Wants and Needs:
SAMS’ Relationship with the Army

A Monograph
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Abstract


The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is at the same time well noted for and bound by its reputation. Enter most Army division or above headquarters and ask where you can find the “SAMS” officers and the answer you will get is “in the plans shop.” This is because if you ask most Army officers, not associated with the school in any way, they will tell you that SAMS is the planning school, and SAMS graduates are planners. It is this commonly held belief that typifies the field Army’s expectations of the school, expectations that should guide the school in its mission and curriculum. However, is there a difference between what the Army in the field expects a SAMS Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) graduate to be capable of when they complete the program and what SAMS actually educates that officer to do? This is the primary question answered in this monograph.

The expectations of the Army come in the form of results of a survey, conducted by the school in 2007, of sitting Army flag officers in Divisions and Corps. The data indicates the leaders of the Army in the field expect what the school has traditionally produced and has gained a renowned reputation for: critical and creative thinking, problem solving planners and staff officers. These expectations have been shaped primarily by the performance of graduates of the Advanced Military Studies Program, (AMSP), and also by its 25 year history. Of course the school and its graduates know they are much more than planners for the Army. Many graduates go on to successfully command at many echelons and the school touts 55 sitting flag officers as graduates of one of its two programs, with many more in the retired ranks.

Changes at SAMS in the AMSP program in 2007-2008 do not match with the field Army’s expectations. The mission statement of the school removed educating staff officers as a focus and was elevated from the tactical and operational level of war, to the strategic level. A subsequent curriculum redesign resulted in one that centers on strategy and policy at the operational to strategic level. While this curriculum has not been fully implemented, it logically follows that it will provide an education that does not meet the Army’s expectations for the AMSP, and is ill suited for the professional military education of junior field grade officers.

One reason the redesign resulted in a mismatched curriculum is the school did not follow the curriculum design policies and standards of the Command and General Staff College. These policies incorporate proven theories and standards of graduate and professional military education. More importantly, they ensure continued academic accreditation of CGSC’s programs by both graduate and military education accreditation agencies, including SAMS and its two programs.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is at the same time well noted for and bound by its reputation. Enter most Army division or above headquarters and ask where the “SAMS” officers are and the answer one will get is “in the plans shop.” This is because asking most Army officers, not associated with the school in anyway, they will say that SAMS is the planning school, and SAMS graduates are planners. It is this commonly held belief that typifies the field Army’s expectations of the school, expectations that should guide the school in its mission and curriculum. However, is there a difference between what the Army in the field expects a SAMS Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) graduate to be capable of when they complete the program and what SAMS actually educates that officer to do? This is the primary question answered in this monograph.

SAMS is one of several schools at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and has two programs: The Advanced Military Studies Program, AMSP, and the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship, AOASF.¹ The mission of SAMS is to educate future commanders and leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-agency at the graduate level to think strategically and operationally to solve complex adaptive problems across

¹The Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) is the capstone program of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Focused at the operational and strategic levels of war, AOASF is a two-year senior service college-level course that prepares senior officers for colonel-level command and for operational planning assignments to combatant and service component commands. During year one, fellows follow a curriculum that includes graduate-level study of military art and science, visits to combatant and service component commands, guest speakers, and practical exercises in campaign and major operations planning. Graduates of AOASF earn a masters degree in Military Arts and Sciences and receive Military Education code 1 (War College level graduate) credit. During year two, fellows serve as faculty members of the Command and General Staff College with particular service as seminar leaders in the Advanced Military Studies Program. US Army Command and General Staff College, “School of Advanced Military Studies: Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship.” US Army Combined Arms Center, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/sams/ (accessed April 23, 2008).
the security environment.” AMSP is the traditional “SAMS” program with which people are most familiar. In fact, many people around the military refer to the AMSP as SAMS without a distinction between the school and its programs. AMSP is open to majors or junior lieutenant colonels of all the services and active Army Reserve or National Guard who are Intermediate Level Education (ILE) graduates. Officers normally attend AMSP the year immediately following ILE at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS). The curriculum is currently directed at the strategic to operational levels of war and includes studies in history, theory, doctrine, political science, international relations, and philosophy. Students are required to read at least 100 pages per night on average. The AMSP class completes several contemporary exercises throughout the course year as well. There is a writing program culminating with a research monograph, which is required to graduate. Graduates receive a Masters in Military Art and Science from CGSC.


3 US Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy(OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01C, December 22, 2005 defines Intermediate Level Education, ILE, as the level of professional military education in the US military provided to military officers that are about mid-way through their careers. These officers are generally junior field grade officers in the grade of O-4. Each of the services has their own ILE program and exchange officers between their schools. The primary US Army ILE program is conducted by the Command and General Staff School of CGSC at Ft Leavenworth and several satellite campuses across the Army. On page A-A-3, the CJCSI states: “Intermediate education focuses on war fighting within the context of operational art. Students expand their understanding of joint force deployment and employment at the operational and tactical levels of war. They gain a better understanding of joint and service perspectives. Inherent in this level is development of an officer’s analytic capabilities and creative thought processes. In addition to continuing development of their joint war fighting expertise, they are introduced to theater strategy and plans, national military strategy, and national security strategy and policy.”

4 Any junior field grade officer O-4 or O-5 can apply to AMSP as long as they meet the pre-requisite of being an ILE graduate. In AY 2007-2008, SAMS began a new policy for field nominations of officers. Army divisions, corps, and MACOMs were allowed to self nominate one officer to attend AMSP. This nomination required a general officer endorsement from the nominating command.

5 A detailed description of the 2008 curriculum is covered in Chapter 4.
Traditionally, and officially by policy, AMSP graduates are assigned as planners in Army divisions and corps.\textsuperscript{6} Sister-service and non-basic branch Army officers are generally assigned to similar positions. If this is the primary expectation for AMSP graduates, the military may not be getting the most out of this short but intense graduate program in military arts and science.

AMSP has played a significant educational role in the leader development of its graduates in the past. The school touts fifty-five serving General Officers who graduated from the AMSP sometime in its twenty-five year history. There are dozens more already retired. As we will see, the original purpose and intent of the school, initially just AMSP, was to educate promising leaders who would contribute to the Army throughout their careers in the art and science of war at the operational level – operational art.\textsuperscript{7} SAMS, as a military education institution, knows this, but this foundational purpose has been lost somewhere recently, by the school and in some respects the Army in the field. It is this possibility that makes this monograph significant, because of the unrealized potential of the education that AMSP can provide its graduates to benefit the field Army.

Since SAMS is a military institution, it has developed a mission through an iterative process with its next higher headquarters. Because SAMS is also an academic institution, it should also have an enduring charter. SAMS does have a mission statement but it changes with each SAMS director. The school, and more particularly the individual directors, has developed the mission statements themselves as they have come and gone, as opposed to being assigned by CGSC or the Army. Other than the professional experience of individual school directors and the

\textsuperscript{6} Department of the Army, \textit{Army Regulation 614-100: Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers}, Headquarters Department of the Army (Washington, DC January 10, 2006).

\textsuperscript{7} Joint Staff Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, “\textit{Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms},” US Department of Defense, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03912.html (Accessed May 5, 2008). According to the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, Operational Art is defined as “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs - supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience - to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.”
verbal guidance they may have received upon taking their new position, there is no mechanism to
match the mission of the school with the long-term requirements of the Army. Other
authoritative documents such as AR 614-100, Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and
Transfers, and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System database also provide
reference documentation of what the role, mission, and function of SAMS, and in particular,
AMSP are, but there is not one authoritative source for the mission of SAMS.8 This is important
because it is the mission statement itself that primarily guides the faculty and staff of the school
in designing its curricula and programs.

There is a difference between the traditional role of AMSP and what the field Army
requires or wants of AMSP graduates when they complete the program, the current mission of the
AMSP, and the education provided through the AMSP curriculum. The differences between the
three result in misplaced expectations by organizations employing AMSP graduates in both initial
and follow-on assignments and disconnected academic curriculum in the program. To explore
this issue, it is important to understand the brief history and original foundations of SAMS and
AMSP alluded to earlier. The roots of the program, planted firmly in the changes of the Army in
the 1980s, have had a lasting effect on the expectations of the Army for the school and its

8 US Army Command and General Staff College, “School of Advanced Military Studies:
contains the mission of SAMS as of this date, referenced in note 1. Department of the Army, Army
Regulation 614-100: Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers, Headquarters Department of the
Army (Washington, DC January 10, 2006) paragraph 5-4.h(1) provides a detailed description of the AMSP
along with the policy for utilization of officers upon graduation from the program. This description is
similar to the one listed on the same CGSC website but a different page containing the AMSP course
description: US Army Command and General Staff College, “School of Advanced Military Studies:
2008). Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), “Information for Course 1-250-
2008). The ATRRS database took the place of the Army Formal Schools Catalogue, DAPAM 351-4, and
lists the AMSP as one of the Army’s formal schools. Its only description of the school is dated October 1,
1987 and describes the scope of the AMSP as “Military science and theory, military art and doctrine,
preparing for war, joint and combined operations. Studies the history and scope of war from antiquity to
the present. Examines current and future issues of operational concepts and doctrine across the spectrum of
conflict.”
graduates. A key aspect of the early development of AMSP in the 1980s was structuring a graduate level program, which it did become. Since it is a graduate level program in the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), it is also necessary to cover the graduate education and curriculum development standards of the college to properly evaluate the AMSP curriculum. The background knowledge provided by the history of the program, and the standards it is responsible for maintaining, will place the three sets of expectations for the AMSP program referred to earlier in proper perspective.

