Full Spectrum Operations: An Analysis of Course Content at the Command and General Staff College

A Monograph
by
Major Frank L. Turner II
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The consequences for failing to prepare for the next war can be significant. How does the United States military balance the perceived requirement for its traditional competencies in major combat operations with the near-term requirement for counterinsurgency trained forces? Can one Army follow two grand strategies, simultaneously? In February 2008, the Army approved FM 3-0 Operations and introduced Full Spectrum Operations as the new operational concept to satisfy both grand strategies.

This monograph examined the Intermediate Level Education, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Tactical Commanders Development Program curricula at the Command and General Staff College to determine how much emphasis each school placed on operational themed instruction, and the balance of the themed instruction across each of the following five operational themes: peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations.

The balance between operational themed and non-operational instruction was generally even across each of the three schools. The operational themed instruction significantly favored the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. The balance between irregular warfare and major combat operations varied depending on the school. The non-operational themed instruction often comprised indispensable components of each course. Ultimately, the balance of the instruction was acceptable.
Title of Monograph: Full Spectrum Operations: An Analysis of Course Content at the Command and General Staff College

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 15 April 2008 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Peter F. Schifferle, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Monograph Reader
Michael J. Swanson, COL, AV

__________________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

__________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract


The consequences for failing to prepare for the next war can be significant. How does the United States military balance the perceived requirement for its traditional competencies in major combat operations with the near-term requirement for counterinsurgency trained forces? Can one Army follow two grand strategies, simultaneously? In February 2008, the Army approved FM 3-0, Operations, and introduced Full Spectrum Operations as the new operational concept to satisfy both grand strategies.

This monograph examined the Intermediate Level Education, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Tactical Commanders Development Program curricula at the Command and General Staff College to determine how much emphasis each school placed on operational themed instruction, and the balance of the themed instruction across each of the following five operational themes: peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations.

The balance between operational themed and non-operational instruction was generally even across each of the three schools. The operational themed instruction significantly favored the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. The balance between irregular warfare and major combat operations varied depending on the school. The non-operational themed instruction often comprised indispensable components of each course. This important instruction covered a multitude of important topics including several military problem solving tools and processes that provide some of the approaches about “how to think.” Students also learn how the effort should all come together incorporating the branches of the Army, the sister services, the interagency partners, and the multinational allies.

Ultimately, the balance of the instruction was acceptable, but the study did provide several conclusions and recommendations. The instruction should ensure that ILE and AMSP graduates possess confidence, competence, and understanding of irregular warfare for general purpose forces. Much of the counterinsurgency instruction is focused on the FM 3-24; recommend the addition of prominent insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists to augment the counterinsurgency instruction. The current full spectrum operations construct subordinates domestic operations; recommend collaboration between Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), NORTHCOM, and the Army National Guard Bureau to consider the addition of a sixth operational theme focused on domestic operations. The operational theme taxonomy subordinates the non-operational themed instruction; recommend any adjustments to the non-operational themed instruction must be mindful not to emasculate the central tenets of a course. The practical exercises immersed students in multiple operational themes and each course should have at least one irregular warfare practical exercise to reflect the predominant operational theme in both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom; recommend AMSP develop an irregular warfare operational themed practicum. The interaction between ILE and AMSP is only informal; recommend an integrated AOASF-AMSP-ILE practical exercise to provide a better appreciation for the benefits of collaboration between the echelons of command.
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Introduction

One of the principal challenges the Army faces is to regain its traditional edge fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned--and relearned--about unconventional wars--the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead.¹

Secretary Robert Gates, AUSA Convention

The consequences for failing to prepare for the next war can be significant. Secretary Gates’ comments from the Association of the United States Army Convention in 2007 highlight the major dilemma facing United States Army today. How does the United States military balance the perceived requirement for its traditional competencies in major combat operations with its most likely near-term requirement for counterinsurgency trained forces? Can one Army follow two grand strategies, simultaneously? The approach in the latest edition of FM 3-0 (the Army’s capstone doctrine) attempts to satisfy both grand strategies.

A similar grand strategy dilemma faced the United States Army during the Vietnam War. Dr. Andrew Krepinevich’s highly acclaimed study, The Army and Vietnam, exposed the Army as an institution resistant to adopting a holistic approach to irregular warfare. His work also informally incorporated a methodology that is useful to assess the efforts of the contemporary Army. He studied the grand strategy, its discourse, and its manifestations within the DOTLM (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, and Materiel) tenets to illustrate the perpetuity and assess effectiveness.² The preponderance of this monograph conducts an extensive study of the professional military education component of the Leadership tenet. A quick comparison of the grand strategy, doctrinal, and adviser efforts will precede that effort to bring to light some important similarities and differences between the Vietnam War and the current conflicts.

²Today, the tenets are organized as DOTMLPF, which stand for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities.
Grand strategy is the overarching politico-military effort under the purview of the president and the senior civilian and military leaders of the country. The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University defines grand strategy as “a plan of action that is based on the calculated relation of means to large ends.” A discussion about the Vietnam era grand strategy must also consider the real threat of a conventional war in Europe with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the grand strategy that guided the Vietnam era was the containment of communism. An important element of the grand strategy was the strategy for the Vietnam War. Dr. Krepinevich found that while the Vietnam strategy evolved on the surface, its underlying approach remained focused on conventional warfare. He coined the term “Army Concept” to describe the Army’s approach to how it believed it should wage war, and determined that the Army Concept was the “focus on . . . conventional war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties.” While the “containment of communism” grand strategy proved successful, the conventional warfare strategy for Vietnam failed.

Today’s grand strategy is explicitly outlined in the *National Security Strategy*. The primary threat identified in both the 2002 and 2006 versions of the *National Security Strategy* was Global Terrorism. Although there have been numerous fronts in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), this quick overview focuses on Operation Iraqi Freedom, which has become the watershed component of the GWOT. The initial strategy for Iraq aimed to “strike a blow at terrorism by ousting a long-standing adversary, eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,

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and implanting a moderate and pro-American state in the heart of the Arab world.”\textsuperscript{6} The shortcomings of the planning and execution of that strategy are well documented by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor in \textit{Cobra II}, and by Thomas Ricks in \textit{Fiasco}. Gordon and Trainor noted five “grievous errors” that included misreading the foe, overreliance on technological advancement, failure to adapt to developments on the battlefield, dysfunction of American military structures, and the administration’s disdain for nation-building.\textsuperscript{7} Although much of \textit{Fiasco} focused on the shortcomings, the postscript in the most recent publication highlighted the comprehensive shift to a counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq in 2007 led by General David Petraeus.\textsuperscript{8} Although the recent progress of this shift is encouraging, it is still premature to declare the success of the new Iraq strategy. In an effort to look forward, the subsequent comparisons focused on the latest efforts since 2007 that are associated with the shift to the counterinsurgency strategy.

The comparison of the doctrinal efforts of the Vietnam and the GWOT eras illuminates the same issue, a critical shortcoming counterinsurgency doctrine comprised, with different outcomes. Doctrine, defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives,” helps provide the underpinnings for strategy development.\textsuperscript{9} Dr. Krepinevich discovered that despite multiple revisions, FM 100-5, \textit{Operations}, never properly articulated the tenets of counterinsurgency operations; the 31 series manuals, intended to address counter guerilla operations, proved inappropriate for use by the regular Army; and the development of USCONARC Pamphlet 515-2, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, proved

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7}Ibid., 497-505.
\end{itemize}
insufficient to indoctrinate the force as intended. Overall, the efforts to develop comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine during the Vietnam War failed to produce a widely accepted framework for general-purpose forces to conduct irregular warfare.

The development and publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, in 2006 provided a catalyst to educate the Army on counterinsurgency. The manual not only was downloaded 1.5 million times from Army and Marine Corps websites during the first month of release but it was also published commercially by the Chicago University Press. LTC John Nagl’s forward in the Chicago University Press edition highlighted the unprecedented team of “journalist, human rights advocates, academics, and practitioners of counterinsurgency” that contributed by reviewing and vetting the manual. The manual was deliberately developed with the general-purpose forces in mind. Its prominence within the curricula at the Command and General Staff College will be noted in subsequent sections of this monograph. The recent publication of FM 3-0, *Operations*, in 2008 codified the Army’s new approach to warfare called Full Spectrum Operations. Its holistic approach to warfare accounts for irregular warfare as one of five operational themes; Section 1 of this monograph explores the construct and nuances of FM 3-0 in detail. Overall, the efforts to develop comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine for today produced a widely accepted framework for general-purpose forces to conduct irregular warfare.

A synopsis of the adviser efforts highlights some differences between Vietnam War and the GWOT eras. Chapter 6 of FM 3-24 confirms that “[d]eveloping effective HN [Host Nation] forces--including, military, police, and paramilitary forces--is one of the highest priority COIN

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10Krepinevich, 39-45. Note: Page 39 highlights the shortcomings of 100-5; pages 39-41 highlight the shortcomings of the 31 series efforts; Page 45 describes the USCONARC Pamphlet 515-2 Counterinsurgency effort.


12Ibid., xvi.
tasks.” In both cases, the Army adopted an approach that leveraged general-purpose forces to conduct the Security Forces Assistance as advisers to indigenous forces. Dr. Krepinevich’s findings indicated that the Vietnam War Army’s adviser requirements overwhelmed their capacity to prepare them. Of approximately sixteen thousand advisors in Vietnam at the end of 1963, only three thousand attended the Military Assistance Training Adviser (MATA) course. He also noted that major shortcomings reported by those who did attend included the “absence of quality instructors and the lack of any good definition of just what an adviser’s duties were.” A significant adviser training capacity gap remained; a 1973 HumRRO survey concluded that as late as 1970 “only 194 of 605 individuals [advisers] surveyed had been to the MATA Course.” During the Vietnam War, the solution to the adviser requirement was to send the adviser, trained or not.

