities of state burden sharing decisions. Finally, since critics of the Iraq War coalition claimed that legitimacy, provided by a U.N. Resolution, was an essential influence in coalition decisions I review
the literature on legitimacy in order to develop a research method to determine the influence of legitimacy on state burden sharing decisions.

Systemic Theories of Alliance and Burden Sharing

Economic Theory and Burden Sharing

While the issue of cost distribution has always existed in alliance relationships, the burden sharing debate emerged in the wake of World War II. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed by U.N. military operations in Korea, prompted a debate on the uneven distribution of security burdens within alliance systems. The theoretical foundation for collective action theory – and hence burden sharing theory – is Mancur Olson’s collective goods theory, which seeks to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. In his 1965 seminal work, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Olson contends that although groups do join collective agreements striving for a common purpose, there is no shared perspective on how to distribute the costs of their collective action. Ultimately, a small group of states assumes the majority of the burden, or the collective action is never initiated due to the high initiation costs.

Olson’s findings suggest that large organizations tend to assume a significantly larger burden providing public goods than smaller organizations.¹ Public goods are marked by two identifying factors: the benefits must be non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rivalness implies that one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce the

amount available to anyone else. For instance, one’s use of the public good “clean air” does not reduce the amount available to other members of an alliance. Non-excludability suggests that it is impossible to prevent relevant constituencies from consuming the good.² Similarly, one cannot easily exclude another from gaining the public benefits from “clean air.” As no organization can reap all the benefits of a collective, or public, good that they have produced, insufficient incentives exist to produce it voluntarily. First, consumers can take advantage of public goods without contributing sufficiently to its creation. Second, small groups are more likely than large groups to undertake collective action. Because free riding is easy and collective goods are non-excludable, large groups require separate and selective incentives to stimulate individuals to act in a group-oriented way. Individuals in large groups will gain relatively less per capita of successful collective action, whereas individuals in small groups will gain relatively more per capita through successful collective action. Hence, in the absence of collective incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones.

One year after The Logic of Collective Action, Olson – along with Richard Zeckhauser – specifically addressed issues of collective action in the security realm. They proffered a model of security cooperation integrating Olson’s economic theory with an empirical analysis of NATO defense expenditures. Their work employed a simplified economic model that characterized nuclear deterrence as a pure public good and alliances

² Hardin, Collective Action, 17-18.
as the main vehicle for providing that good. Although they admitted that alliances have some private benefits, they state, “above all alliances provide public goods.” As expressed earlier, to qualify as a pure public good, deterrence must satisfy two requirements, non-excludability and non-rivalness. Non-excludability in this context means it is impossible to prohibit any alliance members from enjoying the benefits of deterrence, even to those alliance members that do not contribute. For example, France continued to enjoy the benefits of NATO deterrence even after it resigned from the Integrated Military Command in 1966. The public good must also be non-rival, meaning that one individual may consume the good without preventing simultaneous consumption by others. In the case of NATO, West Germany’s deterrence of the Soviet Union was not diminished by Denmark’s deterrence under the NATO nuclear umbrella. Thus, according to Olsen and Zeckhauser, NATO’s deterrent effect met the requirements of a public good.

Since spending on collective defense competes with other spending priorities, Olson and Zeckhauser argued that states have incentives to underpay for a public good if another provides it in adequate supply. Since the benefits of any collective action such as defense also goes to others, states acting independently do not have an incentive to provide optimal amounts of defense, but have an incentive to wait for others to provide defense for them. Contributing to a collective defense effort requires a reprioritization of funding for participating states. A state contributing to an alliance must determine the

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value it places on collective defense as well as the value of other non-defense items that must be sacrificed for the collective defense. As spending on collective defense competes with other spending priorities, Olson and Zeckhauser argued that states have incentives to underpay for a public good if another state provides it in adequate supply. Since defense outlays in a collective action goes to all states in an alliance, states acting independently have no incentive to provide optimally to a collective defense, but rather have an incentive to wait for others to provide defense for them. Using empirical data from NATO defense contributions, Olson and Zeckhauser demonstrated that individual states acting independently would not promote their common interest optimally. This tendency to rely on other states for a public good is known as the “free-rider” problem. They found that wealthier allies assumed a greater defense burden than poorer allies, as measured by the ratio of military expenditure over gross national product (GNP). Thus, their research empirically confirmed the hypothesis that, within the NATO alliance structure, a consistent tendency existed for exploitation of the “great states” by the “small states.” To confirm that these “exploitation” effects were a result of alliance burden shifting, these results were also tested against defense burdens of non-alliance states. Olson and Zeckhauser found that non-aligned states did not share a similar exploitation effect. They concluded that larger actors placed a greater value on collective defense because they had more to lose if collective defense failed.

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In 1970, however, Bruce Russett observed that the “exploitation effect” seemed to be diminishing; smaller states appeared to be assuming a larger share of the NATO defense burden in the late 1960s.\(^5\) This change in correlation between defense expenditure and GNP suggested that NATO no longer conformed to the original assumptions specified by Olson’s collective action theory. Successive scholars postulated a joint product model when appraising NATO defense burdens, which refined collective action hypothesis by relaxing the assumptions of non-excludability and non-rivalness.\(^6\) The joint model would account for the decline in free riding by arguing that defense expenditures by military partners could accrue both public and private benefits. Assuming “publicness” as a key tenet of the original theory, joint product theory argues that by relaxing the public good assumption one could explain increased spending ratios. Two possibilities emerged for the apparent decline in free riding; the goods provided by NATO may be either exclusive or rival. The first explanation for the decline in free riding is the possibility that defense expenditures may increasingly reflect exclusive benefits withheld from the alliance as a whole. State defense expenditures were producing military power that was either partially or totally private and not shared by the alliance. Some defense expenditures were totally private; Portugal funded colonial

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occupation forces that privately benefited Portugal, but provided no benefit to the NATO alliance. Some defense expenditures provided multiple benefits to both the state and the alliance. For instance, funding for NATO infrastructure would benefit both the alliance and the host nation. A significant infrastructure improvement, such as building additional airbases would provide a public benefit to the alliance and private benefit to the host state. Alternately, a second explanation for diminishing free riding may be that the alliance was producing products that were rival. Alliance forces – especially ground forces – stationed in one geographic area are unable to defend against aggression in a geographically separate area of the alliance. A state’s peace resulting from nuclear deterrence did not reduce its benefit to others, but the actual defense of territory required that forces be deployed to one geographical area, inherently meaning they were not available to physically defend other areas of the alliance. In this case, the product of defense was not purely public, but rather “impure,” meaning that it possessed qualities of both public and private goods.\footnote{John R. Oneal and Mark A. Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change," \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 33, no. 4 (1989), 440. See also Russett, \textit{What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense}, 96-99.} The alliance in later years may have been supplying a good that had characteristics of both a private and public good. In essence, deterrence violated the assumptions of non-excludability and/or non-rivalness.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Todd Sandler and several associates refined Olson’s original argument by relaxing the assumptions of the pure public good model in
favor of impure public goods and joint products. They developed a joint product model that describes products that provide both public and private benefits. These scholars argued that military expenditures provided multiple benefits including deterrence, damage limiting protection in wartime, and nation specific interests. According to Sandler, the changed emphasis in NATO from nuclear deterrence to territorial defense invalidated Olson’s assumptions of “publicness.” In contrast to nuclear deterrence, conventional territorial defense is joint public good for which the allies gain partly private benefits. Joint products explain a state’s motivation for higher levels of defense spending. State defense expenditures in the NATO alliance thus could have an element that is excludable and rival between alliance partners. Although Olson recognized this distinction in his initial formulation, his empirical analysis assumed the effect on defense expenditures was negligible.

Sandler and his colleagues attribute the decrease in free riding to joint products to the strategic doctrine of NATO. After 1967, the shift from the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine to the flexible response doctrine made collective defense a more private product, invalidating some of the original assumptions of the Olson-Zeckhauser model. During 1949-1966, NATO ascribed to a strategic doctrine of MAD in which any Soviet aggression involving NATO allies would trigger a devastating nuclear

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9 Olson and Zeckhauser identified the private benefits inherent in collective defense, but argued that predominately public goods were produced. Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," 272.
retaliation by the United States, Britain, and France. The alliance depended on nuclear deterrence for collective security and, as such, shared mostly purely public benefits, supporting the Olson-Zeckhauser model. During the late 60’s, however, NATO altered its strategy to flexible response, in which a Soviet aggression would be met with a commensurate response. The measured response would be conventional or nuclear based on the type and scope of Soviet aggression. Because of this doctrinal change, conventional forces became a much more important deterrent and defensive force. The shift from nuclear deterrence to conventional defense changed the “publicness” of the NATO defense posture, as conventional military forces were excludable and rival. NATO allies on the Warsaw Bloc periphery failing to deploy sufficient conventional defense forces would likely become the point of a Soviet attack; therefore, states increased their individual conventional defense spending. Flexible response’s reliance on conventional and nuclear forces meant that defense activities within NATO yielded joint products with varying degrees of publicness.\footnote{Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," \textit{Journal of Economic Literature} XXXIX (2001), 879.}

John Oneal and Mark Elrod in 1989, however, offered conflicting interpretations on the decline of free riding in NATO. Their critique of Sandler argued that little evidence exists that the European allies adjusted to the changes in NATO nuclear doctrine. Instead, they suggested that two other influences were responsible for the apparent decline in free riding. First, they argue that the greater pursuit of private
interests by Portugal, Greece, and Turkey skewed NATO defense expenditure data.\textsuperscript{11} Portugal’s colonial wars, and the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, drastically increased these states’ defense spending, which – in aggregate – appeared in the burden sharing analysis as a willingness of smaller states to contribute larger burdens to the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{12} Second, regional economic independence caused an increase in cooperation among European allies. Oneal argued that a shift occurred in NATO from a competitive allocation process that incentivized free riding to one of cooperation and more equal defense burdens for European allies. Wallace Thies disputes this hypothesis and argues that the private benefit arguments more adequately applied. According to Thies, NATO members attempted to shift burdens for public goods to other partners while concentrating on maximizing their defense budgets on supplying private benefits.\textsuperscript{13}

Mark Boyer broadened the scope of the burden sharing debate in his reformulation of the economic theory of alliances. Boyer developed a model that accounts for burden sharing across multiple issue areas and therefore accounts for multiple public goods. Boyer’s analysis suggests that nations specialize in the production of those alliance goods (diplomatic, economic, or military) for which they possess comparative advantage. Therefore, state alliance contributions will tend to be in their areas of specialization. For example, the United States will tend to contribute military forces, while Japan leans to economic support for international efforts. Although a nation

\textsuperscript{11} Oneal and Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change."
\textsuperscript{12} Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO."
\textsuperscript{13} Thies, \textit{Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO.}
appears to be free riding on security contributions, that nation may not be free riding due to its contributions in the area of foreign aid.\textsuperscript{14} This hypothesis seems to be born out in recent coalition operations. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States and United Kingdom undertook a large military burden, while Japan and Germany shouldered a larger economic burden.\textsuperscript{15} Boyer’s analysis suggests that burden sharing initiatives that attempt to force all nations to increase contributions in a particular category are counterproductive for alliance efficiency. Security provision is likely to be optimal when alliance nations specialize rather than when forced to contribute in one security dimension. In light of this research, burden sharing initiatives should focus on discovering and utilizing the comparative advantages of each individual alliance member.

Although Sandler, Oneal, and Boyer disagree on the causal mechanisms behind decreased free riding, their research confirms that states have conflicting interests between private interests and the collective goods, and states have an interest to contribute in areas where they have a competitive advantage. Additional research suggests that the pure public model is inaccurate and that “impurities” will always exist in the public good model that lend more credence to the joint model formulation in which states are motivated by private and public incentives.\textsuperscript{16} For collective action theory, the

\textsuperscript{14} Mark A. Boyer, "Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System," \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution} 33, no. 4 (1989).
\textsuperscript{15} Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War."
\textsuperscript{16} Goldstein argues that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, second-rate powers developed nuclear capability even when under the collective umbrella of great power sponsors. This strategy hedged against the risk of a totally “free-ride.” Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," \textit{International Organization} 49, no. 1 (1995). For a discussion of the impurity of public goods in UN peacekeeping operations, see Davis B. Bobrow and Mark
joint product model suggests different hypotheses compared to the pure public goods model. First, the joint product model predicts defense burdens sharing more in accordance with the private benefits received. The model suggests that the more private benefits alliance nations receive because of their contributions to the collective defense, the more they will tend to contribute to the alliance. The presence of ally-specific private benefits, and excludability, motivates allies to share defense burdens based on self-interest as well as collective interest. Small allies that receive substantial excludable benefits may assume a large burden despite their wealth position. Second, alliance membership restrictions based on rivalry of benefits received become relevant. If rivalry is not an issue, alliances can continue to add members since new members will not exhaust the public good. If rivalry is an issue, however, then alliances have a size limitation. Additional alliance members decrease the amount of collective good for each individual member; therefore, pressure will exist to exclude new allies that do not enhance the alliance’s defense capability. The individual incentive not to contribute increases with group size, therefore a minimum willing coalition must be found. Third, A. Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 6 (1997).

17 Van Ypersele de Strihou pointed to specific defense benefits that are private to a specific ally and do not support the public good. For instance, defense expenditures used to maintain control over a state’s colony, provide purely private benefits to the state, but yield little or no benefits to the other allies. Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou, "Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 49, no. 4 (1967). See also Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 3 (1993).


19 This is commonly known as the “size principle.” Assuming private incentives, side-payments will need to be made to entice coalition members. Therefore, participants will create coalitions just as large as they
burden sharing initiatives should focus on specializing in areas of comparative advantage of each individual alliance member. Security provision and defense burden is likely to be optimal when alliance nations specialize rather than when forced to contribute in one particular security dimension. Finally, an ally's demand for defense may depend on factors not applicable to the pure public good model.\textsuperscript{20}

Although the security burden sharing literature has matured significantly since Olson and Zeckhauser’s original formulation forty years ago, the economic theory of alliances currently contains two significant weaknesses. First, it remains somewhat disconnected from other areas of international relations research in that the collective goods model, the joint production model, and the comparative advantage model are all somewhat apolitical. All of these economic models of alliances assume that alliance agreements are, in an important sense, enforceable contracts guided by the “invisible hand” rather than political through political maneuvering. These models fail to account for ally shopping, bargaining, and motivations for support other than economic efficiency. Second, as the bulk of alliance economic theory is based on the highly institutionalized NATO, the ally does not account for security options outside the alliance.\textsuperscript{21} Burden sharing literature almost exclusively models static behavior within an existing formal alliance structure rather than the dynamic nature of bargaining for


coalition partners. Most efforts to test the efficacy of economic theory have empirically relied on the highly institutionalized alliances formed after World War II, particularly NATO. Because NATO is the most significant alliance in recent history, and due to the ready availability of defense spending data, most empirical studies of burden sharing have focused on it. Due to questionable economic data from the former Soviet Union, significantly less research examines the Warsaw Pact.22 Scant analysis exists on the security burden sharing decisions outside the realm of highly institutionalized alliances such as NATO. Scholarly research exists on peacekeeping burden sharing, but this literature still typically explains NATO contributions within a peacekeeping context.23

The focus on the highly institutionalized NATO in the burden sharing literature overlooks the possibility that burden sharing motivations may be different for ad hoc coalitions. The coalition leader has the option of shopping for coalition partners, and potential partners may join the coalition for a variety of private and/or public motivations. The initiator of an allied action can search for ad hoc partners in the international community if contributions from alliance partners are too expensive, or insufficient for a given action. In addition, the coalition building process becomes a “two front”


bargaining problem for the initiator with the existing allies on one side and potential new partners on the other. The “bargaining” view of alliance initiation highlights several weaknesses of economic theory to explain coalition burden sharing decisions. First, states may assume a level of burden in exchange for future private benefits. Second, coalition leaders may offer incentives outside of the security domain to participate in a coalition. Incentives may be in an area that is difficult to quantify as defense related for an economic analysis. For instance, a coalition leader may offer trade benefits in exchange for military participation in a coalition. Finally, geostrategic position should affect a state’s level of burden for a particular operation. States that are threatened directly are expected to contribute more to a coalition than those that are relatively safe under a collective action umbrella. This discussion highlights the need for a wider theoretical approach to explain state burden sharing decision.

The following sections outline the wider motivations for participating in a security coalition missed by the economic models. Although economic benefits are important, states also join coalitions for reasons of threat, interest, and domestic concerns. The following theoretical discussion aims to provide greater context and explanatory power to explain state burden sharing decisions. Most importantly, the degree of threat by a potential adversary greatly influences a state’s burden sharing motivation. The section begins with a discussion on the influence of power and threat on alliance

24 Patricia Weitsman discusses how states will hedge their alliance choices in the expectation of future potential benefits, see Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Glenn Snyder discusses the bargaining element of alliance formation in Snyder, Alliance Politics.
decisions, followed by analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of a threat-based approach as an analytical construct. Finally, the theoretical debate will be extended to the influence of domestic factors on burden sharing outcomes.

**Realist Approaches to Alliances**

As discussed earlier, the collective goods theory of alliances explains why some states are tempted to “free ride” on the efforts of others. Realist theory, however, suggest that states will experience strong countervailing pressures to avoid this alliance dependence. Rather than “ride free,” states in an anarchic international system must balance against large power concentrations as a matter of survival. Classical realism emerged after World War I as a set of theories associated with a group of thinkers who aimed to distinguish themselves from Wilsonian idealists. The basis of their belief was the centrality of power for shaping international politics and the danger of basing foreign policy on morality. Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr argued most influentially that foreign policy is based on interest and power than moral and ethical considerations.25

The realist paradigm refers to the following shared assumptions. The first assumption is that nation-states are the most important actors in international relations. Second, international relations take place in a state of anarchy. Third, power is the fundamental feature of international politics. Finally, politics are a function of power rather than

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ethics or morality. In the realist approach, international relations is largely a realm of power and interest alliances are traditionally imagined as tools for a state to augment its power capabilities.

According to realists, the interstate system is anarchic, and thus lacks the ordering mechanisms of a domestic government. Thus, states must rely on self-help mechanisms to ensure their own survival. In an international system where there is no reliable authority to enforce contracts, commitments are inherently uncertain, and states who would depend on others must worry about the risks of abandonment. In an anarchic system, the state is the final repository of political power and there is no authority above the state capable of imposing a system of morality, rules or norms on the state. Therefore, states must always prepare for the possibility that others may use force against them in the pursuit of their national interests. Because states have to be prepared to defend against the use of force, they are preoccupied with issues of security and survival. Imbalances in the distribution of power push states to develop either additional military capability or to seek allies. State behavior is thus a consequence of state desire to maximize material capabilities as a method to gain their security in an anarchic world.

The quest for power, and therefore alliances, is central to this concept. Since building internal capability is time consuming, external balancing through alliances is the most expedient method to counter an imbalance of power. Consequently, alliances form because they are security-maximizing tools. The primary function of an alliance is to maintain the stability of a particular balance by deterring or defeating any challenger(s).

Realism – and its balance of power theory – has been the most dominant theoretical thread in international relations theory, since the first historical account of warfare, for explaining alliance formation and behavior. Realist theories of alliances claim that international competition in the form of balance of power – or more recently balance of threat -- provide the motive for state alliance action. In the seminal account of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides describes the conflict between Sparta and Athens as a result from a power imbalance, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” With this balance of power outlook, alliances become an invaluable tool for maximizing a state’s security. Building on the arguments of Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau articulates the role of alliances to balance power. In Politics among Nations, he describes alliances as “a necessary function of the balance of power.” In his classic work on alliance politics, Robert Osgood further argues that alliances are “one of the primary means by which states seek the cooperation

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31 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 197.
of other states in order to enhance their power.”

According to these classical realists, states ally to enhance their power position relative to other states. Anarchy, or the lack of an international ordering principle, requires states to balance power in order to ensure their security.

It follows from the realist understanding of the anarchic system, and role of power, that alliances do not arise from an economic conception of “community of interests,” but rather from the need to ward off common threats to state security. Alliances are merely strategies used to enhance one’s material capabilities to counter an imbalance of power. Reliance on “community” or “morality” for security is dangerous for without power, a community of interest cannot survive. Alliances then become “against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”

According to Morgenthau, the purpose of an alliance is to aggregate capability to counter an imbalance: “A nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected.”

When alliances do form, classical realists expect them to be a temporary phenomenon. An alliance is most likely to emerge to counter a power or threat imbalance and is thus most likely to endure when the interests underlying it are

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32 Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 17.
33 According to realists, since there is no coercive institution above the state, the rule of law must be guaranteed by the powerful. See Carr and Cox, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 162, Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 253-56.
34 Liska, *Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence*, 12.
significantly stronger than the underlying threat. The natural conclusion to classical realist thinking is that an alliance cannot outlive a significant change in the balance of power. When a powerful threat recedes, states begin to pursue self-serving policy interests and the balance of power dictates that alliances will realign. Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, acknowledge that other factors influence international behaviors, but they concentrate primarily on the role of state interest through power as the determinate of state behavior.

Structural realism emerged in an effort to add theoretical rigor to the historicism of classical realism. For structural realists, international structure, rather than human nature, forces states to pursue power. Neo (or structural) realism is guided by an attempt to make the study of international relations more scientific and theory-driven. Additionally, it was an attempt to simplify the complexity of classical realism. Kenneth Waltz, the foremost structural realist, argues that a theory must simplify complex phenomena to further understanding of essential elements in play and indicate the necessary relation of cause and interdependency. Structural realists identified the distribution of power as a major factor determining the stability of the international system. They strengthen the balance of power argument by positing that most international behavior can be explained and predicted based on the distribution of power capabilities across states in the international system. Since the distribution of power is

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the key consideration for structural realists, domestic politics within states is seen as largely irrelevant to international politics. By assuming that the state is the central actor – and that it is unitary and rational – structural realism argues that domestic factors are significant, but do not dictate international political outcomes. Structural realists discount factors essential to classical realism such as the role of public officials, elites, and bureaucracies. Since states are considered undifferentiated units, they are considered to be driven by external “market forces” rather than internal dimensions. In this sense, states are governed by balance of power politics, as they must balance against the strongest potential rival in order to survive.

The tendency to balance poses analytic challenges for realist arguments since bandwagoning behavior, the behavioral opposite of balancing, is also common in the international system. Bandwagoning is siding with the actor who poses the greatest threat or has the most power. This behavior is deviant according to realist theory since an alignment with one’s potential adversaries threatens state survival, and to the extreme would promote the creation of world hegemony. Since the international system is a competitive realm, once cannot align with a stronger power due to the risk to survival. By aligning with the weaker side, a state is protected against being exploited by a

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37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 10.
39 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 61.
stronger ally.\textsuperscript{41} One significant weakness of realist literature based on balance of power is that it fails to explain why states failed to balance against, and in many cases bandwagon with, the United States at the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{42} To explain bandwagoning behavior, realist arguments typically dismiss it as a tool for small, weak states to gain security\textsuperscript{43} or as a means for states to make temporary gains.\textsuperscript{44} These arguments undercut the central realist premise that balancing is the dominant tendency; powerful states should provoke others to align against them.

In \textit{Origins of Alliances}, one of most significant modifications to the structural realist framework, Stephen Walt, alters the structural realist argument by offering an innovative solution to the bandwagoning observation. Walt argues that alignment decisions are not based on the distribution of capabilities or power, but rather on imbalances of threat. According to his balance of threat theory, aggregate power is only one of several factors that make a particular state or coalition threatening. Additional considerations for Walt include geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.\textsuperscript{45} States are more threatening if they have significant military power massed on the border, rather than around the world. Treat requires more than an imbalance in military and material capability. Walt finds that when an imbalance in threat exists – or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, 126-27.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Some realist scholars argue that balancing is in progress, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," \textit{International Security} 25, no. 1 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{43} Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, 125-26, 73-78.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Schweller argues that states bandwagon when the status quo starts to deteriorate causing states to align with the new winning coalition in the international system. This argument is in direct conflict with the realist paradigm that states will balance against a rising power. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," \textit{International Security} 19, no. 1 (1994).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, 21-26.
\end{itemize}
is perceived to exist – states will form alliances or increase internal efforts to reduce their vulnerability. With balance of threat theory, Walt explains bandwagoning behavior by arguing that states do not balance if not threatened. Applying Walt’s approach explains why balancing behavior was not seen at the end of the Cold War; as long as the United States is not perceived as threatening, states are not motivated to balance against it. In this manner, Walt introduces domestic influences such as the role of threat in determining national interests.46

Patricia Weitsman, in Dangerous Alliances, extends the threat perception debate, initiated by Walt, by arguing that bandwagoning behavior is generated by asymmetric threats. States that bandwagon are allying with their enemies because they cannot overcome the extreme level of threat. Similar to Walt, the domestic perception of threat provides explanatory power to the theory; state’s alliance behavior and level of commitment are attributable to threat perceptions in the domestic realm.47 As the structural realism research program on alliances evolved, it included domestic theoretical perspectives such as domestic perceptions to explain foreign policy outcomes.

In summary, Waltz’s structural theory provided a parsimonious theory for predicting and explaining state behavior based on the power structure of the international system. Neo realism provides a theory of alliance that argues that systemic conditions

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46 One critique of Walt is that by combining exogenous changes in power and state perceptions of the intentions of others into a single variable, Walt’s “balance-of-threat” approach excludes virtually no potential cause of rational balancing short of irrational, altruistic, or incoherent state action and therefore becomes a source of fundamental indeterminacy. See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999).
47 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War.
motivate states to enter alliances. According to these structural perspectives, states form and dissolve alliances due to changes of power or threat within the system. Once a preponderant threat or power is eliminated, states are expected to disband their alliance relationships. Structural realists have no explanation for alliance persistence unless a new threat emerges. Unfortunately, NATO’s persistence at the end of the Cold War provides a significant theoretical challenge to structural realism. From a structural realist perspective, the transition from a bipolar to hegemonic power structure should be accompanied with balancing behavior against the United States. Instead, NATO remains a robust alliance contrary to neorealist predictions.

Neoclassical realist viewpoints emerged in the early 1990s in response to the limitations of a purely structural focus to explain state behavior. Realist scholars recognized realism’s inadequacy to explain foreign policy decisions and argued that realism must be revised so that it would “pay more attention to interactions between international and domestic politics.” Neoclassical realism emerged because structural realism is strictly a theory of international politics, and thus makes no claim to explain foreign policy. This literature attempts to reintegrate some of the sophistication of classical realism while also achieving a more rigorous and systematic body of theory. It

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48 Although the term “neoclassical realism” was not coined until 1998, the structural realist research program began accounting for domestic influences in the early 1990s. I mark this as a divergence from the neorealist research program and the beginning of a new theoretical brand of realism.
seeks to bridge the gap between classical and structural realist theory. Neoclassical realism, like previous forms of realism, contends that state foreign policy is primarily driven by its relative material power. Yet the theory contends that the influence of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex; systemic pressures are influenced by unit level variables such as statue structure and leader preferences. For neoclassical realists, understanding the relationship between power and policy requires examination of both the international and the domestic contexts where foreign policy is formulated and implemented.\(^{51}\) Fareed Zakaria, an early neoclassical realist suggests, “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of policy can be explained by what factors.”\(^{52}\) Neoclassical realists claim that power directly shapes only the generalities and not the specifics of foreign policy, and that the theory is therefore loose enough to make mid-range theorizing practicable.

The neoclassical cannon is limited, but it provides insight to alliance motivation previously unexplained in the realist tradition. By borrowing from the liberal, institutional, and constructivist research programs, they aim to explain the influence of factors such as domestic politics and ideology on foreign policy behavior. In “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” Thomas

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Christensen and Jack Snyder argue ultra parsimonious systemic theories need to be cross fertilized with other theories to make determinate predictions at the unit level. They contend that state perceptions of offensive or defensive military advantage give rise to either chain-gang or buck-passing foreign policy behavior. They introduce domestic variables when they argue that these perceptions are rooted in patterns of domestic civil-military relations and the engrained lessons of formative experiences.\(^5^3\) In his comprehensive study of alliances, *Alliance Politics*, Glenn Snyder maintains that systemic variables such as the distribution of capability and conflict determines the inherent worth of prospective alliances to their members, while who aligns with whom and under what terms is ultimately decided by a bargaining process significantly influenced by state perceptions of value and credibility. According to Snyder, alliances are best considered relationships that are affected by international structure, but that have other quasi-structural effects based on internal variables such as interests and interdependence.\(^5^4\) Finally, in *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest*, Randall Schweller builds on realist theory by incorporating the influence of interests on alignment behavior. He extends beyond Walt’s balance of threat theory by more openly addressing domestic influences on intent such as ideology and

\(^{53}\) Christensen and Snyder attribute the differing pre-1914 and pre-1939 alliance patterns to different perceptions about the inherent superiority of the offense or defense. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990).

\(^{54}\) Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. 

goals on foreign policy actions. These scholars highlight the role of domestic audiences and decision makers in both assessing and adapting to systemic changes. Their propositions have extended structural realist arguments by specifying and developing the causal processes, and linkages at the domestic and international levels that influence foreign policy behavior.

Neoclassical realists highlight the problems experienced by decision makers in assessing and adapting to structural changes. Their theoretical insights do not generally contradict the propositions of structural or classical realism but rather complement and extend realist arguments by specifying causal processes and contingent conditions at the domestic and international level implied by structural theories such as balance of power or balance of threat. Neoclassical realist scholars aim to explain how domestic factors such as social cohesion, elite politics, and elite-mass linkages impede or further states’ efforts to fit their behavior to the predictions of systemic theory. Criticism of the neoclassical approach is that other analytical paradigms such as liberal and constructivist approaches explain the same phenomena without resorting to ad hoc explanations. The new variables are not drawn from the core assumptions of realism but rather are borrowed to explain deviant outcomes resulting in a patched-up development rather than a coherent positive heuristic.

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57 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?", John A Vasquez, "Kuhn Versus Lakatos? The Case for Multiple Frames in Appraising International Relations Theory," in *Progress in International Relations*
Realist theoretical developments share two analytical themes in regards to alliances. The first premise is that alliances are formed due to the consequences of anarchy. Anarchy is a persistent condition that cannot be transcended and that states will continue to develop internal capability or ally to provide security. Coalitions or alliances exist to balance against a growing power or threat. Although bandwagoning circumstances occur, they evolve due to the lack of threat, or a continuity of interests. In response to an asymmetry, states will look for alliance choices to balance with other states to counter the threat posed by that power. The second premise is that military alliances form for capability aggregation. Alliances combine the military capabilities of member states, thus making them more capable and more secure. The central value of alliances is from the enhanced defensive, or offensive, capability inherent in the aggregated capability. The need for alliance ends when the threat passes.

The majority of realist literature treated the state as a unitary and rational actor in the attempt to explain alliances as a response to imbalances of power or threat. Simplification of state influences allowed the development of system level theories that explained macro level systemic behavior. Stephen Krasner in 1978 argued that societal cleavages are unimportant in “foreign political policy-making” because of the “independence of decision makers from particular pressures” within that realm. One

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Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, Snyder, Alliance Politics, Walt, The Origins of Alliances.

weakness of this approach, however, is that assessments focused narrowly on structural
and material factors do not accurately account for state behavior. Therefore, the realist
literature generally provides an overly narrow explanation for why states choose to form
alliances. The capability aggregation assumption overlooks the fact that alliance
membership can serve other state interests, such as legitimacy benefits, foreign policy
objectives, or organizational doctrines and routines that call for international military
cooperation. Another disadvantage of the aggregation focus is that it has difficulty
explaining neutrality, or instances in which states prefer not to align at all. Finally, the
aggregation focus does not address issues of burden sharing. For most quantitative
capability assessments, the entire state military defense outlay is assumed to benefit the
alliance. National and alliance power comparisons of A.F.K. Organski, Jack Kugler,
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, assume that the majority of alliance capability is predicted on
the overall material capacity of member states, but this view does not address the issue
that significant levels of capability may be reserved for future use, or situated in an
entirely different theater of operations. Realist alliance literature does not address how
much of a state’s capability will be committed to a given contingency. Although
neoclassical approaches are a step in the right direction for explaining foreign policy

University Press, 1993).
Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1992), A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of
behavior, this area of scholarship is limited in its view that domestic audiences respond to
external conditions. Additional theoretical approaches are necessary to explain how
domestic influences constrain or influence the international environment.

**Bringing the State Back In -- State-Level Theories**

In contrast to realist theories, classical liberal theories of international relations
rely on the core assumption that domestic actors or structures strongly influence foreign
policy interests as well as foreign policy behavior. Liberal approaches consider domestic
properties as crucial explanatory variables that determine policy outcomes. This is
reflected in the outlook of Peter Katzenstein, “the consistency and the content of foreign
economic policies result at least as much from the constraints of domestic structures as
from the functional logic inherent in international effects.”63 Domestic structure and
coalition-building approaches have proven useful and are well established in the study of
international political economy, but they are far less common in the area of security
studies.64 Liberal approaches provide a means to explain the influence of domestic
constituencies on foreign security policy. These methods tend to be second image
approaches, in that explanations for international outcomes are located at the level of the
state, rather than the system. Each type of liberal theory explains international politics

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through the influence of domestic and transnational actors and group on underlying state preferences.

Although there is no one single theory of liberalism, these theories share the core assumption that the crucial variables that explain state behavior at the international level reside at the domestic level. The liberal research program contains three common assumptions. The first assumption is that the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and groups who organize to promote their interests. This view promotes a “bottom-up” theory of politics where the demands of individuals and societal groups are the causes of state interests. Second, rather than being a unitary entity, the state represents some segment of domestic society, whose preferences constitute the state preferences that officials pursue in their foreign policy. Domestic institutions and processes represent the method for transmitting social preferences into state policy. The third core assumption is that the configuration of state preferences shapes state behavior in the international system. Liberals view the distribution of preferences, rather than capabilities or information as the systemic characteristic that shapes foreign policy strategies. The liberal research program emerged to explain the relationship of public opinion, institutional structure, pressure groups, and culture as a cause of variation in state foreign policy outcomes.

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**Domestic Structural Approaches**

Structure-centered liberalism emphasizes in institutional features of states in order to explain international behavior. Domestic structure theories focus on the domestic polity, or the influence of society on policy based on the domestic structure. These approaches examine the nature of the political institutions constituting the “state,” basic features of the society, and the institutional and organizational arrangements linking state and society and channeling societal demands into the political system. Domestic structures determine how the state responds to societal demands. The primary assumption of the domestic structural approach is that domestic political processes are so ingrained in foreign policy decision making that it encroaches significantly on the international system.

Early structural approaches highlighted the degree of centralization of policy making processes. In *Between Power and Plenty*, Peter Katzenstein developed the notion of “weak” and “strong” states to represent the influence of society on government decisions. The more fragmented the policy-making apparatus and the more unified the society, the weaker the state relative to society. Fragmented policy institutions allow the government to be open to pressure from societal interest groups and political parties. Weak states ability to impose policies on society and to extract resources from it is fairly

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limited. Conversely, strong states exhibit the reverse tendencies; the state may make
policy choices while ignoring the influences of society. They are able to preserve a high
degree of autonomy and resist public demands.\textsuperscript{69} David Auerswald incorporates the
strong versus weak state distinction to predict burden sharing outcomes in wars of choice.
By limiting himself to wars of choice, Auerswald is able to isolate the influence of
domestic structure from other independent variables such as threat. State decision to
support a coalition is based on the influence and independence of the executive in the
burden sharing decision. Auerswald finds that institutionally weak executives are
reluctant to use join coalitions requiring force because of domestic political calculations.
On the other hand, strong states do not need to factor in domestic circumstances such as
public opinion into their decision calculus. Strong executives will base their decisions on
international factors.\textsuperscript{70} However, the parsimonious “strong” and “weak” state distinction
is too simplistic to account for the variations between domestic structures. Weak states
like the U.S. are sometimes able to conduct highly efficient policies, whereas strong
systems might not always pursue coherent and potent foreign policies.\textsuperscript{71}

Thomas Risse-Kappen refined the “strong versus weak state” approach by
incorporating coalition-building processes within the state strength analytical construct.
He focuses on “policy networks,” that allow representation by political parties and
interest groups to link the societal environment to the government. His research shows

\textsuperscript{69} Peter J. Katzenstein, \textit{Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial
\textsuperscript{70} Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."
\textsuperscript{71} Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," 485.
that domestic structure and coalition-building process influences the impact of domestic public opinion on foreign policy decisions. Previous research on the policy impact of public opinion treated the domestic decision making process as a black box by directly comparing opinion polls with policy outcomes. Risse-Kappen’s findings, on the other hand, strongly indicate that domestic structures predict the influence of public opinion on foreign policy.

In *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, Helen Milner constructs a model of the interaction between domestic and international politics in formulating trade agreements. Milner’s model incorporates the literatures on strong and weak states, presidential versus parliamentary systems, and the importance of societal actors versus political institutions. Her model specifies the contingent conditions and causal mechanisms through which legislative and societal actors influence foreign policy. It presents a theory of the interaction of domestic and international politics through the use of “two-level games” pioneered by Robert Putnam. Milner demonstrates that societal preferences and legislative cleavages affect the ability of the executive to enter into cooperative agreements. The main disadvantage of Milner’s model, however, is that it is difficult to operationalize. Its level of

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73 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies."

abstractness and technical sophistication do not generate sufficiently different observations compared to approaches that are more parsimonious.

In an effort to capture the influence of domestic influences, while maintaining a parsimonious theory of domestic influence, domestic structure theory emerged. An extension of the work of Katzenstein and Risse-Kappen, domestic structure theory argues that domestic structure affects the states’ capacity to mobilize resources based on the influence of society on government and of leaders on legislatures. Elements of international theory, state strength, government influence, and state society relations are encompassed in domestic structure theory. It allows simplifying assumptions concerning the interaction of the executive and the state, and the state and society, to predict likely foreign policy outcomes. These structural approaches fundamentally seek to explain the role of the interaction of state political institutions with a given state’s society. Harold Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen suggest that, “Domestic structures determine the selectivity of political systems with regard to societal demands.”

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76 Harold Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From the Outside in and from the inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy," in *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and
Domestic structure analyses present parsimonious hypotheses for explaining state-societal interaction. Statist and societal approaches portend differing expectations regarding the interests that drive foreign policy. Statist approaches assume that national interests – whether derived from systemic or domestic cultural sources – provide the primary criteria for judging policy choices. Societal approaches, however, assume that foreign policy is the product of particular societal interests. Mixed approaches account for both institutional structures and coalition-building processes, combining the influences of policy structures, coalition processes, and societal influences.

In his study of anti-nuclear movements, Herbert Kitschelt formalized a typology on the relationship of political opportunity structures based on the degree of state centralization and societal interaction with government. According to his typology, states differ significantly with regard to the government’s autonomy within the political systems and their societal environments. Kitschelt finds that political opportunity structures – and protest strategies – differed in the anti-nuclear movement according to domestic political structure. A decentralized political system combined with an active societal structure allows societal actors significant influence over policy because political movements can work through established institutions. Since decision making is decentralized, society can access the policy process through multiple points of access. In contrast, centralized political structures have considerable capacity insulate themselves

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from societal threats because access to the decision making structure is limited. Kitschelt shows that government policy reaction to nuclear protest movements was shaped in certain pre-established ways by the channels and opportunities that political regimes offered to policy opponents.  

Andrew Cortell and James Davis extended Kitschelt’s typology to explain the influence of domestic structure in embedding international norms into state policy. Table 7 illustrates the Cortell and Davis typology of pattern of state society relations versus state structure. They argue that the domestic impact of an international rule or norm is highly contingent on the domestic structure affecting the policy debate and the domestic salience of the norm or rule. In Type I or Type II structures where government decision making is centralized, government officials’

Table 7. Cortell and Davis Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of Decision Making Authority</th>
<th>Pattern of State Society Relations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distant</td>
<td>Close</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Type I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Type III</td>
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preferences are likely to translate into policy outcomes. The former Soviet Union represented an extremely state-controlled domestic structure with a highly centralized decision making apparatus. Its top leadership controlled which voices it wanted to listen to domestically; therefore, policy reflected the leadership’s preferences.\textsuperscript{79} In contrast, when decision making authority is decentralized, the impact of individual appeals on policy choice will depend on the domestic salience of the international rule or norm. When state-societal relations are close, such as a Type II state, societal appeals are expected to influence decision makers’ policy preferences; conversely, when they are distant, as in a Type III state, bureaucratic battles ensue.\textsuperscript{80} In a type III structure, decision making authority is dispersed across functionally differentiated arms of the government. Since state-societal relations are distant in this structure state behavior is contingent on the actions and interests of government officials. One advantage of Cortell and Davis’s typology is that it is not limited to liberal democratic states. Autocratic regimes are also represented in their analysis by their degree of centralization and openness to societal demands. Research by Daniel Thomas, Jeffrey Checkel, and Matthew Evangelista affirm that structural approaches that link domestic salience to regime type are applicable to

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{79} Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 40, no. 4 (1996), 455-56. \\
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Domestic structural analysis is a useful tool for mapping the influence of executives, elite coalitions, the legislature, and society.

Later, Susan Peterson and David Auerswald extended Cortell and Davis’s research to demonstrate the direct influence of state structure – and society’s influence thru that structure – on international security outcomes. Peterson argues that the international bargaining and negotiating process is influenced by domestic political factors determined by the state structure. Her model of domestic influence is measured across two dimensions. The first is the ability of the state to respond to a conflict depends on the “structure of the foreign policy executive.” This dimension defines the executive’s autonomy from the government bureaucracy. Executive autonomy affects the freedom of action of the executive; the greater number of government offices with a decision making role, the less freedom of action of the executive. The second dimension – the “degree of executive autonomy from the legislature” – defines the organization of foreign policy authority. The legislature exerts influence in two ways. National

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legislatures may possess the authority to make foreign policy during a crisis. The legislature also exerts control over the executive through the executive’s dependence on the legislature for tenure in office. In this manner, the legislature serves as the conduit for societal pressures on the executive. Although this seems to be an ineffective measure of societal influence, Peterson argues that in the area of crisis decision making private actors can only exercise binding influence through the national legislature.\textsuperscript{84}

The significant feature of Peterson’s work is that it makes specific determinations of state policy processes based on a state’s typology. She distinguishes four types of domestic political structures, each producing a different kind of bargaining behavior. By distinguishing between types, she predicts when cognitive or bureaucratic theories should dominate the domestic debate. Peterson’s theory convincingly demonstrates the influence of domestic political structure and processes on foreign policy formulation.

One key point inherent in domestic structural theorizing is that variation in structural context will exist based on the policy debate. For instance, in the American case, foreign security policy reflects a fairly centralized structure while U.S. trade policy reflects a more decentralized structure with more congressional and special interest group participation.\textsuperscript{85} Accordingly one must identify the proper domestic structure for the given policy debate.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 27-28.
Domestic structure research convincingly argues that states’ foreign policies are not simply the result of international constraints defined by power, but also vary with regard to the executive’s willingness and political ability to respond to systemic necessities. The research demonstrates that domestic political processes help to shape a state’s definition of the national interest and its ability to implement it. Content and consistency of foreign policy result as much from the constraints of domestic structures as from international systemic influences. One must determine the influence of both international and domestic factors for an adequate analysis of international political interaction. Domestic and international analyses are complementary in explaining international outcomes. The political causes and consequences of international problems should be explained from the perspective of domestic politics, as well as from the perspective of systemic influences.

The discussion of structural approaches highlights the need to understand the beliefs and biases of key leaders. As shown in Peterson’s typology, the beliefs and interests that are shared by a state’s leaders – and its support groups form an important motivational basis for the overall direction a state will take in its foreign policy. One cannot understand a state’s foreign policy only through structures, but must also understand the biases and influences of key constituencies in the foreign policy process. Structure determines the key constituencies for a given issue.
**Bringing the Man Back in – Individual Influences on Foreign Policy**

Most scholarship on alliances and burden sharing assume a homogeneous unit of action or – if heterogeneous units are posited – assume a rational actor as decision maker. However, the images that elites and publics hold of other actors, and about ends, means, and effective strategies, are important sources of international behavior. This argument extends the cognitive arguments first proffered by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin that recognize that state outcomes are actually the result of the sequential decisions of leaders who actually constitute the state. Rather than assume that states are monolithic and have well-defined interests, Snyder, et al, called for an “examination of the beliefs, values, and goals of decision making elites who act as the state in foreign policy.” Instead of international outcomes, one must look at actual foreign policy decisions to determine why states behave as they do. Foreign policy, in this view, can best be described as an unending sequence of problem-solving tasks accomplished by goal-oriented elites who operate within organizational and cognitive constraints. This problem-solving perspective implies that decision makers consider goals, policy alternatives, and a feedback or monitoring system to estimate progress toward achievement of those goals. Due to their complex nature, foreign policy problems are rarely if ever “solved,” but rather produce consequences that serve as the seed of new problems. Additionally,

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decisions are not rational, but rather a collection of biased decisions. In this view, the appropriate means of achieving a particular foreign policy objective is influenced by decision maker beliefs of other actors, ends, means, and effective strategies. Since national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence of cognition and historical learning are critical to understanding nation-state foreign policy decisions. Developments in political psychology and learning theory can inform systemic and state level arguments on the influences of cognitive constraints on rational decision making.89

**Cognitive Influences – Historical Analogy and Learning**

The effect of historical learning and cognition has received increasing attention in international relations literature.90 The psychology of analogical, or historical, reasoning begins with the recognition that human beings are cognitively limited when trying to reason through complex situations. Leaders often face considerable uncertainty and complexity when trying to predict the outcomes of foreign policy actions. In order to understand how leaders make foreign policy, it is necessary to address how leaders deal with uncertainty.

A growing body of scholarship is emerging to understand elite beliefs through the role of learning and historical analogy. Learning in this context means the application of information from past experience to facilitate understanding of a particular policy

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question. This scholarship posits that national security and foreign policy decisions are influenced heavily by the formative experiences of key policy makers. Policy becomes the product of individual political actors who influence government decisions through their roles and influence in the decision making structure. Decision makers learning from similar or analogous situations provide insight into their beliefs and their view of the international system.

Robert Jervis highlighted the need to incorporate cognitive learning into the analysis of decision maker policy choices. By illustrating that decision makers are influenced by historical events and cognitive biases he demonstrates that the rational assumption of economic and realist approaches is somewhat questionable. Leaders often face considerable uncertainty and complexity when trying to predict foreign policy

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outcomes. In order to understand foreign policy behavior, one must address how leaders and elites deal with uncertainty. The cognitive influence through learning literature provides a means for determining the influence of decision makers’ experiences on foreign policy processes and outcomes.

The cognitive influence literature shares one core assumption, that decision makers use mental knowledge structures – or schema – to cope with incomplete information and complexity. A schema is a person’s individual theory about how the social or political world works. It is typically derived by generalizing across experiences. This schema provides the knowledge structure where decision makers sort and interpret information. Schemas are necessary for interpreting information and for forming understanding from that information. Schemas not only allow decision makers to interpret incoming information, but they also allow him to go beyond the information given, and “fill-in” for missing information allowing a more complete picture.\(^94\)

Schemas explain how decision makers reduce complex cognitive tasks into more manageable set of diagnostic tasks. The complexities of the international environment place heavy information processing demands on decision makers. Decision makers are hampered by too little information, or a blizzard of information on which they must make inferences. Information is never perfect with regard to the motives or intentions of other actors, and therefore decision makers are forced to draw inferences from available

information. Decision makers’ limited capacities for processing this conflicting and ambiguous information lead them to become cognitive misers in that they tend to resort to cognitive “shortcuts” to understand their environment. This process tends to order an otherwise incomprehensible mess of information and experience. Decision makers develop shortcuts, rules of thumb, and “heuristics” from their schema for organizing mass amounts of information into a usable form. They allow one to analyze a phenomenon, extract cues from the environment, and then develop an explanatory framework from based on analogy.

Historical analogy is the method that decision makers build and test these cognitive schemas. Decision makers tend to draw lessons from experience to help cope with difficult choices. Learning and attribution theory contends that previous experience in similar circumstances affects learning behavior shaping future perceptions. Individuals tend to rely on historical analogies, a comparison of some past

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98 Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (1994), 491. See also
experience with a current decision problem, so that some important aspect of the past experience may lend insight into the current problem. Experimental studies have found that, when faced with complex situations requiring significant cognitive effort, subjects will use analogy to a previous significant event to facilitate generalization. Analogies become intellectual devices called upon by policy makers to perform a set of diagnostic tasks relevant to political decision making. They help policy makers perform critical diagnostic tasks crucial to the political decision making process. These tasks include helping to define the nature of the situation, helping assess risk, provide prescriptions, predict chances of “success,” evaluating moral “rightness,” and warning about the dangers of other options. These decision making heuristics can be both a powerful means of dealing with a complex environment and a major source of misperception and error.

In the first major work on the use of analogy, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May discovered that major U.S. governmental decisions of the past fifty years revealed a chronic avoidance or misuse of historical precedents. Drawing upon knowledge derived from a decade of teaching a course titled “Uses of History,” they proffered a primer on analogy for decision makers. Through process tracing and case study evidence, they observed that

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102 Ibid., 10.
good historical analogy was presented in policy debates but was eventually ignored or
misused by senior decision makers. To more correctly implement analogy in policy
discussions, they focus on a set of analytical techniques for separating known facts from
presumptions. Their observations claim that presumptions, rather than facts, all too often
become the determinants of government policy. To correct this problem they argue for a
rigorous methodology that make these presumptions explicit, allowing analytical
exploration.\textsuperscript{104} Decision makers should use history to visualize issues as time-streams
rather than isolated events. Seeing the numerous historical events that influence a current
event can reframe the decision maker to see “other possible futures.”\textsuperscript{105} This work
provided an excellent tool for helping decision makers sharpen their use of analogy, but
falls short in providing a theoretical framework for understanding how to predict the
influence of analogy on decision making.

Yuen Khong, in \textit{Analogies at War}, demonstrated that historical lessons are used
for more than advocacy. Khong finds that analogies – regardless of whether they are
correctly drawn or not – matter greatly. Historical learning and analogy provides an
influential methodology for individual and group decision making in the selection and
rejection of policy options.\textsuperscript{106} Khong analyzes in detail the influence of analogy on
Johnson administration selection and evaluation of Vietnam policy options. Khong
extends the arguments of Neustadt, May, and Jervis on how policymakers misuse the

\textsuperscript{104} Neustadt and May, \textit{Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers}, 232-46.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 247-70.
“lessons of history” by showing convincingly showing how analogies enter into the
decision making process and more importantly by providing a theoretical explanation.
Khong uses cognitive theory to show that the same analogical reasoning that produces
gross policy error enables people to comprehend and process information about the world
in complex situations. When no knowledge structure fits observed events, decision
makers may invoke close matches to understand the situation. Khong directly confronts
the counter-argument that analogies are merely post hoc justification of policy options.
Using public and private deliberations of the Vietnam policy debate, he convincingly
finds that officials repeatedly used analogies in private, even when others challenged
their relevance.\textsuperscript{107} Although Khong provides an excellent framework for explaining the
use of history – especially poor uses of history – in the policy process, however, this
framework provides no predictive capability to highlight which historical events would
be salient to decision makers.

Dan Reiter further extends early learning theory into the alliance realm by
developing a theory of learning that assists one’s understanding of how and why small
states make the alliance choices they do. In \textit{Crucible of Beliefs}, Reiter advances three
learning propositions: 1) lessons are drawn infrequently; 2) they are most often taken
from high-impact, politically significant events; and 3) when drawn, lessons reflect the
desire to repeat past successes and avoid past failures.\textsuperscript{108} He argues that a state’s
individual experience in a formative event (in this case major wars) often determines

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 251-63.
\textsuperscript{108} Reiter, \textit{Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars}, 3.
alliance choices in future years. Small states, especially, will learn from alliance successes and failures – previous “success” causes a state to maintain a course of action (alliance or neutrality), while “failure” will change their course of action. Reiter supplements learning theory by developing parameters where historical learning will translate into policy outcomes. He maintains that high-impact – vivid -- formative events shape decision makers beliefs to the point where they strongly influence thinking about international relations and foreign policy behavior.\textsuperscript{109} He argues that a state’s political system and domestic structure has a significant effect on the influence of formative events on foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{110} Like Khong, Reiter finds that use of past experience does not necessarily make better policy, only that policy dilemmas are framed as repetitions of past formative experiences. Using past experience is often disastrous due to unrecognized changes in pertinent political or military factors. Reiter adds a predictive element to learning theory by teasing out the elements of formative events. Events significant in political and human terms are more likely to be formative.\textsuperscript{111}

The dominating effects of a formative experience on alliance policy can last for decades after the formative event. Unfortunately, framing a current decision problem based on past experience can be disastrous because of unrecognized changes in important political or military factors. Not only is analogous learning dangerous, but states do not seem to learn from others’ experience. While states draw heavily on their own individual

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 183-202.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 210.
experiences, they pay little attention to those of other states in the same formative event. In effect, decision makers ignore pertinent information that does not accrue from their own collective experience. These findings have important implications for international relations scholarship. If formative events do drive beliefs, then our theories should account for the role of beliefs and learning in forming foreign policy. Reiter’s analysis provides a predictive framework for predicting the effects of learning. Vivid, recent, formative events are likely to frame foreign policy decisions.

Although a significant contribution to learning theory, Reiter’s analysis contains several weaknesses. One significant weakness of his learning hypothesis is that he does not thoroughly explain his unit of analysis. Reiter’s analysis of learning suggests that it is the state that learns lessons from formative experiences rather individuals. He makes this assumption to provide a parsimonious theory of historical learning, however, this assumption begs the question of what happens when decision makers within a state learn divergent lessons from a formative event. Missing in his analysis is a causal mechanism through which diverging lessons are aggregated into foreign policy. Additionally, Reiter’s learning theory only applies to small powers. Although he posits that this theory ought to apply to great power interactions, Reiter provides no analysis of this hypothesis. Additionally he fails to specify when systemic, or state level factors, would influence decision makers more than learning. Reiter fails to specify when

\[112\] Ibid., 203-04.
\[113\] Ibid.
external factors, such as level of immediate threat, may overcome decision maker bias based on learning.

Scholars who work with cognitive approaches contend cognitive and attribution theories explain outcomes that cannot be explained only by systemic factors.\textsuperscript{114} However, neither of these cognitive approaches proves adequate to provide a theory of foreign policy behavior individually. Instead of replacing the realist or liberal paradigms, cognitive theories more stringently specify the conditions in which realist or liberal predictions should dominate. The learning thesis helps explain why like states react differently in similar circumstances. Each largely explains decision making behavior in the context of existing systemic and unit level constraints. The results of the cognitive research tradition encourage the conclusion that one must account for decision makers experiences and beliefs to explain state foreign policy behavior.

The scholarly literature examining the interaction between domestic politics, foreign policy, and international relations indicates a growing consensus emerging among scholars on the need to integrate individual-level, unit-level, and systemic-level variables to understand state actions in the international environment. Most existing empirical research does not incorporate multi-level methodology but rather chooses the international environment, domestic politics, or decision making processes as the primary frame of reference to explain foreign policy behavior. As a result, parsimony is valued over decreased explanatory power. The process of learning makes strategic assumptions,

\textsuperscript{114} Jervis, \textit{Perception and Misperception in International Politics}. 
The Role of Legitimacy

Concerns about international legitimacy play an integral role in burden sharing decisions. For example, legitimacy concerns dominated the criticisms of the U.S. involvement in the 2003 Iraq war; critics of the intervention argued that the U.S. failure to gain legitimacy in the form of a United Nations Security Council mandate to use force resulted in an unacceptable aggression on the part of the United States. The argument continues that military participation was limited—compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf War—due to the influence of legitimacy, as states did not want to participate in an illegitimate military intervention. Though this argument has received robust attention in popular media circles, however, it fails to sufficiently explain the instances participation in the Iraq coalition. If legitimacy concerns dominate a state’s decision to enter a coalition, this research should find that decision making elites were concerned with gaining international sanction. Based on this assumption, one would expect to see greater participation in the Iraq War coalition once the UN Security Council approved international participation. This section probes the influence of legitimacy on multilateral coalitions. I first review the relevant literature defining legitimacy and its influence on state interaction. I then outline an analytical approach for determining the influence of legitimacy on foreign policy outcomes. The aim of this section is to separate the
influence of legitimacy concerns from other influences such as material interest and power.

For the purposes of this research, legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution should be obeyed.\textsuperscript{115} Legitimacy may gain its influence from the substance of the rule, termed substantive legitimacy, or from the procedure or source by which it was constituted, termed procedural legitimacy. Substantive legitimacy reflects the belief that international norms are an important element of social behavior. This social theory of normative influence emerged in the wake of the Cold War to understand the social dimensions of international relations and the possibility of change. Constructivism extends the social theory argument by focusing on the constitutive role of norms and shared understandings, as well as the relationship between agency and structure.\textsuperscript{116} According scholars subscribing to the substantive argument, states abide by international norms because those norms reflect and constitute acceptable behavior in a society of states.\textsuperscript{117} Martha Finnemore, a proponent of the idea of substantive legitimacy, argues that a norm is emerging requiring the multilateral use of military force. Finnemore equates unilateral use of force with naked aggression; wide collaboration with a community of states is necessary to ensure that force is used responsibly within the international community. International politics expects that states \textit{ought} only to use

\textsuperscript{115} This definition contains several critical aspects which separate legitimacy from other motives for state behavior. Essential is the distinction that a rule OR institution may provide the normative belief. See Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," \textit{International Organization} 53, no. 2 (1999), 381.

\textsuperscript{116} Wendt, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics}.

military force with the approval and participation of other states, or they will likely face condemnation from other states.\textsuperscript{118} Essential in Finnemore’s distinction is that the unilateral use of force for interventions is normatively rejected. This model of action recognizes that a state’s participation in a coalition reflects their approval of the military action. This normative argument, however, is undermined if those norms and ideas are simply the beliefs and dictates of the most powerful states in the international system. Empirically one must separate normative interests from material interests to argue the strength of normative beliefs. Policy responses perceived as legitimate may be guided by considerations of relative power and national interests rather than genuine normative beliefs. Additionally, normative arguments suffer when prevailing norms in the international system conflict with each other.

In contrast, procedural legitimacy arguments reflect the neo-liberal internationalists’ viewpoint that behavior is legitimated when it is approved by legitimate international institutions.\textsuperscript{119} Inis Claude, Jr. argues that international institutions such as the United Nations provide political authority through collective legitimization. In this school of thought, states are keenly conscious of the need for consensus by a large and impressive a body of other states to provide multilateral endorsement of their positions.

providing collective legitimization. According to Claude, “the world organization [United Nations] has come to be regarded, and used, as a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states, including, but going far beyond, their claims to status as independent members of the international system.”

U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan reflected this view when he declared, “When states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.” In terms of procedural legitimacy, however one must again separate interests based on power versus interests based on legitimacy. The policies and procedures necessary to gain procedural legitimacy often amount to little more than ceding individual power to others. Analytically, one must separate power motivations from those based on the legitimating effect of the process. Does the U.N. provide legitimacy because of an internationally recognized process for approving force, or because it constrains the great powers?

Though substantive and procedural legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, they do invoke different arguments to justify the use of force and therefore should influence burden sharing differently. The use of military force in Kosovo highlights the significant differences between these two ways of thinking about legitimacy. NATO’s military

121 Ibid., 367.  
action in Kosovo was legitimized primarily on substantive grounds under the argument for human rights and self-determination; however, it lacked procedural legitimacy since the intervention never garnered the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council. The Kosovo scenario highlights that sources of—and arguments for—legitimacy must be unpacked to determine the causal role of legitimacy on influencing state behavior. Understanding the causal role of legitimacy arguments is essential to understanding the bargaining behavior and ultimately the burden sharing behavior of states. If legitimacy arguments are truly normative, one should not expect any support for a security coalition deemed illegitimate. On the other hand, if legitimacy arguments are instead intended to increase audience costs, then illegitimacy merely increases the bargaining stakes.

The role of legitimacy rests on the foundation of state motivation for action: do states support coalitions because of the legitimacy that it provides, or do they support for state material interests? Realist scholars argue that state behavior is most often influenced by narrowly defined self-interests and that legitimacy arguments are intended to bind the power of stronger nations through the controlling authority of international institutions. To determine the influence of legitimacy on burden sharing, one must examine state motivations for supporting or opposing a given coalition effort.

The idea of social control is central to understanding the motivations for legitimacy arguments. Social control refers to the social mechanisms that regulate behavior, leading to conformity and compliances to the rules of a given society or social

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group. Max Weber introduces the influence legitimacy on social control and order.\textsuperscript{124} For Weber and later social theorists, political authority is strengthened by a population’s belief that the authority is legitimate. In the absence of legitimacy, political actors have to rely on more costly social control mechanisms as a means of control. Social control literature outlines three motivations for rule following:

1. The actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers;
2. The actor sees the rule as in its own self-interest; and
3. The actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed.\textsuperscript{125}

Each of these motivations activates a different compliance mechanism with distinct distinguishing characteristics.

The first motivation for compliance identified in social control literature is fear of punishment from the stronger power; in the absence of legitimacy, political actors have to rely on more costly methods, such as punishment, to encourage participation. Punishment is the use of asymmetrical power, or threats, to change the behavior of weaker states. A state obeys a rule because it is motivated by the fear of punishment from the stronger power. The rule itself is irrelevant except as a signal for what behaviors will and will not incur a penalty. This conception of authority is paramount in Steven Waltz’s conception of the international system. According to Waltz, “states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal

rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them.\footnote{Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, 94.}

Strong states set the rules and coerce weaker states to comply due to power asymmetries. Coercion is a simple form of social control; however, it is inefficient because it does not provoke voluntary compliance. Empirically, compliance based on coercion should be easy to observe. In coercive situations, one should see threats to generate compliance. For example, Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact was based primarily on the threat of punishment rather than legitimacy.