Fortunately, there is current and relevant survey data available on the views and opinions of AMSP in the field Army. The CGSC quality assurance office conducted a survey of 46 division and corps commanders (or senior leaders of these organizations) in the fall of 2007.9 While only 20 of 46 leaders surveyed responded, the data is representative of the views of senior leaders in the Army because of the common culture, background, development, and experiences of senior leaders across the Army. Information on the views of joint leaders in combatant commands is not yet completely available except for that from personal interviews conducted by the author with a few leaders outside the field Army. The survey data shows a desire on the part of senior military leaders for SAMS to produce planners of campaigns and operations conducted in complex and ambiguous environments. This is a significant finding when matched with the mission statement of SAMS and AMSP. While SAMS sees its role as providing a broad education to create adaptive, problem solving, strategic thinking leaders in AMSP, the Army is looking for proficient planners and problem solvers for its operational staffs.

The mission statement mentioned earlier plays a significant role in shaping the curriculum of AMSP. In this case, the current mission statement of SAMS is new as of the

9 Maria L. Clark and Dr. Jacob Kipp, November 2007, Executive Summary, Div and Corps Commanders Survey, US Army Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
summer of 2007. This new mission statement, derived on the arrival of a new school director, in part drove a complete review and revision of the AMSP curriculum in the fall of 2007. While the new curriculum may not be in a state of readiness for detailed analysis, the learning outcomes and objectives are sufficiently developed to determine whether the curriculum, as designed, meets its intended purposes and the needs of the Army. What one finds upon this analysis is a disjointed curriculum that matches the 2007 mission of SAMS, but does not match the traditional role of the school in the Army, or the current expectations of the Army in the field.

After comparing the mission of SAMS and the AMSP to the survey results and the AMSP curriculum, there is a disconnect between what the Army in the field thinks AMSP does and what SAMS intends AMSP to do. Again, while the Field Army thinks of SAMS as a school for planners, SAMS sees itself providing a broad-based curriculum in military arts and science to educate creative thinking and adaptive strategic leaders. What is the significance and relevance of the gap? What impact does it have? These questions form the basis of this monograph. The analysis begins with the mission of SAMS.

Chapter 2. The Mission of SAMS and AMSP

The School of Advanced Military Studies’ current (2007) mission is to educate future commanders and leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-agency at the graduate level to think strategically and operationally to solve complex adaptive problems across the security environment. This mission was developed under the direction of the current Director of SAMS, Colonel Stefan Banach. He briefed and received concurrence for this new mission statement in his first briefing to Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center in September 2007. That briefing and concurrence makes this mission statement the current assigned mission of SAMS. The mission serves as the primary guidance for the Advanced Military Studies Program, which is described by CGSC on its website as:

A graduate-level program of the School of Advanced Military Studies that provides education in military art and science. All enrolled officer students are graduates of the Army Command and General Staff Officer Course or US service-equivalent intermediate level school. Focus is on the military art and science of planning, preparing, and executing full spectrum operations in joint, multinational, and interagency contexts. Curriculum combines integrated study of military history, military theory, and execution-based practical exercises, and enables students to develop cognitive problem-solving skills to overcome tough operational challenges at the tactical and operational levels of war. Course emphasizes both command and staff perspectives on military decision-making, doctrine, and force employment. State-of-the-art information technologies enable student interaction with the field, and provide an exercise environment for collaborative, joint, and multinational operations planning. Graduates earn a Masters Degree in Military Arts and Sciences. Following graduation, officers serve a twelve-month utilization tour in critical battle staff positions within division or corps headquarters.

These two descriptions, the school mission and the course description of AMSP, constitute the official mission of SAMS and the AMSP. The operative phrases from the mission statement and

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course description do not match. While the course description describes one that melds the study of military history and theory, with exercises at the tactical and operational levels of war, the mission statement specifies educating officers to think strategically and operationally. The mismatch has carried into the AMSP program in that, as we will see, the mission statement has driven a curriculum focusing on the strategic to operational levels of war.

The mission of the school prior to September 2008, developed under the previous director, Colonel Kevin Benson, is slightly different. It states; “The School of Advanced Military Studies educates and trains officers at the graduate level in military art and science to develop Commanders and General Staff Officers with the abilities to solve complex problems in peace and war.” Colonel Banach cited two changes that were deliberate. First, changing the words “Commanders and General Staff Officers” to “Future Commanders and Leaders” was done, as he puts it “to dispel the myth that we (SAMS) produce planners.” The focus of the programs of the school is on command and leadership. He took the term “General Staff Officers” out of the mission statement to emphasize this point. Training was also removed from the September 2008 mission statement leaving education the only learning focus. Second, he replaced “peace and war” with the term “across the security environment” to encapsulate the entire spectrum of

14 Ibid. One can assume that the website still contains an older version of the mission because of an administrative oversight in updating the data on the pages.


16 Several scholars speak of the differences, similarities, and relationships between training and education. Tight writes in Malcolm Tight, *Key Concepts in Adult Education and Training*, (New York: Routledge. 1996), 18: “we might distinguish education from training on two grounds. First, the former is a broader and deeper learning activity. Second, the latter is more likely to be involved with the development of narrower skills, while the former has to do with more general levels of understanding. Dr. Claude Bowman, a faculty development and educational standards professor at CGSC agrees and went further in an interview on 29 January 2008 by relating them to the relationship of the educator and student to the information. He agrees that in education the student is an active participant in the learning process as opposed to most training venues where the student is usually a passive receiver of new, primarily factual information. This does not place a value judgment on either in that training can occur at a very high intellectual level while education can also happen at a relatively lower intellectual level.
conflict in full spectrum operations that officers face, recognizing that we are often at peace and war, and somewhere in between, at the same time.\footnote{Colonel Stefan Banach, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 2008.}

The changes between the two mission statements are not necessarily remarkable in themselves. The fact that the mission of the school changes slightly upon arrival of each new director is understandable and not remarkable either. What is remarkable is that the missions are developed at the school, presented in someway to the leadership of the Army, and when approved, become the mission of the school with no deliberate system to maintain the enduring charter of the institution. Evolutionary change in the form of constant improvement is healthy for an organization. Fundamental and profound change every two to three years inserts undesirable volatility in an institutional environment. As Colonel Banach put it, when he briefed the three-star commander of the Combined Arms Center on his new mission, that officer “was the Army at that point.”\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, the Army assigned the mission.

Both Colonels Banach and Benson spoke of a similar process of deriving their mission statements. The process involved each of them receiving verbal guidance iteratively from several senior Army leaders, including the TRADOC and Combined Arms Center Commanders at the time, as well as others, in the period just prior to or just after taking charge of the school.\footnote{Colonel (Retired) Kevin Benson, interview by the author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 14 2008. Colonel Stefan Banach, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 2008.} Neither officer received written guidance or any specific guidance to change the mission of the school. The guidance they received generally fit the pattern of making sure the school remained relevant in a changing security environment, emphasizing creative and adaptive thinking but was described by each as ambiguous. Benson even related a meeting with a senior commander whose
only guidance was “Kevin, you know what we need.” On one hand, one can view this type of
guidance as a vote of confidence in the officer being appointed to direct one of the Army’s
premier educational institutions. On the other hand, it is rather surprising that the Army, as an
institution, has no mechanism or organization to think through and develop a deliberate role,
mission and function for such an institution, and chart that enduring role for the long term.

How does the Army determine if the school and its programs are meeting expectations?
What are those expectations? Does the mission of the school meet the expectations of the Army
in the field, where graduates serve? Are the expectations what should drive the curriculum, or
should something else? As far as the mission of SAMS is concerned, it is historically left up to
the school and its director to identify those expectations through primarily verbal guidance and
feedback, from that derive the mission and vision, which then focus the curriculum to meet Army
requirements. While this mission development process works well in military operations, and is
thoroughly documented in Army doctrine, that doctrine is not specified as being applicable to
educational institutions with enduring professional military education responsibilities. Covered
in depth in chapter 4, documents such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Policy on
Officer Professional Military Education, CJSIS 1800.01, and the CGSC Accountable Instruction
System are deliberately written to apply to military education institutions.

20 Colonel (Retired) Kevin Benson, interview by the author, Fort Leavenworth, KS January 14
2008.
Chapter 3. Expectations of AMSP

History and Background of AMSP

SAMS and the AMSP began as a part of the development of Air-Land Battle, the new Army keystone doctrine in the early 1980s. Its founder, Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege, was one of the principle developers of the new doctrine and writers of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This new doctrine introduced the operational level of war to the US Army. Wass de Czege, then a Lieutenant Colonel, knew that such a revolutionary change in approach for the Army would require a requisite change in the intellectual development of leaders who would use it. Richard M. Swain, in his paper Filling the Void, described the unique situation where Wass de Czege received approval for starting SAMS: “On a trip to China with (Lieutenant General William R.) Richardson...he got approval to create a new school at CGSC to study large unit operations, and by implication, seek a better understanding of the operational level of war.”21 Wass de Czege spent 1982 and 1983 as a Senior Service College fellow at Fort Leavenworth where he produced a comprehensive study of Army Staff College Level Training. The logic and concept for the school that he forged with Lieutenant General Richardson on their trip to China was the primary focus and guiding template for the staff study.22 Among other things in this study were the design and curriculum for the Advanced Military Studies Program. Swain continued: “The new School of Advanced Military Studies of the Command and General Staff College took in its first students in June 1983. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege was its first director.”23


A major theme of Wass de Czege’s two-hundred page staff study was that the changing nature of warfare, the added complexity of the modern battlefield, and a revolutionary change in Army doctrine with a focus on the operational level required a fundamental change in the way the Army educated the officers who would be charged with leading in this environment. In the staff study, Wass de Czege stated that the focus of the AMSP was on “the time to study in-depth, to learn the theory behind current methods and techniques, and thus achieve mastery of the art of war at the tactical and operational level.”

