The Suitability of Defector Operations Applied Against Al Qaeda

A Monograph
by
LCDR Joseph P. Bozzelli
USN

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The Suitability of Defector Operations Applied Against Al Qaeda.

Joseph P. Bozzelli, LCDR, USN

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
100 Stimson Ave.
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Avenue
Forth Leavenworth, KS 66027

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This monograph examines defector operations and their suitability as a weapon for use against Al Qaeda. The United States has a long history of conducting Defector Operations. During the Vietnam conflict 194,000 enemy personnel defected to the United States and her ally. The majority of these individuals were then exploited for intelligence, propaganda, and other capabilities beneficial to the allies and detrimental to the communist cause. In spite of this and other similar experiences there is barely a mention of defector operations in modern unclassified doctrine; nor, more importantly, have defector operations been employed as a weapon against Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has many characteristics in common with the Vietnam insurgents as well as other insurgencies from the last century against whom defector operations were applied. These common characteristics make Al Qaeda similarly susceptible to the capabilities of defector operations

Defector Operations, Al Qaeda, Chieu Hoi Program, Insurgency, Malaya Insurgency

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Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
McClary, Rob

__________________________________ Monograph Reader
Cabrey, Richard, COL

_______________________________ Director,
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN School of Advanced Military Studies

______________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

THE SUITABILITY OF DEFECTOR OPERATIONS APPLIED AGAINST AL QAEDA by LCDR Joseph P. Bozzelli, USN, 43 pages.

During the Vietnam conflict the United States along with the South Vietnam government were able to convince 194,000 enemy personnel to change sides. The majority of these individuals were then exploited for intelligence, propaganda, and other capabilities beneficial to the allies and detrimental to the communist cause. The United States has a long history of using defector operations stretching back to the War of Independence and on through to the end of the Cold War. In spite of this history of experience there is barely a mention of defector operations in modern unclassified doctrine; nor, more importantly, have defector operations been employed as a weapon against Al Qaeda.

The insurgents of the last century were particularly appropriate targets for defector operations due to the specific nature of their fight. Because insurgencies by definition are intent on overthrowing an established government they, for the vast majority of the cases, have certain common characteristics. Insurgencies, at least during the initial phases of their struggle, are inherently weaker and poorer than the established government and at a disadvantage in manning and equipping. Insurgencies, also, must be able to conceal themselves from the authorities while still maintaining contact with the populace. With common characteristics and a common objective, common Lines of Operations can be established for insurgencies. These insurgency Lines of Operations are: Information Operations, Secrecy, Establishing Safe Base of Operations, Establishing Support, Gaining New Members, and Creating and Maintaining an Internal Structure. Though Al Qaeda appears unique and holey unimaginable fifty years ago it too uses these same lines of operations in its struggle. For Al Qaeda, with its objective of overthrowing the ruling governments of the Middle East, is an insurgency.

Al Qaeda is different than the prior communist insurgencies, Al Qaeda uses religion as the primary component of its cause, relies heavily on the modern products of the information age, has forces dispersed around the globe, and has set as its objective the overthrow of multiple
governments. However in spite of these significant differences Al Qaeda still uses the common Lines of Operations for insurgencies. Because Al Qaeda operates in a similar fashion to the previous insurgencies Al Qaeda would also be susceptible to the capabilities of defector operations.

By studying both the previous application of defector operations and the academic study on the subject the Lines of Capabilities for defector operations were established. These Lines of Capability are: Intelligence, Psychological Operations, Government Legitimacy, Counterinsurgency Force Enhancement, and Insurgent Instability. When these Lines of Capability are overlaid onto Al Qaeda’s Lines of Operations, specific points of impact can be determined. When these points of impact are extrapolated upon it can be established that defector operations would be a suitable program for use against Al Qaeda.
# LCDR Joseph Bozzelli, SAMS

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Introduction

On the evening of 27 September in 1957 Frank Kitson, a British platoon commander stationed in Malaya, stumbled along a dark jungle path and bumped into Tay Boon Hui; a midlevel communist insurgent. The two shook hands. The encounter on the jungle path was not an accident; it had been arranged that day at the request of Tay Boon Hui. Tay Boon Hui served as a loyal and dedicated member of the communist insurgency for nine years, sacrificing everything in his life for the cause. Hui did not have a wife or children; the constantly shifting jungle hideouts of the communists were Hui’s home. His dedication and support for the communist cause in Malaya was complete. Despite his commitment, however, within two days of defecting to the British Hui facilitated the surrender of two other terrorists, the ambush and killing of a third terrorist, raids on multiple weapons and supplies caches, the production of psychological propaganda aimed at specific former comrades, and a raid on a communist jungle hideout. ¹

Imagine the story of Hui’s defection not occurring in a Malayan jungle, but on a mountain path in Afghanistan. That instead of Hui being a committed member of the communist insurgency, the defector in the story is a nine-year veteran of Al Qaeda, and instead of 1957, the story were to occur next month. A mid-level Al Qaeda member energetically working to undermine the enemy would be of significant value to the United States in the War on Terror. The story of Hui’s defection was neither a closely held secret nor exceptional during the Malayan conflict; rather, Hui represents one of approximately 2,700 members of the communist insurgency who defected. The Malayan defector program successfully elicited 23% of the 12,000 member insurgent population. ² The United States would go on to use the defector program from

Malaya as a template for the conflict in Vietnam. The Chieu Hoi Program, the defector program in Vietnam, would account for the defection of over 194,000 members of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army and Government between 1963 and 1971. In spite of its demonstrated value defector operations have not been applied to Al Qaeda.