The challenges for the contemporary adviser efforts for the GWOT are slightly different. In his recent New York Times OP-ED “A Battalion’s Worth of Good Ideas,” LTC John Nagl, one of the writers of FM 3-24 and commander of an adviser training battalion at Fort Riley, advocated the development of an “advisory strategy.” While currently 5,000 advisers are trained annually at Fort Riley, Nagl estimated that United States will need “at least 20,000 combat advisers for the duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” His advisory strategy also promotes institutionalizing the adviser force. Nagl noted, “As it stands now, the troops we train at Fort Riley do their tour and are then moved back into conventional roles, while the embedded training teams are demobilized.” Developing an advisory strategy may create the opportunity to build an

14Krepinevich, 48.
15Ibid., 210.
enduring capability with a larger, more experienced cadre of advisers better prepared to help
indigenous forces assume a greater burden of the combat load.

The Professional Military Education component of the Leadership domain comprised the
final area examined in this monograph. Prior to examining the results from this present-day study
of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), this study will review Dr. Krepinevich’s
selected findings about Professional Military Education from The Army and Vietnam. While he
also examined the basic and advanced courses at the Infantry and Armor branch schools, and the
Army War College, only Dr. Krepinevich’s findings from CGSC will be reviewed; they
adequately represent the trends from the other institutions. In the 1959-1960 and 1960-1961
academic years, he found only three hours of counterinsurgency related instruction. The addition
of six hours devoted to “airborne unit operations against irregulars” increased the instruction to
nine hours for the 1961-1962 academic year. The 1962-1963 and 1963-1964 academic years
capitalized on “creative labeling of conventional topics as counterinsurgency-oriented [topics]” to
comply with Army directives. Dr. Ivan Birrer, a senior official at CGSC from 1948-1978,
revealed that, “It became expedient for Leavenworth to appear immersed with unconventional
and insurgent warfare. . . . [I]nclud[ing] a sentence or two suggesting that there might be the
possibility of some irregular forces . . . permitted [CGSC] to count the entire subject as
unconventional warfare;” by this method, CGSC “ran the hours up to 437.”17 In most cases, the
Professional Military Education programs resisted efforts to fully implement counterinsurgency
instruction, and often inflated and exaggerated their reports of compliance. This study did not
examine any related studies on the instruction at the present-day Command and General Staff
College or discover any misrepresentation of the operational theme balance by the institution.

This monograph examined the curricula at the Command and General Staff School
(CGSS), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the School of Command

17Krepinevich, 51-52.
Preparation (SCP) within CGSC in order to determine how much emphasis each school placed on operational themed instruction, and to determine the balance of the themed instruction across each of the following five operational themes: peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. The balance of instruction between the non-operational themed topics and the operational themed topics was generally even across each of the three schools. Table 1 provides an overview of the statistical findings. Fifty-four percent of the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum at CGSS emphasized non-operational themed topics that included the joint and Army planning processes; the capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of Army formations, warfighting functions, joint functions, sister services, interagency partners, multinational partners; and the intricacies on how the Army functions. Forty-seven percent of the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) curriculum at SAMS emphasized non-operational themed topics that included various approaches on “how to think” about problems and an understanding of the capabilities, advantages, and disadvantages of the multiple military problem solving methodologies. Fifty-one percent of the Tactical Commanders Development Program (TCDP) curricula at SCP emphasized non-operational themed topics focused primarily on battle command, which was appropriate for this command preparation course. In almost all cases, the non-operational themed instruction comprised indispensible components of the course.
Table 1. Overview of Statistical Findings

Complete Findings*

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<tr>
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<th>Op Themed</th>
<th>Non-Op Themed</th>
<th>Operational Themes</th>
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<tr>
<td>ILE (total)</td>
<td>CGSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>PME LI Peace IW MCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>1% 1% 1% 1% 17% 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOWC</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>3% 1% 1% 6% 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSP</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0% 2% 0% 28% 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCDP</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>4% 4% 1% 13% 25%</td>
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*Operational Themes expressed as percentages of total curriculum

NOTE: This table reflects the author’s observations and findings about the Intermediate Level Education, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Tactical Commanders Development Program at the Command and General Staff College. The author determined whether each assignment in the curricula were operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. The author’s data files are available in the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library.

The examination of just the operational themed instruction proved equally insightful. The study determined that the balance of the operational themed instruction significantly favored the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes over the peace operations, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement operational themes. The balance between irregular warfare and major combat operations varied depending on the school. Table 2 provides an overview of the statistical findings for only the operational themed instruction. The ILE curriculum focused predominantly on the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. The increased emphasis on irregular warfare in AOWC complemented the Core Course’s initial emphasis on major combat operations. The AMSP curriculum had the widest coverage across all the operational themes. It leveraged two practicums to emphasize the peacetime military engagement and limited intervention operational themes. The TCDP curriculum clearly focused on irregular warfare to prepare future commanders for their upcoming command. The balance of the operational themes across each of the schools was not unreasonable; but leadership at CGSC must ensure that ILE and AMSP graduates possess the
confidence, competence, and understanding of irregular warfare for general-purpose forces required as they return to an operational force most likely to conduct counterinsurgency missions.

Table 2. Statistical Findings for Operational Themed Instruction

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<th>Operational Themes</th>
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<td></td>
<td>PME</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILE (total)</td>
<td>CGSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>CGSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOWC</td>
<td>CGSS</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMSP</td>
<td>SAMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCDP</td>
<td>PCC</td>
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*Only includes the Operational Themed Instruction

NOTE: This table reflects the author’s observations and findings about the Intermediate Level Education, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Tactical Commanders Development Program at the Command and General Staff College. The author determined whether each assignment in the curricula were operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. The author’s data files are available in the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library.

The remainder of the monograph is organized into five sections. Section 1 investigated full spectrum operations and examined Army Training and Education to better understand the strategic context that influences the Command and General Staff College. The section concluded with a detailed discussion of the research methodology employed by this study. Section 2 examined Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff School. The section reviewed the school’s mission, delivery methods, curriculum structure, and student and faculty demographics. It investigated the operational theme emphasis of the Common Core Course and the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course in detail. Section 3 examined the Advanced Military Studies Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies. The section reviewed the school’s mission, curriculum structure, and student and faculty demographics. It investigated the operational theme emphasis of the curriculum in detail. Section 4 examined the Tactical
Commanders Development Program at the School of Command Preparation. The section reviewed the school’s mission, curriculum structure, and student and faculty demographics. It investigated the operational theme emphasis of the curriculum in detail. Section 5 presented conclusions and recommendations. The section discussed potential merits and pitfalls of utilizing the operational theme taxonomy as a curricula management tool. It also presented potential opportunities for future study related to this monograph.

Section 1 – Strategic Context

A failure to understand the context that shapes or constrains a process may yield incomplete conclusions or infeasible recommendations. In an effort to provide strategic context to this study, this section investigates full spectrum operations, reviews Army Training and Education, and examines Army Professional Military Education. Ultimately, this context refined the scope and focus of this monograph. This section concludes with a detailed explanation of the research methodology employed.

Full Spectrum Operations

[FM 3-0] is the kind of manual that you would look at before you ever went to the field. It’s the kind [of manual] we use in our educational bases.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{LTG William B. Caldwell IV, The Daily Show}

FM 3-0, \textit{Operations} (formerly FM 100-5) is the capstone doctrine that articulates the latest Army operational concept. The 2008 version of FM 3-0, \textit{Operations}, offers the most comprehensive framework to understand the nature of modern warfare. In fact, senior leaders adopted this construct to visualize and describe the Army’s current approach to operations even

prior to approving the doctrine. This subsection explored the nature of taxonomies and validated FM 3-0 as an authoritative taxonomy source. The study considered the following three taxonomy alternatives from FM 3-0: (1) the conditions along spectrum of conflict, (2) elements of full spectrum operations, and (3) operational themes. This subsection weighed the advantages and disadvantages of all three taxonomies, and then selected the most advantageous one for this study. The figure 1 provides a visualization of the relationship between the three taxonomies.

Figure 1. Relationship Between the Three Taxonomies

Taxonomy selection is a critical consideration when conducting a quantitative study. Taxonomy is defined as a scheme of classification. Benjamin Bloom’s work in the 1950s, while

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19 LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commander Combined Arms Center (CAC), and other CAC leaders have embarked on the “FM 3-0 Roadshow” to help educate the Army on the new doctrinal framework of FM 3-0. Initiated on 9 January 2008, the “FM 3-0 Roadshow” described the Full Spectrum Operations construct in a manner that previewed the construct of the recently published version of FM 3-0.

leading the effort to build the taxonomy for educational objectives, produced sound principles about taxonomy development.\textsuperscript{21} He stated that building taxonomies requires the selection of appropriate terms, development of precise and usable definitions, and attainment of consensus from the group that will use it.\textsuperscript{22} This study derived its taxonomy from the recently approved FM 3-0, \textit{Operations}. The modern process for developing doctrine embodies the collaboration and consensus between the developers and practitioners envisioned by Bloom.

A synopsis of the FM 3-0 development process demonstrates how the Army’s doctrinal development process adhered to Bloom’s guidance and gained a high degree of consensus. In 2005, the FM 3-0 Writing Team from the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) produced issue papers on unified action, the design of the war fighting functions, the continuum of operations, and the Army’s operational concept. Information technology virtually linked the writing team (developer) and practitioners (group that will use it) to refine the concepts. The Writing Teams used the initial concepts to develop the initial terms and definitions, and then collaborate with practitioners to gain consensus. The initial collaboration with over 200 organizations, media groups, and practitioners provided initial ideas on how to best organize the new FM 3-0. Subsequently, they initiated three Army-wide reviews of draft versions of the manual, conducted three Councils of Colonels, and adjudicated over 4,000 comments from practitioners. In February 2008, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved FM 3-0, \textit{Operations}, and established it as authoritative within the United States Army.\textsuperscript{23} The approval was coupled with the “FM 3-0 Roadshow” an initiative that circulated Army Senior Leaders to highlight the

\textsuperscript{21}The Command and General Staff College uses Bloom’s taxonomy to describe desired levels of learning when crafting learning objectives.


approval of this new capstone doctrine and promotes its availability. Consequently, the manual’s approval established all three taxonomy alternatives considered for this study as authoritative.