He argued that in the past, during similar times of change, the Command and General Staff College added a second year of instruction for a select number of officers and that second year of instruction led to success in the next war. He specifically used the interwar years between WWI and WWII as an example where he cites at least eleven general officers who had an impact on victory in both the European and Pacific theaters as being graduates of 2-year classes at the Army Staff College in the 1930s.

24 Wass de Czege lays his argument for the AMSP out in three primary documents. First was the Staff study written for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for operations in 1983. Second, he published two professional journal articles, derived from the Staff Study, published in Military Review in 1984: Challenge for the Future: Educating Field grade Battle Leaders and Staff Officers, June 1984; and How to change an Army, November 1984. Both of these articles were published while he was the director of AMSP in its pilot year of 1984.


26 Several scholars have studied and written about the Army’s 2-year staff college programs and their impacts. Richard Macak’s thesis The United States Army’s Second Year Courses: a Continuing Tradition in Educational Excellence, University of Kansas, 1989; and Timothy Nenninger’s thesis The Leavenworth Schools: Post Graduate Military Education and Professionalization in the US Army 1880-1920, University of Wisconsin, 1974, both posit positive impacts of second year programs but recognize that the Army only implemented a second year of staff college education when there was not wartime demand for quickly producing officer graduates. Peter Schifferle notes in his dissertation Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and US Army Military Effectiveness, 1919 to 1945, University of Kansas 2002, 325, that graduates of second year programs at Leavenworth during the interwar period did not have as great an impact on Army effectiveness in World War II as Wass de Czege may have implied in his staff study. “Although the second year course graduates performed valuable services in the war, they did not serve in any appreciable numbers at division or regimental level.”
Wass de Czege was consistent and clear on the purpose and necessity for a second year of education at CGSC as well as which officers should attend and why. According to the Staff Study:

The purpose of the second year course is to provide a broad, deep military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels that goes beyond the CGSO course [Command and General Staff Officers Course] in both theoretical depth and practical application to officers who have demonstrated a high degree of potential for serving as battalion and brigade commanders, as principal staff officers of divisions and corps, and as branch chiefs and deputy division chiefs on major command and Department of the Army level staffs or their equivalents....The other purpose of this course is to seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will produce a leavening influence on the Army by their competence and impact on other officers. This influence will, overtime, gradually raise the levels of competence Army-wide. The purpose of this course therefore is not only to train individuals to do certain key jobs better, but to create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers teach others.27

With this, it was clear that the focus of the program should be the development of a body of knowledge of military art and science, and the conduct of war. Further, the program should create a group of experts who would possess, protect, and continue to develop and proliferate that body of knowledge throughout the Army; the goal being, according to Wass de Czege, “to develop an officer who will make a positive contribution toward producing a winning army throughout a long career as a commander or staff officer in key positions of increasingly greater responsibility.”28 This aspect of the original intent of the Army for the AMSP has endured through its twenty-five year history, which in turn has influenced what the Army in the field currently expects: proficient planners and problem solvers for divisions and corps. The fifty-five serving General Officers who graduated from the AMSP sometime in its twenty-five year history support the intent for the continuing contribution of graduates through a long career.

28 Ibid F-5
Wass de Czege perceptively recognized that acceptance of the school by the Army at large would be difficult and a long, generational process. To assist in this endeavor he noted that the program should not be viewed as attempting to create an elite officers corps akin to the famed German General Staff Corps and that there should be no skill identifier or other distinguishing features that would single out the graduates from the rest of the officer corps. However, he noted that, “we are a pragmatic Army. Education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession) is not highly valued.”

The fear was that before senior leaders would begin to see the value added of an AMSP education in the field, the personnel bureaucracy, represented by assignment officers and promotion boards, would begin discouraging attendance under the guise of spending too much time in school and not enough time in the field Army.

In part to gain traction for the program with commanding general officers in the field, and part to continue the education of graduates through general officer mentorship, Wass de Czege and General Richardson, by this time Commanding General of TRADOC, hammered an AMSP graduate utilization policy through the Army Chief of Staff. The policy was in keeping with a key aspect of the template the two developed in China; a three-part education consisting of the AMSP, a focused utilization tour, and continued service as general staff officers and commanders throughout a long career. From his experience on division staffs himself, Wass de Czege knew the best place for AMSP graduates to have regular, mentoring contact with the commander and other general officers in a division was on the division planning staff, as a planner. Thus, the policy, which continues to this day in AR 614-100, specifies that AMSP graduates be assigned to division or Corps planning positions upon graduation from the program. It is this policy, and the

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29 Ibid F-34.
31 Ibid.
legacy it has created, that began the pervasive association of AMSP graduates as planners and their school as a planning school.

In addition to laying out the argument for the school, the staff study also documented a detailed curriculum and program of instruction. It specified the methodology of instruction, a staff and faculty structure, a day-by-day schedule for the pilot year of 1983/84, as well as plans for expansion after evaluation of the pilot program. The initial staff and faculty Wass de Czege put together adapted the concept from the staff study into the reality of building a fledgling program in a bureaucratic institution where there was little support for change. The course was conducted primarily through graduate level education methods in seminar settings of 12 officers each. Each seminar would have a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel Seminar Leader who would be responsible for all instruction. In addition to academic work, exercises, war games, and practica were conducted regularly to test and practice the theories and methods learned through seminar instruction.32

Wass de Czege enlisted the help of Dr. Robert Epstein, a historian in the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, among others, to help develop and improve the course content of the AMSP curriculum. Epstein remembered, “The initial curriculum was integrated by the relationship between history and theory. History and theory were the crown jewels of the program.”33 Eventually, an operations research analyst from what is now known as the TRADOC Analysis Center, Jim Schneider, joined the faculty. Schneider’s interest in Soviet military theory forged a partnership with Epstein’s expertise in Napoleonic warfare, perfecting the key relationship between history and theory in the curriculum that would grow over the years. Again, the underlying purpose for the school, in Wass de Czege’s argument, was to educate an

33 Dr. Robert Epstein, interview by the author, January 11 2008.
officer corps capable of dealing with the increasingly evident complexity of the modern battlefield and employing the revolutionary new Air-Land Battle doctrine, which required expertise at the operational level of war and thus operational art. SAMS was a school to study and build the expert body of knowledge of military art and science at the operational level, analogous to medical school or law school for those professions. One of the findings from Wass de Czege’s staff study was that the Army must teach more theory and principles in its service schools to build a deeper understanding of war and warfare throughout the officer corps. Epstein and Schneider agreed and helped build the curriculum to, in their words, “develop the practice of the art of war and conduct of warfare.”

The purpose for history in the curriculum was more than obvious to military educators and practitioners alike. In crafting his case for SAMS to the Army at large, in the *Military Review* articles of 1984, Wass de Czege posed the following: “the art of war is best learned in combat through the course of several campaigns,” developing sound military judgment in peacetime and a “desire and interest in military matters” is best “cultivated with a carefully selected set of readings in military history.” Essentially, learning from history is learning from the mistakes of others serving before you. The purpose for theory fits with the medical school analogy. On the topic of theory, Wass de Czege continued: “Theory is the foundation of any

34 The analogy of the military profession with others such as medicine and law is common. Several scholars have written about the role of professional education in the military being analogous to other noted professions such as medicine and law. Samuel P. Huntington in *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), uses an analogy with law and medicine to argue that a broad, general educational background is a “desirable qualification for the professional officer.” Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins used similar analogies as one basis for their study on the state of the Army profession in *The Future of the Army Profession,* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002).


science”, building a theoretical base and constantly challenging and testing it to improve it is essential. Therefore, it followed that in Swain’s words, “SAMS students studied classical theory, principally Clausewitz’s *On War*, and examined large unit operations in history and in simulations, in order to understand what the school came to call Operational Art.”

By the 1987/88 academic year, the curriculum for AMSP stabilized and matured into a complete body of work designed to confront students with the complexity of war and provide them with the means of comprehension through the application of military theory, history, and war game exercises. This curriculum consisted of six courses designed as vertically integrated blocks of instruction, sequenced to build on each other from the start of the academic year to the end.

Course One, Foundations of Military Theory, had a stated purpose of teaching students how to think about war rather than what to think, and laid a theoretical and doctrinal foundation for students to build on through the rest of the year. It consisted primarily of material from Clausewitz’s *On War* as well as primary US and Soviet army doctrine. Of the thirty-four periods of instruction scheduled for this course, four were history lessons; nine were lessons on doctrine, and the rest on theory.

