RESISTANCE TO PARADIGM CHANGE: Potential Crisis for the U.S. Army and the All-Volunteer Force

A Monograph
by
LTC Michael J. Johnson
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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LTC Michael J. Johnson

School of Advanced Military Studies
250 Gibbon Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Command and General Staff College
100 Stimson
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

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RESISTANCE TO PARADIGM CHANGE: Potential Crisis for the U.S. Army and the All-Volunteer Force

Approved by:

______________________________  Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D

______________________________  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Stefan Banach, COL, IN

______________________________  Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
RESISTANCE TO PARADIGM CHANGE: Potential Crisis for the U.S. Army and the All-Volunteer Force by LTC Michael J. Johnson, U.S. Army, 46 pages.

The U.S. Army’s ability to meet current demands for land combat power in the execution of the National Military Strategy has reached a critical stage. For the first time the All-Volunteer Force must sustain a lengthy conflict with significant amounts of ground combat power. This paper examines the ability of the All-Volunteer Force to meet the manpower needs of the U.S. Army. There are significant issues with the All-Volunteer Force that point toward a crisis for the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army must first recognize the problem and subsequently plan to avert a potential crisis.

As a framework to look at the All-Volunteer Force, this paper used Thomas Kuhn’s Paradigm Theory. Kuhn theorized that once a paradigm is accepted, guiding principles or the normal science of a paradigm are established. However, very often anomalies happen that the normal science cannot explain. Defenders of the paradigm change the rules to keep the paradigm rather than change the paradigm itself. Finally, crisis occurs and must be resolved either through the paradigm or by replacing the paradigm. To determine the normal science of the All-Volunteer Force, the rational choice and the normative institutional theories were used. Understanding the twin aspects of the U.S. Army as a rational choice and normative values based institution illuminates the guiding principles of the U.S. Army. The principles are the recruitment of quality individuals, the retention of quality individuals, and the retention of normative values. There are significant anomalies happening in all three of these guiding principles pointing towards a potential crisis for the U.S. Army.

Although anomalies are different in all three guiding principles, quality continues to drop. This is clearly evident with recruiting. In FY2005 the U.S. Army missed its recruiting goals and lowered its quality standards. Since then, despite increased incentives for recruits and policy changes, the U.S. Army has failed to meet its new, lower standards. Although retaining soldiers at rates above targets, the U.S. Army has had to increase its monetary incentives significantly. It has changed promotion policies to keep soldiers in the service and the U.S. Army continues with its “stop loss” policy. The U.S. Army has experienced significant issues with declining normative values. Sexual assaults, suicides, and cases of wartime atrocities have all increased since the start of the war on terror and are approaching rates similar to those in Vietnam.

Senior leaders in the U.S. Army continue to defend the All-Volunteer Force and are reluctant to explore alternatives. These leaders have made preserving the All-Volunteer Force a strategic imperative. Senior U.S. Army officers saw the institutional failure of the U.S. Army in Vietnam and the years immediately after the war and worked hard to build a professional fighting force. The All-Volunteer Force has proven to be successful therefore few want to change the current paradigm. However, the All-Volunteer Force has significant anomalies pointing to a potential crisis for the U.S. Army. If the normal science of the All-Volunteer Force does not prove adequate to fix these anomalies then the paradigm will change. Senior U.S. Army leaders must be prepared to offer solutions. Two possible solutions are universal national service and an increased usage of contractors.

The U.S. Army must take a critical look at its three guiding principles and the anomalies occurring in each. It should consider making the retention of normative values the number one priority to sustain the force. Rational choice incentives will fail at some point and currently perpetuate a lower quality U.S. Army. An emphasis on normative values gives the U.S. Army strategic flexibility to change the current paradigm should it become necessary to do so.
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Introduction

The United States Government is using all elements of its national power to fight the War on Terror; however, the heaviest burden is falling on the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army’s ability to meet current demands for land combat power in the execution of the National Military Strategy has reached a critical stage. Published in 2004, the National Military Strategy stated that the U.S. Armed Forces must be able to defend the homeland, operate from four forward regions, execute lesser contingencies, swiftly defeat adversaries in two overlapping campaigns, and be prepared to maintain an enduring result in one campaign.¹ Based on its last posture statement, the U.S. Army had approximately 600,000 soldiers on active duty deployed or forward stationed in 76 countries.² The 2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement noted, “Now five years after 9-11, the Army continues to fight the long war with high levels of force deployment. This high level of demand is placing an enormous strain on the Army’s All-Volunteer force.”³ Near the end of 2007, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army stated, “The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.”⁴ The stress placed on the All-Volunteer Force could break the U.S. Army. In November 2007, Senator Jack Reid (D-RI) commented, “Are ground forces broken? Absolutely not. Are they breakable? They are.”⁵ For the first time

³ Ibid., 13.
⁵ Ibid.
since 1973, the All-Volunteer Force must sustain a lengthy conflict with significant amounts of
ground combat power.

Given that demand exceeds supply for active U.S. Army soldiers, it is relevant and
necessary to look at the state of the All-Volunteer Force in the U.S. Army. One must ask the
question, does the U.S. Army have a crisis with the All-Volunteer Force? This paper will argue
that the U.S. Army has significant anomalies with the All-Volunteer Force that indicate potential
crisis. U. S. Army leadership will change recruiting and retention standards to preserve the
current system rather than change the system. This paper will explain why current military
leaders defend the All-Volunteer Force and will propose that the U. S. Army plan for crisis,
having options available should the current system fail.

The paper is organized into four sections. Section One, methodology, explains noted
professor Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory. This theory provides a framework for how to view
the All-Volunteer Force as a paradigm. His theory suggests that science operates within a set of
established rules. Once anomalies, occurrences not explained by the rules, appear, either the
paradigm is modified or it is completely replaced. Those who believe in the paradigm resist
complete change and modify the rules, making the new rules an accepted part of the paradigm.
The methodology section then explains the paradigm of the All-Volunteer Force and defines its
guiding principles. These principles are the recruiting of quality individuals, the retention of
quality individuals, and the retention of normative values. The U.S. Army is an institution that
people must choose to join and must choose to continue serving in if the U.S. Army is to sustain
the All-Volunteer Force. Section Two demonstrates that the U.S. Army has anomalies with the
All-Volunteer Force indicating a potential crisis. It illuminates the current set of anomalies
facing the U.S. Army. This section discusses the extent of anomalies in the U.S. Army and how

6 Kuhn defines a paradigm as achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions
to a community of believers. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: The
policies and procedures are being changed, modifying the All-Volunteer Force paradigm. Section
Three demonstrates the U.S. Army’s resistance to changing the current paradigm. This section
uses the U.S. Army’s experience in Vietnam and the U.S. Army’s experience building the All-
Volunteer Force to explain the basis for resistance. The final section recommends that the U.S.
Army plan for institutional failure with the All-Volunteer Force and have policy
recommendations available should crisis occur.

**Section One: Methodology**

Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory provides a framework explaining why the U.S. Army
will not abandon the All-Volunteer Force. Kuhn was professor emeritus of philosophy at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author of the book *The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions*. His paradigm theory stated that once a paradigm is accepted, it provides guiding
principles and rules, which Kuhn calls “normal science,” for those operating in the paradigm. At
some point, anomalies occur that do not fit established rules. Kuhn wrote, “To be accepted as a
paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does,
explain all of the facts for which it can be confronted.”

Individuals within the paradigm must
determine how to deal with anomalies.

Most often, simple anomalies are solved by the normal science within a paradigm. Kuhn stated, “There are always some discrepancies. Even the most stubborn ones usually respond at
last to normal practice.” Paradigms are resilient. This is why, when confronted with an anomaly
or several anomalies, true believers in a paradigm resist alternatives. They resist change even
recognizing that a crisis could develop within the paradigm. Senior decision makers of the
paradigm devote significant attention to anomalies once those within the paradigm and those
outside of it acknowledge indicators of potential crisis. Rather than accept an alternative,

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7 Ibid., 17-18.
8 Ibid., 81.
defenders change the rules of their current paradigm so that anomalies become the norm. Kuhn wrote, “They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.”⁹ At some point, the paradigm experiences crisis. Kuhn did not specifically define the term crisis; however, he wrote, “A novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving activity.”¹⁰ According to Kuhn, crisis within a paradigm can be solved in one of three ways: 1) Normal science is able to handle the anomalies, 2) The crisis is allowed to exist until future generations have the means to solve it, and 3) A new paradigm emerges to replace the old.¹¹ For the purposes of this paper, anomalies are defined as occurrences requiring adjustments to the guiding principles of a paradigm. Crisis is defined as a pronounced failure in one or more of the guiding principles, causing a paradigm change.