The imagined scenario of Al Qaeda members defecting to the United States or to other member states of the coalition could become a reality. Before the United States can establish a defector program against Al Qaeda with an expectation of effectiveness three steps of analysis must be conducted. The first step is to determine the suitability of a defector program as a weapon against Al Qaeda. The primary question to answer is: what can a defector program do for the coalition in its goal of defeating Al Qaeda? To answer this question defector operation’s capabilities would be applied against Al Qaeda to determine the program’s potential impact. The second step is to establish the feasibility of defector operations as a weapon against Al Qaeda. A defector operation must be able to elicit enemy personnel to abandon their cause and come over to the government’s side in the conflict. The critical question to be answered in this step is: can members of Al Qaeda be convinced or enticed to support the government’s efforts against Al Qaeda? To answer this question, analysis of Al Qaeda members’ psychological motivation as well as the potential effects of various elicitation themes would be conducted. Of particular importance would be the pervasive religious component of Al Qaeda. The final step is to determine whether the cost of establishing a defector program is acceptable. The last question to

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4 It is possible that the U.S. is conducting a classified operation similar to a defector program that the author is not aware of. However such a program would not be a true defector operation. A significant portion of a defector operation’s power comes from the enemy as well as the public knowing about the program. This concept is developed further in Chapter 1.

5 It would be relevant to study the U.S. defector program in the Pacific during World War II. The program successfully elicited defectors among Japanese service members. The fanatical dedication, religious conviction, and acceptance of self sacrifice demonstrated by Japanese service members was similar to that being displayed by Al Qaeda members.
be answered is: what would the required organizational and operational structure to conduct a defector program against Al Qaeda cost? To answer this question the requirements for running a defector operation tailored for Al Qaeda would have to be determined. A key aspect would be determining the expenditure in effort and money required from U.S. agencies and participating coalition partners as well as potentially non-partner nations. Once the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the United States establishing an effective defector program is determined then the imagined scenario of former Al Qaeda members reaching out to join hands with U.S. soldiers could become a reality.

The focus of this paper is the first step: determining the suitability of defector operations as a weapon against Al Qaeda. To determine suitability capability must be contrasted with structure. The methodology for conducting this contrast is to overlay defector operation’s Lines of Capability (LOC’s) onto Al Qaeda’s Lines of Operations (LOO’s). This overlay will identify where and how a defector program would impact Al Qaeda and the subsequent benefits for the United States. However before the contrasting can be accomplished the specific LOC’s of defector operations must be presented. These capabilities will be taken from historical case studies as well as academic research. Al Qaeda’s LOO’s will then be presented. The model used to present Al Qaeda’s structure is that of an insurgency. This model was chosen because Al Qaeda is an insurgency. Also, the majority of instances where defector operations were employed has been against insurgencies. Subsequently the majority of the data about defector operations comes from their use against insurgencies. Once the overlay is completed and the potential impact of a United States operated defector program against Al Qaeda extrapolated, the thesis of this paper will be validated: that defector operations are a suitable weapon for use against Al Qaeda.

6 The Saudi Arabian program to reintegrate Guantanamo detainees back into society would be a relevant program to study. The Saudis have incorporated many of the traditional components of a defector operation into their rehabilitation program.
Al Qaeda appears to be a suitable target for defector operations because, like the
Vietcong and the Malayan communists, Al Qaeda is an insurgency. Therefore the impact of
defector operations on the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies would be comparable to the
potential impact of defector operations on Al Qaeda. The JP 1-02 defines an insurgency as “an
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of
subversion and armed conflict.”\(^7\) Al Qaeda’s own media statements can be used to establish that
Al Qaeda is an insurgency. Al Qaeda’s declaration of war against the United States was in a \textit{fatwa}
created by Osama Bin Laden and released 23 February 1998.\(^8\) Al Qaeda has prosecuted this war
through several attacks to include those upon U.S. embassies, U.S. military personnel and
equipment and, most spectacularly, the destruction of the Twin Towers and the partial destruction
of the Pentagon in 2001. Al Qaeda’s strategic objective, however, is not to destroy the United
States, rather, according to Bin Laden’s deputy, Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s strategic objective is to
establish an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East.\(^9\) A January 2005 audiotape and a June 2005
videotape clearly state Al Qaeda’s objectives. Al Qaeda’s plan for establishing the caliphate has
two elements. The first element is to remove western support from the governments in the Middle
East; hence the \textit{fatwa} and attacks on the United States intended to drive the United States out of
the region. The second requirement for establishing the caliphate is the overthrow of the current
political regimes in the Middle East. Al Zawahiri stated that any government in the region that
does not rule by sharia law and in accordance with Islamic principles should be overthrown.\(^10\) Al
Qaeda has active elements in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kurdistan, Algeria, and Pakistan working

\(^7\) U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms}, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 October 2007),

\(^8\) David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism,” \textit{Small

against the established governments in the region. Al Qaeda’s strategic objective of overthrowing governments in order to establish a new system of rule defines Al Qaeda as an insurgency.

Insurgency style warfare is as old as warfare itself: as long as governments or rulers have existed, there have been groups of fighters striving for regime change. Because insurgencies all have the same objective, there exist certain aspects of the insurgent’s struggle that are common among insurgencies. Certain of these aspects are actions that the insurgency must perform in order to successfully overthrow the government. The most critical of these actions will be termed Lines of Operations: critical functions that an insurgency performs in achieving its objective. No two insurgencies are identical in how they execute their LOO’s, but a general model for insurgency’s LOO’s can be established.

The first LOO of the insurgency model comes from the cause. An insurgency uses a cause to gain support from the masses and possibly outside sources. The cause can contain both calls for change, such as land reform, along with grievances that stir anti-government emotion. The insurgency’s LOO for its cause is the requirement for the insurgency to both disseminate and popularize the cause. This LOO takes the form of Information Operations, to include propaganda, to target the masses and attack the government. The second LOO in the model stems from the insurgency’s inherent vulnerability. An insurgency is militarily weaker than the government, and though this relationship will change as an insurgency approaches success, an insurgency cannot allow the government to set the conditions for engagements. An insurgency must be able to

