
A Monograph
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Abstract

The United States Military conducted numerous attempts to train Foreign Security Forces over the past 100 years. From training the Nicaraguan National Guard to the most recent efforts in Iraq, the U.S. Military has repeatedly shown a need for a coherent and comprehensive plan to develop foreign security forces. U.S. advisory missions in the Philippines, Vietnam and El Salvador contained positive elements, but none of these past operations contained the necessary framework to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise foreign security forces. As a result, the programs were haphazard at best, resulting in both the loss of national resources and delays in achieving foreign policy goals. Even today, when in conjunction with National Strategic Objectives, the United States Government has developed a host of programs to assist a host nation in bolstering their security forces, none of these programs has adequately addressed the threats found in the contemporary operating environment.

The contemporary operating environment requires a more comprehensive framework to develop foreign security forces in conjunction with a host-nation. Rogue states, non-state actors, super empowered individuals, trans-national terrorist organizations, religious and ethnic strife, and disenfranchised elements of society all contribute to the difficulties of developing a functional and effective native security force. Today’s security forces must possess the capability to defend their nation from both external and internal threats. While the United States Government has some programs available to assist in the security development of other nations, none address the multitude of problems common today. Additionally, the lack of a concise doctrine applicable for general purpose forces greatly hindered past security force assistance missions and remains the biggest obstacle to future mission success.
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Reveille

“Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that Army leaders use to solve military problems. It is a menu of practical options based on experience. By establishing common approaches to military tasks, doctrine promotes mutual understanding and enhances effectiveness.”

-Field Manual 3-0, Operations

The United States Army’s history demonstrates the importance of working with foreign forces to develop the internal stability of a host nation. America continually sent its warriors into remote regions of the world to work by, with, and through foreign security forces. However, except for a small, specially trained force, a clear and complete set of doctrine focused on working with foreign security forces has not existed. The results included varying levels of success, different training techniques, and the increased cost of both blood and national treasure. Today’s U.S. General Purpose Forces (GPF) require a dedicated and pertinent series of doctrinal references to conduct current and future Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has had no conventional military peer. Its overmatch capability on the conventional scale created a shift in how current and future enemies attempt to challenge United State military dominance. Today’s enemies fight a more asymmetric style of battle, mixing advanced technology with irregular warfare while integrating within a society. To prevent the spread of insurgencies and warfare, the United States assists legitimate foreign governments, supported by their constituents, to mitigate the fundamental root causes of modern insurgencies. The development of an effective host nation security force is fundamental to this effort. Although not a new concept, the military historically relegated security force assistance (building host nation security forces) to a secondary role.

However, history and current operations demonstrate the vital importance of security force assistance, and the clear need to treat this key component of long-term stability as more than an afterthought. Future success lies not in the creation of new advisor organizations, but in a dedicated series of joint, doctrinal references applicable to general purpose forces.

All training and advisory missions are not alike. While similarities exist between foreign security force assistance missions, the different missions and operating environments impose subtle differences. Security Force Assistance is an evolving term used to describe the broader application of the organize, train, equip, rebuild, advise (OTERA) tasks across the broadest range of possible operating environments.2 Historical examples illustrate the varying types of SFA missions the U.S. military has undertaken, and the differences with the overriding need for the creation of doctrine specifically suited for GPF, the newest vogue term for conventional forces. SFA is an emerging concept, not doctrine. JCSIFA defines Security Force Assistance (SFA) as, “Unified action to generate, employ, and sustain host nation or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority.”3 It encompasses aspects of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), a task normally limited to the Special Forces community. However, historical and recent missions reveal the need to arm and equip GPF forces with the supporting doctrine to plan for, resource, and execute SFA missions.

The difficulties inherent to advisory missions are numerous. At the tactical level, the advisor struggles to overcome a foreign culture and the challenges of working with another military organization. At the strategic level, a successful SFA mission requires a whole of government approach. The military alone cannot successfully rebuild a host nation’s security


3 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), Security Force Assistance Planners Guide (SFAPG), (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 September 2007).
force. Other institutions require assistance ranging from infrastructure to ministry level rebuilding. The most difficult challenges, however, remains at the operational level. The Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) must balance the tactical needs of U.S. advisory forces working directly with a host nation, and the strategic end state required by the highest levels of government. This tension between all three levels greatly increases the chances for a successful SFA mission.

On February 28 2007, a message sent out to all Army activities stated, “The U.S. Army’s transition team (TTS) mission is the Army’s top priority and is the way to achieve a more secure region in the primary theaters of operation- -Iraq and Afghanistan- - in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).”\(^4\) Five years after the attacks of September 11, the United States Army finally labeled SFA missions as its top priority. However, a majority of the conventional military still lacks a thorough understanding of the mission, requirements, scope, size, and goals of the transition teams. SFA works “by, with, and through” host nation security forces. The bottom line of SFA is to build capability in other people, their organizations, and their institutions to ensure a stand-alone host nation security force; legitimate, trusted, capable and supported by the people of their nation. SFA missions build up the internal structures necessary to maintain stability within a nation. They additionally counter the rising tide of the enemy’s use of asymmetric warfare. The most successful military troops at countering an insurgency are the indigenous security forces of the nation in peril. They better understand the politics, the cultural nuisances, the languages, tribal structures, and power brokers of their own country. By strengthening a host-nation’s security forces, the United States gains a stable global partner.

For centuries, other nations assisted the training, development, and organization of struggling militaries. Numerous historical works study the advisory efforts of the U.S. military,}

ranging from operations in Central America to South East Asia, the true foundation of security force assistance. However, few focus on the specific efforts in the Philippines and El Salvador. The majority of sources with regards to the Philippine efforts emerged shortly after the President Theodore Roosevelt declared the end of the insurgency in 1902. Brigadier General Henry Allen, established the Philippine Constabulary and wrote the foundational “Handbook: Philippine Constabulary,” providing the operating principles for the constabulary in 1901. Allen served as the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary from 1901-1907, and as General Nelson Miles’ aide, the overall U.S. Commander of the Philippines. The handbook and his letters highlight the importance the U.S. Army placed on using host nation forces to pacify the Philippines. James Blount, a former army volunteer officer and later district judge in the Philippines wrote a valuable account of the Philippine Constabulary in The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912. Blount’s military experience provides a view of the capabilities of the indigenous forces. Additionally, his legal background provides insights into the legal issues and social struggles of arming the local population. Blount’s work, published in 1912, captures the struggles and benefits of America’s early attempts at security force assistance. Both Blount’s and Allen’s works are hard to find, and their location in only special collections result in an inability to disseminate their lessons learned across the U.S. military today.

In 1938, author Victor Hurley published, Jungle Patrol. His work reads more like a fiction novel but is based on interviews, diaries, and letters from dozens of Philippine Constabulary veterans and the insurgents they fought. Hurley’s book provides vivid accounts of the Constabulary members with their advisors, and is a useful read for current and future advisors.

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in today’s counterinsurgency efforts. *The Constabulary Story*, written by the Public Information Office of the Philippine Constabulary in 1978, provides a thorough background and history of the founding, training, and operations of the Constabulary.8

More contemporary sources recently examined the U.S. Army’s experience in the Philippines. Historian Brian McAllister Linn revisited the constabulary role of the U.S. Army in his work, *Guardians of the Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*, published in 1997.9 Andrew Birtle’s *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, took on renewed importance as the U.S. military struggled with a rising insurgency in both Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003.10 Birtle’s work devotes an entire chapter to the importance of the Philippine Constabulary and its development. In 2004, Edward Coffman analyzed a similar time frame as Linn in *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941*.11 Coffman explores both the roles of the military during that time along with its culture, family life, and position in Philippine society. There are many lessons learned from the U.S. Army’s experience in the Philippines. However, few of these valuable lessons have spread to the wider army. Their importance is clear and therefore need better distribution across the U.S. military today. Similar important lessons exist in literature exploring the U.S. advisor’s role in El Salvador in the early 1980s.

While only a small amount of information exists on the formation of the Philippine Constabulary, there is a glaring dearth of references on the Operations, Plans, and Training Teams (OPATT) in El Salvador. The OPATT mission took the ill-trained El Salvadorian Armed

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Forces (ESAF), quadrupled their size and increased overall professionalism. The majority of the references spring from either military or government sources. Former Ambassador Pickering provides a good assessment from his perspective in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present. Manwaring and Prisk’s work captures important lessons from participants and studies conducted by U.S. think tanks on lessons learned. Coming less than a decade after the end of the Vietnam War, the American public and Congress did not want to start another advisory effort possibly leading to a large conventional ground war. Bacevich, Hallums, White, and Young highlight why the OPATT mission remained under tight constraints in their work, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador. Robert Ramsey does an excellent job compiling the experiences of the participants and capturing lessons learned in his Combat Studies Institute publication, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador. The OPATT mission utilized a large number of Special Forces personnel, possibly limiting the amount of works available on their mission with the ESAF. The RAND Corporation’s American Counterinsurgency Doctrine in El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building, written by Benjamin Schwarz, provides a useful timeline capturing the various evolutions the OPATT mission underwent. Finally, Cecil Bailey’s article, “OPATT: The U.S.

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Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” found in Special Warfare Magazine looks at the difficulties the OPATT members experienced due to the constraints placed on their mission by Congress.  

The attempts to rebuild the Iraqi Army following the end of conventional operations in mid-2003 continue to dominate the headlines. Once again, American military forces attempted to relearn the advisory lessons of the past. Reports, newspaper articles and a few books highlight the initial difficulties caused by some decisions of the Coalition Provincial Authority. However, books such as Tom Ricks’ Fiasco along with Gordon and Trainor’s Cobra II are the initial cuts at the history of the early advisory efforts. The Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth continues to capture lessons learned and recent advisor experience in its interview process and a series of occasional papers. Ramsey’s OP 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, culled recent articles from professional military journals written by former advisors. While it is too early to have firm histories of the initial efforts to rebuild the Iraqi Army, there exist numerous sources full with the experiences of recent advisors coming from both Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are subtle differences in conducting security force assistance missions versus foreign internal defense or security cooperation missions. These differences will be explored in the first chapter. Additionally, unlike many instances in the past, SFA planning must start prior to any conflict and develop as part of a long-term campaign plan, not as an afterthought or ad hoc organization. In past conflicts, the training of host nation forces remained a secondary effort to the conventional fight. Unfortunately, the failure to balance the two resulted in failed policies.


and a longer duration of bloodshed through many conflicts. This monograph shall use historical case studies to highlight both the necessary components of SFA and to capture some of the previous examples of SFA conducted by the U.S. Army. The most effective use of SFA missions is during the pre-conflict, or shaping phase of a long-term engagement plan. Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs) are managed by the overall Regional Combatant Commanders to maintain interaction, dialogue and military relations with the nations within the geographic area. Chapter one highlights the need to engage SFA planning both early in and entirely through various TSCPs.