Summarizing the paradigm theory, one can see a logical progression. A paradigm is accepted and established. Anomalies occur that the rules of the paradigm cannot reconcile. These anomalies can indicate a potential crisis. True believers of the paradigm start to pay more attention to problems and make adjustments to the rules so that anomalies become accepted. Defenders of the paradigm resist alternatives. Finally, crisis is resolved, resulting in either the retention of a paradigm or the emergence of a new one. The current and accepted paradigm for providing manpower to the U.S. Army is the All-Volunteer Force. It was established in the early 1970s, after it replaced the paradigm of conscription.

The All-Volunteer Force Paradigm

After over thirty years of implementing the All-Volunteer Force, the overwhelming consensus is that it has been and continues to be a success. In 2004, United States Secretary of

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⁹ Ibid., 78. Kuhn also stated that the reason for this is because to completely change a paradigm is hard. It takes significant effort to retool a system. People are only willing to go through the retooling effort in the case of pronounced crisis.

¹⁰ Ibid., 74.

¹¹ Ibid., 84.
Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a forward for the book *The All-Volunteer Force Thirty Years of Service*, wrote, “The men and women in uniform today are, without question, the finest in the world...This concept of the all-volunteer force has been a booming success. It works and it works well.” In 2006, RAND Fellow and former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Bernard Rostker echoed Mr. Rumsfeld’s comments when he wrote, “The alternative to the draft, the all-volunteer force, has been a resounding success for the American military and the American people. It has resulted in a professional, career-oriented military that has proven itself on battlefields throughout the world.”

The U.S. Army has worked hard to produce an effective volunteer fighting force.

In 1970, it was not a forgone conclusion that the All-Volunteer Force would be successful, but yet by the mid-1980s, the quality of individuals in the military was as high or higher than in the civilian labor force. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger stated, “We know that the All-Volunteer Force can succeed, and we know what it takes to make it succeed. We need only the will, the perserverance [sic], and the commitment to quality.” The All-Volunteer Force continued to increase in quality and effectiveness reaching a high point in the early 1990s with the victory in the Persian Gulf War. Operation Desert Storm validated the All-Volunteer Force as a professional, high-performance army. Noted author Martin Anderson wrote, “The all-volunteer force, after many growing pains, became a military force unsurpassed

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in its efficiency and effectiveness.”16 Over the last thirty years, the paradigm of the All-Volunteer Force proved valid, supplying necessary manpower for the U.S. Army. The All-Volunteer Force has become a quality force comprised of individuals from across the nation.17 The paradigm is firmly entrenched as the way to provide manpower for the U.S. Army and the other Armed Forces of the United States. It consists of volunteers who willingly serve the nation.

**All-Volunteer Force Guiding Principles**

There are basic guiding principles or normal science for the All-Volunteer Force. These rules are neither formally stated nor articulated. To understand the guiding principles for the U.S. Army’s All-Volunteer Force, one must understand some basic institutional theory. It is important to note that there is no universally accepted definition of what defines an institution. Philip Selznick, in *Leadership in Administration*, one of the first key works on the subject, explained that institutionalization of an organization happens gradually. Over time, people, history, interests, and environment all shape the organization into an institution that in the end, becomes infused with values.18 B. Guy Peters, professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, discussed the most accepted institutional theories in a paper written for the Austrian Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. He wrote, “Potentially the most important impediment to a more central position for institutionalism is that it means so many things to


17 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, “Population Representation in the Military Services,” 2005, [http://www.humrro.org/poprep/popre05/summary/summary.html](http://www.humrro.org/poprep/popre05/summary/summary.html), (accessed January 4, 2008). Today the All-Volunteer force is comprised of volunteers from all over the country who serve in the armed forces. The 32nd annual Department of Defense report on social representation concluded, “The FY 2005 Population Representation report shows both the diversity and quality of the total force…the mean cognitive ability and education levels…are above the average of comparable-aged U.S. Citizens.”

18 Phillip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 16. His exact definition is “an institution is as an organization infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.”
different scholars.”19 Two of the theories that he discussed, the rational choice and the normative, explain the U.S. Army as an institution.

The rational choice theory suggests that institutions set up rules and incentives for individuals who join. People choose to join or stay with the institution because of the opportunities that it provides. Individuals keep their own set of preferences or values that remain unchanged by the institution. The normative theory argues that institutions are a major repository of values. Individuals in the institution behave as they do because of normative standards put forth by the institution.20 Taken together these theories explain the All-Volunteer Force as an institution. It is a rational choice for individual volunteers to work in a place that provides opportunities to excel and it has normative values that individuals who remain in the U.S. Army internalize.

Before the All-Volunteer Force in the late 1950s and early 1960s, both Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz debated what the military should look like and its role within society. Both acknowledged the rational choice and normative components of the military. In his book, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington advocated that the military as an institution must balance both functional imperatives against threats to society and social imperatives of the society in which it operates. He wrote, “Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function.”21 Huntington argued for a normative based institution because the professional officer had specialized knowledge and skill,
was part of a moral unit possessing certain values and ideals, and felt a sense of unity and consciousness as a group apart from laymen.  

Morris Janowitz supported the rational choice theory but agreed with Samuel Huntington on many points. Janowitz acknowledged that the military had a special skill set and had a set of ethics and standards noting, “The style of life of the military community and a sense of military honor serve to perpetuate professional distinctiveness.” However, Janowitz wrote that the military and civilian communities were converging. Because of this convergence, which Janowitz saw as the key to the military becoming more like society as an institution, rational choice became more important than normative values.

In the last 30 years, scholars have also concluded that the All-Volunteer Force is both a normative and rational choice based institution. Sociologist David Segal, director of the Center for Research on Military Organizations at the University of Maryland, wrote, “The modal modern soldier seems to be motivated by considerations that are institutional or normative and in part occupational or rationalistic.” The U.S. Army has recognized this fact for decades. It understands the need for small unit cohesiveness but also the need for high quality people who want to excel. Segal noted in the 1980s that the U.S. Army emphasized belongingness goals within units while at the same time its recruiting slogan, ‘Be all that you can be,’ was explicitly

22 Ibid., 9-10.
tied to the notion of self-actualization.” Segal clearly recognized both the normative and rational choice based theories at work in the U.S. Army.

An understanding of the twin aspects of the U.S. Army as an institution illuminates the guiding principles of the U.S. Army. Based on these two theories, three guiding principles of the U.S. Army’s All-Volunteer Force paradigm can be deduced. They are the recruitment of quality individuals, the retention of quality individuals, and the retention of normative values. These three principles are, using Kuhn’s terminology, the normal science for sustaining the All-Volunteer Force paradigm.

Section Two: Anomalies and Adjustments

The All-Volunteer Force paradigm has numerous anomalies indicating potential crisis. There are anomalies in all three guiding principles of the paradigm. To demonstrate these anomalies, evaluation criteria are established. Anomalies in recruiting are defined as missing recruiting goals or decreasing quality of recruits. Anomalies with retention are defined as missing retention goals or problems maintaining end strength. Anomalies with values are defined as an increase in discipline problems or atrocities. The U.S. Army has dedicated significant time, effort and resources into each of the three guiding principles. In all three areas, the U.S. Army is attempting to avert institutional crisis by changing policies and implementing new programs. As Kuhn’s paradigm theory predicted, the U.S. Army is changing the rules of the paradigm so that anomalies become accepted.

Recruiting quality individuals to serve in the U.S. Army

The U.S. Army is currently recruiting in the toughest environment since 1973. In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Major General Thomas Bostick, Commanding General of the United States Recruiting Command, stated that the

25 Ibid., 154.
U.S. Army must overcome an environment of low unemployment, low influencer support, and the lowest propensity to serve in two decades. Much of the low influencer support and low propensity to serve has occurred since the invasion of Iraq. Lieutenant General Michael Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 for the U.S. Army, testified in the same hearing, that the propensity to serve had dropped seven percent since 2003, with only sixteen percent of youths age 17-24 willing to serve in the military. All of these factors contribute to the continuing anomalies the U.S. Army is experiencing recruiting soldiers.