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10 Ibid., 13.
11 Kilcullen, 6.
12 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 21
protect itself from contact with government forces along all levels of its structure.\textsuperscript{14} The LOO for the protection required by an insurgency is Secrecy. Without the shield of secrecy for its members and plans, an insurgency would be unable to operate in and among the populace. The insurgency must have freedom of movement to interact with the populace in establishing its own credibility. Secrecy alone does not provide an insurgency with all of the operating room it requires. An insurgency must have a protected area; this generates the third LOO in the model.\textsuperscript{15} An insurgency must establish a Safe Base of Operations; an area where the insurgency can “rebuild and reorganize without fear of counterinsurgent interference.”\textsuperscript{16} Because of an insurgency’s size and illegitimacy it does not have the economic base from which to finance itself. This shortfall results in the fourth LOO: Establishing Support. An insurgency must have some form of either financial or supply support to sustain its members and expend in the execution of operations.\textsuperscript{17} The LOO of Establishing Support is critical for insurgencies. The fifth LOO is Gaining New Members to sustain and expand the active elements of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{18} Established governments replenish the ranks of their counterinsurgency (COIN) effort from their pool of citizens. Every child born into the state is a potential fighter or bureaucratic agent in the service of the COIN effort. A characteristic of insurgencies is that its members join the organization as adults and due to the nature of the fight are unable to create a self-sustaining population base from which to draw required manning. Since the members of an insurgency are subject to the attrition of combat as well as typically harsh living conditions they must find a way to replenish their ranks. The sixth and final LOO is for insurgencies to create and maintain an Internal Structure. The objective chosen by insurgencies is characteristically a challenging one- the overthrow of the government;

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 1-18.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 1-18.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 1-16.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 1-18.
\textsuperscript{18} Thompson, 35-37.
therefore insurgencies must have some organization so their efforts will be coordinated and effective. Typically insurgencies will organize along two lines: a political and a military wing with the military element subordinate to the political. This organization reflects the primacy of politics in the struggle. There are other insurgency structures, but regardless of the form chosen, some form of command, control, and coordination must be established.

Like previous insurgencies Al Qaeda should operate along the six lines of the insurgency model. Therefore, just as in previous COIN efforts, defector operations should be a suitable weapon for attacking Al Qaeda’s LOO’s. With the insurgency LOO model established, the next step in the methodology is to present defector operation’s capabilities. This will commence with a historical review of the United States and defector operations followed by the applicable definition of defector operations. Historical cases and academic study will then be used to establish the capabilities of defector operations.

The research and contents of this paper are unclassified. The vast majority of the current intelligence regarding Al Qaeda and its LOO’s is classified. In spite of this fact this paper can validate its thesis using unclassified data. The most current and detailed analysis of how Al Qaeda executes its LOO’s is not necessary. Understanding of the larger perspective of Al Qaeda operations is sufficient to support the thesis. There are adequate unclassified references to provide this understanding.

**Defector Operations**

**Historical Review**

The United States’ history of conducting defector operations goes back to before there was a United States. During America’s Revolutionary War, direct attempts were made by the Colonists to elicit the defection of British-contracted Hessian soldiers. The colonists tempted the
Hessians to change allegiance with various forms of seduction to include wine, women, and promotion. George Washington directed the creation of the Free and Independent Chasseurs Corps consisting of foreign defectors who would go on to fight several engagements against the British. During the American Civil War, defections occurred at a rate of one out of seven soldiers for the Union Army and one out of nine soldiers for the Confederate Army. The issue of how to handle the mass influx of confederate defectors reached such a magnitude that President Lincoln deemed it necessary to make a formal proclamation. The Proclamation of Pardon and Amnesty offered reprieve to confederate soldiers in exchange for swearing to support the Constitution and Union legislature. During World War II, the United States established a defector program against Japan. 19,500 Japanese POWs were taken in during the conflict, though not exactly known, approximately 20% of the POWs could be extrapolated as defectors operating under the influence of the allied defector program. During the Philippines COIN fight against the communist Hukbalahap between 1946 and 1954, U.S. Air Force General Edward Lansdale worked on the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program with the then Philippine Chief of Staff General Magsaysay. 1,500 communist insurgents defected to the government in the

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22 Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 226.
23 Ibid., 95.
Land-for-Peace EDCOR program. From the United States’ perspective, the next experience with defector operations was in Vietnam. The Vietnam defector program, however, has its roots in Kenya where from 1952 to 1954 the British fought and won their battle against the Mau Mau insurgents. A significant aid to the British victory came from the turning of insurgent prisoners into informants and false fighters. The Kenyan program fed directly into the British efforts in Malaya, where, as previously mentioned, nearly 25% of the insurgents defected to the government forces providing intelligence, propaganda, and direct action support all under a robustly organized and funded British program. Through the rewards-for-surrender, or Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP), program the Malayan insurgents could “go from terrorist to capitalist in two easy moves.” The British defector program immigrated to South Vietnam with Sir Robert Thompson who was detached from his post as Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya and assigned as the head of the British Advisory Mission to the South Vietnamese Government in 1961. It was Thompson who persuaded the Diem Regime to provide an option besides death or capture to the insurgents. The option for a supported return to society was the Open Arms Program, or translated to Vietnamese, the Chieu Hoi Program. The final example of the United States’ involvement in defector operations is the Cold War. From the surrender of Japan to the collapse of the Soviet Union thousands of individuals to include military pilots, politicians, sports figures, and ballet dancers switched sides in the bi-polar struggle between communism and democracy.

26 Kitson, 47.
27 Dewar, 43.
28 Thompson, 88.
Definitions

Before the LOC’s for defector operations can be established definitions must be provided. Exactly what a defector is must be identified since that entity is the target of a defector operation and the primary agent of the program’s capabilities. Current U.S. military capstone doctrinal references contain minimal information regarding any aspect of defectors or defector operations. For example the FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency manual identifies defector operations as the best source of human intelligence and an outstanding means of attacking the enemy’s morale. But, after offering this high praise, the manual is blank regarding what a defector program is, what else it can accomplish, or how it operates. This same pattern holds true for the other capstone documents; those that mention defector operations usually praise its ability, but with minimal explanatory information and certainly no definitions. It would appear that defector operations have been all but abandoned by current doctrine.

The only thorough critical analysis of defector operations as an independent subject, rather than an historical analysis of specific programs, is that done by Colonel Emmett J. O’Brien, who in 1971 while stationed at the U.S. Army War College wrote “Defection: A Military Strategy for Wars of Liberation.” O’Brien provides three definitions for a defector before creating his own. The three provided definitions come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the English speaking members of NATO, and the French-speaking members of NATO- all in 1968. The JCS definition for a defector was a “national of a country who has escaped from the control of such a country or who being outside such jurisdiction and control, is unwilling to return thereto and who is of

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29 The capstone references are the JP 3-0 Joint Operations, JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence, FM 3-0 Operations, FM 2-0 Intelligence, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-05.30 Psychological Operations, JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics.