The first potential taxonomy considered was the conditions along the spectrum of conflict, defined as the “scale of graduated violence that describes the predominate nature of an operational environment.” Four conditions define the spectrum of conflict--Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, Insurgency, and General War.\(^{24}\) The dynamic interactions between the actors characterize the operational environment. Actors can be internal or external, state or non-state, and individual or collective. Interactions play an important role in determining the nature of the operational environment. Interactions may involve one, many, or all of the following operational variables: political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure; however, the political and military interactions usually provide the best insights into the nature of the operational environment. The spectrum of conflict provides an exceptional tool to visualize and describe the nature of the operational environment, but offers little insight about the actual operations conducted by military forces. Although authoritative, the four conditions along the spectrum of conflict were a poor taxonomy choice to implement into this study.

Another taxonomy alternative considered was the elements of full spectrum operations that include offense, defense, and stability (overseas) or civil support (domestic) operations. Together, the terms offense and defense have historically provided a common lexicon of warfare and defined its adversarial nature. The Army’s priority and responsibility for stability and civil support operations received less emphasis. Recent approaches placed offense and defense within the “war” category, and placed stability and civil support into the “military operations other than war category.” A primary theme of full spectrum operations asserts that the Army conducts

\(^{24}\text{U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library, 2008), 2-1.}\)
simultaneous combinations of the elements of full spectrum operations (offense, defense, and stability) within the joint military operations.25

The equal emphasis of the elements of full spectrum operations is a significant paradigm shift and merits further discussion. Early experiences in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom exposed the folly of following three popular myths that were prevalent throughout the force: “Operations since the end of the Cold War [are] temporary interruptions to preparing for offensive and defensive operations against a near peer enemy;” “offensive-defensive and stability operations [are] either/or propositions;” and “if an Army can conduct offensive and defensive operations under the conditions of MCO [Major Combat Operations], then it can conduct any kind of operation along the spectrum of conflict.”26 While it is likely General Krulak’s description of the three-block war may have provided some of the inspiration, a landmark policy directive consummated his vision.27 In November 2005, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, in an effort to address widespread military shortfalls in stability competencies. This important directive placed stability operations as a core mission of the US military and directed its equal consideration in all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, planning, and exercises.28

The initial assessment of elements of the full spectrum operations as a taxonomy uncovered an important problem. The Army no longer considers the individual elements of full

25Ibid.
27In his article, “Future Warfare: The Rise Of Hybrid Wars,” James Mattis describes General Charles Krulak’s description of the three-block war as “You are fighting like the dickens on one block, you're handing our humanitarian supplies in the next block, and the next one over you're trying to keep warring factions apart.”
spectrum as discrete, pure, or independent activities. FM 3-0 developed visualizations to portray how an operational task is simultaneously comprised of all of the elements of full spectrum operations. The visualization for counterinsurgency operations is depicted in figure 2. The disassembly and separation of counterinsurgency into the offense, defense, and stability components fundamentally alters an operation’s nature and removes its identity. Imagine the disassembly of a unit’s multiple Mission Essential Tasks and subsequent reassembly as offense, defense, and stability tasks. Although authoritative, the elements of full spectrum operations proved to be a poor taxonomy choice to implement in this study.

Figure 2. Aspects of Counterinsurgency Operations

The final taxonomy alternative considered for this study was the Operational Themes, defined as “the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations.” The five operational themes offer a comprehensive representation of the continuum of military operations: Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Major Combat Operations. The Army introduced operational themes as the taxonomy to group common and related military operations
to streamline doctrine development. The taxonomy also offers potential as a curriculum management tool. In fact, the following excerpt from the Draft FM 7-0 directly addressed this notion: “The Generating Force must be ready to adjust content of courses to maintain a balance of capabilities with the Army’s leadership for operations across each of the operational themes.”

This implies that an organization knows their current course content across the operational themes. The next consideration is examines where to adjust the course content.

The Draft FM 7-0 introduced the emerging “Aimpoint” concept to describe a desired end state for the rebalance of operational theme for the Operational Force. The Aimpoint is defined as the “set of conditions (types of operations and conditions of the operational environment) under which Army forces train their core mission essential tasks, until they are assigned a directed mission.”

Figure 3, from FM 3-0 Roadshow, provides the actual desired coverage of operational themes. The Aimpoint offers an effective mental model to visualize the operational themes, but requires more precision to provide actionable guidance to subordinate leaders. Should the balance on the “FM 3-0 Roadshow,” (figure 3) reflect 45 percent major combat operations, 40 percent irregular warfare, and 15 percent limited intervention; or should the balance reflect 50 percent major combat operations, 40 percent irregular warfare, and 10 percent limited intervention? In addition to clear understanding of senior leader guidance about the operational theme balance, subordinate leaders need a clear understanding of the operational theme definitions and descriptions.

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29U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, 2-3.
30U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 Draft, 1-4
31Ibid., 1-5.
This study implemented the following definitions and descriptions of the operational themes from FM 3-0 as the taxonomy:

**Peacetime Military Engagement** describes “all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.” Typical military operations include multinational training events and exercises, security assistance, joint combined exchange training, recovery operations, arms control, and counter drug operations.\(^\text{32}\)

**Limited Intervention** describes military operations “conducted with a tailored force to achieve a clearly end state.” Typical military operations within the limited intervention operational theme include noncombat evacuation operations, strikes, raids, shows of force, foreign humanitarian assistance, consequence management, and sanction enforcement.\(^\text{33}\)

**Peace Operations** comprise “multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to

\(^{32}\)U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, 2-5.

\(^{33}\)Ibid.
contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.” Typical military operations include peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{34}

Irregular Warfare describes a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.” Typical military operations include foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{35}

Major Combat Operations are conducted between uniformed military forces in support of significant national or multinational interests.\textsuperscript{36} The process that describes how this study employed the taxonomy to classify the selected Professional Military Education curricula is explained in detail in the Research Methodology subsection.

**Army Training and Education**

The Army is a massive, multifaceted organization and the importance of training and education cannot be overstated. The Army recently developed two broad terms to describe the types of units within the Army, the Operating Force and the Generating Force. The Operating Force refers to the portion of the Army that “fights and wins our Nation’s wars by providing combat capability necessary to sustain land dominance.”\textsuperscript{37} The Generating Force refers to the portion of the Army that “generate[s] and sustain[s] the operating force capabilities for employment by joint force commanders.”\textsuperscript{38} The examination of the relationships between the

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 2-8.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 2-10.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 2-13.
\textsuperscript{37}U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 Draft, Glossary-9.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., Glossary-6.
Operating Force and the Generating Force provides a better understanding of the coordination and synergy needed in the Army’s training and education programs. This subsection provides a brief overview of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), outlines the Army Training System by domain, distinguishes training from education, and focuses on Army Professional Military Education.

In today’s contemporary operational environment, the question is no longer whether or not one’s unit is deploying, but instead when one’s unit is deploying. The recurring requirement for large-scale troop deployments triggered the Army’s transition from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness and introduced ARFORGEN.39 FM 7-0 describes ARFORGEN as a “process that progressively builds unit readiness over time, during predictable periods of availability, to provide trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployments.”40 ARFORGEN utilizes three force pools, Reset/Train, Ready, and Available, to describe the three states of mission readiness. Figure 4 provides a visual orientation to the ARFORGEN process.

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40U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 Draft, 4-1.
Fortunately, current mission requirements have allowed the Army to offset and stagger the ARFORGEN timelines across the Operational Force. As a result, Professional Military Education has retained its role and importance in developing leaders. As outlined in figure 5, TRADOC estimates that the typical active duty unit has approximately only 19 weeks or 135 days to conduct institutional training.41 To meet the demands and wartime requirements of ARFORGEN, the Army must continue to realize value and efficiency from the Army Training System.

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The Army Training System organizes training into three domains—operational, institutional, and self-development. Additionally, the Generating Force and the Operating Force have important roles in the Army Training System. The Army expends considerable resources to ensure that the training and education are integrated, complementary, progressive, and synchronized across each of the domains. An overview of each of the training domains provides a better understanding of the Army Training System.

The operational training domain is unit centric and the operating force is the predominant force. Unit commanders are responsible for individual and collective training conducted at home station, at Combat Training Centers (CTC), and while deployed in this domain. The Mission Essential Task List (METL) allows the commander to focus the unit’s training on the “collective tasks that the unit must be able to perform to successfully accomplish their mission.”

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42U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 Draft, 4-6.
The institutional training domain is centered on the individual and the generating force is the predominant force. The institutional training domain is comprised of Individual Military Training (IMT), Professional Military Education/Civilian Education System, and Functional Training conducted at the various TRADOC centers. Other responsibilities for this domain include the development of doctrine, training strategies, and training support packages, and the conduct of on-site mobile training teams for the Operational Force.

The self-development training domain is also centered on the individual, and each force plays an important role in this domain. Individuals assume personal responsibility for their own professional growth in this domain. Self-development training is a lifelong endeavor that may encompass reading military history, professional journals, doctrinal manuals, or works from any of the general or specific reading lists; participating in Battle Command Knowledge System threads or other military blogs; taking college courses, or pursuing academic degrees. Self-developmental training guidance can be either formal or informal, and may originate from schools, organizational leaders, mentors, or peers. The Army Training System remains the foundation for how the Army learns.

Many improperly use the terms training and education interchangeably. The Army Training System subordinates education within the training domains. Although the Army established formal linkages, training and education describe two separate activities. Army training is the “instruction and practice that develops tactical and technical individual and collective skills.” Training utilizes the task-condition-standard construct to progressively improve through repetition along the crawl-walk-run methodology. Most military professionals

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43Initial Military Training is comprised of Initial Entry Training (Basic and Advanced Individual Training), the Warrant Officer Candidate Course, pre-commissioning (USMA, ROTC, and OCS), and the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC).

44U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 Draft, 3-3.

associate training with enabling action and preparing for certainty, best described as “what to do.” Army education, on the other hand, “provides the intellectual constructs and principles so [that] trained skills can be applied beyond a standard situation to gain a desired result.” Education focuses on developing cognitive thought processes and lifelong abilities. Most military professionals associate education with enabling judgment and creativity, and preparing for uncertainty, best described as “how to think.”