Since the War on Terror began in 2001, there have been anomalies in recruiting individuals to join the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army missed its recruiting goal in FY2005. This was one of the first significant anomalies with the All-Volunteer Force. Prior to 2005, the U.S. Army had not missed an annual recruiting goal since 1979. The U.S. Army missed its goal by almost 7,000 individuals in FY2005, causing it to reassess its standards for recruits. It subsequently met its recruiting goals in FY2006 and FY2007. It did so only by lowering the quality standards for recruits and changing recruitment policies, thus changing the normal science for recruiting.

The quality of a recruit is determined by three factors: level of education, vocational aptitude battery test score, and whether a moral or medical waiver is required. A quality recruit has a high school diploma, scores in the upper three categories of the entrance test and does not require a waiver. The quality of recruits has fallen since its high in 1992. In 1992, one hundred


27 Ibid., 4.

percent of all recruits had a high school diploma and seventy eight percent scored in the top three levels of the entrance aptitude test. The trend has gradually worsened since the start of the War on Terror. House Representative Martin T. Meehan (D-MA), the chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, recently stated, “The data is crystal clear; our armed forces are under incredible strain, and the only way that they can fill their recruiting quotas is by lowering their standards.”

After missing its recruiting goals in 2005, the U.S. Army lowered its quality standards. Prior to 2005, the U.S. Army had maintained a standard that at least ninety three percent of recruits would have a high school diploma (HSDG) and at least sixty seven percent of recruits would score in the top three categories of the vocational aptitude battery test. At a press conference in October 2005, U.S. Secretary of the Army Noel Harvey stated that the U.S. Army would now allow for more general equivalency diplomas (GED) and accept a floor of ninety percent of recruits with high school diplomas. He also revealed a change in the percentage of recruits that must score in the top three categories of the entrance vocational aptitude battery test. The U.S. Army would now use the Department of Defense standard of sixty percent of recruits in categories I-IIIA and two percent in category IV. At the same press conference, General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, denied that this change was a lowering of

32 Some students do not finish high school thus they have no diploma. Some elect to take and pass an equivalency test. If they pass this test they are awarded a GED indicating completion of a high school level education.
33 Jospeh L. Galloway, “Army Moves to Recruit More High School Dropouts,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, October 4, 2005 http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1004-01.htm, (accessed January 24, 2008). The vocations aptitude battery test has six categories. Individuals in category V are not eligible to enter the service. All others not in categories I-IIIA and IV are in category IIIB.
standards. Since 2005, the U.S. Army has not officially changed its standards; however, it has failed to meet them, allowing lower quality recruits to enter the U.S. Army.

The percentage of recruits with a high school diploma has dropped for the last two years. In a prepared statement for testimony before the House Subcommittee for Personnel, Major General Thomas Bostick, referring to recruiting statistics for FY2006 and FY2007, stated, “The regular Army fell short in the area of HSDG, achieving 81%, we anticipate achieving approximately 80% HSDG, 60% test score I-IIIA and 4% category IV this FY.”34 This indicates a ten percent drop in high school graduates and two percent increase in recruits in the lowest category of the entrance examination. The official FY2007 U.S. Army recruiting statistics have not been released. However, the National Priorities Project, using information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, found that only approximately seventy one percent of FY2007 recruits had a high school diploma. It also found that the number of quality recruits with a high school diploma and scoring in the top three categories of the vocational aptitude battery test dropped from sixty seven percent in 2004 to forty five percent in 2007.35 Douglas Smith, spokesman for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, acknowledged declining rates for recruits with a high school diploma; however, he stated, “Every Soldier that we put into the Army is qualified. We don’t put unqualified people in the Army, but it is something we’re watching.”36 Each year, the U.S. Army either lowers its standards or fails to meet its standards, resulting in a lower quality force. Rather than acknowledge that quality is declining, the leadership and defenders of the paradigm have instead stated that everyone entering is qualified.


36 Ibid.
Although they may be qualified today, many of those entering the force would not have been qualified several years ago. Recruitment waivers are at their highest levels ever. In the last three years, recruits with criminal histories have increased sixty-five percent from 4,918 in 2003 to 8,129 in 2006. That means that a little over ten percent of recruits entering the U.S. Army in FY 2006 had a criminal record. Statistics show that waivers for serious misdemeanors and felonies have had the sharpest increase while less serious crime waivers remain relatively unchanged. Medical waivers have risen four percent during this time-period. In October 2007, the percentage of recruits requiring waivers jumped to almost twenty percent. As retired Rear Admiral John D. Hutson stated, “The across-the-board lowering of standards is buying problems in the future.”

U.S. Army officials dispute the fact that an increase in waivers means a decrease in quality, in effect denying that there are problems now or will be in the future. Senior U.S. Army leaders point out that many of these individuals simply made mistakes when they were younger, have changed, and should not be denied an opportunity to serve. Major General Thomas Bostick also commented that the number of people age 17-24 in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports database has increased by fourteen percent. His comment implied that increased usage of waivers is not due to an increase in crime but rather do to an increase in records availability. The implication was that there have always been recruits entering with hidden criminal records. Now that computers make information more accessible, U.S. Army waivers have increased. The U.S. Army leadership’s point again is that quality has not decreased.


Besides lowering recruit quality standards, the U.S. Army has continued to change policies in order to attract more recruits, lowering standards. It has changed its polices on age, tattoos, and enlistment bonuses. Changing the age and tattoo policies increased the available pool of recruits and increased bonus money for enlistment has attracted more individuals, convincing them to make a rational choice to join the U.S. Army. These are all good reasons for the U.S. Army to make policy changes; however, the change in policies demonstrated that the U.S. Army has recognized recruiting anomalies. It is better to change policies than miss recruiting goals.

One example of a policy change to meet recruiting goals was when the U.S. Army raised the maximum age for enlistees. The U.S. Army raised the enlistment age twice in 2006: from 35 to 40 in January, and from 40 to 42 in June. An official news release by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command in June of 2006 stated, “Raising the age for active Army enlistment expands the recruiting pool, provides motivated individuals an opportunity to serve, and strengthens the readiness of U.S. Army units.”\(^{40}\) The recruiting pool was expanded and did allow motivated individuals to enlist, but it may only have helped statistics not U.S. Army units. The U.S. Army brought in 653 recruits over the age of 35 in 2006. Without these additional recruits, the U.S. Army would not have met its recruiting goals. But older recruits were almost twice as likely as younger recruits to never see a U.S. Army unit with 11.4 percent of older recruits failing to stay in for a year as compared to a 6.5 percent washout rate for younger recruits. U.S. Army spokesman LTC Hilferty stated, “That’s because older recruits failed to meet medical or physical standards.”\(^{41}\) One has to question how these recruits met the medical and physical requirements.


to enlist in the first place. If they did, then there is reason for future study to conduct a cost
benefit analysis in order to determine if bringing in these recruits is a benefit to the U.S. Army.

The U.S. Army has also changed recruitment bonus policies, which are at their highest
levels ever. In April of 2005, the U.S. Army announced a series of enlistment bonuses and
incentives. These included a $20,000 bonus for a three year enlistment, a $14,000 seasonal bonus
for high-priority military occupational specialties (MOS), some student loan repayment, and an
$8,000 bonus for U.S. Army Officer Candidate School enliees.\textsuperscript{42} Less than a year later, the
U.S. Army doubled the initial entry bonus to $40,000 for just about every MOS.\textsuperscript{43} These high
recruitment bonuses indicate anomalies with recruiting; it has become increasingly expensive for
the U.S. Army to entice individuals to make a rational choice to join the U.S. Army.