The second chapter of this monograph explores the development of the Philippines Constabulary, a classic example of security force assistance. After the cessation of insurgency operations in 1902, the U.S. Army continued its constabulary work in the Philippines. In its quest to maintain security yet eventually turn over the lead role to local forces the U.S. Army turned to the local population to develop security forces. Both the Philippine Constabulary and Scouts emerged as the first security force assistance missions of the twentieth century. Often overlooked by scholars, the Philippine War and the subsequent constabulary effort provide historical lessons and examples of developing host nation forces and the need for established doctrine.

The third chapter looks at the SFA mission conducted in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Again, this is an often overlooked aspect of the U.S. Army’s history, overshadowed by the events of the cold war. In this case, a 55-man team of advisors organized, trained and equipped a substantial amount of the Salvadorian military, developing what many considered a rag-tag force into a much more professional organization. Some similarities also exist in terms of the organization and selection of the advisors for El Salvador to transition teams of today.

The fourth chapter explores the early attempts to organize the new Iraqi Army after the end of major conventional operations. In late 2003 and early 2004, the U.S. Army realized the importance of rebuilding the Iraqi security forces. Unfortunately, the thought process and planning for this SFA mission began too late in the planning process. This resulted in ad hoc organizations to address the need to rapidly develop Iraqi security forces. The initial training mission of the Iraqi Army highlights the important need for a comprehensive and well understood SFA doctrine.

The fifth and final chapter summarized the key components of SFA and highlights the importance of a new organization within the Department of Defense, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). Established by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in 2006, JCISFA’s charter began under the former Combined Arms Center Commander, Lieutenant General David Petraeus. Its stated goal is to, “institutionalize lessons and best practices from security force assistance operations to better prepare U.S. and partner nation forces to rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.” JCISFA provides a key capability missing for so long in the U.S. military and is the leading proponent developing future SFA doctrine for future advisor missions. The aim of this study is to aid provide historical examples demonstrating the need for viable joint doctrine for general purpose forces to conduct SFA missions. In addition, this study looks to assist JCISFA to both capture best practices of SFA missions and disseminate them through the joint community.

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19 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Charter, from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 4 April 2006, in author’s possession.
Chapter One: Foreign Assistance and the need for SFA Doctrine

“Future Warriors will understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces.” -2006 QDR

Nowhere in the 2006 QDR does it state the role of training foreign security forces fall exclusively to those in the Special Forces community. Highly trained and specially selected, the Special Forces of the U.S. Army focus their training on working with foreign security forces. However, as recent operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq proved, there exists a vital role for general purpose forces (GPF) in the training of foreign security forces. In order to complete future SFA missions, the U.S. Military needs an established joint doctrine designed to achieve mission accomplishment. Numerous programs and doctrine exist to provide assistance to foreign militaries. None, however, fill the niche of SFA.

Many leaders with the U.S. Government believe America is engaged in a “Long War”, or age of persistent conflict. While the focus of this paper is not to debate the above terms, most agree working with foreign security forces provides the best way to extricate U.S. troops from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Future operations will most likely involve similar tasks involving either the training or rebuilding of host nation forces.

The U.S. Government has developed a wide variety of foreign assistance programs to assist other governments. These programs provide a variety of specific assistance to assist a foreign government’s security forces. For example, Security Assistance (SA) is, “A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies or objectives.” According to U.S. law, actual training and

advising cannot occur during combat conditions or operations. Security Cooperation (SC) is, “All Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests which develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a Host Nation (HN).” According to U.S. Law, Security Cooperation occurs only during peacetime and is limited to DoD agencies only. Finally, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is, “Participation by civil and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.” The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. Clearly these different programs for dealing with foreign governments all have specific goals and limit the types of assistance offered. Security Force Assistance not only tries to tie all these programs together, it also strives to fill in the gaps between them.

These above U.S. Government programs to assist friendly governments focus at the strategic level. The programs provide financial assistance, equipment, education and training to build the capabilities of a nation to defend its self. At the tactical level, U.S. trainers assist with the development of a security force’s capabilities. The rapport-building skill of our Special Forces combined with an in-depth knowledge of a peer’s cultural background translates to successes at the lowest levels. The real difficulty occurs when looking at the level in between the

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21 JP 1-02, 476.
22 Ibid, 212.
23 Ibid, 269.
strategic programs and the tactical actions. It is at the operational level both the U.S. Military and U.S. Government struggle to understand the intricacies of a Security Force Assistance mission.

SFA seeks to overcome the limitations found in the majority of the government programs designed to provide assistance to foreign governments. Some of the obvious restrictions of the previously discussed programs involve their usefulness in war time. SA and SC are valuable programs during the shaping phase of a campaign plan but run into legal and logistical restrictions once hostilities commence. FID, while applicable in a combat environment, focuses on an internal threat only. Today’s insurgent rarely emerges from, remains in, and draws support from only one country. The transnational nature of terrorists and insurgents today make the usefulness of FID highly limited. While FID does provide valuable aid and training to a host nation, it lacks the capability to deal with both internal and external threats. Additionally, FID normally focuses on the host nation’s military programs, leaving vital security forces such as police, border guards, and customs officials out of the training.

The deficiencies of current government programs also include the training audience. Security cooperation goes against all the current trends and experience from previous operations which call for an interagency approach to problems within a host nation. Even in Iraq, most experts and leaders agree the military (DoD) solution alone is not going to bring about resolution. Instead, the U.S. government needs all elements available to the host nation including the Department of State (DoS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others to develop nation-building capabilities. Additionally, the majority of the nation-building programs target their assistance at a host-nation’s military. While military to military contacts are normally the fastest to establish, SFA highlights the importance of training with all the security forces to include police, paramilitary organizations, border police, customs officials, and their respective supporting infrastructures.
SFA not only dictates the necessary training for the personnel conducting security operations, but also looks at establishing and maintaining the supporting architecture of each element. For example, in early 2004, the focus of the U.S. military efforts was to produce as many “functional” Iraqi army battalions as possible. However, equally important was the need to develop the Ministry of Defense, the logistical systems, and the supporting architecture necessary to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces in the field. While U.S. Special Forces (SF) are excellent at training battalion size and below indigenous forces, are they the right choice to stand up a foreign armored division complete with supporting logistical and personnel structures? Normally such a mission requires dedicated trainers with that experience. In other words, this task requires a dedicated SFA commitment from the conventional army.

The U.S. military works at three distinct levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The concepts behind SFA include incorporation at every level of planning. The chart above provides a visual representation of the levels of planning and SFA integration and shows the importance of integrating SFA at every level of planning. SFA planning at the strategic level brings into play all the interagency elements of the national government. The operational level includes the command elements responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of a host-nations security forces. An example of this is the current Multi-National Security and Transition Command in Iraq (MNSTC-I). Serving as the operational command, MNSTC-I coordinates the efforts of training all security elements with Iraq. The tactical level includes the different advisor groups, transition teams, and U.S. units partnered with Iraqi battalions.

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24 Ibid, 5.
Normally the need to train foreign security forces appears in Phase IV (stabilization phase) of a military campaign plan. Similar to a campaign plan, SFA has different phases covering the entire spectrum of planning. According to JCISFA, the proposed phases of SFA are: 1) Plan and resource, 2) Generate, 3) Employ, 4) Transition and 5) Sustain. Each one of the SFA phases linked to the campaign planning phases are shown below.  

The plan and resource phase normally occurs during the shaping phase of a campaign plan. This phase undergoes a continual reevaluation. Once a problem is framed, the planners continue shaping operations until either the situation changes resulting in another evaluation or orders drive a plan into its next phase. Combatant commanders must evaluate what level of involvement a SFA mission may involve. Commanders need to understand what the host nation’s security forces actual capabilities are and what capabilities they are supposed to possess.

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according to their doctrine. Then the commander needs to determine if the intent is merely to improve an existing host nation force, reconstruct it based on existing capabilities and structure, or to construct security forces from scratch. Often, SFA requirements encompass elements of all three. By identifying the necessary requirements, the GCC commander then determines the size, structure, resources, funding, and selection of the U.S. units to conduct the SFA mission. This guidance then becomes the basis for the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). Planners must keep in mind they will have to separate requirements: U.S. forces used to generate host nation security forces and U.S. forces to assist in host-nation employment. The first train HN forces while the second group acts as the advisors and liaisons between U.S. and HN forces. Planners must look at what elements of the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) organizations they might need to conduct the SFA mission. The GCC Commander has the power to reach out to other USG agencies which may play a potential role in any SFA mission.

The generate phase is the next step in SFA campaign planning. The elements of this phase are organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTER-A). Advising is built into every portion of the generate phase. Advisor teams exist at the organization, training, equipping and resourcing portions of the SFA mission, depending on the current proficiency level of the HN security forces. Critical to mission success is early identification of what level of assistance the HN requires. If HN forces are built from scratch, there will be a heavy emphasis on the organizing and train portions of OTER-A. If the HN has well established forces, they may only require additional training or equipping. Regardless of what level of involvement is required, the need for advisors at every step is the critical component.

The employ phase of SFA transitions away from the development of HN capabilities and into actual utilization of their forces. HN forces may focus on an internal threat, external threat, or a combination of the two. Regardless, the main effort of the mission shifts to the capabilities and employment of U.S. advisors. While military advisors are normally part of SFA, a requirement exists for other government agencies and multi-national partners to work with their
HN counterparts. This often overlooked portion of the employ phase is of critical importance, ensuring a successful integration of all JIIM elements to assist the development of the HN.

The transition phase of SFA differs from a typical campaign transition phase. During a campaign’s transition phase, U.S. forces focus on turning over operations to the HN forces with their embedded advisors. During the SFA transition phase, the focus is on removing the U.S. advisors from the HN security forces. Therefore, the actual phasing of each occurs at different points in a campaign plan. As HN forces develop their capabilities to a sufficient level where they no longer need U.S. assistance, the advisor presence scales back. The two phases are not necessarily complimentary to one another. Politically it may be necessary to remove U.S. military forces from a HN. However, the requirement for advisors (at all JIIM levels) may remain for years. In other cases, HN forces may operate without the need for any U.S. advisors, but U.S. conventional forces may remain in the HN’s country in support of strategic objectives. The transition phase of SFA is a critical step in removing the dependency of a HN’s security forces on U.S. advisors demonstrating their ability to conduct independent operations.