This study recognized the roles and linkages between training and education, but deliberately focused on education. A comprehensive study of education within the military would encompass aspects of each of the three training domains. A study of the entire the Professional Military Education program would include the Officer Education System, Warrant Officer Education System, NCO Education System, and Civilian Education System. Even an assessment of the entire Officer Education System remains too broad for the scope of this study. Therefore, this study examined only the Professional Military Education programs at the Command and General Staff College.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), founded at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1902, has played an important role in the Army’s history over the past century. The mission of CGSC is to “educate and develop leaders for full spectrum joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations; and advance the art and science of the profession of arms in order to support the operational requirements of the Army.” Today, CGSC is comprised of the following four schools: the Command and General Staff School (CGSS), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the School of Command Preparation (SCP), and the Army Management Staff.

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46Ibid., Glossary-5.
47Ibid., 3-2 to 3-3.
College (AMSC). Forthcoming sections of this monograph examined each of the CGSC schools in detail, except AMSC, which remained outside the scope of this study.

**Research Methodology**

This study examined five programs at the Command and General Staff College to determine the emphasis they placed on each of the operational themes—peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. The primary goal of this study was to conduct an independent, comprehensive, and consistent examination of the curricula. This study did not examine whether the lesson materials were sufficient to meet the learning objectives, or whether the objectives were relevant. It did not investigate whether the lesson sequence was optimal, or if they were progressive or interwoven. It also did not survey the lesson effectiveness—what did students actually learn and what did graduates need to know. The evaluation process employed the following four steps: (1) gather the materials, (2) assemble the data, (3) classify the data, and (4) consider intangibles. This balance of this subsection will review assumptions, and then describe the evaluation process in detail.

Two important assumptions were necessary to conduct this research. This study assumed that students completed all the out-of-class requirements. It is impossible to predict which reading assignments students opt to read, or not read. This study also assumed that instructors taught the lessons in strict accordance with the advance sheets. The nature of experiential learning provides latitude for the student or instructor to deviate from the structured lesson plan and pursue alternate avenues to meet the learning objectives.

The initial research step was to gather the materials. All schools examined rely on Blackboard to virtually deliver a majority of the course requirements and course materials.49

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49 The Blackboard Academic Suite® provides CGSC an Internet technology based environment for students and faculty to communicate, collaborate, and share course materials. This study leveraged each program’s Blackboard Academic Suite® for access to schedules, advance sheets, and course materials. For
Blackboard enrollment in each course provided online access to the repository of student materials. The online curriculum materials used to determine the course requirements included memoranda of instruction, course maps, syllabi, and advance sheets. The online course materials included the block reading books, scenario reference books, lesson reference materials, and doctrinal manuals. The predominance of the materials not available online included books; all books were available for checkout from the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth. This study received access to all course requirements and course materials required to conduct the necessary research.

The next step was assembling data, and involved the following two efforts: develop the list and determine the time. The first effort organized all the course requirements into a standard, usable format. This study employed a Microsoft Excel worksheet to assemble the comprehensive lists for each course. The lists included all in and out-of-class requirements, but omitted the optional and recommended readings. Once the list was developed, the subsequent effort focused on reviewing the course materials, as well as the course requirements, to determine the time needed to complete all the course requirements. Course maps and advance sheets identified the time allotted to each in-class lesson. Calculating the time allotted to out-of-class reading requirements was more complicated, because both “importance” and “word count” determine the time allotted to each assignment. Each advance sheet assigned a level of importance for each assignment to provide the student guidance on the desired rate to read the assignment. Table 3 provides the term, definition, and reading rate for each of the four levels of importance used by CGSC.50

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Table developed from information presented in CGSC Faculty Development Course, “Appendix C - Reading Levels and Homework Time Requirements,” April 1999. CGSC routinely updates the “Read” reading rate based on the results of the Nelson Denny that is administered to the entire CGSS class. In 1999, the “Read” rate was 250 words per minute. The “Read” rate for Academic Year 2007 was 230 words per minute.

additional information on the Blackboard Academic Suite® see their homepage at http://www.blackboard.com/us/index.bbb.

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Table 3. CGSC Reading Rate Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Reading Rate (Words/Min)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Material of primary importance. Includes more than just reading; includes pausing, organizing, and/or outlining.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read</td>
<td>Material of secondary importance when assigned with “study” material, and primary importance when not.</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review</td>
<td>Material previously assigned as “read” or “study.”</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scan</td>
<td>Includes any material not evaluated, but meant for student awareness.</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Word count determined the length of each out-of-class reading assignment. This monograph assumed that students across all the schools read at a similar reading rate. In some cases, course authors annotated the word count at the end of the reading assignment in the block readings book. In other cases, the word count can be determined using the “word count” function in Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat Reader for assignments available as portable document format (pdf) files. In many cases, the word count had to be determined by using a manual “By-Page” method. The time allotted for out-of-class requirements was calculated by dividing the word count by the reading rate. The final step totaled time of all the requirements.

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51 This monograph assumed equality for all word counts and did not make adjustments for complexity of sentence structure or readability.

52 The “By-Page” began with a cursory review of the publication to find an average page. The average page was examined to count the number of lines and the number of words per line. The number of word per line was determined by averaging the number of words from five lines of a standard paragraph. Multiplying the number of lines per page by the number of words per line provided an acceptable estimate of the words per page. In general, a publication wastes one page of blank words for every chapter. The total page count was adjusted by subtracting one page for every chapter from the total page count. The total word count was determined by multiplying the estimated word per page by the adjusted page count.
The step to classify all the course requirements leveraged the Operational Theme taxonomy presented in the Full Spectrum Operations subsection. The initial step segregated the course requirements as either non-operational themed (or common to multiple operational themes) or as operational themed. This study implemented a strict threshold for classification as an operational theme. Every course has specific requirements to teach non-operational themed topics as well as topics common to multiple operational themes that contributed to competency in general areas like planning, command, leadership, or the warfighting functions. For example, within the TCDP curriculum, the Information Operations instruction was classified as a course topic that applied to multiple themes, while the Iraq culture instruction was classified within the Irregular Warfare operational theme. Next the operational themed course requirements were classified as one of the five operational themes. Once all the requirements were classified, the times were totaled for each operational theme.

The final step considered intangibles. An intangible is defined as “unable to be touched; not solid or real; vague and abstract.”53 Within this study, intangibles described the attributes of the courses not directly measured by the data. The examination of intangibles provided additional insights into the desired learning experiences. In some cases the intangibles can reinforce findings, and in others they can mitigate apparent shortcomings. Intangibles could be common throughout all schools and programs, common within a specific school, or unique to a specific course. Intangibles common to all schools and programs throughout CGSC were highlighted below in this section. Intangibles common only to one specific school were highlighted within the introduction section for that school. Intangibles unique to a specific course were presented within the individual narrative about that course.

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The remainder of the section examines the intangibles common to all the programs examined for this monograph. Three intangibles promulgate all schools and programs to shape the nature of the CGSC learning experience. The cognitive learning environment, the physical learning environment, and the Faculty Development Program share an interdependent role in creating the positive learning atmosphere; the removal or modification of one invariably alters the effectiveness of other two. Each intangible will be reviewed in detail to better understand their contribution.

The cognitive learning environment of CGSC is best understood by reviewing the adult learning model and the experiential learning model. The first major influence of the CGSC cognitive learning environment is the adult learning model. According to education pioneer Malcolm Knowles, there are four principles of adult learning—“the greatest learning occurs when adults take responsibility for determining what they learn, adults learn that which is personally beneficial, adults learn what they discover for themselves, and adults learn more from experience and feedback than from experience alone.”54 The adult learning model assumes that adult learners are internally motivated, self-directing, and most receptive to task or problem centered requirements. In CGSC, the discussion leader (instructor) leverages the Socratic Method to create a student-centric, seminar environment. The discussion leader asks open-ended questions about the subject matter to facilitate student led learning. Students conduct a collective discourse that leads toward group discovery of answers to the question.

The second major influence of the CGSC cognitive learning environment is the experiential learning model. This approach “examines[s] and strengthen[s] the critical linkages among education, work, and personal development.”55 CGSC recognizes that both students and

54U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Faculty and Staff Development Division, “Faculty Development Workshop for SAMS Fellows,” Day 1 (January 2008), slide 8.
faculty offer unique perspectives as experienced military professionals. Their firsthand accounts, whether positive or negative, often deliver a more powerful lesson than the assigned course materials. CGSC incorporates the adult learning model and the experiential learning model to create an effective cognitive learning environment.

The next intangible that helps to shape the nature of the CGSC learning experience is the physical learning environment. Figure 6 of the CGSS typical array staff group reflects the orientation for all schools and programs within CGSC. The size, shape, and composition are arrayed to best facilitate the desired CGSC cognitive learning environment. The small size of the staff group typically has 16 students; most educators agree that students learn best when in smaller groups. The shape or orientation of the class is a horseshoe with the students all facing inward; this facilitates discourse and discussion. Finally, the composition of the staff group reflects a cross section of the student population; the representation of service, branch, and country or origin is balanced in each seminar. The size, shape, and composition of the staff group create an effective physical environment.

Figure 6. Typical Staff Group Array

The Faculty Development Program (FDP) is the final intangible that helps create the positive learning atmosphere. FDP provides detailed instruction to train the faculty to “orchestrate an adult learning environment.”\textsuperscript{56} FDP’s four level construct allows CGSC to progressively develop members of the faculty as they receive additional responsibilities and advance along the instructor assignment life cycle. All CGSC instructors must complete FDP 1 and FDP 2 prior to assuming duties as an instructor. FDP 1 focuses on learning theory and teaching methods. FDP 2 focuses on curriculum content and methodology. Instructors who progress to FDP 3 focus on curriculum design, and those who progress to FDP 4 focus on continuous education and individual development.\textsuperscript{57} The deliberate and comprehensive Faculty Development Program ensures that instructors are educated and trained in the mechanics and nuances of the adult learning model and the experiential learning model, and ready to assume their role as discussion leader within the staff group.

\section*{Section 2 – Command and General Staff School}

The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) is the oldest, largest, and most widely known school within the Command and General Staff College. CGSS conducts Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for all majors in the United States Army, focused on providing their professional military education for their “next 10 years” of military service.\textsuperscript{58} Its mission is to “educate and train intermediate level Army Officers, International Officers, Sister Service Officers, and Interagency leaders prepared to operate in full spectrum Army, joint, interagency,%


\textsuperscript{57}\textit{U.S Army Command and General Staff College, “Preparing Leaders for the Future - Evolving and Adapting to Meet Challenges and Exploit Opportunities: Command & General Staff College Command Brief,”} 10 July 2007, slide 32.

and multinational environments as field grade commanders and staff officers.”