30 FM 3-24, 3-27 and 1-19.

31 The FM 3-24 custodian stated that attempts were made to incorporate defector operations into the current version of FM 3-24. Why these attempts failed is not specifically clear. However there are tentative plans to incorporate defector operations into future versions of the manual.
special value to another country.” The definition of a defector for the English speaking members of NATO (Canada, United States, and United Kingdom) was “a person who for political reasons or other reasons has repudiated his country and may be in possession of information of sufficient interest to justify special treatment.” The French speaking members of NATO (Belgium and France) had their own definition for a defector: “Nonmilitary person of enemy nationality who for political or other nonmilitary reasons has repudiated his country and is in possession of information of sufficient interest to justify special treatment.” O’Brien discards all three definitions and provides his own dated definition for what a defector is: “Any person who repudiates one of the world’s bi-polar ideologies (Communism or Democracy) and professes an allegiance to, and assistance to the protecting country’s ideology.” Another source that provides a definition for a defector is Lieutenant Colonel David L. Jones’s 1965 paper “Defection: Its Impact on International Relations”. Jones defines a defector as “anyone who flees from one of the world’s bi-polar ideologies—Communism or freedom—to the protection of the other.” All of these definitions are anachronistic to the Cold War. The definitions limit a defector to an individual caught in the bi-polar struggle between communism and democratic states or at least to a member fleeing from the control of a nation state.

In creating the definition of a defector for use in this paper, O’Brien’s definitions provide the basis. O’Brien’s definition needs to be updated from the Cold War days to the current struggle between constitutionally legitimate nations and non-state terrorists. This paper is only concerned

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33 Ibid., 9.
34 Ibid., 10.
with the concept of defection as it relates to an individual moving from the side of Al Qaeda to
the side of the United States or a United States’ allied nation state. An allied state is included
since if a member of Al Qaeda defected to Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia then used the
information gained from that defector to degrade Al Qaeda operations, the United States’ efforts
in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would be served. An additional difference between
O’Brien’s circumstances and the United States’ current situation is that in the Cold War days the
desire was not for every member of the opposing regime to defect, i.e. the United States did not
want every citizen of the Soviet Union to defect. Rather, the desired defectors were those
individuals who possessed or may possess items of value to the receiving nation. However, in the
case of Al Qaeda today, if every member of the organization defected, it would be strategically
desirable and logistically feasible. Since the focus of this paper is Al Qaeda and every member of
Al Qaeda can be considered an item of value unto himself, the following definition for a defector
will be used: “An individual actively supporting Al Qaeda who ceases active support for Al
Qaeda and can provide assistance to those forces opposing Al Qaeda.” This definition for
defector will apply directly to a defector operation.

The description for a defector operation as used in this paper is: “An organized, funded,
and structured effort that encourages and helps facilitate an individual actively supporting Al
Qaeda to cease active support for Al Qaeda and instead to provide assistance to the forces
opposing Al Qaeda.” For clarification purposes, a term often confused for defector operations
will be defined in order to prevent confusion or inaccurate analysis of defector operations. The
concept often confused with defector operations is amnesty. Austin Long in writing “On “Other
War” Lessons Learned from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research” uses the term
amnesty program to describe the Chieu Hoi program in Vietnam and the SEP program in Malaya.
Long does not use the term defector nor does he explain why he chooses to use the term amnesty
instead of defector. Neither the JP 1-02 nor FM 1-02 define amnesty nor use that word in other
definitions. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines amnesty as “the act of authority (as a
government) that a pardon is granted to a large group of individuals.\textsuperscript{37} The term amnesty does not capture the idea that something of value is being obtained by the government for granting a pardon to the group. Amnesty also specifically references a group instead of an individual, and does not indicate that the group being pardoned had previously opposed the government. For these reasons, and in spite of Long’s use of the term, amnesty is an inappropriate term to be used in association with defector operations.

**Defector Operations Lines of Capability**

With defector and defector operation defined the benefits a government would expect from establishing a defector program, or the expected LOC’s of a defector operation, will be identified. There is not a single comprehensive list for defector operations LOC’s. Rather, most material intertwines the capabilities of defector operations with both the elicitation and structural components of defector operations. For example J.A. Koch’s study from 1973 titled “The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971” describes the Chieu Hoi Program as

\begin{quote}
the only institution that has sought to persuade enemy soldiers and civilians to rally to the GVN [Government of Vietnam] side and has established instrumentalities for neutralizing such defectors, obtaining intelligence through them, indoctrinating them with a view to winning and retaining their loyalty, and even, to some extent, training them for economic survival in a slowly urbanized society.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

The most detailed consolidated description of a defector program, Koch’s description includes all three elements of a defector program: capabilities, elicitation, and structure. Gaining intelligence from defectors is a capability (an LOC). Persuading enemy fighters to defect is the elicitation component and the instrumentalities for indoctrination and vocational training are part of the structure. This paper deals strictly with capabilities; therefore, the LOC’s for defector operations will have to be created.

\textsuperscript{37} Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Amnesty.” \textsuperscript{38} Koch, iii.
Gaining intelligence is the most obvious and documented capability gained from a defector and likely the most vital. According to the FM 3-24 the success of a COIN effort depends on intelligence.\textsuperscript{39} The defector has potentially lived among the insurgency for years, knows the identity, personal history, and position of multiple members of the insurgency as well as the support network. In his 1969 article “Defector Operations” Lieutenant Colonel John Ozaki writes that one of the key types of intelligence that can be gained from a defector is the identity of the insurgents. Besides the identity of the insurgents themselves, Ozaki adds, a defector can provide insight into insurgent tactics, the areas that the insurgents operate and the current status of the insurgent force. These insights are “invaluable”.\textsuperscript{40} From the insurgent’s perspective, specifically the Vietcong (VC), the intelligence gained from defectors is of a nature the COIN force could not have easily obtained from other means. The VC knew that defectors could provide the enemy with an understanding of “our secret military situation, especially our combat plans, our internal military situation, key units, and agencies.”\textsuperscript{41} O’Brien adds identifying key members of the insurgent’s support network as another type of intelligence gained from defectors.\textsuperscript{42} In Kenya, Kitson used former members of the insurgency to collect intelligence from the Mau Mau support network. The former insurgents, operating with Kitson’s platoon, would go to the shacks of individuals who provided food for the Mau Mau to find out details on gang location and activity. On one occasion, learning that a gang was laid up near a supply shack the defector immediately contacted the gang and lured them into an ambush. Kitson differentiated the two types of intelligence he was gaining from his defectors. The first type of intelligence Kitson gained was background information: the biographies of the insurgents, the location of insurgent hideouts, and the operating procedures of the insurgents. The second type of intelligence was the

\textsuperscript{39} FM 3-24, 3-1.