The second possible motivation for compliance with rules in social control literature is the belief that compliance promotes one’s self-interest. This view suggests that rule following is the result of an instrumental and calculated assessment of the net benefits of compliance.\footnote{Self-interest is the basis of rational choice theory. All rational choice theories assume individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and constraints facing them. See Ferejohn John and Debra Satz, "Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory," \textit{Critical Review} 9, no. 1/2 (1995), Robert O. Keohane, "Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations," \textit{The Journal of Legal Studies} 31, no. 1 (2002), Alexander Thompson, "Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls," \textit{The Journal of Legal Studies} 31, no. 1 (2002). For a critique see Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, \textit{Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science} (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).} The task of governing authorities is to structure incentives so that members comply because it is the most attractive option. If the system correctly manages incentives, self-interest should encourage rule following. Social interaction is seen as an exchange and social obligations as contracts; the fundamental political act is consent to a contract. Self-interest needs to be carefully defined so that it does not subsume all other categories of social control. Self-interest motivations differ from coercive motivations in that self-interest is a positive incentive where coercion is a
negative incentive. A self-interest perspective leaves the actor better off by taking the rule *obeying* path, while coercion leaves the actor worse off for deviating from the desired rule. Self-interest involves self-restraint while coercion requires external restraint. Actors making decisions based on self-interest will exhibit certain characteristics. Actors will constantly assess the costs and benefits of a system and will stand ready to abandon it immediately should some alternative provide greater utility. In this sense, self-interested actors are inclined towards revisionism rather than the status quo. David Beetham highlights the weakness of the self-interest approach: “To explain all action conforming to rules as the product of a self-interested calculation of the consequences of breaching them is to elevate the attributes of the criminal into the standard for the whole of humankind.”

Finally, compliance with a rule may result from the belief in the normative legitimacy of the rule, or in the legitimacy of the organization that generated the rule. Compliance becomes voluntary when an actor believes that the rule itself is legitimate. Compliance is no longer motivated by fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but rather by an internal sense of moral obligation. Legitimacy as a method of

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128 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 385-87.
129 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
social control has efficiency advantages over coercion and self-interest. According to Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, “legitimacy is not indispensable to all control. Nevertheless, lack of legitimacy imposes heavy costs on the controllers.”¹³² This efficiency advantage was noted by Hans Morgenthau, “Power exercised with moral or legal authority must be distinguished from naked power…legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power.”¹³³ Additionally, Morgenthau affirms that international organizations, such as the U.N., confer legitimacy on a military effort, “Power exercised in self-defense or in the name of the United Nations has a better chance to succeed than equivalent power exercised by an ‘aggressor’ nation or in violation of international law.”¹³⁴ The Security Council is an exemplar for demonstrating the effect of legitimacy since its leverage resides almost exclusively in the perceived legitimacy its decisions grant to forceful actions. States appear more willing to cooperate voluntarily once the Security Council has approved a use of force.¹³⁵

**Summary**

This review of international relations literature demonstrates that no single analytical outlook can explain state alliance behavior. Systemic theories such as economic or realist theories describe the systemic forces that define a state’s decision described as output legitimacy Friedrich Kratochwil, "On Legitimacy," *International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2006).

¹³² As quoted in Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 388.
¹³⁴ Ibid.
space, but these theories do not explain decision outcomes. Systemic theories are unable to explain the foreign policies of individual states because they explain away the effects of state level variation. For instance, balance of threat theory predicts that states will balance against an external threat, but it cannot explain how a state is perceived as a threat in the first place. Balance of threat theory treats threat perception as an exogenous variable rather than something that is constructed over a period of time. Economic theory explains the problems initiating and executing a collective action event. Small states are likely to take advantage of large states because the contributions of smaller states are less likely to influence the outcome of a security effort. The weakness of economic approaches is that they are agnostic to political reasons for allying. It fails to explain significant contributions as a result of side-payments, bargaining, or alliance dependence. For coalitions, states engage in a series of negotiations that determine the level of burden sharing. Turkey was willing to lend significant support to the U.S. coalition in Iraq as long as significant side payments were paid for their support.

In most coalition burden sharing situations, states have choices that can be explained in terms of domestic politics and goals of key actors. State-level analytical approaches are necessary to explain the influence of domestic politics and society on foreign policy decisions. Domestic structure research convincingly demonstrates the influence of differing domestic structure on state foreign policy. States’ foreign policies are not simply the result of international constraints defined by power, but also vary according to the executive’s willingness and political ability to respond to systemic
necessities. The research demonstrates that domestic political processes help to shape a state’s definition of the national interest and its ability to implement it. Content and consistency of foreign policy result as much from the constraints of domestic structures as from international systemic influences. However, one cannot understand a state’s foreign policy merely through structures. Scholars must also understand the biases and influences of key constituencies in the foreign policy process to determine how structure translates these influences into policy. A theory of individual influence is necessary to complete the picture since foreign policy is the culmination of many individual lessons from history that form decision maker’s beliefs.

Finally, individual and cognitive theoretical approaches explain the influence of individuals’ beliefs on foreign policy. Cognitive approaches provide a methodology for exploring the influence of decision maker experience and beliefs the formulation of effective foreign policy strategies. John Lewis Gaddis maintains that every U.S. presidential administration has “certain assumptions about American interests in the world, potential threats to them and feasible responses, which tend to be formed before or just after an administration takes office.”\textsuperscript{136} This highlights the influence of past experience on future policy choices; decision makers may be predisposed to certain coalition choices regardless of systemic pressures. Common ideologies, perceptions of threat, domestic and societal influences, and individual motivations all affect foreign policy outcomes in some respect.

Scholarship since the end of the Cold War reflects the general attitude that the facts of international relations are multidimensional and therefore have multiple causes. This conclusion supported, and in turn was supported by, the related view that multiple interdependent theories are required to explain the complexity of state relations. This discussion of alliances and coalitions suggests that parsimonious theories of alliances do not adequately explain coalition or alliance burden sharing decisions. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, in their exhaustive quantitative study of alliances suggest that a generalized theory of alliance has limited validity. They suggest that theories provide a useful starting point but one must examine the effects of intervening variables in order to define the scope and limits of alternative explanations of causes and effects. To generalize to the highest level, parsimonious theories often miss relationships among variables, or are not expected to explain the complexities of foreign policy decisions. To determine foreign policy behavior, multi-causal analysis is necessary to explain causal relationships found in foreign policy decisions. Integrated models offer a methodology to explain foreign policy behavior by determining the contingent conditions when a particular theory is applicable. An integrated model offers a method to explain complex behavior by allowing the scholar to extend mono-causal approaches to the multifaceted nature of real-world decisions.

137 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 219-26.
The next chapter explores an integrated model developed to explain burden sharing behavior. The model incorporates the dominant theories discussed to explain the contingent conditions when each theory applies. The biggest drawback with this integrative model – and integrating models in general -- is their lack of parsimony. Integrated theories are complex, but so is foreign policy formulation.
CHAPTER THREE

INTEGRATIVE FOREIGN POLICY MODELS AND METHODOLOGY

Since burden sharing decisions lie at the intersection of domestic and international politics, only an integrative model can explain the spectrum of constraints and opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system, as well as the capabilities to act accounting for domestic political constraints. As shown in chapter two, the leaders of coalition nations must act within the spectrum of constraints and opportunities that are defined by each nation’s domestic political structures. When domestic political considerations are not included in the study of foreign policy, researchers are limited to developing a set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for foreign policy decision making.¹ The foreign policy decision maker must answer to an international audience that includes other political leaders, international organizations, and regional institutions. The international arena establishes the attributes of the executives menu of available choices for a particular foreign policy decision. Systemic theories, based only on the international environment, however are incomplete because they do not explain domestic constraints on choices and ignore domestic forces that motivate state executives. Domestically, the executive must answer to an audience that includes supporters, critics, agents responsible for execution of policy, and most

importantly, challengers for the leadership position. However, domestic models alone
do not explain national motivations for foreign policy choices. The domestic audience
shapes and is shaped by the international environment, but each alone only partially
explains why states make the foreign policy decisions that they make. Integrated models
provide attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when
simpler, existing theories have an uneven track record in explaining complex outcomes.

Two burden sharing models currently exist that attempt to explain the influence of
domestic and international factors on security decisions. In “Wars of Choice: An
Integrated Decision Model of NATO policy in Kosovo,” David Auerswald presents an
integrated model explaining state decisions for participation in the 1999 Operation Allied
Force. He examines the variation in burden sharing in NATO’s intervention using four
relatively sparse, existing approaches to foreign policy analysis: theories of collective
action, balance of threat, public opinion, and government institutional structures. In his
analysis, Auerswald developed a simple, integrated, decision making model that
incorporates the core concepts from each existing explanation in a staged, conditional
manner. Auerswald’s research demonstrates that the integrated model is more
explanatory than each theory individually. Although Auerswald’s model provides a
parsimonious explanation for NATO burden sharing in Kosovo, it suffers from two
significant weaknesses. First, Auerswald’s analysis is limited to “wars of choice” where

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2 Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: W.H.
Freeman, 1989), 21-25.
3 See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."
4 Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."
direct threat is insignificant. He states, “I assume that no group member’s survival is threatened, an assumption consistent with the vast majority of contemporary interventions of choice by western powers.”

Although this restriction was valid for the Kosovo intervention, it limits the generalizability of the model. Since the model fails to account for threat, it does not account for the dynamics of burden sharing where the adversary directly threatens some members of the coalition. The integrated model does not explain Saudi Arabia’s participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, since it was not a war of choice for the kingdom. The second limitation of the model is that it assumes knowledge of the “K-Group,” or collective action core group, in advance. Outcomes significantly change whether one is a member of the collective action core, but the designation of the group is tautological in Auerswald’s analysis. K-Group membership is exogenous to the model, but determination of group membership is typically determined by level of support for a particular intervention. Determining K-Group members in advance is difficult methodologically. Membership in the core of a collective action group is often the product of “strategic behavior” that Auerswald admits is missing from the model. In total, Auerswald’s model is a useful, but limited, analysis tool.

The second burden sharing model was proffered by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger to explain burden sharing decisions in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Bennett, Lepgold, Unger model is a typological theory that accounts for these international, domestic, and cognitive influences. It incorporates the same external

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5 Ibid., 643.
6 Ibid., 658.
factors as the Auerswald model, but also accounts for threat in a state’s decision calculus. The strength of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model is that it accounts for a greater range of interventions than the Auerswald model. This model accounts for complex interactions between independent variables, and provides multiple causal paths to outcomes. It is not limited to a certain subset of interventions and therefore is generalizable to a wider range of security interventions.

This chapter introduces the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security decision model and discusses the operationalization of the model for this study. The strengths and weaknesses of the model will be reviewed. Finally, I offer a modified model that accounts for the weaknesses of the current model and enhances its predictive value. Finally, I address methodology and case selection in evaluating the security model.

**Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger Security Model**

Recognizing the failure of any single existing literature to explain the first Gulf War burden sharing decisions, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger developed a coalition decision model that integrates the dominant theories of alliance burden behavior. The Desert Storm episode presented empirical anomalies for theories of collective action and burden sharing. According to collective action theory, or the economic theory of alliances, small states will ride free or give minimal contributions to an alliance because their limited resources will have a small impact on the amount of security provided. Even in cases where a state has a large stake in the outcome they will tend to free ride

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7 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War*. For an earlier version of the model see Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War."
because the largest alliance members would provide the collective good. Free riding is especially prevalent in cases where the benefits are non-excludable and indivisible.\(^8\) The existence of free riding results in three logical outcomes. First, collective action is very difficult to initiate when there is a large coalition, with no dominant member, that provides the public good. When the group interested in a public good is large, and the share of the total benefit that goes to any single actor is small, no individual has an incentive to contribute to provide the good. Second, collective action arrangements typically provide a Pareto suboptimal amount of security. Sub-optimality occurs because a contributor to a public good can obtain only part of the marginal utility from one more unit of contribution to that good. As a result, each contributor only increases the total level up the point where marginal utility is equal to marginal cost which is lower than the optimal level for the group.\(^9\) Finally, the burden will likely be disproportionately borne by the member states that are significantly larger than the rest. This occurs because contributions of those states can significantly affect the outcome of a collective action effort. In contrast, a small contributor can only make marginal contributions to the common effort.\(^10\) As shown in Chapter 2, even under the joint product and impure public good economic models, there is wide agreement that relative economic size correlates well with alliance contributions. However, burden sharing is likely to be more

\(^8\) See discussion of collective action theory in Chapter 2.

Unfortunately for collective action theory, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a striking example of robust burden sharing across the war coalition. Major financial contributions from Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait virtually offset all U.S. military financial costs. Combined with the large military contributions by Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, and Syria, it is difficult to argue that the United States shared a disproportional burden. The United States organized a collective action coalition and committed itself to leading a major military operation against Iraq before the pledges of military support or reimbursement from potential partners. After committing so publicly to the reinstatement of Kuwaiti sovereignty, collective action theory predicts that the United States would be forced to bear a disproportionate cost for the operation since the U.S. committed a significant operational capability to the effort. Instead, coalition nations robustly supported materially, diplomatically, and financially. The Gulf War episode demonstrated that foreign policy decisions rarely adhere to a single theoretical conception, but rather are complex interactions which are influenced by numerous competing factors.

Bennett, et al, in their qualitative study of the Gulf War coalition, concluded that no one general theory of alliance behavior applied evenly across the coalition. Realist
theoretical perspectives most adequately described the actions of those states that were threatened by Hussein’s action, while alliance dependence factors influenced states that were predicted to ride free. Collective action theory, the foundation of most burden sharing theory, explained the U.S. initial commitment to defend Saudi Arabia, but fared poorly in explaining other state behavior with the exception of Iran, who benefited by weakening a revisionist Iraq. Once the United States committed to military action, other states had the opportunity to ride free as the U.S. had the capability to pursue their shared goals unilaterally. Yet many countries contributed to the coalition, even when it was not in their direct national interest. Bennett, et al, found that the U.S. was able to exploit the uncertainty in the structure of the international system to influence states to contribute to the coalition. American leaders, anticipating free riding, preempted it by offering a series of incentives and disincentives for coalition participation, arguing that Congress would not look favorably on non-participating allies, and promising future benefits for those that participated. U.S. pressure for support was hard to ignore in light of the uncertainty in the international system. Process tracing evidence indicated that several contributors were motivated by the expectation of future dependence on the United States in the post Cold War shift of power. After forty years of firm alignments, the structural discontinuity caused by the end of the Cold War produced anxiety, uncertainty, and hopes of reaping strategic rewards of new alignments.¹² For instance, President Özal of Turkey strongly supported the coalition, against the wishes of an anti-war public, in

hopes that this would cement Turkey’s role as an indispensable partner to the U.S.\textsuperscript{13} Bennett, et al, concluded that a complex confluence of external threat, domestic influence, executive leadership, and alliance dependence influenced the timing and composition of state burden sharing decisions.

To explain the contingent, complex interactions inherent in a burden sharing decision, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, developed an integrated, multi-level model that incorporates the dominant theories of alliance contribution to explain coalition burden sharing decisions. This model represents a significant contribution to the study of coalition behavior, but it has been relatively untested in coalitions other than the first Gulf War.\textsuperscript{14} Figure 3 presents the security decision making model. It is a typological theory that offers an alternative to prevailing alliance theories that only examine systemic or state level facets of a burden sharing decision. The model accounts for complex interactions between independent variables, and provides multiple causal paths to outcomes.

\textsuperscript{13} William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," \textit{International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)} 68, no. 4 (1992), George S. Harris, "U.S.-Turkish Relations," in \textit{Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy}, ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).

\textsuperscript{14} Only one study has compared the suitability of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security model, but robust theory testing remains incomplete, see Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, did perform a test of the model against UN action in Bosnia, however, the model has not been rigorously tested. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}. 
Independent Variables

The blocks depicted in the first three columns of the security decision making model represent the independent variables affecting foreign policy outcomes. Following is a discussion of the theoretical foundation supporting each block.

Cognitive Factors

Historical Learning. Chapter two demonstrated that most scholarship on alliances and burden sharing assumes that the nation-state is the significant unit of political action. However, studies employing a cognitive approach that focus on beliefs and images held by political elites provide a powerful source for understanding foreign
policy behavior. As discussed in chapter two, cognitive theory emerged to explain how decision makers deal with complexity and uncertainty. Process models can be applied to decision structures such as government to illustrate the influence of cognitive schema and biases on state decision making. In this construct, the state evolves from a strictly rational decision maker to one influenced by cognitive biases. State decisions become the accumulation of the sequential decisions of leaders and elites who constitute the decision making structure for a particular issue area. Foreign policy, in this view, can best be described as an unending sequence of problem-solving tasks accomplished by goal-oriented elites who operate within organizational and cognitive constraints. The appropriate means of achieving a particular foreign policy objective is influenced by decision maker beliefs of other actors, ends, means, and effective strategies.

Since national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence of cognition and historical learning are critical to understanding nation-state foreign policy decisions. Policy makers rely heavily on historical analogy to simplify and understand complex situations. A historical analogy provides a comparison of some past experience with a current decision problem, so that some important aspect of the past experience can provide an insight into the current problem. Analogy helps decision makers define the nature of the situation, assess the stakes, and provide policy

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17 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: an Approach to the Study of International Politics, 63.
prescriptions. Unfortunately, this use of analogy is often, resulting in poor policy choices. Policy makers tend to oversimplify complex lessons neglecting an important historical detail that leads to inappropriate analogizing and misguided policy choices. Additionally, vivid personal events are more likely to guide decision makers rather than other more relevant events. Decision makers tend to “learn” from events in which they were personally involved, rather than from others’ experiences. Historical learning through analogy can explain foreign policy outcomes that seem irrational when considered merely by systemic factors.

For this study, learning is the application of historical analogy from past experience to facilitate understanding of a particular policy question. Given the complexity of measuring cognitive beliefs and values, this study incorporates a simplified cognitive model that can offer useful predictions of state beliefs concerning coalition burden sharing. This analysis makes four assumptions on the influence of beliefs and choice heuristics on actors in their use of analogies to make decisions. These assumptions draw heavily on the methodology of Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger. First, a key component of beliefs consists of the lessons or analogies drawn from the past. Second, individuals rely on their particular society’s experiences as sources of lessons

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19 This definition builds on the work of Khong and Reiter in that it recognizes that decision-makers use analogy to simplify complex cognitive problems and that lessons are “learned” from past experience. See Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars.

20 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 14-17.
and analogies. Third, lessons and analogies are more likely to be influential if they involve events that are recent, vivid, evocative, personal, or of significant historical importance. Finally, decision makers who undergo similar experiences will tend to share dominant sets of analogies and lessons.

With these assumptions in mind, the case study analysis will consider the following beliefs in the historical lessons and learning module. First, the study will assess the motivation for collective action. Beliefs on the threat of Hussein to regional stability, and his capability to proliferate nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to terrorist organizations should affect perceptions of the public good of collective action. Beliefs about the likelihood of free riding should matter as well since state burden sharing decisions are influenced by expectations of the collective effort. Second, coalition contributions should be shaped by beliefs about the influence of force and diplomacy on external threats. Each state decision has the potential to be shaded by whether each state’s most important and recent experiences of using force were successful. Third, decisions should be influenced by perceptions of alliance dependence. States that recently experienced entrapment by an ally should be reluctant to contribute to the Iraq coalition. Conversely, states that experienced abandonment should be more likely to contribute if they believed that a failure to support an ally in an earlier case led to their abandonment. Additionally, states that suffered abandonment after supporting an ally should be even less likely to support another coalition without extreme guarantees. Finally, leaders should be more likely to contribute if they believed a failure to do so in
an earlier instance led to a domestic backlash. Conversely, if recent military intervention led to domestic backlash leaders should be wary of making major contributions to another coalition.

This study examines lessons, stated above, that chief executives, interest groups, government organizations, and the general public “learned” in previous burden sharing efforts. Since this study is concerned with historical lessons that influence the U.S. led intervention in Iraq, previous U.S. led military interventions in Kuwait/Iraq (1991, 1998), Bosnia (1994), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001) should be noteworthy in their influence on decision making. These interventions should provide a backdrop for most decision makers since one could expect costs and rewards for the Iraq effort to be influenced by outcomes from the previous coalitions. In particular, this study analyzes how participation or non-participation in the first Gulf conflict, Bosnia, and Kosovo affected beliefs on the cost benefit analysis for joining the U.S. in another coalition.

Learning beliefs will vary across constituencies; therefore, I will concentrate on the effects of the beliefs of key constituencies on decision makers such as chief executives. The influence of learning on the model is to determine how leaders embody and respond to the “lessons” of key constituencies, including public opinion.

According to the learning hypothesis, leaders will be more likely to contribute to an effort if they gained full participation rights, influenced decision making, and received compensation in the form of increased influence with the coalition leader, or material

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21 This will be a limited conception of learning, for more detail on a learning research program see Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield."
benefits, for their participation in previous efforts. Leaders will be less likely to contribute if they recently experienced alliance entrapment or abandonment. Leaders should be more likely to contribute if they believed a failure to do so in an earlier instance led to a domestic backlash, conversely, they would be less likely if participation generated domestic backlash.

Historical learning is expected to not only influence whether a state supports a coalition, but it is likely to affect the method and timing of support. Past “mistakes” or “successes” influence the makeup, duration, and timing of support. One lesson is the influence of timing on past coalition efforts. Early or late support to a coalition can influence the ingrained lessons learned. Early support runs the risk of entrapment in an action that grows well beyond the initial level of commitment. Additionally, joining a coalition too early runs the risk that a state’s effort is taken for granted because it did hold out in bargaining for a larger share of the coalition benefits. Late support, on the other hand, can be seen by the coalition leader as a lack of support, thereby running the risk of abandonment. On the other hand, late support may have saved a state from entrapment in a failed intervention.

For the Iraq War coalition, beliefs about the threat of Iraqi force compared to the possible destabilizing effects of a Middle East war should weigh heavily on decision makers. For Germany and Japan, the influence of being labeled “checkbook” participants in the first Gulf War should influence their level of military vice economic support. Since Britain was a full scale partner in the first intervention, and subsequent
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the learning hypothesis predicts robust military support. In contrast, Turkey’s support is expected to be highly contingent since the first Gulf War set off a series of economic disappointments and contributed to an ongoing insurgency with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

**International Factors**

International, or systemic factors, are those broad factors that define and shape the international environment and explain the interaction of external inducements and constraints on states foreign policy behavior. Systemic theory allows the understanding of the context of action before explaining unit level variation.

*Balance of Threat.* Since private versus collective incentives significantly influences burden sharing, the balance of threat block in the security decision model seeks to explain whether an ally considers the action a “war of choice,” or a necessary intervention to counter an existential threat. This block of the model aims to identify state motives for action. If a collective action, one can expect to see states attempt to free ride. On the other hand, if states consider the coalition as countering a significant threat, one can expect to see states robustly supporting the effort. Since collective action problems can be overcome when states have private incentives, the balance of threat block aims to explain contributions that are too large for the collective action proposition.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{22}\) The determination of threat is critical to determining the amount of publicness of the security intervention. A non-threatened ally will likely display collective action motivations, while a threatened ally
Based on Stephen Walt’s reformulation of balance of power theory, balance of threat theory identifies four factors—military capability, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions—that affect states’ perceptions of threat, allowing for a more nuanced understanding than balance of power theory of balancing motivations.  

This theory argues that states act to protect themselves from tangible threats instead of mere power differentials. Therefore, the main determinant of private benefits for a security action is the threat posed by the adversary. If the adversary threatens a particular state then that state has a “private good” explanation for contributing to a security coalition.

The question of how states identify threats is relevant to this study. Walt takes threat as given; threat is a composite of four factors; aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. There seems to be an assumption that the source of greatest threat is obvious to decision makers. Yet the question of how states actually identify threats is much more complex. Walt provides no guidance to how states prioritize among the four elements of threat: “One cannot determine a priori . . . which sources of threat will be most important in any given case; one can say only that

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all of them are likely to play a role.”

When analyzing an environment of multiple potential threats to a state, it is essential to unpack the bundle of independent variables Walt designates as encompassing threat. The differentiation of threat better defines the environmental conditions in which policy is formulated. The type of threat and adversary will have an obvious impact on policy choices.

Bennett, et al., incorporate Walt’s aggregate definition of threat in their security decision making model. Using the Walt model they assume that the most threatened states, and therefore most likely to share defense burdens, are those that are closest to Iraq. In the light of the strategic environment before the first Gulf War, that was a logical assumption; Iraq had just invaded Kuwait and seemed eager to annex Saudi oil fields. However, as the above discussion argues, threat perception is a function of the ordering of multiple sources of state threat. Walt’s elements of threat need to be disaggregated to ascertain what really drives alliance decisions.

When disaggregated, studies support constructivists’ assertion that identity and ideas are as important as material power in determining the influence of threat. States overwhelmingly identify ideological and political threats to internal stability, emanating from abroad, as more salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive

26 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, 24.
capabilities. Internal unrest threatening the existing government is perceived as
dangerous as a direct invasion.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, for many Persian Gulf states, a resurgent
Iraq may not be as threatening as an Iran, ideologically bent on causing domestic
disturbance to further its political agenda. Similarly, a weakened Iraq that does not check
Iranian influence may be more threatening to Gulf States than an Iraq under Saddam
Hussein. This argument does not discount the typical realist depictions of threat, but
rather emphasizes the influence of domestic and transnational political identity factors in
explaining threat perceptions. It looks to additional factors to help explain state choices
in an indeterminate structural environment.

This paper operationalizes the threat as a factor of material capability and
intentions to influence a state internally and externally. If military defeat is seen as the
most serious threat to regime security, then state decision makers should seek to balance
against the local state which is geographically closest and whose aggregate military
power capabilities are greatest. Even if that state’s intentions are not immediately hostile,
its power presents the most serious threat to state security because intentions can change
drastically and rapidly. Since the first Gulf War diminished Iraq’s power projection
capability, balance of threat effect should be most visible in states where Iraq could
potentially threaten with offensive WMD.\textsuperscript{30} If, on the other hand, ideational factors are

\textsuperscript{29} Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73."
Cooper, "State-Centric Balance-of-Threat Theory: Explaining the Misunderstood Gulf Cooperation
\textsuperscript{30} Although it is now known that Iraq did not have WMD capability for some time, overtly Iraq maintained
the threat of WMD that was seen as credible by many parties. This threat can be accounted for in balance
of threat theory. Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, "Saddam's Delusions: The View
seen as the most serious threat to security, then state leaders should balance against the state that manifests the most hostility toward their regimes, regardless of that state’s aggregate power and geographic proximity. Hostile intent is defined as public attempts by one state to destabilize another state’s ruling regime through propaganda, or support by one state for domestic or exile political groups opposed to another state’s ruling regime, or threatening with military or economic sanctions. In this instance, leaders do not see military capabilities by themselves as threatening, but rather view external threatening challenges to their domestic legitimacy and security as being more serious than threats based simply upon a preponderance of military capabilities. Hence, “five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the U.S. than five North Korean ones.”

In order to sharply between private and collective motivations for supporting a coalition, threat does not include public goods. Therefore, threat will be a function of Iraqi capability to influence, destabilize, or attack potential allies. Anxieties concerning Iraqi threats to world oil market stability will be included since oil destabilization could affect domestic stability.


31 This method of coding threat is seen in Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf."

32 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 255.
Table 8 shows the predictions of Middle East burden sharing based on balance of threat theory. The table disaggregates threat from hostile intentions. The first column shows the relative military strength in numbers of personnel in the active forces, reserves, and paramilitary organizations for the respective states. This represents the material capability for threatening local regimes. The second column illustrates the predicted balance arrangements based only on geographic proximity and military strength. Interestingly, based on material capability alone, Turkey becomes a threatening state due to the large size of its military forces. The third column shows hostile intent in the region based on ongoing disputes or claimed interference in domestic politics. Iran is a significant producer of hostile intent due to its desire to topple and replace Sunni monarchies with fundamentalist states. Incorporating capability and intentions, balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Active, Reserve, and Paramilitary (000)</th>
<th>Aggregate Power Threat</th>
<th>Aggregate Intentions Threat</th>
<th>Predicted Burden Sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2726</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria, Iraq, Iran</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iran (weak)</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Syria</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>Iraq, Iran</td>
<td>PKK (Iraq), Greece</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Bahrain</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iran (Weak)</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emirates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of threat theory predicts one can expect a significant contribution from the United States, Israel, Iran, Kuwait, and lesser contributions from the remaining states.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{Collective Action.} As shown in chapter two, lacking private incentives (threat), collective action theory aims to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. The second block in the security decision making model determines the level of private incentive for a particular situation. If a state perceives a threat, it is more likely to participate fully than if governed by collective security concerns. If collective action motivations dominate, however, small states are less likely to contribute to the collective good. Their burden sharing contributions are expected to be in an amount smaller than their size would suggest. The reason for the smaller expectation is due to how size affects marginal gains calculations. A state acting rationally is expected to increase the supply of a good until its marginal cost equals its marginal gain. However, when such reasoning leads a powerful state to contribute, less powerful states will be tempted to ride free because their efforts cannot be expected to secure much more of the collective good than what will be already supplied by the larger states.

Although collective goods theory predicts an under-contribution by smaller states, the theory says nothing about the relative contributions that states make in providing the public good. Neither does it make any predictions concerning the types of contributions. Most studies of collective action have concentrated on defense spending, although recent

\textsuperscript{33} The United States is included because it considered Iraqi WMD linked with Islamic terrorism a strategic threat.
studies have also looked at peacekeeping, and coalition contributions.\footnote{Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War.", Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, Bobrow and Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations.", David Dickins, "Can East Timor Be a Blueprint for Burden Sharing?", \textit{The Washington Quarterly} 25, no. 3 (2002), Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World."} The collective goods theory also does not account for the differing values that states will attach to the particular good in question.

According to collective action theory, the value of the collective good should influence state participation in a collective coalition. Those states that highly value a public good are expected to contribute significantly towards obtaining that good. Much of the political disagreement with the U.S. in the buildup to the Iraq War concerned the value or worth of the “public goods” for potential coalition allies. States clearly did not value the collective action equally. This observation conflicts with most of the existing literature on collective burden sharing. The majority of collective action studies of NATO assume that states equally value the “good.” In the Iraq War, however this assumption was not valid. To determine the collective benefits of the Iraq War, this study identifies three collective goods. First, the disarmament of Iraqi offensive weapons of mass destruction (WMD), second, the stability of global oil markets, and finally, the stabilization of the region through the removal of the Hussein regime. This study does not take that assumption as a given, in fact states are expected to have divergent views on the value of the “public good” the United States was positioned to provide.
The collective action hypothesis predicts that dominant states, measured in economic size and military spending, will pay more to secure the collective good.\textsuperscript{35} In the Iraq War case, the United States repeatedly demonstrated that it was willing to act unilaterally, thus smaller states are expected to ride free. Table 9 shows the 2002 defense spending for the top 10 nations in dollars, percent of GDP, and military strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Defense Expenditures $M</th>
<th>% GDP</th>
<th>Active and Reserve Military (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>329,616</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2673.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48,380</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2820.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48,040</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3388.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38,005</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>360.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37,070</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>286.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35,249</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>467.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31,465</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>686.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24,210</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>282.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20,981</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>199.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13,073</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1833.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly, based on defense expenditures, the U.S. dwarfs all coalition and potential coalition nations in military spending, comprising 111\% of the next nine spenders combined, and nearly seven times the second largest spender (China). This fact should encourage a coalition partners to free ride, or keep their distance altogether, since the U.S. has more than enough military power to provide the public good.

Russell Hardin suggests that the size the subgroup that is capable of providing the collective good is a significant indicator of participation in collective actions. He argues that the smaller the group that is capable of providing the collective good (K-group), and would benefit from doing so, even if no other group member contributed good themselves, determines the likelihood that the good gets provided. A small K-group fosters transparency, reduces coordination problems, and thereby decreases the chances of free riding among K-group members. Conversely, with large K-groups, responsive collective action is hindered as each member waits for the others to act first.\(^{36}\)

Significantly, non-group members know that the benefits of the collective good in question cannot be denied to them even if they do not participate. They have no motivation to pay for the collective good if someone else is willing to.\(^{37}\)

The collective action hypothesis predicts that the United States and United Kingdom would provide a majority of coalition forces while other partners would provide a minimum. Since the U.S./U.K. bloc was willing and capable for a near-unilateral action, other states had a motivation to ride free. Based on Hardin’s K-group hypothesis, the United States, along with the United Kingdom was capable of disarming Iraq with a two state coalition. Since the small K-group assured a collective action, other nations had a diminished collective action motivation to participate. The collective action hypothesis provides a puzzle for the Iraq War. Since the U.S. was willing and capable for near-unilateral action, why would states that have a chance to free ride contribute? Moreover,


if they did contribute, why would they commit troops, risking domestic resistance, rather than other commodities such as economic or political support? Since a successful collective action requires significant leadership, did the U.S.—feeling more powerful in 2003 than 1990—ask for less help, offer fewer inducements, and make fewer concessions on goals and tactics to coalition allies?

**Alliance Dependence.** Another external dynamic that affects coalition formation and burden sharing is the concept of the alliance security dilemma. Potential allies face a security-autonomy tradeoff when entering into a defense pact; if an excess of “security” exists a state may opt to trade some of the excess for more autonomy, by loosening alliance bonds or by reducing support to the ally on some issues, potentially risking the ally’s support on future security issues. However, the security-autonomy trade-off creates a tension between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment. This “alliance security dilemma” recognizes that each ally has alternative alliance choices and may opt for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied with the present allies. Therefore, a pervasive aspect of alliances is the constant fear about being deserted by one’s ally. Exercising too much autonomy runs the risk of abandonment, or defection, by allies. Abandonment can range from realigning with one’s adversary, de-aligning from the standing alliance, failing to make good on explicit commitments, or failing to

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38 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 181.
provide support in contingencies where support is expected.\textsuperscript{40} The most common form of abandonment is the failure to support the ally diplomatically in a dispute with its adversary, when support was expected.\textsuperscript{41} Being dependent on an ally risks entrapment.  Entrapment occurs when a state becomes entangled in a conflict central to an ally’s interests but peripheral to its own, in the hope that the gains in preserving the alliance will outweigh the risks and costs of future war.  Entrapment occurs when one state values the preservation of the alliance over the cost of fighting for its ally’s interests.\textsuperscript{42}

The risks of abandonment and entrapment tend to vary inversely.  A possible hedge against abandonment is to increase one’s commitment to an ally, thus increasing the ally’s security and reducing its temptation to defect.  However, this increases the likelihood that one will be entrapped by the ally.  Concerns about possible entrapment may be reduced by limiting commitment to the ally or by withdrawing support in specific crises.  However, this risks devaluing the alliance for the ally and causing its defection.  Acting to reduce one’s own alliance concerns tends to increase the ally’s concerns.

The alliance security dilemma arises because reducing the risk of entrapment tends to increase the risk of abandonment; the greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment.\textsuperscript{43} These pressures apply even without a formal alliance if weaker coalitional partners are

\textsuperscript{40} Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," \textit{World Politics} 36, no. 4 (1984), 466.
\textsuperscript{41} Snyder, \textit{Alliance Politics}, 182.
\textsuperscript{42} Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, 12.
\textsuperscript{43} Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 466.
vulnerable to security threats that they cannot deal with alone.\textsuperscript{44} Weaker states, dependent on a dominant ally for security, are significantly influenced by future promises as much as threats of abandonment. Future promises provide the motivation to participate in peripheral security coalitions.\textsuperscript{45}

Dependence is not limited to the security realm; states may also be dependent economically or politically. States will be more likely to support an ally that can impose costly adjustments to existing relationships. Additionally, allies may also support an effort in response to incentives, such as military aid or debt forgiveness. Hence, alliance dependence refers to a state’s susceptibility to arm twisting and the conditioning of incentives by coalition leaders.

The alliance security dilemma also influences inter coalition bargaining considerations. A strategy of strong commitment and support will have the undesired effect of reducing bargaining leverage over the ally. Conversely, bargaining power over the ally is enhanced when support is doubtful because one can make credible threats of non support. Alliance bargaining thus favors the strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger found that several states in the Desert Storm coalition were motivated not so much by actual dependence on the United States, but rather expected future dependence. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, 347-48. This behavior is consistent with a hedging strategy, see Weitsman, \textit{Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War}.


\textsuperscript{46} Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 467.
The severity of the alliance security dilemma, and the intensity of fears of abandonment and entrapment, is determined largely by commonality of interests, level of dependence, and commitment to the ally. Thus, the dilemma will be mild when the allies have a high proportion of common interest. The allies will have little fear of abandonment because of shared interests, and since the threat of abandonment has little credibility, they will have little bargaining advantage over each other. In contrast, the alliance security dilemma will be most severe if the allies do not share common interest in the conflict, or if they face the same adversary but have different conflicts with that adversary. Then both the likelihood of abandonment and the cost of entrapment will be high. The allies will simultaneously be skeptical of the other’s commitment and anxious against being trapped into a widening conflict.\textsuperscript{47}

The decision making model operationalizes alliance dependence by analyzing a state’s susceptibility to demands and incentives from the coalition leaders. The most important determinant for this study is the relative dependence of a potential coalition partner on U.S. provided security. Additionally, trade and economic dependence on the U.S. should also factor into state burden sharing decisions. The more dependent a state is the more likely the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of abandonment.\textsuperscript{48} In the Iraq War case, the greater a state’s dependence on the United States relative to entrapment concerns, the more it should have contributed to the anti-Hussein coalition. This study measures coalition member’s dependence in terms of

\textsuperscript{47} For an excellent discussion on the intensity of the alliance dilemma see Snyder, \textit{Alliance Politics}, 186-92.

military and economic ties or other assistance that would be hard to replace with other partners. Britain would be expected to strongly support America because of the shared interests and close diplomatic, economic, and military ties between them. Japan and South Korea are also likely to strongly support due to the U.S. balancing role against China and North Korea in East Asia. Due to the diminished threat of Russia to Western Europe, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Canada should show a reluctance to be entrapped in a U.S. incursion into Iraq. Finally, according to this theory, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian participation should be zero. The effects of alliance dependence are clearest when states make contributions unrelated to any collective action pressures or immediate Iraqi threat. 49 Evidence of alliance dependence is most likely to be seen in bargaining considerations and U.S. arm-twisting to generate support.

U.S. arm-twisting is expected to be highly visible when it becomes part of a “two-level” bargaining game between an ally’s leadership and domestic constituency. 50 As part of a “two-level” bargaining situation, the leadership of an ally will use international pressure to gain concessions from domestic constituencies. Conversely, potential allies will use domestic pressure to gain leverage with the coalition lead in the alliance or coalition bargaining situation. An ally’s negotiators may invoke domestic pressure concerns to soften the coalition lead’s demands, or might use international pressure to garner domestic support.

50 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."
**Internal Factors**

Systemic theories are unable to explain or predict the foreign policy behavior of particular states because they assume away the effects of state level variation. The Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model incorporates domestic variables to highlight the contingent conditions where domestic politics will play a role in determining state burden sharing decisions.

*Public Opinion.* Public opinion plays an important role in the formation of state preferences and the introduction of those preferences into policy choices. Most of the available literature on the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies can be categorized into three broad concepts, a “bottom-up” approach, a “top-down” approach, and a “structural” approach where public opinion influence is shaped by issue, domestic structure, elite coalitions and cleavages.

The first concept, the "bottom-up" approach, assumes that public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy.\(^{51}\) In this mode, leaders follow mass beliefs. This approach assumes the Kantian notion of democracy in which domestic opinion has a great impact on foreign policy. The public has a strong influence on foreign policy because the people will be the ones that bear the brunt of a given foreign policy decision.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{51}\) Page and Shapiro statistically show public opinion leads policy outcomes, but fail to determine the mechanisms in which public opinion affects elite behavior, see Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy."

empirical record for the “bottom-up” thesis shows mixed results. Numerous cases exist where elites have made crucial foreign policy decisions in the absence of public consensus. Examples include the U.S. decisions favoring an active international role post World War II, the West German decision to rearm and join NATO in the early 1950s, the French decision to build an independent nuclear force and leave NATO military structure, and more recently the military surge in Iraq.53

A second approach, the “top-down” approach of public opinion posits a more realist orientation where public consensus is more a function of elite consensus that trickles down to the mass public. This approach assumes a state centered approach to foreign policy. It presumes the public is easily manipulated by political leaders in the foreign policy realm because of the low salience of security issues compared to domestic issues, combined with the low degree of public knowledge on foreign policy issues.54 In this view, public officials tend to respect their constituents’ preferences on domestic issues, but feel unconstrained on issues pertaining to foreign affairs.55 However, scholars have reported a high degree of consistency between American public opinion and foreign policy, including a high degree of congruence between shifts in public opinion and

53 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies."
changes in foreign policy. Additionally, researchers have also shown public opinion shifting before policy changes, suggesting the weakness of the “top-down” hypothesis.  

Finally, due to empirical difficulties with the first two theories of public opinion, a third approach argues that the role of public opinion varies across issue area, domestic institution structure, and coalition-building process among elites. This approach assumes that “bottom-up” or “top-down” theories ignore the rich diversity in the ways that public opinion influences policy decisions. Simplistic theories tend to ignore that public opinion and societal groups may influence the policy-making process in several ways and at different stages. The public can directly affect decision making by changing policy goals or how those goals are prioritized or by narrowing the range of policy options. Moreover, the public may also indirectly affect policies by influencing the coalition building processes among the elites. It can influence the positions of bureaucracies or single actors within the government. Jacobs and Shapiro, in their review of the state of the discipline in studying public opinion, suggest that domestic structure and societal interaction with the government influence foreign policy. According to their hypothesis, public and elite opinion interacts with each other and is transformed into policy decisions differently depending on the issue area, domestic

58 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies."
structure, leadership preferences, and elite coalition building processes.\textsuperscript{59} Thomas Risse-Kappen and Ole Holsti, in their studies of public opinion on foreign policy, have demonstrated that understanding domestic structures and coalition-building processes is essential to explain the impact of public opinion on the foreign policy. With these developments in mind, the next section discusses the interaction of public opinion with domestic institutions and politics and their effect on burden sharing outcomes.

\textit{Domestic Institutions and Politics.} Many foreign policy scholars recognized that theories of the international system, as developed by Waltz, were inadequate to predict foreign policy behaviors of particular states. To develop his systemic theory, Waltz argued that microeconomic theories of the market are possible precisely because they abstract away from variation at the level of the firm. Accordingly, Waltz agreed that market theories would be inadequate to develop a systematic theory of foreign policy behavior. However, this preclude theories of the firm; to fully understand the behavior of individual firms, or in our case, states, one must develop a theory of the firm, rather than a theory of the market. Domestic political theory allows consideration of the ways that politically organized social groups seek to influence policy and how state decision makers either cooperate with, resist, or compromise with such groups.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} Skidmore and Hudson, "Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy," 3-6.
The Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model domestic institutions and politics block represents the influence of domestic institutions and structure on foreign policy outcomes. It aims to explain the influence of public opinion on shaping domestic actor’s preferences for coalition support. This block seeks to explain the influence of public opinion, national legislatures, and domestic political processes on executive decision making. Proponents of these theories argue domestic politics and structure is important because they represent the relationship between state and society, or public opinion and political outcomes. Domestic structure affects the capacity of states to mobilize resources based on the influence of society on government and of leaders on legislatures. The domestic influence block in the Bennett, et al, burden sharing model is an amalgam of hypotheses on the influence of the executive, bureaucratic politics, legislatures, political elite, and society as a whole on foreign policy. Following is a discussion of the influence of domestic politics as embodied in the model.

The first element of the model’s domestic block is the influence of the chief executive on the policy making and execution processes. The hypothesis assumes that, “holding preexisting beliefs constant, leaders of executive branches should be more likely than other domestic actors to want to participate in a coalition, if only because they are

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directly exposed to pressure from other coalition members, especially the United States.\textsuperscript{62} Building on the work of David Lake on the influence of the chief executives in foreign policy, the model posits that executives are more responsive to international-level encouragement and negative pressure than the public or legislatures, since executives are directly responsible for foreign policy.\textsuperscript{63} Legislatures, on the other hand, are more likely to follow public opinion unless an election is not imminent, since the public, in general, is more concerned with domestic issues than international ones.\textsuperscript{64} According to Bennett, et al, these assumptions suggest leaders will have a longer strategic vision, react to long-term strategic threats, and be more responsive to requests for burden sharing demands from allies they depend upon for security.\textsuperscript{65} Depending on the international context, this can make leaders more or less willing than the public to contribute to a coalition. Therefore, despite state incentive to free ride, state leaders may lean towards coalition support without the requisite domestic support due to external pressure by other coalition leaders. Conversely, state executives of coalitional governments are expected to be more attuned to public opposition and are expected to be more reactive to public opinion.

The next element in the model’s domestic influence block is the role of bureaucratic politics in affecting foreign policy choices. The bureaucratic politics literature suggests that officials’ stands on policy issues are shaped by their roles and

\textsuperscript{63} Lake, \textit{Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy}, 1887-1939. See also
\textsuperscript{64} Auerswald, \textit{Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force}, Martin, \textit{Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation}.
\textsuperscript{65} Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, 17.
organizational interests. The theory asserts that stances on issues stem from the institutional positions that elites occupy. For instance, military elites are more likely to advocate policy options that place the military in a favorable position. Foreign policy elites, similarly, are likely to recommend diplomatic policy options. Bureaucratic theory recognizes that organizations have significant influence in policy formulation and execution, and their executives tend to generate policy options that support core missions and resources. Bureaucrats bargain with each other to define the “national interest” and are often the results of parochial concerns. For supporting the Iraq War coalition, this theory suggests that German and Japanese military officials should have favored a contribution to continue to legitimize a wider role for their organizations based on the critiques of the first Gulf War.

The next issue addressed in the Bennett, et al, domestic institutions and politics block is the autonomy of the state leader’s preferences from legislative and societal pressures. To predict policy outcomes, the model must determine actors’ preferences, and the degree to which actors can achieve their preferences when conflicts exist. To establish the ordering of preferences, one must be concerned with “1) the state’s autonomy with respect to the preferences of civil society, most often reflected by legislators, but including less institutionalized forms of political expression; 2) the

executive’s autonomy vis-à-vis other state actors; and 3) the legislature’s autonomy from public opinion.\textsuperscript{67} The goal is to determine which actors’ preferences will predominate in the burden sharing debate.

Following the ordering logic, if the executive’s preferences overlap with those of society, autonomy is not an issue and the executive should be relatively unconstrained in joining a coalition. However, if public preferences differ from the executive, contributions will occur only in those areas where the state can mobilize coalition resources without the legislature.\textsuperscript{68} Likewise, bureaucratic actors can help or constrain the executive based on their policy preferences. An executive’s ability to override bureaucratic concerns will be a function of autonomy as well as informal bases of executive power.

According to Bennett, et al, two factors determine the executive’s autonomy for a specific issue. The first is the state’s constitutional structure, and the second is the strength of the political coalition in power. Their observations conclude that constitutional structure should be a strong determinant of the preferences in foreign policy outcomes. States with strong executives should generate policy that reflects the executives’ preferences, while states with weak executives should reflect societal preferences. This argument reflects the domestic structure hypothesis of Peter Katzenstein, which argues that the constitutional structure determines whether a state’s

\textsuperscript{67} Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., \textit{Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War}, 18.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. See also Auerswald, \textit{Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force}, Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."
executive is responsive to societal pressure. For example, French executives are strong in relation to their respective legislatures and civil society. Conversely, the American president is weaker due to an independent legislature combined with constitutional limitations on federal powers. Katzenstein remarks, “France embodies the principle of political concentration, the United States the principle of social pluralism.” The autonomy from society determines the constraining effect of society itself. The second factor determining executive autonomy is the political strength of the executive’s party. States whose executive and legislature are from the same party are more likely reflect the executive’s policy preferences states who are divided politically. Conversely, states with split legislatures or strong opposing parties are less likely to reflect the chief executive’s policy preferences unless he can mobilize resources autonomously.

The following predictions emerge from the domestic institutions and politics hypotheses. Chief executives of alliance dependent states will contribute to a coalition in response to pressure from the alliance leader unless preexisting beliefs, a threat to key national interests, or domestic opposition dictate otherwise. Support will be minimal in areas where the chief executive lacks autonomy and fails to win public support for contributions.

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69 Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States."
70 Ibid., 15.
71 Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation.
The domestic institutions and politics hypothesis presents some problems for the researcher trying to predict state burden sharing behavior. The conceptualization, as presented in the security decision making model, provides a rich, nuanced approach to the influence of society on foreign policy decisions. However, the interaction of the theories is difficult to operationalize into a predictive framework. Due to the complex interactions of the domestic variables, predictions are indeterminate. To improve the predictive capability of the model, these state-societal factors may be simplified using assumptions developed recently in the area of domestic structure theory.

Chapter two demonstrated that domestic structure theory allows for simplifying assumptions concerning the interaction of the state and society allowing the prediction of likely foreign policy outcomes. Domestic structure approaches aim to explain the role of the interaction of state political institutions with a given state’s society. They determine the selectivity of political systems to societal demands.

One recent advancement of the domestic structure literature is directly applicable to the security decision model. Susan Peterson applied Cortell and Davis’s framework to explain state strategies for crisis bargaining. In this significant innovation, Peterson evolves the domestic structure argument by identifying a typology of bargaining strategies based on decision making centralization and degree of societal influence.

Using the same domestic influences as Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Peterson’s

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73 David Auerswald notes that he had to simplify the complicated methodology in Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo.” Gerald Steinberg in a review of Friends in Need notes “the heavy weapons of social science were too powerful for the issues at hand” in Steinberg, 743-44.
formalizes theoretical predictions based on domestic structural elements. Table 10 shows Peterson’s typology of dominant foreign policy theories based on state structure.74

By formalizing a typology of state-societal relations, Peterson has created a framework for predicting outcomes based on domestic structure theory. The organization of decision making authority varies along a continuum from centralized to decentralized based on the number of bureaucratic agencies, ministries, and other governmental offices that have authority over a given issue. A centralized configuration exists when foreign policy decision making is restricted to relatively few government officials. The second

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74 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict.
element, degree of executive autonomy from the legislature defines the executive autonomy vis-à-vis society. The greater the executive autonomy the less control the legislature can exert over the content of a state’s foreign policy. The legislature exerts control through two possible causal paths. First, the legislature may possess the authority to make policy for a specific issue area. For instance, the Turkish parliament must approve the stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Second, the executive may be responsible to and dependent on the legislature for tenure in office. A foreign policy executive that is not constrained by the legislature is considered autonomous, while and executive constrained by the legislature is considered non-autonomous.\(^75\)

In a Type I structure, decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near total autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, foreign policy depends on the strategic beliefs of the chief executive.\(^76\) According to Peterson, cognitive explanations describe the foreign policy decision making process. Cognitive explanations distinguish between those who view the international system as conflictual and those who see a more harmonious world.\(^77\) While the structure of decision making authority determines that the chief executive is responsible for decision making, the content and rigidity of the leader’s own beliefs explains how the state responds to burden sharing requests.\(^78\)

\(^{75}\) Ibid., 24-30.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 31. See also Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 455-56.

\(^{77}\) Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics., chap. 3.

\(^{78}\) Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 31-36.
In a Type IV state domestic political factors have the greatest influence on foreign policy decisions. A Type IV structure exists when the foreign policy decision process is composed of a number of different offices that share responsibility for foreign policy decision making, and when the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In this type of state, national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures, and the state’s policy response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Unable to act alone, individual policy makers must recognize domestic opponents who may appeal directly to the public. Interest groups, political parties, the media, and public opinion shape the policy-making process because the foreign policy executive is responsible to the legislature and, indirectly, to the public. Because of the many hands formulating policy, even the most powerful leaders must build a coalition of support for their preferred policy. State institutions shape national policy preferences by allowing societal actors a voice in the process. State structure determines that policy will be the outcome of domestic bargaining and coalition building.\(^7\)

Decision making in a Type III state resembles that of the Type IV state with one exception. An internal process of coalition building and compromise among bureaucratic agencies exists, however, the executive branch benefits from significant autonomy from the legislature. Therefore, societal constraints do not enter the decision making process. Foreign policy elite actors appeal to various bureaucratic or institutional constituencies, since a direct appeal to the public or interest groups would be ineffective. No

\(^7\) Ibid., 36-38.
representative element exists to channel public opinion into the policy-making process. Coalition politics prevail in a state where foreign policy is created by a multitude of actors.\textsuperscript{80}

Finally, Type II states are characterized by need for the large-scale coalition building by the chief executive. The chief executive cannot ignore domestic considerations created by the executive-legislative relationship. Thus while a centralized cadre formulates foreign policy, the existence of administrative, regulatory, or legislative procedures enable societal influences to assume a legitimate role in the government’s policy process.\textsuperscript{81} Policy preferences will reflect not only the executive beliefs, but will also reflect the pressures exerted by political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and the legislature. One would expect the executive to give attention to societal groups’ interests.\textsuperscript{82}

The two components of the state determine the avenues through which foreign policy is made, but do not determine outcomes. The structure of executive decision making authority and the degree of legislative oversight together determines the contingent conditions where cognitive, bureaucratic, or domestic bargaining theories dominate. In all cases, it still remains necessary to determine the preferences of the decision making elite and society to determine the executive influence on outcomes.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 38-40. 
\textsuperscript{81} Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 457. 
\textsuperscript{82} Peterson, \textit{Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict}, 40-41.
Figure 4 illustrates the security model using the domestic structure typology to predict burden sharing outcomes.

The Peterson typology provides a predictive framework on the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. The Bennett model was indeterminate in explaining the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy behavior. Peterson’s structural framework provides a predictive and explanatory model for determining state strategies in the foreign policy arena. The insights reached by the Peterson model easily fit into the Bennett, et al, framework. Type I states are expected to make contributions in response to pressure from the alliance leader unless preexisting beliefs, or a threat to key national interests exist. Conversely, Type IV states are likely to keep their distance or ride free
due to the influence of societal pressure and the need to build an elite consensus for coalition participation. Type III states are expected to support the coalition to the level of support determined by elite consensus, while Type II states are expected to be support to the limit of public and legislature support.

By replacing the Bennett, et al, domestic institutions block with the Peterson typology, the security model is improved in four ways. First, the Peterson typology formalizes the link between public opinion and foreign policy. It explicitly stipulates the causal mechanisms in which public opinion becomes codified in foreign policy decisions. Second, the Peterson typology make explicit predictions on which decision making theories dominate based on state structure and relations to society. Third, the Peterson typology makes firm predictions of foreign policy biases based on government structure. And finally, the Peterson typology simplifies understanding the domestic interactions that influence foreign policy decision making.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is a state’s relative contribution to the Iraq War coalition. Coalition contributions are measured as military, economic, and diplomatic contributions to the Iraq coalition, and post war stability operations. The participation level is predicated on the degree of political and military risk incurred at the level of involvement. Coalition contributions are ranked according to the level of commitment to the coalition. This paper will operationalize the level of commitment in the following manner. Nations that provided military into Iraq proper show the highest level of
commitment since stationing troops within Iraq could generate the largest domestic backlash, and therefore incur the greatest amount of political risk. The next highest level of support would go to those states that provided personnel into areas surrounding Iraq, significant financial contribution, allowed basing of coalition personnel, and/or diplomatically supported the U.S. position in the U.N. The next level of support includes states that provided nominal military support such as over-flight rights or refueling privileges, provided a minimum level of economic support, or eventually diplomatically supported the Iraq coalition. Finally, the lowest level of commitment includes those states that provided no support, or were outspoken diplomatically in their opposition to the U.S. led coalition.\textsuperscript{83}

The security coalition model has three contribution outcomes indicating a state’s contribution or lack thereof towards the coalition objective. The model accounts for equifinality; therefore, there may be more than one path to a given outcome. The outcomes include: (1) no contribution, or negative contribution; (2) the state contributes robustly in areas with public or state support; and (3) the state supports minimally and does not contribute in areas with public or state opposition. The outcomes depicted in the model are meant to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. States are categorized as to whether they had direct (collective action or balance of threat) or indirect (alliance

\textsuperscript{83} I rely on the typology of support developed in Sprowls, "States and War Coalitions: A Study of the Gulf War".
dependence) external incentives to cooperate in the coalition, and their level of contribution given the external incentives.84

These three outcomes generate four possible explanatory effects that match a state’s contribution, or lack thereof, to the coalition. States will either (1) keep their distance; (2) free ride; (3) show their preferences and pay; or (4) pay due to entrapment.

A state “keeps its distance” if it neither shares the public or private security “good,” and does not contribute to the coalition. This situation is likely if a state does not benefit from the coalition and is not alliance dependent on coalition members. States that do not share the public good but are alliance dependent (such as on NATO) may also “keep its distance” due to domestic constraints, but they risk alliance abandonment in the future.

A state “free rides” if it perceives security to be a private or public good but does not contribute. Free riding is likely when a state believes other states will provide adequate security without its contribution and if the state is not dependent coalition members. Free riding also occurs when a state under-contributes to the coalition. States are likely to free ride when domestic pressures limit involvement. Similar to the “keep the distance” effect, alliance dependent states risk abandonment if they free-ride.

Two effects occur when a state contributes robustly to a coalition, they “reveal their preferences” or are “entrapped and pay.” States “reveal their preferences and pay up” when they share in the public or private good and fear that it will be undersupplied

by the coalition. In this instance, they will reveal their preferences for the public or private good and supply support appropriately. Conversely, states are “entrapped and force to pay,” when they do not highly value the good but are highly dependent on a coalition partner. States seeking favor from a dominant power may be forced to support a coalition even if they have no direct stake security good.

**Methodology**

This dissertation applies a structured, focused, qualitative comparison of state burden sharing decisions using of the security burden sharing model as a theoretical framework. Structured, focused comparison allows comparison across cases in a way that yields useful generic knowledge of decision making processes. By using a structured, focused methodology, individual case studies can be truly comparative. The aim of this method is to draw the explanations of each case study into a broader, more generalized theory.

The research is “structured” in that it employs a structured data collection approach for each case that asks a set of standardized research questions developed to illuminate the research objective and theoretical focus of the study. The use of a standard question set ensures the acquisition of comparable data across cases and an orderly cumulative development of knowledge.

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In addition to being “structured,” the study is “focused” in that it will consider only state coalition burden sharing decisions. One danger of multiple case studies is that they lack a clearly defined and common focus. The case studies will be focused on the causal processes, theoretically derived, that influenced coalition burden sharing outcomes. The standard question set used for this study is located in Appendix B.

One issue with comparative studies is “situating” the research in the context of a research program. To ensure that this research builds cumulatively upon previous research, this study builds self-consciously upon the variable definitions and research design employed by Bennett, et al. The intent is to maximize comparability across cases with their previous case studies. However, in the area of domestic institutions and politics this study formalizes the influences of society on state action using the methodology developed by Susan Peterson. Bennett and Peterson both develop their theories from the same theoretical lineage; therefore, the substitution should not substantially change the theoretical base of the Bennett, et al, model while at the same time improving the predictability and usability of the model.

I review each coalition member’s material contribution to the Iraq War, and state discussions leading up to the conflict to determine the relative capabilities devoted to the conflict and the internal and external influences on burden sharing. Diplomatic, economic, and political activities are also examined as they are an important signifier of support. As a result, I explore the relative willingness of each state in my case studies to use force, and support the U.S. led coalition as expressed in official statements, press
reports, biographies, and secondary accounts. I rely on a diverse set of source material to avoid basing assessments merely on public speeches or one individual’s interpretation of events. At the same time, I assume that rhetoric states use during a high-stakes intervention may be particularly important because it influences the expectations of allies and adversaries. Critical to analysis of intention is considering “who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances. (Emphasis in original)\(^87\) I employ process tracing to test the contingent generalizations of the security model, and to verify if the processes and outcomes are as the theory predicts. To determine the appropriateness of the model this study will use in-case process tracing to identify the causal chain between the dependent variable (political, economic, and military coalition contribution) and independent variables (need for collective action, threat perception, etc.).\(^88\) The goal of process tracing in this study is to link observations to constitute an explanation for observed coalition behavior. This study employs a detailed narrative, framed against the six hypotheses in the coalition behavior model, to explain state coalition decisions.\(^89\) Process tracing specifically highlights the dominant factors for states’ burden sharing decisions. The role of process tracing is to confirm the conclusions of the burden sharing model on the circumstances when a particular theory will dominate outcomes.

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\(^87\) For a discussion on the reliability of source material, and suggested research techniques see Ibid. especially chapter 5.


\(^89\) George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 205-11.
One critique of the Bennett et al. study is that it did not account for the effects of duration on the burden sharing process. Due to the short duration of the first Gulf War, this shortcoming is understandable. This research will use in-case comparison to control for the effects of duration on burden sharing outcomes. Due to the protracted nature of the current conflict, this study will incorporate duration effects in its analysis from the initiation of war plans in October 2001, until the national elections of January 30, 2005. This time period was selected to gauge the impact of several factors over time. The lengthened time allows the study to look at the influence of differing levels of international legitimacy; the coalition initiated the war without a U.N. resolution authorizing force, but the U.N. later designated the coalition as a lawful occupation force. Additionally, the protracted timeline allows the study to control for the effects of casualties and sustained cost on coalition participation.