This section provides a general overview of the CGSS delivery options, curriculum structure, and common intangibles—student and faculty demographics. The Common Core Course and Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) will be examined in detail.

CGSS offers several delivery options for the ILE curriculum to meet the needs of the Operational Force. For Academic Year 2007-2008, there were 6,681 students enrolled either at the resident ILE courses at Fort Leavenworth or the three satellite campuses, or the non-resident ILE courses throughout the country. Every year, CGSS conducts two iterations of the 40-week Resident ILE course at Fort Leavenworth and 12 total iterations of the 14-week Resident ILE course at three satellite campuses at Fort Belvoir (6 iterations), Fort Lee (3 iterations), and Fort Gordon (3 iterations). Non-Resident ILE instruction is delivered to both Active and Reserve Component officers from all services and allied nations via distributed learning (dL) utilizing either CD-based or web-based materials. The Army Reserve administers the face-to-face portion of the non-resident instruction within the Total Army School System (TASS) at multiple regional locations. Students participating in the web-based instruction must complete the course at a self-pace within 18 months. A handful of students will soon complete the legacy “Box of Books” non-resident course and allow the CGSS to discontinue the program. Table 4 provides a detailed breakout of how the students are distributed across each program. This study focused on the Resident ILE program at Fort Leavenworth, because the student and faculty demographics were readily available and that population completed the all four portions of the curriculum.

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Table 4. ILE Student/Program Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year 07 ILE Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident ILE (Fort Leavenworth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident ILE (Satellite Campuses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Resident (TASS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Resident (Web-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Course (&quot;Box of Books&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The complete ILE curriculum consists of four components—the Common Core Course, Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC), electives, and graduate degree program. Figure 7 provides a visual orientation to the complete ILE curricula. Regardless of venue, every ILE student completes the Common Core Course. All Operations Career Field (OPCF) ILE students, both resident and non-resident, complete AOWC. CGSS only administers the electives at the resident ILE students in Fort Leavenworth. Participation in the graduate degree program is voluntary and currently limited to resident ILE students at Fort Leavenworth. The complications associated with assessing the electives and the graduate degree program placed them outside the scope of this study.

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61The “OPMS XXI Career Field & Functional Area Information” webpage from the Human Resources Command Homepage describes the Operations Career Field as “provid[ing] the Army with officers qualified by training, education and experience in areas directly related to the deployment, employment and sustainment of land forces. It is composed of officers in the Army’s 16 branches and two functional areas, FA 39 (PSYOP and Civil Affairs) and FA 90 (Multifunctional Logistician Program). All commands will be filled by officers from the OPCF, with the exception of Army Acquisition Corps product and program managers.” http://www.army.mil/ADSXXI/cffa.htm (accessed 25 April 2008).
At the resident ILE course at Fort Leavenworth, the faculty is a common intangible for the entire curriculum. The CGSS teaching faculty provides a balanced role as both instructor and facilitator. The demographics of the faculty in Academic Year 2007-2008 revealed that 30 percent were active duty military (85 percent had at least 22 years of military service) and 89 percent earned graduate degrees (10 percent had PhDs). The faculty coverage at CGSS is the most comprehensive throughout CGSC. Every small group is assigned an instructor from each of the following departments: Center for Army Tactics, Department of Command and Leadership, Department of Joint Interagency Multinational Operations, Department of Military History, and the Department of Logistics and Resource Operations.  

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A quick overview of student demographics revealed that the average student had 12 years of military experience; 73 percent had recent combat experience (62 percent in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom); and 63 percent had civilian graduate degrees or are currently enrolled in graduate programs. The profile of the total student population for CGSS Class 2008-01 included officers from the Active Duty Army (70.3 percent), Air Force (7.5 percent), Sea Service (7.0 percent), Foreign Armies (6.3 percent), Army Reserve (5.0 percent), Army National Guard (3.4 percent), and civilian service (0.5 percent). The broad experience reflected by the demographics of CGSS class 2008-01, coupled with the faculty experience, predicts a rich learning experience.

**Common Core Course**

The ILE Common Core Course is the initial component of ILE curriculum. Its mission is to prepare “field grade officers, with a warrior ethos and warfighting focus for leadership positions in Army, joint, multinational and interagency organizations executing full spectrum operations.” Upon successful completion of the ILE Common Core, graduates are expected to “appreciate the operational environment, use a field grade officer’s perspective, think and reason

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63Ibid., slide 14.

64The specific details on the entire ILE population at all course locations were unavailable for this study; however the CGSC provided extensive details on their resident population at Fort Leavenworth in the CGSC Command Briefing.

65This subsection reflects the author’s observations and findings about the ILE Common Core Course at the Command and General Staff School unless otherwise noted. As outlined in the research methodology subsection, the Common Core curriculum data was gathered from schedules, syllabi, student advance sheets, and course materials from the Command and General Staff School’s Blackboard Academic Suite®. The author assembled them on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and then determined the time to complete each of the assignments. The author determined whether each assignment was operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. After totaling the time for each operational theme, the author considered intangibles. The author’s digital data files are available with the bounded and check out versions of this monograph on the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library at Frank L. Turner II. “Full Spectrum Operations within the CGSC Curriculum - Common Core (ILE) Data.” Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library Archives, 2008.

critically, function well as a general staff officer and executive officer/chief of staff, control combined arms and joint warfighting functions, and exhibit cross-cultural competency.”

The Common Core Course is 16 weeks long and includes both basic blocks and parallel blocks of instruction. The following four basic blocks comprise the nucleus of the Common Core curriculum: C100 - Foundations, C200 - Strategic Studies, C300 - Operational Studies, and C400 - Army Operations. The parallel blocks of instruction in Force Modernization (F100 - Managing Army Change), History (H100 - Rise of the Western Way of War), and Leadership (L100 - Leadership: Forging Success in Uncertain Times) comprise the remainder of the Common Core Course. This study assessed all seven blocks of instruction.

This monograph examined the ILE Common Core curriculum and course materials for Class 2008-01, taught from 10 August 2007 to 29 November 2007. The course requirements included 105 in-class modules and 395 out-of-class requirements. The course requirements were reviewed and classified as operational themed or non-operational themed. The operational themed course requirements were further classified into one of the five operational themes--peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Figure 8 provides a visualization of the findings.

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The cumulative time to complete all course requirements was 458 hours. 69 percent of the course requirements were non-operational themed topics (or dedicated to topics common to multiple operational themes), and 31 percent were dedicated to operational themes. The classification of the operational themed requirements revealed that the ILE Common Core Course dedicated 20 percent of the entire curriculum to major combat operations, six percent to irregular warfare, three percent to peacetime military engagement, one percent to limited intervention, and one percent to peace operations.

The in-depth analysis of the Common Core Course’s operational themed requirements produced additional findings. Major combat operations themed instruction encompassed the Suez Canal and Guadalcanal case studies, the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) application exercise taught during lessons C307 and C308, the C400 Application Exercise (End of Core Course Exercise), and nearly all instruction in the H100 History Block. The irregular warfare themed instruction centered on lessons C151 (Culture and Military Operations) and C303 (Types of Military Operations). Also, students read chapters 1, 6, and 7 from FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. The peacetime military engagement themed instruction was concentrated within the four successive C207 Regional Strategic Concept requirements and
lessons. The Peace Operations and limited intervention themed instruction occurred almost exclusively during the C303 (Types of Military Operations) lessons.

Assessment of the Common Core Course’s non-operational themed requirements revealed several insights. Non-operational themed topics included military planning processes; capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of both the warfighting function and the sister services; leadership attributes and competencies; and leading and managing change in the Army. The Common Core Course included extensive instruction on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and JOPP. Eleven percent of the instruction presented the capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of each of the warfighting functions. Six percent of the instruction highlighted the capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of each of the sister services and the Special Operations community; separate lessons reviewed considerations for the interagency process and multinational operations.

The L100 and F100 parallel blocks presented almost no operational themed instruction within the Common Core Course. The L100 Leadership block covered a multitude of leadership topics, but less than one percent of the total instruction derived from the operational themed leadership instruction. The F100 Force Modernization Block highlighted many of the processes of how the Army changes, but understandably presented zero operational themed instruction.

The Common Core Course focused heavily on doctrine to ensure graduates possessed currency and relevancy. In fact, students read doctrine for 128 of the 395 out-of-class requirements. The curriculum maintained an even balance between Army publications and joint publications. Five percent of the entire curriculum focused on the emerging full spectrum operations concept; each of its four elements--offense, defense, stability, and civil support; and chapters 1, 3, and 5 from the Post-DRAG version of FM 3-0, Operations. The leadership at CGSS demonstrated foresight by introducing students to the FM 3-0 (Post DRAG), and several other doctrinal manuals in Draft form--like FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, and FM 3-28, Civil Support Operations. Not only did they expose them to
the latest initiatives, approaches, and concepts, but they also informally included them in the collaborative doctrinal development process.

**Advanced Operations & Warfighting Course**

The second segment of the ILE course is the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC). The mission of AOWC is to “develop military professionals adept at making repetitive discretionary judgments and skilled in problem-solving under lethal, non-lethal, volatile, ambiguous, and complicated circumstances within the spectrum of conflict in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations . . . and prepare officers to serve on battle staffs of operational-level headquarters, to lead missions assigned to battalion- and brigade-sized units, and to develop the professional skills and competencies needed to be effective senior field-grade leaders.”

AOWC is 16 weeks long and includes both basic and parallel instruction. The following three basic blocks comprise the nucleus of the AOWC curriculum: W100, Operational Warfighting; W200, Division Operations; and W300, Brigade Combat Team Operations. It is important to note that many students participate in the J300, Joint Advanced Warfighting Seminar (JAWS) in lieu of W300; however, this study remained focused on the basic W300 curriculum.