Anomalies are pointing towards a potential crisis for the U.S. Army in recruiting. As a
result, just as Kuhn’s paradigm theory suggested, U.S. Army leadership has devoted significant
time, energy and resources to solve recruiting anomalies. The U.S. Army has introduced a series
of new programs and continued with older programs that work. In his statement to Congress,
Major General Thomas Bostick articulated that the U.S. Army is reemphasizing a series of
initiatives to include the two-year enlistment option, the Super Leads program, using additional
soldiers from initial training to serve as hometown recruiting assistants, re-emphasizing the
$2,000 referral program, and requesting 1,000 former recruiters to augment the recruiting force.\textsuperscript{44}

The U.S. Army has also targeted everyone in the DOD structure as a possible recruiter with its

\textsuperscript{42} U.S. Army Recruiting Command, “Army Increases Enlistment Incentives to Highest Levels,”
April 15, 2005, \url{http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/apa/download/40-20Kbonus-age%201limit%201-06.pdf},
(accessed January 8, 2008).

\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Army Recruiting Command, “Army Raises Enlistment Age, Doubles Cash Enlistment
Bonuses,” January 18, 2006, \url{http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/apa/download/40-20Kbonus-age%201limit%201-06.pdf},
(accessed January 8, 2008).

\textsuperscript{44} U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Military Personnel Statement of Thomas P. Bostick,
\textit{Army Recruiting and Retention}, August 1, 2007, \url{http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=107&sid=5097f51e-78184407-a7a6-16ba2cfb3f%40sessionmgr103},
(accessed January 9, 2008), 1.
Recruiting-Referral Bonus. The Army News Service reported, “The Secretary of the Army may pay a bonus to any Soldier, Army retiree, or Army Civilian who refers to an Army recruiter a person who has not previously served in the Armed Forces and enlists in the Active Army,”\textsuperscript{45} In addition to these two programs, the U.S. Army has initiated several others to help meet recruiting goals.

The first is the U.S. Army Advantage Fund. This program targets individuals who want to either own a house or start a small business, giving them up to $40,000 to do this after the completion of a four year enlistment. The program actually targets parents to show them that the U.S. Army can offer tangible benefits.\textsuperscript{46} It is a three year pilot program open to five hundred individuals. The second program is the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength (ARMS). This program allows recruits to enter active duty overweight and see if they can lose the weight in the first year and remain in the U.S. Army. It is designed to give recruits a second chance. It allows males to enter service with up to thirty percent and women with up to thirty six percent body fat. For example, an eighteen year old male entering under ARMS would then have one year to reach the U.S. Army’s standard of twenty percent.\textsuperscript{47} The U.S. Army has expanded the program from six sites to fifty across the country. This program brings in recruits that do not meet U.S. Army standards and hopes that they will. If these recruits do not meet standards, they become a unit’s problem diverting leaders’ time and energy away from preparing soldiers for combat to helping soldiers meet minimum entrance standards.

The U.S. Army is experiencing significant anomalies with recruiting. Anomalies exist as the U.S. Army missed its recruiting goal in 2005, lowered quality standards, failed to meet its


new minimum quality standards, and implemented policies and programs designed to attract more recruits. Leadership has dedicated manpower and resources to the effort, but failed to keep the quality of recruits entering the All-Volunteer Force from declining. Many of these same issues are present with retaining quality soldiers creating more anomalies in the All-Volunteer Force.

**Retaining quality individuals in the U.S. Army**

The U.S. Army has met its reenlistment goals since the War on Terror started; however, it has had to implement new policies in order to maintain its end strength, decreasing the quality of the force. The U.S. Army has significant anomalies retaining quality individuals as it has increased reenlistment bonuses, extended soldiers involuntarily beyond their enlistment contracts, and increased promotion rates for noncommissioned officers and officers. Reenlistment is a bright spot for the U.S. Army as it struggles to maintain the All-Volunteer Force. Even in 2005, when the U.S. Army failed to meet its recruiting goals, it met all of its reenlistment objectives.\(^{48}\)

Deployments do not seem to hurt reenlistment; in fact, they help. In 2005, General Richard Cody, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, commented that even after a combat tour and heading back to Iraq, the 3rd Infantry Division had a reenlistment rate double that of the U.S. Army as a whole.\(^ {49}\) This trend continued. The 25th Infantry Division, after 15 months in Iraq, had a one hundred fifty percent reenlistment rate for FY2007. Despite tremendous reenlistment rates in combat zones, the U.S. Army has implemented additional measures to increase retention.

One of these measures was to increase selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB). The U.S. Army uses SRB to encourage quality soldiers to make a rational choice and stay in the military.


These bonuses and special programs help the U.S. Army keep good soldiers in and move soldiers to special skills or units requiring more manpower. Reenlistment bonuses have reached very high levels. An example of this program was the drive to keep special operations soldiers in the force. In 2005, the U.S. Army approved a budgetary plan of $168 million over a three-year period aimed at retaining special operations forces. These incentives ranged from $8,000 to an extraordinary $150,000 in bonuses for soldiers to remain in the special operations field. At the time, many were calling for an increase in special forces personnel to fight the War on Terror but these bonuses were not necessarily about increasing end strength. U.S. Army spokesman LTC Joe Richard stated, “It is about keeping the ones we already have.”

In 2007, the U.S. Army spent $600 million on SRB programs. These programs have been very successful, especially in combat zones, because bonuses received there are tax-free. It is hard to determine if the U.S. Army would have made its reenlistment goals without increased, targeted SRBs. In addition to increased SRB programs the U.S. Army has implemented and changed other policies.

One policy designed to keep end strength as high as possible is the policy of “stop loss.” This policy extends soldiers on active duty beyond their service obligation. Many soldiers who are kept in the service for deployments due to the “stop loss” policy end up reenlisting. Since they had to deploy, soldiers decide to take the tax-free bonus money and reenlist. In 2003, the U.S. Army began implementing the “stop loss” policy for units deploying to Iraq. This policy has continued. With units deploying just about every other year, many soldiers get caught in the “stop loss” program and must deploy just prior to when they would have departed the U.S. Army. This keeps them on active duty for another fifteen to eighteen months. In May of 2006, a typical deployment month in the War on Terror, the U.S. Army had 9,800 soldiers on active duty serving

under “stop loss.”\textsuperscript{52} That number remains relatively constant each year. The U.S. Army cannot afford to discontinue the “stop loss” policy or it would be 9,000 soldiers short within its ranks. Successful reenlistment and recruitment should have made “stop loss” unnecessary years ago. Keeping this policy in place indicates a problem maintaining end strength for the U.S. Army. Another method of maintaining end strength is changing promotion criteria for both noncommissioned and commissioned officers.

The U.S. Army has increased promotions to keep attrition rates as low as possible. For enlisted soldiers, it has implemented the automatic list integration policy. This policy changed the old system of soldiers being promoted based on performance and quality to one based on time in service. Under the old system, soldiers had to appear before local promotion boards, earn promotion points, and then were promoted based on the needs of the U.S. Army. Now soldiers eligible for promotion to sergeant are automatically promoted, unless the unit formally requests that a soldier not be promoted. The U.S. Army is about to extend this policy in 2008 to promotions for staff sergeant.\textsuperscript{53} This new policy ensured that more soldiers will stay on active duty. Poor performers, who under the old system would not have been promoted and would have been required to leave the U.S. Army at their retention control point, are now promoted and continue to serve. This change in policy lowers the quality of the force placing low quality noncommissioned officers in charge of soldiers. It appears that the U.S. Army is willing and has the need to keep as many soldiers as possible by promoting all soldiers to staff sergeant.

Officer promotion rates are also increasing, allowing more officers to stay in the U.S. Army. Promotion rates for captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels are at all time highs. Established promotion rate goals are ninety five percent for captain, eighty percent for major, and seventy percent for lieutenant colonel. In FY 2005, the U.S. Army far exceeded these numbers


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
with rates of over ninety eight percent, ninety seven percent, and eighty eight percent respectively.\textsuperscript{54} Along with increased promotion rates, the U.S. Army has implemented new policies to keep officers in the service.