The final phase of SFA is the sustainment. In this phase, U.S. advisors completed their mission. Coordination between the HN and the GCC is normally through an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and routine Security Assistance programs. This transition point must be considered well in advance and serves as the termination criteria of a SFA mission. The following chart captures the phases of SFA.26

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26 Ibid, 12.
Finally, the following chart graphically portrays the level of effort between US/Coalition efforts and the host nation efforts. The initial efforts of U.S forces are intensive in the early phases of the campaign. As the foreign security forces develop better capabilities, the responsibilities shift away from U.S. forces to them.²⁷
Security Force Assistance missions include a variety of tasks: 1) Force generation (organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise); 2) Advise HN forces as part of FID (stability, offense, secure); 3) Assist employment of HN forces in support of campaigns and major operations; 4) Advise the HN forces faced with an external threat (offense, defense, stability); 5) Provide traditional Security Assistance through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs); 6) Develop sustaining capabilities for HN forces; 7) Develop legislative and legal authorities of HN; 8) Integrate FSF into the broader interagency of the HN; and 9) Enhance the professionalism of FSF as the legitimate forces of a partner nation.28

The goals of SFA are to develop foreign security forces that are Competent, Capable, Committed, and Confident (4Cs). HN forces must be competent across all levels from the individual to ministry levels and across all functions including combat operations to logistics. Capable forces are appropriately sized to accomplish any potential mission and sustainable over time within the HN’s resource capabilities. HN forces must be committed to the security of their people, the survival of their state, the preservations of human rights, and the peaceful transition of power within the state. Finally, HN forces must be confident in themselves, their government must show confidence in their security forces, the people must trust in the professionalism of their security forces and the international community must believe HN security forces are an agent for positive change. When a SFA mission develops forces which meet the requirements of the 4Cs, that mission is considered a success. 29

The main area lacking in our current understanding of SFA is the doctrine. There simply is not any applicable to our general purpose forces. While Joint Doctrine Publication 3-07.1, the

28 Ibid, 15.
29 Ibid, 16.
Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for FID, looks as some of the elements of an internal assistance mission, it lacks the clear understanding of the intricacies found in today’s SFA environment. Doctrinal publications exist for our Special Forces, those best suited to work with foreign militaries. However, the doctrine requires a specially trained and educated soldier to successfully implement it. Through history, U.S. forces conducted numerous SFA missions. Those before the creation of our Special Forces highlighted the difficult time conventional forces underwent while struggling to train foreign forces. Even after the creation of Special Forces, the lack of GPF SFA doctrine plagued SFA missions in Vietnam and El Salvador. Today as over 5000 conventional soldiers serve as advisors in Iraq, there is no SFA doctrine applicable to them or their vitally important mission. Such doctrine would provide the necessary guidance to conduce OTER-A with their host nation forces and bridge the divide between the strategic and tactical level of understanding.

The next chapters will analyze historical mission through the lens of SFA and the lack of a coherent doctrine applicable for GPF conducting these missions. The historical examples include the development of the Philippine Constabulary in the early 1900s, the El Salvador mission in the early 1980s, and the attempts to establish a new Iraqi Army in late 2003 into 2004. Each example provides a brief summary of the historical events then analyzes each using the phases of SFA to see how successful each mission was. Without established doctrine, both current and applicable for conventional U.S. forces, each of these historical SFA missions struggled to achieve success.
Chapter 2: The Philippine Constabulary

“If there had been organized materials on the Philippine insurrection, we could have saved ourselves a good deal of time and effort in Vietnam.”

Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr., former Army Chief of Military History

The efforts to train a constabulary force in the Philippines after the cessation of conventional warfare is an example of ad hoc ingenuity over established method. With no doctrine or specialized training, a handful of U.S. Army volunteers ventured out into the Filipino jungles to build what would become a highly effective and efficient law enforcement force. While the campaigns of the U.S. Army prior to the Philippines provided invaluable experience for the officers, it was only through their hard work and perseverance that they successfully overcame a lack of guidance and advisor doctrine while accomplishing their mission.

The United States Army in the late nineteenth century essentially was a continental based constabulary force. After the Civil War, the Army shifted away from conventional operations and into frontier duty to match the rapid expansion into the West. As Americans continued west, the Army expanded with society. Across the West, small posts of Army troops popped up providing protection and trading resources for the settlers. Rather than traditional war fighting, the Army served in a constabulary role, providing law for the plains. The junior leadership found themselves isolated and often in charge of huge swaths of land. Alone with their units and far away from commanding officers, junior officers learned to act independently and take control of their respective territories. The military leadership quickly learned to work with the local civilian leadership to build civil-military relations. Up until the start of the Spanish-American War, the

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US military’s constabulary methods provided useful experiences for their eventual role in the Philippines.31

From the end of the Civil War, the United States Army included courses in providing civilian assistance to its officer corps. Both West Point and Fort Leavenworth included similar text books on military governance of civilians including Henry Halleck’s *International Law* (1861), Theodore Woolsey’s *Introduction to the Study of International Law* (1864), and William Birkhimer’s *Military Government and Martial Law* (1892).32 Officers gained valuable, real-world experience on frontier duty in addition to the curriculum on military governance at the school houses. While not established doctrine or practices, these texts did provide an education basis to train and guide officers establishing relations with civilian authorities.

In 1892, Fort Leavenworth published a handbook written by Captain William Birkhimer which provided lessons learned and guidance on how to operate a military government. His work was primarily based on the U.S. Army’s recent experiences in the post-Civil War South and Mexico.33 While preparing for the Philippine invasion, Captain Birkhimer’s text caught the attention of Major General Nelson Miles and Brigadier General Franklin Bell, two Army leaders in the Philippines. Birkhimer’s work highlighted the lessons related to civil-military governance with regards to both the Mexican and Civil War. He noted, “The United States has endeavored to avoid resorting to the harshest measures permitted by the laws of war because by a policy of forbearance it was hoped ultimately to convert the people, including the insurgents, into loyal citizens.”34 As the U.S. Army spread across the Philippines, Major General Elwell Stephen Otis, Commanding General and Military Governor of the Philippines, ordered his subordinates to

follow Birkhimer’s lessons. Otis ordered his men to respect the people, their customs, and maintain discipline within their own ranks. Public work projects, such as roads, schools, markets, and health clinics helped to develop both the local’s trust in the U.S. Army and increase the cultural interaction between the natives and American soldiers. The increased contact between the locals and the U.S. Army laid the groundwork for the eventual development of local security forces such as the Philippine Constabulary and Scouts.35

In 1902, the conventional fighting came to an end. The war policies of the U.S. Army crushed the last elements of the organized Filipino resistance movements.36 Nearly four years of war and centuries of ineffective Spanish rule left a majority of the Philippines ruined. Disease rapidly spread through the islands, aggravating the already difficult situation. These conditions provided an ideal breeding ground for organized criminal elements roaming the countryside and attacking villages. These bandits were known by the Filipinos as ladrones.37 Unlike the defeated insurgents, these ladrones lacked any sort of central control and emerged from the lower elements of society, the peasant class. This combination of decentralized brigands combined with an emerging religious fervor resulted in a difficult enemy for the conventional U.S. Army to eliminate. The American administration in the Philippines knew the most effective force to counter this growing criminal element were the local authorities.

Governor William Howard Taft, the acting U.S. civilian leadership in the Philippines, already created a Philippine Constabulary to provide the civil government with its own counterinsurgency capability prior to the official end of hostilities.38 The Philippine Commission passed the Organic Act No. 75 on July 18, 1901 titled, “An act providing for the organization and

35 Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 47.
36 Ibid, 46.
38 Ibid, 154.
government of an insular Constabulary.”39 The Constabulary provided a police force for the civilian government, while the Philippine Scouts acted as a military organization working with U.S. Army units. Historian James Woolard described the key difference between the two: “While the two forces (Scouts and Constabulary) were equal in size and the Scouts did assist the Constabulary in the handling of insurrectionist groups, the Scouts were an official branch of the U.S. Army under the direct supervision of the officer commanding the Philippine Division. Taft’s civil regime had complete control of the Constabulary.”40

Henry Allen received the appointment of Chief, Philippine Constabulary, along with a promotion from lieutenant colonel to Brigadier General. He immediately issued General Order No. 1, appointing 68 handpicked officers to form the core of the constabulary. Allen looked for similar traits Brigadier General George Crook for when selecting men to lead his Indian Scouts. Brigadier General Crook led the counter guerilla operations against hostile Indian tribes during the constabulary years of the U.S. Army. Crook utilized native Indians as scouts, lead by U.S. officers. He looked for bright, ambitious, and physically robust men could withstand the harsh environment of field service yet maintain sensitivity to the local sociopolitical environment.41 These officers needed to exhibit the traits of a paternal strongman, remaining aloof from his charges to gain their allegiance while demonstrating a genuine concern for their welfare and respecting their culture.42

These handpicked officers immediately received a variety of training prior to working with their charges. They received a crash course on the laws, customs, and traditions of the

42 Ibid.
Philippine people.\textsuperscript{43} Each officer received additional education on the organization and training of light infantrymen, the base structure for the Constabulary. Allen used U.S. Army regulations and manuals as the basis for training. In 1906, Allen and his organization published the \textit{Manual for the Philippine Constabulary}.\textsuperscript{44} This small unit manual captured the many lessons of small-unit operations, cultural nuisances of the Filipino troops and tactical techniques particular to the Philippine area of operations. However, the Manual was more than a lessons-learned book. It contained great details on the Constabulary’s police functions, arrest procedures, evidence collection, court procedures, and the latest legal code. The selected officers had to know Spanish, including the dialect and cultural customs of the regions for which they were selected. Once the soldiers completed their training, they departed across the Philippines in small teams to recruit, organize and train Filipino natives in constabulary work.\textsuperscript{45}

The Constabulary was not capable of policing the postwar Philippines alone. Its American advisors maintained contact and relationships with the local U.S. Army units. Lacking the manpower, the administrative skills, and the logistical support found within the U.S. Army, the advisors became the Constabulary’s link to American firepower. The advisors to the Constabulary, well versed in local customs and the language, served as an effective intelligence conduit for U.S. forces. The Constabulary understood the local politics, the cultural nuisances, and, for the most part, knew their neighbors since childhood. The Filipinos knew when strangers entered the village or who had traditionally held animosity towards the government structure. By working with their advisors, the Filipino troops passed on actionable intelligence, driving operations by the U.S. Army when necessary.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} San Gabriel, \textit{The Constabulary Story}, 85.
\textsuperscript{44} Birtle, \textit{U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941}, 156.
\textsuperscript{45} San Gabriel, \textit{The Constabulary Story}, 88.
\textsuperscript{46} Linn, \textit{Guardians of Empire}, 25.
As the civilian government police force, the Philippine Constabulary initially worked closely with the Philippine Scouts. From 1902-1905, the Scouts and Constabulary worked closely together for two reasons: to concentrate the growing local national forces and to maximize the small cadre of American advisors between both organizations.47 Eventually, as the guerilla wars wound down, the Scouts moved into garrisons to hone their conventional military skills. The Constabulary continued to expand into the hinterlands to bring law enforcement to the local villages under the supervision of American advisors.