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68This subsection reflects the author’s observations and findings about the ILE Advance Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) at the Command and General Staff School unless otherwise noted. As outlined in the research methodology subsection, the AOWC curriculum data was gathered from schedules, syllabi, student advance sheets, and course materials from the Command and General Staff School’s Blackboard Academic Suite®. The author assembled them on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and then determined the time to complete each of the assignments. The author determined whether each assignment was operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. After totaling the time for each operational theme, the author considered intangibles. The author’s digital data files are available with the bounded and check out versions of this monograph on the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library at Frank L. Turner II. “Full Spectrum Operations within the CGSC Curriculum - AOWC (ILE) Data.” Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library Archives, 2008.

and omitted the J300 course. Blocks of instruction in History (H200, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period and H300, Roots of the Contemporary Operational Environment) and Leadership (L200, Leadership) comprised the parallel instructions that complete AOWC.

This study examined the AOWC curriculum and course materials for Class 2008-01 that was taught from 30 November 2007 to 28 March 2008. The course requirements included 52 in-class modules and 203 out of class requirements. The course requirements were reviewed and classified as operational themed or non-operational themed. The operational themed course requirements were further classified into one of the five operational themes—peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Figure 9 provides a visualization of the findings.

![Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course](image)

**Figure 9.** Findings Intermediate Level Education-Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course

The cumulative time to complete all the course requirements was 422 hours. Thirty-five percent of the course requirements were non-operational themed topics (or dedicated to topics common to multiple operational themes), and 65 percent were dedicated to operational themes. The classification of the operational themed requirements revealed that AOWC dedicated 35
percent of the entire curriculum to major combat operations, 28 percent to irregular warfare, two
percent to limited intervention, and zero percent to both peacetime military engagement and
peace operations.

A closer examination of the AOWC major combat operations themed requirements
yielded additional insights. The instruction leveraged several case studies and application
exercises throughout the core and parallel instruction. The case studies included the Battle of
Okinawa (World War II) in the W100 block; the entrapment and breakout at the Chosin Reservoir
(Korean War), and Battle of the Ia Drang Valley (Vietnam War) case studies in the L200 block;
and multiple case studies in the H200 block. The H200 case studies illustrated the World War II
outcomes from several interwar period innovations (mechanization, airpower, aircraft carriers,
amphibious warfare, and maneuver warfare). The W199 (The C/JFLCC Concept Development)
and W221 (Division Functional Staff Procedures) applications both focused on the major combat
operations theme. The W299 (Division Operations) application exercise focused on the transition
from major combat operations to post combat operations and irregular warfare, therefore the time
was evenly divided between major combat operations and irregular warfare for that event.

AOWC integrated irregular warfare themed instruction throughout each component of the
curriculum. The W100 block included case studies on the (W115) Philippine Insurrection,
(W116) the French in Algeria, and (W117) the Soviets in Afghanistan; additionally, lesson W301
examined Philippine Insurrection in more detail. The L200 Leadership block presented two
irregular warfare case studies. The first case study examined the dynamics and contemporary
challenges of Military Transition Team (MiTT). The other profiled the transition to a
counterinsurgency approach for the 101st Air Assault Division while in Mosul in April 2003. The
H300 History block conducted lessons on the American Revolution (H301), the Chinese Civil
War (H302), and the Vietnam War (H304 and H305). This comprehensive effort exposed the
students to several different historical accounts of irregular warfare. The weeklong W330
(Employ the BCT) application exercise focused on irregular warfare. As expected, the irregular
warfare doctrine centered on FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*; students read chapters 2, 4, 5, and Appendix B. Combining these readings with the Common Core Course FM 3-24 requirements, students completed all chapters of the manual.

The remaining operational themes received little or no emphasis during AOWC. The limited intervention themed instruction was all concentrated within H307 (Interventions in the Era of Goldwater-Nichols). That lesson briefly examined Operations Desert One (Iran), Urgent Fury (Grenada), and Just Cause (Panama). No peace operations or peacetime military engagement themed instruction was conducted during AOWC.

AOWC’s non-operational themed requirements also provided an important part of the curriculum. The non-operational themed topics included military planning processes; the capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of the joint function; and a detailed examination of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). AOWC conducted additional instruction on MDMP and JOPP to reinforce the instruction from the Common Core Course. Ten percent of the AOWC instruction highlighted the capabilities, roles, and responsibilities of each of the six joint functions. Ten percent of the AOWC instruction focused on the BCT. Introductory lessons highlighted the force structure and capabilities of each of the three types of BCTs (light, stryker, heavy). In subsequent lessons, student teams developed a Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI) plan for a BCT and a Force Packaging plan for a heavy division.

AOWC relied upon doctrine to build on the baseline knowledge established during the Common Core Course. Students read doctrine for 80 of the 203 out-of-class requirements. The balance placed a heavier emphasis on the Army doctrine; 75 percent of the requirements were from Army publications and 25 percent were from joint publications. An additional 3 percent of the doctrine focused on full spectrum operations. The L200 block included reading requirements for chapters 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and Appendix A from FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*. 
Section 3 – School of Advanced Military Studies

Formally established at Fort Leavenworth in 1983, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) was developed to “provide a broad, deep military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels that goes beyond the CGSC course in both theoretical depth and practical application.” The initiative aimed to emulate the success of the famed 2-year CGSC classes that witnessed over 37 percent of its graduates between 1930 and 1936 became general officers. Its current mission, “to educate the future commanders and leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-agency at the graduate level to think strategically and operationally to solve complex adaptive problems across the security environment,” alludes to how the school grown since its inception 25 years ago.

Today, SAMS is comprised of two resident programs, the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF). The remainder of this section is focused on AMSP. It reviewed the intangibles generated by the students and faculty, and then examined the AMSP curriculum in detail.

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70 Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Staff College Level Training Study” (Final Report, Army Staff College, 1983).


Advanced Military Studies Program⁷³

The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) is a 40-week program for self-nominated, faculty-selected majors and lieutenant colonels that are graduates or current students of Intermediate Level Education. In 1983, COL Wass de Czege noted that “[AMSP] cannot be viewed in isolation of the CGSC core curriculum and the prerequisite individual development courses which prepare the foundation for the increasing depth in both theory and practical matters attained in the second year.”⁷⁴ This monograph also recognizes the supplementary effect of the ILE and AMSP experiences on the AMSP students.

A quick overview of student demographics revealed that the average student had 13 years of military experience; 100 percent had recent combat experience (90 percent in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom); 40 percent earned prior civilian graduate degrees, and 100 percent were currently enrolled the mandatory CGSC graduate degree program.⁷⁵ The profile of the total student population for AMSP Class 2008-01 included officers from the Active Duty Army (75.9 percent), Air Force (6.9 percent), Sea Service (4.6 percent), Foreign Armies (5.7 percent), Army Reserve (3.4 percent), Army National Guard (2.3 percent), and civilian service

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⁷³This subsection reflects the author’s observations and findings about the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at the Command and General Staff School unless otherwise noted. As outlined in the research methodology subsection, the AMSP curriculum data was gathered from schedules, syllabi, student advance sheets, and course materials from the School of Advanced Military Studies’ Blackboard Academic Suite®. The author assembled them on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and then determined the time to complete each of the assignments. The author determined whether each assignment was operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. After totaling the time for each operational theme, the author considered intangibles. The author’s digital data files are available with the bounded and check out versions of this monograph on the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library at Frank L. Turner II. “Full Spectrum Operations within the CGSC Curriculum - AMSP (SAMS) Data.” Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library Archives, 2008.

⁷⁴Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Staff College Level Training Study,” F-11.

⁷⁵U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Preparing Leaders for the Future, slide 14. All students are required to complete a monograph for AMSP to fulfill the Graduate Degree Program requirements for a Master of Military Art and Science.
(1.1 percent). The broad experience contributed to an important intangible to the course’s learning environment.

A quick overview of the interactions between AOASF, AMSP, and the civilian faculty highlight another intangible not directly measured in this study. The unique role of the 2-year AOASF Fellows includes immersion the war college educational experience and development as educators to prepare them as the military AMSP faculty for their second year. The AOASF faculty development program is based largely on the influential work of Donald Schön where he studied the teaching of artists, architects, and musicians. The AOASF faculty development program emphasizes the role of the AOASF Fellows as military mentors who “coach fellow experts [the AMSP Students] in realistic problem solving experiences.” Not only does the civilian faculty provide continuity for the SAMS programs, but they also conduct selected instruction on many of the specialized topics for both programs. The combination of the military and civilian faculty truly challenges the academic limits of the AMSP students.

This study examined the AMSP curriculum and course materials for Class 2008-01 that was taught from 1 July 2007 to 22 May 2008. Figure 10 provides a conceptual depiction of the AMSP curriculum for Academic Year 2007-2008.

76 The specific details on the AMSP class were provided by the SAMS administration section on 1 MAY 2008.


79 In addition to the introduction of Seminar 7, Class 08-02 (scheduled for January 2008-December 2008), the AMSP curriculum witnessed slight modifications during the academic year to leverage new lessons that were identified and developed during a comprehensive course review. The actual findings of this study reflected the instruction delivered to AMSP Class 08-01.
The course materials included 90 in-class modules and 295 out-of-class requirements. The course requirements were reviewed and classified as operational themed or non-operational themed. The operational themed course requirements were further classified into one of the five operational themes--peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Figure 11 provides a visualization of the findings.
The cumulative time to complete all the course requirements was 1004 hours. 47 percent of the course requirements were non-operational themed topics (or dedicated to topics common to multiple operational themes), and 53 percent were dedicated to operational themes. The classification of the operational themed requirements revealed the AMSP dedicated 25 percent of the entire curriculum to major combat operations, 13 percent to irregular warfare, 4 percent to limited intervention, 4 percent to peacetime military engagement, and 1 percent to peace operations.

An assessment of the operational themed curriculum produced additional findings. Several lessons focused on operational art and were classified as major combat operations, including Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, Antoine Henri Jomini’s *The Art of War*, and Shimon Naveh’s *In Pursuit of Military Excellence*. Other lessons classified as major combat operations included the 1812 French campaign into Russia and Operation Barbarossa, the 1941 German campaign into the Soviet Union. Lessons about Napoleon’s irregular warfare experiences in both Naples and Navarre reinforced the notion that irregular warfare was not a recent phenomenon. Other irregular warfare lessons examined insurgencies by reviewing the works of Mao Tse-tung and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. The primary counterinsurgency texts included FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict*, FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Warfare*, and two chapters from the Draft *USA/USMC COIN Handbook*.