Traditionally, the hardest officers to retain have been those in the rank of lieutenant and captain who have completed their initial service obligation. The FY2006 loss rate for lieutenants and captains was 7.9 percent, just under the ten year (1995-2005) average of 8.5 percent.\textsuperscript{55} This appears to be good news; however, current attrition rates are artificially low and are still too high to adequately man the force. As discussed earlier in this section, the policy of “stop loss” is keeping some officers who wish to depart in the service. Once these officers are allowed to depart, the junior officer attrition rate will increase. There is also a shortfall of officers in year groups 1990 to 2002. Maintaining an attrition rate close to the ten-year average will not help alleviate the immediate problem of officer year group shortages. The U.S. Army is 3,000 officers short and experiencing what the Congressional Research Service called, “Acute shortfalls in “senior” captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of service.”\textsuperscript{56} The minimum fill rate for officers in this grade is eighty five percent, however, projections for FY 2007 were eighty two percent.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, for the first time ever, the U.S. Army has implemented a monetary retention bonus for officers, specifically targeting captains. This bonus gave captains a $25,000 to $35,000 critical

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 2.
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skills bonus in return for three additional years of service. Other incentives included fully funded graduate schooling, ranger school attendance, and branch, functional area, or post of choice.\textsuperscript{58}

There are anomalies retaining quality soldiers in the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army has increased SRB money and made its reenlistment goals each year. Despite this good news, the U.S. Army has had to continue the “stop loss” policy, keeping soldiers involuntarily on active duty to fill deploying units. It cannot fill critical officer positions in the junior grade levels of captain and major. The U.S. Army also made the choice to dramatically increased promotion rates to maintain end strength. Soldiers who were not qualified to serve in the U.S. Army before the War on Terror, are now fully qualified. The result is lower quality noncommissioned officers and officers leading soldiers in combat.

**Retention of normative values**

Values are tremendously important to the U.S. Army. Published in June 2005 as one of two capstone documents for the U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army*, stated:

> The Army is a values-based organization. It upholds principles that are in the constitution and inspire guiding values and standards for its members. The Army values are the building blocks of a soldier’s character. The Army Values form the identity of the Army, the solid rock on which everything else stands, especially in combat. They are the glue that binds together its members in a noble profession.\textsuperscript{59}

There are seven U.S. Army values. They are: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. In an attempt to deepen the U.S. Army’s understanding and internalization of these values, General Peter Schoomaker introduced the Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos shortly after becoming the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 2003. FM-1 stated, “The Soldier’s Creed captures the spirit of being a soldier…the Warrior Ethos (is) the very essence of

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what it means to be a soldier."{60} Despite constant emphasis and attention placed on ensuring that soldiers live up to the U.S. Army Values, there have been recent anomalies indicating a problem with normative values.

The first anomaly is an increase in sexual assaults. Sexual assaults demonstrate that the perpetrators lack integrity, honor, and respect for other service members. The number of reported sexual assault cases increased dramatically between 2004 and 2005, rising from 1700 to 2374.{61} The increase in sexual assaults was so significant that in an effort to deter individuals, the military established several new programs. Top leadership and the chains of command in units devoted significant time and manpower to the issue. In October of 2004, the Department of Defense established the Joint Task Force for Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. In 2005, it created an office to oversee the implementation of prevention programs. The U.S. Army then released a change to its Command Policy AR600-20, implementing a Sexual Assault Prevention and Review Program. The policy change directed installation commanders to immediately conduct review boards and establish Sexual Assault Response Coordinators.{62} In addition to implementing new programs, the U.S. Army began to vigorously prosecute offenders. The U.S. Army’s 2006 Sexual Assault Report Summary stated that in FY2005, of completed cases, seventy nine resulted in court martial, ninety one in nonjudicial punishment, and one hundred four in adverse action or discharges.{63} The report detailed the U.S. Army’s success implementing its programs. It also noted that the U.S. Army had reduced DNA processing time from one hundred

{60} Ibid.
forty two to fifty six days, which is four days less than the congressionally mandated goals.\textsuperscript{64} It is still too early to tell if new programs and leader emphasis have worked to reduce sexual assaults. However, it is clear that the U.S. Army viewed the issue as significant, diverting resources, time, and energy towards this goal.

Another anomaly is increased suicide rates. U.S. Army suicides have risen steadily since 2004, going from sixty seven in 2004, to eighty seven in 2005.\textsuperscript{65} The U.S. Army’s report indicated that the most common factors were failed relationships, and work, legal, and financial problems. Director of the U.S. Army’s Human Resources Policy Directorate, Colonel Dennis Dingle, stated that the U.S. Army report did not find a relationship between increased deployments and suicides.\textsuperscript{66} Most suicides in the U.S. Army are by males. Current levels of suicide equate to roughly 17.8/100,000 males between 17 and 45. This is higher than the historical average for the All-Volunteer Force, which is 10/100,000, but lower than the American male population in this age group, which is 21.1/100,000.\textsuperscript{67}

In response, the U.S. Army implemented an aggressive suicide prevention program aimed at early intervention using the chain of command and mental health officials. It also implemented a new program to train soldiers on the symptoms and effects of post-traumatic stress disorder. Even though there is not a definitive link between suicides and deployments, the U.S. Army is attempting to be proactive, helping soldiers with mental health issues. At a round table discussion, Colonel Elspeth Ritchie, behavioral psychiatry consultant to the U.S. Army Surgeon General, stated, “We need to ensure that all of our soldiers know that it is OK to come in and get

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
help.”68 The U.S. Army acknowledged an increased problem with suicide, and, just like with sexual assaults, used significant effort and resources to combat the problem. Newly published data indicates that U.S. Army efforts did not work. In 2006, 102 active-duty soldiers committed suicide and 1,400 soldiers attempted to commit suicide.69 Suicides continue to be a problem and an anomaly with the U.S. Army’s values.

A third area of anomalies is wartime atrocities. Atrocities indicate problems with duty, respect, honor, and integrity. Soldiers have been accused, and in some cases convicted, of killing innocent civilians or violating established laws of warfare. In 2006, five U.S. Army soldiers were accused of raping and murdering a young Sunni girl in the town of Mahmoudiya. Just three months earlier four soldiers from the 101st Division were accused of killing three Iraqi detainees in Samarra.70 These are several of many cases which the U.S. Army is investigating and prosecuting. They are not the norm for the U.S. Army; however, they indicate problems with values in combat. Not since Vietnam, has the U.S. Army had to deal with these types of issues on a regular basis. In addition to these cases, there have been several other high profile cases of atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The most notable case was the Abu Ghraib scandal. This scandal was felt throughout not only the U.S. Army, but throughout the U.S. government, the country, and the world. This scandal, more than any other incident, struck right at the heart of the values-based All-Volunteer Force. In response, the U.S. Army launched several lengthy investigations. Major General Antonio Taguba investigated the 800th Military Police Brigade, Lieutenant General Anthony


Jones investigated CJTF-7, The U.S. Army Inspector General investigated to determine if U.S. Army doctrine played a role in the incident, and Major General Fay investigated the 2005th Military Intelligence Brigade. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld backed the U.S. Army by taking full responsibility for the incident and had the Department of Defense conduct an independent investigation as well. These investigations showed that there was systematic torture of detainees and disregard for established policies. The scandal involved more than just a few soldiers acting in an inappropriate manner. It involved whole chains of command not enforcing regulations, pressures from high-ranking officials to get results, and interagency cooperation to break rules and policies. Many argue that the failure to punish high-ranking officials constituted a failure to properly address the scandal. A number of factors, such as the inadequate training of Reserve units, the short deployment timelines for units, and general confusion on the ground in late 2003 and early 2004, all contributed to the scandal. Instead of blaming others, the U.S. Army knew that there had been a breakdown of discipline and values. This was an event not fathomable by the leadership of the U.S. Army. In the Washington Monthly, Phillip Carter, a former U.S. Army officer, wrote, “Three generations of military

72 Ibid., 2.
73 “Abu Ghraib Conviction Dismissed,” CNN, January 10, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/us/01/10.abu.ghraib.ap/index.html?eref-edition_meast, (accessed January, 21, 2008). Soldiers at all levels were disciplined. No officers were ever convicted of a crime. The highest-ranking individual sentenced to serve jail time was Staff Sergeant Frederick who served 3 years of an 8 year conviction. Although senior officers were not convicted of crimes, many paid a heavy price for the scandal. The officer in charge of the Iraqi prison, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, was forced to retire as a Colonel. Major General Sanchez the commander of CJTF-7 would retire soon after his duty in Iraq. Soldiers at all levels were held accountable in various methods.
officers have grown up respecting the Geneva Conventions.” A large failure to observe regulations, orders, and international law points to major problems with values in the U.S. Army.