**Determining the Influence of Legitimacy**

The interaction between coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy—and their relationship to foreign policy decision making—is complex as states are rarely motivated by one single incentive. Foreign policy decisions likely contain elements of all three motivations. Claude noted in 1966, “The process of legitimization is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles.”\(^9^0\) The empirical task for this study is to separate and isolate these motivations to determine if legitimacy

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arguments for foreign policy decisions were genuine, or instead based on a calculation that the policy would advance a state’s material interests.

At its base, my research seeks to examine if institutions and rules affect burden sharing decisions or if those decisions are primarily based on self-interest or coercion. Identifying the method of social control is not easy because doing so requires knowledge of actor motivations that may not be clear to the actor himself. This study will use the following techniques—drawn from Ian Hurd’s work on delineating motivations for rule compliance—to determine the influence of legitimacy on participation levels in a particular security coalition.

First, this study will try to separate rhetorical compliance from actual compliance by examining a state’s compliance for a given rule. To determine if a state holds a rule or institution legitimately it should show compliance in similar instances where the rule would apply. Legitimacy arguments are supported if in similar instances a state followed a rule when such action would be counter to short term interests. For coalition burden sharing and the use of force, this study will ask, did the state in question comply with international rules and procedures for similar uses of force? For instance, do states go to the Security Council regularly to support their own uses of force, or do they use force unilaterally when in their self-interest? For instance, Turkey’s rhetoric that a U.N. resolution authorizing forces is suspect, since Turkey regularly violated Iraq’s borders in its campaign against Kurdish terrorists. The weakness of this measure is that states

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91 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 390.
92 Ibid., 390-93.
comply with international rules for a variety of reasons – compliance does not indicate that legitimacy was the controlling mechanism.

Second, to determine the normative influence of a rule, this study will look at reasons given for compliance with a given rule. This question asks, what do decision makers say is their motivation for complying with the rule in question? Reviewing executives’ statements on motivations for following a rule will highlight, at least, rhetorical motivations for compliance. Although public statements are somewhat unreliable, they shed light on the reasons states give for compliance. Executives’ statements during closed deliberations and hearings are likely to show the executive’s preferences since those deliberations have some expectation of privacy. Overall, these sources give an insight into rhetorical arguments, but other sources of information, such as insider accounts and investigative reporting, will be necessary to determine state motivation for compliance. This method is limited in that actors are motivated to distort accounts of their motives to shape the history of the event.

In addition, this study will examine reasons given for noncompliance: what do decision makers say when knowingly breaking the rule in question? This technique has the same disadvantages of the one above given that states are likely to shield true motivations within a rhetorical shell. However, this approach has advantages because rhetorical language for a non-compliant actor can give insights into the legitimacy held by that norm. When rhetorical responses continue to conform to the international norm, they support the notion that the norm is legitimate in the eyes of the international
community. This “giving of reasons” is an important political act and much can be learned comparing use of language to actual compliance. If nations explain their actions as conforming to the rule in question, the rule is arguably embedded in the international discourse, while arguments that the rule no longer applies argues that the norm no longer holds a normative value.

In addition to Hurd’s three measures, Arthur Stinchcombe suggests that the researcher examine whether other centers of power come to the aid of the institution or rule under threat. In the case of interpretation of international law, if member states do not come to the defense of the U.N. when it is being criticized as an ineffective institution, the U.N. may possess little legitimacy. As with many of these techniques, more information is required to determine if the support is motivated by threat, self-interest, or legitimacy.

Finally, the combination of methods above combined with plausible alternate explanations should provide insight into state motivation for rule compliance and non-compliance. This study will look into alternative explanations, other than legitimacy and norms for state rule compliance. This is an attempt to explicitly examine alternate explanations such as coercion or self-interest as a state motivation for compliance.

None of these methods provides explanations that are individually compelling because

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94 As quoted in Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." See also Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, 1968).
they are not falsifiable. These methods highlight alternate explanations on the influence of legitimacy in foreign policy decisions, and the combination of methods help explain the most influential motivations for state policy action.

Legitimacy concerns influence state burden sharing levels in important and meaningful ways. If rules and institutions are based primarily on coercion and self-interest, the coalition leader can structure incentives for following or abandoning a rule fairly easily. According to Weber, Morgenthau, and Claude, the higher level of legitimacy afforded to the particular institution or rule, the higher the cost for abandoning it. Determining the motivations of interested actors should give an indication of the costs and benefits for a coalition action based on the legitimacy placed on that action by the international community. If legitimacy is valid, sanctioned events should require less “arm-twisting” for participation; conversely, costs should be high for the coalition lead of an unsanctioned action.

Case Selection

The major theoretical innovation I propose to the security model is the substitution of Susan Peterson’s domestic structure framework into the domestic institutions and politics block of the original Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security model. This innovation is an attempt to improve the predictive and explanatory capability of the security model. To determine the suitability of this advance, this study incorporated three case studies—each case representing a different cell in the each Peterson typology—to determine the influence of domestic structure and society on
burden sharing decisions. Since this dissertation is most concerned with the influence of state domestic structure, it attempts to control for other influences such as level of threat and public opinion by choosing cases that are most similar in those independent variables.

This study incorporates in-depth qualitative analysis on state burden sharing decisions—each case from a different typological group—to determine the predictive and explanatory capability of the improved security model. Additionally, cases were selected to compare states with similar legislative constraints, but differing state society relations to highlight the influence of domestic structure under similar constraints. Finally, cases were selected to examine the influence of duration on coalition participation. Cases were selected to determine the influence of duration on different combinations of domestic structure. The goal of case selection is to determine the influence of the Peterson typology on the Bennett, et al, model.

The Type I case requires a state structure that is centralized while the executive is autonomous from the legislature. The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) provides an excellent example of this case type. The Republic of Korea represents a weak Type I domestic structure in the Peterson typology, where decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, the chief executive has significant influence over foreign policy, relatively free from legislative
oversight.\textsuperscript{96} The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized in the past two decades, still favors strong executive leadership where the President sets the tone and agenda for the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{97} Although executive prerogatives usually gain traction in the National Assembly, the introduction of civic groups and an opposition legislature made the government a weak Type I state.\textsuperscript{98} The Korean president enjoys significant influence over the legislature, especially in the area of foreign policy. Additionally the assembly members are relatively independent from society and reflect the interests of their party rather than their constituents. According to the Peterson typology, chief executive beliefs should dominate burden sharing decisions and cognitive theory should have significant influence over executive decision making. South Korea was also selected as a case study to determine the effects of duration on coalition contributions.

Germany was selected to explore the influence of a Type IV state that was also constitutionally limited in using force. As a Type IV state, German politicians and bureaucrats are more responsive to social movements and civil institutions. Additionally, German foreign policy decision making is typically diffuse due to Germany’s federal

arrangement. However, due to the influence of German national elections, incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government reflected a Type II rather than a Type IV domestic structure. Schröder was able to commandeer the foreign policy process and imprint his preferences on German policy by appealing directly to public attitudes during his re-election campaign concerning the use of force in Iraq. Since Schröder’s stance resonated well with the public, he was able to accomplish a policy coup and develop a policy position individually, rather than through the typical collaborative process. The appeal to mass public opinion resulted in less coalition building and policy coordination than would normally be seen in a Type IV typology. German support for the Iraq war provides an interesting contrast to its support to the Afghanistan coalition. The differences in support are expected to highlight the influence of legitimacy on coalition burden sharing efforts.

Finally, Turkey was selected to explore the influence of a Type II government. Although Turkey reflected Type I tendencies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the country evolved into a Type II state as a result of public unease with the outcome of the war. Chronic inflation combined with chronic problems with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers Party generated a change in government. Turkish press and political activists gained access to the government throughout the late 1990s. November 2002 elections signified a major realignment of the Turkish political landscape. Members of parliament were

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fractured from their party leadership and held more accountable by their constituents. Turkish foreign policy was historically forged in a highly centralized manner that did not necessarily reflect societal interests, reflecting a Type I structure in the Peterson typology. Due to national elections in November 2002—which prompted a change of the ruling party, and a restructuring of the national assembly—Turkey acted rather as a Type IV state in the Peterson typology. During the approach to the Iraq War, Turkey showed decentralized decision making was dominated by the influence of a newly elected National Assembly. Turkey is also a critical case for this study for three reasons. First, it was a steadfast ally in other U.S. interventions and a steady NATO ally therefore the U.S. expected it to robustly support the intervention. Second, Turkey’s participation was critical to the initial U.S. war plan, therefore one can expect that the U.S. would apply significant pressure for Turkish participation. Finally, Turkey counted on U.S. support for inclusion into the European Union. For these reasons Turkey’s non-participation in the coalition should highlight the influence of domestic politics on international outcomes.

This research design contains several weaknesses, but it is sufficient to determine the suitability of the enhanced security decision model. One weakness of this research design is that I only explain coalition burden sharing in a U.S. led environment. The research program may be better informed with a study of a non-U.S. instance of burden

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sharing. Additionally, this design does not explore the contributions of Gulf States to the coalition. As a second phase of research I intend to extend the suitability of the enhanced security model under differing conditions of threat and alliance dependence. However, time constraints will limit this study to the cases selected above.
Chapter Four

South Korea: Between Iraq and a Nuclear Crisis

South Korean cooperation in the Iraq War coalition provides a compelling case to test the Security Decision Model, as well as the influence of domestic politics, on state use of force decisions. The Republic of Korea (ROK) support for the Iraq War coalition is puzzling in two dimensions. First, the ROK had no direct stake in the Iraq War, yet it was the third largest provider of military forces to the post-conflict stability operations.¹ South Korea was not threatened by Saddam Hussein, possessed a reliable source of oil, and was not expected to contribute troops as a member of a collective security organization. Only 15 percent of South Koreans surveyed in the summer of 2002 considered terrorism to be a national priority, one of the lowest figures for major countries surveyed. Additionally, 72 percent of South Koreans opposed the U.S.-led war on terrorism.² Second, the newly elected liberal government campaigned on a pledge of assertiveness against the asymmetric alliance relationship with the United States, and exploited a wave of anti-Americanism. President Roh Moo-hyun was elected president over his pro-U.S. conservative opponent based on a platform that called for a Korea that would not “kowtow” to the United States.³ Roh’s victory reflected public anger towards

¹ The size of the ROK contingent of 3,600 troops was significant, making it the third largest contingent after the United States and United Kingdom. This also marked the first time the ROK has sent combat forces overseas in nearly 40 years when ROK forces constituted the second largest contingent in Vietnam.
the United States concerning President Bush’s aggressive policy regarding North Korea and the acquittal of two U.S. servicemen in a traffic accident that killed two South Korean schoolgirls. Unlike most South Korean political leaders, Roh had no ties to the United States and had not even visited before he assumed office, which is rare for politicians of national stature in Korea. During the fall 2002 presidential campaign, Roh promised to be more assertive with the United States concerning alliance issues and resolved to solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear programs through dialogue rather than force. Given the lack of threat, President Roh’s stance in the election, and rampant anti-Americanism at the time, Korea’s support to the Iraq War coalition is puzzling. Why would an administration, which was elected on an anti-American platform, provide the third largest troop contingent to post-war stabilization operations and commit those forces during the combat phase of the conflict?

This chapter demonstrates that domestic structure and alliance dependence explain South Korea’s policy towards the Iraq War coalition. The Republic of Korea represents a weak Type I domestic structure in the Peterson typology, where decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, the

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chief executive has significant influence over foreign policy and is relatively free from legislative oversight. The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized in the past two decades, still favors strong executive leadership in which the President sets the tone and agenda for the National Assembly. Although executive prerogatives usually gain traction in the National Assembly, the introduction of civic groups and an opposition legislature made the Roh government a weak Type I state.

The Roh Moo-hyun government defied strong opposition from its core political constituencies and committed non-combat troops during the invasion of Iraq as a method to gain leverage over U.S. nuclear policy towards the North. However, Roh was able to overcome public discontent by linking the troop deployment to U.S. policy towards North Korea. By making a timely promise of his “active support” of the unpopular Iraq War, Roh attempted to repair damage that had been done by anti-American protests in an effort to soften the U.S. stance towards North Korean nuclearization. South Korea’s alliance dependence, combined with a strong executive allowed the government to support the coalition with an outcome of “State is Entrapped and Pays” in the Security Decision model.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of Korean governmental structure, showing that a strong executive combined with a party influenced unicameral legislature provides

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8 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."
9 Moon, "US-South Korean Relations."
the executive with nearly unchallenged influence over government decisions. Following this discussion, I summarize South Korea’s contributions to the Iraq War. Korean contributions were substantial considering that it had not participated in a U.S. led coalition with combat troops since the Vietnam War. These contributions are then analyzed in the framework of the Security Decision Making Model, developed in chapter three, to determine the significant external and internal influences on the Roh government regarding support to the Iraq War coalition. Next, I address legitimacy arguments and show that the Korean government was not significantly influenced by international legitimacy and, in fact, made most decisions for coalition assistance before the U.S. had gained UN sanction. Finally, I comment on the suitability of the Security Decision Model in explaining the ROK support to the Iraq War coalition.

South Korean Government and Politics

Whereas, the Republic of Korea is a presidential democratic republic, its democratic track record has been mixed. The ROK has had a “nominally” democratic form of government since 1948; however, before 1968, Korean politics had been dominated by a string of dominate presidents that sought to exert total control over all aspects of the political process. The strong role of the president is reflected in the current constitution but the influence of legislative and judicial checks is increasing. It was only after 1988 that Korean national leadership instigated genuinely democratic institutions that respected the rule of law and emphasized reform. Previously, Korea was ruled by a series of military elite that invoked democratic principles, but actually ruled in a very
authoritarian manner.  Korean government reflects a state-centered approach where a powerful state was required for economic development and defense against the Communist North. Although there is a movement for local democratization this effort has been unsteady and regional governments are still hierarchically dependent on the central government.  By 2003, the Korean government could be categorized as a consolidating democracy where the roles of the executive, legislature, and civil society were in a state of transition and the roles of political parties, the judiciary, and the legislature as a check on executive power were still being institutionalized. Overall, Korean government reflects a majoritarian democratic approach where the government derives its power from majority rule and the political process is based on the concentration of power.

South Korea’s president maintains a considerable amount of power and authority compared to the other branches of government. The president—directly elected for a single five-year term—serves as the head of state, chief executive, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Government policy is formulated by the State Council, or cabinet, which is directly appointed by and includes the president. Members of the State

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12 Hahm and Plein, After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy, Jung In Kang, "Reflections on Recent Democratization," in Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification, ed. Jung In Kang, Sallie W. Yea, and Byong-Man Ahn (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002), Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture. Instead of consolidating democracy, the Republic of Korea, may be represented as an “Organizing Democracy” where liberal principles are accepted, but democratic institutions are immature, see Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?," Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998).
13 Majoritarian democracies have electoral systems with only two major political parties or coalitions, single-party cabinets, unicameralism, and unitary and centralized governments. See Scott Mainwaring, "Two Models of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (2001).
Council are collectively and individually responsible to the President only. The National Assembly, or legislature, is unicameral and is directly elected every four years for a four year term.\textsuperscript{14} Local governments, though gaining autonomy, are highly influenced by the executive branch and thus are often indistinguishable from the central government.\textsuperscript{15} The three branches of government are interwoven into a hierarchical relationship in which the executive branch and the president form the center pillar of Korean government.\textsuperscript{16} The weak legislature and the unstable party system contribute to the president’s substantial influence on Korean government and politics.\textsuperscript{17}

The president is the only national executive that is directly elected. The president serves one five-year term and is constitutionally limited to only a single term. This single-term limitation is a response to past abuses of presidential power from the 1950s through the 1970s, during which presidents, once in power, would prolong their terms in office for extended periods. In his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has extensive authority over military policy, including the power to declare war, declare a state of emergency, or martial law, subject to the National Assembly’s

\textsuperscript{14} Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. South Korea," (London: The Economist, 2003), 5.
subsequent approval.\textsuperscript{18} Article 74 of the Korean constitution marks the president as commander in chief and Article 73 gives the president authority to negotiate and ratify treaties, and to declare war. The president unilaterally appoints the prime minister and the State Council according to Articles 86 and 87, who by Article 89 are the designated members that formulate foreign policy and war decisions. Finally, Article 77 gives the president the authority to declare martial law.\textsuperscript{19} The president maintains significant influence over the legislature. Articles 72, 75, and 76 allow the president to submit important decisions directly to a national referendum, issue presidential decrees, and in time of crisis, issue orders having the effect of law without concurrence of the National Assembly. However, he does not have the power to dissolve the assembly as is typical in parliamentary governments. Presidential appointments to the cabinet and high government office are usually from within his political party ranks and from close friends and associates. Former classmates and regional relations constitute the bulk of presidential appointees; therefore the president maintains significant influence over cabinet decisions.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the president appoints three influential cabinet-level staff members (chief of staff, chief policy secretary, and chief national security secretary)

\textsuperscript{18} Korea (Republic), \textit{The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987)} (Seoul: Office of Legislation, 1987).

\textsuperscript{19} Auerswald, \textit{Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force}, 139. Korea (Republic), \textit{The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987)}.

who do not require assembly approval, but who oversee the cabinet and bureaucracy and play an important role in formulating public and foreign policy.\(^{21}\)

Day to day operations of the executive branch is overseen by the prime minister, who assists the president in his duties. Unlike the prime minister under a traditional parliamentary system where he or she is the chief executive, the prime minister of Korea is the principal executive assistant to the president. Constitutionally, the president is popularly elected and represents the people, while the prime minister is appointed by the president and serves as his chief administrator.\(^{22}\) The prime minister is not required to be a member of parliament and is usually filled by the president with a political confidant. The prime minister is approved by the National Assembly and supervises government ministries and independent agencies. He or she also has the power to recommend the appointment or dismissal of cabinet ministers; however, they are typically chosen by the president and traditionally follow the president’s prerogatives.\(^{23}\) In the event that the president is unable to fulfill his duties, the prime minister assumes the position of acting president.\(^{24}\) Rather than providing a check on executive power, the ROK prime minister in actuality consolidates presidential power.

\(^{21}\) Hahn and Plein, *After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy*, 134.

\(^{22}\) Young-jae Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries," *The Korea Herald*, January 21, 2008.


\(^{24}\) During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the prime minister acted as chief executive while President Roh was considered for impeachment from March to May 2003. Sung-ho Kim, "The Constitutional Soul of Korea's Democracy," *The Korea Herald*, December 25, 2007.
The State Council—the highest executive body—is composed of the president, the prime minister, and the heads of executive ministries. The Council deliberates on major policy decisions that fall within the power of the executive; its meetings are chaired by the president and officiated by the prime minister. Although the Council has no power to make final decisions, the Constitution requires that certain matters be brought to it before final decisions are made. These include drafts of constitutional amendments, declarations of war, budget proposals, government restructurings, and emergency orders. South Korean political observers have noted that the president uses his appointment powers to the cabinet as an important political tool for balancing factional interests within his party and for rewarding loyalty. Therefore, the president has almost unfettered influence over the State Council and government ministries.

Individual minister ability to influence and control policy under a “strong” president is considerably limited. Ministry heads tend to have little influence over policy due to frequent reshuffling of ministry positions by the president, or forced resignations due to public scandals. Under the Kim Young-sam regime (1993-98), the average term for the prime minister was only 10 months, while the average term for ministers of economy, internal affairs, health, general affairs, and political affairs averaged about seven to eight months. This trend continued in the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-08).

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26 Savada and Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study*.
27 Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries."
The most influential executive body as of late is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the primary decision making body for security issues. The NSC consists of the prime minister, the director of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), and the ministers of national defense, foreign affairs and trade, home affairs, and finance. During the Roh administration, the NSC was effectively led by the Vice Chief rather than the National Security Advisor. During the Roh administration, the NSC was Roh’s primary advisory and decision making body on most issues, especially those involving the United States.  

The 1987 Constitution attempted to restrict the power of the president by divesting the power concentrated in the executive and balancing it with the legislature. According to the constitution, the legislature has many powers with which to check and scrutinize the executive. As stated above, it has the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties; control of taxation and budgeting; the right to investigate public affairs and inspect government offices; the right to request the prime minister, ministers, and government delegates to attend the legislative session and answer questions; the right to pass a recommendation for the removal of the prime minister or a state council member from office; and finally the right to pass motions for impeachment of the president, the prime minister, members of the state council and other public officials, in case they have violated the constitution or other laws in the performance of official duties.

The legislative branch consists of the unicameral National Assembly. Similar to most Western national legislatures, the major role of the Assembly is passing laws, representing national sentiment, and overseeing the executive body. According to Article 60[1][2] of the constitution, the Assembly possesses the right of consent to treaties, declarations of war, and military deployments. The Korean legislature is intended to balance the power of the executive, but historically this separation has been effectively disabled by strong presidents who maintain significant control over party appointments. Only recently has the opposition controlled the legislature and moderately checked the power of the president. Under Korean law, assembly members are both directly elected and appointed by the political parties in proportion to the number of seats the party wins in the national election held every four years. In the 2000 election, 227 assembly members were directly elected, while the remaining 46 were appointed based on the proportional formula. Sessions of the Assembly may be either regular (once a year, for no more than 100 days) or extraordinary (by request of the president or a caucus for no

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29 Korea (Republic), The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987). See also Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, 139.

30 Since the National Assembly is unicameral, the president is often supported by his own party and retains significant control. Likewise, when the National Assembly is from the opposition party, the president is often able to gain votes in the legislature by offering personal incentives to ministers to switch parties. Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 315-16. President Kim Dae-Jung secured a majority in the National Assembly in 1998 by enticing a large number of opposition lawmakers to defect through abuses of his executive power, Hong Nack Kim, "The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (2000), 895. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, UK New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3. The National Assembly actually rejected two nominees for the Prime Minister position that were presented by President Kim Dae-jung, in 2002. Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 284-85.

31 The 2000 election is significant, because it determined the Assembly composition during the deliberations approaching the Iraq War.
more than 30 days). These sessions are open to the public by default, but can be closed by majority vote or by decree of the Speaker. In order for laws to be passed in any session, a quorum of half the members must be present.\textsuperscript{32}

The legislative process in the Assembly has several distinctive features that favor the executive. First, bills may be introduced by the executive or by assembly members; however, the constitution provides the executive with streamlined procedures for introducing legislation.\textsuperscript{33} Bills must pass through legislative committee before they reach the floor for a vote; however, before they reach committee, they must already have gained the support of at least 20 members. Bills introduced by the executive branch, in contrast, do not require a threshold value to be introduced to committee. Second, the executive bureaucracy maintains an advantage over legislative committees on policy expertise and agenda setting. Since committee chairs and members change every two years, members have little opportunity to develop policy expertise. Additionally, the lack of a well-developed committee assignment process hinders committee specialization. Committee assignments are distributed under the direction of the party leadership and reflect political pork-barrel politics rather than policy expertise.\textsuperscript{34} Third, the assembly may pass laws contrary to the president’s policies, but those bills may be vetoed. Overriding a veto requires a two-thirds majority of assembly votes and must be completed within 15 days of the veto. Fourth, according to Article 54[3] the president

\textsuperscript{32} Korea (Republic), \textit{The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987)}.
\textsuperscript{33} Ahn, \textit{Elites and Political Power in South Korea}, Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."
\textsuperscript{34} Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."
formulates the budget, and the legislature cannot hold the budget hostage to his performance on foreign policy issues, nor can it force the president to fund unwanted initiatives based on Article 57. Finally, the Assembly only recently gained an independent capability for research and analysis. Committees previously had little ability to counter the highly coordinated position advocated by the executive’s bureaucracy.

The executive advantage is also reflected in the high passage rate of bills introduced by the executive versus the legislature and the lack of oversight over executive functions. Prior to the onset of the democratic transition in 1987, bill-proposing power had been almost completely monopolized by the executive branch. The preeminence of the executive branch as the initiator of policy was accepted as a necessary condition for hastened economic development in a short time, but that preeminent status of the executive branch has continued in a less explicit but still prevalent fashion.\textsuperscript{35} Under Article 62[2] the Assembly can question the prime minister or State Council, but has no power to call the president for questioning. Likewise, the Assembly may only recommend that the prime minister or a council member be removed based on Article 63. Furthermore, according to Article 65[1] the Assembly may impeach the president, but only for constitutional or legal violations. All considered, the Assembly falls short of fulfilling its role representing society and checking the power of the executive.

Sound party politics, if they represented the will of the public, would provide a crucial bridge between society, the Assembly, and the president, but this bridge is

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
missing in Korea. Political parties are weak in Korean politics and have not become institutionalized, nor have they served to connect voters with actual policy choices.\textsuperscript{36} Political parties in Korea do not reflect the aggregated interests of its members, but rather function as instruments of political leaders to further their individual interests. Parties are top-down rather than bottom-up organized and tend to serve elite interests while merely providing insincere efforts to promoting public and general interests.\textsuperscript{37} They represent the political opinions of party members rather than constituents.\textsuperscript{38}

Korean lawmakers follow their party leader’s decisions almost all the time. Cross-party voting is rarely found in Korea’s national and local assemblies, which demonstrates a high level of party loyalty, but not ideological cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{39} Party discipline is extremely rigid, meaning that dialogue and negotiation does not occur between Assembly members, but rather party bosses determine policy.\textsuperscript{40} To that end, the center of policy debate is not the Assembly but the political party. If an individual legislator does not follow party guidelines in a critical floor vote, he or she may be punished by being deprived of various privileges within the party, including nominations

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\textsuperscript{37} Kihl, \textit{Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture}, 317.


\textsuperscript{40} Seong-ho Lim, "Creating Balanced President-Assembly Relations," \textit{The Korea Herald}, January 25, 2008, Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."
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and committee assignments.\textsuperscript{41} Political leaders or specific political elites founded or dispersed political parties for their political purposes and interests; therefore, the party became a method to extract rent from the state on behalf of party elites in exchange for favored policies.\textsuperscript{42} In this way, political parties have functioned to organize and manipulate society from above.\textsuperscript{43}

Since political parties tend to be manipulated by party leaders for self-interested reasons, they frequently dissolve and merge at the behest of political leaders and elites. Korea’s political parties are not subsequently enduring entities and have very short lives.\textsuperscript{44} As long as the party functions in a manner acceptable to the party leader, the leader continues his association with the organization. However, stability has been rare in Korea, since founding personalities have often dismissed their parties or renamed them. Therefore, the average lifespan of parties has been exceptionally short, and numerous political parties have been created and dissolved.\textsuperscript{45}

The effect of the weakened party system has been to further the power of the president and powerful politicians at the expense of societal interests. The ROK federal government and local governments still tend to aggregate demands of large powerful

\textsuperscript{42} Kihl, \textit{Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture}, 317.
\textsuperscript{44} Kim, "The Ideological Affiliations of Political Parties."
groups, ignoring constituent needs and desires. Furthermore, the president’s single fixed term gives him little direct electoral incentive for aligning policy with public opinion. Additionally, Articles 8 and 21 give the government significant power to quell dissent. Limited methods exist for voters or interest groups outside the executive inner circle to influence policy or make their preferences known. Voters dissatisfied with the status quo have a choice between submission and violent mass protest. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and civic action organizations have emerged as a means to influence policy; however, since Korean NGOs are heavily subsidized by the government they are often reluctant to challenge government positions.

Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) have voluntarily attempted to increase the influence of the Assembly and limit the powers of the president; however, these changes reflect personal policy preferences rather than structural constraints on the executive. The legislative process in the Assembly is still marked by deep involvement from the executive branch, exceptionally strong party leadership, and a confrontational mode of interaction between the governing party and the opposition parties. The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized in the past two decades, is not yet mature enough to give priority to a balanced partnership between legislative and executive branches. Due to legislative

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46 Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries."
47 Kil and Moon, eds., Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction, 88.
48 Kyudok Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," Journal of International and Area Studies 12, no. 2 (2005), 37-38.
49 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."
gridlock, influence peddling, and executive dominance, and a lack of means to influence policy, Korean citizens maintain an ambivalent attitude toward the ability of the National Assembly to represent their interests. The balance of power is skewed toward a president equipped with unilateral executive powers, and Assembly members’ active involvement in policy issues often generates gridlock in governance which is overcome by executive prerogatives.  

This strong presidential leadership and control of the bureaucracy, combined with a weak legislature, marks South Korea as a Type I state in the Peterson typology.

The Timing, Size, and Mix of South Korea’s Contributions

Korea walked a diplomatic tightrope with the United States in the approach to the Iraq War. The ROK government did not want to commit to a costly military intervention with the potential to alienate Arab oil suppliers. At the same time, the Kim and Roh governments attempted to balance U.S. requests for military support against their need for U.S. cooperation in the North Korean nuclear standoff. To obtain U.S. consent to the “Policy for Peace and Prosperity,” the Korean NSC encouraged the government to join the Iraq War effort with the eventual dispatch of 3,600 troops by summer 2004. South Korea provided a significant number of military personnel supporting the Iraq War coalition in two phases. The first phase involved the dispatch of approximately 650 medical and engineering personnel in the immediate aftermath of declared combat

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50 Lim, "Creating Balanced President-Assembly Relations."
51 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict.
52 "Korea Walking Diplomatic Tightrope over War on Iraq," Korea Times, September 14, 2002.
operations. The second dispatch of an additional 3,000 troops occurred in response to the U.S. request for forces to support stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

Korea’s diplomatic support was less noteworthy. Politically, South Korea remained on the sidelines in 2002 and early 2003 while the Bush administration attempted to forge a coalition of the willing against Iraq. However, once military intervention was inevitable, Seoul provided political support to the intervention. Economically, Seoul’s contributions were significant. Seoul provided approximately $275 million in assistance, soft loans, and grants through UN organizations and bilaterally.\footnote{United States Department of State., \textit{Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction} (Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, April 2008 [cited May 16 2008]); available from \url{http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105341.pdf}. Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148.} The following sections describe the timing and composition of ROK political, economic, and military contributions to the coalition of the willing.

\textit{Political Contributions}

Seoul’s political strategy in the approach to the Iraq War was to walk the fine line between supporting U.S. efforts to condemn the Hussein regime while not angering Arab oil suppliers. Korea imports the bulk of its oil from the Middle East, and the region is an important export market for Korean goods as well. Seoul’s political strategy hinged on encouraging a UN mandate until it was inevitable that the U.S. would implement a military strategy in Iraq.

Under the administration of President Kim Dae-jung, Korea maintained a strategy of ambivalence towards the U.S. efforts aimed at Iraq. This ambivalence mirrored the
South Korean attitude towards contributing to the 1991 Gulf War coalition; the ROK government maintained a diplomatically neutral stance until asked by the United States to support the coalition.\(^{54}\) The Blue House (Korean White House) refrained from either endorsing or disapproving U.S. policy and offered no reaction to President Bush’s September 12 speech to the UN General Assembly accusing the Hussein regime of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to a ROK government official, Seoul’s strategy was to not publicly reveal its stance on Iraq until necessary.\(^{55}\) Considering the anti-American climate in South Korea, and the lack of international consensus regarding Iraq, Seoul maintained diplomatic neutrality in an effort to not inflame its domestic or international constituencies.

President Kim encouraged a UN mandate in private conversations with President Bush. In a September 2002 phone conversation, Kim expressed his support for U.S. intentions to gain a UN resolution on Iraq before resorting to the use of force. Seoul’s stance was articulated publicly at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), September 22-24, 2002, when President Kim and leaders of 24 ASEM member countries called on Washington to work within the UN framework regarding military action in Iraq.\(^{56}\) According to a presidential aide, “Kim’s support doesn’t cover a unilateral U.S. move.”\(^{57}\) However, Seoul had to maintain a moderately pro-U.S. diplomatic stance so that it could

\(^{55}\) “Korea Walking Diplomatic Tightrope over War on Iraq.”
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
coordinate North Korean policy. The same aide declined to answer whether Korea would support the U.S. if it eventually pursued unilateral action against Iraq.

In late November 2002, the Bush administration allegedly requested military support from Seoul for the Iraq coalition; however, the government did not publicly acknowledge this request until February 2003. According to an anonymous senior Korean government official, “There has been a US request for a ‘usual level of support’ in case a war breaks out in Iraq.” The official added, “We have not yet decided our position regarding this.” In anticipation of a visit to Seoul by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in December, the ROK government continued to announce that it had not yet received a specific request from the United States for assistance in the event of military action. Regional experts stated that with the current anti-American mood in Seoul, combined with North Korea’s nuclear declaration, a direct request from Armitage would put the Kim administration in a tough position.

By early February 2003, alliance dependence concerns seemed to overcome Korean reluctance to support the coalition of the willing. In late January, in a response to President-elect Roh’s markedly anti-American campaign and Korean demands for a change of the Status of Forces agreement, James Baker reputedly gave a disturbing

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61 Ibid.
assessment for a delegation of South Korean national assembly members visiting the

United States:

When Corazon Aquino asked U.S. troops to leave we left without any second thought…When China seized some Filipino islands by force, she telephoned to ask whether we will let China get away with this. I said there were no U.S. soldiers in her country to prevent any such Chinese aggression…The same applies to Korea were she to opt for U.S. military pullout.\(^{62}\)

Within two weeks of this visit, the ROK government openly announced its support for the coalition of the willing, although its commitment was limited to non-combat forces.\(^{63}\)

On February 10, the outgoing Kim government declared that Seoul would likely provide support to the impending U.S. military action if requested. Prime Minister Kim Suk-soo stated to the National Assembly that Seoul could send troops to the Middle East to show support for the U.S. military action.\(^ {64}\) Brig. General Hwang Young-soo, from the Defense Ministry, added, “If the U.S. asks for soldiers [in non-combat areas], we will consider it by following the precedents set during the Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan.”\(^ {65}\)

Finally, at the urging of the United States, the newly seated Roh government pledged its support to the coalition of the willing. On March 11, nine days before the start of the war and two days before the U.S. and United Kingdom withdrew demands for


a new U.N. Security Council vote on war with Iraq, South Korea officially accepted the
U.S. request to assist in its war effort against Iraq. A Chong Wa Dae (Office of the
President of the Republic of Korea, or Blue House) spokesman said that Washington
conveyed a request that Seoul express its support of the coalition by providing it with
medical assistance to deal with the anticipated refugee flow.66 Another official stated,
“We are not in a position to sit idle, when our ally is sending a desperate call,” however
he cautioned that, “We will first issue a statement pledging our support but in a way that
will minimize misunderstanding in the Arab world.”67 In a March 13 telephone
conversation with President Roh, President Bush affirmed that he needed Seoul’s
outspoken support for its possible war on Iraq.68 In return, Roh gained Washington’s
confirmation that the United States would seek a peaceful solution to its nuclear standoff
with North Korea.69

Diplomatically, South Korea remained on the sidelines until compelled by the
Bush administration to support the war effort. The Kim Dae-jung administration
attempted to maintain a position of neutrality by maintaining that it would not get
involved in the Iraq issue. The only stance that the administration took was that it
encouraged the United States to seek a UN mandate for a military mission. The
successor Roh administration attempted to maintain its distance, but increasing tensions

66 "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq."
67 Ibid.
68 "Roh, Bush Show Signs of Reconciliation," Korea Times, March 15, 2003, Hyun-jin Seo, "Both Roh,
69 "Roh, Bush Show Signs of Reconciliation.," Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks."
on the peninsula, combined with U.S. pressure to participate, influenced Seoul’s decision making.

During the approach to the Iraq War, Seoul was considerably more concerned with tensions emanating from North Korea’s declaration that it would restart its nuclear program rather than the implications of U.S. action in the Middle East. Initially, the Roh administration aimed for de-escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis through a continuation of sorts of President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” as the “Policy for Peace and Prosperity.” Roh unveiled his “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” in his February 25, 2003 inauguration address. The Policy for Peace and Prosperity advocated the normalization of relations between North Korea and the international community as a means of developing a durable peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Roh stressed that a peaceful resolution through dialogue was the only solution, and that heightened military tension must be avoided at all costs, undermining the U.S. strategy of confrontation. Roh’s continuation of the “sunshine” approach was in direct conflict with the Bush strategy of confrontation. The ROK’s continued engagement with North Korea made it appear to be a “spoiler” of the U.S. nonproliferation policy, making up for North Korea’s lack of resources with aid, regardless of DPRK actions.

Until February 2003, Seoul declined to give clear-cut answers on whether the government would support a possible U.S. action without UN approval; however, the

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72 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator."
fledgling Roh administration realized that non-cooperation could lend a fatal blow to South Korean efforts to defuse the tension catalyzed by North Korea’s nuclear declaration.

**Economic Contributions**

In terms of economic assistance, Korea’s economic pledges have earned it a position as a major donor for Iraq Reconstruction, but its $260 million of support pales in comparison to the $4.9 billion pledged by Japan. The Republic of Korea’s initial pledge of $10 million in economic assistance earned it a position on the Donor Committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). The UN sponsored IRFFI has been one of the principal vehicles for delivering international donor assistance to Iraq. IRFFI is a multilateral mechanism made up of two Iraq trust funds, one managed by the UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. The Donor Committee consists of countries that have committed at least $10 million to the fund facility and also includes two rotating representatives from countries that have committed less than $10 million.\(^{73}\)

Korea’s initial pledge of $10 million in April 2003 towards humanitarian assistance for Iraqi refugees was increased to $60 million by the time of the Madrid Donor Conference in October 2003.\(^{74}\) This aid was distributed through international organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the World

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Food Program. Seoul eventually pledged an additional $200 million over five years at the Madrid conference. Washington acknowledged South Korea’s contribution at the 2003 Security Consultation Meeting. According to ROK Defense Minister Cho Young-kil, “Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for President Roh Moo-hyun’s decision to provide both additional forces in Iraq and $260 million in reconstruction funds from 2003 to 2007.”

These contributions were seen as a means to display to the Arab community that Korea was supporting the coalition of the willing as a means to reconstruct Iraq rather than as part of an occupying force. The Roh administration underscored these financial contributions to Arab leaders as a means to foster an atmosphere favorable to Korean troop deployments to Iraq. On February 17, 2004, President Roh hosted a group of envoys from 13 Arab nations to seek their support for South Korea’s plan to send 3,000 troops to Iraq. During the meeting Roh urged the envoys to play a role in persuading their constituencies that Korean military efforts were geared towards gaining security and rehabilitating Iraq. Since most Arab nations opposed any additional troop deployment that was not led by the United Nations, Seoul felt that Korea needed to explain their contributions directly to the Arab public. In that effort President Roh provided interviews

to Al Jazeera, Egypt’s Middle East News Agency, and Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency. 79

In addition to Madrid pledges, a number of countries made new pledges to help Iraq at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, at the launching of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI or Compact) in May 2007. South Korea’s pledge included a $200 million soft loan provided by Korea’s Economic Development and Cooperation Fund to help rebuild and develop Iraq’s oil industry. 80 Finally, the ROK and Iraq also reached agreements to strengthen economic ties through construction, energy, and information technology sharing. South Korea’s contribution to Iraq reconstruction marks it as one of the six major donors of foreign aid. 81

Korea’s economic assistance compares favorably with its economic role in 1991. In that effort South Korea was forced through U.S. pressure to contribute $115 million to international assistance efforts and $45 million to the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Morocco for their military forces. In both the 1991 and 2003 efforts, Korean assistance was provided after U.S. pressure. 82

79 Ibid.
Military Contributions

The ROK government deployed military personnel to Iraq in two phases, both in response to pressure from the Bush administration. The first deployment of troops was in response to a February 2003 request to Seoul to assist militarily with post-war reconstruction, combat operations, and humanitarian assistance. Seoul initially hesitated, in light of domestic opposition to the U.S. action. However, considering the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and increasing tensions between the United States and North Korea, Seoul finally decided to send troops in levels similar to the assistance given to Operation’s Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). During the 1991 Gulf War, Seoul deployed a 150-member medical team, five C-130 transport aircraft, and 150 transportation personnel. Similarly, the ROK government sent 150 medical personnel, 350 transportation personnel, and a team of 150 military engineers to Afghanistan. In April 2003, Seoul dispatched 670 military engineers and medical personnel to Iraq supporting the U.S. military mission. Significantly, these troops were pledged to the U.S. war effort in March 2003—before combat operations began—and they arrived in theater in April, while the U.S. was still engaged in combat against the Hussein regime.

83 "Defense Ministry Reaffirms Non-Combat Troop Dispatch."
After the end of the conventional combat phase of the war, these units moved to Nasiriyah to assist the reconstruction of Iraq.\footnote{United States Central Command., \textit{Coalition Countries: Republic of Korea} (U.S. Central Command, 2008 [cited May 15 2008]); available from http://www.centcom.mil/en/finance/93.html. President Bush declared the end to combat operations and “mission accomplished” on May 1, 2003.}

In an effort to put a more “international face” on the American led occupation, the Bush administration aggressively solicited for additional coalition troops in an effort to replace some American forces.\footnote{Eric Schmitt, "Up to 30,000 Troops from a Dozen Nations to Replace Some G.I.'S in Iraq," \textit{The New York Times}, June 19, 2003.} This request resulted in the eventual deployment of an additional 3,000 ROK military personnel in August 2004. U.S. requests for assistance were reported in the Korean press throughout July and August 2003 provoking rumors across Korea that additional ROK forces might soon be sent to Iraq to assist the American forces already there.\footnote{Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 32.} At the fourth Future of Alliance (FOTA) talks in Seoul on September 3 and 4, and in a meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and ROK Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan in Washington September 5, the U.S. requested that Korea deploy a sizable military contingent to Iraq.\footnote{Chae-Jin Lee, \textit{A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 269.} In response, Minister Yoon hinted that his government would comply with the U.S. request.\footnote{Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 33.} On October 17, 2003 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1511 which urged UN members to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Roh government quickly took advantage of this event and on October 18, Roh announced that he would send
additional troops to Iraq.\textsuperscript{90} The U.S. requested 5,000 ROK combat troops to be deployed to Mosul to replace the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division; the Roh administration, however, opted to send a contingent consisting primarily of support troops to provide reconstruction aid rather than the security that was desperately needed.\textsuperscript{91} Although the government committed itself to the additional deployment in October, the deployment was repeatedly delayed due to the increased violence in Iraq and domestic resistance at home.\textsuperscript{92} The Korean deployment was conditioned that the ROK send mostly a peacekeeping force rather than a combat force, and that the U.S. find a safe location for the ROK area of operations. The ROK government, already concerned about domestic unrest, cited security concerns in Mosul and U.S. pressure to participate in “offensive operations” for its delay.\textsuperscript{93} The U.S. complied with Seoul’s requests and the ROK dispatched the Zaytun unit to the Arbil province in August 2004. This unit was composed of 1,400 combat Marines and Special Forces commandos and 1,600 military engineers and medics responsible for security and reconstruction of the Kurdish Autonomous Region centered in Arbil.\textsuperscript{94} The Zaytun deployment was South Korea’s largest troop dispatch since the Vietnam War, when it deployed over 300,000 personnel over a twelve-year period. In

\textsuperscript{90} Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 269-70.
\textsuperscript{92} Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 31, "Over 5,000 ROK Soldiers Likely to Head to Iraq," Korea Times, October 20, 2003.
fact, Korea’s presence was the third largest military contingent in the coalition of the willing until late 2007. The Zaytun division’s mission was to reconstruct roads and infrastructure, offer vocational training assistance, provide medical treatment to local residents, and provide training to Iraqi Security Forces. Later, in March 2006, the unit assumed guard and escort missions for UN officials in the region, but was constrained by its parliamentary mandate from participating in offensive military operations throughout the deployment.

Though the ROK National Assembly has repeatedly extended the Zaytun unit’s mandate, the number of Korean troops in Iraq has steadily decreased to approximately 650, as of May 2008. The Korean National Assembly voted for the first significant troop reduction December 20, 2005 in reaction to anticipated domestic pressure to withdraw from the Iraq coalition and the planned drawdown of U.S. and British forces. Seoul unilaterally scaled back its force level by 1,000 personnel as part of their plan for extending deployments in Iraq, which require parliamentary approval each year to gain approval. In a blow to the Bush administration, the first indication of the troop

reduction was from the Korean media. The next force reduction was bundled into the
approval bill the next year. The government gained parliamentary approval for extending
the deployment for another year by reducing the size of the contingent from 2,300 to
1,200. Additionally, in a concession to the ruling Uri party, the government agreed to
present a plan for a complete withdrawal of all Korean troops by the end of 2007 in order
to gain approval of the National Assembly. The Assembly did not specify any
specific timetable for troop pullout, and the Roh administration extended the troop
mandate for an additional year with a reduced troop level, hoping to gain economic
benefits and strengthening ties with the United States for continuing support.

Explaining South Korean Contributions

The Republic of Korea’s contribution to the Iraq coalition is noteworthy, since the
country provided the third largest military contingent from 2003 through 2006. This
level of support was initiated and maintained in the face of significant criticism from the
public, who elected the Roh administration on a platform of independence and greater
autonomy within the ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship. Shortly after his inauguration, the

24, 2005, "Talk of South Korean Troop Reduction Points to Uncertainty of Iraq Coalition Future,"
Associated Press, November 18, 2005.
100 "US Learned of South Korean Troop Reduction from Media," Yonhap News Agency, November 21,
2005.
to Withdraw Iraq Troops Next Year," United Press International, November 30, 2006, "South Korea
102 The governor of Arbil hinted that his provincial government would give an oil concession to South
Korean firms for the country's successful efforts to help rebuild the region. Sung-ki Jung, "S. Korea Delays
Decision on Fate of Troops in Iraq," Korea Times, June 28, 2007. See also Dae-woong Jin, "Troop
Deployment in Iraq Emerges as Key Campaign Issue," The Korea Herald, October 23, 2007, Sung-ki Jung,
Roh administration made an abrupt policy reversal and acquiesced to U.S. requests to assist the Iraq coalition. At the same time, Roh’s policy towards North Korea hardened to a policy contingent on North Korean concessions. Why would an administration striving for greater autonomy and independence from the United States become such a willing participant in the coalition of the willing?

The alliance dependence and domestic political structure hypotheses of the Security Decision Model best explain the ROK’s contribution to the Iraq coalition. President Roh himself aptly describes the forces that converged to encourage participation by Korean military forces, “Cooperation from the U.S. is essential to the security of Northeast Asia and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Amid the unpredictability surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, the importance of a closer South Korea-U.S. alliance cannot be overemphasized.”

Alliance dependence influenced Korean decision making towards the Iraq coalition. Seoul felt obliged to submit to U.S. requests in order to gain influence over U.S. policy towards North Korea. President Roh attempted to link deployment of ROK troops to progress on defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear ambitions. While alliance dependence pressures motivated Seoul to participate in the coalition, the influence of public opinion on the government explains the timing, composition, and level of military support both in the dispatch of troops and the eventual drawdown. Public discontentment with the troop deployment influenced

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government decision making in a very indirect manner after the U.S. request for a substantial troop deployment in the fall of 2003. The Blue House and the NSC were concerned that putting troops at risk would have a negative impact on President Roh’s public ratings. To manage public opinion concerning the deployment, the NSC advised President Roh to limit the troop deployment to 3,000 consisting of primarily non-combat troops. Accordingly, the Blue House considered it necessary to offer troop reductions in order for the National Assembly to continue the Iraq troop mandate. The troop reductions were preventive in nature in anticipation of domestic backlash concerning the deployment to Iraq.

The following sections analyze the influence of external and domestic factors using the revised Security Decision Model.

**Historical Learning**

Since national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence of cognition and historical learning are critical factors in understanding nation-state foreign policy decisions. Policy makers rely heavily on historical analogy to simplify and understand complex situations. According to the learning hypothesis, leaders are more likely to contribute to a military effort if they gained full participation rights with the coalition leader, influenced decision making, and received compensation in the form of increased influence with the coalition leader or material benefits, for their participation in

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previous efforts. The South Korean case demonstrates a shift in attitude in the decision making elite, learned not from combat operations, but “unlearned” in the ROK government attempt to have a more favorable relationship with the DPRK.

Since the United States defended the Republic of Korea in the Korean War and the ROK provided the second largest contingent of soldiers that supported the United States in Vietnam, one might assume that these previous wars would shape decision making towards the Iraq intervention. However, scant evidence exists that these experiences influenced elite decision making. Rather, with the introduction of the Roh Administration, a new generation of political leaders, known as the “386 generation” has risen to power with little if any direct recollection of the Korean conflict and no allegiance to the virtually uncontested acceptance of the Korean-American alliance by previous generations. Unlike their parents who held the United States in high regard due to its role in the Korean War and the ensuing Cold War, this group views the United States as a supporter of the authoritarian governments in South Korea from the 1960s to 1980s and therefore complicit in numerous military crackdowns, including the massacre at Kwangju in 1980. These formative experiences provide a frame of reference

105 The so-called “386 generation” is a reference to the 386a computer chip which became prevalent while the generation acted as pro-democracy activists in the 1980s. 386ers are those college educated Koreans in their 30s and early 40s, who went to college and fought in the pro-democracy movements in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s. According to one 386 activist, “My generation, the 386 generation, were in the streets fighting in the 80s against the military dictatorship. Now, 20 years later, we are combat-ready with our internet.” Caroline Gluck, South Korea's Web Guerillas (BBC News, 2003 [cited May 23 2008]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2843651.stm.

106 In May 1980, hundreds of civilians were massacred by soldiers in the south-western city of Kwangju after rising up against military rule. Although it was brutally suppressed, the Kwangju Uprising is now seen by many as a pivotal moment in the South Korean struggle for democracy in the long period of
significantly altered from the Korean War generation. While the political agenda for the Korean War generation was economic sustenance, security, and survival, the younger, more affluent, and higher-educated generation is more concerned with quality-of-life issues including labor rights, environmental issues, urban congestion, and the status of U.S. forces in the Korean legal system. Overall, the 386 generation regards the United States less as the country that fought for Korean independence than as the country that backed past military dictators. Although more conservative policy makers were integral to Roh’s foreign policy apparatus, the 386 influence significantly altered the view of U.S. policy in high government circles.

The election of President Roh Moo-hyun marked the ascendancy of the 386 generation into Korean national politics. Roh entered politics in 1988 with an activist agenda, grilling the government over corruption allegations and the 1980 Kwangju Massacre. His election as President in 2002 marked the most liberal government to be voted into office since the ROK’s inception in 1948. The Roh administration policy preferences reflect Roh’s 386 influences, such as the desire for a more even footing in the ROK-U.S. bilateral alliance and independence in policy concerning the DPRK. First, the

dictatorship following the Korean War. The final toll of those who lost their lives is still unknown, as it is believed the military dumped bodies in mass graves or lakes, however, estimates today range from 500 to 2,000. At the time of the Kwangju uprising, a U.S. general retained ultimate operational control over combined U.S. and South Korean forces, therefore activists hold the U.S. complicit in the massacre. Becky Branford, *Lingering Legacy of Korean Massacre* (BBC News, 2005 [cited May 23 2008]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4557315.stm.


administration reflected a “post-Cold War mindset” that framed North Korea as a Korean problem rather than a continuing confrontation, moving away from conventional notions of threat toward an affirmation of North Korean vulnerabilities as Pyongyang sought to balance regime survival with domestic reform. Second, the administration advocated a parallel need to foster a more equal partnership with the United States. Throughout his race for the presidency in 2002, Roh portrayed himself as a leader who would be able to send a strong message to Washington that “business as usual” would no longer be considered to be the norm in the ROK-U.S. relationship. Roh stressed the need for an alliance relationship that would mature into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship. Lastly, the influence of the 386 generation is significant considering that the Roh administration tended to formulate policy based on the advice of 386 generation progressives rather than from those with significant domestic and foreign policy experience.\textsuperscript{109}

Based on the experiences of the 386 generation, the learning hypothesis predicts that the ROK would not be an active participant in the Iraq coalition. Seoul would be expected to distance itself from the Bush administration in order to gain a greater degree of independence from the United States. According to University professor Kim Il Young, “The younger generation believes more in self-reliance and independence. It feels that in the long term, South Korea should strike a balance between the United States and

\textsuperscript{109} Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications."
China and adopt a more neutral position toward the United States.” The Iraq War provided an excellent opportunity for the Korean government to demonstrate independence from the United States and to court potential regional allies. Participation in the coalition would not be predicted unless the Korean government was afforded an influential role in Iraq policy, or unless the ROK could significantly influence U.S. policy bilaterally in regards to the DPRK.

**Balance of Threat**

Since private versus collective incentives significantly influence the degree of burden sharing, the balance of threat block in the Security Decision Model seeks to explain whether an ally considers the action a “war of choice” or a necessary intervention to counter an existential threat. This dissertation operationalizes threat as a factor of material capability and intentions to influence a state internally and externally. If military defeat is seen as the most serious threat to regime security, then state decision makers should seek to balance against the state that is geographically closest and whose aggregate military power capabilities are greatest. Given South Korea’s distance from Iraq and the lack of any threatening intentions from Saddam Hussein towards the ROK, the balance of threat hypothesis fails to directly explain Korean participation in the Iraq War coalition. However, when the scope of threat is enlarged to include proximate threats to South Korea, balance of threat theory provides some explanatory power for Korean motivation to join the coalition of the willing. The U.S. war on terrorism—

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110 Onishi, "U.S. And South Korea Try to Redefine Their Alliance."
including the inclusion of North Korea in the “axis of evil” and the Bush doctrine of preemptive war—raised serious concerns in the ROK government that hard-line U.S. policy towards North Korea could easily catalyze an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. The Roh administration considered this U.S. policy stance threatening to ROK security interests and sought to influence U.S. policy by deploying military forces in the Iraq coalition.

South Korean perceptions of threat, and attitudes toward North Korea and the U.S., have changed substantially as a result of President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” and his subsequent summit in Pyongyang in June 2000. As a part of this engagement strategy, the ROK government engaged in a campaign to convince the South Korean public that the North was a country to be pitied rather than feared. This campaign included removing remarks of North Korea as a threat in military documents and framing the North Korean famine as an economic problem rather than an issue of authoritarian control. As a result, the public and much of the decision making elite—

especially the 386 generation—appeared much less concerned with the threat from the North than reason would otherwise dictate. Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy fostered a psychological metamorphosis in the South by framing North Korea as an underprivileged sibling rather than existential threat. In a national survey, 75 percent of South Koreans regard citizens of the North as “brothers.” Ignoring Korean War history, many in the South see the North as incapable of starting a war against its “brothers” in the South.

At the same time, an increasing number of South Koreans came to perceive the U.S. as a bully, a threat to peace, and an obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation and unification.

President Bush’s hard-line policy toward North Korea, combined with President Kim’s sunshine policy, created tension and friction in ROK-U.S. relations. The first ROK-U.S. summit between Bush and Kim Dae-jung, held in Washington, D.C. in March 2001, highlighted the great separation of policy preferences between the two leaders.

Instead of endorsing his partner’s sunshine policy, Bush lectured Kim about Kim Jong-
il’s untrustworthiness. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the subsequent attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism, Bush’s stance further hardened toward North Korea. As the U.S. foreign policy goals focused on curtailing WMD and preempting potential terrorist acts against the United States, President Bush designated North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” and displayed a personal distaste against dangerous autocratic regimes. During his February 2002 visit to South Korea Bush revealed to Kim that he would not let the world’s “most dangerous regimes” acquire its “most dangerous weapons.” South Korean reaction to this position was largely negative. The majority of South Koreans felt the Bush administration’s hard-line policy towards the North effectively encouraged its nuclear weapons development. The Bush administration’s perceived proclivity for unilateralism, regime change policy, and preference for military rather than diplomatic solutions, was considered threatening to peace on the Korean peninsula. These fears were all ignited when the U.S. confronted the DPRK over its covert nuclear development program.

The fall 2002 nuclear crisis brought ROK-U.S. relations and the ROK public trust in U.S. intentions to a new low. In a visit to North Korea, arranged by Seoul to re-engage

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U.S. bilateral relations with the DPRK, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly accused North Korea of developing uranium enrichment capabilities (a potential building block for nuclear weapons) in violation of the 1991 Joint Denuclearization Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to news accounts, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-joo acknowledged the program and responded that North Korea had been “compelled” to begin a uranium enrichment program for self defense after being branded a member of the “axis of evil” by President Bush. Thus, what began as a fact-finding mission to resume long-stalled talks with the reclusive Stalinist North Korea turned into unproductive and failed diplomacy. Suspicions regarding U.S. motives in confronting Pyongyang on its nuclear weapons program and the continued U.S. refusal to yield to North Korean demands, helped raise anti-American sentiments to new heights in the South. North Korean motives seemed to be accepted as legitimate, while U.S. motives in confronting the DPRK were questioned less frequently. They feared that Bush would not have the patience to engage in dialogue with the North, and that a tough U.S.

122 During a visit to Pyongyang in April 2002 South Korea’s National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won tried to persuade Kim Jong-il to receive a special envoy from the United States. North Korea decided to resume the bilateral dialogue and Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s visit to the DPRK was the first round of the renewed talks. Christoph Bluth, “Between a Rock and an Incomprehensible Place: The United States and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII, no. 2 (2005), 89.


124 North Korea demanded bilateral talks with the U.S. in an effort to establish a non-aggression pact between the two countries. The U.S. countered that the Korean War was a multilateral effort that required multilateral talks. In a 60 Minutes interview, younger Koreans accepted that President Bush is more threatening than Kim Jong-il. See Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, "The Korea Crisis," Foreign Policy, no. 136 (2003).

reaction would cause crisis on the peninsula. These views were expressed by President Roh when he stated that “success or failure of a U.S. policy toward North Korea isn’t too big a deal to the American people, but it is a life-or-death matter for South Korea” and “therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea’s opinion.”

In general, South Koreans feared a preemptive war against North Korea by the United States to resolve the nuclear crisis.

South Korea judged its primary threat to be the possibility of a military confrontation or regime collapse, not Pyongyang’s WMD capabilities. For this reason, easing tension between the U.S. and the DPRK and preventing any potential crisis that could threaten South Korean prosperity became the first priority of the government.

The economic consequences of a North Korean regime change, or collapse, caused much concern in Seoul. Seoul’s lessons from German reunification were hardly positive.

Balance of threat theory does not directly explain the ROK assistance in Iraq; however, when viewed from the perspective of South Korea’s security priorities, the theory provides explanatory power to the ROK contribution. President Roh used a contribution to the Iraq coalition to gain influence over U.S. policy towards the DPRK.

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127 Brooke, "South Opposes Pressuring North Korea."
129 The Seoul metropolitan area was already within range of thousands of North Korean chemical artillery tubes and therefore did not consider a nuclear capability a significant increase in threat.
130 Sheen, "Grudging Partner: South Korea," 98.
and lessen the threat of direct confrontation on the Korean peninsula. By the time of Roh’s inauguration in February 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was imminent and there was a widespread concern among South Koreans that North Korea would be the next target for U.S. attack. To gain U.S. acquiescence to a more measured strategy with the DPRK, President Roh and the National Security Council accommodated global U.S. security policy by joining the Iraq War coalition and maintaining the peacekeeping operations even after the other U.S. allies began disengagement.

**Collective Action**

As stated in chapter two, lacking private incentives such as threat, collective action theory seeks to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. The second block in the security decision making model determines the level of private incentive for a particular situation. If a state perceives a threat, it is more likely to participate fully than if governed by collective security concerns. If collective action motivations dominate, however, small states are less likely to contribute to the collective good. Their burden sharing contributions are expected to be in an amount smaller than their size would suggest. This paper identifies one collective good for the second Iraq War case: the disarmament of Iraqi WMD. This research demonstrates that South Korean decision makers were not concerned with Iraq as a proliferator of WMD and regional instability, but rather were motivated by private concerns with U.S. policy towards North Korea. If

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133 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 215-16.
Seoul had been motivated by collective action concerns, it would be predicted to limit its effort to a token contribution. Instead, the ROK government submitted to U.S. requests for significant participation in the larger stabilization operations. Threat and alliance dependence concerns motivated the Roh administration to support the war coalition as a means to gain leverage over U.S. policy. Though Korea provided the third largest contingent to the Iraq coalition in an effort to be marked as a major contributor to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, its contribution reflected alliance dependence concerns rather than a desire to be an integral element of a collective action.

Alliance Dependence

As stated in chapter three, allies face a security-autonomy tradeoff when entering into a defense pact; if an excess of “security” exists, a state may opt to trade some of the excess for more autonomy, by loosening alliance bonds or by reducing support to the ally on some issues, potentially risking the ally’s support on future security issues. Conversely if “security” is needed, a state may tighten alliance bonds or support an ally on an issue important to that ally. This security-autonomy tradeoff creates a tension between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment. This “alliance security dilemma” recognizes that each ally has alternative alliance choices and may opt for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied with the present allies. The Roh

134 Katharina Coleman argues that the global norm of multilateralism provides an incentive for states to engage in tokenism, or the dispatch of token forces as part of a multilateral coalition. See Katharina P. Coleman, “The Significance of Token Forces” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, March, 2008).
135 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181.
administration’s support for the Iraq War coalition reflected alliance pressures on foreign policy decisions. Domestically, Roh’s “386” backers assessed that the ROK was strong enough to allow for more autonomy in the ROK-U.S. alliance.\(^{137}\) Roh campaigned for the presidency on a platform that argued for increased independence in the alliance. In addition, he portrayed himself as a leader who would be able to send a strong message to Washington that “business as usual” would no longer be considered to be the norm in the ROK-U.S. relationship.\(^{138}\) However, the 2002-2003 North Korean nuclear crisis highlighted the need for Seoul to maintain strong alliance ties with the United States in order to influence U.S. policy on Iraq.\(^{139}\) Instead of loosening the alliance in an effort to gain more autonomy, Seoul was entrapped into supporting the Iraq War coalition in an effort to gain U.S. concessions towards North Korea.