It is useful to use the Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild, and Advise (OTER-A) model recommended by the current Security Force Assistance Planners Guide (SFAPG) to analyze the development of the Philippine Constabulary. In terms of organization, Brigadier General Allen broke the numerous Philippine provinces into three Constabulary districts. Each district contained anywhere from six to eleven provinces under each. Governor Taft sent a report to War Secretary Root describing the set up of the Constabulary, “The general scheme is to create an insular force of not exceeding one hundred and fifty men for each province, selected from the natives thereof, who may be mounted in whole or in part, and who are placed under the immediate command of one or more, not exceeding four provincial inspectors.”48 Reality differed greatly from the initial organizational intent. In the smaller provinces, Constabulary strength ranged from 45-60 men, while the larger provinces, such as Sulu, had three to four times that amount.49

The Constabulary’s main effort revolved around small outposts located across the each province. The outposts were often located in small nipa and bamboo huts, with the ground around cleared of brush trees to create a firing zone. Constantly fighting the jungle, disease and

hostiles, the life of an early day Constabulary was fraught with danger. However, the American
advisor shared these dangers and lived in the outpost with his troops. This sharing of common
danger forged rapid and strong bonds of mutual trust between the Filipinos and the American
advisors.

Training of the Constabulary was haphazard at best, often varying from province to
province. One writer of the time states, “It was not uncommon for a PC officer at that time to be
issues a number of firearms, uniforms and a cash advance and then ordered to proceed to some
God-forgotten province, recruit his own troops and he was on his own as guardian of the peace in
his jurisdictional area. As it happened, the raw recruits got their much-needed training as they
went about the grim business of chasing bandits and other lawless elements in the mountain
fastness.”\textsuperscript{50} On-the-job training for recruits unfortunately resulted in a high number of casualties
and decreased effectiveness of the Constabulary. It was not until the establishment of a
Constabulary Officer’s school in 1908, attended by all recruits that the Filipinos received the
necessary training to better accomplish their mission.\textsuperscript{51} This recognition of the disadvantages of
on-the-job training was a critical step in both improving the overall quality of the Constabulary
and increasing their professionalism in the eyes of fellow Filipinos.

The equipping of the Constabulary ran into many hurdles. While agreed to in purpose
and numbers, numerous disagreements developed as the advisors sought to arm their newfound
troops. Knowing full well the Constabulary would often fight outmanned, outgunned, and far
away from rapid reinforcements, the advisors sought the best modern equipment possible for their
police force. Unfortunately, upper elements of the U.S. military did not place a great deal of trust
in the new found Constabulary. One regular Army officer recommended, “By no means arm the

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} San Gabriel, \textit{The Constabulary Story}, 89.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 94.
Constabulary with smokeless, repeating rifles. Do not arm them with rifles at all. If they are held to black powder shotguns, they will be infinitely less dangerous should they revolt. The smoke of the black powder shells will reveal their positions to army sharp-shooters.”

Initially, 1,372 modern rifles were set aside for the Constabulary. About half were issued before a flood of protests reached General Adna Chaffee, the U.S. ground commander in the Philippines from 1902-1903. Chaffee objected to the Constabulary having the same arms as the regulars and ordered their return. Instead, the Constabulary received old single-shot Remington shotguns and .45 caliber revolvers. While the shotguns and revolvers were not as advanced as the weaponry utilized by the U.S. troops, the constabulary troops preferred these older weapons. They became the weapon of choice for the constabulary troops to fight off the machete attacks from the bandits.

Since the Constabulary started as a new force, there is little comparison between the current SFA rebuilding phase and what occurred in the Philippines. During the initial establishment of the Constabulary, the focus was more on the selection and training of the U.S. advisor, rather than the Filipino troops. Those Filipinos with military experience tended to join the traditional military organization, the Scouts, instead of the law enforcement-focused Constabulary.

The most important factor contributing to the Constabulary’s eventual success was the U.S. advisor effort. From the very start of the Constabulary, the U.S. administration in the Philippines looked for the best qualified individuals to advise the Filipinos. The military established firm selection criteria based on the officer’s records, previous assignments, and performance within the Philippine theater. Normally, the officers selected as advisors possessed successful records performing frontier duty back in America. The expeditionary nature of

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53 Ibid, 66.
frontier duty, performing duties while isolated from higher headquarters in harsh conditions, directly contributed to the success of U.S. advisors working with the Constabulary. After a perfunctory training period on the important aspects of Filipino law and the suggested Constabulary organization, the advisors went forth with minimum guidance and used their judgment to develop each provincial force. The initial formational years of the Constabulary, from 1901 until about 1908, required all the ingenuity and perseverance of the U.S. advisor. Once the Constabulary developed its own operational procedures, the individual traits of the advisor had less of an effect on their respective Filipino unit.55

The selection of the Constabulary advisors provides valuable lessons in today’s SFA environment. The process used to select the advisors involved knowing each individual, his respective history and traits. The commanders of the advisory effort chose an officer’s experience and maturity level over rank or age. Unlike the system used during the early SFA mission in Iraq, advisors in the Philippines needed experience in theater before assignment to the Constabulary. This ensured the selected advisors had combat experience and a better understanding of the culture in which they would work. Often the selection of advisors for Iraq was based on availability versus experience and maturity. Leaders during the Philippine campaign knew soldiers with a combination of frontier and Philippine experience possessed the necessary experience to successfully lead the newly formed Constabulary. While advising was by far the most important aspect of the SFA mission with the Philippine Constabulary, the selection of these advisors was equally important, if not more so. Placing advisors with their respective constabulary units was not as important as the quality of these advisors. Placing inexperienced advisors with the constabulary had the potential to derail the fledgling effort or cause more cultural problems. Their valuable frontier experience overcame the lack of any established

55 Linn, Guardians of Empire, 48.
doctrine, yet their struggles highlighted the importance of capturing lessons learned and translating it into future doctrine.

The Philippine advisory effort had both strengths and weaknesses. The U.S. Army entered the Philippine Constabulary mission with decades of institutional knowledge gained from constabulary efforts in the Western Plains. The individual spirit, maturity and ability to act with minimum guidance ensured U.S. officers serving in the advisor role to the constabulary were primed for success. Additionally, the U.S. Army gathered older lessons on conducting nation building from both the reconstruction phase after the Civil War and the expansion west across America. These lessons were updated and distributed to the advisors in training and in the field, ensuring a standard knowledge base existed across the force. Finally, the constabulary advisors had U.S. Army infantry units to assist them in conducting operations when needed. The advisors gained the best of both worlds: the intelligence gathering capability and local cultural knowledge from the Filipino troops and the firepower of a U.S. infantry battalion.

Unfortunately, as U.S. troops once again prepared to conduct another advisory mission in El Salvador, many of these hard earned lessons were lost. The difficulties of conducting advisory work in both Korea and Vietnam deeply scarred the general purpose forces of the United States. Additionally, the formation of Special Forces, highly trained troops specifically created to work with indigenous soldiers, shifted the onus of advisory missions away from the conventional forces thereby forgetting about the lessons learned from the Philippine Constabulary effort. Unfortunately, it would take years of learning in the school of hard knocks for those troops conducting SFA missions in El Salvador to realize insights existed from the past.
Chapter 3: Operations, Plans and Training Teams in El Salvador

“It was a tragedy that there was no respectable body of doctrine to be drawn on, that we were
thrown back into pragmatism. We had no respectable organizational approach to deal with
this.”56 -U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering

The above quotation from Ambassador Pickering highlights the enduring theme through
the numerous advisor missions conducted by the U.S. military. In the early 1980s, the U.S.
Military once again undertook a security force assistance mission without the necessary SFA
document for general purpose forces. The 12-year United States military-assistance program in El
Salvador resulted in a variety of experiences and lessons learned. Too often, lessons learned from
advisory missions are not captured and translated into enduring doctrine for future generations to
utilize. Rather, these SFA missions are treated as aberrations detracting from the important
mission of conventional war fighting. Ambassador Pickering captured the essence of the SFA
mission in El Salvador. The U.S. military wasted too much time relearning lessons of the past
thereby detracting from the efficiency of another SFA mission. Once again in El Salvador, a need
for dedicated SFA doctrine emerged.

After the 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran leftist movement
formed into a single movement, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).57 The
FMLN launched an armed rebellion in 1980 and conducted conventional offensive operations in
1981 in an attempt to seize power. While the FMLN’s actions failed to garner the popular

56 Ambassador Thomas Pickering, quoted in Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at
War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present (Washington, D.C., National
Defense University Press, 1988), 244.

57 Cecil Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” Special Warfare
(December 2004), 20.
uprising they hoped for, their operations highlighted numerous weaknesses in the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF).

The ESAF had minimal doctrine, training, and experience in counterinsurgency warfare. The majority of the military defended fixed sites across the country from insurgent attack, forfeiting any offensive advantage they had. In 1981, the ESAF was untrained, poorly equipped, and notorious for its record of human rights abuse. The ESAF conducted brutal, repressive campaigns in an attempt to maintain internal stability and utilized “death squads” to eliminate political rivals. These techniques violated one of the most important principles of counterinsurgency warfare: maintain the support of the population.58

The military consisted of a small officer corps and essentially peasant soldiers.59 Like many Latin American militaries of the time, the ESAF had no concept of a Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) corps. The 11,000 man Army lacked training, modern equipment and effective leadership. As the FMLN continued to demonstrate its prowess on the battlefield, the ESAF recognized it needed assistance to defeat the increasing effective insurgency.60

After the FMLN launched a major offensive against the ESAF, the United States restored military aid to El Salvador on 14 January 1981.61 In addition to military aid, the U.S. sent a Special Forces Mobile Training Team to train an immediate reaction battalion for the ESAF. In March, Congress authorized a “training” mission within El Salvador, capped at 55 personnel on the ground. Coming only six years after the fall of South Vietnam to the communists, Congress and a good portion of the American public remained skeptical about any sort of advisory mission

with the potential to pull America into another conventional war. With the influx of Cuban
advisors and the build-up of forces in Nicaragua, Congress agreed El Salvador required
assistance. However, this time there were numerous restrictions placed on the advisors, starting
with the number allowed in country by the State Department. Concurrently, a fight over the
financing and deployment of U.S. military advisors to El Salvador raged in the Senate to ensure
the U.S avoided another open-ended commitment.\textsuperscript{62}