A final indicator of anomalies with values is that units have refused to follow orders. Refusing to follow orders indicates problems with loyalty, selfless service, honor, and personal courage. Cases where units refused to obey orders are extremely rare; however, they have happened in Iraq. One case involved the 2nd platoon, C Company, 1-26 Infantry. After an improvised explosive device (IED) killed five members of the platoon, the platoon collectively decided that they could not function and might commit crimes against Iraqi civilians. They were ordered to go back out to the site and clean up. About forty individuals refused to go back out on patrol. There was evidence that the company commander did not know the mental state of his soldiers when he ordered them to go back out on patrol. The fault lay with both the men and the commander, causing this situation to get to a point that the unit refused orders. Nevertheless, the unit was broken up and the soldiers were disciplined.

A second incident involved a U.S. Army Reserve logistics unit. In October of 2004, the 343rd Quartermaster Company from South Carolina was responsible for transporting equipment and fuel from Tallil, Iraq to units north of Baghdad, Iraq. Members of the unit stated that the fuel they were to haul was contaminated but investigations soon determined that many members felt that they did not have the proper equipment and protection for the mission. The U.S. Army denied that the fuel was contaminated and stated that it had added armor protection to the

vehicles. Other members of the unit accomplished the mission, transporting fuel as ordered. The U.S. Army has not yet published the results of this investigation; however, the case shows the lack of discipline and courage of these soldiers.

There are anomalies with values. The U.S. Army has responded with intense investigations and programs to stem the tide of sexual assaults and suicides with little success. There continue to be discipline problems and atrocities from members and units. One should expect things to go wrong given the amount of combat that U.S. Army soldiers are experiencing; however, a professional high-quality U.S. Army should not have sustained problems with its values. Sustained normative value anomalies decreases the effectiveness of units in combat and hurts the U.S. Army’s ability to recruit and retain soldiers.

Section Three: Defending the Paradigm

Senior military leaders, soldiers with over thirty years of service, acknowledge issues with the All-Volunteer Force; however, they refuse to consider alternatives to the current paradigm. General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, recently stated, “We’re running the all-volunteer force at a pace that is not sustainable.” The U.S. Army has spent significant time, energy, and resources to maintain the All-Volunteer Force. Despite anomalies, senior leaders defend the current paradigm. The U.S. Army has made retaining the All-Volunteer Force one of its strategic imperatives. The 2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement noted, “Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force as an enduring institution is a fundamental strategic objective for the Army.” Just as Kuhn theorized, the true defenders of the paradigm, even when recognizing

anomalies and crisis, refuse to consider alternatives. Senior leaders with thirty or more years in
the service either served in Vietnam or were junior officers when the All-Volunteer Force
paradigm replaced conscription. Today’s senior officers are the true defenders of the current
paradigm.

Senior military leadership will resist alternatives for two reasons. First, they remember
the negative effects of the draft from Vietnam. Admiral Michael Mullin, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, recently stated, “I watched the military break apart…. To the best of my ability,
I’m never going to let that happen.” He went on saying, “You can read about it, but I was there,
so I know; I understand the quality that we had back then.”80 Near the end of the Vietnam War,
especially in 1973, the U.S. Army had reached a low point. James Dunnigan, noted author, and
Raymond Macedonia, retired Korean and Vietnam combat veteran, wrote, “The loss of Vietnam
created a loss of confidence in the military as a winning force as well as a loss of confidence in
the professionalism of the military.”81 It was clear that the U.S. Army was in an institutional
crisis. Senior leaders had to take notice. Historian, Dr. Robert Griffith wrote, “Westmoreland
and his colleagues became increasingly convinced that the professional fabric of the institution
was unraveling.”82 The public lost trust in the institution as well. The media played on negative
incidents like My Lai and fueled the public’s poor image of the military. Public trust of the
military dropped from sixty six percent in 1966 to forty percent in 1970.83 Constant public and
private questioning of the military profession lowered the self-esteem of many officers. Morris

80 “Chairman Supports All-Volunteer Force.” U.S. Fed News Service, October 25, 2007,

81 James, Dunnigan and Macedonia, Raymond, Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after

82 Robert K. Griffith Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974
Janowitz wrote, “Today’s greater civilian contacts, and not necessarily more stable ones, mean that the military man’s self-esteem and self-image depends to a greater extent on public attitudes and popular opinion.”\textsuperscript{84} Sam Sarkesian, Professor Emeritus of political science at Loyola University, specifically acknowledged the identity crisis in the military after the Vietnam War when he wrote, “Institutional irrelevancy and decay has created an identity crisis...the identity crisis must be resolved quickly if in fact motivated and committed individuals are to remain in the profession.”\textsuperscript{85} He continued, “Until the period of the Vietnam war...the system upon which the profession was based proved adequate to defend the nation.”\textsuperscript{86} Conscription was adequate until it, and the institution, failed.

Conscription did not survive long-term conflict.\textsuperscript{87} In 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered a commission to develop a comprehensive plan for the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force. Known as the Gates Commission, it researched the benefits and drawbacks of an All-Volunteer Force. Its conclusions resulted in overall support of an All-Volunteer Force. The Report stated, “We unanimously believe that the nation’s interest will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft.”\textsuperscript{88} The U.S. Army was near collapse. In 1971, Colonel Robert Heinl Jr., wrote an article pointing out the many problems in the U.S. Army. He stated, “By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{83}Sam C. Sarkesian, \textit{The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society} (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1975), 203.
  \item \textsuperscript{84}Morris Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier} (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 226.
  \item \textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 236.
  \item \textsuperscript{87}Historically, the United States has relied on a small standing army to provide manpower for security and a militia at the ready for larger conflict. It has used conscription five times to provide necessary manpower for the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
\end{itemize}
state of approaching collapse.” Current senior leaders do not want to return to conscription because to them, conscription equates to a failed paradigm and institutional failure within the U.S. Army. Those officers who were in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam Era saw the failure. Those that entered the U.S. Army shortly afterwards saw its results—a devastated U.S. Army—and went about building the All-Volunteer Force.

Senior leaders in today’s U.S. Army have served a career in the All-Volunteer Force and helped to create it. Things were not easy for those who rebuilt the U.S. Army or those who started their careers at the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force. The first portion of the transition to an All-Volunteer Force was plagued by problems as the military attempted to develop and understand a new set of paradigm rules. This was to be expected, since no other country in the world had an All-Volunteer Force of the size that the United States was trying to achieve. The burden fell the heaviest on the U.S. Army. Martin Anderson from Stanford wrote, “The Department of Defense and the individual services, especially the Army, were faced with what was probably the most difficult, largest personnel management problem…dealt with in this country.” Recruitment, retention, and pay were all poor in the 1970s. Paul Glastris, senior fellow at the Western Policy Center, wrote, “For the first decade, this force was a disaster; the quality of recruits and retention rates plummeted.” Leaders at the time were determined to make the new paradigm work. Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General John Vessey Jr wrote, “We were going to fix what was broken. We were going to make the armed forces—for us,
the Army—better, and we were going to make it work despite the problems.”

The problems of the 1970s all began to turn around in the 1980s when Presidents from Carter to Reagan implemented a series of pay raises and modernization programs for the military. With increased budgets came the ability for the U.S. Army to modernize, increasing its weapons inventory. It revamped its educational system and placed a large emphasis on technology and training. All of this required professional soldiers. Paul Wolfowitz, former Assistant Secretary of Defense wrote, “The all-volunteer force is effective because it is a high-quality force.”

The current defenders of the paradigm lived through this period of transformation from a low-quality to a high-quality force. They built the paradigm.

While U.S. Army leadership is defending the current paradigm, it should reexamine the crisis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Most remember the U.S. Army after it failed as an institution, but there were anomalies before the crisis. There are many similarities between the anomalies that indicated a crisis in the U.S. Army during the early 1970s and the anomalies indicating a potential crisis in the All-Volunteer Force today. The two situations are not the same but they are similar.