Course two, Dynamics of Engagements, was designed to reinforce the fundamental knowledge students gained of tactics from company through brigade levels in the CGSO course and provide a laboratory to examine those tactics through the lens of the theory learned in course

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38 Ibid 41.
40 James J. Schneider, “Course 1 – Foundations of Military Theory and Doctrine” (Course Introduction Memorandum to SAMS Faculty and Students contained in the Course 1 Syllabus, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Academic Year 1987/88).
This course used theory, history, doctrine (both US and Soviet), and practical exercises to study the basic building block of battles - the engagement. Of the sixteen lessons in this course, four were history lessons, two covered US and Soviet doctrine, and ten were practical application exercises of some form including a terrain walk.

Course 3, Dynamics of Battles, followed the same rationale focused on the basic building block of campaigns. This course had thirty scheduled lessons, four of which were history lessons, five were doctrinal both US and Soviet, two were theory lessons, and the rest comprised two practical exercises on division and corps operations.

Courses 4 and 5 hence focused on operational art and campaigns. The former was titled “The Evolution and Practice of Operational Art” and was entirely a history survey course focused on its title, the latter “Planning and Conduct of Major Operations and Campaigns” consisting of an equal mix of history, theory, doctrine and practical exercises centered on joint and combined operations and capabilities. These two courses again, combined theory, history, doctrine, and practical exercise to develop the body of knowledge at the operational level of war that Wass de Czege and Richardson knew was necessary to successfully implement Air-Land Battle doctrine throughout the Army. The final course offered to the students in academic year 1987/88 was titled “Preparing for War”, and included lessons designed to stimulate student thinking of how to effectively use peacetime, to prepare for war in the future. This included organizing, training, and equipping army forces for the unknown, ten to twenty years in the future. Again, the course mixed two history lessons, two theory lessons, four doctrine lessons, and practical exercises with guest instructors to meet its objectives.

By the end of the 1980s, the Army began to see the fruits of the student’s labor in AMSP. Nothing illustrates this better than the group of graduates that became General Schwarzkopf’s

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planning cell for Operation Desert Storm. To develop a ground offensive plan for the Operation, General Schwarzkopf requested and received four recent graduates of the AMSP, which by 1990 was noted as the “bastion of the operational art.” These officers were placed at the center of planning the famed left hook executed by 3d US Army forces liberating Kuwait in the winter of 1991. This four-man planning cell, networked with other AMSP graduates throughout the forces that executed the operation, were the officers that acquired the nickname of “The Jedi Knights” which sticks to AMSP graduates to this day. It also may have been these officers, who were so successful at planning the pinnacle operation of the era of Air Land battle, which solidified AMSP graduates as expert planners in the minds of the Army, and thus SAMS as the school that produced them. This still typifies the expectations of the Army in the field.

**Field Expectations of AMSP Graduates**

The quality assurance office of CGSC conducted a survey of division and corps commanders in the fall of 2007. The purpose of the survey was to acquire senior leader input as to the quality of recent AMSP graduates. While the survey was conducted simultaneously with the review and update of the AMSP curriculum, and thus had little impact on the 2008 curriculum design, it contains necessary and useful data that will continue to be useful into the future. It is not possible to determine with accuracy whether the respondents were rendering opinions of their current AMSP graduates, graduates they have served with over a number of years, or even themselves if they were graduates. Another interesting aspect of the survey is the use of the term

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44 Ibid 206. Swain seems to be the first to document this moniker in a published work. It is now a widely used, accepted, and published nickname for graduates of AMSP.

45 This section is exclusively derived from the SAMS division and corps commander survey conducted by the quality assurance office of CGSC. The report was prepared by Maria Clark, an analyst from the CGSC quality assurance office and obtained electronically from her on 7 January 2008. The
SAMS as opposed to AMSP in the questions. Understanding that the intent of the survey was to ascertain opinions on AMSP graduates, AMSP is inserted next to the term SAMS used in the survey questions, for clarity in this monograph. Despite these caveats, the data serves to inform on the opinions of the field Army as to the quality of the AMSP program and its graduates, its intended purpose.

Forty-six sitting general officers in Army divisions and corps were sent surveys. Twenty of forty-six responded by the time a report was required, although individual responses continue to come in and are added to the database. “The survey consisted of eight Likert scale questions, four open ended questions, and an opportunity for respondents to provide comments and/or recommendations.” The survey designer chose six primary question areas to fulfill the purpose of the survey.

How prepared are AMSP Graduates?

All commanders agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared upon graduation to address ambiguous problems and all but one agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared for joint or combined staff assignments. This indicates that commanders believe AMSP graduates are capable of serving as general staff officers dealing with complex adaptive military problems. Fourteen of the commanders surveyed either strongly agreed or agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared for senior officer responsibilities. This indicates commander support for one of the
original intents of the AMSP; to educate officers that can think like their commanding general officers. The focus on staff officers in this and other sections of the survey results questions the removal of staff officers from the SAMS mission statement.

**How are SAMS (AMSP) graduates different than other members of your command performing similar responsibilities?**

A clear majority of respondents (12 of 14 86%) to these questions indicated that they thought AMSP graduates were better thinkers and problem solvers than other officers on their staffs. This could be for several reasons. For instance, the response could be because of poor quality or inexperience of the non-AMSP graduates on the staffs as opposed to an indication of a high quality of graduates, and by inference the program. The opposite could also be a reason for the answer. Regardless of the cause of the opinion, the respondents indicate a high opinion of the thinking and problem solving skills of AMSP graduates. This is a clear indicator that AMSP is fulfilling its stated mission of educating officers to solve complex adaptive problems.

**What should be the primary focus of SAMS (AMSP)?**

A plurality of the nineteen respondents to this question (9 of 19 47%) indicated that planning should be the primary focus of AMSP. Four of the remaining ten indicated joint and inter-agency operations as the focus. The remainder of responses was diverse and varied. This is another indicator that leaders in the field want AMSP to be a school focused on planning, and thus by inference a school for planners. With the doctrinal relationship of joint operations to the operational level of war, it follows that there is a desire in the field for proficiency at the level. Again, it is hard to attribute a why to these answers, such as whether they are formed because of conventional wisdom about the program or a clear desire for expert planners in the field. Nevertheless, the data indicates planning, at the tactical to operational level, as a primary focus of

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the CGSC Quality Assurance Office via email on 14 February 2008. Ms. Clark corrected the error stating that the fourteen respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that AMSP graduates are
the program, which was deliberately removed from the 2007 SAMS mission statement. In addition to planning as a subject of many responses, creative thinking and problem solving was closely linked to the answers as well. This is an indicator of a desire for these attributes, contained explicitly in the SAMS mission statement. This point directly relates to the next question area in the survey.

**What skills are most important for a SAMS graduate working directly for you?**

There was no clear majority of opinion as to one particular attribute or skill but four predominant skills or attributes were noted in responses: thinking, communicating, team leading, and joint/inter-agency awareness. All four of these skills and attributes can be considered essential for general staff officers, planners, and commanders alike. This is an interesting point and one that is explored further in the concluding chapter, that is, does it really make a difference whether the school is thought of as a school for planners or future leaders and commanders if the skills and attributes of each are similar if not the same.

**For what reason would you select a SAMS graduate?**

Three trends come from the responses to this question. First, a third of the responses (5 of 15) dealt with the ability of graduates to think, with several descriptors of “think” being strategic, creative, or critical. Second, several responses (3 of 15) acknowledged that admission to the program was through a selection process that indicated a high overall quality of the officer before entering the program, thus the officer's quality is the desirable attribute, not necessarily the education they received in the program. Last, and once again, the expertise in planning, leading planning teams, and putting plans together was a definite theme in 4 of 15 responses. These three trends follow the same as responses to other questions, which is of three prevalent and desirable attributes of AMSP graduates: Planners, thinkers, and problem solvers. The remaining three responses were variable and unrelated to each other or the other trends.

prepared for senior officer responsibilities.
Given the opportunity, would you select a SAMS (AMSP) graduate as a member of your team?

One hundred percent of respondents to this question answered yes. This response indicates that there is no lack in confidence in the program or its graduates. Commanders in the field do not foresee a drop in quality of officers coming from the program by indicating they would continue to select graduates for assignments to their commands.

The overall survey data indicates that leaders of the Army in the field expect what the school has traditionally produced and has gained a renowned reputation for; critical and creative thinking, problem solving planners and staff officers. These expectations have been shaped primarily by the performance of graduates of the AMSP, but also by its 25-year history. Of course, the school and its graduates know they are much more than planners for the Army. Many graduates go on to successfully command at many echelons and the school touts 55 sitting flag officers as graduates of one of its two programs, with many more in the retired ranks. The question now is whether the 2008 AMSP curriculum will fulfill these expectations, and the confidence displayed in the program by commanders in the field will continue.
Chapter 4. AMSP Curriculum

CGSC Accountable Instruction System

As a military education institution, the US Army Command and General Staff College is accountable to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for adhering to professional military education standards set forth in CJCSI 1800.01. This instruction requires that service schools undergo accreditation of their Programs for Joint Education (PJE). The process is called the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). There is a deputy director position on the joint staff for military education, which oversees the accreditation process, and CGSC follows the process set forth in appendix F to CJCSI 1800.01.48

As a graduate education and degree granting institution, CGSC is accountable to the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCA). The Higher Learning Commission of the NCA, which was founded in 1895 as one of six regional institutional accreditors in the US, accredits, and thereby grants membership in the commission and in the North Central Association, to degree-granting educational institutions in the north central region of the US, including Kansas.49 Accreditation from this institution gives the degrees granted by CGSC their academic credibility.