The liberal leadership under Roh reflected Korea’s increased national confidence. Roh’s 386 generation led transition team posited that the ROK’s economic status as twelfth worldwide, combined with an armed force that numbered over 600,000 soldiers, should allow Korea significant influence over U.S. policy towards the DPRK. They believed that South Korea was indispensable for U.S. global security strategy, while at the same time more capable in dealing with threats emanating from the North. Moreover,


indoctrinated into radical leftist ideologies during college years, the transition team dismissed conservative warnings that increased independence from U.S. policy would lead to alliance problems as Cold War paranoia. During the fall 2002 presidential campaign, the Roh camp capitalized on the fear among the South Korean public and many in the government that South Korea would be entrapped in a military conflict precipitated, at least in part, by U.S. unwillingness to pursue a more flexible policy toward Pyongyang. Against the backdrop of the developing nuclear crisis with the DPRK and the accidental death of two Korean schoolchildren by a U.S. armored vehicle, Roh leveraged nationalistic themes to bring ROK-U.S. alliance politics to the forefront of the December presidential election. Roh secured the election by a 2.3 percent margin, emphasizing alliance reform as one of the main themes of the election. Once elected, however, the Roh administration realized that it was trapped by U.S. policy towards the North, which necessitated a strategy of concessions concerning the alliance relationship in an effort to gain leverage over U.S.-DPRK policy.

Roh’s Policy for Peace and Prosperity was in direct conflict with the Bush strategy of confrontation. While Roh was promoting a policy of engagement with the North, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the most provocative language toward North

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Korea since President Bush included it in his “axis of evil.” Rumsfeld, at a committee hearing in the House of Representatives, called the North Korean government a “terrorist regime.” U.S. and ROK policy differences were highlighted when Roh’s transition team was hosted by U.S. government leaders in early February. One of President Roh’s personal advisors, at a private dinner with U.S. policy makers, was quoted as saying that “the incoming government would prefer that North Korea had nuclear weapons to seeing it collapse.” This statement reflected that the Roh administration’s willingness to tolerate a nuclear North in exchange for stability on the Korean peninsula.

Unfortunately for the Roh’s Policy of Peace and Prosperity, the DPRK engaged in a series of escalatory measures that ensured that the U.S. would remain engaged on the Korean peninsula: Pyongyang announced that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; it reactivated its nuclear facilities and announced that operations were proceeding “on a normal footing;” a North Korean jet violated South Korean airspace over the Yellow Sea; and on the eve of Roh’s inauguration, North Korea test fired an anti-ship missile that landed in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

Seoul’s effort to mediate the crisis resulted in growing distrust between the U.S. and the ROK on the value of the alliance. Seoul’s efforts at mediation confirmed the

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144 Ibid., 17, "Roh to Walk Diplomatic Fine Line over Nk."
perception of many in Washington that their South Korean allies were flirting with the enemy, betraying the spirit of the alliance by acting as mediators rather than taking sides with the United States.\textsuperscript{146} Richard V. Allen, president of a U.S. consulting firm that serves U.S., European, and Asian-based companies seeking access to South Korean markets, spoke for many Americans when he said that South Korea’s option was either to side with its U.S. ally or to take “another path.”\textsuperscript{147} Reacting to highly visible anti-U.S. demonstrations in South Korea, many Americans voiced displeasure in the alliance and some even demanded a possible reduction and relocation of American troops stationed in South Korea. As described earlier, former Secretary of State James Baker warned a visiting delegation from the National Assembly in February that a pull out of U.S. troops would reflect less U.S. commitment towards ROK concerns on the peninsula. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in Congressional testimony that he was ready to discuss issues of restructuring and relocating U.S. forces in Korea and floated the idea of moving forces off the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{148} Shortly after Roh’s inauguration, the U.S. ambassador in Seoul, Thomas Hubbard, suggested that the U.S. was considering reducing the number of American combat troops in Korea, an unusual move in a time of crisis.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{146} Snyder, "South Korea's Squeeze Play."
\textsuperscript{147} Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 213-14.
\textsuperscript{148} On March 6, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted that the South “has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of upfront deterrent that's needed” and further suggested that the American military could play a more supportive role on the Korean peninsula by arranging its forces at an “air hub” and “sea hub,” and as off-peninsul reinforcements for South Korean front-line troops. James Brooke, "Musing on an Exodus of G.I.'s, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence," \textit{The New York Times}, March 8, 2003. Dong Shin Kim, "The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where Is It Headed?," \textit{Strategic Forum} (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2003).
The diplomatic onslaught by the Bush administration conveyed the message that the United States was prepared to disengage from the ROK-U.S. alliance at a time of significant importance for South Korea.

Roh’s change in attitude appears to be in reaction to spiraling tensions between the DPRK and United States, combined with U.S. threats to withdraw U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) personnel away from the demilitarized zone. On March 1, 2003, North Korean fighter aircraft intercepted an American reconnaissance aircraft in international waters, reportedly “locking on” to the American aircraft with its fire-control radar, which is considered a hostile act. In response, U.S. repositioned 24 long-range B-52 and B-1 bombers near North Korea and hinted that it may send fighter escorts with surveillance planes. In this way, the U.S. signaled that it would not be distracted by Iraq and still retained enough military capability in the theater to pressure the Kim Jong-il regime against their nuclear ambitions.

The ROK reaction to the spiraling tensions, especially Roh’s defense of the DPRK intercept caused significant tension in the ROK-U.S. relationship. U.S. military and defense officials were upset by the failure of South Korea to offer firm support for U.S. surveillance flights near North Korea or to condemn the interception of a U.S. spy plane. Instead, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said nothing, while President Roh exacerbated U.S. sensitivities in an interview with The Times of London, saying that the

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The spy plane episode was part of “a very predictable chain of events.” In response, the Bush administration signaled that it was willing to disengage militarily from the peninsula. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld remarked that South Korea “has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of upfront deterrent that’s needed to events on the peninsula.” The U.S. response to events on the peninsula illustrated to the Roh government that by playing a neutral role, it risked degrading the bilateral relationship and any subsequent means to influence U.S. policy.

Roh’s advisers recognized that by allowing a rift to develop with the United States, South Korea may have encouraged the North to believe that its aggressive tactics were successful. Roh’s advisors consequently determined that a change of policy was necessary to defuse tensions. Within two weeks of gaining office, South Korea’s fledgling administration executed a political about face as it called on Washington not to withdraw its troops, while at the same time pledging support to the Iraq War coalition. Senior figures surrounding President Roh were concerned that the U.S. moves were the initial steps towards a U.S. pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. The timing of Rumsfeld’s comments, combined with the bomber deployment, generated speculation in South Korea that the purpose of the USFK redeployment below the Han

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153 Brooke, "Musing on an Exodus of G.I.'S, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence."
River was to place U.S. forces out of range of North Korean artillery fire. In response, at the March 6 NSC meeting, Roh charted a new course for his administration stating, “The international standoff over the North’s nuclear programs should be resolved peacefully. The top priority of our government policy dealing with this issue should be placed on the reduction of the chance of war on the Korean peninsula.”

With the nuclear standoff as a backdrop, the United States requested that the South Korean government no longer remain neutral towards Iraq. This request was forwarded by U.S. Secretary of State Powell at Roh’s inauguration February 25 and reportedly presented to the senior presidential staff sometime before March 10. National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil reported the U.S. request on March 10 during a meeting of advisers and senior presidential staff at the Blue House.

The Roh administration responded with what they thought was a strategy of asymmetrical exchange with the United States. In order to obtain U.S. acceptance to Roh’s engagement strategy towards the DPRK Seoul accepted a significant role in the Iraq War coalition. Local news reports indicated that the NSC principals discussed assistance options for a possible U.S. war in Iraq in the period between March 6 and

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156 Marquand, "Rethinking US Troops in S. Korea."
159 "U.S. Asks for Help in Iraq War."
Blue House spokeswoman Song Kyoung-hee stated in a press briefing March 12 that four Iraq support plans were discussed at the last NSC meeting and that South Korea was considering sending non-combat troops to help the U.S. in the event of war with Iraq. She continued by emphasizing that no decision had yet been made concerning the size of the force. At the same time, Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan acknowledged on a local radio program that the ROK government intended to dispatch a contingent of non-combat troops to Iraq in support of the coalition of the willing.

The Roh administration defended its support of the Iraq coalition in alliance dependence terms. The administration argued that, for the purpose of national security, it was imperative to maintain a close alliance relationship with the United States, whose cooperation was essential to resolve the tension in the Korean peninsula. Ryu In-tae, a top political aide of President Roh, framed the deployment as a means to gain influence with the U.S. in a meeting with opposition civic leaders, “The troop dispatch plan is unavoidable, in order to influence U.S. to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully through dialogue.” Pointing out Korea’s “alliance duty to help the United State when it is in difficulty,” President Roh affirmed, “by fulfilling such a duty rather

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164 "Roh Tries to Soften Opposition to Troop Dispatch," Korea Times, March 27, 2003.
than by directly confronting the U.S. on the question of the war’s legitimacy, we can better serve our national security objective of the peaceful resolution of the North Korean problem.\textsuperscript{165} Roh acknowledged in his first speech to the National Assembly that the troop dispatch was a \textit{quid pro quo} to repair damaged ROK-U.S. relations, “I decided to dispatch troops, despite ongoing antiwar protests, because of the fate of our country and the people…In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, it is important to maintain strong cooperation with the United States.”\textsuperscript{166} South Korean political analysts described President Roh’s decision to push for the troop deployment—despite his own antiwar views and public opposition to the war—as part of a shrewd but risky bid to preserve the alliance with the United States.\textsuperscript{167} By making a timely promise of his “active support” of the unpopular war, Roh was betting on the chance to rescue the damaged U.S.-Korea alliance that he regarded as indispensable not only to deter a potentially devastating war on the peninsula, but also to pursue inter-Korean reconciliation.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165} French, "A Nation at War: The Asian Arena; South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq."
While Roh’s linkage strategy did appear to influence the Bush administration’s North Korean policy, it was also seen as an early domestic defeat for Roh. In their first summit meeting in May 2003, President’s Roh gained Bush’s agreement that a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis was achievable. However, Bush highlighted that further inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation should depend on North Korean behavior and increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require “consideration of further steps.” Roh accepted this position, making engagement contingent on North Korean nuclear concessions rather than the “sunshine” position of unconditional support. This abrupt change in policy, combined with ROK support of the Iraq coalition, was criticized as a renunciation of Roh’s campaign pledge to forge a foreign policy independent of the U.S. The fact that public opinion was decidedly against the Iraq War, damaged Roh’s populist image. As a populist head of state who had a weak partisan power base in the National Assembly, he had to be at least aware of public opinion so that his party could gain a majority in the 2004 general election. Even more critical for Roh was that the nation’s anti-war movement was spearheaded by the same reform-minded lawmakers and civic groups that supported his presidential.

169 In a March 13, 2003 phone conversation with Roh, Bush quelled South Korean fears of military intervention. Bush is quoted as stating that the United States would seek a peaceful solution to its nuclear standoff with North Korea. Bush also denied speculation that the United States is pursuing its military options in deliberating over the matter. In response, Roh pledged Seoul’s active support for the U.S. efforts to resolve the Iraqi issue. "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US.", Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks.", "USA Reiterates Support for South Korea's "Sunshine Policy"," Yonhap News Agency, March 14, 2003.


campaign only months prior. Those citizens most active against the Iraq war aid were the same ones who voted him into office the previous December.

Although Roh sought to extract concessions on U.S. policy towards North Korea, Roh’s linkage strategy failed to resonate with U.S. policy makers. As seen by many U.S. strategists, South Korea’s dispatch of peacekeeping forces to Iraq was an act of duty expected of military allies in times of crisis, not a concession on the part of South Korea to be repaid by the United States in the form of support for the Peace and Prosperity Policy. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty had reciprocity as its central organizing principle, and according to the interpretation of that treaty by U.S. policy makers, South Korea’s assistance to U.S. war efforts in Iraq was a payment in kind for U.S. guarantees of South Korean security. Rather than moderating its Korean policy, the Bush administration announced plans to redeploy U.S. troops from the Korean demilitarized zone to south of Seoul. The plan to reduce force levels and shift troops south on the peninsula was unilaterally accelerated by the U.S. in the spring 2003, even after Seoul announced its support to the Iraq coalition. U.S. officials announced a reduction of the U.S. military presence in Korea as part of the U.S. Global Posture Review while at the same time continuing its strategy of confrontation with the DPRK. In a May 2003 interview, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith stated that nearly all U.S.

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172 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 215-16.
forces deployed in East Asia could be reassigned to new locations for operations very different from their traditional missions.\textsuperscript{174} Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz quickly disavowed these remarks, but the U.S. accelerated discussions with the ROK government concerning the movement of USFK troops.\textsuperscript{175} The U.S. adopted a take-it-or-leave-it attitude, presenting USFK troop relocation as nonnegotiable on the principle that it was only the U.S. president, as commander in chief, who could determine the deployment of US military troops. Consequently, many South Koreans viewed the Pentagon decision to reposition and reduce U.S. forces on the peninsula as “punishment” for their recent protests against the U.S. troops and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{176} The realignments were initiated despite the continued military confrontation with the North and without weighing the implications of a nuclear North Korea, potential instability on the peninsula, or the prospect of unification.\textsuperscript{177}

The threat of troop withdrawal again gave the U.S. leverage in alliance matters and highlighted Seoul’s dependent position in ROK-U.S. bilateral relations when, in the fall of 2003, the U.S. again asked for additional troops to assist in quelling the developing insurgency in Iraq. Seoul accommodated the request, again framing the deployment in terms of alliance dependence. The ROK government deployed an additional 3,000 soldiers, mostly non-combat personnel in August 2004, to meet with the Bush

\textsuperscript{176} Moon, "US-South Korean Relations," 42.
\textsuperscript{177} Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon."
administration approval. Korean contributions were unprecedented and were acknowledged as such by the United States. In a major policy address on terrorism by President Bush on the one-year anniversary of the war against Iraq, the U.S. president singled out both Japan and South Korea for their “historic commitments” of troops and materiel to the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{178} Korea subsequently also gained a reprieve from the threatened drawdown of USFK forces. In the immediate aftermath of the decision to augment troop deployments to Iraq, the U.S. agreed to extend the U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula by another three years.\textsuperscript{179}

Overall, in the wake of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the ROK decision to support the Iraq coalition was formulated based on alliance dependence concerns. Although President Roh campaigned on a stance reflecting a more equal relationship in the alliance, when confronted with escalating tensions and a potential U.S. troop withdrawal, Seoul was trapped. Seoul provided numerous alliance concessions with the aim of influencing the Bush administration’s stand on North Korea. Seoul committed troops to the Iraq war and subsequently expanded that commitment in response to U.S. requests for a larger role for Korea. At the same time, Seoul conceded to a repositioning and eventual drawdown of U.S. forces on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{180} Seoul’s commitment to Iraq did not reflect commitment to U.S. global counter-terrorism policy, but rather a linkage strategy to gain influence over a senior alliance partner. According to Korean policy

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\item \textsuperscript{178} Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon."
\item \textsuperscript{180} Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," "US Asks ROK to Send Light Infantry Division to Iraq," \textit{Korea Times}, September 16, 2003.
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expert Victor Cha, Seoul’s support can be viewed as a bargaining chip to gain favors from the U.S. rather than a commitment to U.S. objectives in the global war on terrorism. Seoul’s support for the Iraq War reflects alliance dependence since the government continues to justify it as an alliance obligation rather than an international obligation. Ironically, alliance dependence concerns caused President Roh, initially skeptical of the justification for the ROK-U.S. alliance, to provide the third highest level of support to the Iraq War coalition, while at the same time accommodating a major troop reduction and realignment of USFK forces on the peninsula.

**Domestic Structure and Politics**

Although alliance dependence issues motivated Seoul to support the U.S. led coalition in Iraq, domestic structure and politics highly influenced the timing and composition of the Korean effort. As stated earlier, the Republic of Korea is a Type I state where decision making is centralized and the executive is fairly independent from legislative and societal pressure. In the Security Model, a Type I government under alliance dependence pressure is expected to contribute substantially to the coalition because the chief executive is likely to respond to external pressure without being significantly influenced by the legislature or public. This section will articulate that Roh did exert significant influence over the ROK burden sharing strategy, but that domestic reforms implemented by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations weakened executive influence, allowing some consideration towards legislative support.

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and public opinion on the composition and timing of Korea’s contribution. Ultimately, however, once President Roh determined the size and disposition of the Korean troop dispatch, public opinion and the legislature had little effect on decisions to deploy soldiers to Iraq. Roh was able to deploy and maintain a sizable military contingent to Iraq while public opinion was, at least initially, significantly opposed to the conflict.

President Roh Moo-hyun—the most liberal President in the republic’s history—stunned his supporters by brokering the deployment of 670 military personnel to Iraq within two month of assuming office. His troop dispatch plan was a very politically risky move as he was elected on a promise to devolve Seoul from the U.S.-oriented foreign policy orbit. Additionally, South Korean public opinion data consistently showed ambivalence towards U.S. intervention in Iraq. In the summer of 2002, polling data shows that only 15 percent of South Koreans surveyed considered terrorism to be a national priority—one of the lowest figures for major countries surveyed—and 72 percent of South Koreans opposed the U.S.-led war on terrorism. During the run-up to the war in Iraq, 81 percent of the general public in South Korea opposed U.S.-led military action against Iraq and only 10 percent supported it. Additionally, 76 percent opposed the deployment of ROK combat troops to Iraq and only 16 percent supported it.\footnote{Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148-49.} Clearly, Roh’s decision to deploy troops would meet with public opposition.

The first deployment decision was the result of the influence of conservative elements on Roh’s national security team and Roh’s weak position for influencing the
conservative national assembly. Roh presided over a yoso yadae government in which the governing party was the minority in the assembly.\textsuperscript{184} Party distribution in the National Assembly at the time of Roh’s election was 111 seats for the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), 129 seats for the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), and 14 seats divided between the conservative United Liberal Democratic Party (ULD) and Independents. This situation of a “divided” government between the executive and legislative branches necessitated a brand of politics and presidential leadership in which Roh had to court the conservative GNP with skill and tact to overcome political stalemate in national politics.\textsuperscript{185} The GNP was very supportive of the ROK-U.S. alliance and concerned that the liberal Roh government would damage relations by not supporting the Iraq coalition.\textsuperscript{186} Additionally, an influential number of Roh’s key foreign policy advisors reflected the conservative agenda of the GNP. National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil was a strong advocate of a closer South Korea-U.S. alliance.\textsuperscript{187} National Defense Adviser Kim Hui-sang maintained a critical stand on the sunshine policy and had strong U.S. connections. Lastly, Foreign Policy Advisor Ban Ki-mun was a career diplomat who has spent more than 30 years in the Foreign Ministry, 70 percent of whose priorities lie with the United States.\textsuperscript{188} A pragmatic politician, Roh navigated a middle course politically that reflected the need for the ROK to address the crisis on the

\textsuperscript{184} Kim, "The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," 894.
\textsuperscript{185} Kihl, \textit{Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture}, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{187} Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?"
peninsula by pursuing a more conservative agenda with the United States. According to a political observer, “Roh realized that the North Korean nuclear crisis is his most pressing task whose outcome can make or break his presidency.”

In a response to a U.S. request for military support in Iraq, senior advisors on the NSC recommended a moderately sized deployment of non-combat troops to demonstrate support for the U.S.-led coalition. Additionally, they formulated a public campaign that stressed that the deployment was in the national interest of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan expressed the deployment as an alliance “duty” expected of an ally on a Korean radio program. National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil, together with Roh’s top defense advisor Kim Hee-sang, explained to the press that, “The U.S. war on Iraq is justifiable. Besides, helping an ally in need is what the South Korea-U.S. alliance is all about.” In public statements, Roh stressed the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as a means to justify the deployments. He emphasized that Seoul had accepted the U.S. request to resolve the North Korean issue. Meanwhile, the administration immediately framed the scope of the deployment as consistent with previous ROK efforts. Roh immediately pledged that, “The scale of the assistance is not expected to surpass that of our support made during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.”

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190 "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US."
191 Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?"
192 "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq."
On the recommendation of MDP chairman Chyung Dai-chu, Roh formed a supra-partisan committee of party leaders in the National Assembly to aid policy coordination and to suppress opposition within the Assembly. Roh personally assured them that the Cabinet approved of the deployment measure, and he met with lawmakers from the Assembly’s National Defense Committee to coordinate legislation for the Iraq deployment.\(^{193}\) Roh acknowledged the domestic anti-war sentiment and, with statements of support from political leaders of the two major political parties, he expected the authorization bill to face little opposition.\(^{194}\)

Though Roh fast-tracked the deployment legislation, a vocal opposition within his own party emerged to impede administration efforts to pass the mandate. Roh’s public relations efforts failed to impress liberal members of the MDP, who saw the deployment as supporting the “inhumane invasion of Iraq.”\(^{195}\) A group of reformist lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties issued a statement opposing the government plan to dispatch troops to Iraq. A statement by a group of 18 ruling and opposition lawmakers stated, “There is[are] no grounds to participate in the war of aggression, which lacks a UN resolution, in the name of (the US-Korea) alliance.”\(^{196}\) The authorization vote was delayed while the MDP attempted to consolidate support for the assembly vote. Public protests mounted outside the National Assembly and civic action groups threatened to


\(^{195}\) Ibid.

\(^{196}\) "South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq," *Yonhap News Agency*, March 25, 2003.
take retribution against lawmakers in the next general election.\footnote{Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq."} Nosamo, an internet based group that had supported Roh’s presidential bid, announced that it would mount opposition campaigns against lawmakers in the next general election if they voted for the deployment.\footnote{"Troop Dispatch Cuts President Roh's Support Group in Half," \textit{Korea Times}, March 31, 2003.} In response, civic groups supporting the alliance with the United States spearheaded a drive to block lawmakers from seeking re-election if they voted against the bill proposed by the government.\footnote{"Divisions Deepen as Protests over Iraqi War Intensify."} In light of this domestic turmoil and in an effort to relieve legislator’s concerns against retribution, the MDP allowed its lawmakers to cast a vote “free” from the party endorsement, an unusual move in Korean politics.\footnote{"South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq."} Each MDP lawmaker could thus cast his or her vote based on local concerns rather than party recommendation.

While MDP support for the resolution began to falter, the GNP grew concerned that it would be held politically responsible for the authorization bill. To gain support for the measure, Roh courted the conservative opposition to approve the troop deployment. At a dinner with ruling and opposition party leaders, Roh asked floor leaders to, “deal with the motion as soon as possible.” The opposition GNP floor leader Rhee Q-taek responded that the president had to make tangible efforts directly to the public first.\footnote{"Roh Tries to Soften Opposition to Troop Dispatch."} The GNP leadership promised a positive vote only after President Roh, “reaches out to
the public himself and his persuasion efforts show results." GNP members did not oppose the deployment *per se*, but were concerned with being blamed for an unpopular resolution. Conservatives generally backed the decision to send troops to Iraq on the grounds of national interest and strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance. Since the MDP had authorized a free vote, the GNP grew concerned that an approval of the deployment would be seen a GNP policy rather than a Roh administration decision.

Roh resisted efforts to make a public appeal for the dispatch, relying instead on administration officials to make public statements for the troop deployment. Advisors to Roh urged civic organizations to exercise restraint in their attempts to pressure lawmakers over the Iraq deployment issue. After a second delay for the authorization vote, amid rising opposition, Roh directed his aides to intervene to ensure the bill’s passage. Presidential Chief of Staff Moon Hee-sang and political advisor Ryu In-tae contacted dissenting lawmakers and pressured them to support the bill. The MDP leadership intensified efforts to persuade lawmakers opposed to the presidential motion. Party chairman Chyung Dai-chul held a news conference at the party headquarters to call for cooperation to pass the bill. Finally, Roh appealed to his own and opposition party members in his first speech to the National Assembly. Roh’s public campaign seemed to convince the public that the troop deployment reflected ROK national interests. By April

206 "Roh to Appeal to Nation for Troop Dispatch Bill Today."
1, public opinion polls showed that 55 percent of the public supported the government’s troop deployment decision while approximately 43 percent did not.\textsuperscript{207}

Roh’s speech to the National Assembly gave the GNP the necessary political cover, while at the same time convincing a portion of the MDP that the authorization bill was necessary to defuse the nuclear crisis and restore Korean economic stability. Roh’s acceptance of responsibility for the deployment decision seemed to quell lawmaker’s concerns. He appealed to the members “to be courageous and endorse the bill.”\textsuperscript{208} Roh’s arguments to the Assembly stressed the need to resolve the peninsula crisis by deploying troops to Iraq. Roh stated:

I have reached the conclusion that assisting the United States in its time of difficulty and solidifying the Korea-U.S. relationship would be much more helpful in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue than driving relations to worse terms.\textsuperscript{209}

Additionally, the deployment was framed to quell economic uneasiness. Roh stated, “Our decision to deploy forces to Iraq is contributing to clearing the anxieties of the business community, especially foreign investors, about possible discord between Seoul and Washington.”\textsuperscript{210} Further, he stated that even if the Iraq War was without justification, the deployment was necessary for upholding solidarity with the United States.\textsuperscript{211} He acknowledged that the Iraq deployment marked a reversal of his equal

\textsuperscript{207} “83.8 Percent of Koreans 'Understand' Roh's Troop Dispatch Decision,” \textit{Yonhap News Agency}, April 1, 2003.
\textsuperscript{208} “South Korea's National Assembly Approves Bill on Troop Dispatch to Iraq.”
\textsuperscript{209} “South Korean PresidentAppeals for Support on Troops Dispatch to Iraq,” \textit{Yonhap News Agency}, April 2, 2003.
\textsuperscript{210} “Roh Appeals to Nation to Back Troop Dispatch,” \textit{Korea Times}, April 3, 2003.
\textsuperscript{211} Lee, \textit{A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas}. 230
partnership goals, but he noted, “it would be absurd to endanger the lives of the people in order to put the two countries’ relations on an equal partnership.” The National Assembly eventually approved the deployment with 179 voting in favor, 68 against, and 9 abstentions, with 256 out of 270 legislators casting votes.

Roh’s Assembly appeal decision won support from a number of Korean editorialists, despite the uncertainty about the wisdom of the war. The conservative Chosun Daily said, “The president and the Assembly have acted responsibly and in a practical manner by setting aside for a moment their ideals or opinions that the war in Iraq may be unjust.” JoongAng Daily, an independent paper, determined that sending troops would help quell investor concern about the possibility of a split in the ROK-U.S. alliance. It also called for Koreans to accept the lawmakers’ decision in the national interest, “Now is the time to show national maturity...further debate on this matter would be waste of the nation's time and energy.” A similar call came from another daily newspaper, Dong-A, which said the administration now had to demonstrate united leadership, while anti-war groups should respect and accept the lawmakers’ decision, “We live in a democratic society where, once a decision is made by the approval of the majority, the rest should respect and carry out the decision together.”

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213 “South Korea's National Assembly Approves Bill on Troop Dispatch to Iraq,”
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
the calls for universal support, Roh was severely criticized by his base for giving up on his ideal of an equal partnership with the United States.

While the opposition parties applauded Roh’s adoption of pro-American agenda, those who supported Roh said he failed to secure a U.S. pledge to rule out any military option to end the eight-month nuclear standoff with North Korea.\(^{217}\) After his May 2003 summit with President Bush in Washington, Roh’s performance was criticized by his former supporters as a “diplomatic humiliation.”\(^{218}\) Young and progressive supporters posted angry remarks and attacked Roh on the internet for retreating from his campaign promises and kowtowing to the United States.\(^{219}\) Roh weakened his engagement strategy with the North by linking economic assistance to positive developments in denuclearization.\(^{220}\) Roh acknowledged that he sidestepped contentious issues in the summit, choosing instead to dwell on the strengths of their alliance; but these rapid policy reversals caused him to lose support in his own MDP.\(^{221}\)

In September 2003, President Roh was again put to the test when the U.S. officially requested South Korea to deploy an additional brigade sized (3,000-5,000) combat force. The Bush administration made the request in several venues in

\(^{219}\) Lee, "Summit Feared to Cloud Inter-Korean Ties."

Washington and Seoul on September 4-5. The government again convened an NSC meeting September 18 to discuss the timing and composition of possible ROK support. While Washington did not specify the exact number of troops it wanted South Korea to dispatch, it requested a dispatch of a unit that could form the core of a multi-national division. U.S. officials cited the 2,500-member combat unit from Poland as an example. It was widely speculated that Seoul would deploy at least 5,000 troops, mostly combatants, to Mosul in northern Iraq to replace the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. Mosul at the time was one of the most dangerous spots in Iraq with numerous insurgent attacks by supporters of Saddam Hussein. Public opposition in the wake of the increasing violence in Iraq forced progressives in the Blue House to seek a reduction in the number of troops who would be deployed to Iraq, despite objections from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).

The MND and MOFAT were very supportive of efforts to increase the ROK presence in Iraq according to the U.S. request. The MND suggested dispatching 5,000 elite troops from the southern region of South Korea to minimize the disruption of forces on the peninsula. Korean Army leaders judged that small numbers of troops were not

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appropriate in dealing with the missions requested by the United States. MOFAT agreed with the deployment as an effort to strike a decisive blow to the skeptics among the American public and opinion makers that questioned Korea’s role in the ROK-U.S. alliance. Foreign Minister Yoon, along with the ROK ambassador to the United States Han Sung-joo and other adherents of the “alliance faction” argued in support of the request in light of Korea’s strategic and diplomatic concerns. MOFAT officials expressed concern that Korea should not be left behind when more and more nations were participating in the coalition of the willing.

The Blue House and the NSC, however, did not share the optimism of the MND and MOFAT. In this instance the more progressive elements, led by NSC Vice Chief Lee Jong-seok, gained control over deployment deliberations. Lee, who was deeply involved in the formation of Roh’s progressive inter-Korean and foreign affairs platform, was concerned that putting Korean troops in danger would have significant negative fallout on President Roh’s public opinion ratings. The Blue House further noted the significant public opposition to the first deployment in their arguments to minimize the size of the deployment.

224 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39.
226 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq."
227 Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications."
226 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39.
Public opinion stabilized and became steady once the United Nations adopted Resolution 1551 authorizing the international community to assist Iraq stabilization and reconstruction effort. According to a poll conducted by Hankook Ilbo on October 23, 2003, 64.9 percent of those polled favored the idea of sending additional troops.\textsuperscript{230} An additional survey illustrated that 73.9 percent of Koreans polled approved of the UN resolution.\textsuperscript{231} Additionally, the Korean public urged the government to not yield to terrorist demands after the death of a Korean civilian in Baghdad. Public opinion was not universally supportive of the additional deployment. From September 23 to October 18, 2003, civic action committees organized more than twelve street demonstrations to protest Seoul’s support to the Iraq conflict, which became a concern for Assembly members. A spokesperson for the Roh administration attempted to defuse critics when he stated, “the Korea-U.S. relationship, the national interest, and the recent passage of UN resolutions were all considered in making the decision.”\textsuperscript{232} Noting the civic group activity, Blue House aides sought to minimize the size of the deployment, taking into account significant public objections to the deployment. The progressives on the NSC actively managed the size, timing, and composition of the deployment in an attempt to preempt public opposition to the larger deployment.

The Blue House became sensitive to the term “combat troops” after it became clear that Washington wanted troops similar to the Polish-led multinational, light infantry

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 36.
\textsuperscript{231} Lee, \textit{A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas}, 270.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
236 National Security Advisor Ra hinted October 1 in a radio interview that sending combat troops was unthinkable saying, “because the war in Iraq is over, we are not thinking about sending troops that might be involved in violent conflicts.” 234 Lee Jong-seok, Vice Secretary-General of the NSC, ended administration discussions on troop strength when he declared that Korea would send no more than 3,000 additional troops to Iraq. 235 The NSC formally announced that Korea would support the U.S. troop request one day after the passage of UN Resolution 1551.

President Roh’s decision to send no more than 3,000 additional troops to Iraq symbolized a victory for the progressive Blue House staff over the conservative ministries that favored a larger deployment. 236 The two factions inside his administration had been locked in a power struggle since the first troop deployment decision. The NSC led the charge to minimize the number of troops to be sent to Iraq and to staff the contingent mainly with non-combat soldiers, while the MND and MOFAT tried to fulfill the U.S. request for a large combat-capable force. Sources in the administration noted that the fierce opposition led by groups who had supported Roh during the presidential election campaign influenced Roh’s decision making. 237 Roh felt a sense of crisis in anticipation of the upcoming 2004 general elections if he chose to side with the U.S.

233 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39.
234 Ibid.
236 "Roh-Lee Combination Spells Danger."
concerning the deployment of additional troops.\textsuperscript{238} The cap on the troop deployment caused concerns in the MOFAT that the reduced contingent would harm ROK interests with respect to the United States. South Korean diplomats were quoted as saying the Roh administration was “naive and unrealistic” in its dealings with the United States. Others said that dealing with members of the NSC and its chief, Lee Jong-seok, was like dealing with the Taliban, as they were so radical and reactionary. This accompanied speculation that some within the administration, specifically the NSC, were North Korean sympathizers.\textsuperscript{239} Consequently, the Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan was forced to resign and the NSC gained greater control over South Korean foreign policy.\textsuperscript{240}

The NSC advised President Roh to hold a vague position—while recognizing in internal discussions a 3,000-troop limit—and to repeat that he needed more time to make such an important decision. Roh presented this position to President Bush at a meeting in Bangkok on October 20.\textsuperscript{241} In negotiations with U.S. defense officials on November 5-6, the Korean delegation could not be dislodged from the 3,000-soldier cap due to the NSC imposed limit. Roh’s decisions concerning the second troop deployment were based not on alliance concerns, but rather on the predicted domestic backlash to the large Korean deployment. Once the decision regarding the troop deployment was made, the Blue

\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{240} Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications," 618.
\textsuperscript{241} Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39, Lee, \textit{A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas}, 269.
House maintained strict control over the government ministries to ensure the message to the public was managed.

The Blue House secretariat coordinated with the National Assembly leadership to ensure a smoother passage of the required second authorization bill. The administration briefed details of the troop dispatch plan to the leaders of the four ruling and opposition parties on December 11 and 12 and a final decision on timing and composition was made at a December 14 meeting with Roh, Defense Minister Cho Young-kil, and Presidential National Security Adviser Ra, and the four party leaders. The Uri Party leadership expressed concern that the bill would splinter the young party. The Uri Party, composed of the progressive lawmakers from the MDP, shared a similar agenda with the civic groups that threatened to boycott lawmakers in the upcoming April general election who supported the deployment. The Uri Party was effective at delaying the bill until it could convince a majority of its members to support the decision. The conservative GNP, which by February 2004 controlled 149 seats in the 273-member parliament, publicly supported the second dispatch bill. Chough Soon-hyung, leader of the former ruling MDP, finally told his party's lawmakers during a pre-session meeting to vote for the dispatch; despite this instruction most members of the MDP voted against the measure. With the leaders of the major parties supporting the deployment, the

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243 The Uri Party was formed in late 2003 from a left-leaning faction of the MDP. It gained a slim majority in the National Assembly after the April 2004 legislative elections, but lost it in subsequent by-elections.
National Assembly finally scheduled a vote on the measure on February 13. The Assembly ratified the deployment plan easily by a 3 to 1 margin (155 to 50 members) with a majority of members from the Uri Party and GNP supporting the decision.\textsuperscript{246}

Deployment of the troops was initially scheduled for late April, but it was delayed for weeks as Seoul and Washington failed to agree on where they would be located and the timeframe. The Roh government deliberately postponed the deployment in order to deploy the forces to a relatively safe area of Iraq.\textsuperscript{247} The NSC estimated that the 30-70 casualties expected in Mosul would constitute an unbearable political setback for Roh; therefore avoiding casualties became the first priority in the deployment. At a meeting in Baghdad on March 18, the U.S. finally accepted the Korean request to change the deployment destination.\textsuperscript{248}

The deployment was also delayed due to the March 12 impeachment of President Roh on charges that he had inappropriately backed his breakaway Uri Party in the parliamentary elections in violation of election laws.\textsuperscript{249} These charges and the ensuing scandal caused an immediate suspension of Roh’s presidency; the Prime Minster, Sang-mee Bak, "South Korean Self-Identity and Evolving Views of the United States," in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, ed. Derek J. Mitchell (Washington D.C., Seoul: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Yonsei University, 2004), 47, Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 270-71.
247 Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy," 264-65.
248 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 42.
traditionally powerless, assumed the duties of the presidency. South Korea’s Constitutional Court rejected the impeachment charges May 14 stating the charge of illegal electioneering “was not serious or grave enough to justify the unseating of the president.” No official in the government wanted to facilitate the deployment for the two months in which the Korean Constitutional Court decided on the legality of the impeachment.

In the meantime, the U.S. announced that it would deploy to Iraq a brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division that was garrisoned in Korea. Additionally, Washington informed Seoul at the 10th Future of the Alliance Talks (FOTA) on July 22, 2004, that 6,000 U.S. troops would be pulled out of South Korea by 2004, and 6,000 more by the end of 2005. These deployment decisions generated speculation in Korea that the moves were punishment for the delay of the ROK troops. Once the U.S. announced its decision to transfer the brigade off the peninsula, the Korean government accelerated its efforts to deploy its troops. The Korean government, with the support of the ruling Uri party, deployed the first troops in July 2004 and the main contingent in August.


\[254\] Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 43.
The continued deployment of Korean soldiers to Iraq was considered a concern for the Roh administration. Civic action groups such as the Citizen’s Action against Deployment to Iraq, a coalition of 351 NGOs, proclaimed that they would work to deter any attempt to prolong the tenure of the Korean troops in Iraq.\textsuperscript{255} Interestingly, they did not take any direct action against the Uri Party for supporting the deployment decision. In fact, due to a number of factors including the GNP’s impeachment of Roh, the Uri Party gained a significant number of seats in the 2004 general election.\textsuperscript{256} The lack of serious opposition is likely due to the preemptive drawdown of troops with the yearly mandate renewal. As discussed previously in this chapter, the Roh administration made anticipatory concessions on troop withdrawals in an attempt to disarm public opposition to the deployment. This approach seems successful, since as of May 2008, the Korean government still has approximately 650 personnel deployed to Iraq. The renewal mandates have been successful; however the opposition vote has risen over the length of the deployment.\textsuperscript{257}

In summary, domestic politics significantly influenced the composition and timing of South Korean support to the Iraq War coalition. The Roh administration

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256} South Korea’s ruling Uri Party (UP), formed in 2003 by defectors from the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), captured 152 seats. The Grand National Party (GNP), won a landslide victory in its traditional stronghold in the Kyungsang provinces, including Pusan and Taegu, but lost its majority in parliament. Wonbin Cho, "The General Election in South Korea, April 2004," \textit{Electoral Studies} 24, no. 3 (2005).
showed strong leadership in influencing the decision to deploy Korean soldier to Iraq, but this decision was somewhat influenced by resistance to the deployment in Roh’s own MDP and Uri parties. The Peterson typology predicts that decision making in South Korea would be heavily influenced by the preferences of the chief executive and this case study supports those predictions. Once President Roh publicly committed to the coalition of the willing, legislative and societal pressure failed to alter the level or composition of Korean commitment to the coalition of the willing. This is not to say, however, that public opinion had no influence over national decision making. The Roh administration frequently anticipated public attitudes and intentionally constrained its assistance to the Iraq coalition in an effort to alleviate public concerns. In this manner, the Roh administration acted like any authoritarian regime that had to balance resource extraction against domestic interests.258 Rather than allowing public opinion form the policy, Roh managed domestic expectations so that he could commit the necessary resources to the coalition to meet Korea’s foreign policy goals.

**The Role of Legitimacy**

Although legitimacy arguments were raised in Roh’s political circles, legitimacy arguments affected only the composition and timing of military support rather than the decision to join the Iraq War coalition. Although President Kim Dae-jung advised the Bush administration to pursue a UN mandate on Iraq, this advice was based on national concerns rather than the pursuit of international legitimacy. President Kim encouraged a

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UN mandate in private conversations with President Bush and encouraged a UN based multilateral action at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Copenhagen, however, the ROK government never attempted to withhold political, economic, or military support to the coalition based on legitimacy concerns.259

After the ROK government publicly committed to the coalition of the willing, a select group of National Assembly members protested the action on legitimacy grounds. A group of reformist lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties issued a public statement opposing the government’s plan to dispatch troops based on the legitimacy of the operation: “There is no grounds to participate in the war of aggression, which lacks a UN resolution, in the name of (the ROK-U.S.) alliance.”260 Ultimately, discussions in the NSC and in the National Assembly hinged on national security concerns rather than the legitimacy of the Iraq War effort. President Roh, in his address to the national assembly, admitted that the Iraq effort was lacking a full international mandate. Roh argued that even if the Iraq War was without justification, it was nonetheless necessary for South Korea to participate for the sake of upholding solidarity with the United States.261

Legitimacy issues affected Korean deployments to the extent that the contribution was shaped in an effort to demonstrate that Korea was not participating in potentially illegitimate combat operations, but rather a more legitimate peacekeeping effort. The first deployment of soldiers was framed as a humanitarian effort to aid in the Iraq refugee

259 "Seoul against US Moves on Iraq."
260 "South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq."
Roh made his support known for dispatching a non-combat engineering unit of 600 soldiers and approximately 100 medical personnel to support coalition forces and also to take part in postwar rehabilitation efforts. After noting the public objections to the first deployment, the Roh administration ensured that the second deployment consisted of a peacekeeping rather than a combat mission. The Roh administration clearly sent the message to the public that the additional soldiers were being dispatched in order to maintain peace and public order in Iraq and not for a war against the Iraqi people. Once the stabilization operations gained the legitimacy of a UN mandate under Resolution 1551, the ROK government quickly committed to the coalition of the willing. Additionally, the government rejected a combat mission for its sizable deployment and instead negotiated for a location that nearly guaranteed that the Korean contingent would see little combat.

Unlike many countries in the international community, Korean concerns about contributing to the coalition of the willing were not based on the international legitimacy of the operation, but rather on pragmatic concerns about the influence of Korean causalities on domestic politics. This research found no evidence that the ROK government used legitimacy arguments to condition its responses to the United States. Instead, this study finds that deployment decisions were geared to gain leverage over U.S. policy towards the DPRK.

Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 328.
Summary and Conclusions

This South Korean case study illustrated that the Security Decision Model is a useful framework for analyzing state burden sharing decisions; however, the model still possesses some limitations in predicting state support for a particular coalition. South Korea’s burden sharing decisions in the Security Decision Model are shown in Figure 5. The inclusion of external and internal variables provides a detailed and nuanced framework for determining influences on state burden sharing decisions. South Korea was particularly influenced by alliance dependence on the United States. With increasing tensions between the DPRK and the United States, the Roh administration departed from its anti-American course and accepted a role in the coalition of the willing. This support sought to reduce spiraling tensions on the peninsula and to demonstrate support to its U.S. ally in the international community. Domestic structure and politics subsequently influenced the nature of support that the ROK government provided to the coalition. This research demonstrated that even Type I regimes, which have significant autonomy from the legislature, must make controversial decisions with an eye towards domestic unrest. Due to the significant influence that the Korean President has over the national government and democratic institutions, the public’s main means of influencing policy is typically through organized mass protest.\(^{263}\) Although the Roh administration was able to build

\(^{263}\) The recent mass protests against imported beef demonstrates that protest has become the primary means for Korean citizens to influence government decisions. For discussion on the influence of political protest on the ROK government see Jaehyun Joo, “Explaining Social Policy Adoption in South Korea: The Cases
support for the deployment in an opposition-held parliament, it also had to scale the troop contingent considering the amount of domestic unrest present. The Roh government made a series of anticipatory concessions with the public and its own party by limiting the scope and mission of the deployments. In that manner, the administration could demonstrate that it was considering the demands of society. An interesting observation, however, is that once deployment decisions were formulated within the NSC, public opinion had little effect on changing the government’s decision. No decision regarding

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troop deployments to Iraq was modified after the public announcement of a government decision was made.

South Korea’s support of the Iraq War coalition is also a case of alliance entrapment. During the transition from the Kim Dae-jung to the Roh Moo-hyun administrations, advisors sought to implement Roh’s campaign goal of a more equal alliance partnership with the United States. This goal was quickly abandoned when the ROK government found that it had little influence over the confrontational U.S. policy towards the North Korean nuclear ambitions. Faced with increasing tensions and the prospect of a U.S. troop drawdown on the peninsula, the Roh administration rapidly reversed course and supported the coalition of the willing in an attempt to gain leverage within the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK government maintained a weak bargaining position and made numerous concessions to the United States in an effort to change U.S. policy towards the DPRK. The U.S. ultimately extracted concessions from Korea by threatening to make significant reductions and realignments to its military presence on the Korean peninsula.

The use of the Peterson typology to determine the influence of public opinion on government decisions was a useful tool in explaining state behavior, but in isolation does not adequately predict the likely direction a government will take on a given decision. According to Peterson, a Type I government will reflect the preferences of the chief executive. Using the rhetoric of Roh’s presidential campaign, one would predict that Roh’s preference was for a loosening of the ROK-U.S. alliance relationship. Preferences,
however, are shaped by one’s external environment and the North Korean nuclear crisis dramatically reordered Roh’s preferences concerning the ROK relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{264} Once Roh’s preferences were known, Peterson’s typology did accurately depict the level of Korean burden sharing. The Security Decision Model thus provides an important framework for improving the predictive capability of Peterson’s domestic structure typology. The model highlights external influences on executive decision making, thereby giving the researcher a basis upon which to determine executive preferences.

\textsuperscript{264} According to Andrew Moravcsik, states seek to realize their distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states in the international system. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," \textit{International Organization} 51, no. 4 (1997).
CHAPTER FIVE

GERMANY: NON-COALITION BUT COOPERATING

After the devastating 9/11 attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was quick to promise *uneingeschränkte Solidarität* (unlimited solidarity) in all necessary measures against global terrorism.¹ Within a year of Schröder’s unqualified declaration of support, he was also the first Western leader, however, to issue a categorical “no” to the Bush administration for participation in the Iraq War. The Schröder government not only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war in 2003, but moreover engaged in active counter-coalition-building by lobbying France and Russia to support Germany’s resistance to the U.S. “adventure.”² Germany abandoned its traditional policy of balancing between Washington and Paris, and instead created a counter-coalition with Russia and France against the United States. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led coalition—even under a UN mandate—seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq. Philip Gordon and

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Jeremy Shapiro, in *Allies at War*, contend that Schröder’s declared refusal to support the use of force against Iraq—even if authorized by the UN Security Council—was, simply put, “irresponsible.” They add, “Germany’s decision to stand with France in blocking NATO’s preparation for the possible defense of Turkey in the context of an Iraq war was also difficult to defend.”³ The Chirac-Schröder strategy stripped the U.S.-led intervention of the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate and unintentionally sent false signals to Saddam Hussein on the probability of armed intervention, weakening US crisis management, and actually increasing the danger of war.⁴

Open government opposition to U.S. foreign policy measures is unusual for Germany. It is not abnormal for France to seek to counter the United States in international politicking; however, France typically uses this strategy to extract concessions from the United States before joining in on a common action.⁵ Germany, in contrast, has rarely and reluctantly differed openly with the United States on major issues.⁶ This pattern was shattered when Chancellor Schröder broke with U.S. policy in August 2002, and later encouraged Europe and the Security Council to break with the

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⁶ Erb, *German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era*. 

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Germany’s position concerning Iraq is puzzling in two dimensions. First, why did Germany stake out such an extreme foreign policy position when it could have quietly withheld support? Typically, German foreign policy rejects the notion that it would be either advisable or even promising to tackle foreign policy problems unilaterally; in this case, however, Germany’s position was firm and uncoordinated.7 As Germany was scheduled to occupy a temporary seat on the Security Council, why did it make its anti-war stance so public when it could have gained the same result through quiet diplomacy? Secondly, why did Germany cooperate with the United States in so many others aspects of the war effort while at the same time thwarting U.S. efforts diplomatically? In the area of military cooperation, for example, Germany was a much more supportive ally than NATO ally Turkey; Germany put no limitations on the use of U.S. military bases and actually supplied German soldiers to guard U.S. bases so that U.S. military forces could deploy to Iraq. This level of support contrasts directly with the assistance initially provided by Turkey, which provided very limited logistical support. This level of support contrasts greatly with German support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. As of March 2008, some 3200 German soldiers were serving in Afghanistan, and Germany

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had suffered 26 fatalities. Thus, why did Germany provide essential support to the U.S. war effort, while at the same time maintaining a hardened diplomatic stance against war preparations?

Two explanations of Germany’s Iraq policy have emerged. One group of scholars stresses the role of the September 2002 federal elections, arguing that Schröder and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) exploited widespread German public skepticism for a military intervention in Iraq to turn the tide in their faltering electoral campaign. A second group of scholars argues that ideational factors, particularly Berlin’s “culture of restraint” concerning early use of military force, explains Germany’s Iraq policy. Unfortunately both of these arguments are underspecified and do not completely explain Germany’s early stance against a military intervention in Iraq.

This chapter will demonstrate that both domestic explanations, combined with a continued dependence on the United States within NATO and the greater international community, explains Germany’s policy stance towards the Iraq War. Chancellor Schröder’s early public opposition against military ventures in September 2001, and

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11 See Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict."
categorical “no” for a military intervention in Iraq policy, can be best understood by taking into account Schröder’s role in preserving the SPD-Greens coalition government in the face of considerable public opposition to a foreign military intervention in Iraq. Schröder felt obliged to rule out any military participation by Germany (even before the Bush administration had committed itself to military action), as this would have spelled the likely demise of his government.\textsuperscript{12} Germany however, complied with numerous Bush administration requests as long as they did not require parliamentary approval. Due to Schröder’s weak domestic position vis-à-vis parliament and the public, Germany could only provide support only in those areas in which the executive maintained control. Schröder was motivated to participate in these areas to maintain U.S. support in NATO and other regional and international institutions.

First, I begin with a discussion of German government and politics using a structural approach developed by Susan Peterson. Peterson’s domestic structure typology is intended to provide simplifying assumptions concerning the interaction of the state and society, thus allowing the prediction of likely foreign policy outcomes. The analysis of German government structure will show that German foreign policy decision making typically reflects a Type IV structure in the Peterson typology where the foreign policy decision process is composed of a number of different offices that share responsibility while the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In this type of state, national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures, and the state’s policy

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 2-3.
response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Following this, I summarize Germany’s contributions, both positive and negative, to the Iraq War coalition and then draw on the Security Decision Model to explain Germany’s burden sharing decisions. This analysis suggests that German foreign policy was influenced primarily by domestic issues, due to the lack of perceived direct threat by Saddam Hussein. Significantly, this analysis concludes that electoral politics significantly altered the influence of the executive, and society, on governmental decisions; in this case enabling an independent Schröder to formulate a more radical populist policy towards the U.S. on Iraq. In this manner, Germany reflected a Type II rather than a Type IV state in the Peterson typology.

Following the model analysis, I also address the role of international legitimacy and demonstrate that German policy, though shrouded in legitimacy arguments, were actually motivated by short-term political gain. Finally, I summarize and offer conclusions.

**German Government and Politics**

Germany is a federal republic, in which the president (Bundespräsident) maintains largely a ceremonial role and the chancellor (Bundeskanzler) is the head of government and of a plurality multi-party system. The president is elected every five years on May 23 by the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung), a special body convened only for this purpose, comprising the entire Bundestag and an equal number of state delegates selected especially for the election, in proportion to election results for the
state legislatures. The chancellor heads the Federal Cabinet (*Bundesregierung*) and thus the executive branch of the federal government. The position of chancellor is equivalent to that of a prime minister and he or she is elected by—and responsible to—the lower chamber of parliament, the *Bundestag*. The chancellor cannot be removed from office during a four-year term unless the *Bundestag* has agreed on a successor; this constructive vote of no confidence is intended to avoid a situation in which the executive would not have enough support in the legislature to govern effectively. Except during the periods 1969–72 and 1976–82, when the Social Democratic Party of Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt came in second in the general elections, the chancellor has always been the candidate of the largest party, usually supported by a coalition of two or more parties with a majority in the parliament. The chancellor appoints a vice-chancellor (*Vizekanzler*), who is a member of his cabinet, usually the foreign minister. When there is a coalition government, the vice-chancellor usually belongs to the smaller party of the coalition. The chancellor also selects the cabinet members who are typically influential members of the ruling coalition parties. Their primary political allegiance is to the chancellor’s policies and not to the federal parliament. The German cabinet is not a “working cabinet”—as in the role of the U.S. cabinet—in which government policy is openly discussed, debated, and finally determined. Rather, the German cabinet’s role is limited to a final political check on the general lines of government policy; the cabinet

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15 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," 16.
typically approves rather than makes decisions. The structure of the executive branch, as long as a coalition government exists, ensures that executive decision making is typically based on bargaining between the coalition party leaders.

Federal legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chambers of parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The lower house, the Bundestag, is elected every four years under a system of mixed direct and proportional representation. The Bundestag is the main legislative body and is solely responsible for electing the chancellor. The members of the Bundestag constitute part of Germany’s political elite with the chancellor, almost all cabinet ministers, and all parliamentary state secretaries drawn from its ranks. The upper house, the Bundesrat, represents state governments and must approve all federal legislation affecting policy areas for which the Basic Law grants the states concurrent powers and for which the states must administer federal regulations. Each of Germany’s sixteen state governments has between three and six votes in the Bundesrat depending on the size of its population. Since the political orientation of the Bundesrat depends on the various state elections that occur independently of the federal elections, parties in opposition to that of the Bundestag quite frequently control the Bundesrat. In recent years, the Bundesrat has evolved into a forum for the opposition parties to have influence over government policy and legislation.

The judiciary of Germany is independent of the executive and the legislative branches. The courts maintain a powerful check on executive and legislative action and

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17 Ibid., 199.
18 Ibid., 186.
almost all state actions are subject to judicial review. For constitutional issues, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) retains jurisdiction; the sole task of this court is judicial review. A variety of political institutions, including the governments of the German states (Bundesländer), federal institutions, and individual members of the Bundestag, may bring a law passed by the federal legislature before the court if they consider it unconstitutional. The court is empowered to declare public acts unconstitutional and thus render them ineffective. It is the most powerful constitutional court in Europe, having the authority to not only to find a law unconstitutional, but also to deactivate it and replace it with its own regulations.19

The German Basic Law, which originated as the West German constitution, includes two consistent themes: the effort to construct legal obstacles to ensure that totalitarianism and Nazism can never rise again and a federated political system where power is distributed among states so that no government entity gains a considerable amount of power. A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature is required to change the Basic Law and certain fundamental provisions—such as the commitment to human rights and the federal structure—cannot be changed at all. The Basic Law provides wide scope for judicial review. Individual state governments or a defeated minority in the Bundestag with at least one-third of the Bundestag members can challenge a law in the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition, the federal structure also

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limits the power and influence of the federal government. Germany is a federal republic with sixteen states that constitute the republic. Each state has its own constitution, a democratically elected parliament, a government, administrative agencies and independent courts. Each state government has representation in the Bundesrat; therefore, major legislation requires the consensus of the federal and state government who often represent competing interests.\(^{20}\) This power sharing arrangement ensures that political decisions are reached by consensus rather than through the centralization of power. As a result, Germany maintains a less centralized government than the parliamentary democracies of either Britain or France.\(^{21}\) The Basic Law clearly states the primacy of the Bundestag as the only institution directly legitimated by the public. This primacy is expressed through the formal election of the chancellor, the constitutional limits on executive decrees, and the principle that “essential” decisions on legislative issues may not be delegated to the executive.\(^{22}\)

Not only is state power limited constitutionally, but the government must also be responsive to the public due to the influence of party politics on policy decisions. Germany has been termed a party state, in the words of German political scientist Kurt Sontheimer, meaning: “All political decisions in the Federal Republic are made by the parties and their representatives. There are no political decisions of importance in the German democracy which have not been brought to the parties, prepared by them and

\(^{20}\) Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," 16.

\(^{21}\) Conradt, The German Polity, 181.

finally taken by them.”

The party exerts considerable influence because, as a rule, the chancellor and the government ministers also hold leading party functions and can be considered as “party representatives of sorts in the government.”

Understanding the positions and debates within and between political parties is especially critical, as parties are the nexus between the public and elites. They are the vehicle that individual politicians use to achieve power.

Primarily two political blocs have dominated politics in Germany since World War II. The first bloc is “the Union” comprised of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU). The center-right CDU has been traditionally the most influential party in German politics. The CDU supports a free-market economy and social welfare programs, but is conservative on social issues. It has also been a strong advocate of European integration while at the same time cultivating close relations with the United States. The CSU is the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU; although the CSU has its own leadership, organization, and fund-raising structures, it does not run candidates outside Bavaria. The CSU takes a more conservative stance than the CDU on social issues. In parliament, the two parties maintain a common caucus with co-chairmen representing each party; for federal purposes they may be considered one party—the Union.


The center-left SPD heads the second political bloc. The SPD was the only major Weimar political party to reemerge in the Federal Republic, but it mainly played an opposition role in early West German politics due to doubts concerning its commitment to NATO and pro-Western policies. In 1959, the SPD abandoned its commitment to Marxism and approved a new party strategy that advocated the modernization of the economy to meet the demands of globalization as well as stressing the importance of addressing the social needs of workers and society's disadvantaged. In 1966, it entered a grand coalition with its chief rival, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and from 1969 to 1982, the SPD governed as the dominant coalition partner with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The SPD remained out of power at the national level from 1982 to 1998, suffering four successive election losses. In 1998, the SPD—led by Gerhard Schröder—was able to win a governing coalition with the Green Party based on a centrist agenda that favored lowered taxes and cuts in government spending.

The FDP and Greens 90 Party complete the list of major political parties that combine in coalition to form the federal government. For almost 50 years, the FDP enjoyed the position of kingmaker by forming coalitions with the large parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The FDP’s ideology combines beliefs in individual liberty combined with a limiting the size of government to the minimum necessary to provide basic services. It promotes a market economy, with traditional features of the German social welfare system. Its location as ideologically between the CDU/CSU and the SPD

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26 Ibid., 124-30.

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has ensured the party’s survival. The Free Democrats have never received more than 13 percent of the party vote in any national election, yet the party has played a role in the political system far exceeding the size of its electorate. The FDP can sometimes decide which of the two larger parties will provide the chancellor and form a governing coalition.²⁷ In foreign policy, the FDP supports European integration and the transatlantic partnership. The Green Party traces its origins to the student protest movement of the 1960s, the environmentalist movement of the 1970s, and the peace movement of the early 1980s. Initially a pacifist movement, the experience of Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to a restructuring of this position. The party was severely torn by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999, which party leader Joschka Fischer strongly supported.²⁸ The party moved from a pacifist leaning to one that supported military intervention for humanitarian reasons.

Procedures in the Bundestag are mainly structured by parliamentary party groups (Fraktion). The government is restricted from offering legislative amendments in the Bundestag; only individual ministers or Fraktion can propose amendments to legislation, thus further limiting the influence of the government. Once a bill is introduced to parliament, the government has to rely exclusively on its party groups to guide it through

²⁷ Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 122.
²⁸ See Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 169.
the legislative process. This means that party positions over time are an important indicator of the contest and basic “battle lines” within German politics.

In Germany, coalition government is the norm, as it is rare for either of the dominant parties, the CDU/CSU or the SPD, to win an unqualified majority in a national election. Thus, at the federal level, governments are formed with at least one of the smaller parties. This lack of a party majority in parliament requires constant coordination and persuasive efforts for government stability. Government policy requires comprehensive coalition negotiations in which many party positions are qualified until a compromise policy position is reached. Radical policy adjustments are rare, and reforms tend to be incremental and marginal to avoid electoral backlash. The discipline and restraints imposed by electoral politics serve as an important constraining factor on the government and the parties in their exercise of power.

In the realm of foreign policy making, the most important figures in Germany are the chancellor and the foreign minister; however, due to party influences and electoral politics, foreign policy is a result of party negotiations and consensus building since the chancellor and foreign minister are traditionally from different parties and may therefore,

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30 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 14.
32 Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 197.
34 Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 126.
represent different subcultures and interests. Controversial issues of foreign policy are usually decided by parliamentary resolution after the appropriate debate in party and parliamentary forums. This corporate view towards policy has avoided perpetuating deep rifts in the population and the political elite over basic foreign policy issues.

A further limitation for the government in the foreign policy arena is the requirement in German law for Bundestag approval of every military engagement that is not self-defense related, as well as extensions of existing military operations. In its ruling of 12 July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the deployment of German armed forces abroad requires the consent of the Bundestag. This ruling ensures political discussion on the merits of any deployment and limits the chancellor’s power to deploy military forces independently. The Christian Democrats argued that this provision limits the executive’s decision making ability in times of international crisis; however, they have been unable to garner the necessary votes in parliament to overturn the rule. Therefore, politically, the Bundeswehr’s role in an international crisis remains a highly contested issue domestically.

This discussion of German politics demonstrates that the German government is severely constrained by domestic politics and coalition building, especially in areas requiring the use of the military. The Basic Law was written to limit the abuses and

35 Malici, "Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior."
37 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 191.
38 Krause, "The Role of the Bundestag in German Foreign Policy," 162.
39 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 79.
dangers caused by the centralization of government. The German political system is a
democracy with multiple veto players and strong consensus elements, making it a Type
IV state in the Peterson domestic structure typology. Neither the executive branch nor the
governing parties in parliament are able to control unilaterally policy-making in Germany
and thus policy-making is the result of negotiation and compromise. This does not mean
that policy does not change, but rather that changes tend to be small and incremental
rather than radical.40

This review of German politics is instructive because it defines the environment
in which Chancellor Schröder had to formulate his Iraq policy. After this discussion, I
analyze German support for the Iraq coalition using the Security Decision Model as a
framework. Especially instructive is the role of domestic politics and NATO alliance
influence on Germany’s Iraq policy.