In the fall of 1981, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sent a seven-man Strategic
Assistance Team led by Brigadier General Fred Woerner to work with the ESAF General Staff.
Woerner’s mission was two-fold: to guide the military leadership in developing a national
military strategy to defeat the FMLN and to provide an assessment of the ESAF’s capabilities to
the U.S. Government. The requirements developed by the ESAF General Staff and Woerner
consisted of expanding the ESAF by 10 battalions, modernizing the equipment, improving the
training, command, control, and communications systems across the force. The guiding principle
established by the initial US Military Group (MILGROUP) was KISSS, “Keep it simple,
sustainable, small and Salvadorian.”\textsuperscript{63} Woerner reported such an effort required both an
expensive and long-term American commitment. According to Woerner, failure to do so,
“Unabated terror from the right and continued tolerance of institutional violence could
dangerously erode popular support to the point where in the Armed Forces would be viewed not
as the protector of society, but as an army of occupation.”\textsuperscript{64}

After using SF teams to work with selected ESAF battalions, in 1984 MILGROUP
decided to attach advisory teams to each of the six ESAF brigade headquarters to assist in staff

\textsuperscript{61} Ramsey, \textit{Advising Indigenous Forces}, 84.
\textsuperscript{63} Ramsey, \textit{Advising Indigenous Forces}, 85.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
work and planning. Each team consisted of a lieutenant colonel team chief, a captain as a training officer, and a military intelligence officer. Known as an Operational Planning and Assistance Training Team (OPATT), these three man groups specifically avoided the title of advisors, per the guidance issued by Congress. Rather, Congress felt the term “trainer” reinforced the non-combatant role of the U.S. forces working with the ESAF. In addition to the 55-man force cap on the El Salvadorian mission, Congress specifically banned the trainers from participating in combat operations with their respective ESAF units. This decision resulted in problems for the U.S. trainers later on. Regardless of the term, OPATT, the U.S. soldiers continued to refer to themselves as advisors, “The word ‘advisor’ is more accurate and is a direct translation of the Spanish “aesor,” which is what we were called by our Salvadoran colleagues.”65 The OPATT members will be referred to as advisors for the rest of this chapter.

The U.S. embassy supported the advisor team plan knowing the El Salvador presidential elections were in May 1984. The embassy wanted U.S. officers inside each ESAF brigade to monitor the reaction of the military. While the elections went well, the ESAF started to rally against the uninvited advisors.66 Salvadorian Brigade commanders disagreed with the presence of an American lieutenant colonel within their headquarters. While they did not object to the presence of the captains, the brigade staff officers felt their authority was challenged by the presence of an advisor of equal or senior rank. According to Lieutenant Colonel James Roach, one of the U.S. advisors, “I know that the brigade commanders weren’t comfortable with (us) because we were bold enough to ask questions about their plans and operations.”67 By the end of the summer, a new U.S. commander in charge of the advisors arrived. Colonel James Steele

65 Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces, 88.
67 Ibid.
moved the lieutenant colonels to other positions away from the OPATTs, leaving only the infantry and military intelligence captains with each brigade.

The year 1985 brought about changes and improvements to the OPATTs. A combat arms major, preferably a Special Forces officer, led the OPATT. Additionally, two warrant officers or senior non-commissioned officers with operations, intelligence, and training experience rounded out the team. This switch from using officers to NCOs provided two key benefits. First, the pool of available advisors greatly increased. Because the number of Spanish-speaking infantry or military intelligence captains was small, opening the advisor requirement to either warrant officers or NCOs greatly increased the available manpower pool. Second, the ESAF now had the opportunity to work first hand with senior NCOs. This one-on-one contact with experienced NCOs demonstrated the importance and the necessity of building a strong NCO corps. While the MILGROUP running the OPATT mission preferred Special Forces officers and NOCs, there was not enough to fulfill the ongoing mission. Therefore, members of the Regular Army continued to fill the ranks of OPATTs until 1991. The specific requirements for the OPATTs, however, kept many of the advisors returning for additional tours. This provided the added benefit of advisors arriving in El Salvador with prior experience working with the ESAF. The 1985 OPATT structure remained consistent until the end of the mission in 1993.68

The congressional restrictions directly affected the ability of the advisors to assist their counterparts. The restriction against U.S. military personnel accompanying ESAF units on operations was especially distasteful to the advisors. The restriction stemmed from the trainer versus advisor debate. Congress saw advisory work as a slippery slope towards the commitment of conventional ground forces into Central America, similar to Vietnam. While Congressional concerns were understandable less than 10 years after the fall of Saigon, the advisor members suffered from the restrictions. Barred from accompanying their units on combat missions,
advisors lost credibility, and more importantly, rapport with their partners. Major William Nealson, the 1st Brigade OPATT said, “Not the brigade commander, but some of the junior officers were pretty curious about why you were cuartel (base) bound. I think certainly if we had been able to selectively go out, it would have enhanced our ability to establish rapport at the junior level.” 69 While senior ESAF officers did not want U.S. advisors observing them in the field, many ESAF junior officers wanted the Americans’ tactical experience to accompany them on combat missions. Adding to the problem was the simple fact some advisors willfully sidestepped the congressional mandate, “Those advisors who broke the rule insisted they had to if they were to be effective- their credibility was at stake. Those who stuck to the rule argued that the risk of being caught disobeying a Congressional mandate far outweighed any passing esteem that might be gained from their Salvadorian counterparts.” 70

There is little debate advisors needed to observe their counterpart ESAF units in the field. For example, Nealson realized that on operation after operation, units from his Brigade returned without prisoners. Nealson cajoled his counterpart to bring in prisoners to try and gather intelligence. The next night, his Brigade had four prisoners who produced important intelligence for the unit. One United Nations Truth Commission report cited the success of the OPATT mission for a steady decline in human-rights violations by the ESAF during the war. 71 The OPATTs stressed the importance of human rights to the ESAF from a practical perspective. To defeat the FMLN, the ESAF needed the support of the Salvadorian population. By taking prisoners, treating them with dignity and respecting the civilian population, the ESAF’s chances of winning a counterinsurgency fight grew exponentially. FMLN commander, Joaquin Villalobo

69 Ibid, 20.
70 Ibid, 21.
offered the most telling praise of the OPATT’s efforts, “Putting American advisors in therigades were the most damaging thing that happened to the FMLN during the war. As the
advisor’s influence on ESAF made them more professional and less abusive, the FMLN lost
much of its earlier propaganda advantage and recruiting appeal.”72 This praise coming from the
FMLN commander speaks volumes to the effectiveness of the OPATTs.

The mission of the OPATTs varied substantially from those who established the
Philippine Constabulary. Rather than organizing an entirely new force, the OPATTs rebuilt the
ESAF from a force of 11,000 men in 1981 to a professional force of 56,000 men by 1991 capable
of conducting effective counterinsurgency operations while maintaining public support. What
makes this SFA mission even more impressive was the limited manpower used by the U.S.
military. The 55 man cap forced the MILGROUP to put careful thought into the organization,
selection, and rotation of the advisors. As a result each OPATT fulfilled a specific mission with
hand selected personnel.

The MILGROUP worked carefully with the ESAF General Staff to develop an
organization which was both effective and sustainable. The American advisors knew the ESAF
needed more trained soldiers, not fancy technology or new weapons systems. As a result, the
reorganization of the ESAF focused on expanding the military while increasing its overall
professionalism. The manpower cap in country forced the MILGROUP to develop training
programs outside of El Salvador. In 1982, the U.S. military trained one ESAF rapid reaction
battalion at Fort Bragg at a cost of a 180 man cadre and $8 million dollars – enough resources to
train six to eight battalions in El Salvador. Training then moved to Honduras where a regional

71 Chris L. Lukasevich, “Training and Advisory Assistance to the Armed Forces of El Salvador

training center allowed the development of new units and the retraining of others outside of the combat zone.\textsuperscript{73} These efforts fulfilled part of the SFA tenets of organization and training. Additionally, the OPATTs picked their battles carefully. As with any advisory mission, the development of rapport with counterparts remained the most important tool to successful change. Advisors tread carefully when trying to improve the overall human rights records of the ESAF, especially since so many ESAF units had committed previous abuses.

\textbf{Training} ESAF units on American tactics resulted in the ESAF adopting bad habits, especially when equipped with U.S. military hardware, “By replacing damaged fixed and rotary wing aircraft, the MILGROUP produced an El Salvadoran air force capable and willing to support combat operations. The result was that for counterinsurgency operations that emphasized ‘being among the people, the UH-1 made ESAF into an army that spends too much time above the people.’”\textsuperscript{74} Advisors struggled to move the ESAF from large, conventional operations towards more decentralized, small-unit operations better suited for counterinsurgency efforts. Again, the inability of most advisors to accompany their counterparts on combat patrols greatly hindered their ability to influence the ESAF and to evaluate the effectiveness of the training conducted.

The continued U.S. funding \textit{equipped} the ESAF with the latest weapons and technology through Security Assistance programs. This provided numerous advantages to the ESAF, especially with regard to night vision devices. Intelligence collection tools, improved radio technology, and improved weapons brought marked improvement in the tactics of the ESAF. However, the newer equipment provided numerous challenges to the members of OPATT. Improved weapons and technologically sophisticated equipment required improved maintenance and specialized training for the users. Too often technologically advanced equipment falls in

\textsuperscript{73} Ramsey, \textit{Advising Indigenous Forces}, 84.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 100.
disrepair without proper maintenance, tools, and training. OPATT therefore took on additional training task in terms of properly training the ESAF in the use and care of the new equipment provided by the United States.

Unlike the Philippine Constabulary efforts, the OPATTs conducted a large amount of SFA rebuilding operations. This included the attempt to rebuild the officer corps and to develop a professional NCO corps. Unfortunately, both efforts went against the grain of the ESAF culture and found only limited success. The attempts to create a more professional officer corps had the least success. OPATT members fought against a broken system. The ESAF had a promotion system where each military academy class members were promoted together based on year group, not on performance. Officers had to remain in the military until reaching the rank of colonel, at which point they could retire and leave the military. But the promotion system provided no incentive or rewards to change the status quo. Attempts to train officers outside of El Salvador at Fort Benning or at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras often failed as soon as the officer returned back to El Salvador. The ESAF felt it did not need to change its internal organization, and as a result, the OPATTs struggled to influence the officer corps.75

Attempts to develop a professional NCO corps proved equally frustrating. Traditionally, Latin American militaries consist of an elite officer class and peasant soldiers; “The NCO concept is alien to the Salvadoran military tradition, as it is throughout most of Latin America.”76 Attempted institutional changes met stiff resistance from the decision makers, the ESAF officer corps. ESAF officers did not understand the need for nor welcome any class of leadership

viewed as a threat to their own. OPATT efforts to build an effective NCO corps resulted in frustrations and no real change in the ESAF rank structure.77

The advising mission of the OPATT effort varied from that of the Philippine Constabulary. The Congressionally mandated restrictions placed on the ability for an advisor to leave the base with its units mired the OPATTs ability to observe the effectiveness of its training. Additionally, the loss of credibility in the eyes of the ESAF leadership hindered OPATT member’s ability to influence their counterparts. Working within the force cap, however, the OPATTs gained a foothold into the ESAF. The OPATTs at the Brigade levels focused on the areas they felt best able to influence: operations, training, and intelligence. The personal counterpart relationships between advisor and Salvadoran counterpart were the primary means of achieving minor changes with each unit. One lesson from such a structure is to look for areas with the potential for influence and focus on them. The rank structure of the OPATTs caused push-back from the ESAF leadership, and understandably so. Again, rather than building an entirely new security force, the advisors entered an already established military wary of outside advice or influence. The MILGROUP’s willingness to modify the rank structure resulted in both a better balance of team members with a larger pool of participants along with gaining better credibility in the eyes of the ESAF.