To assist in fulfilling the detailed standards for each of these two accrediting bodies, CGSC has adopted the Accountable Instruction System (AIS).50 The stated goal of AIS is to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the educational process by developing instruction

48 US Department of Defense, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01C,” (December 22, 2005): D-5.


50 US Army Command and General Staff College, “CGSC Bulletin 30, Curriculum Development: The Accountable Instruction System,” US Army Command and general Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
based on the CGSC mission and educational goals, eliminating irrelevant instruction and/or coursework from the curriculum, and ensuring graduates gain the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the CGSC programs they attend. It also assists CGSC and its schools in meeting accreditation requirements of PAJE and NCA. The AIS is applicable all the schools in CGSC, including SAMS and its two programs AMSP and AOASF.

The AIS is, in practical terms, a curriculum development process for the schools of CGSC and provides a standard process by which school and department directors, course authors, and faculty should develop and document courseware for their respective curricula. These standards also assist in adherence to accreditation standards. Even further, according to Dr. Claude Bowman of the CGSC Faculty Development Division, “particularly in military education, a more stringent standard is necessary because of the importance of the end result.” Because of the importance of the education offered by CGSC and other like military schools, and the role these institutions play in forming and embodying the body of knowledge of the military profession, adherence to high standards in curriculum and faculty development seems imperative. As we will see, SAMS has not completely adhered to the AIS standards of CGSC in developing the AMSP curriculum.

As set forth in CGSC Bulletin 30, the AIS is a four-phase process for developing and assessing CGSC curricula. The four phases are first, analyze and determine instructional and educational needs; second, design effective curriculum to meet the identified needs; third, develop instructional materials and courseware to support goals and objectives; and fourth,

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KS (February 1, 2006), 1. This section on the AIS is derived primarily from the information contained in CGSC Bulletin 30.

51 Dr. Claude Bowman, personal interview by author, January 29, 2008.
implement the developed courseware. The system is intended to be cyclic as depicted in figure 4-1.  

The Accountable Instruction System

Figure 4-1

In addition to the AIS, CGSC has implemented a standardized faculty development program that is in keeping with US Army Training and Doctrine Command standards. One of the four faculty development programs under this system is specifically for faculty who are designated as course authors in their respective schools. This program, Faculty Development Program III (FDP III), is a pre-requisite to become a course author in any school in CGSC and teaches faculty the detailed requirements prescribed by the AIS.

The AIS and faculty development programs of CGSC are much more than mechanisms to implement standard administrative procedures for curriculum and courseware documentation. A fundamental aspect of both of these programs is to develop faculty and courses that are graduate level quality for adult learners. The CGSC Course Author’s Handbook, issued during FDP III, contains in-depth material and instruction on topics such as instructional methodologies, relationships between learning domains, levels of learning and learning objectives, and the experiential learning model. In short, there is a major emphasis in CGSC on achieving and maintaining high standards in every aspect of adult learning, and graduate and professional military education from curriculum and faculty development to NCA and PAJE accreditation. The standards exist for multiple reasons and all the schools in CGSC are required to follow them, including SAMS.

Theories of Adult Education

The area of adult education is a comparatively new field of study and research compared to other fields of study in the hard or social sciences like history or physics. It has been only 61 years since the first graduate program in adult education began at Columbia University. In their book, Adult Education: Evolution and Achievements in a Developing Field of Study, Peters and Jarvis describe adult education as both a field of practice and a field of study. They go on to describe that because it is both, a tension exists between theory and practice in adult education. This tension is not unlike that between military art and military science.

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55 Ibid p15.

56 The tension between art and science, or theory and practice in military education, is constant and was felt by the team of curriculum developers in SAMS as they worked on the 2008 AMSP curriculum.
There are several theories of adult education used at CGSC to train faculty as well as develop curriculum. CGSC presents these theories to all new faculty in its first faculty development course, FDP I. The first is presented as a set of principles and assumptions of adult learning and learners put forth by Malcolm Knowles, frequently referred to as the father of adult learning, from his book *The Modern Practice of Adult Education; Andragogy Versus Pedagogy*. The first is that the greatest learning occurs when adults take responsibility for determining what they learn. This is an important principle in determining curriculum content. Second, adults learn that which is personally beneficial and third they learn best what they discover for themselves. Last, adults learn more from experience and feedback than from experience alone.\(^57\) This last principle is an important aspect of the Experiential Learning Model, which is the prevailing theory of adult education in use in CGSC.\(^58\)

The Experiential Learning Model (ELM) is a theory most closely attributed to David Kolb and his book, *Experiential Learning: Experience as a Source of Learning and Development*. Kolb’s model is a five-step process centered on learning through practical application of new knowledge gained. The process begins with an interactive practical exercise introducing new knowledge to the student. The new knowledge is then documented and processed through discussion and dialogue with other students, facilitated by the instructor. The student then generalizes the new information through a more traditional method such as lecture or Socratic discussion, which then progresses into the fourth step of developing new knowledge. In this step, the student decides how they will use the new knowledge and think creatively about its

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58 Dr. Claude Bowman, “Faculty Development Phase I Workshop,” (briefing presented to AOASF Fellows, Fort Leavenworth, KS January 7, 2008).
applicability. Finally, the process ends with a practical exercise or test with incorporated feedback.59

Another theory of adult education in use at CGSC is the Pratt theory of general teaching, put forth by Daniel Pratt in his book, *Five Perspectives on Teaching in Adult and Higher Education*. In this, Pratt models the relationships between students, instructors, and course content itself in adult learning environments. The emphasis in the triangular relationship is on the students connecting with the content being facilitated and resourced by the instructor rather than being taught.60

The CGSC AIS and the college’s administrative requirements for documenting courseware center on the use of the ELM from the structure of course syllabi, to lesson plans, course evaluations, and student assessment. In this way, the college has been able to proliferate a widely accepted model used in adult graduate education programs across the varied schools under its charge. Unfortunately, SAMS does not completely follow the AIS or use the ELM.

There is a theory of adult education in operation partially in the AMSP. It is a structure to develop what Donald Schoen calls “the Reflective Practitioner” in his book *Educating the Reflective Practitioner*.61 Peter Schifferle cites this theory in his dissertation *Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and US Army Military Effectiveness, 1919 to 1945*, and uses it to illustrate how the Leavenworth programs of this period were responsible for educating the practitioners of the military profession, which differ from education programs designed to educate academics or scientists.62 This responsibility is the same one that exists at SAMS today and a version of Schoen's model can be seen in the structure of its curricula both past and present.

59 Ibid. Kolb’s book is cited in this presentation by Dr. Bowman.

60 Ibid. Pratt’s book is cited in this presentation by Dr. Bowman.

In Schoen’s model, the curriculum first “presents the relevant basic science, then the relevant applied science, and finally a practicum in which students are presumed to learn to apply research-based knowledge to the problems of everyday practice.”63 Looking back at the 1987 curriculum developed from the proposal of Wass de Czege for the school one can see Schoen's model at work. The reliance on first studying theory and history – the basic military art and science; then studying doctrine – the applied military art and science; then finally an exercise or practicum where AMSP students apply what they have learned in a controlled environment.

While not followed explicitly, the logic of Schoen’s model is present in the AMSP curriculum, as we will see in looking at the 2008 curriculum. His book Educating the Reflective Practitioner is in the basic issue for the fellows in AOASF intended for their preparation as AMSP seminar leaders.64

The prevailing method of instruction in AMSP is seminar discussion. There are multiple theories of education related to the use of discussion in learning. The most frequently cited or referred to amongst faculty is the Socratic Method, named for the Greek philosopher Socrates, and his conversational style, which is described as inquiring and questioning.65 Simply put, the Socratic Method involves questioning learners through the subject matter using probing and leading questions in discussions. Many seminar leaders in SAMS, as well as other schools in CGSC use this method in some form in leading seminar discussions.

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64 Another theory of education related to discussion in use at SAMS is that of Brookfield and Preskill in their book Discussion as a Way of Teaching: Tools and Techniques for Democratic Classrooms (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1999)xii. Not necessarily a specific model or method of discussion, this book serves more as a handbook on how to structure and conduct discussions focused on the balance and fairness implied in the term “Democratic Classroom.” This book is in the basic issue for the fellows in AOASF intended for their preparation as AMSP seminar leaders.

Theories of Professional Military Education

One theme of Dr. Schifferle’s dissertation on the role of Leavenworth service schools on the military profession in the inter-war years is the larger issue of the role of education in the military profession. While there are no specific and distinguishing theories of purely military education in the same vane as those of adult education, there have been several scholars who have studied and written about the relationships between education and the profession of arms. To many members of the profession, the necessity for an education to practice in and progress through the profession may be obvious. Nevertheless, questions such as the particular role of education, who to educate and when, what subjects should they study, whether there should be more science or more art in military education, or how to strike a balance between the two have typified the scholarly work on the topic and will most likely continue to do so well into the future.

Samuel Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait* both have consistent themes of the role and value of education in the professionalization of the officer corps. Huntington speaks of a general education as “almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification of the professional officer” in the same manner as it is for the professions of law and medicine. 66 He goes beyond general education when he describes the military man as learning from experience and if he has little opportunity for broad experience of his own he must learn from others. “Hence, the military officer studies history.” 67 However, Huntington adds, history only has value to the officer when it is “used to develop principles which may be capable of future application.” 68 By this description, one can see that the application of the Experiential Learning Model in the

67 Ibid. 64.
68 Ibid. 64.
professional military education offered by CGSC schools is practical and the reliance on extensive study of military history and theory in AMSP is grounded. Unfortunately, SAMS does not use the ELM.