The Timing, Size, and Mix of Germany’s Contributions

Political Contributions

Germany was the first Western power to issue a categorical “no” to the Bush
administration for participation in the Iraq War. While refusing to participate in any U.S.
intervention, the Schröder government aggressively countered the Bush administration in

40 The changes of “use of force” policy discussed later are instructive. In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, German policy-makers realized that they needed to expand the possible roles and missions of the
Bundeswehr. To expand the domestic mandate for Bundeswehr deployments, the government engaged in a
series of political and legal debates that gradually expanded the acceptability of the use of force. The
policy change was significant, but was the result of a long process of conciliation and coalition building
between the ruling coalition and the opposition parties. The process has resulted in a significant
“normalization” of German foreign policy, but one that still reflects a high degree of domestic constraint.
international venues such as the United Nations Security Council and NATO.\textsuperscript{41} Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led coalition—even under a UN mandate—seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq, and incited a European policy split that threatened viability of both the United Nations Security Council and NATO. Schröder’s anti-war coalition ensured that the U.S. did not gain the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate, thereby allowing Saddam Hussein to assume that military action was unlikely.\textsuperscript{42}

Germany’s diplomatic response to Bush administration objectives began in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington. Schröder pledged Germany’s “\textit{uneingeschränkte Solidarität}” (“unlimited solidarity”) with the United States in the fight against international terrorism. This statement surprised many in Germany, and he soon qualified his remarks by stating that there would be no participation in any foreign “adventures.” He stressed that any military action within the NATO framework would require consultations between members. In his remarks to the \textit{Bundestag} requesting a vote of solidarity with the United States, he stated:

\begin{quote}
Naturally: Every right corresponds with a duty. But this, of course, also applies the other way around, which means information and consultation. What do we want to achieve as Germans and Europeans: unlimited solidarity with the United States in all
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} Schröder looked to coordinate his position with Russia and to use the new ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia that included a regular government consultation process. Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 340, Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67.

\textsuperscript{42} "German Stand on Iraq Weakens US Crisis Management, Heightens War Risk - Paper."
necessary measures. Risk, including military, will be shared by Germany but she is not prepared for adventures. These are not asked for by the American administration, because of its considerate position after the attacks, and they will certainly not be asked for in the future.\textsuperscript{43}

Schröder was asking the Bundestag to support NATO, but assuaged their fears that that support would be unrestricted. According to Schröder, effective alliance management required the consultation of equals.

Germany defended the NATO decision to evoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty legitimizing military action and promised support to the United States under the auspices of NATO, but endorsed a legalistic version of support, which did not necessarily commit military forces.\textsuperscript{44} German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping stated, “It [NATO support] does not mean we are at war.” According to Scharping, the NATO treaty requires assistance, but does not specify exactly the type of assistance member states must provide.\textsuperscript{45} Reacting to Schröder’s request of solidarity and the lack of request for military support, the German parliament passed a resolution with 611 out of a possible 666 votes expressing full solidarity with the United States, only the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the measure.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Schröder comments to the Bundestag, September 19, 2001, quoted in Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 6.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Article 5 states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members. North Atlantic Treaty Organization., \emph{The North Atlantic Treaty} (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4 1949 [cited March 10 2008]); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, 193. Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 61.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, 193.
\end{itemize}
Washington’s response to NATO’s Article 5 declaration suggested that Germany did not have to fear being drawn into military action. Washington was quick to rebuff a NATO led response, instead opting for a tailored military coalition that proffered a greater degree of U.S. control. The U.S. government did not initially request German military support. The German government, however, continued to prepare for a NATO intervention. With the challenges of commanding a NATO force in Kosovo fresh in American minds, NATO could not be allowed to hinder any U.S. military response in Afghanistan.  

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced, “If we need collective action, we will ask for it; we don’t anticipate that at the moment.” Secretary Rumsfeld further clarified the U.S. position by stating, “The mission determines the coalition. The coalition doesn’t determine the mission.” German officials were alarmed by this unilateral tone. “It is safe to say that Germans after 9/11 expected that the attacks would lead to greater multilateralism,” according to one German diplomat. Nonetheless, to support a possible NATO role in Afghanistan, Schröder insisted on—and won—a Bundestag mandate in November 2001 authorizing an out of area deployment of 3,900 Bundeswehr troops. This request reflected a decade-long trend for Bundeswehr

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48 Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, "All Dressed up and No Place to Go," Parameters (2002/3), 52.
50 Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," 57.
51 Ibid., 58, Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 350, Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 193-94, Harnisch, "German Non-
participation in NATO military actions, but was met with staunch domestic opposition who questioned the role of military interventions outside Europe. Schröder’s coalition government was nearly toppled by the vote, and eventually required a vote of confidence for passage. Although German domestic support existed for the United States in general, the government was fiercely challenged by the opposition The Left (PDS) party in Bundestag debates and even the SPD showed little enthusiasm to have German troops engaged in what was seen as a risky campaign. The vote of no confidence is noteworthy as it marked a turning point in the German use of military force; it was the first time in post WWII history that German combat troops would be authorized to deploy combat forces outside of Europe. The deployment vote illustrated that the governing coalition remained far from united regarding Germany’s role in the U.S.-led war on terror.

The Iraq War began to emerge onto the international agenda in early 2002 with President Bush’s declaration of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address. The German public and elite were critical of the declaration of “rogue states” and were
uncomfortable with the idea of aggressively policing of states that harbor terrorism.\textsuperscript{56} Bush, however, assured Schröder that there were no plans for attack and the NATO alliance partners would be informed of any military preparations.\textsuperscript{57} Although Schröder held reservations that the United States was not adequately consulting with the NATO allies, he remained mildly supportive of U.S. objectives within a multilateral framework, while continuing to warn against ill-conceived military ventures.\textsuperscript{58}

The annual Munich Security Seminar in February 2002 became the first public forum for the Americans and Europeans to voice their opinions on future military operations regarding the war on terrorism. The American representatives clearly articulated their position: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that the United States was still at war after the September 11 attacks and that the new threats meant that Washington had to act preventatively. In the words of Secretary Rumsfeld, the United States was prepared “to take the war to the enemy.”\textsuperscript{59} Senator John McCain clarified the U.S. position by mentioning that the “day of reckoning” was approaching for


In contrast to the American position on Iraq, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping noted that it would be naïve to think that European societies would support military action. Europe, and specifically Germany, would support military intervention only if several conditions were met: a clear mandate under international law, a clear role for the United Nations, and a multinational political and military approach. Sharping’s comments reflected Germany’s reluctance to expand the war on terrorism to Iraq. The SPD/Green coalition government and German public were unconvinced of the connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq and skeptical of U.S. claims of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Throughout the spring of 2002, Germany supported U.S. policy diplomatically, but stressed the need for a UN mandate to support military operations against Iraq. At the March European Union (EU) summit in Barcelona, Schröder confirmed the German stance when he stated that Germany would only join an anti-Iraq coalition if the United Nations supported an intervention.

A serious rift in German and U.S. policy developed after Bush visited Berlin in May 2002. Bush made his case against Iraq to Schröder, but gave reassurances that he would not act without consultation with the allies. It was reportedly agreed that Bush

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would not start preparations for war before the German elections, and Schröder would not campaign on the antiwar issue during his election campaign.\textsuperscript{63} Both promises were soon broken. As news of an impending Iraq War began to surface in the early summer, the German government remained cautious towards U.S. policy as long as the U.S. made no concrete requests for German support. As long as there were no specific requests from Washington, a Berlin spokesperson stated, there was no need for the government to make a decision.\textsuperscript{64} After President Bush’s West Point address that made the case for preventive military action against emerging WMD threats, however, German public opinion polls showed that an overwhelming majority of Germans opposed a military intervention in Iraq.\textsuperscript{65} An October 2002 Pew Research Center poll reported that while 75 percent of German respondents supported the removal of Saddam Hussein, only 26 percent supported the use of force.\textsuperscript{66} Weakened by a poor economic record and facing a strong challenge in the upcoming federal elections, Schröder felt he could no longer take a cautious approach towards Iraq and embraced negative public attitudes towards the impending conflict as a defining election issue.


\textsuperscript{64} Quoted in Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 9.


Immediately after the start of the German election campaign in August 2002, Schröder hardened his rhetoric against a military intervention in Iraq and explicitly stated that Germany was not going to support the U.S. policy. In an election rally in Hanover on August 5, Schröder stated, “We must get the international inspectors into Iraq. But playing games [Spieleret] with war and military intervention—against that I can only warn. This will happen without us…We are not available for adventures [Abenteuer], and the time of checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end.” In an interview in the news weekly Die Zeit, Schröder openly criticized the Bush administration for not consulting with Germany and declared the need for a “German Way” in foreign policy. He began to use charged phrases like “reckless adventure” and emphasized that there would be no German military contribution to a war in Iraq, even though the Bush administration had not specifically asked for one. Foreign Minister Fischer was also critical of any war in Iraq, but was careful to formulate his positions diplomatically. Fischer’s more nuanced position concerning Iraq, based on a UN mandate, is significant given his pacifist background as an activist in The Greens party and 1960s peace movements. Fischer believed that German support should be conditional on an international mandate. The German opposition was also critical of Schröder’s stance, arguing instead for the coalition government to work out a common European position in the Iraq debate.

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67 This quote is in response to the notion that Germany provided only checkbook support in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Quoted in Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23. Forsberg, “German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation,” 218. “Gerhard Schröder Auf Anti-Amerika Kurs [Gerhard Schröder on an Anti-American Course],” Die Tageszeitung, August 6, 2002.

According to the opposition, Germany and Europe would be better served by a unified European position on Iraq. They were concerned that a foreign policy classified as “The German Way” would cause considerable upset in European foreign policy circles.

Instead, Schröder publicly continued to criticize U.S. policy for domestic gains. His staunch opposition to the war marked him from his challenger, CSU candidate Edmund Stoiber. Der Spiegel magazine later observed that the campaign marked the end of “unlimited solidarity” when Schröder became the Chancellor of Peace.69 Schröder’s position hardened in late August in reaction to Vice President Cheney’s speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars claiming the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein by military means, if necessary. Cheney stated, “old doctrines of security do not apply;” quoting Henry Kissinger he continued, “The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action.”70 Cheney’s speech presented Schröder an ideal opportunity to escalate his opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq, and the Iraq issue became the dominant theme in the elections.71 In an interview in the New York Times, Schröder stated that the arguments against a war with Iraq are so strong that he would oppose one even if the

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69 Quoted in Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23.
Security Council approved [emphasis added]. During the course of the national election campaign, the German position on a possible Iraq war changed from support with a UN mandate to unequivocal opposition to any military intervention even under a UN mandate. Schröder’s anti-war stance isolated Germany within Europe and established a policy position from which Schröder could not retreat after the elections. The anti-war rhetoric resonated well in the east where suspicion of NATO was strong, and along with a the government’s competent response to a massive flood just a few days before the election, turned a 10 percentage point deficit into a SPD-Greens victory by the slimmest margin in the Federal Republic’s history. The governing coalition gained a narrow four-seat majority in the Bundestag, yet the unintended consequences of Schröder’s rhetoric quickly became apparent: a weak coalition government, European isolation from U.S. foreign policy prerogatives, and a soured German-American relationship.

The resolute policy position taken by Schröder in the campaign left little room for any adaptation or modification. The day after the election, Schröder met with the left wing of his parliamentary party and told its foreign policy spokesperson, Gernot Erler, that his decision on Iraq was fundamental and unshakable. To change his approach

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would cost him credibility with his party and the voters, and he had no mandate to do so.\textsuperscript{75} Schröder welcomed the late September decision by the United States to seek a UN Security Council resolution but continued to counter any U.S. policy advocating the use of force. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed that any UN resolution should not contain mechanisms to justify immediate military action in the case of Iraqi non-compliance. Fischer also re-stated Germany’s earlier position that it would not participate in military intervention, even if the United Nations provided a clear mandate for that participation.\textsuperscript{76} This position lost Germany any real leverage to influence the Bush administration into taking a more restrained approach towards Iraq. Furthermore, the stance continued to isolate Berlin among its European partners who continued to suggest a military intervention would require at least an additional UN resolution. Schröder’s unilateral stance was critiqued within policy circles, “It does not say much for the prospects of a shared security and defense policy when Schröder comes out with a stance like this without any liaison,” said Frank Umbach, a senior research analyst at the independent German Council on Foreign Relations.\textsuperscript{77} Schröder was alone among NATO leaders in ruling out military action regardless if it was supported by a United Nations resolution.

At the same time that Germany refused to support military intervention, it attempted to repair diplomatic relations with the United States in a strategy of damage

\textsuperscript{75} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 34.
\textsuperscript{76} Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 12.
limitation. Schröder supported efforts in the larger war on terrorism, while also providing Iraq support that did not require a vote in the Bundestag. Schröder offered support to the United Nations for arms inspections in Iraq.\textsuperscript{78} At the end of September, Foreign Minister Fischer declared that Germany could participate in a post-war UN-mandated force although it still opposed military intervention in the first instance.\textsuperscript{79} The Bundestag consequently extended the mandate for the German contingent for Operation Enduring Freedom.\textsuperscript{80} At the advice of U.S. Secretary of State Powell, Germany expanded its military role in Afghanistan to include almost 2,000 troops and volunteered to command NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once the force came under NATO’s authority.\textsuperscript{81} Most significantly, the federal government—in spite of concerns of several members of the governing coalition who deemed this commitment would violate international and German constitutional law—promised transit rights for German territory and air space as well as rights to the use of U.S. installations in the case of military intervention.\textsuperscript{82} Chancellor Schröder also agreed to provide security for U.S. bases in Germany in case of war thereby making U.S. troops from the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry

\begin{footnotes}
\item[78] "German Chancellor Offers Support for UN Arms Inspections in Iraq," \textit{DDP News Agency}, September 17, 2002.
\item[79] Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 12.
\end{footnotes}
Division available for deployment to Iraq.\textsuperscript{83} Lastly, Berlin offered two Patriot missile batteries to Israel.\textsuperscript{84} By the end of 2002, Germany was robustly supporting the war on terrorism with approximately 8,500 German troops deployed in various parts of the world, second only to United States in the effort. Politically, however, its opposition to military intervention in Iraq offset this support.

Germany was thus caught between its interest in improving relations with the United States and Schröder’s uncompromising position on a war in Iraq. Foreign Minister Fischer continued to keep open the possibility that Germany might eventually lend political support to the war, and he stated: “That’s something no one can predict as no one knows…which accompanying conditions the Security Council will attach. It remains certain that we will not participate militarily in an intervention.”\textsuperscript{85} Fischer’s comments prompted a strong reaction in Germany. Some in the SPD and the Green parliamentary groups were worried that the government was backing away from its strong opposition to the war.\textsuperscript{86} Using the analogy of a two-level game, Schröder had given too much for a win-set at the domestic level to have a win-set available with the United States at the international level.\textsuperscript{87} Germany had to continue its staunch opposition

\textsuperscript{83} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 35.
\textsuperscript{84} “Germany, Israel to Hold Talks on Patriot Missiles,” \textit{DDP News Agency}, December 3, 2002. “Germany to Grant Overflight Rights to US, Allies in Case of Iraq War.”
\textsuperscript{86} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 37.
\textsuperscript{87} Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."
to the war to maintain Schröder’s credibility domestically and had to search for support in
the international community to mitigate its isolation from the United States.

The natural partner to combat their perceived isolation from the United States was
Germany’s neighbor to the west: France, their European Union ally and traditional
antagonist to the United States. By January 2003, Germany was politically isolated by
the Bush administration and unsure whether France would side with the Americans,
British, Spanish, and Italians on Iraq. This position left Germany dangerously
marginalized within the Western alliance. The true impact of the German anti-war
position was felt by French President Jacques Chirac, pushing him towards adopting a
policy of confrontation with the United States.  

Schröder reached out to French
President Chirac in a telephone conversation and agreed that they would closely
coordinate their policies in the Security Council when Germany gained its rotating seat.  

German foreign policy expert Gregor Schöllgen described Germany’s role as having “had
unintentionally taken on a leadership role as a counterbalance to the United States.”  

As a result, Schröder continued to court President Chirac of France to counter any U.S.
military intervention. The U.S. counter-alliance solidified in a January 20 ministerial
meeting in the United Nations when Foreign Minister Fischer joined French Foreign
Minister Dominique de Villepin in accusing the United States of “impatience” in the

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89 Ibid., 37.
confrontation with Baghdad. Fischer supported the French in hinting that it would support a French veto if the United States tried to raise the issue of Iraq, particularly in anticipation of the January 27 ministerial meeting in which Hans Blix was slated to announce progress on weapons inspections. The Franco-German bloc was firmly cemented two days later when Schröder and Chirac issued a joint statement in Versailles declaring that military intervention in Iraq would be a last resort and would require a UN Security Council decision. According to a German official, “Chirac gave Schröder a great gift that day. Schröder went from being isolated to being part of a French-German-Russian bloc whose position was supported by a potential majority on the Security Council. He was no longer alone.”

Germany, together with France and Russia, sought an open-ended extension of the UN weapons inspections authorized under Resolution 1441. To regain momentum for the U.S.-U.K. position in the Security Council, Secretary of State Powell provided gripping testimony offering detailed evidence that argued Iraq was hiding WMD and maintaining links to al Qaeda. The German-Franco-Russian axis was unmoved: the speech had little impact on their position that the inspectors should be given more time to do their work. After the second report by UN inspectors Hans Blix and Director General of the IAEA Mohamed El Baradei on February 14, which showed improvement

91 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations.
94 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 42.
in the inspection process but a considerable lack of full co-operation on the part of Iraq, Foreign Minister Fischer declared that the inspection regime had to be improved. He advocated a strengthened verification and control mechanism so that a re-start of Iraqi weapons programs could be precluded.  

This strategy was also pursued in the European Union, where Germany advocated a declaration that agreed that “war is not inevitable” and that “force should be used only as a last resort.” Berlin, however, resisted fixing a specific date for the Hussein regime to comply with Security Council demands. Instead, the German government—in a joint memorandum with France and Russia—proposed a strengthening of the inspections regime in the Security Council. These measures would have taken months, if not years, to implement. The anti-war bloc, now under the leadership of the French, continued to resist U.S. efforts in the Security Council. In late February, French ambassador to Washington, Jean David Levitte, urged Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley not to pursue an additional Security Council resolution on Iraq. He delivered a message from Chirac, “Let's agree to disagree on Iraq, but a second resolution by the Security Council was unnecessary and would risk damaging relations further.” Hadley replied that the United States did not think it needed a second

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95 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 17-18.
97 The Declaration on Iraq by Russia, Germany, and France stated, “U.N. Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the U.N. Security Council, provides a framework of which the potential has not yet been fully exploited.” It continued, “There is still an alternative to war. The use of force can only be considered as a last resort. Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully.” Declaration by Russia, Germany and France Pronounced by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, During a Joint Press Briefing with Vladimir Poutine, President of the Russian Federation (Embassy of France in the United States, February 10 2003 [cited March 4 2008]); available from http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2003/chirac021003.asp.
98 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 18.
UN resolution authorizing force, but that British Prime Minister Tony Blair required one for domestic political reasons. The Bush administration reasoned it had nothing to lose in attempting a second resolution. If the United States did not seek a second resolution and lost Blair, it still would not be able to win over France. The United States, Great Britain, and Spain thus submitted a proposed resolution to the UN Security Council on February 24 calling for the authorization to use military force; consequently, on March 5, France, Germany, and Russia issued a joint statement that unambiguously declared that the three states would block any attempt in the UN Security Council to use force against Iraq. The draft resolution was withdrawn on March 10 when Chirac stated “whatever the circumstances, France will vote no.”

To counter the German-French-Russian impasse in the Security Council, British Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed changes to the proposed 18th UN resolution on March 12, which would call for Iraq to meet certain benchmarks to prove that it was disarming. France, which promised to veto any new resolution and could not back down from that unequivocal guarantee, immediately rejected the Blair amendment. With the outbreak of war imminent, Schröder and Fischer underlined their commitment to solving the Iraq crisis through diplomacy. In his State of the Nation speech to the

99 Kitfield, "Damage Control." Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 39.
100 Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67.
Bundestag of March 14, Schröder argued, “We must have the courage to fight for peace as long as there is a scrap of hope that war can be avoided.”\textsuperscript{103} On March 16 in a prewar council held between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain, a decision was made to withdraw the additional UN resolution and present Hussein with an ultimatum to leave Iraq.\textsuperscript{104} At the UN Security Council meeting on March 19, Fischer condemned the use of military action by stating “the Security Council had not failed” and that “Germany emphatically rejects the impending war…the policy of military intervention has no credibility.”\textsuperscript{105}

Germany was also a crucial U.S. counterweight in NATO. Belgium, supported by Germany and France, led the opposition in NATO for providing Turkey with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and Patriot anti-missile batteries. The three opposing NATO members argued that voting to deploy military aid to Turkey would amount to implicit support for military operations that were underway, and they again argued against a “rush to war.”\textsuperscript{106} The debate in NATO lasted several weeks, and a solution to deploy NATO forces was found by moving the deliberations to the Defense Planning Committee (where France was not represented).\textsuperscript{107} At the same time, German

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    \item \textsuperscript{103} Quoted in Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67.
    \item \textsuperscript{106} Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 220, Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 65-66.
    \item \textsuperscript{107} Richard Bernstein and Steven R. Weisman, "Threats and Responses: Alliance; NATO Settles Rift over Aid to Turks in Case of War," The New York Times, February 17, 2003. Harnisch, "German Non- 
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Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer further defended the German stance against the war at the annual Munich Security Council. U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that, “Diplomacy has been exhausted,” while Fischer continued to urge for caution with respect to Iraq by stating, “Why now? I am not convinced.”

Fischer criticized the United States for its militaristic strategy to combat international terrorism since September 11, arguing instead that the more important task was to promote a Middle East peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Germany’s diplomatic strategy in the buildup to the Iraq War was to minimize the international consequences of an anti-war policy. According to Karsten Voigt, the coordinator for German-American cooperation and a former Member of Parliament, “The Americans were telling us that the French would leave us by ourselves, so we moved closer to France to avoid that isolation.”

By aligning Germany with France and promoting views that enjoyed broad support within the public, Schröder broke with the basic tenets of his country’s foreign policy: promoting strong rapport with the United States. As a result of Schröder’s anti-war stance, the relationship with the United States was severely damaged and, on the continent, smaller EU members felt rejected by the

Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 15. France pulled out of the Defense Planning Committee in 1966 over DeGaulle’s belief that French nuclear weapons should not be subject to NATO oversight. As a result, France participates diplomatically in NATO discussions but not in defense planning operations.  


exclusivity of the French–German relationship.\textsuperscript{110} Central and East European political leaders argued that there was a dual standard in the EU when Chirac commented that the East and Central Europeans had missed a “great opportunity to shut up,” when they wrote an open letter in support of the United States on Iraq. Their frustration was best illustrated by Hungarian writer Péter Esterházy, who stated that whereas he had once been an East European, he then became Central European, and then for a few months a new European but, even before he could get accustomed to it or reject it, he was now relegated to being a non-core European.\textsuperscript{111} Schröder repeatedly emphasized in practically every speech he held on major foreign policy issues that alignment with France served Germany’s national interests better than any other strategy.

Overall, German diplomatic opposition to U.S. planning for a military intervention in Iraq began immediately after the attacks of September 11 and remained fairly consistent. Germany’s unqualified refusal for military action created a dilemma for the Schröder government when the Bush administration decided to pursue Security Council approval in September 2002. By pursuing military action under the auspices of the United Nations, the Bush administration exposed the central weakness in Schröder’s premature position that German armed forces would not participate in military action in Iraq. If the UN Security Council were to decide that force would be necessary to implement its former resolutions, the Schröder government would have to change its

\textsuperscript{110} Kaare Dahl Martinsen, “The End of the Affair? Germany’s Relationship with France,” \textit{German Politics} 14, no. 4 (2005), 413.
\textsuperscript{111} Quoted in Ibid., 409.
stance domestically towards German military participation. Therefore, Germany exerted significant diplomatic effort to create a counter coalition in the Security Council and NATO, strengthening Schröder’s position domestically. Germany encouraged a shift in French policy to form a common position with Russia to prevent a UN resolution authorizing force. Schröder’s stance vis-à-vis a UN resolution authorizing force significantly contributed to the European Union’s inability to present a unified strategy on Iraq, stripped the U.S.-led intervention of the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate, and unintentionally sent false signals to Saddam Hussein that an armed intervention was unlikely.¹¹²

After the conclusion of conventional combat operations in May 2003, Chancellor Schröder softened on a German role in Iraq by suggesting to the United States that Germany would be willing to participate economically in the reconstruction of Iraq only if there were a clear UN mandate and a strong role for the United Nations in stabilization and reconstruction operations. After the conclusion of U.S. and allied combat operations in Iraq, the Schröder government toned down its anti-war rhetoric and shifted its diplomatic goals towards stabilizing the war and sanctions-torn country as well as mending fences within the European Union and NATO. Schröder signaled that his

¹¹² Throughout the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003, Saddam’s public and private comments reflected his belief that the United States and United Kingdom lacked the stomach for war. Additionally, sometime in the first week of March 2003, the Russian ambassador to Iraq assured the Iraqi government that Russia, China, France and Germany would counter U.S. efforts in the Security Council giving Saddam the hope that the international community would dissuade the coalition from attacking. Woods and Joint Center for Operational Analysis (U.S.), Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership. See also Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," 63-64, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 89-90.
government favored lifting sanctions against Iraq during Secretary of State Powell’s visit to Berlin in mid-May 2003. Germany, while willing to offer limited assistance to the U.S. reconstruction effort, urged a symbolic end to Iraq’s status as an occupied country. In contrast to the sharp public criticism leveled by President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder stressed the need to move forward. Additionally, Schröder indicated a willingness to expand the German patrolled security zone in Afghanistan beyond Kabul, as long as it did not change the approved mandate in the Bundestag.

Despite strong U.S. pressure for more substantial military contributions to the Iraqi stabilization and rehabilitation effort, through 2003 Berlin continued to resist further calls for German deployment, and instead offered to help train Iraqi police and security forces in Germany. Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer made it clear that Germany would not contribute troops to the stabilization and reconstruction process in Iraq. This resistance, however, did not block a small role for NATO in the stabilization process. In May 2003—with German approval—NATO backed logistical support for the Polish sector in Iraq, extending the decision again in December 2003. Berlin also assured Washington that it would not block a consensus on NATO’s involvement in Iraq. The German government argued that the UN Security Council would have to provide an appropriate mandate and that the United Nations would have to

117 Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 30.
take over much of the civilian administration in the transition period towards Iraqi self-rule before it could consider supplying forces to a stabilization force such a move. The German government suggested that the Bush administration should consider a multilateral framework for outlining goals for an interim government, similar to the “Petersburg Process” implemented for Afghanistan.  

Germany continued to exert pressure on the United States for a wider multinational role in the reconstruction of Iraq. In early September, both Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac announced that their countries would not support the initial American proposal that the Security Council authorize an expanded international force under American control and financial help for Iraq. France and Germany provided a prod to the United States to give the United Nations greater authority in post-war Iraq. In mid-October, Germany—after urging from Russian President Putin—agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1511, which provided a framework for UN and international participation in the political and economic rebuilding of Iraq and the maintenance of security. The resolution authorized a multinational security force and urged states to contribute to Iraq security and reconstruction. Despite U.S. pressure in the wake of Resolution 1511, Berlin remained silent on the issue of troop deployments to Iraq, while supporting the substance of the resolution.

118 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 20.
Although Germany attempted to come together with the United States in the aftermath of conventional combat operations, U.S. policy clearly showed a preference for coalition partners. In December 2003, the Department of Defense implemented a policy barring the states that did not support the Iraq coalition. France, Germany, Russia and other coalition non-participants were blocked from $18.6 billion in U.S.-financed Iraqi reconstruction projects. Chancellor Schröder intervened personally with President Bush, who subsequently sent former Secretary of State James Baker as a special envoy to encourage German creditors to forgive Iraq debt and to promise future reconstruction contracts, even though German had been deliberately excluded from the initial $18.6 billion disbursement. The Bush administration policy sought to reward those states that contributed militarily to the American effort in Iraq with lucrative contracts and funds approved for reconstruction.

Finally, in January 2004, after NATO Secretary General Jaap de Scheffer again proposed a NATO force for the reconstruction of Iraq, Chancellor Schröder floated the idea of German military support for Iraq medical evacuation missions. Schröder continued his stance that Germany would not block NATO operations in a military mission for Iraq. To placate his domestic audience, Schröder argued that such an engagement would not constitute a “military deployment” of German forces that would

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require Bundestag approval, but rather a “humanitarian action.” However, since Bundestag approval had been the crucial obstruction for the SPD-Green government ever since the September 11 attacks, the Schröder initiative met strong domestic resistance within the coalition’s own party caucus. Germany rescinded any offer to place troops in Iraq proper.

In February 2004, Germany began to mend fences when German Foreign Minister Fischer called for a new transatlantic Middle East initiative structured around NATO at the annual Munich Security Conference, thereby embracing the U.S. position that the status quo in the region entailed a security risk for both Europe and America. Furthermore, in the wake of the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, Germany privately asked Spain’s new leadership to tone down its anti-U.S. rhetoric. According to a senior German official, “If we give the impression that you can plant a big bomb in Europe, cause a government to fall, and force a withdrawal of troops, then this would send the wrong signal to terrorists.” Stressing a unified role in combating terrorism, the official stated, “That's not in Germany's interests, or in Europe's or in Spain's.”

In June 2004, NATO decided to support the training of Iraqi security forces and to build up a modest military presence in Baghdad to support the training mission. The German government continued to refuse to send troops into Iraq, focusing instead on a training mission in the United Arab Emirates.\textsuperscript{126} Another sign of rapprochement in the German-United States relationship came in November 2004, when Germany—along with the Paris Club, 19 of the world's richest countries—wrote off 80 per cent of Iraqi debt, a move long sought by the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{127}

Germany’s foreign policy during the reconstruction phase involved approachment with the United States combined with maintaining a firm stance against military involvement in Iraq’s reconstruction. Germany advocated a greater role for the UN in post war Iraq, and pressured the United States in the Security Council to accept UN sponsorship of the pursuant occupation. The Schröder government actively courted U.S. policy makers and supported U.S. efforts in the greater war on terror. By the late spring of 2003, reconciliation was under way and Germany generally supported U.S. positions concerning Iraq.

\textit{Military Contributions}

Despite the diplomatic maneuvering and the denial of UN sanction to the war, the Schröder government provided robust support to military efforts that did not require

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parliamentary approval. Military planners in the Pentagon noted, “Germany is an odd category. It was quietly contributing to the U.S. effort, but opposed to the war.” In fact, Germany provided two types of support to enhance U.S. operations in Iraq. First, Germany shouldered a larger military burden than other NATO partners in other areas of operation. Germany provided military forces in Germany, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, freeing U.S. forces for participation in Iraq. Second, it provided direct covert intelligence support for U.S. coalition operations within Iraq. Schröder did everything he could—that did not require the Bundestag—and kept it quiet to not arouse the alarm of the German domestic audience.

The German government significantly cooperated with U.S. military preparations inside Germany. More than 2,500 Bundeswehr soldiers were tasked to protect U.S. installations in Germany, which freed up additional U.S. Army V Corps personnel to deploy for the war. Additionally, Germany provided 800 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense troops and 20-25 Fuchs chemical detection vehicles as a detachment in Kuwait that was designed to detect and clean up a potential chemical or biological weapons attack. Moreover, after initially resisting the NATO approved deployment, Germany supplied the Turkish military with Patriot missiles to defend against a possible Iraqi missile attack. In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, German

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128 Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," 134.
130 "Germany's Struck to Discuss Bundeswehr Changes, Iraq at Munich Security Talks," Welt am Sonntag, February 1, 2004.
ships guarded the sea-lanes as part of *Operation Enduring Freedom*. The operation was intended to deter movement of al Qaeda, but the Germans, in effect, were safeguarding the waterways that the United States used to build up its military forces in the Persian Gulf. According to German Rear Admiral Rolf Schmitz, “We are stabilizing the area, and that probably is an advantage for your [American] forces as well.”

Germany expanded its military role in Afghanistan including the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once the force came under NATO’s authority. It also contributed to a new NATO Reaction Force, which was established after the Prague NATO summit in the fall 2002 to undertake counterterrorism operations. With their presence in the Balkans, and within the framework of the *Operation Enduring Freedom*, a total of 10,000 German soldiers were deployed worldwide at the beginning of the Iraq war. Germany’s political and diplomatic opposition to the war thus did not impede its military cooperation in efforts outside Iraq.

Germany also provided direct—and controversial—support to the Iraq military effort in two significant ways. First, agents of the German intelligence service, the BND, reportedly provided American war planners with Iraqi plans for the defense of Baghdad. In February 2003—one month before military operations commenced—a German liaison

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132 Quoted in Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, 123.
133 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 224, Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations*, 44. Although Germany has a significant ground presence in Afghanistan, its soldiers are still restricted from participating in combat operations, see "NATO Requests German Troops for Combat Role in Afghanistan," review of Reviewed Item, *Deutsche Welle*, no. February 21 (2008), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3095130,00.html.
officer to U.S. Central Command in Qatar slipped to U.S. officials an illustration of Hussein’s concentric defensive lines around the capital.\textsuperscript{135} The illustration was identified as the Baghdad defense plan presented at a December 18, 2002 meeting of Saddam and his top commanders. The plan gave the American military an extraordinary window into Iraq's top-level deliberations, including where and how Mr. Hussein planned to deploy his most loyal troops. The \textit{New York Times} article discussing this crucial acquisition was based largely on a classified study of Iraqi military strategy prepared in 2005 by the Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command and a classified German Parliamentary report on BND support the Iraq effort.\textsuperscript{136} In addition, the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, as well as a German TV show and the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}, reported that German intelligence operatives provided targets for the advancing U.S. troops. In particular, two German military intelligence operatives, who stayed in a Baghdad safe house after Berlin had closed its embassy, passed the intelligence tip that Saddam Hussein and his two sons had been spotted near a chicken restaurant in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansour district. Less than 45 minutes later, a B-1 bomber obliterated the site with four satellite-guided bombs, leaving a deep crater and at least a dozen dead.\textsuperscript{137} German government spokesperson, Ulrich Wilhelm, admitted the existence of the two agents and the intelligence sharing with the U.S.


officials, but claimed that the relevant data did not contain military targets, but rather dealt exclusively with the identification of institutions such as mosques, hospitals, and embassies that were to be protected.\[138\] The reports of intelligence sharing and the significant military cooperation inside Germany is evidence that, despite their sharp political differences over the Iraq war, Germany and the United States continued practical cooperation at a high and continuous level.

**Financial Contributions**

Germany’s financial contributions to the Iraq War and post-war reconstruction stand in stark contrast to its support to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the 1991 effort, Germany, even under the financial strain of reunification with the German Democratic Republic, provided approximately $11.5 billion to the Gulf coalition. Germany provided direct funding to the coalition partners to support military, technical, and logistical support. Additionally, Germany contributed to international aid through the United Nations, Red Cross, and European Community. Due to constitutional limitations on the deployment of its military forces, Germany’s robust financial support for the Persian Gulf War was dubbed “checkbook diplomacy,” but it reflected the strong conviction that Germany share the burden with allies that had supported Germany since World War II.\[139\]

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As Ronald Asmus, an expert on German foreign policy observed, “What was perhaps most striking in the German debate was the almost total lack of any discussion about German strategic interests in the Gulf and how they should guide policy. Instead, the terms were set by such issues as whether Germans ‘owed’ the United States political support in the Gulf in return for American support during the unification process.”

Germany’s financial support for the 1991 Persian Gulf War reflected its dependence on the United States for influence in Europe and NATO.

Conversely, Germany’s financial support for the Iraq War reflected the anti-war stance in Germany and a renewed focus on Euro-centric interests. German contributions to Iraqi reconstruction were modest considering its support of the earlier Gulf War. Germany agreed to $2 billion in debt relief and eventually pledged $155 million to training and reconstruction accounts. This amount pales in comparison to the $11.5 billion in direct compensation for the Persian Gulf War. Although Chancellor Schröder pledged financial support to the Iraq reconstruction during President Bush’s late September 2003 visit, Russia, France and Germany refused to commit money at the October 25 Madrid Donors Conference. Germany’s tepid support reflected two major

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German Basic Law in 1991, the government was barred from supplying troops for military operations other than self defense or NATO defense of Europe. See Historical Learning, this chapter, for a discussion on Germany’s broadening interpretation of the Basic Law.

140 Quoted in Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 47-48.
141 O’Hanlon and Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, April 18, 2005.

Germany’s lack of investment in Iraq reconstruction was exacerbated by a directive issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz that announced a list of 63 countries eligible to bid for the 26 primary Iraq reconstruction contracts worth $18.6 billion. Countries eligible to bid were identified as either coalition partners or force-contributing nations.\footnote{Bumiller, "Bush Defends Barring Nations from Iraq Deals."; Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 21.} Chancellor Schröder reacted immediately with a phone call to President Bush, and Bush dispatched his personal representative, former Secretary of State, James Baker to visit Berlin to discuss Iraq reconstruction and debt restructuring.\footnote{"Bush's Personal Representative to Berlin 'before Christmas' to Discuss Iraq," DDP News Agency, December 11, 2003.} At Baker’s urging, Germany granted Iraq a debt relief of 80 percent of the $2.5 billion Iraq owed Germany, and engaged in various reconstruction activities.\footnote{Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 352. See also Nikolaus Blome and Torsten Krauel, "Gerhard and George," Die Welt, February 26, 2004. Craig S. Smith, "Major Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt," The New York Times, November 22, 2004.} Germany’s total
contribution towards reconstruction and training totaled $155 million. This contribution to reconstruction, however, pales in comparison to Japan, for example, which pledged $3.3 billion in debt relief, $1.5 billion in grants, and $3.5 billion in loans for reconstruction.

Germany’s financial support to the Iraq War explicitly reflects its desire to distance itself from the conflict and U.S.-led coalition. Germany did not support reconstruction efforts with the largesse that Japan or Saudi Arabia did; rather, Germany chose to contribute through institutions such as the European Union and World Bank.

**Explaining German Contributions**

Why was Germany the only European country to exclude a priori any military involvement in a war to disarm Iraq, even in the case of a UN mandate? Germany’s behavior is somewhat puzzling since it provided much of the military support the United States required to move efficiently its forces from Europe but, at the same time, its diplomatic approach ensured that Germany would be excluded from any rewards from the United States for its permissive use of airspace and facilities located in Germany. Chancellor Schröder’s early public opposition against military “adventures” in Iraq, can be best understood by understanding the domestic concerns of preserving his ruling SPD-Green coalition government in the face of the considerable opposition that had developed

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throughout the 1990s concerning the use of military force, particularly for non-humanitarian interventions. Chancellor Schröder felt compelled to rule out any military adventures long before the Bush administration committed itself to military action or had made a request for support, because a vote on the use of force in the Bundestag could well have signaled the end of his government. The domestic political structure, historical learning, and alliance dependence blocks of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model best explain Germany’s Janus-like stance.

**Historical Learning: From “Checkbook Diplomacy” to “Tactical Abstention”**

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 became the first significant security challenge for Germany in the post-Cold War era. All German leaders believed the invasion itself was a blatant violation of international law, but the crisis posed a complex challenge for the newly unified Federal Republic. In response to the Iraqi aggression, President George H.W. Bush personally requested that the German government consider the deployment of troops to the Gulf; deployment, however, was stymied by political disagreements about the proper response to the Gulf crisis. The notion that the Bundeswehr could be used for purposes other than the defense of Germany was inconceivable across the political spectrum. Most German political leaders agreed that Articles 24 and 87 of the German Basic Law essentially barred the government from sending troops to the Persian Gulf. In the end, Germany’s participation in the 1991

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150 Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification*, 21-22.
151 Article 24, paragraph 2 stated, “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will
Persian Gulf War amounted to “checkbook diplomacy,” which provoked embarrassing international criticism that Germany was shirking in its role as a European leader by not supplying military forces. This incident convinced leading conservative politicians that Germany’s international influence and standing as a partner was indeed at stake.\(^{152}\) Criticism of Germany for not supplying military forces for the Persian Gulf War led German leaders to pursue a strategy of progressively stretching the boundaries of the use of armed force through the use of increasingly taxing deployments.

In Germany, discussion of the proper role for German foreign policy focused on the tension between notions of “normalization” and “civilian power.” “Normalization” meant that Germany would free itself from its post-Cold War restriction on the use of force while pursuing international interests like the other large Western powers. It would act more often out of self-interest, but it would not return to its historical Sonderweg (special path) and once again become an international “trouble-maker.”\(^{153}\) Hans Maull, noted expert in German foreign policy, in contrast, explained German foreign policy with the concept of “civilian power;” civilian power referred to Germany’s nature as a strong international power that was willing to respect international law and understood the

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\(^{152}\) Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 103, Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 155.

\(^{153}\) Forsberg, "The Debate over German Normality: A Normal German Debate?," James A. McAdams, "Germany after Unification: Normal at Last?," World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997).
necessity of cooperation. The consequence of this “civilian” attitude was a consistent preference to employ political, rather than military, solutions through multilateral organizations to address international conflict.\footnote{Hanns Maull, "Germany's Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," in \textit{Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic}, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2001), Henning Tewes, "How Civilian? How Much Power? Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of NATO," in \textit{Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic}, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2001), Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 61. Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 29, Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations."} Civilian power did not stand in a direct opposition to military power, but military power was to be used only with strong international consensus; a “civilian power” did not resort to unilateral military options. German preferences for the use of military force thus swung between concepts of “normalization” and a supra-state “civilian power” notion. German foreign policy therefore emphasized the politics of dialogue and preventive diplomacy rather than military intervention.\footnote{Siwert-Probst, "Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy," 31.} Domestically, the German public rejected the notion that it would be either advisable or even promising to tackle foreign policy problems unilaterally.\footnote{Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 303.}

Chancellor Kohl and the conservative Christian Democrat-Liberal government used the 1991 Persian Gulf War crisis as an opportunity to address the constitutionality of out of area troop deployments. The government supported a broader interpretation of the Basic Law that would allow collective security participation under NATO, the United Nations, and even European Community (EC)/Western Economic Union (WEU)
Opposition Social Democrats and Greens, in contrast, strongly resisted efforts to liberalize deployment policies and argued against military action for legal and moral reasons. Legally, the opposition parties stressed that Articles 24 and 87 barred Germany from military involvement outside of the NATO area. Morally, the government opposition argued that given Germany’s history, it was obliged to exercise maximum restraint in all military matters. A broad consensus existed in parliament that financial and logistical support represented the limits of German military participation.

The Kohl government attempted to alter the strict interpretation of the Basic Law through repeated *Bundeswehr* deployments that set new precedents for the role of the armed forces. By early 1991, Germany was providing non-combat support to the Kurdish refugee crisis in Turkey and Iran and minesweeper support to clear the Persian Gulf, thus making the Gulf safe for commerce. Other crises in the 1990s helped define Germany’s use of force boundaries. In 1992 and 1993, German ships and aircraft helped monitor a sea-embargo of Serbia/Montenegro, a no-fly zone over Bosnia Herzegovina, while German troops provided medical and logistical support to the UN missions in Somalia and Cambodia. The Somalia crisis notably marked the first deployment of

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158 Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification*, 24.  
160 Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification*, 46-47.
German ground forces beyond the NATO area of operations since World War II.\textsuperscript{161} The liberal opposition opposed these “out-of-area” deployments of troops and lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court that the deployments violated Article 87 of the Basic Law. In July 1994, the Court ruled that out-of-area engagements of the *Bundeswehr* were constitutional if they formed part of a multinational coalition, obtained the explicit approval of a simple majority in the *Bundestag*, and served to uphold “international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{162} The court decision is of central significance in that it ratified the government deployment strategy without the need for constitutional amendment; the debate about *Bundeswehr* deployments consequently lost its legalistic argument.\textsuperscript{163} Even with this legal mandate, however, majorities on the German left maintained moral arguments against out-of-area engagements and warned against the “militarization” of German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{164} After the legal argument lost vigor with the court decision, the moral argument against the use of force lost steam during the ongoing bloody war in Yugoslavia, where all non-military measures to stop ethnic cleansing proved ineffectual. In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN “safe area” of Srebrenica and systematically killed 8,000 Muslim men and boys. Diplomatic and economic measures failed to prevent the


\textsuperscript{162} Hanns Mauil, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?" (paper presented at the Workshop on Force, Order and Global Governance, Washington DC, July 1-2, 1999). See also Press release issued by the Federal Constitutional Court, No. 29/94 (Karlsruhe, Germany).

\textsuperscript{163} Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, 64-65.

\textsuperscript{164} Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 103.
largest European mass-murder in post-Cold War history. The massacre split the German left, bringing elements that are more moderate closer to the conservative Christian Democrat government.\textsuperscript{165} Fischer, then influential in the pacifist opposition Greens Party, pointed to the massacre at Srebrenica as the point at which it became clear that sometimes the use of military force was not only moral, but refusal to use force might be immoral.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, the previous opponents to “out-of-area” deployments began to argue that Germany had a historical responsibility to resist aggression and massive human-rights violations, if necessary by threatening or using force. Respected philosopher Jürgen Habermas joined Fischer by stating that preventing Serbian ethnic cleansing clearly represented a case where using force was necessary.\textsuperscript{167} The other major opposition party also changed its official position on the use of force outside the NATO boundaries. In June 1997 and later in December 1997, the opposition Social Democrat party changed its foreign policy stance from “humanitarian support only” to a wider interpretation allowing \textit{Bundeswehr} support for “all kinds of military operations that have the blessing of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{168} While it superficially appeared that German security policy had undergone a profound change, pacifism still shaped the foreign policy discourse; the German government supported a wider range of military intervention, but a robust consensus between elites on the proper use of armed forces reflected the tension between the “normalization” and “civilian power” advocates. The use of force was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Jürgen Habermas, "Ein Abgrund Von Trauer [an Abyss of Grief]," \textit{Der Spiegel}, August 7., 1995.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Longhurst, \textit{Germany and the Use of Force}, 67-68.
\end{itemize}
marked by a propensity to consider using the *Bundeswehr* in a greater range of missions, but consensus would require a strict mandate based on UN support, a multilateral framework, a clear mission statement, and a clear humanitarian dimension. ¹⁶⁹

In 1998, the conservative coalition was replaced by the liberal Social Democrat-Greens government, yet the use of force policy continued on a “normal” path. The 1999 Kosovo conflict further solidified Germany’s transformation in the use of military force. The deployment of 14 fighter aircraft for *Operation Allied Force*—a NATO sponsored bombing campaign aimed at halting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—marked the first combat deployment in the history of the *Bundeswehr*. ¹⁷⁰ Germany had thus officially crossed the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Kosovo mission was also markedly different in that it was an offensive military operation against a sovereign state without a clear UN mandate. ¹⁷¹ The expanded role of the *Bundeswehr* in interventions, however, came at a cost to the governing SPD coalition. The Greens party was critical of the dominant role of the United States and the way American-style coercive diplomacy had foreclosed options other than military escalation. The *Bundestag* vote of 444-318 in favor of supporting the government position reflected the view that Germany was committing the “sin” of having consented to military action without a UN mandate. ¹⁷² In contrast, German consensus solidified when the *Bundestag*, by a vote of

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 69.
¹⁷¹ Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, 70-71.
endorsed the deployment of 8,000 soldiers to the UN sanctioned post-conflict Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{173}

German foreign policy through the 1990s reflected a coalition between the “normalization” and “civilian power” elements in the German government. The center-right Christian Democrats were driven by concerns about Germany’s international standing and influence, while the center-left Social Democrats were influenced by the perception that Germany had an obligation to combat ethnic violence and massive human rights abuses. Thus, Germany’s willingness to deploy armed forces was far from unconditional, but reflected an alignment of interests between the left and the right.

The German participation in \textit{Operation Essential Harvest} illustrated the fragile nature of German views on the use of military force. In 2001, violence again emerged in the Balkans when ethnic Albanians clashed with the army and police of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Germany responded swiftly to an EU and NATO brokered ceasefire and pledged troops to a NATO-led stabilization force. Chancellor Schröder’s quick commitment to NATO, however, was not fully supported within his governing coalition, and Germany’s participation was secured through the support of the opposition parties.\textsuperscript{174} The government had to live with the humiliation of significant defection from within its own ranks. The case of Macedonia demonstrated that the use of force remained a highly contested issue with factions divided between pragmatic and 

\textsuperscript{173} Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 104.

\textsuperscript{174} Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, 174-75, Longhurst, \textit{Germany and the Use of Force}, 78-80.
idealistic lines. The intervention was defended by the Social Democrats and Greens in terms of human rights and Western solidarity, however those themes ran hollow since the deployment was preventive in nature and the case for dispatching soldiers was not emotionally appealing.  

Although future votes maintaining the Macedonian presence were widely supported, the German government was severely strained by the aftermath of September 11.

Chancellor Schröder’s promise of solidarity with the United States in combating international terrorism again demonstrated the tension between idealistic and pragmatic elements of the German elite. At the U.S. request for a German military contribution, Chancellor Schröder pledged 3,900 Bundeswehr soldiers for the campaign against terror. After the cabinet approved the deployment plan, reservations within Schröder’s own governing coalition of SPD-Greens emerged about supporting an American war on terrorism. The Berlin Greens maintained, “military campaigns against civilians and the bombing of entire countries or cities is not suited to catch terrorists.” When the SPD–Green government sought to gain the necessary votes for German military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Bundestag, the coalition fell short by several votes because 28 members of both the SPD and the Greens threatened to vote against the bill. Subsequently, the chancellor tied the deployment issue to a vote of confidence (literally a vote of trust—Vertrauensfrage) in his government. By linking the deployment vote to a

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vote of confidence, those members disagreeing with the deployment of troops would link their vote with a vote to dissolve the government. In order to gain as much support as possible from his own coalition, the government’s bill proposal also included clear restrictions on the geographic scope of the mandate for German forces in *Operation Enduring Freedom*.\(^\text{177}\) The deployment was approved by a vote of 336 to 326—thus keeping Schröder’s government intact—but significantly weakening it. Over seventy deputies voting yes added a written explanation of their vote to the record explaining that their votes were cast to support the government rather than a military intervention.\(^\text{178}\) In the weeks after the vote, the governing SPD and Greens held several party conferences to maintain their governing coalition since they were concerned that the party rank and file would revolt against the line taken in the parliamentary vote.

The twelve-year period timeframe between *Operation Desert Storm* and *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was one of profound change in German foreign policy concerning the use of force. At the end of the Cold War, the notion that the *Bundeswehr* could be used for anything other than the defense of NATO was unimaginable across the political spectrum and German public. German policy-makers had converged on a policy of strict abstention from military conflicts beyond Europe. The numerous conflicts in the Balkans, however, provided the newly unified nation the opportunity to expand its ability to participate with the greater collective security community. By the late 1990s,

\(^{177}\) Erb, *German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era*, 202, Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, 86.
Germany seemed to have reached stasis in the relationship between force and diplomacy, between “normalization” and “civilian power.” Germany progressively increased its international engagement in terms of troops deployed and military difficulty of their tasks. Germany’s participation in the military operation in Kosovo in 1999—a NATO campaign launched without a UN mandate—suggested Germany’s foreign policy had normalized away from its initial pacifistic tendencies. However, the use of force policy that evolved through the 1990s reflects a composite consensus of groups with quite different agendas concerning the wider use of force. Conservatives were driven by concern about Germany’s standing in the international community, enhanced by participating in collective security arrangements. Liberals, on the other hand, were more driven by the moral obligation to combat ethnic violence and respond to humanitarian crises. Thus, German security and defense policy has continued as a “culture of restraint.” Despite the “opening” of military policy options towards combat operations, the German priority going into Afghanistan was still clearly placed on peacekeeping and peacemaking (post-conflict reconstruction) missions, especially those that contain a humanitarian element.

**State Structure and Domestic Politics**

Given Germany’s history of restraint and the domestic view as a “civilian power,” domestic structure and politics was a guiding influence on Germany’s position on the Iraq War. Chancellor Schröder’s early public opposition against military “adventures” in Iraq and his subsequent Iraq policy can be best understood in the framework of German
domestic structure and politics. Germany’s decentralized constitutional structure
instituted under the Basic Law ensures that German governments are weak and civil
society is strong. The federal government is required to compromise and to consult with
the governing coalition, federal offices, individual states, and opposition parties.\footnote{179}
Foreign policy is the purview of the chancellor and the foreign minister, but because each
is typically their respective party’s leader, policy can often be divergent. The
decentralized foreign policy structure combined with a parliamentary requirement to
approve military deployments marks the nation as a Type IV state in the Peterson
typology. However, the chancellor may be motivated to commandeer foreign policy
since his international stature can win votes for the party at elections.\footnote{180} In the approach
to the Iraq war, domestic pressures heavily shaped Schröder’s Iraq policy, as is evident
by the internal bureaucratic bargaining required by a weak government seeking
reelection. Schröder independently charted a policy course on Iraq that played to the
electorate’s interests. Initially, Foreign Minister Fischer maintained a more nuanced
position advocating a UN mandate, but he later accepted Schröder’s hard “no” against
military action in Iraq.\footnote{181} This independent role of the chancellor in foreign policy is not
unusual in German history. Chancellor Adenauer, the first West German Chancellor, was

\footnote{180} Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 196.
\footnote{181} "Election Will Not Change German Opposition to War, Says Foreign Minister," \textit{DDP News Agency},
September 16, 2002, "German Foreign Minister Considers UN Mandate for Iraq Strike Unlikely," \textit{DDP
He set a precedent by which successive chancellors have defined their own foreign policy agendas, giving rise to the notion of Germany as a “chancellor democracy” (*Kanzlerdemokratie*). In this manner, German foreign policy structure for the Iraq war represented a Type II typology. Schröder, whose preferences reflected the pressure generated by a domestic election campaign and public opinion that was decidedly against a military intervention in Iraq, formulated Germany’s Iraq policy.

**Role of the September 2002 National Elections**

Due to the influence of national elections and popular opinion against military intervention in Iraq, Chancellor Schröder was able to claim an extreme policy position regarding Iraq by exploiting domestic public opinion for electoral gains. The German government position on the war on Iraq emerged in an *ad hoc* fashion, rather than a result of conscious strategic rethinking. An important factor was the timing of the *Bundestag* elections in 2002. Without the election campaign, Schröder might have tried to steer a policy course much closer to the United States or he might have at least have refrained from strong criticism of U.S. action and rigid anti-war positions.

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182 Siwert-Probst, "Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy," 20.


184 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 226.
By the 2002 election, chancellor-candidates assumed unusually prominent roles as German campaigns began to reflect the style of American presidential campaigns. Instead of running a party-centered campaign, chancellor-candidates campaigned on personal charisma and electability. For Schröder’s initial winning campaign in 1998, the SPD ran a professionally designed and organized campaign, modeled on the campaigns of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The SPD’s campaign machine deployed advanced techniques such as demographic research, professional advertising, and consultations with political scientists to a degree previously unseen in German politics. The result of the professionalization of Bundestag campaigns was that “wedge issues” were explored to swing voters from one party to another.

The wedge issue for the 2002 campaign was German foreign policy concerning Iraq. Until late 2001, Schröder seemed certain of a second term in office. However, domestic concerns about a sluggish economy and high unemployment eroded the early lead of Schröder’s SPD in public opinion polls putting. The SPD had not kept its 1998 election promises to revive the economy and significantly reduce unemployment. Early in the year, the opposition CDU/CSU candidate Edmund Stoiber and the Christian Democrats managed to eliminate the lead in the polls that the SPD had enjoyed by emphasizing the economic failures of the SPD-Green coalition government. By midsummer, Schröder had become desperate for support and realized that he needed a

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185 Hogwood, "The Chancellor-Candidates and the Campaign."
186 Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 94-97.
broader coalition of the left. Schröder’s SPD and Stoiber’s campaigns were nearly indistinguishable on policy grounds, therefore, Schröder needed to gain a “wedge issue” to halt his slide in the polls and distinguish his campaign from Stoiber’s. To gain votes from the former East Germany, the SPD needed to appeal to two ideologically distinct sets of voters: the center-left electorate which made up their own clientele base and undecided eastern voters on the radical left who might possibly be pilfered from the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS—formerly the East German Stalinist SED). The strategy for the SPD was to center the campaign on Schröder as a leader and to prioritize the campaign in the east, concentrating on practical issues of interest to eastern voters rather than on socialist ideals. Nevertheless, all his tactics—including an attempt to paint his opponent, Edmund Stoiber of Bavaria, as a right-wing extremist—failed. Five weeks before the election, a poll by the Dimap Institute indicated that 45 per cent of voters were still undecided. Both campaign teams understood that it would be essential to win over this important undecided bloc. The government’s competent response to a major flood days before the election and Schröder’s staunch anti-war stance reversed the favorable trend for the opposition CDU/CSU. Schröder’s insistence late in the campaign that his

187 Major polling organizations showed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) with 38 to 40 percent and the SPD with between 33 and 36 percent in early July 2002. More alarming the SPD trailed in its power center, the state of North Rhine—Westphalia. At the end of July, just before the launch of the anti-Iraq campaign, the SPD lost another 5 points in the polls and the opposition had gained 2 points, so that the SPD was trailing the CDU/CSU by a margin of 43 to 35 percent. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 161-62.
189 Ibid., 253.
government would not participate in, nor support, any military action against Iraq was a populist guarantee that appealed to the electorate in the former East Germany.\footnote{Roberts, \textit{German Electoral Politics}, 95. Erb, \textit{German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era}, Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 204-05.}

The Schröder campaign polled the electorate on the Iraq issue and saw it as a wild card that could be played as a last resort. Polls had shown that eastern voters were less attached to Germany’s relationship with the United States than were western voters and that they had more concerns about war and NATO.\footnote{Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 21-22.} The SPD party council decided on 1 August to start the final phase of the re-election campaign earlier than planned with the aim of stopping the party’s slide in public opinion polls. Franz Müntefering, the party’s general secretary, took the helm as election campaign manager and proposed a new campaign based on the concept of “the German Way,” which was meant to focus domestically on social reform. However, before discussion of the foreign policy agenda, Chancellor Schröder left the party board meeting and gave a television interview that highlighted Iraq as a campaign issue. Asked how the SPD would try to improve its re-election chances, the chancellor repeated the central points of his party’s agenda but added ominously that Germany would not participate in any “adventures.”\footnote{Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 10.} Shortly thereafter, in an August 5 campaign speech in Hanover, Schröder intensified his anti-war rhetoric by stating, “pressure on Saddam Hussein, yes. We must get the international inspectors into Iraq. But playing games [Spielerei] with war and military intervention—against that I can only warn. This will happen without us… We are not available for
adventures ["Abenteuer"], and the time of checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end.”

With these two successive appearances, Schröder was able to commandeer German foreign policy and set the tone for the German response to Iraq. Schröder’s clear rejection of German participation in a war against Iraq, even if covered by a UN resolution, evoked severe criticism from Stoiber and the CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU and FDP (Free Democratic Party) warned against a “German separate way” and demanded instead that the government should work out a common European position in the Iraq debate. CDU foreign policy expert Wolfgang Schaeuble accused the German government of “creating a bogey” and weakening the United Nations in the Iraq debate for its own electoral ends. Schröder countered this assault by effectively arguing that it was the Bush administration that was weakening international institutions. In an interview with Die Zeit, Schröder openly criticized the Bush administration for not consulting with Germany and continued stressing the need for a “German Way.” He began to use charged phrases like “reckless adventure” when referring to Bush’s terrorism policy. Der Spiegel was later to observe, the time of “unlimited solidarity” ended in Hanover on August 5 when Schröder became the Chancellor of Peace, campaigning on a pacifist platform.

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193 Quoted in Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23. Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 218. "Gerhard Schröder Auf Anti-Amerika Kurs [Gerhard Schröder on an Anti-American Course]."
194 "German Opposition Critical of Government Stance on Iraq."
196 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23.
By late August, it was evident that the Iraq issue was helping Schröder in the polls. After an impassioned speech by Vice President Cheney at VFW 103rd National Convention, arguing for a preemptive regime change in Iraq, the Iraq War became the dominant theme of the Bundestag elections. Cheney’s speech—which one Schröder advisor described privately as “the miracle”—presented Schröder with an ideal opportunity to escalate his opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq and gain separation from Stoiber on the Iraq issue. Cheney’s sharply unilateralist speech shocked the German public and supported media portrayals of the Bush administration as dismissive of its allies. It also shifted the emphasis in Iraq from controlling WMD to regime change—a new development in the eyes of Berlin. In an interview with the magazine Stern, Schröder strengthened his anti-war position by saying that under his leadership, Germany would not participate in a military intervention in Iraq and that the coming election would not change his stance. SPD Secretary General Müntefering further stressed that the chancellor’s “no” was definite, “We should not participate in any case…the United Nations will not decide.” At the same time, Stoiber and the CDU/CSU moved toward Schröder’s policy position on Iraq; Stoiber could no longer afford to maintain a neutral

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197 Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections.", Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 218. White House, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention.
199 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 24-25.
200 Quoted in Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 11. See also Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake; Perspectives -- Sept. 11 and Beyond: Gerhard Schröder.", Horsley, Foreign Policy Works for Schroeder.
Whereas Stoiber had initially criticized Schröder’s refusal to involve Germany in U.S. action against Iraq, after the Cheney speech, Stoiber publicly warned the Bush administration that unilateral action without consultation and a UN mandate would not be supported by Germany. Michael Glos, leader of the CSU group in the Bundestag, mirrored Schröder’s earlier rhetoric, stating that Germany was not prepared to participate in any “adventures in Iraq.”