\textsuperscript{41} Koch, 125.
contact information - the intelligence that could lead to government forces engaging the insurgents in combat.\textsuperscript{43}

Another attribute of defector intelligence is the ease with which it is provided. O’Brien makes the comparison between intelligence gained from a defector to the laborious process of prisoner interrogation where the intelligence provider is an unwilling participant. O’Brien writes that the willingness of the defector to provide information directly contributes to the quality of the product.\textsuperscript{44} In his book “Defeating Communist Insurgency”, Sir Robert Thompson also identifies surrendered personnel as sources that can reveal “tremendous amount of information.”\textsuperscript{45} Thompson writes that in an insurgency information from surrendered personnel is one of the main sources of intelligence.\textsuperscript{46} By 1970 in Vietnam, in spite of the limited support for the defector program, intelligence gained from Chieu Hoi defectors was responsible for 21.2 percent of all the Vietcong infrastructure neutralized.\textsuperscript{47}

The second most documented capability of defector operations is in Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Just as with intelligence, a defector’s insight into the internal issues, struggles, mind set, and motivation of the insurgents is exactly the kind of information required to operate a successful PSYOPS program. Ozaki writes that defectors should be used to develop PSYOPS specifically aimed at inducing more defections since they have the insight into the insurgent’s environment and means of operations. Defectors can also evaluate all PSYOPS products for effectiveness and idiomatic accuracy.\textsuperscript{48} Long writes of instances of insurgents

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} O’Brien, 31.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Kitson, 33-34.
\item \textsuperscript{44} O’Brien, 31.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Thompson, 87.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 87.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Koch, 92.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ozaki, 73.
\end{itemize}
choosing to defect because a defector program was in place that offered acceptable alternatives to death or imprisonment.\textsuperscript{49} The existence of a defector program itself is an effective PYSOPS tool.

Besides the best source of PSYOPS material, defectors are considered the best means of delivery for PSYOPS messages. According to Thompson defectors are the most effective way for the government to communicate its message to the insurgents. Thompson writes of the two-step process of using defectors to communicate to the insurgents. First the defector communicates directly with the villagers. The villagers, seeing the defector alive and free as promised by the government, are convinced of the government’s honesty. The villagers then pass on the government’s message to the locally operating insurgents along with their observations of the defector’s status.\textsuperscript{50} Ozaki endorses Thompson’s observation by advocating the sending of armed defectors to contested areas to perform hands-on propaganda missions. Ozaki believes defectors will be more effective as deliverers of propaganda because they can speak with first hand knowledge.\textsuperscript{51} In Vietnam, defectors were used to create Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) that conducted face-to-face defection elicitation of enemy soldiers and civilian personnel. By 1970 there were 84 APT companies operating. Koch claims that the APT’s were critical in establishing credibility for the government by demonstrating first-hand that insurgents would be treated fairly and with respect if they defected; directly contradicting insurgent propaganda. Special teams were created within the APT program to include female cultural drama entertainers and lecture teams. The lecture teams consisted of the most intelligent defectors who spoke to businesses, military units, and students of all levels. These lecture teams proved very successful.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{49} Austin Long, \textit{On “Other War” Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research} (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2006), 46.
\textsuperscript{50} Thompson, 95.
\textsuperscript{51} Ozaki, 73.
\textsuperscript{52} Koch, 93-96.
\end{flushright}
Within the FM 3-24’s five requirements for the COIN effort to succeed is a sub-
requirement under Information Operations to “Favorably influence perceptions of 
HN [Host Nation] legitimacy and capabilities.” An LOC of defector operations is the demonstration of 
Government Legitimacy, the government’s capability as an administrative entity and a legitimate 
caretaker of all citizens. Ozaki says rewarding defectors as promised is an opportunity for the 
government to demonstrate in a quick and tangible means that it is an honest broker; the 
government lives up to its word even to former enemies. Thompson endorses the observations 
of Ozaki, writing that the government can bolster its standing among the populace by establishing 
a defector program; a positive perception of the government can decrease the support and 
potential recruits of the insurgency. O’Brien identifies the advantage a government can gain to 
its reputation by establishing a defector program by pointing out that the government will appear 
benevolent in the eyes of the people. The government is offering the insurgent fighters, the sons 
and daughters of the contested populace, an honorable option to fighting other than death or 
internment.

The FM 3-24 identifies that a key requirement of the COIN force is to understand the 
environment. The COIN force, as was the case in Vietnam and Malaya, can consist of foreign 
soldiers who are unfamiliar with the area of operations. A proven LOC for defector operations is, 
COIN Force Enhancement, assisting the COIN force with that required understanding. Defectors 
are invaluable operational force enablers. In Malaya, defectors were organized into Special 
Operational Volunteer Forces (SOVF) which were then integrated into special platoons of 
soldiers and law enforcement officers to aid in scouting out insurgent hideouts, ambushing

53 FM 3-24, 5-1.  
54 Ozaki, 74.  
55 Thompson, 92.  
56 O’Brien, 22-23.
insurgents, and intercepting insurgent lines of communication. In Vietnam, the Kit Carson Scout program was created, teaming defectors with US and other coalition forces. The Kit Carson Scouts proved very effective in aiding the COIN forces with overcoming their environmental ignorance. The Scouts served at checkpoints with soldiers readily identifying insurgents attempting to mingle in with the populace. The Scouts also trained the COIN forces on insurgent techniques and procedures; assisting with the understanding of the local means of war. The Scouts also worked as interrogation supervisors. The mere presence of a former insurgent in the room often expedited gaining the truth from a captured or suspected enemy. The most creative use of defectors as COIN force enablers was by Kitson in Kenya. Kitson used defectors to train British soldiers to dress and act like the Mau Mau insurgents. On one occasion Kitson’s defectors lead a mixed team of defectors and British soldiers acting as an insurgent gang, or a pseudo gang, into the bush. The pseudo gang met with insurgent facilitators who tracked down and brought in the local gang in order to negotiate a supposed turf issue. When the real gang arrived the British soldiers signaled waiting reinforcements to capture the gang. Due to the insight of the defectors the British soldiers were able to sit in the same darkened hut as the insurgents; unsuspected and undetected as non-African COIN forces.