Janowitz also uses the medical and law school analogy in contrasting military education experiences with those of lawyers or doctors. “The military career could better be described as a progression of educational experiences…interspersed with operational assignments, in contrast to the concentrated, single dosage of professional education in medical or law school.”69 What Janowitz refers to here is the structured progression of professional military schools that officers are required to attend periodically throughout their careers. He describes the progression simply as officers attending schools commensurate with their rank and the units they will likely serve in; junior officers attending schools focused on tactical level subjects, mid career officers focus on larger unit operations, and senior officer focus on strategic and national level subjects in their schools. Janowitz includes assignments as instructors as educational experiences as well, thus his conclusion that school assignments seem more prevalent than operational ones.70

A second set of works that can be thought of as theory of military education are those related to the development of a professional officer corps in the Army. In particular, the key characteristic of a profession of having a specialized, expert body of knowledge that is developed and maintained by the members of the profession. This particular characteristic is dealt with in depth in both the first and second editions of The State of the Army Profession, edited by Lloyd Mathews, and Martin van Crevald’s The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance.71 The expert body of knowledge theme relates to the analogy used by Huntington,

70 Ibid 139.
Janowitz, and Dr. Epstein from SAMS earlier, comparing the military profession to the medical and legal professions, which also are typified by an expert body of knowledge maintained by the profession as a whole.

While some aspects of the Accountable Instruction System are in use in SAMS, specifically the administrative standards of documenting some courseware, SAMS does not follow the complete four-step process. While SAMS does incorporate practical exercises in the AMSP curriculum, they are not used in a manner reflected in the Experiential Learning Model. Finally, as Janowitz’s work points out, the level at which instruction is delivered to military professionals is important for them to build the body of knowledge for them and the profession as a whole. The next section illustrates these points.

**AY 2008 Curriculum**

A group of SAMS staff and faculty developed the Academic year 2008 curriculum in the summer and fall of 2007. The group was led by two, second year AOASF fellows and was representative of the entire staff and faculty of SAMS, including at least one member from each academic discipline represented on the faculty. According to one of those officers, LCol John Frappier, the group followed a planning process more similar to the Military Decision Making Process than the CGSC standard curriculum development process embodied in the CGSC Accountable Instruction System. The process the team used incorporated some aspects of the AIS, particularly the administrative standard of preparing lesson advanced sheets and course syllabi. The group first conducted a mission analysis using the new 2007 SAMS mission statement, which served as the primary guidance for the curriculum design. From this, they

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LCol John Frappier, interview by author on January 7, 2008. LCol Frappier, of the Canadian Army, was one of the second year AOASF fellows charged with leading the curriculum design team.
derived desired outcomes for the AMSP. From these outcomes, the team developed curriculum learning areas and terminal learning objectives that were then assigned to course authors who were to account for the learning objectives in their courseware. Once the course authors achieved a certain level of fidelity in their course, the team leaders arranged the courses vertically in space and time on an academic calendar.73

The curriculum was based on a list of desired graduate outcomes. These outcomes were derived using primarily the mission analysis, as well as other guidance from the SAMS director.74 The outcomes, as presented in the academic year 2008-2009 curriculum update stated that: AMSP Graduates are innovative risk takers willing to experiment; excel at adaptive leadership and the art of command; analyze complex adaptive problems using strategic and creative thinking; demonstrate effective communications; anticipate the future operational environment; synthesize the elements of US national power; and evaluate the role and influence of land power in the Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.75 These outcomes partially meet the standards of the Accountable Instruction System (AIS) in that they contain action verbs commensurate with graduate level learning objectives. They do not meet the standard because of the ambiguity of several terms used.

Adaptive leadership is one such term. It is a trademark term of Cambridge Leadership Associates, a leadership-consulting firm founded by two professors at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Ron Heifetz and Marty Linsky.76 Setting an academic objective for AMSP students to excel at adaptive leadership is not out of the question, but

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73 Ibid
74 Ibid
75 Stefan Banach, “School of Advanced Military Studies Academic Year 2008-2009 Update” (Briefing presented to the Dean of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 14, 2007).
designing a curriculum to do so can prove to be difficult if not expensive given potential trademark restrictions. Development of creative thinking skills is a common learning objective in graduate programs, and a core curriculum objective of CGSS.77

Strategic thinking is less common. While the term has been under development and use at the US Army War College since at least 2004, the curriculum development team developed its own definition of the term for use in the 2008 curriculum.78 Development of risk taking and experimentation characteristics are more likely a function of experiential leader development rather than curriculum based education, although it is not out of the question that the curriculum can provide knowledge to support development of these leader characteristics. The ambiguity of these terms presented challenges to the AMSP faculty charged with the design of the 2008 curriculum.79

The AMSP program outcomes resulted in six learning areas for the faculty to account for in the curriculum. The learning areas were: excel at adaptive leadership, analyze complex

77US Army Command and General Staff College, “Intermediate Level education (ILE) Common Core C100: Foundations, Block Advance Sheet,” (https://courses.leavenworth.army.mil/@@afbb6f69aefbf6f60726a12bed8bab5c5/courses/1/MASTER_LIBRARY_AY06-07/content/262107/1/C100%20AS%20and%20Readings%2010-31-2007.pdf) (accessed March 22, 2008) This website contains the core curriculum of ILE at CGSC. Core course C120 is entitled “Critical Thinking and Problem solving. “This block of instruction establishes a foundation and sets the conditions for all subsequent learning within the core ILE course and all subsequent courses.”

78 US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Strategic Leadership Primer, 2d Ed., US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2004. p.2. Provides a working definition of Strategic Leadership as leadership exercised at the strategic level and not by one individual but the collective leadership at the highest levels of an organization. According to LCol John Frappier in a personal interview with the author January 7, 2008, the AMSP curriculum development team used a working definition compiled by surveying the student body of both SAMS programs in July 2007. The results of this survey were captured in the following document: COL Robert Taylor, untitled Power Point presentation (Electronic working document used in preparation of the 2008 AMSP curriculum, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2007)

79 In researching this monograph, the author interviewed every permanent faculty member assigned to the faculty of SAMS as of January 7, 2008. The author also interviewed LCol John Frappier and COL Robert Taylor, the military faculty members charged with leading the 2008 curriculum design team. In the interviews, a common theme among many of the faculty members was the ambiguity of guidance they received and then subsequently developed through their process. This included the program outcomes that came to be known as “the blue box” for the way the outcomes were visually represented in update briefing presentations. The ambiguous terms referenced here were contained in the blue box.
adaptive problems using strategic and critical thinking, demonstrate effective communication, anticipate the future operating environment, synthesize the elements of US national power, and evaluate the role and influence of land power in Joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multi-national (JIIM) operations. It is these learning areas, derived from the mission statement replacing operational with strategic, that resulted in an AMSP curriculum elevated from the operational to strategic level of war. These learning areas resulted in the team developing a curriculum course of action containing six courses.

In designing courses to meet the learning objectives, the design team followed the graduate school curriculum design standard with which they were familiar; a horizontally integrated set of primarily single discipline courses. This type of curriculum design is accepted as a standard structure for graduate programs throughout the US. The single discipline courses were: Course 1 - Adaptive Leadership, the Art of Command, and Operational Design; Course 2 - Adaptive Decision Making; Course 3 - Evolution of Warfare; Course 4 – Elements of National Power; Course 5 – 21st Century Conflict; Course 6 – Colloquia. With this type of curriculum structure, subject matter experts deliver their curriculum in a course designed for that discipline. For example, military history would be delivered two days each week to each seminar throughout the semester. In this structure, integration of the knowledge is left primarily to the student.
Eventually, for structural and resource utilization purposes, a vertically integrated curriculum structure was adopted and is what is being delivered in 2008.\textsuperscript{84} This structure includes six separate and different courses, oriented on particular general subject matter, presented as blocks of instruction throughout the academic year, one after the other. The disciplines of history, theory, doctrine, regional studies, political science, and leadership, as appropriate, are integrated together into each course. The courses and their corresponding terminal learning objectives are at figure 4-2.