Schröder used Iraq as an embodiment for pacifist and nationalist themes, warning of the dangers of war while stressing that Germany should not be afraid to stand alone on the issue if necessary. This popular message reached multiple bases in contemporary German politics. It reinforced Germany’s identity as a “civilian power,” which was particularly strong among left-leaning voters. At the same time, his message embraced an acceptable face of German nationalism: the ability to stand alone against aggression. In this manner, Schröder claimed the center and left-leaning population on the Iraq issue while forcing Stoiber and the CDU/CSU to clarify the occasions they would support the use of the German military in Iraq. Ultimately, Stoiber reacted hesitatingly and awkwardly in moving his party’s position to the left to gain public support.

Schröder consequently won the closest election in postwar German history by only 6,000 votes. Capitalizing on the Iraq issue contained a number of positive effects for the SPD’s campaign. First, it shifted attention away from domestic economic issues.

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201 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 205-06.
202 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict."
Secondly, it mobilized the SPD and Green constituencies, many of whom were deeply skeptical of the use of military force and the motives of the Bush administration in Iraq and elsewhere around the world.\textsuperscript{204} In this way, Schröder exploited popular attitudes on Iraq and the United States to gain domestic credibility. Thirdly, it also appealed to voters in eastern Germany—especially PDS supporters—who were pacifist. Lastly, Iraq allowed Schröder to take advantage of his leadership edge over Edmund Stoiber in an area where an incumbent chancellor always has the advantage over a challenger: security policy.\textsuperscript{205} According to Friedbert Pflüger, a leading foreign policy specialist in the opposition CDU, “This time and for the first time, the government was not in danger of yielding to the street, it was fueling the street.”\textsuperscript{206} It is clear that Schröder was both shaping and responding to a broad sense of uneasiness and concern about the Bush administration as well as its policy on Iraq.

Chancellor Schröder cemented his anti-war position the day after the election. In a meeting with the left wing of his parliamentary party he told its foreign policy spokesman that his decision on Iraq was fundamental and unshakable. To change his approach would cost him all credibility with his party and the voters and he had no mandate to do so. That promise took on added weight soon after the election when he began to break his campaign promises concerning unemployment and EU Common Agricultural Policy reform and suffered a loss of public confidence in his government.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{205} Hogwood, "The Chancellor-Candidates and the Campaign.", Roberts, \textit{German Electoral Politics}.
\textsuperscript{206} Quoted in Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 79-80.
right at the beginning of his new term.\textsuperscript{207} He could not afford to wobble on Iraq. The White House viewed the political faction of Schröder’s party as “defiant,” and this faction sought to keep the Iraq issue alive.\textsuperscript{208}

Schröder’s effective use of the Iraq crisis reflected a two-level game where the required domestic stance overruled a favorable policy vis-à-vis the United States.\textsuperscript{209} His zealous stance contributed favorably to his reelection, but it also ensured that Germany would be unable to influence future Iraq policy. If Schröder had supported the tough U.S. stance on Iraq, he would have likely lost many SPD and Green party supporters who strongly opposed military intervention. Schröder’s weak position in the government ensured that he could not embrace a policy in conflict with a majority of his base support. Alternatively, he could not have adopted a more measured policy, because the Stoiber campaign had already positioned itself as supporting intervention under a UN mandate. Schröder’s self-inflicted stance of ruling out German military participation—even under a UN mandate—locked out future policy options on dealing with the United States regarding Iraq. Berlin was trapped between the possibility that the government would have to withdraw previously approved basing rights for the passage of U.S. forces stationed in Germany—thereby putting the NATO Alliance at risk—and the option of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{207} Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections.", Hogwood, "The Chancellor-Candidates and the Campaign."

\textsuperscript{208} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 34.

voting for a second resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. The government took all measures to circumvent and postpone any Bundestag vote on Iraq, ensuring that Schröder government would not be embarrassed by a defeat of any mandate on Iraq. As the vote for German participation in Operation Enduring Freedom had to be linked to a vote of confidence in the government, Schröder was relatively sure that he could not garner Bundestag support for any additional measures in Iraq. Therefore, he approved U.S. transit rights under the NATO treaty, which ensured that there would be no vote in the Bundestag concerning this support for the war effort.  

Schröder’s strategy after the election remained consistent: no German military personnel would be sent to Iraq. After the declared end of combat operations in Iraq, Schröder stressed the importance of good transatlantic relations and expressed the wish for a greater UN role in postwar Iraq and a clear timetable for restoring Iraqi sovereignty. Schröder was ready to support Bush and Blair’s plan to lift sanctions against Iraq in the UN Security Council. Even after the occupation gained UN legitimacy, however, Germany maintained a hands-off policy regarding Iraq. Germany provided limited financial support to the UN-sponsored reconstruction fund and continued to reject U.S. requests for military support for Iraq stabilization. Instead, to show some level of solidarity in the general War on Terror, Berlin provided additional support to Afghanistan, providing significant military,

212 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 220.
economic, and diplomatic support to NATO’s ISAF. As of March 2008, 3200 German soldiers were serving in Afghanistan, and Germany had suffered 26 fatalities.\textsuperscript{213}

Germany’s contribution to ISAF marks it as the third largest participant behind the United States and Britain. The mandate issued by the Bundesstag, however, does not allow German soldiers to take part in combat operations against the Taliban insurgency in the south and east of Afghanistan, but rather authorizes the training and arming of the Afghan army and staffing of provincial reconstruction teams.\textsuperscript{214}

Domestic issues particularly drove Germany’s position regarding the Iraq war. The SPD–Green coalition leadership steered a policy course that would preserve its parliamentary majority in the face of a blocking majority in its own ranks. As predicted by the domestic politics framework, Germany was unable to show strong support to the Iraq effort due to the influence of the legislature and polity on deployment decisions. Given the requirement for a Bundestag mandate, Schröder would have had to expend significant political capital—which he did not have—building a domestic coalition to pass a mandate supporting the use of force. This political maneuver had been done throughout the 1990s by the Kohl and Schröder governments, but the vote for the Afghanistan intervention demonstrated that the German people had become war weary.\textsuperscript{215}

In the Iraq case, Schröder assessed that his policy must reflect public opinion to ensure

\textsuperscript{213} The List: Who’s Left in Afghanistan?
\textsuperscript{215} Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 94.
the survival of his government given the fragile state of his coalition’s majority in the Bundestag. With just a few votes more than the opposition, the government likely would have circumvented any decision involving military assets. Such a decision would have required a formal mandate for which there was no firm majority in the coalition parties. The Schröder government proved unable to bridge the gap between its own domestic supporters and its allies for two reasons. First, leading German policy-makers were not convinced that the Iraq issue demanded a military response. Secondly, the continuing German debate on the use of force through the 1990s had a cumulative effect that shrank the government’s majority with every military commitment abroad.216

Germany’s policy concerning Iraq reflects David Auerswald’s contention, in Disarmed Democracies, that national elections can dramatically influence a state’s decision to use military force.217 This conclusion reinforces the theories of Herbert Kitschelt and Susan Peterson who argue that leaders become more influenced by the public during election campaigns and are more likely to choose policy positions that reflect public sentiment.218 Germany’s Iraq position reflects observations from American politics that the executive will attempt to maximize the reelection chances by announcing a change in domestically unpopular commitments, even if the executive risks damaging

216 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict."
217 Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force.
Because of Schröder’s weak position going into the elections he found it necessary to capitalize on the Iraq position to build domestic support for reelection. Since the pressure for reelection was so strong, domestic considerations dominated international influences in the Security Model.

**Balance of Threat**

As discussed in previous chapters, balance of threat theory predicts that when a state perceives an external threat it will form alliances or build strength internally to balance against that threat. In the Security Decision Model, balance of threat theory predicts German lack of support for the Iraq War coalition but a greater amount of support for the greater War on Terror efforts based on German perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Specifically, Germans understood the threat of international terrorism and were generally supportive of efforts to halt the proliferation of terror organizations. However, this concern about terrorism broadly did not include Iraq since there was no proven link between the Hussein regime and al Qaeda.

The German government, in general, recognized radical Islamic terrorism as a significant security threat and regarded itself as a potential target of attack. Although German citizens had not been directly targeted, they had frequently been the victims of radical Islamic terrorism. Between September 11, 2001 and January 2005, more German

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220 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.
citizens died as victims of Islamic terrorist attacks than at the hands of the Red Army Faction, a left-wing terrorist group that operated in Germany for over thirty years.\footnote{This statistic includes those Germans who died in the World Trade Center on 9/11, and in the terrorist bombings in recent years in Bali, Djerba/Tunisia etc. Eleven Germans are believed to have died in the World Trade Center attack. The bombing of a Tunisian synagogue in April 2002, reportedly linked to Al Qaeda, killed 21 people, including 14 Germans. See Francis T. Miko and Christian Froehlich, "Germany’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy" \textit{CRS Report for Congress RL32710} (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2004), 9.} In response to this threat, Germany initiated numerous domestic and international programs. Domestically, Germany adopted two major anti-terrorism packages that targeted loopholes in German law that permitted terrorists to live and raise money in Germany.\footnote{Ibid., 4.} Internationally, Germany directly participated in five major counter terror missions as part of the global anti-terror coalition with forty percent of its 7,800 troops based abroad directly involved in counter terror operations. Germany supported a number of counter terror resolutions, most notably the UN sanctions regime targeting members or associates of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Germany also ratified the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Finally, Germany also contributed financially to counter terror efforts; by the end of 2004, Germany contributed $384 million for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.\footnote{Ibid., 12.} Germany’s extensive cooperation in the global fight against international terrorism reflects the threat that it perceives from terrorism.

The Schröder administration, however, remained unconvinced that a direct terrorist threat emanated from Iraq. Their first concern was that a compelling link between the Hussein regime and international terrorism had not been established.
According to German leaders, there did not seem to be a connection between Iraq and the terrorist threat they had agreed to combat after September 11 and they were not convinced Iraqi WMD was a direct threat.\(^{225}\) After September 11, German intelligence found no provable link between al-Qaeda and Iraq and shared these assessments with British and other intelligence services, including the CIA.\(^{226}\) Without a direct link between al Qaeda and Iraq, Germany needed to be convinced that Iraqi WMD posed a threat.

Although German intelligence confirmed that Saddam was likely developing chemical and biological weapons, the government did not consider the development a direct threat to Germany. Chancellor Schröder said he had seen no new evidence indicating that the military danger from Iraq had increased and therefore perceived little urgency in dealing with Iraq. German intelligence discounted information on mobile WMD labs and Iraqi yellowcake acquisition and warned the United States that the information was not credible.\(^{227}\) In the 2001 Report on Disarmament (\textit{Abrüstungsbericht}), the threat by terrorist groups and the proliferation of WMD was emphasized and the report called for a vigorous effort in disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation policy. However, the report did not list Iraq or its possible WMD program as a worldwide and regional proliferation concern. Instead, the report merely stated that the status of disarming Iraq had remained unchanged since the eviction of the


\textsuperscript{226} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 45.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 45-46.
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors in 1998. The 2001 report downplayed any mention of WMD and instead emphasized the “difficult consensus finding process” in the UN Security Council for determining a solution to Iraqi disarmament. Though the BND assessed in a 1999 report that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD program after the expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors, by 2001 there was no sense of urgency for Iraqi disarmament measures.\textsuperscript{228} Iraq was not pictured as an immediate threat, but rather a troubling country in the volatile Middle East. German leaders were consistent in regarding the Hussein regime as distasteful but contained, but regarded Middle East insecurity as a greater threat.

German leadership saw a military intervention in Iraq as more threatening than a contained Saddam Hussein. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in an interview with \textit{Der Spiegel}, noted that the German government saw no link between the terrorist actions of September 11 and Iraq. The German government was focused on the anti-terror fight in Afghanistan and saw regime change in Baghdad, rather than Iraqi WMD, as a more dangerous proposition; in fact, Germans found an unstable Middle East more threatening than Iraq.\textsuperscript{229} According to Fischer, “It would be wrong if we declared a change of regime in Baghdad as top priority.”\textsuperscript{230} The Foreign Minister questioned whether the analyses of the threat justified taking on a risk of an entirely different order of magnitude and

\textsuperscript{228} "German Intelligence Says Iraq Rearming "Massively"", "\textit{Die Welt}, February 23, 2001, Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 6.
assuming responsibility for peace and stability in the region for years, perhaps even for decades—specifically through outside intervention.\textsuperscript{231} Chancellor Schröder and Fischer warned that, “no one has a really clear idea of the political order that would follow in the Middle East” or of the effects of a war on the stability of moderate Arab states or the cohesion of the anti-terror coalition. There has been little discussion, according to Schröder, of the economic consequences, in particular the price of oil, for the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{232} German leadership was more concerned with the regional instability that would ensue after a military intervention rather than the direct threat offered by Iraq.\textsuperscript{233}

This lack of imminent threat from international terrorism—or Iraq writ large—explains why German domestic politics heavily influenced government decisions involving Iraq and is reflected in the Bennett et al, security model. Given that Iraq was contained, had most of its air space off limits to its own aircraft due to militarily enforced “no-fly zones,” and was not in a position to pose a direct threat to its neighbors, Germans were not convinced that Iraq was a threat requiring military action, therefore domestic concerns were much more influential to German decision making.\textsuperscript{234} Schröder simply believed that the threat constituted by Iraq was not great enough to provoke a military intervention that could weaken his government.\textsuperscript{235}

Alliance Dependence

Alliance dependence refers to the susceptibility to pressure and the offering of incentives by coalition leaders. Alliance dependence predicts that a state will support an ally that is demanding a contribution if dependence pressures outweigh fears. The trade-off between benefits and costs creates a tension between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment. An alliance dependence motivation explains Germany’s limited support for the Iraq coalition and also offers insight into Germany’s support for the greater War on Terror. Although dependence was present, it was not nearly as pronounced as in the run-up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1991, Germany provided substantial financial support to the coalition under pressure from the United States for a contribution to the coalition. Since Germany was domestically limited to providing financial support due to disputes on the constitutionality of the use of force, the Bush administration requested a robust financial support package. President George H.W. Bush planned on a mid-September 1991 meeting between his personal envoy Secretary of State Baker and Chancellor Kohl to negotiate the German contribution. Against this background, the German government supported a European Community resolution that pledged support to Saudi Arabia Arabs but rejected support for the military buildup of the United States. Members of Congress reacted angrily to the

236 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 181.
perceived lack of German support to the U.S.-led coalition buildup. Bush personally urged Kohl to contribute its “fair share” and hinted that the Americans would look very closely at how the Germans reacted. Chancellor Kohl’s statement that he would support the coalition with DM 3.3 billion, almost 50 per cent dedicated directly to the U.S. military, came only four days after Bush informed Kohl that he would not be attending the October 3 ceremony marking German unification. At the same time, Secretary Baker publicly indicated that the United States was considering an additional drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe. At a time when it was still uncertain whether Russia would drawdown in the east as planned, these announcements caused concern in Germany that it would be abandoned in the face of a questionable Soviet withdrawal. In total, Germany contributed $11.5 billion to the 1991 Gulf coalition, an outstanding sum given the cost of German re-unification.

After the Cold War, Germany had fewer incentives to support the United States on questions of security. During the Cold War, given its position as a frontier-state Germany relied on the United States particularly through NATO for the provision of its security. In contrast, Germany pursued a unified European security policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. Although Germany continued “dual-hatted” support for NATO, it envisioned a European security structure that would deal with European issues.

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239 Hellmann, "Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks: Germany and Alliance Burden Sharing in the Gulf War," 174-76.
In a speech to the European Parliament in January 1999, foreign minister Fischer emphasized the importance of a European security and defense identity.\textsuperscript{240} The issue of European security and defense cooperation was encouraged further by NATO’s campaign against Serbia. The Kosovo campaign highlighted European dependence on the U.S. military. In reaction, the European Council agreed that the European Union required the ability for autonomous action backed by credible military forces. To that end, Germany was highly supportive of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the European Rapid Reaction Force in an effort to lessen dependence on the United States in security matters and to gain more leverage over U.S. security policy.

The German leadership no longer felt as constrained by geography, history, or strategic threats and Germany’s increased participation in military operations showed that Germany could take a more consultative role with the United States.\textsuperscript{241} Germany’s role in European defense policy and the Western European Union showed that Germany would forge policy to meet its interests. Germany’s was “emancipated” from its role as U.S. policy agent to one of independence. Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992 signified this growing independence.\textsuperscript{242} As a result, Germany considered that its position in NATO obliged the United States to consult with it substantially before planning or implementing a military action in Iraq. Early in the

\textsuperscript{240} Gunther Hellmann et al., "De-Europeanization by Default? Germany’s EU Policy in Defense and Asylum," \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis} 1, no. 1 (2005).
\textsuperscript{241} Borchert and Hampton, "The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or Bust for Transatlantic Security." Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 130.
preparations for war, Foreign Minister Fischer warned the Bush administration that European allies did not want to be treated like satellite states. In addition, Schröder stated that he would no longer agree to the previous division of labor in international coalitions, in which Germany was not available for participation but paid, nevertheless. Germany would no longer be a country where “checkbook diplomacy replaces policy.” Germany saw itself as a more equal international partner due to its role in endorsing European security institutions and policy.

Once major combat operations ceased in May 2003, the United States applied political and economic pressure on Germany to punish it for its intransigence in the war build-up. Shortly after President Bush declared an end to combat operations in May 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers toured Eastern European bases and stated that the United States was considering “reshuffling the military structure in Europe” by moving forces eastward. He stated that the Department of Defense (DOD) strategy had shifted eastward and that a large stationing of military forces in Western Europe would no longer make strategic sense. The new strategy envisioned withdrawing the bulk of its 71,000 military personnel from Germany to the United States, while maintaining a series of smaller expeditionary bases in Eastern Europe to serve as jumping points for troops deploying to points south and east of

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243 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 218.
244 "German Chancellor Warns against War on Iraq," DDP News Agency, August 3, 2002.
Europe. The plans included moving a small number of U.S. forces to new bases in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania and maintaining only the key U.S. airbase in Ramstein and a few other facilities in Germany. The outline of the proposal and its timing suggested to Germany that it was being punished for its opposition to the war in Iraq and that the states that had supported the administration were being rewarded. This perception was reinforced in the fall when the DOD barred French, German, and Russian companies from competing in $18.6 billion in reconstruction contracts. According to U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, this restriction on contracts was a response to German lack of support for the war and for its failure to contribute directly to Iraq’s reconstruction fund.

Germany’s measured response to U.S. pressure indicates that Germany had gained a more independent role in the alliance, but also demonstrated the desire of Germany to keep the NATO alliance intact. The issue of U.S. use of German military bases is illustrative. Given Schröder’s staunch anti-war position, one would expect Germany to limit U.S. access to German bases and airspace. During the highly contested Operation El Dorado Canyon airstrikes on Libya in 1986, France and Spain denied basing and over flight rights. This restriction caused the increased operational complexity and added 1,300 miles one way to the mission. In contrast, Germany

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246 Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations*, 125.
allowed free use of German airbases and provided security so that U.S. forces could deploy to Iraq. After the war commenced, German policy-makers emphasized the need to look ahead and to cooperate in building a democratic Iraqi state, even as the Iraqi insurgency was escalating throughout most of 2003. At the 2004 Munich security conference, German Foreign Minister Fischer stated, “We were not, and are still not, convinced of the validity of the reasons for war,” however he continued to state that it was in the German interest for the Iraqi people—and, by extension—the Americans to succeed. Fischer continued to state that it is certainly not in Germany’s interest for its major ally, the United States, to become bogged down in a quagmire. Fischer’s Munich speech was an explicit attempt to realign Germany with the United States. A few weeks after the Munich conference, Schröder traveled to Washington and publicly declared that the United States and Germany were still strong allies. During that meeting, Schröder proposed a wider Marshall Plan-like approach for the Muslim world, a multifaceted effort—that was first outlined by Fischer in Munich—to address the poverty and desperation that are, in the German view, at the heart of the problem. Overall, Germany resisted direct investment in Iraq, but continued to allow unrestricted access to U.S. bases in Germany, while its military forces embraced the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and the numerous NATO/UN missions in the former Yugoslavia.

Overall, Germany officially was not a member of the Iraq War coalition, but provided assistance that was critical to U.S. efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Schröder would have likely caused the collapse of his government if he actively supported the invasion coalition, and his reelection hinged on open opposition to the Bush plan. However, he was able to provide significant support to U.S. forces under the guise of NATO support. Schröder played a two-level game, denigrating the war to the domestic public, while at the same time allowing the United States to use critical infrastructure that directly supported the Iraq War. Even though there was a widespread view in Germany that the Iraq war was a dangerous course of action, the government did not want to infringe on its role as a critical partner of the United States. If Schröder had blocked access to German bases, he would likely have cemented the demise of the Atlantic alliance. Instead, he ceded to modest U.S. requests to insure that the United States remained in NATO and—more importantly—continued to have an influence in the alliance. Although the German–French resistance to the Iraq War marked a high point in the two countries’ political alignment, Germany still needed the United States to influence the new NATO partners to the east. German and French efforts to carve out an independent defense and security role for the European Union were regarded with suspicion by Polish, Czech and Hungarian politicians and security experts who have

\[251\] See “Military Contributions” earlier.
preferred to look to the United States for their security guarantees. European Union and NATO stability still relies on the influence of the United States.\(^{252}\)

Germany allowed full use of military facilities, combined with over flight rights, which ensured that American forces would be able to transit Europe through normal logistics nodes. This contribution alone ensured that the United States would not have to expend significant diplomatic and material energy developing alternate logistic plans for transiting military forces through Europe. This German contribution was crucial to U.S. strategy, but also insured that European disagreements with the United States remained a temporary annoyance rather than a permanent split.

**Collective Action**

The collective action hypothesis predicts that less powerful states will be tempted to free ride when a powerful state is willing to enforce an action for a collective good. Germany’s “checkbook diplomacy” in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was viewed by some scholars as a classic example of collective action free-riding. Germany’s limitation to financial contribution was seen by some coalition partners as a method to avoid the direct costs of military action—essentially a free ride.\(^{253}\) This classification, however, does not adequately represent the limitation on the German use of force in 1991. Germany’s economic contribution was significant for the *Desert Storm* coalition, and rather than free-riding, it marked a conscious effort for Germany to robustly participate in the


collective effort given its constitutional limitations. In contrast, German actions in the lead up to the second Iraq War reflected the German view that the Iraq action was not a collective action. Germany did not accept Iraqi disarmament through military force as a collective good and countered U.S. attempts internationally to depict the intervention as a collective good. Schröder’s position was that no evidence indicated that the military danger from Iraq had increased and therefore he did not perceive the need for a collective action. Additionally, German leadership saw a military intervention in Iraq as more threatening than a contained Saddam Hussein. Germany expended significant political capital to ensure that the intervention did not gain international legitimacy and gain the status of an accepted collective action. Schröder was the first Western leader to declare unequivocally that Germany would not support an Iraq intervention under any auspices and held that position even risking isolation internationally. Evidence presented in previous sections shows that the Schröder administration assessed an Iraq intervention as a mistake. Germany was concerned with post-war stability and economic disruption in the Middle East. Schröder’s administration assessed the collective good as Iraqi disarmament through a UN inspections regime rather than armed intervention.

256 Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake; Perspectives -- Sept. 11 and Beyond: Gerhard Schroder."
The Role of Legitimacy

Though Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War appeared to be based purely on legitimacy of the invasion and occupation, German opposition showed the tension between the legitimacy of a UN sanctioned military action and the German norm against the use of military force. As shown in the historical learning section of this chapter, German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War had been marked by a tension between the view of Germany as a “civilian power” that was a strong international power willing to respect international law and understood the necessity of cooperation and a “normal power” that was willing to use force for self-interests. Since the end of World War II, the German public maintained a preference for the “civilian power” representation of Germany in the international community. This preference against military intervention was shown in a 1982 survey where only 35 percent of the adult German population stated that they would be willing to fight for their country in the event of a war. In contrast, almost 70 percent of American and over 60 percent of British respondents were willing to fight.\textsuperscript{257} During the 1990s, the German public supported military efforts that were aimed at peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization rather than combat missions themselves. This preference against the use of military force was still prevalent as the Iraq War coalition was being built. An international survey, conducted by the German Marshall Fund in summer 2003, found that Germans stood out in their unwillingness to believe that some wars could be just. When asked whether,

\textsuperscript{257} Conradt, \textit{The German Polity}, 200.
under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice, only 39 percent of Germans agreed, compared with 74 percent of Britons and 84 percent of Americans.\textsuperscript{258} Clearly, due to the lessons learned from World War II, the German public maintains a high standard concerning the appropriate conditions requiring the use of military force.

By stating that Germany would not support an intervention, even if the internationally established process for lawful intervention were followed, Germany invoked its normative standard above the procedural legitimacy provided by a UN Security Council sanction. By declaring that Germany would not participate in an Iraq intervention—even with UN Security Council approval—Chancellor Schröder ordered German normative preferences above the procedural legitimacy provided by the international community through the Security Council.

Procedural legitimacy arguments reflect the viewpoint that behavior is legitimated when it is approved by legitimate international institutions.\textsuperscript{259} Actions are collectively legitimized by the consensus built by a body of statute under multilateral endorsement.\textsuperscript{260} According to Inis Claude, the United Nations has the ability to grant legitimacy because it has come to be regarded as the arbiter of international claims.\textsuperscript{261}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Szabo, \textit{Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations}, 86.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Ikenberry, \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars}.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," 370.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Ibid., 367.
\end{itemize}

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legitimacy not through the abstract will of the international community, but rather through the process for dialog and consensus building within the Security Council.²⁶²

The German state officially recognizes the procedural legitimacy provided by the United Nations. In a recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the German Minister of State recently stated, “The UN is and remains the sole global forum of collective security. The Security Council has the central role in preserving peace and security. Security Council Resolutions also guarantee legitimacy for international peacekeeping missions; both the classic blue-helmet missions and those mandated by the Security Council and carried out by regional organizations and alliances.”²⁶³

Schröder undermined the legitimacy provided by the UN, however, when he stated that Germany would not support a military effort in Iraq, regardless of the outcome of a Security Council vote. By rebuking the sanction provided by the UN, Schröder was discounting the legitimacy provided by the deliberation process in the United Nations. In this manner he was placing national interest in the form of normative legitimacy above the international legitimacy provided by the Security Council process for authorizing military action. Clearly, Schröder could have taken a more nuanced position similar to France and Turkey that enhanced the legitimacy of the United Nations, but instead he issued a categorical “no,” which played well with domestic audiences and ignited his

reelection effort. Germany maintained this position of non-support even after the Security Council marked the occupation of Iraq legitimate with Resolution 1511. If Germany marked the UN sanction as legitimate, support for Iraqi security and reconstruction should have commenced after the Security Council urged states to participate in the multinational coalition. The German government did not significantly increase support to Iraq in the war’s aftermath, instead they continued to refuse to send troops into Iraq, focusing instead on a NATO training mission in the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. administration appealed for international help, but Germany committed neither significant funds nor troops even when the occupation gained UN authorization.

Unfortunately, German actions did not reflect the public’s normative stance against the use of force in Iraq. If the German public thought that the Iraq effort lacked normative legitimacy, one would expect that the German government would block efforts to use German territory and resources in the Iraq War. As shown earlier, however, German support to the war effort was significant, gaining it the distinction as “non-coalition but cooperating” from the Pentagon. Germany’s acquiescence to significant U.S. requests that did not require parliamentary sanction undermined German legitimacy arguments. Rather than rebuking U.S. efforts, the German government streamlined and enabled U.S. logistic and intelligence support for the war effort. Interestingly, the public showed little interest in lessening German support to U.S. forces transitioning to Iraq. In

264 Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 31.
265 Gordon, "German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says."
effect, the government and public provided sanction to the Iraq War effort as long as German forces were not directly involved.

Germany’s stance had two significant outcomes. First, it highlighted the difficulty of legitimacy arguments. The German case shows that legitimacy stems from multiple sources, and these sources may conflict in a particular circumstance. It also highlights the difficulty in separating legitimacy arguments from national interest. Was German assistance undermined by the German normative stance against armed intervention or rather its desire to distance itself from an effort where Germany saw little national and elite interest? This research suggests that Schröder’s desire for reelection was a major motivator for him to fan German anti-war sentiment.

Ultimately, German policy undermined legitimacy arguments for two reasons. First, Schröder’s categorical refusal to participate in an Iraq coalition, even under a UN mandate undermined the procedural legitimacy of the UN. One role of procedural legitimacy is to establish a set of rules for a state to follow so that decisions are based on deliberation and transparency. Germany undermined the process by stating that it would not participate regardless of the outcome of the process. Second, the fact that Germany did support U.S. efforts by making German bases available showed that it was not normatively against a war in Iraq, but rather against German participation.

**Summary and Conclusion**

German resistance to a military intervention in Iraq and its belligerent tone in the summer and fall 2003 is best explained by domestic political considerations; however, its
support of basing, over flight rights, and increased military participation in Afghanistan reflects the Schröder government’s eagerness to help in areas not requiring parliamentary approval because of alliance dependence on the U.S. Figure 6 illustrates the German participation based on the Security Decision Model. Germany did not perceive a direct threat from Iraq, nor did it believe that a collective action was required against Iraq.

Given Chancellor Schröder’s need to invoke a vote of confidence in his government, he was in a very weak position to authorize the use of force in Iraq. The German national elections of September 2002 further weakened Schröder’s position in relation to the use of force in Iraq. Significant risks exist in using, or supporting the use of force, immediately before an election when the public will be focused on the conflict and base
voting decisions on the outcome. In Germany’s case, Schröder recognized that any support of the Iraq coalition would spell disaster for the upcoming elections and that he could gain political advantage by embracing the strong sentiment against military intervention. By unilaterally declaring a “no” on Iraq, with minor consultations with the foreign policy establishment, Schröder’s government reflected a Type II rather than a Type IV domestic structure. Schröder was able to commandeer the foreign policy process and imprint his preferences on German policy. Schröder was able to accomplish this feat by appealing to public attitudes concerning the use of force in Iraq. Since Schröder’s stance resonated well with the public, he was able to accomplish a policy coup and develop a policy position individually, instead of through the collaborative process. The appeal to mass public opinion resulted in less coalition building and policy coordination than would normally be seen in a Type IV typology. Schröder avoided the more moderate stance that was being advocated by Joschka Fischer and the Foreign Ministry. When urged to weigh his words more carefully by his national security advisor and veteran diplomat Dieter Kastrup, Schröder responded, “I have to win the election.”

Schröder was able to set Germany’s Iraq policy unilaterally because it resonated with the electorate, especially in the former East Germany.

Being a NATO partner unwilling to completely reject the U.S. role in the alliance, Germany provided a significant amount of support to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.


as long as those efforts did not trigger a parliamentary vote. For the Iraq effort, Germany provided significant intelligence on Iraqi force disposition, allowed full use of German-based U.S. infrastructure, allowed unrestricted over flight rights, provided security forces to guard American bases, and eventually trained Iraqi security forces. In Afghanistan, Germany supported a role for NATO, commanded the ISAF, and increased the presence of its ground forces. Due to alliance dependence reasons, the German government supported U.S. objectives in areas that would not generate significant public attention.

Realist scholars argue that Germany’s Iraq policy represents a parting of Germany from the Atlantic alliance and support of U.S. foreign policy concerning Europe. According to Henry Kissinger, the German confrontation with the United States without consulting other European states represented a challenge not only to the United States but also to Europe.  

Stephen Szabo, an expert on U.S.-German relations notes that there is “a serious possibility of a deepening and more permanent rift and the emergence of a relationship based on rivalry.” However, Germany’s burden sharing for the Iraq War reflected a belligerent rather than a parting ally. Schröder would have likely taken a more neutral stance supporting a UN mandate for Iraq if he could have won the national elections on that stance. Schröder won reelection not by leading German public opinion, but by following it at a time when anti-war sentiment had reached a peak. Instead of a reasoned move towards German independence in foreign policy, Schröder’s stance was

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268 Quoted in Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations."

framed by domestic exigencies. On the one hand, the German government spoke out against the war vociferously, and yet on the other, made the war possible by supporting it extensively. In the end, the U.S. military employed the phrase “non-coalition but cooperating” to describe Germany’s burden sharing.²⁷₀

²⁷₀ Gordon, "German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says."
CHAPTER SIX

TURKEY: IN VOLUNTARY DEFECTION AND EVENTUAL RAPPROACHMENT

The Bush administration’s inability to win Ankara’s approval for a northern front in the Iraq War significantly affected U.S. Iraq war plans and dealt a serious blow to U.S.-Turkish relations. The Turkish parliament’s failure, after months of negotiations, to grant U.S. ground forces access necessary to launch a direct land assault against northern Iraq struck a blow to the Bush administration’s military plan and added an additional political disappointment to the “coalition of the willing.”\(^1\) The Bush administration expected cooperation from the only NATO ally bordering Iraq and instead regarded the Turkish parliament’s vote opposing vote as tantamount to betrayal.\(^2\) Turkish commentators saw the vote as an example of democracy in action, but the result for Turkey was lost influence with the United States over Turkish vital interests regarding the Kurdish north in Iraq. This level of support contrasts sharply with Turkey’s assistance to the 1991 Gulf War coalition. In that conflict, Turkish President Turgut Özal pursued active regional diplomacy to mobilize Middle Eastern support and allowed use of Turkish airbases for U.S. strikes into Iraq.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) voted 264 – 251 on a measure that would have authorized as many as 62,000 American troops to stage an invasion of Iraq from Turkish soil. Under Turkish parliamentary rules, however, a majority of Members of Parliament (MPs) present in the chamber needed to vote “yes” for the measure to pass. Since there were 19 abstentions, the measure failed by three votes.


General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and leader of the coalition military effort, considered a northern front through Turkey to be critical for military success. A coalition invasion from the north would compel Iraq to divide its attention and resources, easing the U.S. main thrust from Kuwait in the south. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, Franks’ commander for the Iraq invasion, argued it was worth spending a “national blue chip” to get basing approval for a minimum force of 35,000 troops departing from Turkey for northern Iraq.\(^4\) Taking the advice of its military commanders, the Bush administration aggressively pursued a strategy to base up to 90,000 soldiers in southern Turkey to support a northern front in Iraq. Militarily, a two-front invasion was considered essential for successful prosecution of the war.

In addition to this operational necessity, the United States needed to gain Turkish support for military action—as the only NATO ally bordering Iraq, and a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population—to help solidify international coalition-building efforts.\(^5\) The bargaining delays from October 2002 through February 2003, and subsequent failure on March 1 of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM, or Turkish Grand National Assembly) to approve the bargained use of Turkish territory, emerged as a crucial turning point in the U.S. coalition buildup for the Iraq war. Turkey


\(^5\) One of the largest weaknesses of the coalition building effort for the U.S. was the inability to garner basing rights from the nearest NATO ally.
accomplished with a single vote what France, Germany, Russia and other nations failed to achieve in months of UN negotiations: a change in U.S. war plans.\textsuperscript{6}

Turkey’s rejection was especially surprising to administration officials given Turkey’s otherwise loyal support of U.S. military actions since the Korean War. For most of the 1990s, the basing of British and American aircraft at Incirlik Air Base to enforce the northern no-fly zone over Iraq was one of the major policy anchors designed to contain Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{7} At the time the United States requested support for an Iraq War, Turkey was already providing significant military support to U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan. Turkey sent a general officer to CENTCOM Headquarters and an additional liaison team to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Headquarters to coordinate efforts in the war on terrorism. Moreover, Turkey sent 90 Special Forces troops to Afghanistan to train the Northern Alliance, and Turkish ships in the Mediterranean and Adriatic shadowed, interdicted, and boarded vessels suspected of supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda. After the fall of the Taliban, Turkey sent 1,500 troops to join and eventually command the 5,000 person NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Finally, Turkey froze al Qaeda assets and arrested al Qaeda operatives en route from Iran to instigate terrorist attacks on Israel.\textsuperscript{8} Turkey had proven

to be a worthy supporter in the Global War on Terrorism and the United States expected little resistance to its requests to base U.S. troops from Turkish soil.

The TBMM refusal was especially surprising given that Washington and Ankara had negotiated a memorandum of agreement outlining Turkey’s support in any possible military operation against Iraq, and Parliament had already approved a resolution on February 6 allowing U.S. troops to modernize Turkish ports and airfields in anticipation of the upcoming invasion.⁹ Ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan had promised administration officials that he could deliver the necessary votes in Parliament supporting the effort.¹⁰ Unfortunately for U.S. plans, the TBMM failed to pass the resolution by a slim margin. Bush administration officials labeled the March 1 referendum as a “stab-in-the-back.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz expressed the administration’s “disappointment” with harsh words claiming that the Turkish military did not show “leadership” by steering the government to support the United States in the second Iraq War.¹¹ Turkish commentators responded that, “We did something not even the British

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Parliament, the cradle of democracy, was able to do. We voted with the public, against a war."\textsuperscript{12}

While Turkey’s concerns about the Kurdish north weighed heavily in its calculations, Turkey’s rejection of the U.S. plan actually limited Turkish influence over policy concerning northern Iraq and presented Turkey with a problem as to how to shape future events in that strategic area.\textsuperscript{13} Erdogan attempted to regain Turkish influence through multiple engagement opportunities with the United States after the war commenced, but these efforts were stifled due to external events. Erdogan offered to resubmit the failed resolution to parliament after his government was seated, but this effort would not meet the U.S. timeline for invasion. Later in the year, when the United States requested international assistance in maintaining security in Iraq, Turkey pledged troops and passed a resolution authorizing their deployment to Iraq. Unfortunately, Kurdish elements in the fledgling Iraqi government stifled these efforts, fearing the influence of a Turkish intervention.\textsuperscript{14} Turkey’s initial rejection of the U.S. war plan was widely popular domestically, but left Turkey vulnerable to U.S. interests in the Kurdish north of Iraq.

Given Turkey’s robust support of past U.S. military efforts, and its incentives to work with the U.S. to protect its interests in northern Iraq, why did the Grand National

\textsuperscript{13} Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity," 2.
Assembly refuse a substantial aid package to remain on the sidelines of the Iraq war and thus risk U.S. condemnation? Why was the usually centrally controlled government unable to garner the support for the memorandum of understanding negotiated with the United States, especially after the United States had significantly improved Turkish infrastructure to support the war? Turkey’s support in the second Iraq War stands in stark contrast to the basing support provided in the first conflict. This chapter will show that Turkish domestic politics changed significantly between the first and second Iraq Wars and especially between October 2002 and February 2003, making coalition support more difficult for a weak Justice and Development Party. Turkey’s domestic structure moved from one with little accountability to the public to one highly influenced by domestic opinion. Erdogan’s inability to pass the resolution authorizing the United States to use Turkey as a staging point reflected his weakness vis-à-vis parliament and the inexperience of his administration.

I begin with a discussion of Turkish government and politics to provide background on the structure that shaped the decisions concerning the Iraq war. This analysis of Turkish government structure will show that Turkish domestic structure changed throughout the 1990s, and the period leading to the Iraq War. Turkish foreign policy was historically forged in a highly centralized manner that did not necessarily reflect societal interests, reflecting a Type I structure in the Peterson typology. Due to national elections in November 2002—that prompted a change of the ruling party, and a restructuring of the national assembly—Turkey acted rather as a Type IV state in the
Peterson typology. During the approach to the Iraq War, Turkey showed decentralized decision making was dominated by the influence of a newly elected National Assembly. Following the analysis of government structure, I summarize Turkish contributions—both positive and negative—to the Iraq War coalition. I then draw on the Security Decision Model to explain how exogenous and endogenous factors influenced Turkish burden sharing decisions. This analysis suggests that Turkish foreign policy was most influenced by the two changes of government that occurred in the approach to the Iraq War, and the concerns that a war would devastate Turkey economically. Although Turkey was a close neighbor to Iraq, it was not directly threatened by Saddam Hussein. Turkish concerns related to the influence of an Iraq War on Kurdish independence, and the impact of a war on the domestic economy, and hence ran counter to U.S. interests. Additionally, this analysis concludes that electoral politics significantly influenced the government’s position towards the Iraq War, in this case enabling interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül to pursue a foreign policy counter to the wishes of his Party Leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Finally, I address the role of international legitimacy and demonstrate that legitimacy arguments did influence Turkish decision makers, but once war with Iraq was inevitable, Turkey pursued a more pragmatic policy towards the United States.
Turkish Government and Politics

One political legacy from the Ottoman Empire was a strong and centralized, highly bureaucratic state in the form of the Turkish Republic.\textsuperscript{15} Turkey is governed by a mixed presidential-parliamentary political system where the parliament maintains a weakened role compared to other European governments. Modern Turkey has been governed by three constitutions, the first in 1924, the second after the “progressive” military coup in 1960, and the last in 1982 following another military coup. The 1982 constitution, still in force today, recognizes the classic separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament.\textsuperscript{16} However, the 1982 constitution also assigned significant influence to the president and the military as the ultimate guardians and arbiter of the political system.\textsuperscript{17}

Executive authority resides with the president who is designated the head of state. The president is elected for a single, non-renewable, seven-year term by a two-thirds majority of the members of parliament, but is not required to be one of its members. The president appoints the prime minister and, upon the prime minister’s recommendation, the other ministers to government. Parliament must then approve the government in a formal “investiture” vote. The president can dismiss ministers upon the proposal of the prime minister. The constitution provides the president with significant powers in the

\textsuperscript{15} Ergun Özbudun, \textit{Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 7.
\textsuperscript{17} Mustafa Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation," \textit{The Review of International Affairs} 3, no. 2 (2003), 15.
event that the parliament is deadlocked or fragmented.\textsuperscript{18} The president is empowered to summon meeting of the TBMM, veto legislation, and challenge the constitutionality of assembly laws and cabinet decrees. Additionally, the president has the authority to proclaim martial law or states of emergency and to issue decrees having the force of law, upon a decision of the cabinet—or Council of Ministers—meeting under his chair. The decisions and orders signed by the president, in areas that do not require legislative approval, may not be appealed to any judicial authority, including the Constitutional Court.\textsuperscript{19} He also presides over the National Security Council and appoints the Chief of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{20} The president is also authorized to dispatch the Turkish armed forces for domestic or foreign military missions. Presidents, in general, have not been particularly important players in Turkish foreign policy; however, some presidents have played more assertive roles, especially when the elected government was weak.\textsuperscript{21} The Turkish president is more powerful than heads of state in most parliamentary systems and hence has significant influence on the discussions concerning the use of military force.

The Prime Minister (\textit{Başbakan}) of Turkey is the head of government and of the Council of Ministers (\textit{Bakanlar Kurulu}), or cabinet. The president appoints the prime

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{18} Economist Intelligence Unit, "Turkey: Country Profile 2003," \textit{Country Profiles} (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003), Özbudun, \textit{Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Dorronsoro, "Turkey - a Democracy under Control?", 28-29.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Alan Makovsky, \textit{Turkey's Presidential Jitters} (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000 [cited April 1 2008]); available from \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1329}.
\end{itemize}
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minister by asking the head of the party with the largest number of deputies in the National Assembly to form a government. The prime minister then nominates ministers for appointment by the president to the Council of Ministers. The prime minister is then approved by the parliament through a vote of confidence in his government. Executive power rests with the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. The government is responsible for developing and implementing the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey and shares the authority to introduce new legislation with the parliament. The prime minister supervises the implementation of government policy while members of the Council of Ministers have joint and equal responsibility for the implementation of government policy.\footnote{22 Metz, President, Council of Ministers, and Prime Minister.}

Legislative power resides in the unicameral parliament. The National Assembly’s powers include exclusive authority to enact, amend, and repeal laws. Parliament can overturn the veto by approving it a second time with absolute majority of those present. The assembly supervises the Council of Ministers and authorizes it to issue government decrees. The constitution stipulates that the assembly can request that the executive respond to written questions, investigations, and interpellations, and can vote the Council of Ministers out of office.\footnote{23 Helen Chapin Metz, National Assembly (Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1995 [cited February 25 2008]); available from http://countrystudies.us/turkey/72.htm.} While it has the authority to declare war, the TBMM’s power regarding foreign affairs is quite limited. The most important exception is that Article 92 of the Turkish constitution requires the TBMM to authorize any deployment of
Turkish troops abroad, or of foreign forces on Turkish soil, except in performance of Turkey’s treaty commitments to NATO or under martial law.\textsuperscript{24} The TBMM members are elected for maximum five-year terms according to a proportional representation formula where only parties that win at least 10 percent of the votes cast in a national parliamentary election gain representation in the parliament. As a result of the threshold, less than half of the votes cast in the November 2002 election had representation in parliament.\textsuperscript{25} Members of parliament are rarely reelected and newcomers generally amount to over 50 percent, and peaked at 80 percent of the parliamentary population after the elections of 2002.\textsuperscript{26}

Turkish politics in the 1990s and early 2000s was largely driven by party politics. Turkish parties had a high degree of party discipline and deviation from the party line was rare. Parliamentary voting was typically along party lines and parliamentary members that voted out of line were usually expelled from parliament by party bosses. This phenomenon produced a high degree of centralization of authority within the parties, especially the strong position of party leaders. The party centrally controlled candidate selection, and party leaders controlled party executive committees. Turkey’s parliamentary system contributed to this party cohesion since party discipline and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Dorronsoro, "Turkey - a Democracy under Control?," 35.
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cohesion are necessary to pass legislation in the typical coalition governments. Although there was a great degree of party cohesion in Parliament, there was also a high degree of volatility and fragmentation as an increasing number of parties were represented in parliament and voters frequently jumped from party to party. Nearly 23 per cent of the electorate changed its support from one party to another in each election and nearly half of the electorate shifted from one party to another from the1999 to the 2002 elections. This rapid jump in party loyalty ensured that the parties needed to respond to electorate interests even though party politics dominated candidate selection and voting. This was especially true during a volatile election cycle.

The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature, and the Constitutional Court determines the consistency of laws and decrees with the constitution. The Turkish judiciary considerably influences political life through banning political parties and by declaring candidates ineligible for election. Since 1983, the State Security Court—which handles cases involving crimes against national security—has banned 23 political parties and numerous political leaders. The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws and decrees at the request of the president or of one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly. Its decisions on the constitutionality of legislation and government decrees are final.

28 Dorronsoro, "Turkey - a Democracy under Control?," 32-33.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for implementing the day-to-day foreign policy decisions of the Council of Ministers. It ensures the continuity in foreign policy and provides expertise to political elites on foreign policy issues. The Foreign Ministry is comprised of professional diplomats who are loyal to the Kemalist principles of secularism and non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. The Foreign Minister oversees the conduct of foreign policy and ensures that foreign relations conform to the directives established by the cabinet and prime minister.

Finally, no discussion of Turkish government and politics would be complete without reference to the influence of the military. The Turkish military has traditionally held a powerful position in domestic Turkish politics, considering itself the guardian of Turkey's secular democracy. During the time of the Iraq intervention, civilian control of the military existed mainly on paper. The Ministry of Defense had little real control over the armed forces while the Chief of the General Staff, who theoretically reports to the prime minister, enjoyed wide autonomy and effectively controlled the military. The Turkish army maintained its influence on foreign policy through the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK). The MGK was comprised of the Chief of

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29 Kemalist ideology, originating in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's reforms, sought to create a modern, democratic and secular nation-state, guided by educational and scientific progress.
General Staff, the four main Commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces, select members of the Council of Ministers, and was chaired by the president. The purpose of the MGK is to provide the Council of Ministers with national security policy recommendations. The recommendations are given priority by the Council of Ministers to the extent that it is virtually unheard of for cabinets and parliament to publicly question its views.\textsuperscript{33} The number and weight of senior commanders participating in the MGK ensured that military influence would dominate at the expense of civilian members. Additionally, the 1982 constitution ensured that MGK recommendations had significant influence over the Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{34} The MGK was created to maintain watch over the political process and served as the platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security.\textsuperscript{35}

The military has intervened several times within the last decades and forcibly removed elected governments believed to be straying from the principles of the secular state. This legacy of military intervention in the domestic political process has adversely affected democratic practices in Turkey.\textsuperscript{36} Military generals openly express their views

\textsuperscript{33} Philip Robins, \textit{Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War} (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2003), 76.
\textsuperscript{36} As late as 2007, Turkey’s powerful military attempted to influence the election of a new president when the Chief of Staff gave a warning against threats to secularism. See \textit{Military Fires Warning Shot before President Is Chosen} (Times Newspapers Ltd., 2007 [cited February 25 2008]); available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2337417.ece.
on public affairs and, at times, directly contradict the government. Although the military has shown some restraint in order to meet the European Union requirements for civilian control, it tends to take corrective measures when it perceives partisan politics as threatening secular ideals. According to a 2002 Pew center poll, 79 percent of Turkish respondents held that the military was a good influence in their country, while only seven per cent said the same for the national government. Since it is viewed as an uncorrupt institution, citizen trust of the military has always been quite high given the military significant influence on Turkish government policy. On July 23, 2003, the TBMM passed a reform package, which aimed at limiting the role of the military, through reforms of the MGK. These reforms have limited the power of the military and the MGK and strengthened the role of civilian control; however, those reforms were not in effect at the initiation of the Iraq War.

Turkey’s history of centralization of foreign policy and military decisions, combined with its party politics would normally mark the state as a Type I domestic structure, according to Peterson’s typology. In a Type I structure, decision making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near total autonomy from legislative scrutiny. Experience through the 1980s and

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37 Dorronsoro, "Turkey - a Democracy under Control?" 31, Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, 117-21.
38 Albright and Kohut, "What the World Thinks in 2002."
40 In October 2004 the NSC convened for the first time under the chairmanship of the new civilian Secretary General. This institution is currently composed of 7 civilian members and 5 military members. Dorronsoro, "Turkey - a Democracy under Control?,” 37-38.
1990s reinforced the notion that it was a Type I state: Turkish political parties were oligarchies that required total allegiance from their ministers in parliament, the military controlled the debate on issues of strategic concern, and the armed forces lead the policy discussion concerning a military intervention.\textsuperscript{41} Typically, especially during military rule between 1980 and 1983, public opinion was totally silenced. Even after the establishment of civilian government in 1983, freedom of expression remained quite limited due to the restrictions in the 1982 constitution.\textsuperscript{42} However, elections in the late 1990s and early 2000s saw more influence by the electorate in seating and unseating governments. Party fragmentation and voter volatility began to weaken the influence of the parties, giving voters influence over party politics, especially in the area of economic policy. Elections in the 1990s saw a high degree of correlation between economic performance and electoral support. For instance, the governing Democratic Left Party-Nationalist Movement Party-Motherland Party coalition’s electoral support slid from 54 percent in 1999 to only 15 percent in November 2002 because of Turkey’s two-year long economic crisis.\textsuperscript{43} These elections drastically changed the Turkish political landscape and marked the beginning of politics more influenced by the electorate.\textsuperscript{44} For example, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the first party since 1987 to gain a clear majority in Parliament. The AKP’s 363 seats in the Parliament, however, did not

\textsuperscript{41} Salmoni, \textit{Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.}
\textsuperscript{42} Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation."
\textsuperscript{43} The largest incumbent coalition partner, the Democratic Left Party, saw its support dwindle to only 1.2% of the electorate, marking the most significant drop in Turkish political history. Carkoglu, "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?,” 30, 35.
\textsuperscript{44} Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation."
translate into a majority in electoral support; it gained only 34 per cent of the electoral vote. Therefore, although a majority government, the AKP government did not hold a mandate representing the majority of the people. Any time AKP failed to obtain the opposition Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) cooperation for major legislation, the CHP and other opposition parties could justifiably question the government’s legitimacy. The AKP’s single party government was actually a weak government that needed to build a consensus in and out of the parliament in order to maintain its legitimacy.\footnote{Carkoglu, "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?" 34.} Turkish policy required consensus building between numerous governmental and party elements while the unsteady parliament had the final vote on the stationing of U.S. troops on Turkish soil.

An additional factor weakening the government was the questionable status of AKP party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the position of Prime Minister. At the time of the 2002 national elections, Erdogan was banned from public office for making pro-Islamist statements and was unable take over the premiership typically reserved for the party leader. As a result, a temporary government was established in November under his deputy, Abdullah Gül. Parliament rescinded Erdogan’s ban with a constitutional amendment passed in December 2002. He was subsequently elected in a by-election on March 9, 2003, and appointed prime minister three days later. Erdogan’s government finally won a vote of confidence in parliament on March 22, 2003.\footnote{"Turkey: Country Profile 2003," \textit{Country Profiles} (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003), 4.} During the period of U.S.-Turkish negotiations regarding support for an Iraq intervention, Turkey thus had two

\footnote{"Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?" 34.}

\footnote{"Turkey: Country Profile 2003," \textit{Country Profiles} (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003), 4.}
sitting governments and three prime ministers, with an interim government negotiating with the United States and passing the final Iraq resolution to Parliament. This change in leadership and governments caused policy towards Iraq to be formed in multiple venues under multiple leaders. President Sezer was the only senior politician to remain in office during the entire negotiation period.

This discussion of Turkish domestic politics suggests that due to the national elections of 2002, Turkey acted more like a Type IV state rather than a Type I state in the Peterson typology. In a Type IV state, national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures, and the state’s policy response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Unable to act alone, individual policy makers must recognize domestic opponents who may appeal directly to the public. In the Turkish case, multiple prime ministers, combined with the weak AKP government, caused decision making to be influenced by multiple actors. Due to their inexperience and distrust of corrupt Turkish institutions, AKP officials stopped using the normal governmental policy channels and instead employed a wide variety of unofficial personal representatives as semi-authorized go-betweens formulating policy and communicating with the United States. This back channel, parallel governmental effort caused policy making and negotiation to be formed in numerous unofficial venues rather than in the centralized bureaucracy.\(^47\) Additionally, the weak AKP government had significant challenges seating the government and dealing

\(^{47}\) Salmoni, Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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with fundamental internal economic, political, and party challenges.\textsuperscript{48} The parliamentary elections and subsequent fractured government established the conditions that allowed numerous decision makers, including the National Assembly, to significantly influence Turkish policy on Iraq.

\textbf{The Timing, Size, and Mix of Turkey’s Contributions}

Turkey’s support of the coalition in the 2003 Iraq War was minimal compared to the military assistance that it provided during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although Turkish officials tentatively agreed to massive U.S. requests supporting the war plan, the government pursued a dual track strategy of protracted negotiations, delaying U.S. support while negotiating for a regional settlement short of war. Turkey’s delay caused the United States to deploy a large number of troops through Kuwait, rather than pushing Iraqi forces from both the north and south.\textsuperscript{49} In the end, Turkish support for the coalition was well below U.S. requests and initially reflected Ankara’s desire to “keep its distance” from the conflict, however, it soon realized that it would lose influence over U.S.-Kurdish policy if it did not become a coalition partner.

In contrast, Turkey’s contribution to the first Gulf War was critical to the military success of Operation Desert Storm. Although Turkey initially responded to U.S. requests with caution in 1990, it eventually became a full supporter of international efforts against

\textsuperscript{49} Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that the lack of a northern front directly affected the ensuing insurgency. According to Rumsfeld, had the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division been allowed transit through Turkey, there would have been many more troops on the ground and the insurgency might not have gained momentum. See Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld Faults Turkey for Barring Use of Its Land in '03 to Open Northern Front in Iraq," \textit{The New York Times}, March 21, 2005.
the Hussein regime. At considerable economic cost, Turkey terminated the flow of
Iraqi oil exports through Turkish pipelines, thus enforcing UN economic sanctions
against Baghdad. It deployed about 150,000 troops along its border with Iraq, causing
Baghdad to divert an equivalent number of forces from the south to the north of the
country. Furthermore, Turkey authorized unrestricted use of the military air base at
Incirlik for raids over Iraq. Finally, Turkey also provided considerable diplomatic
support in the international community by robustly supporting George H.W. Bush’s
initiatives in the UN and regional forums. Unfortunately, economic sanctions against
Iraq devastated the Turkish economy and international compensation failed to meet
President Özal’s war dividend promises.

Turkey’s contribution to the anti-Iraq coalition of 2003 demonstrates the tension
between intense external pressure for coalition support from a dominant ally and
domestic pressure for non-involvement. Turkey’s initial reaction to Bush administration
efforts for support constituted a two-level game balancing domestic concerns for the
war’s economic and security impact against the desire to remain within a superpower’s
good graces. For the fledgling government elected by a disgruntled populace in
November 2002, U.S. demands for basing rights for a northern invasion route to Iraq
provided a profound political burden. External factors dictated a need to support the U.S.

50 Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict."
51 F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation),
Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 166, Helen Chapin
52 For a discussion of two-level games in international politics see Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."
campaign against Saddam Hussein, but domestic political pressures were definitive, with 80 to 90 percent of the Turkish public opposed to war with Iraq.\textsuperscript{53} This level of domestic animosity is consistent with the public disapproval towards external intervention in Iraq.\textsuperscript{54} Ankara’s response was to pursue two foreign policy tracks of continuing to lobby against war on the one hand—which included regionally-based endeavors to find alternatives to it—and positioning Turkey to make the best of an unwanted situation on the other.\textsuperscript{55}

U.S. military requests to Turkey were enormous, far more than in the first Gulf War, involving an unprecedented massive deployment of foreign soldiers to Turkish soil. Initial requests placed the number of U.S. troops at 90,000.\textsuperscript{56} After lengthy negotiations with the Gül government and numerous revisions of the war plan, this request was eventually adjusted down to 62,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{57} The final request would have created a force that could advance on Baghdad from the north while a larger U.S. force based in


\textsuperscript{55} Bill Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq," Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, no. 2 (2003), 14.

\textsuperscript{56} Woodward, Plan of Attack, 324-25. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.

\textsuperscript{57} Abramowitz, "What's up with Turkey?," A13.
Kuwait moved up from the south. This two-pronged assault, American officials argued, would shorten any war with Saddam Hussein, minimizing U.S. and coalition casualties.\(^{58}\)

Turkish concerns throughout negotiation with the United States were twofold. First, the overthrow of Saddam might allow the Iraqi Kurds to form their own state and capture the important oil-producing centre of Kirkuk, thus re-igniting the Kurdish separatist movement within Turkey. Second, the war and trade disruption would bring a second round of economic devastation to the state. To address Turkish reservations, the U.S. government conceded to allow Turkish troops to enter a limited zone in northern Iraq to prevent a flood of refugees into Turkey, secure its border, and effectively pressure Iraqi Kurds. The United States also promised Turkey a massive financial aid package worth up to $6 billion in grants and $24 billion in loan guarantees.\(^{59}\)

Despite intense domestic opposition, the Turkish government negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the United States that would allow the creation of a second front. To take effect, the plan had to be ratified by the TBMM, but due to inept handling of the parliamentary vote, this measure was rejected—very late for U.S. planning for the Iraq War—by a narrow margin on March 1.\(^{60}\) The agreement would have allowed for a

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sizable Turkish military presence in Iraq and influence over Kurdish policy in the north. After the initiation of war, Ankara realized that Turkey would have limited influence over Iraq policy and rapidly approved over flight rights for U.S. military aircraft on March 20 in an attempt to recover its standing with the United States.

Turks heralded the March 1 referendum as democracy in action, as civilians made a parliamentary decision based on an evaluation of public sentiment, without military intimidation. In contrast, U.S. officials expressed disappointment that the Turkish armed forces had not exercised “the strong leadership role that we would have expected,” by dictating a yes vote to the Justice and Development Party. In the end, Turkey provided minimal logistical support to U.S. Special Forces in northern Iraq and allowed U.S. aircraft and missiles to transit Turkish airspace. The United States was restricted in the use of Incirlik airbase and could not use that facility to mount strikes against Iraq.

By the summer of 2003, the inability to restore order and stability in Iraq well after the end of formal hostilities led to increasing calls by the United States for Turkish assistance. The U.S. government authorized the potential release of $8.5 billion in credits without openly linking it to Turkish troop deployments in Iraq. In an effort to legitimize Turkish involvement in the eyes of the public, both the government and the military stressed that Turkey's role would be a humanitarian one emphasizing the restoration of

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62 Pan, “Turkish Vote on Troops Shows Surprises of Democracy.”
public services. The Turkish parliament, on October 8, 2003, authorized a deployment of up to 15,000 troops to Iraq.\textsuperscript{64}

**Political Contributions**

In contrast to the first Gulf War, Turkey’s pre-war political maneuvering in 2002-2003 undermined U.S. efforts to build a regional or international coalition. Before Operation Desert Storm, however, Turkey pursued active regional diplomacy to garner military and economic support from other Middle Eastern states. Turkey provided strong diplomatic support for the first Bush administration both in international forums such as the UN and in regional diplomatic initiatives. President Özal, the Turkish president and a former prime minister, personally emphasized the need for a strong, quick response, in reaction to the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.\textsuperscript{65} In contrast, Ankara’s reaction to the second Bush administration was quite different politically and diplomatically. Early in the negotiation process, President Sezer, a former president of the constitutional court in Turkey, and Prime Minister Ecevit actively opposed U.S. intervention without a clear international mandate and questioned Turkey’s role in a second Gulf War. They based their stance not on legitimacy issues, but rather on the desire for Turkey to avoid the economic disruption posed by a war with Iraq. As early as January 2002, the Turkish

\textsuperscript{64} Kemal Kirişçi, "Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2004), 44-45.

government explained at great length the adversities a war would produce. Ecevit warned, “northern Iraq is a serious problem for us. It could be used as a basis for partitioning in Turkey, as well.”