Besides supporting the government’s and COIN force’s efforts, defector operations also have the capability to undermine the efforts of the insurgents. When the government offers the insurgents an alternative to fighting and dying the insurgency can be cast in an alternately negative light. By offering its members only the alternatives of fighting or dying the insurgency can lose credibility and popularity among the populace. Therefore an LOC of defector operations is Internal Insurgent Instability. The Internal Insurgent Instability LOC is well

58 Koch, 102-105.
59 Kitson, 37-41.
documented. Thompson specifically identifies internal dissention as a consequence of insurgent countermeasures to defector operations. O’Brien points out the degradation to an insurgent’s morale caused by fellow members defecting. In order to counter the calls for defection the insurgent force will often enact unpopular counter measures such as spying programs to ensure their members do not defect, sowing seeds of distrust and reducing morale. In instances noted by O’Brien in Vietnam, some insurgents were forced to sleep without clothes or weapons for fear they might defect in the night. The VC themselves documented the countermeasures they felt necessary to prevent and mitigate the effects of desertions. Three man cells were created where insurgent spied on insurgent so indications of potential desertion could be discovered before the act. An officially enforced internal spying ring would have negative effects on morale. The possibly most destabilizing impact of a defector program is that whenever an insurgent went missing his full knowledge of the internal workings of the insurgency were assumed to be compromised to government forces. The VC dictated that in the case of a suspected defection higher headquarters had to be immediately notified. Protective measures had to be taken for agents and operators working in government controlled areas, combat plans modified, and the scheduled movement of equipment changed.

A graphical depiction of defector operations LOC’s appears in Figure 1. With the LOC’s established, the next step in the methodology will be to determine Al Qaeda’s Lines of Operations.

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60 Thompson, 90.
61 O’Brien, 22-23.
62 Koch, 130.
Figure 1. Defector operations lines of capability

Al Qaeda’s Lines of Operations

Insurgencies execute certain LOO’s in pursuit of their objective, these are: disseminating and popularizing the cause through Information Operations, maintaining Secrecy, Establishing a Safe Base of Operations, Establishing Support, Gaining New Members, and Creating and Maintaining Internal Structure. Al Qaeda is no exception; it too must execute these LOO’s in order to overthrow the regimes of the Middle East. Al Qaeda is a religiously motivated, global insurgency operating in the information age, which will alter its execution of the LOO’s. This chapter’s focus is on how Al Qaeda has chosen to execute the insurgency LOO’s.

In disseminating and popularizing the cause through Information Operations, Al Qaeda employs propaganda of the word and propaganda of the deed. Al Qaeda’s cause has two central themes. The first is the religious-based call for an Islamic caliphate.63 To build support and

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63 Blanchard, 13.
popularity for this cause Al Qaeda employs propaganda of the word by issuing religious proclamations to include fatwas. Bin Laden labels himself both the sheik and emir of the global Islamic movement within his fatwas. By using these dual titles Bin Laden claims the roles of both the religious and military leader of the movement. From this dual position of authority Bin Laden disseminates his religious-based justifications and commands to the Muslim world via the Internet as well as other electronic media. On the Internet Al Qaeda uses its own web site, Sawt al-Jihad, as well as the web sites of non-member supporters, such as Jihad Unspun operated by a Canadian. Al Qaeda’s online publications include a monthly magazine al-Khansa for female jihadists as well as Al-Battar, a militant training manual. The other aspect of Al Qaeda’s cause is an anti-West or anti-Western influence theme. Al Qaeda calls for the destruction of the Western governments, Israel, and those regimes in the Middle East that appose the caliphate. Propaganda of the word is employed in this cause through online videos and presentations of Muslims being repressed and attacked globally. Palestinian victims are a popular theme for generating jihad motivation among the Muslim world.

The second element of Al Qaeda’s LOO for disseminating and popularizing the cause is the propaganda of the deed. A captured Al Qaeda manual provides ten reasons for conducting special operations, five of which link propaganda of the deed with terrorist operations: “boosting Islamic morale and lowering that of the enemy, mocking the regime’s administration among the population, agitating [the population] regarding public matters, giving legitimacy to the Jama’a [Islamic group], rejecting compliance with and submission to the regime’s practices.” Al Qaeda tries to play off local grievances by its execution of propaganda of the deed. It attempts to unite

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64 Kilcullen, 3.
65 Ibid., 9.
66 Ibid., 9.
locally focused Islamic extremist elements into the Global Jihad. For example in the Poso region of Sulawesi, Indonesia Jema’ah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda’s regional ally, intentionally stirred up local sectarian grievances to attract recruits, funding, and anti-western propaganda in support of the larger global cause.68

Al Qaeda operates a robust and detailed Secrecy LOO. In the captured Al Qaeda manual 13 of the 18 lessons deal with security. These lessons include topics for the procuring and protecting of safe houses; communication to include face to face as well as telephone, letters, messenger, and wireless; training where the location as well as the participants identities are concealed; the procuring of weapons as well as a four step process to ensure the purchase is done safely; espionage to include overt as well as ‘undercover brothers’; and the writing of letters using invisible ink and ciphers. The manual uses case studies, from the Roman Legions to Word War II, to illustrate the importance of operating undetected among the enemy’s population and safe guarding secrets from detection. One of the fourteen prerequisites for new members is the ability to keep secrets. Koranic verses are quoted extolling the virtue of secret keepers including a specific reference to Mohammad’s ability to keep secrets from his wife.69 Al Qaeda’s security precautions extend to the Internet where potential on-line recruits are directed to use Yahoo Messenger for communication since it is more difficult to monitor than e-mail.70 The cellular structure that Al Qaeda adopts for its forward deployed teams is designed to minimize the damage from informants and infiltrators. Members’ identities, within cells, are concealed even

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68 Kilcullen, 9 and 12.