Before a SFA mission begins, both the U.S. and the Host Nation military leadership need to determine what the desired end states are. The desire to change the ESAF officer corps and build an NCO corps was fraught with problems. The focus at the OPATT level, however, made perfect sense and relied on the experience of its team members to accomplish results. Initial attempts to train an ESAF battalion wasted both resources and time. The OPATT mission demonstrated the best chances for success when working with an already established security

77 Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development, xviii.
force resulted from small teams of advisors developing rapport with their counterparts. Additionally, banning advisors from participating in operations with their counterparts due to casualty aversion places the advisor in both a more dangerous and less effective position. To judge accurately the effectiveness of a host-nation force, advisors must have the capability to participate in most, if not all, missions. While the risks to the advisor may seem greater, the benefit to the overall training mission greatly outweighs the risks. Congressional restrictions, however, may be a very real factor in future SFA missions. Therefore, any SFA doctrine developed must take into account the possibility of advisors working in a restricted role within the confines of a host nation military with U.S. Congress oversight.

The OPATT mission in El Salvador consisted of an interesting mix of both Special Forces and General Purpose Forces. The SF soldiers received extensive training in training foreign forces and the task associated with FID missions. However, as the OPATT mission expanded and the need for more advisors grew, the SF community was unable to provide the necessary manpower to meet requirements. Then, members of the GPF started to deploy in the OPATT mission. Lacking the extensive training and foreign nation experience, the GPF soldiers needed some doctrinal references to familiarize themselves both before and during actual mission execution. Unfortunately, no doctrine existed for GPF to conduct the type of missions the OPATT fulfilled. The lack of doctrine resulted in wasted time and resources. The GPF soldiers needed a joint SFA doctrine to prepare for their mission and to assist them during actual operations with the ESAF. While the small scope of the OPATT mission limited the amount of GPF forces in El Salvador, thereby minimizing the negative impact of not having an established SFA doctrine, the warning signs became clearer. It would not be long before the United States military embarked on a massive SFA mission, once again without any established SFA doctrine. This mission involved the rebuilding of the Iraqi Army after the conventional fight of Operation Iraqi Freedom ended. In this case, however, the failure of a SFA doctrine for the GPF was painfully obvious.
Chapter 4: Advisor Support Teams in Iraq: Ad hoc Security Force Assistance

“There was little guidance provided to ASTs concerning their role as advisors, no job description. There was no standardization of procedures across battalions; every new situation generated a reaction because no plan or procedure was in place. Information was sought only when an incident occurred which forced a response. There was little guidance on where information was located and what information was available, all of which was provided after the ASTs were engaged with their Battalions,” Major D.E. Lane II, USMCR, 2d AST AAR comments78

The decision by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) to disband the Iraqi Armed Forces remains one of the most contentious discussions of the intervention in Iraq. Some argue Paul Bremer’s decision was a necessary step towards reconciliation. Others say it stripped Iraq of one of its only organized and integrated organizations, resulting in a sudden pool of trained fighters for a rising insurgency.79 Regardless of the debate, the need to build trained and professional security forces in Iraq became painfully obvious to those in the Green Zone of Baghdad. The initial attempts to build a new Iraqi Army resulted in the formation of Advisory Support Teams (AST). These advisor teams opened a new chapter in the U.S. military’s history of security force assistance, one still under study today as refinements to the advisor missions continue while conducting combat operations. One lesson is clear: the lack of clearly defined SFA doctrine hindered the initial efforts to reestablish the Iraqi Army. Even today, a fissure exists between tactics, techniques and procedures used by current advisors and a lack of doctrine.

The attack into and through Iraq was unprecedented in history, covering a great distance while sustaining a relatively small amount of casualties. However, as combat operations moved past Baghdad, an insurgency formed against the coalition forces. The Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) disbanded the old Iraqi army in May 2003. At that time, the Iraqi Army was composed of more than 400,000 men, including 12,000 generals — compared with 300 generals in an American army of almost 500,000 Soldiers, according to then Major General Paul Eaton. Additionally, hundreds of ammunition caches, abandoned supply points, and unexploded ordnance provided a nearly limitless supply of weapons for the insurgency. Hopes for a rapid transition from American to Iraqi control quickly faded as the newly formed CPA realized the inherited situation in Iraq was worse than most planners and politicians anticipated.

The CPA initially decided to build a small Iraqi Army consisting of approximately 30,000 troops back on active duty with nine infantry battalions making up one full Iraqi Infantry Division. With the majority of Special Forces teams engaged in Afghanistan, combat missions, searches for high profile targets, and searches for weapons of mass destruction, the trainers for the Iraqis had to come from the GPF. Training to build the first four Iraqi battalions started in July 2003 with the first battalion graduating on 4 October 2003. However, as security conditions deteriorated, the decision was made in September 2003 to increase the number of battalions from nine to 27, enough to create three full infantry divisions. Suddenly, the need for additional trainers for the Iraqis became top priority. However, these advisors would not emerge

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81 Packer, *The Assassins’ Gate*, 144.


with the training and doctrine found in the SF community. They would consist of reserve and active-duty soldiers from the conventional force.

CMATT developed a two-phase training technique for building new Iraqi army units. Officers with previous experience in Saddam’s Army went to training in Jordan. Vinnell Corporation received the contract to conduct the training of the Iraqi Army non-commissioned officer program. Vinnell’s involvement in training Arab troops goes as far back as 1975 when they received a contract to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Once trained by the Vinnell cadre, the Iraqi Officers and NCOs combined to form the cadre of a new Iraqi Army Battalion. This cadre, with American advisor assistance, formed the nucleus of a battalion, taking 700-800 recruits and conducting basic training to form a cohesive battalion. The lynchpin for this effort was the Advisor Support Teams.

With so many active duty and reserve units rotating out of Iraq, entering Iraq or training for a future deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan, DoD decided to pull ASTs from small elements across the globe. Both active-duty and National Guard units received tasking to provide a 10-man team capable of training an Iraqi Army Battalion and conducting combat operations with that battalion. The first four battalions of the Iraqi Army received National Guard teams, one consisting of Marine reservists and the other three with Army reservists. The 5th AST consisted of a mixed group of active duty and reserve Marines (5th AST). The 6th and 7th AST formed from two teams of Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) from the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels Germany. The reserve teams consisted of individuals pulled from across a division, many of whom had never worked with each other. The two teams from Hohenfels had the advantage of working together on the same O/C team for up to a year. Each team consisted of

84 Conversation between the author and LTG (Ret) George A. Crocker, Program Manager, New Iraqi Army Training Project, Kirkush, Iraq, 24 June 2004.

one Major as the team chief, two Captains serving as company trainers, and seven NCOs, each with a rank of Sergeant First Class or Master Sergeant. Normally, O/C teams provide training feedback and doctrinal assistance for units rotating the Army’s three Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Each O/C team has a specific focus. The 6th AST formed around members of the Timberwolf O/C team. The Timberwolves normally worked with infantry battalions going through training rotations at the CMTC. While experienced at doctrine and assisting units, the members of the 6th AST had no advisor experience.

The training of the ASTs was limited to say the least. The 6th AST from Hohenfels received little guidance from CMATT, partially due to lack of secure communications and partially due the hectic pace within Iraq. Efforts to locate any form of doctrine related to advising foreign forces led to some older Special Forces manuals and historical articles. The frustration level of the officers in the 6th AST rose rapidly as the limited training seemed to indicate a lack of understanding of their advisor mission. According to the 6th AST Team Chief, Major Pete Fedak, “As an advisor, I got the impression that there was an 'us' and 'them' divide between the advisors and regular U.S. forces. In other words, there was an American camp and then, outside, there was a bermed area for the Iraqis, of which we were part.”

Training consisted of weapons qualification, a live fire convoy exercise, limited medical training, and a smattering of power point briefings on Iraqi culture. The time from notification of deployment to actual arrival in theater was approximately two months. Attempts to gather additional information about the role of the AST met with frustration and failed to produce results. The team departed Germany unsure if they would conduct basic training or combat

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missions with their Iraqis. With no Special Forces members on the team or any FID training, the 6th AST entered the uncharted waters of advisors without doctrine.87

Once in Iraq, the ASTs started in the CMATT forward base in Taji, north of Baghdad. The former Iraqi base broke down into two areas. Elements of 1st Armored (followed by 1st Cavalry Division) occupied the American side of the base while Iraqi army and advisors resided on the Iraqi side of the base. Guarded entry points separated the two, creating a physical and cultural boundary between the two sides. Iraqis had no access to the American side of the base and the advisors needed to go “across the wire” for everything from meals to haircuts to phones. The adversarial mentality had a detrimental effect on later ASTs and their ability to accomplish their missions.

The training in Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) consisted of three parts. First, the Iraqi officers and NCOs joined to form the cadre of the battalion. The NCOs graduated from their Vinnell NCO academy course with their ranks established. The officers found out their battalion positions before departing Jordan. Next, the advisors taught the leadership of the battalion how to train their soldiers. Finally, recruits arrived at KMTB, joined the battalion, and began their basic training. Basic training, run by the Iraqi cadre with oversight by the ASTs, focused on individual combat skills, physical conditioning, and squad level tactics. After graduation and a two week break, the battalion returned to conduct advanced training and began operations in conjunction with U.S. tactical units.