Sezer’s stance from the beginning was unequivocal, “Let us not enter war. This problem is not our problem. This war is not our war. Our military and government should also be opposed to this intervention.” In numerous encounters with the Bush administration, Bulent Ecevit’s coalition government strenuously warned Washington of Turkey’s opposition to war, while at the same time negotiating Turkey’s price for support if war was inevitable.

Elections in 2002 marked a significant change in Turkish government when voters threw out the governing parties and elected the fledgling, anti-establishment AKP. Interim Prime Minister Gül’s approach was no more supportive of U.S. interests. While Turkey agreed with the United States that Iraq should be disarmed, it stressed a peaceful resolution to the crisis and added that a Security Council resolution was required in the use of force against Iraq. Gül committed his personal prestige on a political solution short of war as vigorously as Özal sought to fulfill Bush administration objectives in 1991. Gül attempted to build a regional coalition to apply diplomatic pressure to

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69 Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq," 11, Bill Parks, "Bridgehead or Bridge?," The World Today 58, no. 10 (2002).
Hussein. He traveled extensively with the aim of becoming a regional influence, and “exchanging views with the regional leaders on what we, as regional countries, can do to ease the recent tension and crisis in the region, and contribute to efforts to solve the problem without war.” Gül emphasized a regional diplomatic plan to the exclusion of U.S. diplomatic efforts towards a forceful strategy. Gül’s approach was aimed at applying diplomatic pressure on Saddam to submit to weapons inspections while forging non-aggression agreements with Iran and Kuwait. While Turkey agreed in principle that Iraq should be disarmed, it saw the UN impasse on a resolution to use force as vindication of its foreign policy approach.

To delay the U.S. deployment and forestall a war in Iraq, Gül and Sezer emphasized that a Security Council Resolution in addition to Resolution 1441 was required before a parliamentary vote allowing use of Turkish facilities. They also reiterated that a parliamentary vote was required by Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution for non-NATO military operations. By tying the Article 92 vote to an additional Security Council Resolution, Turkey effectively undermined an early deployment of U.S. troops to Turkey and the two-front strategy.

Once it was clear that neither Saddam nor the U.S. coalition would be satisfied through diplomacy, Gül and Sezer believed Turkey could prevent a war by dragging out

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73 "Turkey, US Agree on Deterrent Policy against, Territorial Integrity of Iraq ".
75 Sami Kohen, "Before the Decision Is Final..." Milliyet December 5, 2002.
basing negotiations and voting no—if necessary—on the Article 92 resolution. “We tried very hard to prevent the war,” acknowledged one senior Turkish official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Many believed it was possible.”76 This view was reinforced by French, German, and Russian resistance to U.S. plans in the Security Council and through personal encouragement by French President Jacques Chirac to Gül. According to French officials, Turkey’s reticence strengthened Chirac’s efforts at the United Nations to continue inspections and avoid a war.77

Overall, Turkey’s political efforts influenced the coalition negatively and undermined U.S. international efforts to apply coercive pressure on Iraq. Turkey’s negotiating strategy had two serious negative effects on the second gulf coalition. First, Prime Minister Gül’s whirlwind diplomatic tour to find an honorable exit for Saddam Hussein in January through early February 2003 weakened U.S. efforts to build strong consensus in the UN that force was necessary to disarm Iraq and that regime change was necessary.78 Secondly, this effort sent the message to the Iraqi regime that the international community would not back the U.S. coalition and that the regime could weather the diplomatic barrage.

After the resolution was rejected, Erdogan sought to submit the authorization bill to the TBMM again to gain U.S. credibility. In an attempt to avoid another parliamentary

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77 Ibid.
mishap, he planned to appeal to his party's parliamentary group after forming his government. The U.S. timetable, however, did not match Erdogan’s. President Bush declared war on Iraq before another resolution could be considered. Foreign Minister Gül contacted Colin Powell to coordinate with the U.S. government for a second resolution authorizing a northern front but Powell had already remarked to Congress that, “Our proposals to the Turkish government are no longer on the table.”\textsuperscript{79}

After President Bush declared an end to combat operations in May 2003, Turkey aggressively attempted to regain Washington’s favor. Ankara realized that it would need to fully participate on Iraq policy with the United States in order to influence policy on the Kurdish north.\textsuperscript{80} The first sign that Turkish-U.S. relations were normalizing occurred when Ankara lifted the restrictions it had imposed on the use of the Incirlik Airbase by U.S. aircraft. According to the June 24 Cabinet decision, which did not require the approval of the National Assembly, U.S. aircraft serving in Iraq were authorized to use both Incirlik Airbase and Sabiha Gokcen Airport for refueling, supplies, and other business. The lifting of restrictions at Incirlik was the result of a Washington visit by Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal. U.S. officials stressed the need for Turkey to prove its strategic value to the United States and stated. “We are expecting a gesture to be made with respect to Incirlik.”\textsuperscript{81}

This early warming of relations was soon derailed by several diplomatic gaffes by the U.S. government. On July 6, in the northern Iraqi town of Suleymaniyah, U.S. soldiers and Kurdish paramilitary peshmerga captured 11 Turkish military officials suspected of planning violent activities. The Turks were transported to Baghdad initially and subjected to the same treatment as insurgents. Although eventually released, Ankara and the Turkish public were outraged by the U.S. treatment of the Turkish “allied” soldiers.\(^82\) Turkish commentators noted that the incident reflects U.S. disdain for Turkey as a result of its failure to allow a northern front.\(^83\) This incident coincided with U.S. requests for a Turkish brigade to support stabilization efforts in the Shiite region in southern Iraq.\(^84\)

Despite the prisoner gaffe, Turkey was the first Islamic nation to pledge troops to assist the U.S.-led stabilization mission in Iraq. During the summer of 2003, Washington pursued a UN resolution authorizing a multinational stability mission, while at the same time requested support for a stability mission in Iraq under the auspices of the original invasion coalition. The U.S. government assured Turkey that the Iraqi Interim Government would support foreign ground forces to provide security within Iraq, and Turkey led the effort to form a regional Islamic coalition to take over security.

operations.\textsuperscript{85} Turkey’s goals were twofold: first, to gain influence over Iraq policy concerning an autonomous Kurdistan; and second, to broker an Islamic solution to Iraq and gain regional power status.\textsuperscript{86} While at the same time negotiating with the U.S. government concerning military support for the stabilization of Iraq, Prime Minister Erdogan tried to build an Islamic coalition to remove the United States from Iraq. Erdogan told Iran and Gül told Pakistan: “Muslim countries should immediately go to Iraq in order to ensure that the United States withdraws from this country without any delay.”\textsuperscript{87} In October 2003, parliament gave Prime Minister Erdogan permission to send troops into Iraq for up to one year, but the Iraqi Governing Council—with its members handpicked by the United States—rejected the idea and embarrassed Turkey. Iraq’s Interim Governing Council responded by saying, “they do not want soldiers from neighboring countries meddling in their affairs”.\textsuperscript{88} The United States was left to build an occupying coalition from states such as South Korea and Poland that historically had no direct influence in Iraq, and Turkey was left without direct influence on Iraqi policy.

Once it was clear that Turkish ground forces would not be welcome in Iraq, Ankara pursued two policy objectives vis-à-vis Iraq. First, Turkey supported efforts for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Ergan, Yilmaz, and Cetin, "National Assembly Will Make the Final Decision," 22, FBIS-NES-2003-0813.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity.", Winrow, "Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally," 204.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Utku Cakir Ozer, "Muslim Countries Should Come for the United States to Leave," Milliyet, August 23, 2003, FBIS-NES-2003-0824.
\end{itemize}
the Iraqi government to maintain central control over Iraqi territory. In the aftermath of the failed 1991 uprisings in Iraq against Saddam Hussein the UN established no fly zones in Kurdish areas of Iraq giving those areas de facto independence. The separatist Kurdish guerrilla group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), operating from their safe haven in Iraq, launched an armed campaign in Turkey resulting in more than 30,000 deaths in their quest for independence. Turkey was concerned that a successful, independent Kurdish Autonomous region would re-ignite Kurdish dissent in Turkey. As a result of this concern, Erdogan established “red lines” bilaterally with the Bush administration concerning the fate of Kirkuk—in northern Iraq—and the distribution of Iraqi oil revenue.  

Ankara was critical of Iraq’s January 2005 elections and argued that Kurds were being relocated to Kirkuk to skew election results. In a letter sent to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Gül stated that efforts to make demographic changes in Kirkuk were rapidly continuing. He wrote, “It is worrying that certain political groups have been tampering with demographics of Kirkuk, to claim supremacy of power through elections.” Güll noted that this was part of a larger effort to turn the elections into a referendum for independence in Northern Iraq. Prime Minister Erdogan raised the same concerns at the World Economic Summit in Davos, “There is an issue of transferring populations. This development constitutes the first sign of a negative development for


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Secondly, Ankara pursued a strategy to eliminate the PKK as a threat. In October 2003, Ankara and Washington agreed to a joint action plan employing political, economic, and legal means to discredit the PKK. Part of the U.S. package was an $8.5 billion loan package to Turkey, contingent that Turkey would not intervene unilaterally action in Iraq. Despite this package, the Bush administration was reluctant to use military force against the PKK, since Kurdish forces supported the Iraq invasion, even though the Kurdish rebels re-engaged in hostilities with Turkey in June 2004.

Turkish diplomatic efforts after the initiation of the war were largely supportive of U.S. efforts, except concerning the disposition of Kirkuk. Turkey supported the formation of a multinational peacekeeping coalition, encouraged Muslim support in the coalition to build a regional focus to rebuilding Iraq, and supported efforts to build a credible Iraqi government. Turkey actively engaged the international community supporting the interests of Turkmen and Sunni populations as a method to increase the strength and legitimacy of the Iraqi central government. Any effort to increase the Kurdish presence in Kirkuk, however, was seen as an effort to gain the oil regions of the north and eventually build an autonomous Kurdish state.

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Economic Contributions

Prior to the implementation of economic sanctions in 1991, Turkey was one of Iraq’s major trading partners, with total trade between the two countries valued at about $3 billion per year. Despite this favorable trade relationship, Turkey aggressively implemented UN mandated sanctions in the first Gulf War to the detriment of the Turkish economy. Turkish firms reportedly reengaged with Iraq in the mid-1990s under the UN sponsored Oil for Food Program (OFFP). Oil trade grew to a value of $340 million in 2002, making Turkey Iraq’s seventh-largest supplier under the UN program.93 No additional economic sanctions were authorized by the Security Council or encouraged by the United States in the build-up to the second Gulf War.

Turkey’s economic support to Iraq exists mainly in the form of business development, rather than grants or loans through the Iraq Reconstruction Fund. Turkey’s unique geographic position marks it as the gateway for European support for and trade with Iraq. No other major economies border northern Iraq—with the exception of Iran—and due to the disruption of the war, significant trade flows shifted through Turkey.94 Northern Iraq continues to be highly dependent on supplies coming from Turkey over the Habur Bridge in the east of the country, which carries 1,000 trucks a day.95 Economic flow through Turkey supports U.S. policy in the north and allows Turkey to have some

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94 Ayla Ogus and Can Erbil, "The Effects of Instability on Turkey's Bilateral Trade with Iraq," Turkish Policy Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2005).
95 Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity."
economic influence over Kurdish policy.\footnote{In November 2007, Turkey imposed economic sanctions on the Kurdistan Regional Government in an effort to stop cross-border operations of the PKK. See Patrick Cockburn, \textit{Turkey Imposes Sanctions on Iraqi Kurdistan in Bid to Halt PKK} (Independent.co.uk, 2007 [cited February 29 2008]); available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/europe/turkey-imposes-sanctions-on-iraqi-kurdistan-in-bid-to-halt-pkk-398680.html.} About 80 per cent of foreign investment in Kurdistan now comes from Turkey. In Dohuk, the largest city in northwestern Kurdistan, the seven largest infrastructure and investment projects are being built by Turkish construction companies. Turkish investors are also building three large housing projects, including a $400 million venture that will feature 1,800 apartments as well as a health clinic, school, gas station, and shopping center. At the construction site for a 15-story office building in central Dohuk, all of the engineers and managers are Turkish, as are dozens of laborers.\footnote{Richard A. Oppel, Jr., "Turkish-Bred Prosperity Makes War Less Likely in Iraqi Kurdistan," \textit{The New York Times}, November 7, 2007.} By May 2005, trade with northern Iraq had recovered to the point that Turkish state minister Kursat Tuzmen set an annual trade target of $10 billion.\footnote{Winrow, "Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally," 205.} Turkey did not economically support the initial coalition effort, but they subsequently contributed $50 million to the reconstruction and stabilization effort.\footnote{Sharp and Blanchard, "Post-War Iraq: A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions," 21.}

\textbf{Military Contributions}

Although the Turkish government did not allow the United States to open a northern front in the Iraq war, Turkey did provide minimal assistance to the military campaign. Turkey was the transit point for Central Intelligence Agency and Special Operations Forces that were operating in Kurdish regions before the war.\footnote{Woodward, \textit{Plan of Attack}, 139-44.} Turkey
allowed special action teams to build a resistance effort in Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, while also maintaining surveillance on U.S. actions to ensure that a Kurdish republic was not created. The intelligence provided by the action teams allowed the U.S. military to precisely target elements of the Hussein regime.\textsuperscript{101} Turkey allowed passage of special operations teams and U.S. diplomats to coordinate coalition support for the main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in an attempt to influence policy on northern Iraq.

Much like the first Gulf War, Turkey did eventually support coalition use of its airspace, but it remained short of the basing rights it provided in 1991. After the U.S. declaration of war, U.S. Secretary of State Powell coordinated with the Gül for the use of the Incirlik Air Base and an air corridor and offered $1 billion in U.S. compensation. Gül once again attempted to link the request with full military cooperation in northern Iraq. Not willing to cede influence in northern Iraq, Powell responded that the U.S. request would be only for use of Turkish airspace.\textsuperscript{102} Turkey hurriedly passed a third motion in parliament—without the prerequisite UN mandate—opening Turkish airspace to U.S. and coalition aircraft and missiles on March 20, 2003, the first day of combat operations.\textsuperscript{103} This rapid about face reflected the perception that Turkey had “missed the train” concerning Iraq and needed an issue to gain leverage over U.S. policy in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.}
\textsuperscript{102} Ergin, “Looks Like We Missed That Train,” FBIS-NES-2003-0927.
\textsuperscript{104} Turkey initially delayed opening its airspace to U.S. warplanes despite parliamentary approval for the overflights, insisting the United States agree to its demands to move troops into northern Iraq. The
Ultimately, American airplanes flew more than 4,000 sorties over Turkey into Iraq. In January 2004, Ankara expanded U.S. use of Incirlik to allow the largest rotation of troops in U.S. history. President Bush responded by noting that Turkey was “a friend and important ally.”

Turkey also provided logistical support to the small coalition ground presence in northern Iraq. For example, at the onset of the Iraq campaign on March 27, Turkey allowed the transit of 204 vehicles into northern Iraq to support U.S. forces that had been airlifted into the north.

Turkish contributions initially could be classified as outcome 3, “no contribution in areas with public or state opposition” in the Security Decision Model. Gül’s diplomatic effort failed, and the impression that “there can be no war with Turkey” had turned out wrong. Once the government finally realized that war was inevitable, they made efforts to join the military coalition, but found that they were too late. Prime Minister Erdogan recognized, “we missed the train.” U.S. forces had already redeployed south and the coalition proceeded with “Plan B.” Turkey subsequently tried to join the stabilizing coalition in Iraq at U.S. urging, but was barred from joining the

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105 Winrow, "Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally," 204.
107 Ergin, "Looks Like We Missed That Train."
military coalition by Kurdish elements in the Iraqi Interim Government who feared Turkish influence in the north. Overall, Turkish contribution is initially categorized as a case of a state “keeping its distance.” Turkey was not free-riding on U.S. contributions, but rather, thought the effort would be contrary to its interests. Once it was clear that the U.S. would unseat the regime in Iraq, Turkey changed its strategy to support the coalition in areas that were palatable to the public. In this manner, Turkey’s contribution reflected Outcome 2 on the security model, “contribution in area(s) with public or state support,” where it “reflected its preferences and paid up.”

**Explaining Turkey’s Contributions**

Turkey’s contribution to the Iraq War can be explained by the convergence of domestic politics with the elite learning experience from the first Gulf War. These factors—combined with traditional elements of Turkish foreign policy, such as noninvolvement in regional conflicts and cultivation of economic relations with Iraq—constrained Turkish support to U.S. coalition access to a northern front. The key difference between the first and second war was the lack of support by a strong leader, who could unite factions in the TBMM and government. In 2003, policy was much more constrained by the legislature and public opinion.

In 1991, President Özal seized the opportunity for Turkey to play an active role in the Gulf coalition. He saw the Iraq War as a chance to assert Turkey’s geopolitical

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significance at a time when it was in question, considering the decline in the Soviet Union. Many observers in Turkey were less than enthusiastic about Turkish participation in the 1991 Gulf War, including senior elements of the Turkish military. President Özal, however, saw a chance for Turkey to secure a seat at the table after Baghdad’s defeat. Support of U.S. coalition efforts, however, directly conflicted with Turkish elite and public opinion that questioned direct Turkish involvement where no clear Turkish national interests seemed to be at stake. Özal, however, was able to force the issue through parliament on promises of the future benefits for Turkey if it supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. His approach caused numerous resignations within the government, including the foreign minister, defense minister, and military chief of staff. Although the resignations cannot be directly attributed to Özal’s policy in the Gulf crisis, they reflect the domestic opposition Özal countered. Public opinion was decidedly against intervention, with 74 percent of the public opposed to Turkish support to the war effort. Özal’s ability to promote an aggressive foreign policy agenda despite these high-level resignations demonstrated his autonomy vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, parliament,

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109 Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 166. William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000).
111 Torumtay’s resignation, the first of any Chief of General Staff, underscored his opposition to direct involvement in the first Iraq war, see Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict," 211.
112 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, 220-21.
113 Haberman, "War in the Gulf: Turkey's Role in Air Assault Sets Off Fear of Retaliation."
and society. Bureaucratic politics and domestic bargaining did not significantly influence policy decisions affecting Turkey during the 1991 Gulf War.\textsuperscript{114}

In 2003, however, the Turkish government was more responsive to public opinion and less supportive of U.S. intervention for two reasons. First, due to a proliferation of private television and radio, the government no longer had a monopoly on the dissemination of information and the shaping of public discourse. The government and military officials had to increasingly take its case to the public for support.\textsuperscript{115} Second, due to the November 2002 general election, the ruling AKP party had to be more responsive to electoral concerns since it won only 34 per cent of the popular vote. The previous government’s coalition suffered an unprecedented loss by losing \textit{all} of its seats in parliament.\textsuperscript{116} The administration was vulnerable to a vote of no confidence; therefore, the prime minister and president could not afford to take positions independent of the electorate without vigorously shaping public opinion. In the second Gulf War case, the United States did not see clear leadership advocating its position in Turkish domestic areas.\textsuperscript{117}

\textit{Historical Learning}

Turkey’s forward leaning stance in the first Gulf War left important and somewhat divergent lessons for both sides. In the United States, the experience of 1990-

\begin{itemize}
  \item Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict," 211.
  \item Carkoglu, "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?," 32.
  \item In a review of newspaper articles in Hurriyet and Milliyet, from October 2002 through March 1, 2003, there were no articles or editorials written by prominent Turkish politicians supporting the U.S. position concerning regime change in Iraq.
\end{itemize}
91 reinforced the image of Turkey as a strategic ally, at the forefront of new security challenges emanating from the Middle East—an impression Turkish policy makers sought to reinforce with American policy audiences. In Turkey, by contrast, the first Iraq conflict and the experience of operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch were widely viewed as the place where the “trouble” started, including widespread economic devastation, PKK insurgency, more complicated relations with Syria and Iran, and more contentious relations with Washington. Özal’s promises of a war dividend failed to materialize after the first Gulf War. Turkey reaped neither economic benefits, a closer relationship to the West, nor influence in U.S.-Kurdish policy. The U.S. policy supporting an independent Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq ran counter to Turkish national interests. Finally, Turkey suffered immense losses in a Kurdish insurgency that was re-ignited by the first Gulf War. This experience had an immense impact on the public and the decision making elite that resulted in a policy of limited involvement.

Far from the new strategic relationship Özal had envisioned, the Gulf War and its aftermath left a legacy of resentment in relations with the United States. Economic sanctions against Iraq—as a result of the first Gulf conflict—devastated the Turkish economy and the international community failed to compensate the country adequately.

Iraq had previously been one of Turkey’s most important trading partners and its lost

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119 Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 166, Metz, The Middle East.
120 Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 166.
trade and other earnings were estimated to have cost the Turkish economy around $2 billion (USD) per year. In 1991, this loss was compensated by special payments of around $2.2 billion (USD), mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However, financial compensation decreased rapidly and by the mid 1990s disappeared altogether.\textsuperscript{121}

Loss of trade and commerce with the wider Middle East was also negatively affected by the war. Sanctions on Iraq closed lucrative routes for Turkish commodities to other markets, undermining Turkey’s comparative advantage supplying the Gulf countries with agricultural products. Turkish exports to the Middle East dropped from 23 percent of its overall exports just before the war to 14 percent in 1996. A fleet of more than forty thousand trucks fell idle. By 1998, the foreign ministry put the revenue and trade loss due to Iraq sanctions at more than $35 billion.\textsuperscript{122} Objectively, Turkey would have suffered many of these costs—even if it remained neutral in the Gulf War—the episode, however, left many Turks with a sense of disappointment and suspicion regarding American policy.\textsuperscript{123}

Turkey also did not gain increased favor in U.S. foreign aid as promised by President Özal. Turkey was a long-term, major recipient of U.S. foreign aid through FY 1998. However, the Clinton administration did not request Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or Economic Support Funds (ESF) for FY 1999, arguing that Turkey had

\textsuperscript{121} Hale, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000}, 225. Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal," 178.


\textsuperscript{123} Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty}, 166.
graduated from an assistance relationship to be more like other NATO members.\textsuperscript{124} With compensation waning, elite and public opinion became critical of the costs of participation in the first coalition and of Turkey’s failure to receive sufficient compensation from the West.\textsuperscript{125} Cem Duna, a former Turkish ambassador to the European Union reflected the common sentiment, “Last time Turkey was taken for a ride, promises were made, none of which were kept, and Turkey suffered serious losses.”\textsuperscript{126}

As the second Gulf war approached, trade with Iraq was showing signs of recovery, therefore, the government was hesitant to plunge the country again into an economic disaster. By 2002, trade with Iraq totaled $1 billion annually because of the OFFP begun in December 1996, and a black market trade in Iraqi diesel and crude oil. Even during the UN imposed trade embargo, Turkey and Iraq were looking to reach pre-Gulf War trade levels of about $2.5 billion annually. The clean sweep of government in the 2002 elections showed that the voting public did not want to see Turkey’s economic growth trend reversed.\textsuperscript{127}

The first Iraq War also adversely affected Turkey’s national security interest of countering Kurdish migration and independence. The Iraqi military operation, in late March 1991, against the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq, precipitated one of the largest refugee crises in recent history. More than a million and a half mostly Kurdish refugees

\textsuperscript{124} Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS-17, 18.
\textsuperscript{125} Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty}, 34.
\textsuperscript{127} Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS-10.
fled toward Iran and Turkey. In the Turkish view, however, a more serious danger than the arrival of refugees was the establishment in northern Iraq of an autonomous Kurdish area within a federation. Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch, two U.S. coalition efforts to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq, have led to a widely shared belief in Turkey that the U.S. supports the establishment of a Kurdish state at the expense of Turkey’s territorial integrity. Ankara saw the emergence of Kurdish administrative organs in northern Iraq (created to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi central authorities) as a step toward the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state. Preventing such a development has long been a cornerstone of Turkish regional policy.

Ankara is concerned about the impact that Kurdish statehood would have on Turkey's own Kurdish population. The post Gulf War power vacuum in northern Iraq created an environment that enabled the PKK to find safe havens from which they prosecuted a deadly insurgency against Ankara. Turkey feared the birth of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq could serve as a model for Kurdish separatists in Anatolia. Therefore, the Turkish public and government elites took a hard line against the revolutionary secessionism of the PKK. The Turkish military fought a grueling insurgency to suppress Kurdish separatism in the southeast. Despite the loss of 30,000 lives, Turkey stood firm against Kurdish claims for self-determination. In Ankara's view,

128 Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," 43.
129 Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," 689, Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," 55, Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War.
130 Brewin, "Turkey: Democratic Legitimacy," 102-03.
the Iraqi Kurdish self-governing arrangements pose a serious challenge to Turkey's hold over its own, equally sensitive Kurdish provinces. Ankara suspects that full independence and sovereignty is the ultimate goal of Kurds on both sides of the border and any moves towards the establishment of an independent Kurdish state would threaten to unravel the entire region.  

Due to the 1998 Washington Agreement between the KDP and PUK, Turkey considers U.S. efforts in northern Iraq questionable. The Washington Agreement called for a commitment to a federative Kurdish political entity within a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. Turkish political leaders, especially Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, were embarrassed that Turkey had been absent from the final rounds of the negotiation and the signing of the agreement. They had the barely concealed suspicion that the agreement would open the way to eventual establishment of a Separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq. As a result, Ankara warmed relations with Baghdad announcing that relations with Baghdad would be upgraded to the ambassadorial level. On the other hand, many in the Turkish military regard U.S. actions with suspicion despite decades of alliance. In the mid 1990s, many Turks came to see the U.S. as a less-than-reliable ally, and some Americans came to see Turkey as part ally, part rogue state.

In retrospect, Turkey’s lessons from the first Gulf War were hardly positive. With the end of U.S. security assistance, and with economic sanctions against Iraq still in

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132 Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq," 13.
134 Lesser, Off Autopilot: The Future of Turkish-US Relations.
place more than a decade after the invasion of Kuwait, many Turks feel that they had little to show for their cooperation with Washington in the Gulf. Most Turks believe that the post Gulf War power vacuum in northern Iraq created an environment that enabled the PKK to find safe havens and export its war in Turkey. The military resisted Turkish involvement in the second Iraq war because it was worried the United States might allow Iraqi Kurds to establish an independent state, losing the Turkish equivalent of the Vietnam War. The military succeeded in a protracted insurgency against the PKK and did not want to see their gains reversed in an independent Kurdish region. “This was our Vietnam War,” said a military official. “The military took all risks, and at a high cost in lives, they finally succeeded. It was an expensive victory, and they don't want that victory to be wasted.”

Turkey feared that a new war would lead to a power vacuum, the partition of Iraq and the birth of a Kurdish state in the north that could serve as a model for Turkish separatists seeking their own state in southeast Turkey. Believing that they did not get fair compensation either politically or economically in the first Gulf War, the political elite used diplomacy to slow U.S. efforts while the military elite argued for a larger influence in Kurdish Iraq.

**Collective Action**

The collective action hypothesis states that when a powerful state provides a collective good, such as security, less powerful states will be tempted to ride free. In the

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135 Kessler and Pan, "Missteps with Turkey Prove Costly; Diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. A Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq."

first Gulf War, Turkey did not pursue a strategy of “free-riding” as predicted by the collective action hypothesis. Instead it made several key contributions to the coalition that were disproportionately high compared to its capabilities.\(^{137}\) Even though the first Bush administration made public its decision to send thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia, Turkey strongly supported with the deployment of 150,000 troops along the border with Iraq, and unreservedly participated in the economic embargo.

Although Turkey appears to be a collective action “free rider,” in the Iraq War case, process-tracing evidence shows little evidence that burden sharing decisions were based on the collective action hypothesis. This paper identifies one collective good for the second Iraq War case: the disarmament of Iraqi offensive weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Research shows that Turkish elites were more concerned with the impact of war on the accessibility of private goods rather than the collective good pursued by the coalition. Turkey was not concerned with Iraqi WMD, but rather with the potential for a Kurdish revolt. Emin Sirin, one of dozens of lawmakers from the ruling Justice and Development Party who voted against U.S. deployment stated, “we had real security concerns about what Iraq would look like after Saddam. They [the U.S.] never addressed those concerns.”\(^{138}\) The Turkish military was focused on what would happen in Northern Iraq, worrying that some sort of Kurdish state would emerge from war. They were less than enthusiastic about a war and, despite U.S. repeated commitment to Iraq's

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\(^{137}\) Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict," 204.

territorial integrity, were skeptical about U.S. ability to manage the Kurdish situation during and after the war.\footnote{Abramowitz, "What's up with Turkey?," A13.}

Both Iraq wars show that Turkish burden sharing decisions were not significantly influenced by collective action theory. Turkish elites in both cases were not concerned with attempting to undersupply a good already provided by a strong coalition leader. In actuality, for the second Gulf War case, Turkish elites did not consider the U.S. led action a collective good, and saw the impending war effort as a threat to more important private goods. Although Turkey’s burden sharing actions on the surface appear to be a case of collective action “free-riding,” it is more logically explained as a case of a state “keeping its distance.”

**Balance of Threat**

Balance of threat theory predicts that when there is an imbalance of threat, rather than power, states will form alliances or change internal efforts to limit their vulnerability.\footnote{Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.} In the 1991 Gulf War, the balance of threat hypothesis had greater relevance for explaining Turkey’s burden sharing decisions than the “collective goods” approach of the collective action theory. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was seen as a security threat to neighboring Turkey. Turkish officials reiterated their belief that the conflict could create general instability and that Iraq’s hostile intentions might increase if it was rewarded for its Kuwaiti aggression.\footnote{Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict," 205.}
In the second Iraq War, balance of threat theory predicts that Turkey would be unlikely to support the Iraq coalition since it perceived Kurdish independence as the greater threat. An Iraq War against Hussein was dangerous since he was weak and not seen as a physical threat. However, once the Kurdish threat increased as a result of the war, Turkey tried to become more involved to shape policy concerning the Kurdish north. Indeed, Saddam Hussein had accused Turkey on a number of occasions of acting unfaithfully by assisting in the “thirty-state aggression” against Iraq in the first war. Saddam also criticized Turkey’s policy of permitting use of Incirlik air base by U.S. and British to use its territory to bomb Iraq. In February 1999, Baghdad actually threatened to attack Turkey if it continued to allow the U.S. and Britain to use its territory to bomb Iraq. Hussein historically supported the PKK and actually helped PKK supporters settle into villages near the Turkish border after his offensive against Kurdish groups in 1988.\textsuperscript{142} However, key to balance of threat theory is not only proximate capability of an adversary, but also a perception of that adversary’s threatening intent.\textsuperscript{143} In the decade after Desert Storm Ankara found Iraq diminished in both capability and intent. A weakened Iraq was not perceived as threatening democracy in Turkey. Nor were Turks, after 1991, much worried by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the air attacks from Operation Northern Watch in northern Iraq were thought to have removed the imminent threat to Turkish cities. Politically, a weakened unitary Iraq ruled by the secular Baathist Party suited Turkish national interests. Ankara feared the

\textsuperscript{142} Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," 45.
\textsuperscript{143} Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
disintegration of Iraq would allow the Shia majority in the south to develop closer links with Iran, a much more dangerous rival.

More accurately, Turkey was more threatened by a resurgent Kurdish insurgency rather than a despotic Hussein. Disintegration of a centralized Iraq might well enable Iraqi Kurds to develop further the autonomy they had enjoyed in northern Iraq. More accurately, Turkey was more threatened by a resurgent Kurdish insurgency rather than a despotic Hussein. Disintegration of a centralized Iraq might well enable Iraqi Kurds to develop further the autonomy they had enjoyed in northern Iraq.144 Turkey’s military establishment was extraordinarily consistent over the previous decade that Kurdish separatism and Islamic extremism were seen as the leading security challenges for the Turkish state.145 Ankara considered the threat posed by Saddam Hussein as manageable and considered a strengthened Kurdish federation or strengthened Iran as the significant regional security challenges.

Turkey’s negotiation with the U.S. reflected this security outlook. Turkey allowed the minimal coalition military presence necessary to meet its security challenges, but attempted to block or gain regional control of any operations from the Kurdish area of Iraq. Key in negotiations with the U.S. was the requirement for a Turkish led force in northern Iraq to quell any Kurdish ambitions.146 In the end, Turkey’s concerns were not with an Iraq under Hussein, but rather the aftereffects of its disintegration. Balance of threat theory does not explain Turkish burden sharing decisions. Turkish elites and institutions had come to an accommodation with Hussein and did not feel threatened by

144 Brewin, "Turkey: Democratic Legitimacy," 99-100.
145 Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 36-37.
his WMD or military capability. In contrast, Iraq cooperated with Turkish cross border raids and only threatened Turkey in response to U.S. military action from Turkish soil.

In the aftermath of the Iraq War conventional combat phase, Turkey began to be concerned with the threat of a Federated Kurdistan. The security elite were concerned that the chaos and instability in Iraq would instigate its break-up and the emergence of a Kurdish state. In contrast to the discussions before the war, the elite now argued that sending troops would block these outcomes while guaranteeing Turkey a place at the negotiating table where Iraq's future would be discussed. These officials were particularly disturbed by the prominent Kurdish presence in the U.S.-appointed Governing Council in Baghdad. The security elite scrutinized every American move and statement concerning northern Iraq and concluded that the United States was conspiring to set up a Kurdish state. Therefore, a military presence in Iraq was required to counter this danger.  

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Alliance Dependence

In the first Gulf War, alliance dependence best explained Turkish foreign policy. Turkey built a close political, military, and intelligence ties with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bilateral ties with the United States, and multilateral ties with NATO, were key components of Turkish defense and foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Washington’s commitment to stopping this aggression, offered Turkey an opportunity to reaffirm Ankara’s position and

147 Kirişçi, "Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy," 44-45.
continued importance to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. President Özal believed that Turkey’s strategic and political role would be enhanced by accommodating Washington and firmly supporting the U.S. led coalition.148

In the second Gulf War, alliance dependence was the trap that Turkey wanted to escape. In this case, Turkey was presented with the classic alliance security dilemma; cooperate and minimize the risk of abandonment, or defect and avoid entrapment. Turkey’s foreign policy leading up to the second Gulf War is characterized as an alliance “defection.”149 Ankara pursued a weak commitment to the U.S. led coalition that was intended to maintain cordial U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations while at the same time not entrapping it into a domestically objectionable military action. The bureaucracies of the foreign ministry and military general staff were convinced early that the U.S. administration had already embarked on an irreversible course over Iraq, and that Turkey's interests mandated cooperation with the United States, hence avoiding abandonment by the U.S.150 Prime Minister Ecevit, however, pursued a strategy of defection, which increased Turkey’s bargaining advantage with the U.S. while providing him domestic maneuvering room. Ecevit stressed the importance of the strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States, but instructed his bureaucrats to make no meaningful deal with the United States. In a meeting with Deputy Secretary of

148 Sayari, "Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict," 205-08.
149 Although Turkey did not openly defect from the U.S. led coalition, it pursued a foreign policy strategy that weakened the U.S. international position and supported the military effort to the minimum, meeting Snyder’s definition of a ‘defection.’ Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 466.
150 Ergin, "Do Not Worry, the Turks Will Not Let Us Down," FBIS-NES-2003-0918.
Defense Wolfowitz in July 2002, Ecevit stated, “The United States is Turkey's strategically. Turkey will consider the steps you take on this issue within the framework of its strategic partnership with the United States.” However, with the organs of government he authorized “detailed negotiations” only on condition that “no commitments be made regarding American requests.”

Throughout negotiations for coalition support, Turkey balanced costs of alliance defection against the costs of an entrapment. As a result, Turkey negotiated for significant concessions from the U.S. to allow a northern front through Turkey. Concessions Turkey gained included an aid package of close to $6 billion in grants and up to $20 billion in loan guarantees, a new status of forces agreement covering U.S. troops, approval for a significant Turkish troop presence in northern Iraq, and guarantees of Turkish influence in northern Iraq policy. However, the onerous negotiations caused considerable friction and eventually distrust between the two governments. Turkish Foreign Minister Yakis eventually demanded $92 billion from the U.S. which the U.S. countered with the final offer of $6 billion. Clearly, Turkey was attempting to gain compensation for the costs of alliance entrapment. Although Turkey had significantly raised the financial awards over the level from Desert Storm, their hardball negotiating

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152 Prusher, "Turkey Seeks Assurances from US; Ankara Wants $30 Billion from Washington to Cover Potential Damages from an Attack by Iraq," 06. Graham and Slevin, "U.S. Won't Sweeten Aid Offer to Turkey; $6 Billion Offer for Access is Final, Bush Tells Ankara."
position, while at the same time delaying U.S. military efforts, created the condition of distrust and lack of influence in U.S. policy that Turkey feared.153

Learning the lessons of the first Gulf War, Turkish military elite also attempted to minimize entrapment to the U.S. course of action. In meetings of the MGK, while recommending support of the U.S. deployment, the military also suggested that Turkey should act independently of the United States to safeguard its own interests and avoid entrapment. The military wing of the MGK stressed in deliberations that, “Turkish servicemen fight only for Turkey. They take risks only for Turkey. The Turkish military is not going to fight the Iraqi military. If there is going to be a fight then it will be between the United States and Iraq. However, in such a situation the TSK (Turkish General Staff) will take the appropriate military precautions in northern Iraq, which it deems of vital importance for Turkey.”154 Turkish elites were attempting to limit the impact of alliance dependence, but in the end, military members of the MGK recommended approving the U.S. deployment precisely because of fears of being abandoned in Kurdish policy, and tried to formulate a strategy maximizing Turkish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the view of the MGK, if the operation was inevitable then a wholly negative reply could not be given to the requests of their strategic ally the

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153 Kessler and Pan, "Missteps with Turkey Prove Costly; Diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. A Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq."
United States. The military elite attempted to “show preferences and pay” by recommending support.¹⁵⁵

In this context, elites in the foreign ministry and military attempted to balance alliance interests against national interests. Turkish negotiating positions were planned to ensure that the minimum acceptable support was extended to the United States while maintaining influence on Kurdish policy. The arms of government recommended supporting the U.S. coalition because of the fear of alliance abandonment. Although most elites did not want war in Iraq, they recognized that failure to support the U.S. coalition would likely cause Washington to chill its relations with Ankara.¹⁵⁶

The alliance dependence hypothesis explains the action of elites in the foreign ministry and military, but as seen in the next section, their arguments were overridden by senior political elites that were more responsive to Turkish public opinion. U.S. officials were confident that Turkey’s influential military, could be relied on to support the United States. After the first Gulf War, Turkey was a strong supporter of American interventionist policy in the Balkans, and also in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁷ However, the Bush administration failed to recognize the tremendous changes had swept Turkish society, including the political and public control over the military. These changes contributed to

¹⁵⁶ Metehan Demir, "War Scenarios at the MGK," Hurriyet, January 30, 2003, FBIS-NES-2003-0131
¹⁵⁷ Larrabee, Lesser, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 166.
an alliance “involuntary defection” in that Turkey’s government failed to provide support to the contingency where support was expected.

**Domestic Structure and Politics**

Previous diplomatic experience with Turkey led American policymakers to believe that Turkish political parties are oligarchies which command total allegiance from parliamentary deputies, that Turkish public opinion did not significantly affect policy, and that the military, through the National Security Council (MGK), makes the decisions concerning national security.¹⁵⁸ This type of decision structure would mark Turkey as a Type I state. Unfortunately for U.S. coalition building efforts, the U.S. failed to recognize three significant changes to Turkish domestic politics since the first Gulf War. First, due to successive changes of government during the U.S.-Turkish negotiating period, no consensus could be built in Turkish leadership for U.S. support. Second, the weakness of the AKP electoral base allowed fractured voting in the TBMM, which was exaggerated by the voting procedures of the March 1 referendum. This weakness was exacerbated by military uneasiness with supporting a moderately Islamic government. Finally, public opinion became much more influential in domestic politics. November 2002 elections signified a major realignment of the Turkish political landscape where political party members were fractured from their leadership, causing Turkey to act like a Type IV state rather than a Type I state. Erdogan had to build a consensus on the

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¹⁵⁸ Saloni, *Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.*
referendum, but because of his weak position as party leader rather than prime minister, he was unable to adequately force a vote along party lines.

One major consideration in adding Turkey to the Iraq coalition was the instability of the government during the negotiation period. Due to successive changes of government during the U.S.-Turkish negotiating period, tough decisions on U.S. support were passed to the next government, rather than acted upon. Prime Minister Ecevit was the first to set a policy of restraint with the U.S., but his preferred policy position was a diplomatic solution that would preclude war in the region. Ecevit strongly opposed the military option in Iraq from the very outset and pressed his concerns about regional instability on President Bush during a state visit to Washington in January 2002.\footnote{Ergin, "Do Not Worry, the Turks Will Not Let Us Down."}

Ecevit stressed to Bush that Turkey did not support the Hussein regime, but also underscored traditional Turkish concerns for Iraqi territorial integrity, and the importance that Kirkuk and Mosul remain outside of Kurdish influence. He hinted that an intervention would have disastrous consequences, especially for Turkey.\footnote{Murat Yetkin, \textit{Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü} (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004). Quoted in Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case."}

After the visit, Ecevit attempted to mediate between the United States and the Hussein regime. In a letter sent to Hussein February 1, 2002, he emphasized the determination of the U.S. administration and asked for full cooperation with UN inspectors. Saddam’s responded that the UN demands were illegal and Turkey’s support of Operation Northern Watch
would be referred to the UN by Iraq. This response led Ecevit to believe that Iraq would be uncooperative towards U.S. demands.\textsuperscript{161}

In March 2002, Vice President Richard Cheney visited Ankara as part of a Middle East tour to seek support against Iraq. The principle aim of Cheney’s tour was to explain Washington’s intentions regarding Iraq to the countries of the region and to secure their backing as much as possible.\textsuperscript{162} The most interesting aspect of this visit is that Cheney requested a separate meeting with the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu. This request showed that the United States expected the armed forces to influence the deployment decision and take its historical role influencing security policy. Although the role of the armed forces was well known, it was very unusual for a visiting high administration official to request direct talks with the military. Instead of direct talks, a separate informal session was held between Ecevit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dem, General Kivrikoğlu, Cheney, and U.S. Ambassador Robert Pearson. In this meeting, Ecevit once again declared that Turkey was against military operations, while Cheney clearly articulated the U.S. intention to intervene in Iraq.\textsuperscript{163}

During the summer of 2002, the Bush administration began to outline the plans for a military action with potential coalition partners. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz arrived in Istanbul on July 14, 2002, to convey President Bush’s plan for regime change in Iraq and to seek the Ecevit government’s support for the military

\textsuperscript{161} Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 30.
operation that was then in the planning stages. Wolfowitz, accompanied by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, met with Ecevit July 16. Wolfowitz passed a message from Bush to the effect that a final decision on the issue of war had not been made, however, the United States needed to make military preparations for a strategy of military intervention in Iraq. Wolfowitz asked Ecevit to outline the extent of military cooperation that the U.S. strategic ally Turkey would offer in connection with an Iraq War. Ecevit replied, “The United States is Turkey’s strategic ally. Turkey will consider the steps you take on this issue within the framework of its strategic partnership with the United States.” Although Ecevit was opposed to the war and insisted on the need for international legitimacy, reports suggested that Turkey’s approach reflected a policy of tacit cooperation. Ecevit’s establishment of a series of counter demands was seen as an indication that official bargaining has started between Turkey and the United States on Iraq. Ecevit’s response to Wolfowitz was not made casually, but rather was formulated by professional diplomats within the Foreign Ministry. The view of the Foreign Ministry was that the U.S. administration had embarked on an irreversible course over Iraq and that Turkey's interests mandated cooperation with the United States. Although Turkey was not excited about a war in Iraq, it had not said “no.” On the contrary, the response suggested that Turkey was open

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165 Ergin, "Do Not Worry, the Turks Will Not Let Us Down."
166 Ecevit outlined four conditions for Turkish support: (1) No Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, (2) Turkish economic losses should be compensated, (3) the new regime should be acceptable to the people of Iraq, and (4) Mosul and Kirkuk could not be left to the Kurds. See Ugar Ergan, "Four Conditions by Turkey in Exchange for Saddam," Hurriyet, July 17, 2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0718.
to cooperation. In the words of a senior Foreign Ministry official who attended the talks and who spoke to Hurriyet newspaper at the time, Ankara “did not pull down the shutters” in Wolfowitz’s face.\textsuperscript{167}

At a dinner later that night, Minister of the Treasury Kemal Dervis made an additional proposition to Wolfowitz, “If there is a military intervention in Iraq it would have the effect of a big shock on the Turkish economy. Financing mechanisms need to be established to offset the adverse effects of such a shock.”\textsuperscript{168} Thus began a two-pronged negotiating stance: Turkey should have a say in the Iraq War, but it should be compensated accordingly for any economic disruption caused by the intervention. According to press sources, Ecevit had no intention of opposing the United States; that is why he responded to Bush’s request by saying that “Turkey would act as a strategic partner.”\textsuperscript{169}

The most significant result of the Wolfowitz visit is that it established a joint coordination mechanism between the two sides for cooperation on Iraq. Ecevit authorized “detailed negotiations” with the United States, but instructed his bureaucrats to make no meaningful deal with the United States without additional government approval.”\textsuperscript{170} Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal’s visit to Washington in the last week of August was the first important step of the negotiation process. During that visit, Ziyal met with Wolfowitz and had a videoconference with Vice President Dick

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\item[167] Ergin, ”Do Not Worry, the Turks Will Not Let Us Down.”
\item[168] Ergin, ”Ecevit Allowed CIA Teams and U-2 Planes.”
\item[169] Ibid.
\item[170] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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Cheney. The most important result of Ziyal’s visit was that the United States signaled that it wanted to deploy troops in Turkey, to build staging areas for this purpose, and to use Turkey's ports and airports in connection with Iraq.\(^{171}\) Ziyal countered that a military intervention would create great risks. It would harm not only the region but also to the United States. Additionally, he stressed that Turkey would require legitimacy and consensus by gained through a multilateral operation conducted within a UN mandate.\(^{172}\)

Between September and October 2002, U.S. requests to Turkey to support the emerging coalition began to formalize, causing additional strain to the weakened Ecevit government. On September 16, the Turkish General Staff sent a note to the Prime Minister’s Office requesting clarification on what responses should be given to various American requests. The United States submitted its official requests to the Turkish government three days after this directive was issued. Rather than waiting for the election results, the United States opted to put its requests on record during this transition period.\(^{173}\) The Turkish government was surprised that these requests came through military channels directly to the TAF, rather than through diplomatic channels. American military personnel were told that the decision was entirely political and could only be taken by the new government.\(^{174}\)

\(^{172}\) Kohen, "To Hit or Not to Hit."
The period of negotiations from Wolfowitz’s July visit until November elections corresponded with a time of great instability in Turkish government. During the 2001-2002 timeframe economic reforms fueled growing dissatisfaction with the government. Criticism of the government focused on the advanced age and declining health of the Prime Minister. Ecevit’s health continued to decline, and in July 2002, two ministers who expected to be chosen as the next prime minister resigned once it was clear that Ecevit would not step down. During that same period, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of one of the government’s coalition parties declared that Turkey should hold an early parliamentary election in the coming November. Without a ruling coalition, Ecevit had to agree to an early election. During the tenure of the Ecevit administration, the United States passed its request for Turkish support in multiple venues. Although Ecevit repeatedly countered that an Iraq war would cause significant problems for neighboring states, he never conferred an absolute “no” to the administration. Rather, he gave the impression of cooperation by negotiating terms of support with the Bush administration.

On November 3, 2002, Turkey held its national parliamentary elections. The results drastically changed the Turkish political landscape; the governing coalition parties were severely punished for the economic and political crises. None of the coalition parties was able to garner the minimum ten percent of the national vote necessary to win

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seats in parliament. The electorate had voted in a conservative Islamic party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had little experience governing at the national level. The party’s president, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, was barred from taking political office due to his conviction in 1998 for making Islamic speeches; therefore, one of the other leading politicians Abdullah Gül formed the cabinet as the interim prime minister, while Erdogan challenged the constitutionality of his ban from office.\footnote{Soner Cagaptay, "November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era," \textit{Middle East Review of International Affairs} 6, no. 4 (2002), Carkoglu, "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?."}

Shortly after the November elections, at the NATO Summit in Prague on November 20, President Bush met with President Sezer. The Gül government had not yet won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly. As a result, there was not a single representative from the AKP at this high-level meeting. With the exception of President Sezer, whose views differed markedly from the AKP in many areas, the Bush team was meeting with bureaucrats and political lame ducks.\footnote{Kapsis, "The Failure of U.S. - Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States, Political Mismanagement, and Conflicted Military."} Bush mentioned, “A short time ago we were able to get Resolution 1441 from the UN Security Council. We consider it important that you stand by our side as we continue these efforts.” Sezer countered, “That resolution does not automatically authorize you to declare war. For that reason you will have to obtain a second resolution from the Security Council.” Sezer then continued, “We are strategic partners with you. Of course, we will support our strategic partner. However international legitimacy will determine the extent of our support.” In one sense, the Turkish President introduced a ‘criterion for Turkey's support’ and was sending the
message, “Do not expect much from Turkey if you cannot obtain a (second) UN resolution.”

In December, Wolfowitz and Grossman again arrived in Ankara to finalize plans for stationing troops in Turkey for a northern front. The timing of the December 3 visit was a sign of the importance to the Bush administration for having the new AKP government on its side for the American Iraq strategy. The purpose of the meeting was to demonstrate U.S. support for Turkey’s bid to the European Union, reconfirm with the new government the deal that he previously negotiated giving U.S. full access to airbases, and to push for permission to base U.S. ground forces in Turkey. In a meeting with interim Prime Minister Gül, Wolfowitz again emphasized the need for the United States to begin deploying troops and additionally offered a grant of $2 billion to offset Turkish economic losses in a probable war. Gül responded by passing leadership on the issue to parliament, which was much more responsive to public opinion, to deflect U.S. attempts for basing. Gül stated, “Our government won a vote of confidence only last week, as a democratic country we will continue talks with the United States within the bounds of our laws. Although we have an absolute majority in the Assembly, it is the Assembly that has to make such decisions.” Then Wolfowitz asked, “Will Turkey support a northern front? We expect your government's answer on this issue as soon as

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182 Ibid.
possible.” Gül replied, “The only gesture we can make to you at this stage is to take certain steps within the discretion of the government. In that framework, we may agree to the beginning of survey work on the (modernization of) bases. However the TBMM has to approve your requests for the later stages.”

Wolfowitz presented Gül with a timetable for the survey work required to assess Turkish ports and airbases. Wolfowitz suggested that a 150-person Department of Defense survey team begin survey work in the third week of December. Gül accepted the surveying work and left the door open for the other stages. However, he emphasized that the TBMM would have the final say on the subsequent stages.

Gül’s “yes” on starting surveying work was the result of a state summit held the previous weekend at the President’s Cankaya Mansion. That meeting was chaired by President Sezer and was also attended by Chief of General Staff Gen. Ozkok. The approval won from Gül was intended to delay full support of the United States, while at the same time allowing negotiating room for multiple options.

Ambassador Pearson arranged a separate, unofficial, meeting at his residence that night between Wolfowitz’s party and Turkish leaders. On the American side, four individuals with official status—Wolfowitz, Grossman, Pearson, and a Pentagon official—attended the dinner. On the Turkish side, AKP party leader Erdogan was accompanied by Istanbul Deputy Egemen Bagis—who served as Erdogan’s interpreter and political advisor and is sometimes referred to as the Turkish Carl Rove—Adana

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183 Ibid.
185 Ergin, "The Bargaining Begins."
Deputy Omer Celik, and businessman Cuneyd Zapsu. No one on the Turkish side officially represented the government. Wolfowitz delivered to Erdogan a written message from President Bush congratulating him on his success in the elections and a verbal message inviting him to the White House on December 10. Wolfowitz left his meeting with Erdogan with the understanding that the AKP leader and his party would support a northern front in Turkish political venues.

Although acting Prime Minister, and a leader in the AKP, Gül never learned of the content of the discussions between Erdogan and Wolfowitz. As a result, Gül’s bargain and delay strategy while passing the final decision for a northern front to the TBMM was never passed to Erdogan. Additionally, Gül did not fully know what messages were being sent through the unofficial Zapsu channel. The American side, on the other hand, was intent on attaining its goals through both Gül and Erdogan. However, this U.S. strategy led to a full-fledged “channel inflation,” where the U.S. negotiated through multiple official and unofficial channels causing misperceptions in the American government on the extent of Turkish support for the intervention. One result of the November elections was that Turkish foreign policy regarding the Iraq War was fragmented. Although Interim Prime Minister Gül formulated government policy, Washington was also courting President Sezer, and AK party leader Erdogan on Iraqi issues.

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186 Hayes, "Wolfowitz Talks Turkey."
187 Ergin, "The Bargaining Begins."
188 Ibid.
In late December 2002, the Bush administration dispensed with diplomatic niceties and exerted pressure on the Gül government for a decision regarding Iraq. On December 21, the U.S. tried to expose Turkish plans by issuing an ultimatum to Interim Prime Minister Gül for a response to U.S. requests for support. In a message sent through the U.S. Ambassador, Bush set a timeline for a Turkish decision, “We expect you to inform us of your decision on the northern front in three days.”

Prime Minister Gül was horrified by the terse tone of Bush’s message. Bush’s message was intended to break Turkey’s approach of taking things slowly, bargaining over everything, and demanding a formal memorandum of agreement on every issue. Gül interpreted Bush’s terse message as a signal that the U.S. would not allow Hussein to remain in power.

Gül again responded in a typical manner on January 16, responding that, “In the light of lengthy appraisals, our government will take the necessary steps to obtain the approval of the TBMM at a time of its choosing for a mode of operation that would not deprive the United States of a northern option.” Gül qualified this response by stressing the need for a response through either the UN or NATO, “There is no doubt that international legitimacy and consensus will play a determining role in the result to be achieved. NATO’s support will also help this process.”

At the end of his response, Gül asked in unequivocal terms for U.S. support of Turkish ‘improvements’ to UN Secretary General

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190 Ibid.
191 Ergin, “We Can Open a Northern Front but a UN Resolution Is Needed,” FBIS-NES-2003-0921.
Kofi Annan’s settlement plan for Cyprus. Again, Gül gave the impression that Turkey would eventually support U.S. efforts, but he relegated the final decision to the TBMM.

Bush replied to Gül’s letter on January 22 by welcoming Gül’s intention to take the matter to the TBMM, “I appreciate your support for a northern option in the event of a war in Iraq.” However, he admonished that time was of the essence, “My expectation from you is that these issues be concluded in the shortest possible time.” Bush did not respond to Gül’s condition on the issue of international legitimacy, nor his linkage of support to the Cyprus issue. Gül was especially concerned that Bush did not offer a quid pro quo on Cyprus.

Days after Bush’s reply was received, Secretary of State Colin Powell continued to press the issue at a private meeting with Gül and Erdogan at the Davos World Economic Forum. Powell sought an answer to Bush’s request and asked no less than three times, “When will you go to your parliament?” Gül’s response was, “no authorization has been obtained from the UN Security Council. It would be hard to pass an authorization bill through our parliament in these circumstances.” Erdogan added, “We cannot act quickly on such sensitive matters.” Erdogan advocated a regional strategy that would include countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf states. Powell replied, “We may have to act without a UN resolution.” Gül left Powell with the impression that Turkey would eventually support the U.S. led invasion when he

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192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
The fledgling AKP government spent most of January 2003 wavering over which way to move on U.S. requests for a northern option into Iraq. The first sign of serious consideration of U.S. requests emerged in the last week of January. On January 31, the MGK (National Security Council) met to advise the government on possible military measures. At the meeting, members of the General Staff’s command echelon officially expressed their view that the government should take step to cooperate with the United States based on agreements reached in December. The Chief of the General Staff Gen. Ozkok and force commanders individually endorsed their support for the military option. The commanders also said that the government must begin to prepare the Turkish public opinion for the military option. The goal of the commanders was to present to the public an argument that highlighted Turkish interests in northern Iraq.\footnote{Bila, "We Will Enter Iraq Not for USA but for Turkey.", Sadat Ergin, "We Thought There Were Troops on the Ships; Turns out There Were Not Any," \textit{Hurriyet}, September 22, 2003.} When questioned on the political climate of the meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakis stated, “when it became clear that the invasion was inevitable and we could not prevent it, then we concluded we should participate in it and cooperate.”\footnote{Ozdamar interview with Yasar Yakis, March 7, 2008. Quoted in Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 31-32.}

The most contentious issue at the MGK meeting was over the question of whether the parliamentary authorization bills should be split. The General Staff and the Foreign

\footnote{Ibid.}
Ministry bureaucrats favored combining the authorization bills for the modernization of the bases, the arrival of U.S. soldiers, and sending Turkish soldiers to Iraq into a single bill and submitting a single text to the TBMM. Both the General Staff and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal presented this position to Gül before the MGK meeting. However, Gül favored splitting the authorization bills into two to strengthen Turkey’s hand in its negotiations with the United States. As of the end of January, Ankara had not fully obtained the concessions it wanted from the United States on issues such as economic aid, political arrangements in northern Iraq, and the rights of Iraqi Turcoman. Nor had the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force. Turkey thus aimed to gain concessions by bargaining at each step of the deployment process. Since France and Germany were countering U.S. positions in the Security Council, Turkey could afford a hard bargaining stance with the U.S.\(^{197}\)

Negotiations began with the U.S. on the specifics of a deployment, but the U.S. government continued to pressure Turkey for a final decision on a northern option. On February 4, Vice President Cheney called Prime Minister Gül to express his delight at the start of the negotiations for the upgrade of Turkish ports and airfields for the expected flow of U.S. forces; however, he cautioned that U.S. plans needed a decision, “President Bush must decide without delay. To do that we must be able to see ahead of us clearly. Indeed the ships that will transfer our 4th Infantry Division have already sailed. They will arrive at the Turkish coast on February 10. The President must decide by February

\(^{197}\) Bila, "We Will Enter Iraq Not for USA but for Turkey.", Ergin, "We Thought There Were Troops on the Ships; Turns out There Were Not Any."
the latest whether these ships should remain near the Turkish coast or head toward the Suez Canal. With these remarks, Cheney clearly implied that the United States might give up on the northern front, and set a timeline for Turkish cooperation. In a press interview on February 5, Gül stated, “All avenues of seeking peace have been exhausted. It is now beyond our hands. We will now act together with our strategic partner. We will submit the authorization bill for the modernization of bases to the Assembly tomorrow.” This authorization bill was approved in the Assembly the next day by 308 votes in favor, 193 votes opposed, and nine abstentions. This approval of the authorization gave the Bush administration the impression that they had reached a breakthrough with Turkey; plans for a northern option were continued.

Negotiations with the U.S. on the Memorandum of Agreement for conducting the war from Turkish soil commenced on February 11 and were completed on February 22, two days before the Council of Ministers met to discuss the submission of the final authorization bill—allowing the staging of U.S. troops—to the TBMM. The negotiations were tough and acrimonious and centered on issues of Turkish autonomy within northern Iraq, and the legal status of U.S. troops in Turkey. Eventually, the Turkish side gained concessions allowing Turkish troops in northern Iraq to engage the PKK while remaining

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198 Ergin, “The Authorization Bill Split the AKP.”
199 Ibid.
200 Gordon and Trainor, <i>Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq</i>, 111-15.
under Turkish command. Unfortunately, the Turkish public viewed American demands regarding the Kurdish north with suspicion, and Turkish hardball tactics continued to sour relations with the U.S. Although the negotiations gained the interests of both sides, the negotiating tactics created a perception with the Turkish media, public, and ministers that Turkey did not gain a memorandum of agreement that met its national interests.

Once the memorandum of agreement was completed, the Turkish government moved to endorse the resolution in the TBMM. On February 24, the Council of Ministers met in a contentious meeting to discuss the second authorization allowing U.S. forces to stage from Turkey. Turkish law required that the cabinet send the resolution to the TBMM with unanimous consent. Interim Prime Minister Gül opened the meeting by stating, “We have to make a decision about the authorization bill related to the arrival of American troops and the dispatch of Turkish troops to Iraq. I contacted the party. The party is also concerned. Our colleagues have serious concerns.” Gül continued, “My request from you is to send this bill to the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly). The TBMM will have the final say.” Gül’s reference that the TBMM would have final say reflected his desire to send the difficult decision to the Assembly without strong

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204 Ergin, "The Authorization Bill Split the AKP."
support from the government. Gül’s comments implied that the cabinet would not take political responsibility for the authorization bill and that it would only perform a forwarding service. This prompted opposing ministers to feel that they had a free hand opposing the resolution. Gül’s opening remarks were followed by six hours of intense debate where Erdogan and the AKP party position were not directly represented. Additionally, the details of negotiations for the memorandum of understanding between Turkey and the United States were never discussed. Gül’s closing reflected his ambivalence towards the resolution, “Our job is to forward the authorization bill to the TBMM. As we said from the outset the TBMM has the authority to make the final decision. Let us leave the decision to the Assembly. Moreover our government will step down in ten days because of the by-election in Siirt. The new government can take up this issue.” In effect, Gül was passing advocacy to Erdogan’s government, which had not yet been seated. Gül concluded by passing responsibility for the resolution to the assembly, “The TBMM is the true authority on this issue. I want an opportunity to send the authorization bill to the true authority on this issue.” This is odd behavior in Turkish politics in that the party usually decides positions on decisions of this magnitude before cabinet discussion. The fact that the cabinet meeting was so rancorous is an indication that there were numerous decision makers influencing the discussion rather than the typical centralized decision making. When the Council of Ministers meeting

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205 Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 35.
206 Ergin, "The Authorization Bill Split the AKP."
ended, it was obvious to political observers that the passage of the authorization bill in the TBMM would not be easy at all.207

After the November 2002 election, Ecevit passed responsibility for U.S. Iraq policy to the interim Gül government causing confusion in the political elite on who would determine Turkish policy concerning Iraq. Gül assumed the responsibilities of prime minister, including directing foreign policy, while at the same time AKP Party Leader Erdogan, and heir to the prime minister’s seat, was also negotiating policy positions concerning Turkish support of the Iraq War. During this period of negotiations, Erdogan was meeting with U.S. representatives but he had no official influence within the government. Unfortunately, on the domestic front, the split leadership of the AKP did not project the clear advocacy on the level that was presented by Özal in the first Gulf War. By the time of the March 1 TBMM vote, the Gül government passed responsibility to Party Leader and incoming Prime Minister Erdogan, even though he was not in an official position to influence the vote. Since the government was managing the transition of the prime minister position, it was distracted from adequately presenting policy options concerning Iraq to the cabinet and TBMM. Critical information involving the negotiations with the U.S. never was introduced into party or cabinet discussions. According to Foreign Minister Yakis, the political elite and public never gained a full understanding that there was an agreement between Turkey and the U.S. that would allow

207 Ibid.
Turkey significant influence in the Kurdish north. Without leader advocacy, and with deflection of decisions to parliament, the war authorization was much more dependent on public opinion. Yakis believes that the public could have been persuaded to go to war if Turkish interests were perceived to be protected by the agreement with the United States. Decentralized decision making allowed the TBMM to gain more influence on the deployment issue.