69 Al Qaeda.

from other members; their only contact is the cell leader.\textsuperscript{71} New members of Al Qaeda are given an alias to protect their identity and background. The only thing known about a member’s background is his nation of origin.\textsuperscript{72} There is even a cell within the leadership apparatus of Al Qaeda whose sole function is organizational security.\textsuperscript{73}

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 successfully denied that once Safe Base of Operations for Al Qaeda. But, according to the October 2004 issue of \textit{Al-Battar}, the Al Qaeda publication, Al Qaeda’s global force distribution expanded as a result of that operation. Now, instead of having one large safe base of operation, Al Qaeda is able to safely distribute its forces to multiple smaller safe havens.\textsuperscript{74} Al Qaeda has elements in over 40 countries.\textsuperscript{75} In his paper “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism”, David Kilcullen argues that denying Al Qaeda a safe base of operations is too difficult due to the presence of failed states and unadministered areas combined with ‘cyber-sanctuaries’ that allow the flow of financing and information.\textsuperscript{76} The information age has redefined the concept of insurgent sanctuaries. Al Qaeda moved from its safe base in Afghanistan to Sudan in 1991 because the physical isolation in Afghanistan limited its ability to influence events in the Arab region. This move supports the classic doctrine that an insurgency “unable to maintain links with the population…cannot develop and is bound to be defeated.”\textsuperscript{77} In 1996, however, Al Qaeda moved back to Afghanistan and was able to maintain required connectivity through satellite phones and the Internet. What was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[71] Al Qaeda.
\item[73] Gunaratna, 78.
\item[74] Site Institute, “Al-Qaeda Confirms and Praises Zarqawi’s Pledge of Fealty to Bin Laden,” Site Institute, \url{http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications9504&Category=publications&Subcategory=0} (accessed December 12, 2007).
\item[75] Kilcullen, 4.
\item[76] Ibid., 4 and 15.
\end{footnotes}
previously a liability, the isolation of Afghanistan, then became an asset; the isolation offered protection from the west.\textsuperscript{78} Since 2001, the sanctuary of Afghanistan has been compromised and Al Qaeda’s leadership has been able to find sanctuary in the unadministered tribal region of Pakistan. Though recent operations by Pakistan’s army are threatening this sanctuary Al Qaeda has been successful in executing its Safe Base of Operations LOO, establishing both a large safe haven for it leadership as well as multiple small safe havens for its globally distributed forces.

Al Qaeda’s LOO for generating and maintaining Support is unique compared to the communist insurgencies of the last century. Like many previous insurgencies, Al Qaeda uses familial and personal relationships to acquire and distribute funds, however, Al Qaeda also employs a robust network of front companies and the Internet to generate and move finances. Al Qaeda’s success at generating funding is unprecedented; it is estimated that Al Qaeda’s annual operating budget was $50 million in 2001.\textsuperscript{79} For the generation of funds, Al Qaeda employs four means predominantly: legitimate companies that Al Qaeda owns or is invested in; charitable organizations; illegal activity; and personal, cultural, or ideologically tied groups and individuals. In Sudan, Al Qaeda created a number of companies that generated revenue from multiple sources to include selling genes for hybrid cattle, leather production, furniture construction, infrastructure construction, and food processing. Among Al Qaeda’s investments in legitimate companies were a fishing fleet in Mombassa, a medical equipment company in Sweden, and a paper mill in Norway.\textsuperscript{80} Within Al Qaeda’s leadership structure there is a dedicated finance committee

\textsuperscript{78} Marc Sageman, \textit{Understanding Terror Networks} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 159.


\textsuperscript{80} Gunaratna, 90.
consisting of trained bankers and investors who work diligently to sustain financial growth.81 A large portion of Al Qaeda’s financing comes from charitable donations; the donors are both witting and unwitting supporters of Al Qaeda and the Global Jihad. An example of one such charity is the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). Under the auspice of helping Palestinian refugees the IIRO distributed funds to both Al Qaeda and Hamas.82 Due to Al Qaeda agent and sympathizer infiltration, donor agencies are often unable to control or even determine who the recipients of their funding are.83 A captured Al Qaeda operative who worked for a charitable organization admitted to filtering US$1 million to Al Qaeda during a one year period.84 For the raising of its illegal fund Al Qaeda operates both a cell within its headquarters as well as a distributed network for conducting credit card fraud. Al Qaeda has purchased equipment to both manufacture its own credit cards as well as pull credit card data from the Internet. Distributed cells of Al Qaeda operatives and supporters conduct credit card fraud globally and send the proceeds to the leadership.85 One cell uncovered in Britain raised nearly US$200,000 in a six month period, just part of the estimated US$1 million per month raised and sent to Al Qaeda from Europe.86 Because of the strong themes of pro-Arab and Muslim culture weaved into Al Qaeda’s propaganda there is a large support network based on religion, language, social values, and commonality of perspective whose members are willing to provide funding to Al Qaeda’s

81 Ibid., 81.
83 Gunaratna, 85.
85 Gunaratna, 87.
86 Ibid., 87.

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The vast oil wealth that flows within these same cultures ensures a significant economic resource from which to provide support.

In distributing capital Al Qaeda employs the same charities, relationships, and supporters as it does to raise finances. In addition, Al Qaeda employs the powerful *hawala* banking system. In spite of U.S. sanctions and regulations designed to establish accountability for this informal money transferring system, the global network is still a robust and effective means of moving money undetected. In Pakistan alone there were an estimated 1100 *hawala* institutes that moved US$5 billion annually with single transfer sums equal to US$10 million in 1999. This often-paperless means of moving large sums of cash reliably and without detection has served Al Qaeda well in the circumvention of United States and international attempts to disrupt their support LOO. One anecdotal example of how successful Al Qaeda has been in distributing their financial resources is that upon capture over a dozen Al Qaeda members had the equivalent of US$1,000-10,000 on them, four members had the cash equivalent of US$10,000-25,000, and two members the equivalent of US$40,000.