Once in theater, the ASTs struggled to overcome problems, including a lack of interpreters, vehicles, and equipment while developing the organization of the Iraqi Battalion. Even the organization of the battalion was unclear. In early 2004, CMATTs training focused on developing enough numbers to build battalions of Iraqis. Confusion ran rampant as to where the

87 Mike Sullivan, “From the Ashes: Rebuilding the Iraqi Army,” Armor Magazine (July-August 2005), 44.
The Iraqi Battalion would train, conduct operations, and receive logistical support. The Iraqi infantry battalion organization consisted of a headquarters, four infantry companies, a transportation company, and a headquarters company. The advisors spread themselves across the battalion to maximize the ability to observe their counterparts and provide guidance to the leadership. One NCO worked with each company coordinating directly with the company sergeant major and commander. The senior U.S. AST NCO worked directly with the battalion command sergeant major. The AST Team Chief partnered with the Battalion Commander. The two AST Captains split the battalion companies in half, mentoring three companies each. Additionally the two Captains each took a staff section to conduct additional staff assistance to build the necessary systems to sustain a battalion.88

More troubles immediately confronted the 6th AST. After a two week stay in Taji, the AST travelled to their training base in Kirkush. After shadowing members of the 2nd AST and the 2nd Iraqi Battalion, the 6th AST thought they had a basic understanding of their mission and how to conduct the training. However, on April 5th, 2004, the 2d AST attempted to move the battalion up to Fallujah to participate in operations with the Marines. After insurgents attacked the 2d battalion’s convoy, they returned to Taji, and the advisors recommended flying the 2nd Battalion to Fallujah. The Iraqis, however, had enough. The Battalion refused to go on the helicopters, and the next morning, approximately 106 soldiers out of a 695 man battalion, plus the 12 Iraqi interpreters, deserted.89 According to a discussion between the CMATT Commander, Major General Paul Eaton, the battalion leadership after the refusal to fight, the Iraqi said, “We did not sign up to fight Iraqis.”90 It was a disaster for the fledgling advisor program.

88 Ibid, 45.
Training brought with it the usual challenges seen across the history of security force assistance missions and the advisors worked hard to achieve small successes. From overcoming the multiple language barriers (Arabic and Kurdish) to training the cadre to pass on their knowledge to the recruits, the AST worked hand in hand with their Iraqi counterparts. Additionally, the AST, while an unknown quantity in Iraq in early 2004, established personal relationships with the adjoining U.S. Infantry Brigade to coordinate for specialty training and partnering between the two units. Kirkush provided a near ideal setting for training the new battalions. Away from any major population centers and surrounded by barren desert, KMTB sheltered the Iraqi battalions from numerous indirect fire attacks, allowing the battalions and the ASTs to train. Vinnell Corporation, responsible for conducting the NCO Academy training, also had the technical knowledge to assist the ASTs with regards to weapons familiarization, maintenance, and translated classroom materials.91

The lack of SFA doctrine to drive training had a negative effect on the members of the 6th AST. Rather than a comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi culture and Islamic religion, the advisors knowledge was literally power point deep. MAJ Mike Sullivan told interviewers at Fort Leavenworth, “If I had to do it over again I know I’d do it completely different. I went there with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood Iraq and the history because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn't."92

Equipping the initial battalions was haphazard at best. Even though KMTB served as the distribution hub for all Iraqi National Guard and Army units, uniforms and personal equipment was always in short supply. Major David Collver of the 4th AST wrote in his After Action Review (AAR), “The current uniform issued to the 4th IA Infantry Battalion, the boots and the

91 Sullivan, “From the Ashes”, 46.
canteens are of such poor quality, the Commander limits training time due to unserviceable equipment. The ratty boots are not available in large sizes and don’t support long training hours.”\(^93\) The battalion did not have any weapons for the first few weeks of cadre training, no arms room facilities and limited logistical support from the Ministry of Defense. Vehicles, in the form of unarmored pickup trucks and cargo trucks, arrived later in the training cycle. The unarmored vehicles, with no built-in communication systems or capability to mount crew served weapons, arrived without any keys. The AST and the drivers started the vehicles by hotwiring the trucks and using a paper binder clip to keep the two wires together, and the vehicle running.\(^94\)

It seems the ASTs in Iraq faced the same equipping challenges the trainers of the Philippine Constabulary faced over 100 years prior.

The AST faced a combination of \textit{rebuilding} challenges. Many of the officers and NCOs had former Iraqi Army experience. While the units were new and the battalion organization different than the previous Iraqi Army, the specter of the old Iraqi Army remained. The ASTs conducted a balancing act between instilling new traditions while trying to rid some of the poorer habits of the old Iraqi Army. One example concerns the treatment of enlisted soldiers by the officers. Similar to the El Salvador Armed Forces, the Iraqi Army lacked an efficient and professional NCO corps. Officers viewed any loss of power or control to NCOs as a challenge to their rank. As a result the ASTs treaded a fine line trying to explain the advantages of the NCOs to the officers and teaching NCOs to take care of their soldiers. The AST set examples for the Iraqi Army, showing them daily the importance of NCOs and how officers took care of their soldiers. It was not an easy obstacle to overcome. Those new NCOs and junior officers with no


\(^{94}\) Michael D Sullivan, “Interview with MAJ Mike Sullivan”, \textit{Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 14.
previous Iraqi Army experience grasped the concepts quickly. It was the older, more experienced Iraqi leaders the AST had a harder time trying to win over.

The decision to rebuild the Iraqi Army from scratch had lasting implications still felt today. FID missions normally work with an existing foreign security force to enhance their overall effectiveness. According to Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint TTPs for FID, “The focus of all US foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s program of internal defense and development.”95 Once disbanded, the Iraqi Army lost its structure, its procedures, and some disenchanted soldiers who decided to join the insurgency. Rather than work at improving an already existing structure, regardless of how poor their historical performance proved to be, the U.S. military faced the daunting task of building a 10 division army capable of defending its borders from external threats and internal strife. Both SFA actions in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the importance of ensuring campaign planning takes into consideration what the desired end state for a FSF is. Before the ground war commenced, few anticipated the massive effort it would take to rebuild not only the Iraqi Army, but Iraq itself.

Since the end of OIF I, advising has become the decisive effort in Iraq. The AST concept was to place 10 mid-level officers and seven senior NCOs in the heart of an Iraqi battalion. Once inside the battalion, the role of the AST was to advise the Iraqi leadership and serve as a conduit between the Iraqi and Coalition forces. The training for the ASTs prior to entering Iraq was woefully inadequate in 2004. While honing combat skills were an important aspect of preparing for an advisor mission, instruction on how to act in an advisory capacity was more needed than anything else. The ASTs had little to no experience with foreign weapons. However, with help from the civilian contractors from Vinnell and some of the Iraqis themselves, the advisors easily figured out the intricate workings of the weapons systems. The ASTs needed instruction from

experienced advisors, preferably Special Forces qualified soldiers, on the role of advisors and
important techniques proven successful over the Army’s history of SFA. Few, if any, AST
members truly understood what their role was, how to build rapport with their counterpart and
how to effectively serve as a conduit between the Iraqi and U.S. partner unit. Unfortunately, the
AST members learned through trial and error, wasting precious time and rapport-building
chances with their counterparts.

The ASTs eventually became Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and CMATT fell under
a new command, Multi-National Security Transition Command, Iraq or MNSTC-I. The training
for advisors increased greatly in scope and duration. Current advisors receive nearly 60 days of
intense training ranging from combat skills to language classes. Currently centralized at Fort
Riley, Kansas under the 1st Infantry Division, the current MiTT members receive extensive
training. JP 3-07.1 lists seven skills required by conventional forces when assigned to an
advisory mission. They include: 1) language training, 2) cultural awareness/interpersonal
communications training, 3) general FID/IDAD principles, 4) revolutionary warfare training, 5)
force protection/anti-terrorism training, 6) Security Assistance (SA) team orientation training, and
7) SA technical training. While the current training at Fort Riley covers a majority of these
recommended tasks, it is only a recent development. There exists a vital need to capture the
lessons learned of the current and previous SFA missions in doctrine. While a large amount of
FID doctrine exists, specifically written for the Special Forces community, it does not address the
additional requirements and challenges found in conducting SFA. The GPFs require SFA
document for the next instance when the need for a large scale SFA mission arises.

96 JP 3-07.1, IV-4.
Conclusions: the Need for SFA Doctrine and the role of JCISFA

“A mission few understand, nobody wants, and the one that everyone is doing.” – Conversation between COL James Greer and COL Sean Ryan on working with foreign security forces.97

“No More Ad Hockery with security force assistance missions.” ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaking to the JCISFA conference, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 2008.

Security force assistance is not a doctrinal term, nor is there existing doctrine to support this important mission. There are no series of references for an operational or tactical level command to refer to when tasked with a SFA mission. Doctrine is plentiful within the Special Operations community for FID missions. However, FID requires a dedicated skill set, already organic to the Special Forces community. Additionally FID represents only a portion of the full spectrum of organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA) missions that the U.S. and coalition personnel, military, and civilians are conducting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.98 The current mission in Iraq, involving both internal and external threats, falls outside the definition of a FID mission.

In April 2006, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld authorized a new organization to capture best practices in security force assistance.99 The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance stood up at Fort Leavenworth Kansas under the command of Lieutenant General

97 James K Greer, COL (R) and Sean Ryan, COL; conversation at Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 10 2007.

Petraeus. Petraeus, the commander of both the 101st Airborne Division and MNSTC-I, was the perfect fit to stand up the new organization. Colonel James Greer, a former School of Advanced Military Studies director, assumed the role of deputy director responsible for day-to-day operations and started JCISFA down its current path.

JCISFA immediately worked on three tracks. The first was the capturing of important lessons learned from both historical and current SFA operations. Second, JCISFA reached out to the entire joint and interagency community, developing ties with DoD, DoS, DHS, a wide variety of government agencies, NGOs and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) to tap into their experience and resources. In November 2006, JCISFA hosted a conference at Fort Leavenworth bringing in over 20 different services, agencies and NGOs to develop the first ever SFA Planners Guide. The SFA Planners Guide remains the best reference for planners, agencies, or organizations at the operational level developing security force assistance missions or policies. The compilation of knowledge, doctrinal references, and historical vignettes provide clear guidance for planners at any level and was the first significant step to developing SFA doctrine.

As JCISFA started making inroads towards developing viable SFA doctrine, the new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24 entered the doctrine field. Recognizing a key role SFA plays in the counterinsurgency fight FM 3-24 highlights the role of GPF, “Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies.”

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To improve the likelihood of success in SFA missions, it is critically important that the doctrine accurately capture the operational requirements. Developing effective SFA doctrine is one cornerstone in constructing a successful mission. Stephen Cimbala and Dr. James Tritten state, “Doctrine is vital to developing concepts of war, education, training, organization and war fighting. Moreover, doctrine is more than the sum of its parts. It lives and breathes into future plans and battles, beyond the visions of those who developed and produced it. Success in doctrine is about victory in future warfare.” In this case, the successful development and integration of Security Force Assistance doctrine translates into successful missions working with foreign security force in future operations.

The current working definition of SFA as defined in developing doctrine is “Unified action to generate, employ, assist and sustain host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” From this developing definition, SFA doctrine requires specific Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks. UJTL tasks provide common operating language for all elements participating in a joint environment. Some example task include: Plan for Security Force Assistance operations, conduct Security Force Assistance missions and evaluate Security Force Assistance activities. SFA UJTL tasks educate the COCOMs on what they need to request for either planned or ongoing SFA missions. The next lower level involves the different services and their role in SFA. These collective tasks may include: Train foreign security forces, advise foreign security forces, evaluate foreign security forces and partner with foreign security forces. Finally, the individual task list runs the gamut from building rapport, to understanding the operating environment or building a counterpart’s legitimacy. These individual tasks let leaders know what skills their soldiers must possess and train on to achieve a successful SFA mission.