The lessons from Vietnam and Iraq included both major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes and offered an interesting perspective. Collectively, these lessons comprise over 5 percent of the entire AMSP curriculum. The ratio of the major combat operations to irregular warfare for the Vietnam based lessons was 62 to 38. The ratio of the major combat operations to irregular warfare for the Iraq based lessons was 56 to 44. In both instances, the United States military pursued a major combat operations approach, while the adversary
effectively conducted irregular warfare. Adjudicating the final decisions on how to classify these lessons created the most uncertainty about the classification scheme.

A closer inspection of the AMSP non-operational themed requirements highlighted several classes that were designed to provide approaches on “how to think.” Classes on causality, complexity, and theory construction highlighted the pitfalls of not understanding problems, oversimplifying problems, and solving the wrong problems. The AMSP curriculum also immersed the students in multiple problem solving methods including the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP), and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). Additionally, students had lessons on the Effects Based Approach (EBA), System of Systems Analysis (SoSA), Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) to understand the effective use of each tool and learn their strengths and weaknesses. Several other areas of non-operational themed instruction satisfied other important learning experiences within the AMSP curriculum. Nine percent of the instruction examined civil support operations. Eight percent of the lessons focused on civil-military relations, International Relations, and foreign policy traditions to establish a fundamental understanding of American cultural norms. Seven percent of lessons involved regional studies on Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Middle East, and Islam that emphasized the intellectual rigor needed to build an appreciation for foreign cultures. Four percent of the instruction involved military deception, information operations, the interagency process, and multinational considerations. Three percent of the instruction examined future warfare topics like weapons of mass destruction, unrestricted warfare, and cyber warfare, which do not yet fit neatly within the operational theme construct. Finally, 1 percent explored mobilization and deployment processes and considerations.

A more detailed examination of the practicums outlined several additional findings. Lion I and Lion V focused on major combat operations in Tunisia and the fictional entity Indolaysia, respectively. Lion II focused on the peacetime military engagement operational theme; examined
potential relations with a fictional post-coup government in Algeria and its neighbors to enhance regional stability within the Maghreb. Lion III focused on the limited intervention operational theme; it examined foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations triggered by a potential tsunami off the coast of Pakistan. In fact, peacetime military engagement and limited intervention themed requirements for the entire AMSP curriculum were limited to their associated Lion exercises. The remaining practicum did not involve an operational theme; Lion IV focused on civil support operations. It examined a potential NORTHCOM Campaign Plan Concept for the consequence management of three simultaneous 10 kiloton nuclear detonations in Washington DC, Kansas City, and San Francisco. Ultimately, the Lion series practicums spanned several of the operational themes that enriched the AMSP educational experience.

Section 4 – School of Command Preparation

Command is the ultimate responsibility entrusted to a military officer. The Army invests considerable time and resources to prepare its officers selected for battalion and brigade commands to assume their new duties and responsibilities. An overarching view of the Command Preparation Program revealed that the program is comprised of both branch pre-command training and branch immaterial pre-command courses. This comprehensive approach ensures that the officers receive a thorough command preparation experience.

Prior to attending the branch immaterial pre-command courses at Fort Leavenworth, command designees attend branch pre-command training at the various TRADOC Branch Centers. Each branch tailors their pre-command training to meet the individual needs of the branch. Their curricula typically include branch updates, training updates, TRADOC System Manager (TSM) updates, staff rides, and simulation exercises.\(^8^0\) This monograph is focused on

\(^8^0\)U.S. Army School for Command Preparation, “Command Preparation Program,” Mr. Kim Summers, Director, CGSC School for Command Preparation, presented at the DOT Conference, 14 June 2007.
only the branch immaterial professional military education programs; therefore, the branch programs remained outside the scope of this study.

The School of Command Preparation (SCP) conducts the branch-immaterial pre-command courses. SCP’s mission is to “prepare brigade and battalion level command selects, Command Sergeant Major selects, and spouses for effective command team performance; conduct training/education to include enhanced battle simulation for students, staff, and faculty; advance military art and science; and support the Army at war.”81 SCP conducts the following five resident courses at Fort Leavenworth--the Pre-Command Course (PCC), Command Sergeants Major Course (CSMC), Command Team Seminar (CTS), Tactical Commanders Development Program (TCDP), and Brigade Combat Team Commanders Development Program (BCTCDP). 82 This study only focused on TCDP.

82Every month, the School of Command Preparation conducts the Pre-Command Course (PCC), Command Sergeant Major Course (CSMC), and Command Team Seminar (CTS) as concurrent, 5-day courses in order to leverage common course instruction and to create command team synergy during selected lessons. The primary audiences for PCC are all officers selected for battalion and brigade equivalent commands (tactical and non-tactical). The primary audiences for CSMC are NCOs selected for CSM responsibilities. The primary audiences for CTS are the spouses for the officers selected for command and spouses for the NCOs selected for CSM duties. Numerous Army senior leaders participate as guest lecturers to offer insights and guidance. Attendees also receive information briefings on Army programs. Since little time is devoted to the COE themed topics, the PCC, CSMC, and CTS are outside the scope of this study.
Tactical Commanders Development Program

TCDP is a mandatory educational requirement for all lieutenant colonels and colonels (non-Brigade Combat Team) selected for command of a tactical unit. TCDP is two weeks in length and administered monthly to three seminars at Fort Leavenworth. All seminars are assigned a facilitator and senior mentor. Facilitators are active duty former battalion commanders and senior mentor are retired former brigade commander. The curriculum at TCDP is dynamic. SCP considers adjustments and improvements every month between iterations based on recommendations from students, cadre, and senior leaders. Facilitators and senior mentors enjoy latitude to select and tailor modules within the curriculum for their seminar. Figure 12 provides an overview of the general organization and composition of the TCDP curriculum.

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83 This subsection reflects the author’s observations and findings about the Tactical Commanders Development Program (TCDP) at the School of Command Preparation unless otherwise noted. As outlined in the research methodology subsection, the TCDP curriculum data was gathered from schedules, syllabi, student advance sheets, and course materials from the School of Command Preparation’ Blackboard Academic Suite®. The author assembled them on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and then determined the time to complete each of the assignments. The author determined whether each assignment was operational themed, then classified the operational themed assignments. After totaling the time for each operational theme, the author considered intangibles. The author’s digital data files are available with the bounded and check out versions of this monograph on the third floor of the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library at Frank L. Turner II. “Full Spectrum Operations within the CGSC Curriculum - TCDP (SCP) Data.” Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library Archives, 2008.

84 Slide developed by the author from the “Tactical Commanders Development Program Class Schedule, 3 December 2007-14 December 2007, Seminar 2.”
This study examined the TCDP curriculum and course materials for Seminar 2, Class 2008-02 scheduled from 3 December 2007 to 14 December 2007. The course requirements included 40 in-class modules and 32 out-of-class requirements. The TCDP course requirements were reviewed and classified as operational themed or non-operational themed. The operational themed course requirements were further classified into one of the five operational themes—peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Figure 13 provides a visualization of the findings.

The cumulative time to complete all the course requirements was 82 hours. Fifty-one percent of the course requirements were non-operational themed topics (or dedicated to topics common to multiple operational themes), and 49 percent were dedicated to operational themes. The classification of the operational themed requirements revealed that TCDP dedicated 44 percent of the entire curriculum to irregular warfare, five percent to major combat operations, and zero percent each to peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, and peace operations.

A closer examination of operational themed topics produced additional insights. The operational themed topics in TCDP predominantly focused on irregular warfare. TCDP dedicated more than 8 percent of the entire curriculum to developing effective relationships with advisor teams, indigenous security forces, and provincial reconstruction teams. The modules on counterinsurgency campaign planning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield in a counterinsurgency environment highlighted the nuances and modifications that can make the planning process more effective. Instruction on Human Terrain Teams, electronic warfare, and culture awareness exposed students to emerging and ongoing OEF/OIF counterinsurgency initiatives. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) conducted capabilities briefings and provided updates on
current trends in theater. The only operational themed module not to emphasize irregular warfare was the MOD1 assignment and subsequent whiteboard exercise where students developed a commander’s intent focused on major combat operations. The operational themed modules were deliberately designed with currency and relevance in mind.

A review of the non-operational themed topics proved equally illuminating. Two specific groups of requirements accounted for almost 60 percent of the non-operational themed topics—the initial doctrinal readings and the Officer Led Discussions. The initial doctrinal readings to be completed prior to day one accounted for approximately 22 percent of the entire course. Of the all the doctrine assigned, only the reading assignment from FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was classified as operational themed. The Officer Led Discussions, topics selected by the students from a preapproved list of potential topics, accounted for 7 percent of the entire course and were classified as non-operational themed.\(^{86}\) The primary non-operational themed topic was battle command; secondary topics included information operations and public affairs.

TCDP is an abbreviated course, purposely designed with a narrow focus and 2-3 year outlook. Graduates are highly likely to deploy as commanders to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the near future. The operational themed instruction addressed current operational gaps and ensured that graduates were current on the emerging initiatives and trends. The non-operational themed instruction reinforced the doctrinal baseline and examined the art of battle command.

**Section 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations**

In February 2008, the Army approved FM 3-0, *Operations*, and introduced Full Spectrum Operations as the new operational concept to shape its approach to warfare. This approach is

\(^{86}\)The Officer Led Discussion list for TCDP Class 08-02, Seminar 2 included the following topics: “Command Climate,” “Command Philosophy,” “How do you react to bad news?” “Engendering relationships (higher, laterally, subordinates),” “Firing a subordinate,” “Chaplain (Role and Relationship),” “Loss of Soldier,” “Tactical Risk Management,” “Motivating Soldiers for 3\(^{rd}\) and 4\(^{th}\) OIF/OEF,” “Moral Courage vs. Physical Courage,” “Training before, during, and after Combat?” and “SOF Integration.”
based on the assembly of simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability (overseas) or civil support (domestic) to describe types of operations. The types of operations are further grouped within the five operational themes--peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. The “Aimpoint” concept describes a desired balance between each of the operation themes. This monograph leveraged this new doctrine to examine the curricula of several programs within the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curricula at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS), the Advance Military Studies Program (AMSP) curriculum at School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Tactical Commanders Development Program (TCDP) at School of Command Preparation (SCP) were all classified using the operational themes as the taxonomy.