Although the AKP was the first party since 1987 to secure a clear majority in parliament, the government was fairly weak because it gained only 34 percent of the popular vote while the entire TBMM represented only 46 percent of the electorate. The remaining 54 percent of the popular vote did not gain any parliamentary representation because it failed to overcome the 10% minimum threshold required by law. Representatives of all three of the veteran political parties that had previously governed the country as well as nearly all the opposition parties were totally swept out of parliament. Approximately 90 percent of the incumbent parliamentarians lost their seats. Mehmet Ali Birand, a well-regarded Turkish political commentator, commented that the election results amounted to a civilian coup. Most AKP deputies had never held public office before and were new to the business of politics. Their inexperience showed in the lead up to the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote. Turkish political observers note that

208 Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 46.
209 Ibid.
AKP Party Leader Erdogan did not properly assess his political strength and mismanaged the parliament vote.

The AKP leadership’s uncertain control over its factionalized and inexperienced deputies showed that the party had merely nominal control over the voting outcome. Two dominant factions emerged within the AKP leadership. One, led by party leader Erdogan and his closest supporters in the cabinet, argued that Turkey should support the U.S. request to protect its interests in northern Iraq. Then Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis argued it would be impossible to dissuade the United States and argued for participation as a means of influencing U.S. policy, “We do not have the means to prevent the war. If the authorization bill does not pass we will be excluded from the postwar scenarios.” Minister of National Defense Gonul and Minister of Justice Cicek also expressed strong support for the authorization bill. They argued that the passage of the authorization bill would give Turkey the means to block the establishment of a Kurdish state and to have a say in the restructuring of Iraq. The other faction, led by Erdogan’s deputy, interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, was both morally and strategically against the war. The Gül faction highlighted the negative consequences of Özal’s support in the first Persian Gulf War and suggested that a “no” vote would keep war from Iraq since Turkey was a necessary ally. Deputy Prime Minister Yalcinbayir was among the most vocal opponents of the bill and argued that an authorization bill that would directly involve Turkey in a war could not be proposed without a second UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. Minister of Public Works Ergezen approached the issue from the
perspective of Islamic sensitivities, “We opposed the Gulf War in 1991. How can we facilitate the bombing of a Muslim people?”

The Gül government’s lack of resolve for the deployment resolution rendered doubtful its capacity to deliver a parliamentary majority. Throughout negotiations with the U.S., both the Ecevit and Gül governments passed responsibility for implementation of negotiations to parliament. Rather than press the parliament for a certain decision, as Özal did in the first Gulf War, the weak leadership of Ecevit, Gül, and eventually Erdogan allowed the parliament to set the agenda. When the U.S. pressed Ankara for basing rights in early 2003, then party leader Erdogan said, “If necessary we will take America's demands over Iraq to a referendum” and gave the first indications that rather than let the government take the decision on this, they might put the matter directly to the people. Even the authorization bill allowing a small number of troops to survey and upgrade Turkish logistics facilities showed a high rate of defection within the AKP, unusual in Turkish politics.

Due to his weak political mandate, party leader Erdogan tolerated this high level of defection in AKP votes to avoid a permanent party split. Typically, Turkish politics parties vote in a block in the TBMM, however, voting procedures for the March 1 vote encouraged individual rather than block voting. Erdogan was sensitive to the polarization

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212 Ergin, "Tough Decision."

213 Ergin, "We Thought There Were Troops on the Ships; Turns out There Were Not Any."
in his party on the Iraq issue and sent a clear signal to the deputies that they would be able to individually vote “no” without repercussions. In his position as Prime Minister-elect, Erdogan was concerned that making the resolution binding to the party ministers could permanently divide his party before he was even seated.\textsuperscript{214} He made a rare and unusual parliamentary move by calling for a closed rather than an open parliamentary vote. This unusual closed vote allowed the parliament to cast its votes confidentially, only the vote totals were made public, therefore, deputies were not individually accountable for their votes. The most plausible explanation for the closed vote was for Erdogan to defend against a vote of “no confidence.” Political observers speculate that Prime Minister Gül, who had serious reservations with the authorization bill, used the closed vote as cover to persuade other AKP deputies to vote “no.” Erdogan allowed the closed vote because such high-profile public defection would send a signal that he was weak and therefore risk the collapse of his government.\textsuperscript{215} The closed vote enabled AKP cabinet members to vote “no” without exposing to the public the weakness of the party leader.

In the wake of the first Gulf War, Turkish public opinion became critical of the costs of participation in the coalition and of Turkey’s failure to receive sufficient compensation from the West. Many Turks regarded the Gulf War as a catalyst for Kurdish separatism and a continuing cost to Turkey in lost revenue from trade with Iraq.

\textsuperscript{214} Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 38.
and pipeline fees. Angry about the lack of influence in post-Desert Storm policy, public opinion turned even harder against U.S. interventions in Iraq. Numerous public opinion polls reported that the Turkish public was overwhelmingly against the use of Turkish bases and troops by the American forces, and opposed to American intervention. Any government showing enthusiasm for American plans would be perceived by the electorate as flying in the face of the country’s interests. Public opinion influenced U.S. operations from Turkey in at least one instance prior to the Iraq war. In Feb 1998, Turkish leaders refused to allow the U.S. to use Turkish territory to attack Iraq. This decision was highly influenced by public opinion; in a poll taken during the Feb 1998 crisis, some 80 percent opposed the use of Turkish military bases for attacks against Iraq.

After the rout of the 2002 general election, Turkish leaders were very reluctant to shape public opinion. Government and party leaders waited until the war was a foregone conclusion before trying to convince the public that they might benefit by cooperating in a U.S.-led war against Iraq. By this time there were many demonstrations, campaigns, and numerous text messages and personal visits to parliamentarians advocating a “no”

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216 In March 2003, an Ankara research center reported that Turks were 94% against the use of Turkish bases and troops by the American forces, and 87% opposed to American intervention see Brewin, "Turkey: Democratic Legitimacy," 96. See also Uslu et al., "Turkish Public Opinion toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question."
218 Kiriçi, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," 55.
vote on the authorization bill.\textsuperscript{220} Despite Turkey's economic hardships at the time, 72.3 percent opposed allowing the American forces to open a second front by using Turkish territory, even if that would result in significant amounts of financial aid.\textsuperscript{221} Because of the weakness and disorganization of the AKP, parliament members felt pressure from the grassroots constituents.

Finally, the silence of the military in the debate is noteworthy since the military typically has a strong influence in Turkish politics. The military’s power is institutionalized through a variety of organizations. The most important of these is the MGK. The highest advisory body to the Turkish government, at the time it consisted of the President (chair), the chief of the General Staff and the respective chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie; prime minister, the minister of defense, the interior minister, and the foreign affairs minister from the civilian side. Although technically the MGK makes only “recommendations” to the Council of Ministers, its recommendations can be tantamount to orders.\textsuperscript{222}

Developments regarded as undermining the domestic stability of the country fall within the responsibility of the military. Therefore, the General Staff should be considered not only a professional military institution but also a core element of Turkey’s political system. In recent instances, the military operated independently of the

\textsuperscript{220} Interview with Abdullatif Sener, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, March 4, 2008. Quoted in Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 45.

\textsuperscript{221} For a comprehensive review of Turkish public opinion towards the Iraq War see Uslu et al., "Turkish Public Opinion toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question."

government to secure its interpretation of Turkish interests in the extension of the fight against the PKK across the Turkish border into northern Iraq. In March 1998, Turkish Special Forces captured Semdin Sakik, from his refuge in northern Iraq. The military did not inform the cabinet or even Prime Minister Yilmaz of this action in advance.223

The fact that the military, which frequently declared its views and even interfered on large and small internal security subjects did not weigh in heavily on the authorization bill is noteworthy. The military elites were concerned that the AKP wanted to shift the political responsibility for the authorization bill onto the Turkish General Staff by presenting the issue to its rank and file as: “What could we do? We were forced to pass the bill because the military wanted it.” In the hours before the vote, Erdogan elements of the AKP looked for the MGK to rescue the authorization. Minister of Justice Cemil Cicek argued that the authorization bill could be rejected without the MGK issuing a statement of unequivocal support for the bill. President Sezer, an opponent of the bill and chair of the MGK blocked any efforts for military influence, “The MGK already expressed its views on this issue and offered its advice to the government at the end of its meeting last month. Consequently there is no need to make any additional reference to it this time.”224 According to one of the most experienced journalists covering Turkish

224 Ergin, “Looks Like We Missed That Train.”
politics, this MGK meeting was perhaps “the only one in history” that produced no advice or comment on such a strategic issue.225

By this time, military commanders expressed their uneasy position in the authorization bill debate. If they took the AKP position, they would be at odds with President Sezer who opposed even a vote in the TBMM on the bill without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. Turkish military commanders were seriously preoccupied with the question of “What should we do?” prior to the authorization vote, but eventually decided to stay out of the debates on this issue.226

Domestic political factors influenced Turkey’s burden sharing decisions much more in the second Gulf War than the first. Turkey's military and political elite was not as powerful as it was in the early 90’s. In the November 2002 elections, voters rejected the previous governing parties and allowed the fledgling, anti-establishment Justice and Development Party to form a government on its own. Due to its weak popular support and fractured party elite, the AKP government was vulnerable to public opinion and needed to build consensus in and out of the TBMM in order to maintain its legitimacy as a government. In this respect, the Turkish government acted much more like a Type IV rather than the Type I government seen in the first Persian Gulf War. Decision making was decentralized between Prime Minister’s Ecevit, Gül, and Erdogan, and President Sezer. Additionally, the AKP leadership’s uncertain control over its factionalized and

226 Ergin, "Looks Like We Missed That Train."
inexperienced deputies showed that the party had merely nominal control over the voting outcome. Because of its disorganization, TBMM members were more responsive to public opinion. Public opinion constrained elite decision making due to the public fears of a fight with an Islamic neighbor along with the subsequent economic devastation. The military, which traditionally influenced decisions on national security, sat on the sidelines when its initial advice was rebuffed. The military, therefore, had its own reasons for wanting the country’s new leaders to be accountable for their first major test with Washington. These domestic political factors convolved to constrain executive and state autonomy in supporting the U.S. coalition.

The Role of Legitimacy

Turkey’s burden sharing was influenced by legitimacy arguments but Turkish support to the coalition was primarily based on national interest considerations constrained by domestic politics. In the approach to the Iraq War, Turkish leadership, especially President Sezer and interim Prime Minister Gül opposed Turkish action in the absence of a UN Resolution authorizing force. Sezer, a former constitutional court judge, and Gül consistently resisted support to the U.S. effort without a supporting international resolution. Although elements in the foreign ministry and military supported U.S. efforts on the grounds that the U.S. had been a strategic partner of Turkey, the leadership stated on numerous occasions that Turkey’s support would be contingent on a UN mandate. In August 2002, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal meeting with Vice President Cheney stressed the need for a UN mandate on Iraq. In the meeting, Ziyal stressed the
need for “legitimacy” and “consensus.” 227 In the final deliberations before the parlamentary vote, major factions argued that Turkey should not support an illegitimate effort. In a six-hour meeting, the MGK drew a distinction between legitimacy and national interests stating, “a second UN Security Council resolution would be appropriate for the Iraq operation...However, if a second resolution is not passed but the operation is still unavoidable then Turkey will take all appropriate measures to safeguard its own interests.”228 In cabinet deliberations, President Sezer, and the Speaker of the National Assembly all insisted that the operation be based on international legitimacy.229 These arguments were more procedural than normative. Procedural legitimacy arguments reflect the viewpoint that behavior becomes legitimate when it is approved by authorized international institutions.230 Turkey was willing to support the invasion based on the legitimacy provided by a UN vote. Some elements in the MGK even argued that because the U.S. coalition had a wide range of nations participating, it had already gained legitimate status. Although those arguments did not convince the parliament to approve the U.S. deployment, it does show that Turkey had no normative arguments against the use of force in Iraq.

Once the war started however, and Ankara found itself isolated by the United States, legitimacy issues were weighed against state interest. In April 2003, the Turkish

227 Kohen, "To Hit or Not to Hit," 18, FBIS-NES-2002-0902.
228 Bila, "We Will Enter Iraq Not for USA but for Turkey.”
230 Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.
government agreed to support U.S. logistics needs in northern Iraq. This action brought public condemnation in the press with the argument, “what happened to international legitimacy? In that case, why did we reject the motion on foreign troop deployment on Turkish soil? Was not our aim to refrain from taking part in an illegitimate war?”

Additionally, in the summer of 2003, the Ankara agreed in principle to join the multinational coalition in Iraq before this was supported by either the United Nations, or the Iraqi Interim Government. Turkey agreed to this offer, after the U.S. ousted a small contingent of Turkish troops from Kirkuk. Turkey saw participation in the U.S. coalition as a means of gaining influence over policy in northern Iraq. Ankara concluded that U.S. reliance on Kurdish factions came at the expense of Turkish influence. Although Turkey later withdrew this offer of support, it was withdrawn at the request of the United States, not because Turkey was concerned with the legitimacy of the occupation. Turkey was willing to support the occupation force in Iraq, even without the cover of international legitimacy, because it saw that it had lost influence with the U.S. on Iraq policy. Additionally, Turkey’s support for the coalition did not change due to changes in legitimacy of the occupation. Turkish policy concerning Iraq remained consistent through several milestones. Turkey did not offer additional diplomatic, economic, or military support after the UN supported the occupation under Resolution 1551 through the general elections of January 2005.

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233 Ibid., 18-19.
Overall, legitimacy has some influence explaining Turkey’s lack of support for
the initial invasion into Iraq, however, Turkey’s need to influence U.S. policy on northern
Iraq soon outweighed legitimacy issues in policy venues.

Summary and Conclusions

The Bennett, Lepgold, Unger model’s synthesis of the dominant externally and
internally driven theories of foreign policy behavior provides a useful tool for analysis of
coalition burden sharing decisions. In the case of Turkey in the second Gulf War, it does
provide a predictive framework for analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. The fact
that the framework includes both external and domestic factors makes the model useful
for framing foreign policy issues and provides some predictive power for state decisions.
Turkey’s burden sharing model is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 depicts the path through the security model based on process tracing
evidence. Based on their experience in the first Gulf War coalition, Turkish elites did not
consider the U.S. led action a collective good, and saw the impending war effort as a
threat to more important private goods. Ankara considered the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein as manageable and considered a strengthened Kurdish federation as the
significant regional security challenge. Turkey’s lack of support for the second Iraq War
coalition reflects this security outlook. Any motivation for Ankara to cooperate with U.S.
demands is best explained by alliance dependence. Early in the negotiations process, the
foreign ministry and military bureaucracy advocated supporting U.S. demands strictly for
alliance dependence concerns. However, public opinion and the political elite were against a military operation in Iraq. In this manner, Turkey’s assistance during the initial stages of the Iraq war can be seen as an “involuntary defection” in that the government was prepared to support U.S. policy, but the public was not. Turkey’s lessons from the first Gulf War were hardly positive. With the end of U.S. security assistance, and with economic sanctions against Iraq still in place more than a decade after the invasion of Kuwait, many Turks felt that they had little to show for their cooperation with Washington and Europe in the Gulf. The AKP leadership’s uncertain control over its factionalized and inexperienced deputies allowed the TBMM to be swayed by public opinion rather than party loyalty. Unlike in the first Gulf War, public opinion constrained
the AKP’s decision making due to its increased influence as a result of the November 2002 elections. The military, which traditionally influenced decisions on national security did not significantly steer the policy debate. Once it was clear that the U.S. would go to war with Iraq, the military leaders of the MGK preferred supporting the Iraq coalition. The military argued that Turkish strategy concerning Kurdistan was best served by joining the coalition and inserting Turkish forces into northern Iraq. However, the military elected to remain publicly silent so that blame for a failed vote would fall on the AKP itself. Turkey’s failure to permit U.S. troops to enter Iraq from the north resulted in the ultimate irony. Turkey avoided alliance entrapment, but America’s thinly spread and relatively lightly armed forces were left with no option but to rely on Iraqi Kurds to control and eventually minister to northern Iraq. American promises to keep the Kurds out of the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk were unsupportable and the United States was left with no choice but to depend on its Kurdish allies as indispensable force generators in the north.

In contrast to the first Gulf War case, elite learning and state domestic structure best describes the change of burden sharing in the second Gulf War case. Preexisting beliefs on the influence of a military operation in Iraq informed elite decision making before the U.S. even requested support from Turkey. Since Sezer, Ecevit, and Gül saw little to gain from the U.S. operation, they had little motivation to act independent of public opinion. Erdogan, although supportive of the United States, was not in a government position to dictate the vote. Unlike the first case, the bureaucracy was the
primary constituency advocating support for U.S. requests. In contrast to Özal, however, President Sezer refused to advocate the bureaucracy’s arguments to the public. The fractured Justice and Development Party was not likely to counter public opinion on the heels of the devastating general election that put it into power. Although U.S. financial incentives were massive, the chief executive and government were too weak to provide more than token support to the U.S. coalition.

Analysis of the second Gulf War suggests that Turkey’s dominant burden sharing strategy was to provide the least amount of support necessary to avoid abandonment by U.S. in the future. Based on this model, U.S. policy makers should have been concerned that Turkish support for a northern front was not a “slam-dunk.” In this case, leaders’ preferences except for party leader Erdogan’s were aligned with public opinion until war was inevitable. The Security Decision Model suggests that U.S. strategy would have been better satisfied vis-à-vis Turkey if it had identified the threat of Kurdish independence perceived within Turkey. If U.S. policymakers had given Turkey a significant voice on policy decisions regarding northern Iraq, Turkey would have been less likely to feel threatened by an Iraq intervention. Unfortunately, this position was not reached until late in the negotiations with the U.S., and was never sufficiently presented to the Council of Ministers and the TBMM, resulting in a “no” vote.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: COALITION BURDEN SHARING AS AN AREA OF STUDY

This research supports the conclusions of scholars who specialize in foreign policy decision making that state relations are multidimensional and therefore are rarely explained by parsimonious theories. This analysis of the burden sharing decisions of South Korea, Germany, and Turkey suggests that parsimonious theories of alliances fail to explain why states assume military, financial, and diplomatic burdens in multilateral coalitions. In their exhaustive quantitative study of alliances, Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan contend that a generalized theory of alliance has limited validity. Rather, they suggest that these theories provide a useful starting point for examining the effects of intervening variables in order to define the scope and limits of alternative explanations of causes and effects.¹

The Security Decision Model provides an explanatory framework to explain foreign policy behavior by determining the contingent conditions when a particular hypothesis is applicable. This integrated model offers a method to explain complex behavior by allowing the scholar to extend mono-causal approaches to the multifaceted nature of real-world decisions. This research found that the Security Decision Model offered in Chapter 3 provided an excellent framework for explaining the influence of the spectrum of constraints and opportunities as defined by the dynamics of the international system, as well as the capabilities to account for domestic political limitations. Burden

¹ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 219-26.
sharing is an integral element of foreign policy decision making and hence requires knowledge both of the international environment in which states make decisions and the domestic environment where policy makers translate decisions into action. As highlighted in the foreign policy literature—but often overlooked in the broader international relations canon—states rarely act as unitary actors but rather present a myriad of responses to the international environment based on the opportunities and constraints provided by the domestic environment. State decisions to commit resources to an ad hoc security coalition are influenced by the ability of the government to extract resources from the society.

Despite its ability to integrate mono-causal explanations into an integrated approach, the Security Decision Model developed by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger possessed one significant limitation. The domestic institutions and politics hypotheses in the original model presented a significant obstacle for the researcher endeavoring to predict state burden-sharing behavior. The domestic influence block in the Bennett, et al, burden sharing model is an amalgam of hypotheses on the influence of the executive, bureaucratic politics, legislatures, political elite, and society as a whole on foreign policy decision making. This conceptualization provided an overly complicated theoretical approach to discerning the influence of domestic politics on executive decision making. The interaction of the theories was underspecified in that the researcher required a vast knowledge of each state’s domestic processes to adequately model the influence of each of the domestic factors. As a result, predictions based on
domestic influence were difficult to make since the model did not specify when each domestic factor would be dominant. The complex interactions of the domestic variables made predictions indeterminate and complicated the explanatory framework. This study simplified the domestic institutions and politics block of the model by substituting the domestic structure theory developed by Susan Peterson, in her work *Crisis Bargaining and the State*, into the domestic institutions and politics module of the Bennett model. This substitution was a progressive improvement that simplified the model’s assumptions while at the same time improving the predictive capability of the model.

By replacing the domestic institutions and politics block with the Peterson typology presented in chapter three, this research improved security model in four ways. First, the Peterson typology formalizes the link between public opinion and foreign policy. It explicitly stipulates the causal mechanisms in which public opinion influences foreign policy decisions, and explains how public opinion is translated into policy in differing domestic structures. Second, the Peterson typology marks which decision making constituencies (executive, bureaucracy, or legislature) will influence a burden sharing decision based on state structure. Third, when incorporated into the Security Decision Model, the Peterson typology makes firm predictions of foreign policy behavior based external influences on government structure. Lastly, the Peterson typology

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2 David Auerswald notes that he had to simplify the complicated methodology in Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." Gerald Steinberg in a review of *Friends in Need* notes “the heavy weapons of social science were too powerful for the issues at hand” in Steinberg, 743-44.
simplifies understanding the domestic interactions that influence foreign policy decision-making.

This chapter first summarizes this study’s conclusions regarding the suitability of the Peterson typology in the Security Decision Model. This research shows that the Peterson typology provided an excellent framework for analyzing the influence of domestic politics on state foreign policy decisions. However, the structural approach employed showed some limitation, especially during a period of national elections. This study found that national elections significantly affected the domestic structure and increased the influence of society over the executive. Then I discuss the impact of legitimacy concerns and how they are translated to the decision making elite through the domestic structure. Finally, I offer policy implications based on this research and a recommend additional areas of research.

**Domestic Influence on Foreign Policy**

The three case studies, each representing a different cell in the Peterson typology, highlight the influence of differing domestic structure on burden sharing outcomes. When controlling for external factors, domestic structure—in the form of the relationship between the state executive and legislature—significantly influences a given state’s burden sharing behavior. Executive authority and parliamentary accountability appreciably affects the ability of a state to contribute military forces to an international coalition, especially in instances where threat or collective action pressures are low. States with strong executive power in the area of military oversight are less constrained in
providing military forces, while states with considerable parliamentary influence are likely to show a significantly lower level of commitment.

The Republic of Korea represents a weak Type I domestic structure in the Peterson typology, in which decision-making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny. According to Peterson, the chief executive maintains significant influence over foreign policy and is relatively free from legislative oversight in a Type I structure. The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized in the past two decades, still favors strong executive leadership in which the President sets the tone and agenda for the National Assembly. Although executive prerogatives usually gain traction in the National Assembly, the introduction of civic groups and an opposition legislature made the government a weak Type I state. The Korean president enjoys significant influence over the legislature, especially in the area of foreign policy. In addition, the assembly members are relatively independent from society and reflect the interests of their party rather than their constituents. In a Type I state, the beliefs of the chief executive are expected to dominate policy decisions and therefore his or her preferences should have significant influence over executive decision making.

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4 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."

5 Moon, "US-South Korean Relations."
In the case of South Korea, the use of the Peterson typology to determine the influence of public opinion on government decisions was a useful tool in explaining state behavior, once President Roh’s preferences were known. Using the rhetoric of Roh’s presidential campaign, one would predict that Roh preferred a loosening of the ROK-U.S. alliance relationship. However, since actors and structures are mutually constituted, exogenous factors can dramatically alter an actor’s preferences and the structures where those preferences are translated into action. State behavior and foreign policy preferences must thus be examined within an intersubjective social context.\(^6\) In this particular case, the North Korean nuclear crisis dramatically reordered Roh’s preferences concerning the ROK relationship with the United States.\(^7\) A pragmatic politician, Roh navigated a political middle course that reflected the need for the ROK to address the crisis on the peninsula by pursuing a more conservative agenda with the United States. Roh ideally sought an equitable alliance relationship with the United States, but against the backdrop of the North Korean nuclear crisis, Roh was forced to make more realistic policy decisions, including supporting the coalition of the willing. Roh realized that resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis was the most critical foreign policy challenge facing his presidency.

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\(^7\) According to Andrew Moravcsik, states seek to realize their distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states in the international system. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics."
Once Roh’s preferences were known, the Peterson model accurately predicted a high level of burden sharing within the framework of the Security Decision Model. South Korea’s Iraq policy was developed and implemented by a few close advisors that were loyal to Roh and sensitive to his alliance dependence concerns. Roh was able to drastically change his administration’s policy towards the ROK-U.S. alliance and provide a significant number of soldiers to the coalition of the willing, despite significant domestic opposition. Once President Roh publicly committed to the coalition of the willing, legislative and societal pressure failed to alter the level or composition of Korean commitment to the coalition of the willing. The Roh administration set the public and legislative agenda, influenced key lawmakers to insure a positive vote in the National Assembly, and eventually gained legislative support for the first significant off peninsula deployment since the Vietnam War.

Although President Roh maintained significant control over the National Assembly, he still needed to formulate policy that reflected the dominant domestic preference against the Iraq deployment. The Roh administration frequently anticipated public attitudes and intentionally constrained its assistance to the Iraq coalition in an effort to alleviate public concerns. When determining the configuration of the fall 2003 deployment request, the Blue House and the National Security Council (NSC), led by Vice Chief Lee Jong-seok, were concerned that putting Korean troops in danger would have significant negative repercussions on President Roh’s public opinion ratings.8

8 “South Korean Defense Minister Denies Number of Troops to Iraq Decided.”
Therefore, the NSC made anticipatory concessions that limited the scope of the deployment to safer areas in Iraq to ensure passage in the National Assembly and to disarm public opposition. The Blue House further noted the significant public opposition to the first deployment in their arguments to minimize the size of the deployment. In addition, the Roh administration made anticipatory concessions on troop withdrawals in an attempt to disarm public opposition to the deployment. This approach seems successful since, as of May 2008, the Korean government still has approximately 650 personnel deployed to Iraq. A Type I configuration does not imply that domestic attitudes are totally ignored, but rather that similar to an authoritarian regime, the administration needed to balance external needs against the level of domestic unrest.  

Rather than allowing public opinion form the policy, Roh managed domestic expectations so that he could commit the necessary resources to the coalition to meet Korea’s foreign policy goals.

The German case study proved surprising because the 2002 national elections changed the existing state structure, and allowed Germany to act as a Type II state rather than a Type IV state. German foreign policy decision making is typically decentralized due to Germany’s federal arrangement in which numerous state and federal level bureaucratic offices influence foreign policy outcomes. Germany’s decentralized constitutional structure instituted under the Basic Law ensures that German governments are weak and civil society is strong. The federal government is required to compromise

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and to consult with the governing coalition, federal offices, individual states, and opposition parties. Foreign policy is the purview of the chancellor and the foreign minister but, because each is typically their respective party’s leader, policy can often be divergent. To that end, a Type II state has a more centralized policy machinery than a Type IV state, but still must reflect public and legislative pressures. Due to the national elections, incumbent Chancellor Schröder was able to commandeer the foreign policy process and imprint his preferences on German policy by appealing directly to public attitudes concerning the use of force in Iraq.

The Schröder administration issued a categorical “no” to participation in the coalition of the willing and actively engaged in counter-coalition-building against the recommendations of the Foreign Office and Defense Ministry. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S.-led coalition—even under a UN mandate—was unusual given the German government bureaucracy’s preference to address unfavorable U.S. policies unobtrusively. As Schröder vocalized Germany’s opposition to the war as a means to appeal to the public in the general election, he was able to accomplish a policy coup and develop Germany’s Iraq policy position individually, rather than through the typical collaborative process that characterizes German foreign policy. The appeal to mass public opinion resulted in less elite coalition building and policy coordination than would normally be seen in a Type IV typology.

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Domestic issues particularly drove Germany’s position regarding the Iraq war. Schröder, leading the Social Democrat–Green coalition, steered a policy course that would preserve the coalition’s parliamentary majority. As predicted by the domestic politics framework, Germany was unable to show strong support to the Iraq effort due to the influence of the legislature and polity on deployment decisions. Given the requirement for a Bundestag mandate, Schröder would have had to expend significant political capital—which he did not have—building a domestic coalition to pass a mandate supporting the use of force. Helmut Kohl, as well as Schröder, had performed this political maneuver throughout the 1990s, but the vote for the earlier Afghanistan intervention demonstrated that the German people had become war weary. In the Iraq case, Schröder assessed that his policy must reflect public opinion to ensure the survival of his government given the fragile state of his coalition’s majority in the Bundestag. Such a decision would have required a formal mandate for which there was no firm majority in the coalition parties. The Schröder government proved unable to bridge the gap between its own domestic supporters and its international allies for two significant reasons. First, leading German policy-makers were not convinced that the Iraq issue demanded a military response. Secondly, the continuing German debate on the use of force through the 1990s had the cumulative effect of shrinking the government’s majority with every military commitment abroad.

The strong role of the Bundestag in approving German military deployments ensured that the domestic constituency would influence Germany’s role in the Iraq War
coalition. Ultimately, the German government provided only the support that could be garnered without a Bundestag mandate. As a NATO partner unwilling to completely reject the U.S. role in the alliance, Germany provided a significant amount of support to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as those efforts did not necessitate a parliamentary vote. For the Iraq effort, Germany provided significant intelligence on Iraqi force disposition, allowed full use of German-based U.S. infrastructure, allowed unrestricted over flight rights, provided security forces to guard American bases, and eventually trained Iraqi security forces.

Finally, Turkey was selected to explore the influence of a Type IV government. Although Turkey reflected Type I tendencies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which its foreign policy was forged in a highly centralized manner without societal input, the country evolved into a Type IV state during the buildup to the Iraq War. Chronic inflation combined with persistent problems with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers Party generated a public unease with the centrally controlled authoritarian government. As a result, Turkish press and political activists gained access to the government throughout the late 1990s. The November 2002 elections, which ushered in a new ruling party, signified a major realignment of the Turkish political landscape. Members of parliament were fractured from their party leadership and held more accountable by their constituents.

A Type IV structure exists when the foreign policy decision process is composed of a number of different offices that share the responsibility for foreign policy decision
making and when the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In this type of state, national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures and the state’s policy response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Unable to act alone, individual policy makers must recognize domestic opponents who may appeal directly to the public. Interest groups, political parties, the media, and public opinion shape the policy-making process because the foreign policy executive is responsible to the legislature and, indirectly, to the public. Because of the many actors formulating policy, even the most powerful leaders must build a coalition of support for their preferred policy.

The Turkish government was more responsive to public opinion and less supportive of U.S. intervention in 2003 than in 1991. The United States had hoped to use Turkey to attack Iraq from the north, but the National Assembly refused to grant access to Turkish bases after weeks of wrangling over financial compensation and arrangements for sending Turkish troops into northern Iraq. This stalemate between the government and the legislature occurred for two reasons. First, due to a proliferation of private television and radio, the government no longer had a monopoly on the dissemination of information and the shaping of public discourse. The government and military officials had to increasingly appeal to the public for support. Secondly, as a result to the November 2002 general election in which the ruling AKP party won only 34 per cent of the popular vote, it needed to be more responsive to electoral concerns.
Due to its weak popular support and fractured party elite, the AKP government was vulnerable to public opinion and needed to build consensus in and out of the National Assembly in order to garner support for a mandate allowing U.S. troops to operate from Turkish soil. After the rout of the Republican People’s Party in the November 2002 general election—in which the government’s coalition suffered an unprecedented set back by losing all of its seats—Turkish leaders were very reluctant to manipulate public opinion that was decidedly against an Iraq intervention. Government and party leaders waited until the war was a foregone conclusion before trying to convince the public that Turkey might benefit by cooperating in a U.S.-led war against Iraq. The AKP party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan could not immediately assume the Prime Minister position due to previous Islamic activity that excluded him from political office. While this issue was raised in the constitutional court, the AKP deputy Abdullah Gül assumed the office of Prime Minister. Being vulnerable to a vote of no confidence, the interim prime minister and president could not afford to take positions independent of the electorate. Due to his weak political mandate, party leader, and incoming Prime Minister, Erdogan tolerated a high level of defection in AKP voting on the Iraq War resolution to avoid a permanent party split. Typically, Turkish politics parties vote in a bloc in the National Assembly, however, voting procedures for the March 1 vote encouraged individual rather than block voting. Erdogan was sensitive to the polarization in his party on the Iraq issue and sent a clear signal to the deputies that they would be able to individually vote “no” without repercussions. In his position as Prime Minister
Elect, Erdogan was concerned that making the resolution binding to the party ministers could permanently divide his party before he was even seated.\textsuperscript{11} He further made a rare parliamentary move by calling for a closed rather than an open parliamentary vote. This unusual closed vote allowed the parliament to cast its votes confidentially; only the vote totals were made public, therefore, deputies were not individually accountable for their votes. The most plausible explanation for the closed vote was for Erdogan to defend against a vote of “no confidence” and because such high-profile public defection would send a signal that he was weak and therefore risk the collapse of his government.\textsuperscript{12}

Political observers speculate that the outgoing Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, who had serious reservations with the authorization bill, used the closed vote as cover to persuade other AKP deputies to vote “no.” The closed vote enabled AKP cabinet members to vote “no” to a Turkish mandate without exposing to the public the weakness of the party leader.

The military, which traditionally influenced decisions on national security, remained detached from decision making once its initial advice was rebuffed. The military, concerned that the newly elected Islamic administration would blame it for a poor outcome, remained aloof so that the country’s new leaders would be held accountable for their first major test with Washington.

\textsuperscript{11} Ozdamar and Taydas, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and the Iraq War: The Turkish Case," 38.
These domestic political factors merged to constrain executive and state autonomy in supporting the U.S. coalition. In this manner, Turkey’s failure to pass legislation allowing U.S. access to Turkey for a northern front in its war with Iraq can be seen as an “involuntary defection” in that the government was prepared to support U.S. policy, but domestic concerns translated through the National Assembly resulted in an outcome where Turkey kept its distance from the intervention.

Ultimately, state domestic structure was an important indicator of a state’s likelihood to provide material support to the Iraq War coalition. As predicted by the Security Decision Model, South Korea, the Type I state, provided significant levels of military support compared to the states that had more legislative influence over military deployment issues. South Korean President Roh was able to influence party politics in the unicameral legislature in order to support his desired deployment configuration. Although disagreement existed in his core constituency, he was able to build a voting bloc that would pass the deployment mandate.

The influence of a strong executive contrasts sharply with the Type IV example of Turkey. Incoming Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, on the other hand, was supportive of U.S. efforts to use Turkey as a staging area for the Iraq War, but was unable to garner the necessary legislative support through typical party discipline. Since Erdogan had to overcome legal issues to claim his position as Prime Minister, he maintained a very weak position vis-à-vis the legislature. He was unable to build enough support in the National Assembly to approve the memorandum of agreement that had been negotiated between
Turkey and the United States. Erdogan’s semi-official government position allowed other government members such as Interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and President Sezer to influence decision making. Eventually, Erdogan’s measure supporting the U.S. was narrowly defeated in the legislature; Turkey would not allow U.S. troops to transit into Iraq. Once Erdogan consolidated power and the Turkish public sensed the increased threat of Kurdish independence in Iraq, the government was able to convince the legislature became more supportive of measures supporting the Iraq War coalition.

Germany’s support to the Iraq War coalition was also significantly influenced by domestic structure and politics. Germany was not expected by the Bush administration to substantially support the Iraq War coalition due to its history of using force only within a NATO context and overwhelming negative public reaction to U.S. Iraq policy. However, Germany’s vociferous international opposition to the effort was unexpected. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, by exploiting public attitudes for domestic political gain, ensured that a positive public reaction to any German effort in Iraq could not be supported. Since government institutions are decentralized, and policy is highly influenced by the legislature, the government was both unable and unwilling to overcome the negative view of the war constructed by Schröder. Unlike Korea, in which the government maintains significant influence over the press and the legislature, Germany was unable to build public support for German participation in the coalition.

It is important to emphasize that domestic political structure is highly dependent on issue area. A Type I state for security issues may well be a Type II state for economic
issues. In South Korea, for example, the executive has significantly more influence over foreign policy than he has over economic policy. Thus, an examination of the policy-making apparatus for a particular issue area is necessary to determine the state structure for analysis.

This study found the Peterson framework especially helpful in determining the influence of public opinion and the legislature on state burden sharing decisions. The following section tests the Peterson framework against the burden sharing levels of select European Union participants in the Iraq War.

**Influence of State Structure on Military Deployments**

The finding of this study that state domestic structure is an important indicator of material and diplomatic support to the coalition of the willing seems to hold when looking beyond these three case studies. States in which the executive maintained significant decision making control over, or independent from, the legislature showed a greater propensity for a high level of commitment to the coalition. The major contributor states all possessed a state structure in which the executive maintains considerable authority to deploy military forces without the consent of parliament.\(^{13}\) The United Kingdom and Poland, the two largest contributors to the coalition after the United States, are states with parliaments that possess weak war powers. According to a study by the

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\(^{13}\) Although the U.S. and Great Britain were not required to gain legislative approval, both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair sought the support of their respective legislatures before engaging in armed conflict. This move for a vote by the legislative arms reflects the fact that public opinion supported the intervention in both the U.S. and U.K. See EOS Gallup Europe., "International Crisis Survey 21st-27th of January 2003," (2003).
University of Düsseldorf, the United Kingdom’s degree of parliamentary war powers are noted as deficient, meaning that there is no parliamentary action or debate required for the use of military force. The same study designates Poland’s parliamentary war powers as basic, meaning that only deployment notification is required to parliament. Conversely, states where the legislature exerts a significant influence over decision making showed a greater likelihood for no war involvement, or involvement with a very low level of commitment. Only one EU nation with comprehensive parliamentary oversight, Lithuania, provided military support to the coalition. In this case, Lithuania’s military assistance can be attributed to its desire to achieve integration into Western structures, particularly the EU and NATO. Ultimately, a high level of parliamentary influence over decision making in the EU was highly associated with a low degree of war involvement in Iraq.

Limitations of Structural Approaches: The Influence of National Elections

State structure was an important indicator of material and diplomatic support to the coalition of the willing, however, national elections may significantly alter the influence of society over the executive. Studies of American politics suggest that the president is likely to try to maximize the chances of reelection by not committing to domestically unpopular commitments, even if this damages the state’s reputation in the

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international community. This observation has been generalized into the international community. In his quantitative study on the influence of election cycles on war propensity, Kurt Gaubatz finds that election cycle timing significantly influences a state’s conflict behavior. His research suggests that democratic states tend to commit to more wars early in the election cycle and significantly fewer wars late in the cycle. Although he is careful to assign causality, he proposes that executives are unwilling to take domestically unpopular positions until safely beyond an election. Atsugi Tago finds that leaders are eight times more likely to terminate a state’s contribution to a coalition during an election month rather than a non-election month. These research programs suggest that the electorate influence over the executive drastically increases during national elections. Considering the influence of society during elections, states are predicted to show qualities of a Type II or Type IV state during an election cycle. National leaders are unlikely to make unpopular decisions while trying to gain reelection, and assembly members are more likely to be responsive to constituent concerns during election periods that affect them.

All three case studies experience national elections during the period leading to the Iraq war and all three displayed some divergence from nominal state typology during the election period. Turkey’s change was considerable. Turkey, which is typically

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17 Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War."
18 Atsushi Tago, "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30-September 2, 2007).
considered a centralized-autonomous Type I state, behaved as a Type IV state due to the instability caused by national elections. Voters rejected the establishment parties and instead elected an inexperienced, anti-establishment AKP to form a government. Due to its weak popular support and fractured party elite, the AKP government was vulnerable to public opinion. Due to the uncertainty of Party Leader Erdogan’s eligibility for the Prime Minister position, the government functioned in a weak and uncoordinated manner for a number of months. During this period, the government was unable to mount a campaign supporting the Iraq War coalition and the newly elected assembly members felt more influenced by their constituencies than the party leadership. The result of this arrangement is that the Gül/Erdogan government was unable to override public opinion, which a Type I state would normally be able to do.

Germany also underwent structural changes during the election. Chancellor Schröder was able to use the Iraq War as a wedge issue in the national elections and, in the process, centralized the policy making process concerning the Iraq War. Although this marked a change in regime type from a Type IV to a Type II, the foreign policy result was only marginally changed. Germany was unlikely to make a contribution to the coalition due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War and the necessity of garnering a Bundestag mandate; therefore, Germany would be expected to provide nearly the same level of support as a Type II or Type IV state. The visible difference was that Schröder was able to personalize Germany’s foreign policy and present an anti-war position more
extreme than what would have likely been formulated through the policy coordination process.

Finally, South Korean national and assembly elections influenced Korean decision making, but the tradition of strong presidentialism prevailed. President Roh formulated policy with an eye to domestic concerns, but once Korea’s burden sharing decisions were announced, the government was able to deflect legislative and public opposition. Although elections did not change the regime type in this case, they did allow the public more influence over policy than would be typically afforded in the Korean domestic structure.

This study confirms the conclusions of Atusugi Tago in “When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable?” and David Auerswald in Disarmed Democracies that the coalition leader is reluctant to commit to the use of force during periods of national elections if the conflict is unpopular with the public. A political leader must expend a great deal of political capital to deploy forces to combat and may be unwilling to do so when faced with a public that is opposed to the intervention. Since an election is a period of heightened accountability for an executive, a failed coercive diplomacy runs the risk of severe penalty from the public. National elections represent a period of structural instability in which the electorate, and hence society, has a larger measure of authority

19 Tago finds that levels of commitment to a coalition are drastically reduced during election periods, while Auerswald suggests that executives will be reluctant to make threats and enter into armed conflict during election periods. Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, Tago, "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’

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over the executive. The heightened accountability of the executive, or in many cases the legislature, during a national election may make support to a coalition prohibitively costly. Therefore, one can expect lower levels of commitment when a leader, or his party, is subject to elections unless the military action is supported by the public.

Structural predictions are hazardous in the aftermath of national elections. One cannot adequately predict the domestic structure until the government has sufficient time to consolidate and become comfortable in its role. In the case of Turkey, the AKP could not begin to consolidate power until Prime Minister Erdogan gained approval by the constitutional court won a follow on by-election. During Turkey’s transition period, government function was highly decentralized and the party apparatus was ineffective in controlling assembly votes. Once approved as prime minister, Erdogan consolidated power and gained influence over his party’s assembly members, making Turkey once again reflect a Type I rather than a Type IV categorization. Since structural category can drastically alter predictions, one must be careful in assessing government structure during and immediately after national elections.

**Policy Implications of Domestic Structure**

State domestic structure significantly influences the ability of the executive to execute military force policy options. An executive that is autonomous from the legislature retains significant freedom to employ military options while those that answer to the legislature must gain legislative approval to utilize military courses of action. This
observation has immediate policy implications for two NATO partners of the United States.

The German *Bundestag*, as I have shown earlier, maintains significant control over government use of force decisions. Germany’s coalition government has recently struggled with an effort by conservative politicians, encouraged by Chancellor Merkel, to drop some of its post-World War II inhibitions and constitutional constraints about robust security measures, including the use of military force abroad and at home. The conservative CDU has proposed a plan for Germany’s parliament to cede greater discretion over troop deployments to the executive branch by creating a new National Security Council based in the chancellor’s office. The CDU paper suggests that the National Security Council should have the authority to approve military responses to crisis situations without waiting for parliamentary approval. The Social Democrats and other opposition parties roundly criticized the idea of creating a National Security Council that would be based in the chancellery. If the German National Security Council were approved, it would likely provide the chancellery with considerable institutional influence over foreign policy.

In contrast, the British House of Lords has suggested that the prime minister’s war powers may have gained too much autonomy from parliamentary oversight. The United

Kingdom is currently considering limiting the prime minister’s authority for deploying military forces. Historically, British constitutional arrangements for deploying armed forces have been an unconstrained instrument of foreign policy. Additionally, the United Kingdom’s courts have taken the view that the exercise of the deployment power is neither justifiable nor subject to review in domestic courts. As a consequence, not only is the exercise of the power immune from judicial review, but such actions are legal as a matter of domestic law.\textsuperscript{23} Currently, Parliament has no formal role in approving deployments, although governments have usually kept Parliament informed about the decision to use force and the progress of military campaigns.\textsuperscript{24} As a response, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution has recommended a parliamentary convention to determine the role Parliament should play in making decisions to deploy force or forces outside the United Kingdom to war, intervention in an existing conflict, or to environments where there is a risk that the forces will be engaged in conflict.\textsuperscript{25} The government responded that it is imperative that the executive have the authority to “take decisions flexibly and quickly using prerogative powers” in order to meet security demands and that existing parliamentary oversight is adequate.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 42.
The analysis of executive versus legislative influence over alliance decision making is an important area of study, particularly considering executive ability to deploy national armed forces. The Security Decision Model, particularly with the domestic structure typology, provides decision makers with a framework for assessing the potential impact of structural decisions.

**The Influence of Legitimacy on Burden Sharing Decisions**

Concerns about international legitimacy play an integral role in burden sharing decisions. This efficiency advantage was noted by Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations*, “Power exercised with moral or legal authority must be distinguished from naked power... legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power.”\(^{27}\) Additionally, Morgenthau affirms the legitimacy that international organizations, such as the UN, confer on a military effort, “Power exercised in self-defense or in the name of the United Nations has a better chance to succeed than equivalent power exercised by an ‘aggressor’ nation or in violation of international law.”\(^{28}\) As stated in Chapter two, legitimacy may be either normative or procedural and thus reflect a different source of authority. Procedural legitimacy arguments represent the viewpoint that behavior is legitimated when it is approved by legitimate international institutions.\(^{29}\) Actions are collectively legitimized by the

\(^{27}\) Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 32.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.*
consensus built by a body of statute under multilateral endorsement. On the other hand, normative legitimacy reflects the publicly held belief that an action is morally right or wrong. This research found each state had legitimacy concerns; however, these concerns were an incomplete indicator of state action within the Iraq War coalition. Domestic structure and the influence of society on the elements of government were important intervening variables affecting the influence of legitimacy concerns on coalition participation.

For South Korea, concerns regarding the legitimacy of the Iraq effort did not influence the decision to support the coalition, but did affect the composition and timing of the assistance offered. The initial decision to join the Iraq War coalition was not based on the international legitimacy of the operation, but rather on pragmatic concerns regarding U.S. policy towards North Korea. President Roh, in his first speech to the National Assembly, noted that the Iraq effort lacked legitimacy but was nevertheless in Korea’s national interest to support the coalition. Once Korea committed to the coalition efforts, however, legitimacy issues affected the composition of the deployment. The Korean contribution was framed as a humanitarian effort, rather than as participation in potentially illegitimate combat operations. Korea’s first deployment of soldiers consisted of a non-combat engineering unit of 600 soldiers and approximately 100 medical personnel to support coalition forces whose mission was to assist in controlling refugee flows and participate in postwar rehabilitation efforts. After noting the public objections

to the first deployment, the Roh administration ensured that the second deployment of 3,000 soldiers comprised a peacekeeping rather than a combat mission. The Roh administration clearly sent the message to the public that the additional soldiers were dispatched in order to maintain peace and public order in Iraq and not for a war against the Iraqi people. The Roh administration rejected the U.S. request for a combat role for its sizable deployment and instead negotiated for a mission and location that in effect guaranteed that the Korean contingent would see little combat. To that end, the ROK decision to support the Iraq War coalition was not largely influenced by legitimacy concerns; however, once committed, the Roh administration balanced legitimacy concerns with the demands of national interest. Due to the ROK’s Type I structure, Roh was able to overcome the public’s legitimacy concerns and commit to the Iraq intervention, however, because he did not maintain a majority in the National Assembly, he had to formulate a pragmatic policy looking forward to the national elections. The public’s concerns for the legitimacy of the Iraq effort influenced elite decision making, causing the Korean National Security Council to make anticipatory concessions in order to gain votes in the next assembly election.

German concerns with the Iraq War coalition exposed the difficulty in assessing legitimacy claims. German opposition illustrated the tension between normative and procedural legitimacy concerns. In the German case, these concerns conflicted, causing the government to take a foreign policy course based on German national interests. By stating that Germany would not support an intervention, even if sanctioned by the
internationally established process for lawful intervention, Germany invoked its normative standard concerning the use of military force above the procedural legitimacy standard provided by a UN Security Council. By rebuking the procedural authority provided by the UN Security Council process, Schröder discounted the legitimacy provided by the United Nations in the same manner that the Bush administration discounted the legitimacy provided in its push for war. In this manner, both Schröder and Bush placed national interest above the international legitimacy provided by a Security Council resolution.

Interestingly, Germany’s acquiescence to significant U.S. requests that did not require parliamentary sanction undermined German normative legitimacy arguments. Because Germany was a Type II state, Schröder could commit to the coalition in areas that did not require parliamentary support. Rather than rebuking U.S. efforts, the German government streamlined and enabled U.S. logistic and intelligence support for the war effort. The public showed little interest in lessening German support to U.S. forces transitioning to Iraq. In effect, the government and public provided sanction to the Iraq War effort as long as German forces were not directly involved. German support to the war effort was significant, gaining it the distinction as “non-coalition but cooperating.”

Turkey’s burden sharing was influenced by legitimacy arguments, but Turkish support to the coalition was primarily based on national interest considerations constrained by domestic politics. In the approach to the Iraq War, both President Sezer, a former constitutional court judge, and Gül consistently resisted contributing to the U.S.
effort without a supporting international resolution. However, national interest also influenced Turkish decision making. The National Security Council drew a distinction between legitimacy and national interests stating, “a second UN Security Council resolution would be appropriate for the Iraq operation... However, if a second resolution is not passed but the operation is still unavoidable then Turkey will take all appropriate measures to safeguard its own interests.” The Council approved a U.S. deployment through Turkey, but the parliament later failed to pass the authorization for Turkish participation. Once again, the Turkish case illustrated that the government took legitimacy concerns into account, but then formulated policy based on national interest. Because Turkey was a Type IV structure, domestic concerns on the legitimacy of the effort were able to override government decisions.

This research demonstrates that legitimacy concerns were a necessary but not sufficient indicator of support to the coalition of the willing. Legitimacy concerns are transmitted to the decision making elite through public opinion. Domestic structure, especially the influence of society on the government, affects the ability of legitimacy concerns to sway government policy. In all cases, the decision making elite addressed the issue of the legitimacy of the Iraq War. In states where the leadership was autonomous from society, legitimacy concerns had a less significant effect than in states where the public had more influence over decision making. The Security Decision Model accounts for the effect by incorporating public opinion and domestic structure.
Burden sharing as defined in this study is an important yet relatively novel area of study in international relations. This research fills a gap in the existing burden sharing and collective action research program by improving on the only analytical model that seeks to explain coalition burden sharing across a wide range of coalition types. Burden sharing research typically sought to answer how states manage defense burdens as a function of overall defense spending within a formal alliance structure. This scholarly work seeks to explain state contributions to collective action organizations, such as NATO. This view of burden sharing, however, is too narrowly defined and excludes the burdens that nations faces when called to participate in a wide range of multinational efforts. By investigating the conditions that influenced participation in ad hoc security coalitions, Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger broadened the collective action research program beyond formal alliance defense burdens. Their work explained the motivations for nations to contribute resources to military operations. This distinction is important since it is military operations that are not governed by an alliance agreement that predominate in today’s international environment. This dissertation further extends the coalition burden sharing research by confirming the validity of the original Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model and by simplifying the assumptions of the domestic institutions and politics hypotheses in that model.

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31 David Auerswald proffers a model of coalition burden sharing that is limited to wars of choice. See Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."
This research informs the academic community in two ways. First, this study continues the burden sharing debate into areas of great importance to national leaders. Although the study of formal alliance defense burdens is necessary, this dissertation continues the debate on the relevance of operational burdens on state conduct. The war in Iraq highlights the fact that even hegemonic states will seek to share burdens across the international community for military operations. Since nations are increasingly employing military force as part of ad hoc or hybrid coalition structures, the results of this study are important. As is evidenced in Afghanistan, burden sharing in a particular military operation is of acute interest to participating nations. Immense friction has developed in NATO over the burdens being shared in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Germany has been soundly critiqued for not providing forces to the restive areas of Afghanistan. Although on paper the German participation appears robust, the Bundestag mandate allows its forces to only participate in stability and reconstruction missions surrounding Kabul rather than combat missions against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This mandate has fomented considerable angst among NATO partners, particularly Canada and the UK who have suffered heavier causalities carrying the combat burden.32 According to a 2007 report concerning burden sharing in Afghanistan, the coalition’s internal cohesion is becoming increasingly stressed due to this burden sharing inequality. The willingness to share risks has become a key alliance

issue. National caveats, which limit participation in risky mission areas, put the fundamental principle of alliance solidarity at risk. This research presents an important tool that informs government decision makers on the influences that determine burden sharing outcomes.

Second, this dissertation presents a model that may explain a greater range of coalition behavior. Since all coalition decisions involve the balancing of international and domestic interests, the model presented in this dissertation provides a framework for understanding the influence of these interests on other types of international coalitions. This model should be tested in areas of policy other than military coalition burden sharing to test this assertion. Subsequent burden sharing research should explore the applicability of the Security Decision Model in non-military areas of foreign policy. Especially promising would be a study that seeks to explain state burden decisions in response to a natural disaster or refugee crisis.

This investigation of state burden sharing provides an important tool for informing the policy community on the influence of international, domestic, and cognitive factors in forming burden sharing decisions. Using the model and methodology presented here, policy makers may make predictions on expected burden sharing outcomes and also determine the factors which most influence burden sharing decisions in a particular state. For example, this study finds that the U.S. government should have engaged the Turkish public as well as the government in an attempt to sell Turkish

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participation as a matter of national interest. Since the government was disorganized, there was no body to present national interest arguments to the public and assembly. One critique of U.S. diplomacy towards Turkey is that the State Department did not take an aggressive role in explaining to the Turkish public how a U.S intervention would meet Turkish national interests. Additionally, this study suggests that U.S. requests would be difficult for Turkey to implement. Since domestic structure had drastically changed since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and immediate threat had greatly diminished, Turkey would not be expected to provide a level of burden sharing greater than in 1991.

In a similar fashion, this study also informs the policy community and institutionalist research program on how structures of incentives, disincentives, rules, and norms affect states’ international and domestic behavior. States may manipulate international factors such as alliance dependence as a means to gain a greater share of support from a particular state. U.S. threats to reduce U.S. Forces Korea troops levels had significant influence on the decision making of the South Korean government. By threatening to adjust troop levels, the Bush administration forced the ROK government to assess its indigenous capability against the North Korean threat. By doing this, the U.S. was able to illustrate to the ROK government that its anti-U.S. rhetoric was unsupportable. South Korea was not able to risk a major U.S. reduction of forces on the peninsula. Similar drawdown threats towards Germany had a much smaller influence on

34 Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq.", Michael Rubin, A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War (Colombia International Affairs Online, Spring (Volume 4, Number 1) 2005 [cited November 14 2006]); available from http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/tpq/vol4-1/.
its burden sharing outcome. Since, Germany is less dependent on the United States for security it was less influenced by alliance dependence issues. Although the planned drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe was alarming, it did not significantly influence German burden sharing outcomes.

This study was limited in that its goal was to determine the influence of domestic structure on the Security Decision Model. In order to test the predictions of the Peterson domestic structure typology within the Security Decision Model I investigated a small range of cases that showed variation in domestic structure. To confirm further the applicability of this study’s adjustments to the model, it should be tested against a wider range of coalition partners. Additionally, the bulk of coalition burden sharing research involves U.S. led coalitions. In order to generalize the observations of this research to the greater international community, further research into non-U.S.-led coalitions is necessary. As a second phase of research, I intend to extend the suitability of the enhanced security model under differing conditions of coalition leadership, threat, and alliance dependence.

The goal of this research was to inform scholars and policy makers on why states assume seemingly unnecessary burdens in the pursuit of multinational objectives. The post-Cold War security challenges will continue to demonstrate the need for continued research into these burden sharing challenges under a variety of conditions. It is my profound hope that this research will contribute to the understanding of how to lead
successful collective actions and successfully share burdens across the international community.
## Appendix A – Coalition Summary

### Table A-1. Non-U.S. Coalition Countries Providing Troops to MNF-I, Dec 2003 - May 2007

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<th>Year Started Contributing Troops</th>
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Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq
APPENDIX B – RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Contribution
1. Did the country contribute to the second Gulf War coalition?
2. What was the official reason given by the executive for support or non-support? Was this message consistent across time? What constituencies is the executive trying to influence, domestic or international? Is the message consistent across the two?
3. If so, who initiated the contribution…U.S., coalition partner, or providing state?
4. Is the contribution military, financial, or political?
5. What was the timing of the contribution? Did the state take cues from others who joined the coalition?
6. What level of support was proposed and what level was actually contributed?
7. Did the contribution last throughout the Iraq effort (as defined in the research plan)? Was the contribution affected by the political goals of the coalition?
8. How does the contribution enhance the coalition effort?
9. What is the level of effort for the host country, i.e. percentage of military capability?
10. Was the contribution in Iraq or the wider CENTCOM AOR?

Learning
1. Did the state have a coalition experience with the U.S.?
2. Did the state have a non-U.S. coalition experience?
3. Did the state have a role in decision making during that experience?
4. Was the state rewarded with aid for joining their last coalition?
5. Are there learning effects from other states in a like experience?
6. What are the recent, vivid experiences that shape foreign policy?
7. What was the effect of previous experience on the executive and leading power constituencies?
8. Where there any other learning variables, such as cultural inclination to use or not use force?

Domestic Political Considerations
1. Which actors and agencies are the most influential in security decisions? Who is in this primary advisory group (PAG). List.
2. To whom does the leader turn for critical information and advice for security decisions?
3. Is the chief executive weak or strong on defense issues? Economic issues?
4. What is the constitutional structure? How does the constitutional structure affect security decisions?
5. Is the bureaucracy supportive of the Iraq War coalition? What offices influence security decisions? What bureaucratic maneuvers influenced coalition outcomes?
6. What are the parties and what is their position on the Iraq coalition? Does the party vote in a bloc that the executive controls? Is the party?

7. Are there legislative limitations on the use of force? If so, what is required to use the military?

8. Is the legislature unified or divided?

9. Is the legislature a coalition or majority government?

10. Does the same party hold the executive and a majority in the legislative branch?

11. Did the legislature or similar body support the coalition effort?

12. Does the public support the coalition contribution? What are the indications of public support or non-support?

13. What are the avenues for public influence on government decisions?

14. Were elections held during the negotiations? During the mission? What was the influence of public opinion on elections?

15. Did the government type allow for a vote of no confidence? Could the executive wait out an election or was he/she vulnerable to a dissolution of the government.

16. What was the impact of causalities on public support?

17. What are the primary press outlets? What is their political leaning? Where they supportive or critical of the Iraq War coalition?

Threat
1. Does the state see Iraq as a threat?

2. Did the state have diplomatic relations with Iraq? Economic relations?

3. Does the public see Iraq as a threat?

4. Are Iraqi sponsored terrorist groups targeting the state?

5. Is the state ideologically opposed to the Iraqi regime?

6. Does the state show any signs of building?

7. What is the history between the state and Iraq?

8. Has force been used in the recent past, distant past?

9. Are there any ethnic animosities between the state and Iraq?

10. Is the Iraq War (Middle East instability) more threatening than the Saddam regime?

Collective Security
1. Does the state see the conflict as a collective good?

2. How does the state politically support the collective good?

3. Is the state encouraging support from other nations?

4. What is the size of the state compared to the coalition lead?

5. What percentage of participation is expected by the coalition lead?
Alliance Dependence

1. Is the state in a formal alliance with the coalition leader, or leading coalition partners?
2. Does the alliance mandate support of the coalition effort?
3. Did the coalition leader offer alliance incentives to participate in the coalition?
4. Did the coalition leader offer other incentives to participate in the coalition?
5. Did the state seek incentives from the coalition leader for participation?
6. Did the coalition leader threaten the state with punishment for not participating in the coalition? What was the threat? What level was it given at?
7. Was the state afraid of abandonment?
8. What tradeoffs were considered in the abandonment/entrapment analysis?
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