\textsuperscript{84} William Gregor, “Alternative program structure”, (briefing presented to SAMS director, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 16, 2007). In this briefing, Dr. Gregor successfully argued to maximize the use of the permanent faculty of SAMS throughout the curriculum including end of course exercises or practicum, and to support instruction on more than one day per week. The result of this briefing was a decision by the SAMS director not to use the horizontally structured curriculum designed by the AMSP design team and to use a vertically structured curriculum proposed by Dr. Gregor in order to maximize the use of all faculty members in preparing and presenting instruction. In effect, much of the curriculum design and courseware preparation completed by the team between July and November of 2007 was rendered unusable at that point and a new curriculum design process began.
## AMSP Courses and Terminal Learning Objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course #</th>
<th>Course Name</th>
<th>Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strategic Decision Making and Joint Planning</td>
<td>Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns to prepare a Combatant Commander’s Estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Evolution of Warfare</td>
<td>Analyze how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Regional Awareness and Campaign Design</td>
<td>Synthesize an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and religion play in achieving the desired strategic and operational outcomes to prepare a Combatant Commander’s course of action in a complex contingency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Applying Elements of National Power</td>
<td>Evaluate selected examples of the strategic employment of the various instruments of power either singly or in combination; evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy to include the current US National Security Strategy; comprehend the fundamental characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>COIN and 21st Century Warfare</td>
<td>Conduct strategic assessments of selected international regions, states, or issues and develop security policy options that integrate the elements of national power and the instruments of national policy in support of the national Security Strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Research Colloquium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first course in the 2008 AMSP curriculum is Strategic Decision Making and Joint Planning. It is intended to set the baseline for the rest of the year and provide students with a “toolbox” of skills they will use throughout the course and their careers. It “is primarily directed at developing analytical and assessment skills needed to frame national security and military problems in support of decision-making and planning in support of the combatant

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commander.\textsuperscript{87} The course includes eighteen periods of instruction on a plethora of topics focused at the strategic to operational levels of war and policymaking. This includes the contemporary strategic security environment, and the processes associated with national security decision making and the formation of strategic guidance. The course also includes doctrinal lessons on the Joint Operational Planning Process, the Effects Based Approach to operations, and System of Systems Analysis including lessons on systems theory. The topic of strategic leadership is introduced in this course using comparative history lessons of military organizational leadership in the 18\textsuperscript{th}, 19\textsuperscript{th}, and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Although many of the lessons integrate several disciplines, there are three history lessons, three theory lessons, two doctrine lessons, and eight political science lessons many of which use history and theory to present the topic of the lesson. The course culminates with a practical exercise where the students evaluate an existing combatant command campaign plan using the doctrinal standards they learned during the course.\textsuperscript{88}

While the experiential learning model does not appear to be used in any of the lesson advanced sheets, the advanced sheets are prepared in accordance with the AIS administrative standard. The lessons in this course include properly written learning objectives and also applicable JPME learning areas from CJCSI 1800.01. The focus of this course is clearly at the strategic level that, while in keeping with the 2008 SAMS mission statement, is not appropriate for officers at the intermediate level of professional military education and does not match the expectations of the Army in the field.

Course 2 is titled The Evolution of Warfare. This course is primarily a history survey course that covers 12 lessons. The lessons are intended to take the student through, as the title


\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
indicates, the evolution of warfare from the pre-modern to modern ages culminating with lessons on contemporary operations in the war on terrorism. From the syllabus, the course author states “the study of history will ideally provide the right questions to ask of a given situation rather than to seek answers. The relationship of grand strategy, strategy, and operations is essential.”\textsuperscript{89} The learning area chart in figure 4-2 states the terminal learning objective of course 3 is to analyze how joint, unified and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, theater strategic and operational levels of war. The course contains twelve history lessons, includes an analytical essay assignment, and culminates in a historical, computer simulation practicum.

The Experiential Learning Model does not appear to be used in any of the lesson advanced sheets. The advanced sheets are formatted in accordance with the AIS administrative standard but the learning objectives all use the action verb “examine”.\textsuperscript{90} Once again, in keeping with the 2008 mission statement and desired outcomes for the program, the history survey course 2 is focused at the operational to strategic levels of war and many of the lessons explore strategies of particular military operations or wars in history. While in keeping with the 2008 SAMS mission statement, the course is not appropriate for officers at the intermediate level of professional military education and does not match the expectations of the Army in the field.

Course 3 is titled Regional Awareness and Campaign design. There was no course syllabus available for this course at the time of writing. From the course concept briefing, the course primarily focuses on various theories related to military operations.\textsuperscript{91} Of the eighteen


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Robert McClary, “RCD Concept” (electronic working concept briefing contained in AMSP 2008 curriculum development files, February 19, 2008).
lessons in the course, ten cover theory topics ranging from traditional military theory to complexity and information theory. There are two regional studies lessons, one leadership lesson, and the rest of the lessons were not documented at the time of writing to determine their topic.\textsuperscript{92} The courseware for this course was not sufficiently documented to evaluate its compliance with AIS standards or its use of the ELM.

A week during course 3 is scheduled for a seminar on Commanders Appreciation for Campaign Design (CACD) provided by the contracted firm Booze, Allen, Hamilton. CACD is an emerging concept that SAMS has been directed to study. In a briefing on the instructional concept for CACD, COL Banach, the SAMS director states the mission of SAMS as it pertains to CACD is to “develop the doctrine for implementing 21st century commander’s appreciation for campaign design in the US Army, and develop the tools required to translate and teach CACD to the US Army.”\textsuperscript{93} From the Army Training and Doctrine Command:

Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) is a new cognitive process for the design, planning, and execution of military campaigns. Published as TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, CACD was developed for today's complex, adaptive operational environment, which requires a more robust upfront commander centric approach to resolve problems. The CACD approach to problem resolution is intended for high-level leaders and Army organizations (but) it has application for any joint, interagency, multinational, or single service command that faces a complex operational problem.\textsuperscript{94}


\textsuperscript{93} COL Stefan Banach “Commander’s Appreciation for Campaign Design CACD,” (electronic briefing presentation contained in the AMSP electronic files on CACD, October 15, 2007). The author had unrestricted access to these files and all electronic files available to SAMS students and faculty on the CGSC computer network. It is not known who the intended audience was for this presentation. Looking at the complete presentation it appears that the target audience was a group of AMSP students and/or faculty about to enter into a CACD seminar provided by Booze, Allen, Hamilton.

The Pamphlet 525-5-500 was developed by the Army’s Capabilities Integration Center and is the first official documentation of the emerging concept of campaign design in the US Army.

By incorporating experimentation, development, and evaluation of an emerging concept into the AMSP curriculum, SAMS is taking an approach to CACD analogous to the early years of the school and the development and teaching of Air-land Battle Doctrine. The danger in doing so is that, unlike the fully developed and approved Air-land battle doctrine contained in the 1983 version of FM 100-5 and used in the 1987 curriculum, CACD is an experimental concept that may not ultimately be adopted as Army doctrine. The focus on campaigning by large units in CACD, as referenced in the TRADOC release of Pamphlet 525-5-500, would be appropriate for the curriculum of AMSP prior to 2007. The 2007 mission focus on the strategic level, and the subsequent change it has driven in the AMSP curriculum thus far, does not match with that objective.

Course 4 is titled Apply Elements of National Power. The terminal learning objectives of this course, from the chart at figure 4-2, are to evaluate selected examples of the strategic employment of the various instruments of power either singly or in combination; evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy to include the current US national security strategy; and comprehend the fundamental characteristics, capabilities and limitations of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. From the learning objectives alone, one can see there is a clear focus on the strategic level in course four.

The course contains seventeen lessons and concludes with a one-week practicum. The first eight lessons constitute a history survey of US international relations, foreign policy, and associated strategic war planning. Four lessons focus on concepts and theories of future war. The last five lessons address the topics of multinational, inter-agency, and domestic civil-support
operations. The final practicum is intended to use a domestic civil-support oriented scenario in the US Northern Command area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{95} The available courseware is formatted in keeping with the CGSC AIS standard with the syllabus and lesson advanced sheets containing well-articulated learning objectives and lessons agendas. The course reading materials are also well documented and provided to students as either issued texts, printed handouts, or electronic texts available on-line. There is a balanced integration of history, theory, and doctrine through the seventeen lessons of Course 4 but again there is a noted absence of campaigning, operational art, or operational level of war material.\textsuperscript{96}

Course 5 is titled Twenty-First Century Conflict. Its learning objective from figure 4-2 is to “conduct strategic assessments of selected international regions, states, or issues and develop security policy options that integrate the elements of national power and the instruments of national policy in support of the national security strategy.”\textsuperscript{97} Course 5 includes sixteen lessons and culminates in a practicum. Five of the lessons focus on theories or concepts related to the subjects of terrorism or insurgency, contemporary challenges that one can expect to last well into the future. There are two lessons on the future concepts of space and cyber warfare, two regional study lessons focused on Southeast Asia, and two doctrinally oriented lessons on joint deployment. There are two lessons planned on the topic of ethics and one on direct leadership. Across the sixteen lessons, there is a balance between disciplines such as theory, history, and doctrine but the lesson topics are not all related. The lesson topics jump from the contemporary challenge of terrorism and counter-insurgency to future challenges of space and cyber war, then


\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.


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to operational deployment and joint reception staging onward movement and integration, to direct level leadership and ethics. 98

Like Course 4, the courseware available for Twenty-First Century Conflict is formatted to the standard of the CGSC AIS including well-written learning objectives, documented reading materials, and in some cases plans and schedules for guest instructors or lecturers. The learning objective of developing security policy options that integrate the elements of national power is again, a strategic level function.

To this point in the curriculum, it is clear that at least four of the five courses have built a body of knowledge focused on strategy, strategy formulation, policy assessment, and development. While it is clear that these courses deliberately reflect the change in focus of the SAMS mission statement to the strategic level, the focus drastically departs from the historical role of the program and what the Army in the field expects of graduates. The existing assignment policy for utilization of AMSP graduates continues to assign them to Army divisions and corps, organizations that are required to function on a high caliber at the tactical to operational level. The curriculum, as written, does not appear to present material to meet that end.