During Vietnam, the quality of individuals entering the service declined. The U.S. Army changed the rules for entrance, but the public remained suspicious of the draft. It was difficult to keep soldiers in the U.S. Army. Discipline problems, such as AWOLs, began to effect

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93 The book Getting it Right by James Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia gives a detailed account of how the Army rebuilt after Vietnam. It examines in detail the changes in education, technology and training. These changes came about due to increased budgets and an emphasis by leaders to produce an effective fighting force. Some of the increased budgets and drive to change were caused by the Cold War; nevertheless the Army became the most modern and powerful in the world.

retention rates. Many good soldiers chose not to stay in the military due to dangerous conditions and poor discipline in the force. First term attrition rates steadily increased. In 1971, the rate was twenty six percent and it rose to thirty eight percent in 1974. Career noncommissioned officers departed at even higher rates. It was no better for officers. The Gates Commission found that first term U.S. Army officer retention rates for draft motivated volunteers and conscriptees was only thirty percent. Conscription could produce select manpower but it could not make individuals stay.

Initially many officers attributed problems to societal issues. Over time, the leadership was forced to acknowledge and deal with issues of drug use, racial tension, and poor discipline. Drugs became a major problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s for the U.S. Army. In 1973, in America’s Army in Crisis, LTC William Hauser wrote, “The U.S. Army in Vietnam experienced the worst runaway drug epidemic in American history.” Theft, crime, and violence on U.S. Army posts world-wide were at all time highs. Finally, there were problems with soldiers’ values. Leaders had to occasionally manage by consensus rather than by issuing orders and leading. In some cases, soldiers simply refused to follow orders and the orders were withdrawn. In 1970, the U.S. Army had no plan for failure, and it did not adequately address

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98 William, Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 121. He documented that 22.7% of the soldiers in Vietnam used drugs. When surveyed, soldiers from the 173rd admitted using drugs. 31% smoke marijuana once a week with one in six smoking it daily. Marijuana use was so common that soldiers smoked it in firebases and on patrol. Even worse was the fact that members of congress believed that between 10 and 15% of the military in Vietnam used heroin.
99 Ibid., 114.
100 Ibid., 99. One case B troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry ended a firefight with a superior North Vietnamese unit but left several classified documents on the battlefield. When ordered by the BDE HQ to
anomalies occurring in the system through the normal science of the time. Because the U.S. Army was unwilling or unable to deal with anomalies, institutional crisis resulted, and a solution was imposed upon the U.S. Army from the outside. The Nixon Administration changed the paradigm, forcing the U.S. Army to change. Today’s U.S. Army, recognizing anomalies, must consider options should crisis occur.

Section Four: Potential Crisis

With significant anomalies in the All-Volunteer Force, the U.S. Army must consider potential crisis. As defined, crisis is a pronounced failure leading to a new paradigm. There are two events which could trigger a crisis for the U.S. Army: an incident in addition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan requiring significant U.S. Army forces or an inability for the U.S. Army to reach its new end strength resulting in a possible defeat in Afghanistan or Iraq. Failure in either one of these two areas could result in a new paradigm. The U.S. Army must consider each crisis and develop options.

The first potential area of failure would be an incident requiring a response with significant U.S. Army forces. This failure would trigger an institutional crisis, since the U.S. Army has already acknowledged that there is insufficient manpower to respond to such an event given current operational requirements. In this case, the U.S. Army should have a plan to support universal national service, mobilizing the nation and increasing manpower for the U.S. Army. Implementing conscription alone to solve manpower issues will likely not have the support of the American people.

Currently, there is little political will to implement conscription. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) first introduced bringing back conscription in 2003. Officials quickly denounced any need for a draft. When asked, on Meet the Press, if the military needed to bring back the...
draft, Senator John Warner (R-VA) responded, “The answer is no.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded the same way to the idea of a draft. He stated, “I just can’t imagine it.”

Representative Rangel reintroduced his legislation in 2006, but it did not move out of committee until January 10, 2007. Bill HR.393 was introduced to Congress on the same day that President Bush announced the surge of American Forces into Iraq. Ultimately, HR.393 did not pass. Seven years after the start of the War on Terror, there is no political will to implement conscription.

At this point in the War on Terror, it is unlikely that the public will support conscription, but a major event requiring manpower that unites the nation would provide an opportunity for the U.S. Army to recommend universal national service as an option. There is some evidence that after the catastrophic events of 9/11, Americans would have considered and supported national service. A poll conducted in 2001 by the Democratic Leadership Council found that sixty percent of Americans favored some form of service that gave a choice between military and civilian service.

Currently, the only sectors of society asked to make a sacrifice are the military, portions of the diplomatic corps, and their families. Universal national service would give the U.S. Army needed manpower and engage the American public, as a whole, to win the War on Terror.

Colonel William Raymond, head of the academic department for the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, proposed a viable concept for universal national service. In 2005, he argued that the United States could successfully implement a plan of national service with four options. Young adults would be required to serve in the military, AmeriCorps, the Department of Homeland Security, or the Peace Corps. The ability to get government assistance

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102 Ibid.
with college loans would be directly linked to completion of national service. The only way that there would be traction to implement such a program would be in the event of a crisis that the U.S. Army cannot react to. The U.S. Army should plan for such a crisis and develop a way to support the implementation of universal national service should it become necessary.

The second potential crisis is if the U.S. Army cannot increase its end strength resulting in a possible defeat in Iraq or Afghanistan. It seems unlikely that a possible defeat in either of these locations would have such a significant effect that the public would support the implementation of universal national service. The most damaging consequence of a possible defeat in these vital areas would be a loss of public support and confidence in the U.S. Army. This is exactly what solidified the institutional failure of the U.S. Army in the early 1970s. Should the U.S. Army see indications that it will not meet its new end strength, it must have a plan to quickly activate more manpower and capability.

Options to obtain more manpower have been virtually exhausted. There is no immediate fix for any manpower or capability shortfalls in the U.S. Army. The United States Government has exerted tremendous time and energy attempting to convince its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to provide more troops and equipment for Afghanistan. This effort has been only partially successful. Relying on allies to surge, if necessary, to either Iraq or Afghanistan, is not feasible. The U.S. Army has increasingly, over the last several years, relied on the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy to provide manpower in Iraq. These services are contributing where they can, even though they have other commitments both in Iraq and around the world. The U.S. Air Force announced in November 2007 that it would increase its

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104 William Raymond, “Uncle Sam says, “I Want You!” – The Politics of the Draft and National Service,” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Science, 2005), 48. In this monograph, COL Raymond examines in detail the use of the draft in the Civil War, WWI, WWII, and the Cold War. He shows how the factors that made the draft successful for most of America’s conflicts can apply to today as
commitment of airmen supporting ground forces to between 2,000 and 3,000. The U.S. Navy has sent individual sailors and units in direct support of U.S. Army units to Iraq as well. When the 3rd Infantry Division was sent to Iraq as a part of the surge in March 2007, it did not receive many needed combat multipliers with which divisions normally deploy. The U.S. Army could not provide them; however, the U.S. Navy was able to help. Most avenues of providing alternative manpower for the U.S. Army have been explored and exhausted. There are few options left. However, there is one solution that could provide additional manpower and capabilities quickly: the use of private security companies from the civilian sector.

Private security companies are an option that the U.S. Army must consider if it needs to surge forces or there is a need for niche capabilities. Phillip Carter and Paul Glastris wrote, “The advantage of using contractors is that they provide a surge capacity; they are hired for the duration of the engagement.” These companies would have to fill manpower gaps. Areas might include trainers for police and army units, security guards, convoy escort, and security for provincial reconstruction teams, to name a few. If the U.S. Army cannot increase its end strength, then private companies will have to provide capabilities for the long term in Iraq or Afghanistan if the U.S. is to win. If the normal science of the All-Volunteer Force fails to replace needed capabilities, private security companies could become a permanent part of the All-Volunteer Force paradigm, thus changing the paradigm.

well. America will have to appeal to the patriotism and volunteerism of its citizens to justify such a program rather than force it on the public.


106 The senior civil affairs officer for the division is a Naval Officer with his deputy serving on a Provisional Reconstruction Team in Hilla, Iraq. The Explosive Ordinance Detachment headquarters and subordinate teams supporting the division are also from the U.S. Navy. These sailors provide a critical capability that the U.S. Army could not fill.