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102 SFAPG, 27.
While the expansion of the current Special Forces organizations is a vital step towards improving the advisory capabilities of the U.S. military, it is not the all-inclusive answer. Others believe the creation of a new advisory corps, a standing organization to train and assist foreign security forces, is the best answer. According to LTC John Nagl, “The Army should create a permanent standing Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisors – men and women organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad.”\textsuperscript{103} The author disagrees. An advisor corps is not only manpower intensive and leader heavy, it presents serious problems once the current conflicts (and yearly supplemental military budgets) end. An advisor corps, whatever its current merits, is a quick fix with serious budgetary and manpower limitations.

The proposal of LTC Nagl to establish a permanent Advisory Corps has some valid points. To both bridge the divide between strategic and tactical SFA, doctrine is required. In order to develop, test and refine this doctrine, a small contingency of permanent advisors provides a great benefit. Additionally, perhaps the creation of a small (around 1000 soldiers) Advisory Corps could provide a cadre should the need arise to rapidly develop the capability needed to rebuild a major security force organization such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. These soldiers receive additional advisory training, schooling and assignments. However, they continue to rotate back into the conventional force for assignments. This provides a small, yet highly trained cadre of GPF advisors with the ability to surge into a larger force. Another potential improvement to the current advisory structure involves utilizing our current Foreign Area Officers. These soldiers receive additional schooling and cultural experience about their particular area of interest. However, the normally serve in an embassy or consulate role. They rarely perform field duty or work with host nation forces in the field. Trained by the U.S. military in language and cultural

skills, they possess the educational background to serve in more of an advisory capacity, thereby eliminating the need for a permanent Advisor Group. These are merely suggestions to generate discussion drawn from the associated research of this monograph. Hopefully they will continue to inspire debate with both the U.S. military and inter-agency community on how to better prepare for SFA missions.

Neither the SF community nor any advisor corps has the overall technical expertise and experience of the GPF. While SF teams thrive on conducting FID missions, they lack certain capabilities to develop organizations other than light infantry units. The need to train division size logistics, armor, artillery, aviation, and ministry level organizations dictates a continued future role for the GPF in any SFA missions. It is only through the development of a sustainable and dedicated SFA doctrine can the U.S. military ensure it has all the necessary capabilities for another long term, large-scale SFA mission.

The historical case studies highlight some key aspects which must be taken into consideration when developing future SFA doctrine. From an organizational standpoint, future doctrine must take into consideration the current status of host nation forces and what the desired end state is. U.S. planners work with the host nation to determine the eventual organizational end state. Before developing the needed capabilities for conducting an SFA mission, a thorough assessment of the capabilities, personnel and equipment is required. This organizational assessment determines the level of involvement needed by SFA forces. Additionally, as SFA planners plan for the final organizational structure of HN forces must consider the cultural background, structure, and regional make up of each security force element. Are the HN forces organized according to regional or tribal lines? What was the function of the HN forces before U.S. SFA efforts began? These are just a few of the numerous questions a flexible SFA doctrine should consider when looking at the organization of future HN forces.

*Training* of HN forces requires a high level of preparation and a clear end state for the SFA forces involved. SFA planners take into consideration the cultural nuisances of that
particular HN force, the current level of training and the status of the equipment. Additionally, determining the needed capability of the HN forces also determines the type of training required. Established HN forces may only require training on new equipment or advanced technology. When rebuilding HN forces from scratch, however, the level of training ranges from the very basic soldier skills to advanced staff training. The level of training for light infantry forces is much different than developing logistical or technologically based force such as naval or air forces. If the HN only required light forces to conduct counterinsurgency work, the level of SFA training is significantly lower than a complete rebuilding of forces. For example, the 55-man OPATT successfully trained an already established security force in El Salvador. In Iraq, however, nearly 5000 advisors continue to work with Iraqi military units to develop their capabilities. The scope and focus of each mission were vastly different. However, emerging SFA doctrine must maintain the flexibility to deal with the range of potential training missions.

**Equipping** HN forces corresponds directly with the level of training needed. While U.S. forces often rely on technologically advanced equipment, different HN forces may not require or have the capability to maintain such tools. Equipping HN forces requires a balance between the need and the ability to maintain varying types of equipment. While developing the Philippine Constabulary, the locals and the advisors realized the older weapons such as shotguns, while shunned by U.S. conventional forces, worked better in the close-in fighting often experienced in the jungles. A conscious decision was made by U.S. leadership not to provide the modern rifles used by U.S. forces to the Philippine Constabulary. Clearly this decision was not made lightly, but for a different reason. The advisor effort took into account the training of their HN forces and the equipment needed to complete their mission. This small example highlights the importance of taking into account the requirements and capabilities of HN forces with regards to providing equipment as part of SFA doctrine.
The **rebuilding** of HN forces requires an accurate assessment of the forces in question along with the desired end state determined jointly by both U.S. and the HN government. Rebuilding a HN force may actually turn into a more difficult mission than organizing a force from scratch. Often advisors must overcome the previous culture found in that security force. The Advisor Support Teams struggled to overcome the ghosts of the old Iraqi Army, their previous outlook on officer-soldier relationships, and the old methods of training. The HN government must clearly transmit its intent to the SFA planners in terms of what forces require rebuilding, why they are being rebuilt and to what level of competency. The rebuilding phase of SFA planning links directly to the initial organizational assessments required before the start of any advisor mission. Doctrine must take into account the advantages and certain difficulties of conducting a rebuilding effort in a SFA mission.

The **advisor** is the key piece to any SFA mission. The three case studies highlight the necessity to have well-trained and carefully selected advisors to assist HN forces in their development. Both the Philippine and El Salvador missions demonstrated the importance of picking the right type of leader to work with, live with and fight side by side with their counterparts. The initial advisor effort in Iraq highlights the problems with taking senior members of conventional forces with little training and placing them in a SFA role. U.S. Special Forces are highly trained and prepared to conduct advisor work with indigenous forces. However, all three case studies demonstrate the need for general purpose forces to assist in training HN forces. Even the small, 55-man OPATT mission ran into personnel difficulty when trying to maintain its efforts over a long period. The selection, training, organization and sustainment of advisors contribute to the overall potential for SFA mission success. Emerging SFA doctrine additionally must address the integration of SFA advisors with U.S. conventional forces conducting their own missions in an active area of operations. Too often a gap developed

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between advisors and conventional units, to the detriment of the HN forces and overall mission accomplishment. SFA doctrine fills a void for both the advisor and conventional forces. For the advisor, SFA doctrine provides a way to plan for and execute missions with HN forces. For conventional forces, SFA doctrine would help facilitate the understanding of advisor missions, the importance of developing HN forces and the necessity to transition operations over to the HN forces.

As the U.S. Government continues to highlight the necessity of fighting a long war, the need for a whole of government approach to SFA is even more necessary. Lessons in all three case studies highlight the importance of having the entire U.S. Government’s menu of assets available to conduct SFA missions. Equally important within the military community is the necessity to plan, resource, train and execute SFA missions at a joint level. The services continue to create their own internal organizations, learning centers, and TTPs without an effective way to coordinate between them. While JCISFA technically is the conduit to tie these organizations together, it is hindered by its appearance of being Army-centric due to its location and association with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth. JCISFA must continue to take the joint lead for all service advisory efforts and serve as the conduit towards a whole of military approach to SFA.

Each level of the proposed doctrine addresses the varying participants in SFA missions, from the Regional Combatant Commands to the individual advisor. All three of the previous historical examples highlighted the need to possess a standard operating language for any part of the GPF to easily understand. While members of the SF community remain well versed in the already established FID doctrine, those in the GPFs require an integrated and validated set of doctrine to successfully complete SFA missions. JCISFA is the main proponent for developing SFA doctrine. The joint community must accept the need for a standardized SFA doctrine and work with JCISFA to develop future advisor missions. History demonstrates the need for, the difficulties of, and the importance of successful SFA missions. By arming future advisors with
SFA doctrine, both the military and interagency community sets the conditions for the future success of foreign security force assistance missions.
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**WEBSITES**
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Terms and Definitions

**Campaign** – (joint) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 3-0)

**Campaign Plan** – (joint) A joint operation plan for a series of major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

**Civil-Military Operations** – (joint) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. (JP 3-57)

**Coalition** – (joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a common action. (JP 5-0)

**Contemporary Operating Environment** – (Army, unofficial) The overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future (out to the year 2020). The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetric ways.

**Foreign Internal Defense** – (joint) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

**Foreign Security Forces** – (JCISFA) All organizations and their personnel (other than U.S. assets) that are under governmental control with the mission of protecting a government, an organization or people from internal and/or external threats. Elements of the security forces include, but are not limited to, military forces, police, corrections personnel, and border guards (to include the coast guard) at the local through national levels.

**Full Spectrum Operations** – (Army) The range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war. (FM 3-0)

**Host Nation** – (joint) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of Allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02)

**Interagency** – (joint) United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)** – Joint center charged to institutional lessons learned and best practices from security force assistance (SFA) operations to better prepare U.S. and partner nation forces to rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.

**Multinational** – (joint) Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 5-0)

**Nongovernmental Organizations** – (joint) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)
OTER-A – In the Generate Phase, the primary SFA tasks are: **organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise** (OTER-A). During generation of HN security forces, the U.S. will assist with organizing, training, equipping and rebuilding depending on the condition of the existing FSF infrastructure and their current capabilities. Advising is inherent to organizing, training, equipping and rebuilding if those efforts are to be successful. (SFA Planners Guide, 1 September 2007)

**Peace Support Operations** – (NATO) In PSO, success will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives that form elements of the overall political end state and should be defined in the overall political mandate and the NAC initiating directive. The nature of PSO is such that these objectives will normally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of the political end state will be the defining criteria for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of military related security objectives will usually be a precursor, or milestone on the way to attaining the political end state. (NATO AJP 3.4.1)

**Security Assistance** – (joint) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 3-07.1)

**Security Assistance Organization** – (joint) All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 3-07.1)

**Security Cooperation** – (joint) All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. (JP 3-07.1)

**Security Forces** - All military, intelligence, law enforcement and constabulary organizations that support a legitimate authority, including the systems and institutions that generate, employ and sustain these forces.

**Security force assistance** – (JCISFA) Unified action to generate, employ, and sustain host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

**Stability operation** – (joint) An operation to establish, preserve and exploit security and control over areas, populations and resources. (JP 5-0)

**Theater security cooperation plan** – Strategic planning document intended to link combatant commander planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives, thus supporting the “engagement” portion of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.