98 Ibid.
Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

As shown through the brief history in chapter 2, the Army’s intended purpose for SAMS and the AMSP was to develop and inculcate in the leadership of the Army, an understanding of Operational Art. This was done primarily because of the introduction of Air-land battle doctrine, campaigning, and the operational level of war to the Army in the mid 1980s. As a doctrinal construct, operational art and campaigning is still very much the prevailing thought of how the Army in the field must operate, certainly at the division and corps level. Even more so, with the imperative of joint operations, an understanding of the Army at the operational level is necessary for mid level and senior Army leaders. Given this, the original curriculum design of AMSP is still very much valid. While it most assuredly needed to be updated to fit the current environment and operational requirements of the Army over the 25-year history of SAMS, the fundamental subject matter of operational art and campaigning has and will endure. Unfortunately, the school has lost sight of this enduring purpose and allowed the study of operational art and campaigning to dissipate from the curriculum in favor of a strategic level curriculum more appropriate for a Senior Service College level program.

It is rather surprising that the Army, as an institution, has no mechanism or organization to think through and develop a deliberate role, mission and function for such an institution other than verbal guidance to have the school do so itself. In this case, the verbal guidance to the current director resulted in a new mission statement focused on the strategic level of war. That mission resulted in a curriculum in AY 2008 centered on that level as well.

The absence of a more deliberate and inclusive method of charting the course for SAMS as an academic institution, has resulted in a mismatch between what the school is providing in AMSP and what the Army in the field expects. Shown in chapter 4, the expectations of the Army have been shaped by the reputation built by the school over the past 25 years. That expectation is for creative thinking, problem solving staff officers and leaders proficient at operational art.
Another change to the mission statement that does not match with the Army’s expectations is the removal of educating staff officers as a purpose. Understanding the roles of education articulated by Wass de Czege, Huntington, and Janowitz, we find that it does not make a difference whether the school is thought of as a school for planners and staff officers or future leaders and commanders because the skills and attributes of each are similar if not the same. What is more important is a broad education in the art and science of war, focused at the appropriate rank level, to develop these attributes. The 2008 curriculum is broad, covering the traditional pillars of history, theory, and doctrine; it has also expanded to include regional studies, political science, and international relations. The level is not appropriate for majors at the intermediate level of their careers, nor does it prepare them to meet the expectations of the organizations where they will be assigned.

One way to explain the mismatch between the mission, Army expectations, and the mission of SAMS for the AMSP may be that SAMS has not fully adhered to the AIS standards of CGSC in developing the AMSP curriculum. As shown in chapter 4, most of the syllabi and lesson advanced sheets conform to step three of the AIS process depicted in figure 4-1. What the school has not done is conform to CGSC policy and use the entire process. The curriculum design team that initially attempted to redesign the AMSP curriculum admittedly used a process they likened more to a mission analysis instead of a complete curriculum analysis including expectations for the program. Admittedly, the survey data provided in chapter 3 was not available when the design team began their work; there was no apparent need to proceed in the process without it. The AIS program, if followed properly, is designed to be a routine, cyclic process resulting in increased effectiveness and efficiency of the educational process by developing instruction based on the CGSC mission and educational goals, eliminating irrelevant instruction and/or coursework from the curriculum, and ensuring graduates gain the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the programs they attend. In short, there is a major emphasis in CGSC on achieving and maintaining high standards in every aspect of adult learning, and graduate and
professional military education from curriculum and faculty development to NCA and PAJE accreditation. The standards exist for multiple reasons and are required by all the schools in CGSC, including SAMS.

**Recommendations for SAMS**

As such, SAMS should begin a fresh curriculum review of the AMSP curriculum fully utilizing the AIS system. As part of step one of that process, analysis, SAMS should request written, documented guidance from CGSC, CAC, and TRADOC in the form of a charter for the school. Along with the charter, SAMS should use the survey data from the 2007 survey of Army leaders on AMSP as the expectation of the program. In addition, SAMS should request this survey be conducted on an annual basis to incorporate into the cyclic curriculum review prescribed by the AIS system.

Once the review and findings are complete, they should be presented to those headquarters that issued the school charter for approval and to receive further guidance. This is done in the form of a post instructional conference in keeping with the AIS. The rest of the process should be followed to develop and document curriculum products, again receiving approval for them, then prepare to deliver the instruction in academic year 09/10 academic year. Again, the school should incorporate this process in a semi-annual cyclic basis to avoid the pitfalls of drastic curriculum changes experienced in academic year 2007/2008. To ensure continuing compliance with CGSC policy and the AIS system, SAMS should send all faculty, civilian and military, through Faculty Development Program I and ensure course authors attend Faculty Development Program III.

Of lesser note, SAMS should update all course descriptions and definitions on websites and databases, including correspondence with foreign schools. These updates can become part of the regular cyclic rhythm of the AIS process in SAMS. This should include updated agreements with sister service and foreign service schools with the most recent changes to AMSP curriculum.
Lastly, SAMS should obtain trademark permissions from Cambridge Leadership Associates to use the term “Adaptive leadership” and any of their products used in the AMSP curriculum as referred to in chapter 4.

**Recommendations for CGSC**

In keeping with the recommendations to SAMS, CGSC should develop and issue an enduring charter to SAMS that can live beyond the iterative changes of school directors and staff. The focus of the guidance to SAMS should be on current approved Army and joint doctrine and the cognitive skills associated with the mastery of that doctrine. The guidance should include the relationship of AMSP to the ILE program, with a rank appropriate level of the curriculum at the tactical to operational level of war.

CGSC should require SAMS compliance with CGSC Bulletin 30, Curriculum Development: The Accountable Instruction System. This should include regular reviews and inspections by the CGSC quality assurance office. One reason the curriculum redesign resulted in a mismatched curriculum is that the school did not follow the curriculum design policies and standards of the Command and General Staff College. These policies incorporate proven theories and standards of graduate and professional military education. More importantly, they ensure continued academic accreditation of CGSC’s programs by both graduate and military education accreditation agencies, including SAMS and its two programs.
APPENDIX

Division and Corps Commanders Survey Executive Summary

School of Advanced Military Studies DIV & CORPS Commander Survey

**Mission.** The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) educates future commanders and leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-agency at the graduate level to think strategically and operationally to solve complex adaptive problems across the security environment.

**Purpose.** The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth Kansas conducted a survey of division and corps commanders in November 2007 regarding the quality of the recent SAMS graduates.

**Methodology.** In response to CAC Tasking G07312100, Forty Six Division and CORPS commanders were invited to participate in a survey to collect their feedback regarding SAMS graduates, US Army Research Institute control number DAPE-ARI-AO-08-05 administered by the CGSC Quality Assurance Office. The survey consisted of 8 Likert scale questions, four open-ended questions, and an additional opportunity to provide comments and/or recommendations. 20 commanders responded to the survey.

**Survey Results.**

**How prepared are AMSP graduates?** 6 Likert scale questions were asked relating to AMSP learning objectives. 100% of those who responded agreed or strongly agreed AMSP graduates are prepared to address problems that have no clear-cut solutions, 95% (19 of 20) agreed or strongly agreed AMSP graduates are prepared for joint assignments and for service on a combined staff. 85% (17 of 20) agreed or strongly agreed AMSP graduates are prepared to work in the strategic environment. 80% (16 of 20) agreed or strongly agreed AMSP graduates are prepared to address and plan for the future while executing in the present, and 70% (14 of 20)
agreed or disagreed AMSP graduates are prepared for senior officer responsibilities. One commander disagreed that AMSP graduates are prepared to work in the strategic environment. Another commander disagreed that AMSP graduates are prepared for service on a combined staff.

How are SAMS graduates different than other members of your command performing similar responsibilities? 50% (7 of 14) those who responded to this question indicated SAMS graduates as better thinkers and 36% (5 of 14) stated they are better problem solvers.

What should be the primary focus of SAMS? 47% (9 of 19) of those who responded provided feedback toward the development of planners as being the primary focus for SAMS and 21% (4 of 19) stated joint and interagency awareness should be the primary focus. Additional feedback for other areas was also provided. (see below)

What skills are most important for a SAMS graduate working directly for you? 39% (7 of 18) of those who responded stated the ability to think as most important, 39% (7 of 18) stated communication skills as most important, 33% (6 of 18) provided examples of teamwork as most important 28% (5 of 18) stated joint and interagency awareness as most important, and 22% (4 of 18) stated an understanding of the operational environment is most important.

For what reason would you select a SAMS graduate? 33% (5 of 15) declared SAMS graduates’ thinking abilities, and 27% (4 of 15) believe the education SAMS provides makes the graduates desirable.

Given the opportunity, would you select a SAMS graduate as a member of your team? 15 individuals responded to this question. 100% of them answered “yes.”

Summary. All respondents provided positive feedback regarding AMSP graduates. Overall, AMSP graduates are thought to be prepared for Division and CORPS responsibilities. 100% of respondents stated they would select a SAMS graduate as a member of their team if given the opportunity. SAMS graduates are known for their thinking and problem solving abilities. The majority of respondents believe SAMS focus should be on developing planners. The primary skills considered most important are the ability to think, to communicate, and
teamwork. The AMSP curriculum currently incorporates team practicum, which enhances all of these skills. Additional writing requirements have been incorporated into the curriculum along with increased success measures.

**Recommendation.** Toward the future development of SAMS graduates as planners and staff officers, it is recommended that the AMSP curriculum be reviewed to verify it is meeting the requirements of Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. It is recommended that Army Field Manual 22-100 be referenced toward the development of leadership curriculum. Joint and Interagency awareness continues to be a needed focus. The AMSP program has and should continue to incorporate Joint Doctrine and the Joint Operational Planning Process in curriculum.

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