A shift towards using private security companies has already started to happen, but on a temporary basis. There is currently significant contractor and private security company presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Congress stated that there are sixty private contractors working for the U.S. Government in Iraq. It estimates that there are some 180,000 private personnel employed by U.S. contracts, with about 20,000 to 30,000 working as private security personnel in Iraq. Many of the individuals fulfilling these contracts are local hires and foreign nationals providing host nation support for U.S. Army personnel. Many are not, especially the private security contractors. The sheer volume of contracts and number of personnel outsourced in Iraq indicates a possible blurring of the All-Volunteer Force paradigm already. The CRS report stated, “Especially given the shortage of U.S. troops, private security contractors are widely viewed as vital to U.S. efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq.” In 2005, author Peter Singer, national securities fellow at the Brookings Institute, noted that without private security forces, the United States would either have to deploy more soldiers or persuade other countries to provide more soldiers. He wrote, “By outsourcing part of the job instead, the Bush Administration has avoided such unappealing alternatives.” The *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* noted, “At a time of operational overstretched, outsourcing services does much to reduce the enormous burden and stress placed on regular soldiers.” Security contractors and private security companies are playing a large role in areas

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109 Ibid., 1.


of conflict. Whether they will continue to do so in future conflicts is uncertain. The U.S. Army must consider the option of expanding the role of private contractors if the U.S. Army cannot increase its end strength. However, there are serious oversight questions that must be adequately addressed. The U.S. Army should think through issues such as cost, oversight, and roles and have a viable way to expand the role of private security companies if it appears that the United States is facing defeat in either Afghanistan or Iraq.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The All-Volunteer Force paradigm is well established, and for the last thirty years, it has succeeded, providing adequate manpower for the U.S. Army. However, the War on Terror is the first time that the All-Volunteer Force has had to sustain itself for an extended period in combat. Although senior leaders have made preserving the paradigm a strategic imperative, they cannot guarantee its success. The fact that significant anomalies exist within the paradigm points towards crisis. If the normal science of the All-Volunteer Force does not prove adequate to fix these anomalies, then the paradigm will change. U.S. Army leaders must recognize that a crisis with the All-Volunteer Force is a very real possibility.

The U.S. Army should take a critical look at the three guiding principles of the All-Volunteer Force. The one trait that each of these principles has in common is quality people. The U.S. Army is foremost an institution centered on its people. It is an institution which needs high quality recruits and high quality, ethical soldiers. Many attempted solutions to the current anomalies have been rational choice based incentives. Additionally, policy changes have been designed to open a larger pool of individuals from which to recruit and retain. Unfortunately, despite new incentives and policies, the quality of soldiers in the U.S. Army has been decreasing for the last three years. Since the U.S. Army lowered its quality standards in 2005, the standards have not continued to change; however, the U.S. Army has continually failed to meet its own standards, resulting in a lower quality force than the U.S. Army would like to have. The U.S.
Army’s dilemma is how to maintain a quality All-Volunteer Force while simultaneously increasing end strength.

As it attempts to increase end strength, the U.S. Army has chosen to emphasize retaining quality soldiers as its primary guiding principle. Initially this appears to make sense since the recruiting environment is very tough right now. The U.S. Army can barely meet present recruiting goals. Given the current recruiting environment, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. Army could meet even higher recruiting goals over the next several years, and failure to meet recruiting goals means failure for the U.S. Army. Failure to meet recruiting goals combined with negative publicity would make future recruiting even more difficult. On the other hand, reenlistment appears to be one place where the U.S. Army has been successful. When units make one hundred fifty percent of their goals, they should be able to meet even higher goals than those previously established. Many of the soldiers who are in the U.S. Army now came in before quality standards for recruits were lowered. Therefore, achieving current recruiting goals and achieving higher reenlistment rates seems to be sufficient to solve current manpower problems.

However, even though reenlistments are up, the U.S. Army cannot afford to ignore what is happening with recruiting. If the U.S. Army cannot reverse the trend of lower quality recruits, then it will continue to promote and reenlist lower quality soldiers. This, perpetuation of low quality soldiers, by emphasizing retention, will have an adverse effect on unit readiness unless the U.S. Army can significantly affect quality once these soldiers have entered the service.

The U.S. Army should make the principle of retaining normative values its main effort. Upon the introduction of the Soldiers Creed and Warrior Ethos, emphasis on the traditional U.S. Army Values declined. The U.S. Army should reemphasize its seven core values to its soldiers and to the American public. The American public holds the military as the most trusted institution in the nation. According to a 2006 Gallup Poll survey, seventy three percent of
Americans surveyed had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military.\footnote{Lydia Saad, “Military Tops In Public Confidence,”\textit{Gallup Poll Briefing}, June 7, 2006, \url{http://web.ebscohost.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/ehost/pdf?vid=1&hid=105&sid=cb4cbdd8-965d-41d8-ae8d-37735ebd864d%40sessionmgr107}, (accessed February 15, 2008).} The U.S. Army should use its distinctive values and uniqueness to its advantage when recruiting soldiers. Rather than an emphasis on rational choice, the U.S. Army should focus on normative values and why Americans trust the military. Values can also help retain quality soldiers.

Although a recruit may be enticed to enter the military by rational choice incentives only, the internalization of normative values can increase the quality of a soldier. Even though increased internalization of normative values may be difficult to measure, it should neither be discounted nor be placed secondary to rational choice incentives. Don M. Snider, visiting professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, advocated this point recently when he wrote, “My second suggestion is that the Army adopts the position that its institutional role and responsibility in the realm of the Soldier’s spiritual development is to facilitate the individual’s search for the moral meaning that defines a leader’s character.”\footnote{Don M. Snider, “Intrepidity…And Character Development Within the Army Profession,”\textit{Strategic Studies Institute OP-ED}, January 2008.} A greater emphasis on moral leadership for new recruits and junior leaders would help reduce discipline problems and atrocities in combat. Reducing these issues, in turn, should lead to less negative publicity and increase the quality of individuals desiring to enter and remain in the force.

An emphasis on normative values as the main guiding principle would also help the U.S. Army succeed should the All-Volunteer Force Paradigm change. If the need arises for universal national service or the use of contractors becomes a long-term solution to capability shortfalls, there must be a mechanism in place to keep standards high. Today’s defenders of the paradigm remain convinced that the All-Volunteer Force is the only way to maintain a quality force. However, changing the paradigm does not have to equate to lower quality. In every instance, other than in the later years of Vietnam, conscription provided quality manpower for the U.S.
Army. Developing a comprehensive program to educate and sustain normative values should be the cornerstone of not only the All-Volunteer Force but of any paradigm that the U.S. Army must use to fight and win the nation’s wars. A strong emphasis on values would provide the U.S. Army with flexibility and could eliminate hesitancy to embrace alternatives.

The U.S. Army has no authority to change the current All-Volunteer Force paradigm on its own. Change will have to come from outside of the institution if it is to come at all. At this point, the U.S. Army is doing all that it can to make adjustments to the All-Volunteer Force sustaining it to fight the War on Terror. The anomalies indicating crisis are numerous and seriously threaten the force; however, senior leaders will defend the current system until they are forced to use another. The junior officers of today’s U.S. Army must look at the strain on the force and be willing to accept that the current security environment may demand a different paradigm. It might not be the force that the U.S. Army’s leadership would like to have but it might be one that is necessary to accomplish the strategic goals of the United States. Yet, these young officers should not embrace a new paradigm until the old one has failed. Changing in the face of mounting anomalies is tempting but runs the risk of being premature and unnecessary. Normal science must be given every opportunity to run its course, since it is most often able to overcome anomalies. Rather than advocate a new paradigm, U.S. Army leaders at all levels must anticipate what a new paradigm might look like. This paper has offered two alternatives, but there are others that will emerge if the guiding principles of the All-Volunteer Force cannot overcome current anomalies. Regardless of what a new paradigm might look like, it is possible to give the current paradigm strategic flexibility. To do this requires the U.S. Army to shift its main effort to promoting and instilling its normative values. With these values internalized in the force and recognized by the public, the normal science of the All-Volunteer Forces should sustain the paradigm. Should the current paradigm fail, transition to a new paradigm in a time of war is possible and has been done before in American history.