A primary output of this study produced a statistical representation of how much of the curricula were focused on operational themes, and what the emphasis was on each of the five operational themes. The balance of instruction between the non-operational themed topics and operational themed topics was generally even across each of the three schools. The operational themed instruction significantly favored the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. The balance between irregular warfare and major combat operations varied depending on the school; ILE and AMSP favored major combat operations and TCDP favored irregular warfare. Ultimately, this study concluded that the balance of the instruction across the operational themes was acceptable; however the importance of the irregular warfare themed instruction in today’s operational environment demanded increased scrutiny. After a closer examination of the irregular warfare themed material, the remaining conclusions and recommendations will gravitate toward three areas--operational themes, course exercises, and doctrine.

An important objective of the ILE and AMSP should be that graduates possess confidence, competence, and understanding of irregular warfare for general purpose forces. The
operational force that is awaiting their return from professional military education will likely continue to conduct counterinsurgency missions for the foreseeable future. Although the entire FM 3-24 became required reading and has assumed a prominent role in all the curricula, the absence of the perspectives of David Galula and others removed some of the manual’s context.  

I recommend CGSC consider reintroducing the perspectives of prominent insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners to augment the FM 3-24 instruction.

The case study methodology can complement a learning experience dominated by theory and doctrine. The recent growth of irregular warfare case studies is encouraging. The case studies on the Philippine Insurrection, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the United States in Vietnam provided insights into application beyond what the doctrine outlines. The ideal case study examines the event at each level of war and from the perspective of both adversaries. Although of the major combat operational theme, the ILE lessons on the Okinawa and Guadalcanal campaigns best epitomized that standard. I recommend any new case studies added to the curricula strive to examine the case from multiple levels of war and from the perspectives of both adversaries.

The operational themes are an exceptionally useful taxonomy to describe types of operations. The well-developed definitions and examples in FM 3-0 attained consensus and greatly reduced any uncertainty or confusion about distinguishing types of operations. The construct broadened the perspective beyond the Counterinsurgency--Major Combat Operations focused discussion, and maintained some visibility on roles and responsibilities within the peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, and peace operations operational themes. One weakness of the operational theme construct is that they fail to properly emphasize domestic operations. The existing construct in FM 3-0 aggregates domestic operations within the civil support element of full spectrum operations in parallel with offense and defense. The AMSP Lion

IV practicum conducted in AY 2007-2008 provided valuable insights into different nuances between roles in Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Support to Civil Authorities for the United States Military. Based on newly-developed perceptions, AMSP students better understand the central role the Army National Guard fulfills through its Title 32 responsibilities while conducting domestic operations. Although not intentional, the current full spectrum operations construct subordinates domestic operations. I recommend collaboration between Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), NORTHCOM, and the Army National Guard Bureau to consider the addition of a sixth operational theme focused on domestic operations.

The application of the operational themes as a classification taxonomy exposed the vulnerability to subordination of the non-operational themed material. This study found that approximately one-half of the instruction of every course examined did not emphasize an operational theme. This important instruction covered a multitude of important topics including several military problem solving tools and processes that provide some of the approaches about “how to think.” A recommendation to increase the operational themed instruction at the expense of the non-operational themed requirements without consciously examining the content could risk the elimination of a critical component of the curriculum. Any adjustments to the non-operational themed instruction must be mindful not to emasculate the central tenets of a course while in pursuit of an optimal operational theme balance.

The application of the operational themes revealed a second vulnerability--oversimplification of the operational themed material. The operational themes naturally possess a certain level of oversimplification. A hypothetical curriculum heavily weighted toward the irregular warfare operational theme may appear to meet the requirements for an agile general purpose force; however, if the types of operations included unconventional warfare or insurgency operations, then they would be inappropriate for the general purpose force. Another aspect of oversimplification is fixation on the statistics. We learned from Dr. Krepenivich’s findings about CGSC in the 1960’s that oversimplification of the directive allowed the institution to eventually
inflated and exaggerated reports of compliance. Oversimplification presents a genuine concern for the implementation of operational themes as the management taxonomy for curricula.

Practical exercises immersed students in multiple operational themes. They are called applications at CGSS, practicums at AMSP, and MODs at TCDP. Most of the practical exercises involve at least one week, and in many cases they last for two weeks. The CGSS applications emphasized the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. The AMSP practicums emphasized the major combat operations, peacetime military engagement, and limited intervention operational themes. The TCDP MODs were based on the major combat operations and irregular warfare operational themes. Although collectively the practical exercises covered four of the five operational themes (none of the practical exercises covered peace operations), each course should have at least one irregular warfare practical exercise to reflect the predominant operational theme in both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. I recommend that AMSP develop an irregular warfare operational themed practicum.

Another area for potential growth within the practical exercise programs is increased integration between the schools. Currently, the only interaction between current ILE and AMSP students occurs informally between classes and during collective guest speaker events. I recommend that CGSC examine the feasibility of constructing an integrated AOASF-AMSP-ILE practical exercise. The integrated exercise should be multi-echeloned; each of the AMSP seminars could assume the role of individual corps and division level headquarters, while the each section within the ILE class could be divided into one brigade and three battalion commands and staffs. If feasible, the additional integration of the AOASF fellows at the joint task force or combatant command level would replicate the friction associated with a higher headquarters for AMSP. The exercise should occur late enough in the year to capitalize on the experience gained through the rigorous curricula. AMSP students would better understand the challenges encountered while tying to meet and exceed the thresholds for feasible, acceptable, suitable, and
complete courses of action. Graduates of all programs would depart with a better appreciation for the benefits of collaboration between the echelons of command.

Doctrine comprised a significant portion of the curricula across the entire college. The use of new and emerging doctrine exposed students to the latest initiatives, approaches, and concepts. In many cases, students studied draft and interim field manuals. The informal introduction and inclusion of the students into the doctrinal development process directly resulted in a wider population of practitioners examining the manual. I recommend that the CGSC maintain this trend and continue to incorporate interim and draft doctrine into the curricula.

The final portion of this monograph considered potential opportunities for future study. The research goal of this study was to conduct an independent, comprehensive, and consistent examination of the emphasis on each operational theme within the curricula at all the schools within the Command and General Staff College. This overview will look at opportunities within the stated goals, consider opportunities outside the stated goals, and reflect on alternate approaches to examine related topics to this study.

The desired goal of this study was to examine the curricula of the all the schools within the Command and General Staff College. One school and two courses were not classified during this study. The Army Management Staff College (AMSC), the fourth school of CGSC, was intentionally excluded from this study, because its focus on civilian education presented little likelihood of emphasizing any operational themes. The newly developed Brigade Combat Team Commanders Development Course at the School of Command Preparation was omitted, because it originated too late in the development process of this study. The Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship at the School of Advanced Military Studies was also omitted; but it represents another legitimate case study that could have been included in this study. I recommend any subsequent studies include the Brigade Combat Team Commanders Development Course and the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship.
Another aspect of the research goal that offers opportunity for further study involves its independent nature. Formal contact with the institutions was intentionally limited. Most of the interactions were limited to the request for access to the advance sheets, course schedules, and course materials; and receiving the command information on the students, faculty, curricula, and schools. The author made all decisions on whether or not to classify an assignment or class as operational themed, and how to further classify them within the operational theme taxonomy. A similar study could be undertaken that involves a larger evaluation team. A larger group could review more curricula, conduct thorough discourse, and incorporate multiple perspectives in the adjudication process. Any follow on effort involving a larger group would need to be mindful of preventing institutional bias from influencing the results. Control measures should also be implemented to maintain consistency across the group and throughout the effort.

The next aspect of this study that did not completely achieve the research goal was the intent to classify the complete curricula. Universally, three areas of the curricula fit poorly within the evaluation process developed for this study – the written requirements, the monographs, and the electives. Determining the time to complete both the written requirements and the monographs is problematic, because the time varies by student. Additionally, operational theme emphasis varies within the monographs depending on the research topic. The electives at CGSS presented the two challenges. First, determining the population density for each elective is difficult, because the final lock-in date for electives occurs relatively late in the term. Subsequently, developing a usable model to represent operational themes that reflects the electives permutations of over 800 students is challenging. A study that properly accounts for the written requirements, the monographs, and the elective may lead to new conclusions or reinforce the conclusions in this monograph.

The application of this study’s research methodology may provide additional insights on the utility and effectiveness of the operational theme taxonomy. One could examine one or several of the numerous Initial Military Training programs. One could examine one or several of
the other courses throughout the PME program from the Officer Education System, Warrant Officer Education System, and Noncommissioned Officer Education System. As outlined in the Army Training and Education subsection, there are numerous other programs available for future study.

Other opportunities for future study involve the application of aspects of this study to similar or related topics. One could adopt part of this study’s research methodology to reexamine the time requirements for any or all the courses and determine its rigor and assess if CGSC is asking too much from its students or faculty. One could examine recent monograph topics using the operational theme taxonomy to determine the trends for where student interests currently lie. Other possibilities include determining whether the lesson objectives were appropriate, whether the lesson materials were sufficient to meet the learning objectives, whether the lesson sequence was optimal, and how well the lessons were nested, progressive, or interwoven. A subsequent examination may attempt to determine what students actually learn, and compare it to what graduates need to know. These efforts would likely require extensive survey work.

How does the United States Army “regain its traditional edge fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned--and relearned--about unconventional wars--the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead”?\textsuperscript{88} This monograph attempted to determine whether the Full Spectrum Operations construct provided a useful approach to manage curricula content at the Command and General Staff College in support of Secretary Gates’ vision. The full spectrum operations approach proved useful for classifying the operational themed instruction; but less useful for the equally important non-operational themed instruction. If indeed the Army’s intent is to follow two grand strategies, simultaneously, then the Army will need an effective approach to manage course curricula.

\textsuperscript{88}Gates.
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