There are two elements to Al Qaeda’s LOO of Gaining New Membership neither of which can be termed recruiting. Within Al Qaeda’s leadership element there is not a dedicated cell for recruiting new members. Rather than a tradition top-down recruiting effort, the first element for Al Qaeda’s LOO whereby new members join the organization is a bottom-up process. In his book “Understanding Terror Networks” Marc Sageman conducts a critical analysis of Al Qaeda’s ability to gain new members. Sageman analyzes the individuals involved in both the U.S.

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87 Kilcullen, 9-10.
88 *Hawala* is an ancient money transferring system. The system does not move the actual funds between provider and recipient. Rather a *hawala* agent receives the funds from the provider then directs a partner agent, using the entire spectrum of communication means, to provide the amount of funds received, minus a transfer fee, to the recipient.
90 U.S. Department of Defense, “JTF-GTMO Information on Detainees,”
Millennial Plot and 9/11 as well as 150 Jihad participants. Sageman concludes that it is a three-pronged process for individuals to become part of Al Qaeda. The first prong is the establishment of “social affiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship.”\textsuperscript{91} In 75\% of the cases studied by Sageman, individuals who joined the jihad where either friends with or related to people already in the jihad. The relationships within both the Millennial Plot cell and the Hamburg cell of the 9/11 attacks were initially ones of friendships rather than religious convictions. These socially isolated young men sought each other’s company and support.\textsuperscript{92} The second prong is the “progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology.”\textsuperscript{93} Salafism demands personal sacrifice as a demonstration of faith. This sacrifice often leads to further separation between those who are members and everyone else. This furthering of social isolation draws the group tighter together.\textsuperscript{94} The final prong is “formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad.”\textsuperscript{95} This link is not a recruiter, rather it is someone with experience in the global jihad who the aspiring jihadist knows and seeks out. Members of the Hamburg cell initially wanted to go to Chechnya to fight the Russians, but interaction with the brother-in-law of a senior Al Qaeda member deviated their course to a training camp in Afghanistan. It was there that they were recruited for the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{96} Only 10-30\% of the thousands of training camp attendees were offered admittance to Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{97} Sageman’s three-pronged process is being replicated in cyberspace. Virtual relationships are being established on the Internet where violent videos of combat action draw the attention of young Muslims. Within the websites religious indoctrination

\textsuperscript{91} Sageman, 135.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 99-113.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 114-120.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 106.
takes place via video taped sermons and chat conversations. Most easily of all is the establishment of the required link to the jihad via the Internet. Young Muslims fill chat rooms with requests for guidance on how to join the jihad. The information age makes the fulfillment of these requests easy.  

The other element of Al Qaeda’s LOO for Gaining New Membership that further differentiates the organization from previous insurgencies is that pre-established, independent Islamic groups join Al Qaeda in mass. In the fall of 2006 the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat and an element of the Egyptian Islamic Group announced their fealty to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Overnight Al Qaeda’s membership and capability expanded. A key means of attracting the membership of both individuals and groups is the conducting of attacks. One of the ten reasons listed for conducting operations from the captured Al Qaeda manual is to attract new recruits.  

Al Qaeda’s LOO for Creating and Maintaining Internal Structure encompasses a well structured element for the command and control of the organization and a looser, harder-to-define element for interacting with the global network. The structured element for the movement leadership has Bin Laden at the top as the overall commander. Beneath Bin Laden is the shura majlis counsel. Subordinate to and reporting to the counsel are four committees: military, finance, Islamic study, and publicity. This structure is similar to a classic communist insurgency where the military wing was subordinate to the political. The element of Al Qaeda’s structure that ties

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97 Ibid., 120.
98 Bakier.
100 Al Qaeda.
101 Gunaratna, 77.
102 Thompson, 30.
into the global network of Islamic Jihadists is more difficult to define. Some descriptions of this other network categorize it as a “franchise” or “venture capital” system between Al Qaeda’s leadership and dispersed like-minded individuals or organizations. Kilcullen argues that Al Qaeda’s networked structure is more a system of patronage built upon familial relationships, financial exchanges, personal relationships, and support links. Al Qaeda lends support to these disparate elements in the form of financing, operational guidance, intelligence, and specialized skill sets via its affiliates. With the exception of 9/11, each of Al Qaeda’s attacks has occurred in theatres where there was a pre-existing Islamic insurgency. Not every Islamic insurgent organization is a part of Al Qaeda, but there are links with Al Qaeda affiliates. Terrorist attacks are not the only purpose of these links; “jihad is simply one activity that the network does, not the network itself.” Sageman describes the structure of Al Qaeda’s global capability as three systems feeding into the headquarters structure of Al Qaeda. The three systems are the Maghreb Arab, the Core Arab, and the South East Asian systems. The two Arab systems are fluidly structured, adjusting to the environment and conditions, while the South East Asian organization is more rigidly hierarchical. All three systems possess strong, continuous alliances with some of the locally, rather than globally, focused Islamic insurgencies within their regions. However they also have variable alliances and relationships with local insurgencies that change as objectives, tactics, and the environment change. This globally dispersed association of entities which share a common ideology and occasionally work in conjunction for that ideology is unique to Al Qaeda’s insurgency.


104 Kilcullen’s paper was written prior to Al Qaeda’s London attacks of July 2005. No information is provided regarding how Al Qaeda’s attack on the Madrid trains in March 2004 fits into this statement.

105 Kilcullen, 8-13.

106 Ibid., 14.

107 Sageman, 171-172.
It is obvious that Al Qaeda has done an excellent job of executing the insurgency LOO’s. Although it is debatable whether Al Qaeda is making any significant progress towards its objectives, there is no doubt that Al Qaeda has continued to operate in spite of a world wide effort to destroy it. The issue of Al Qaeda’s effectiveness at achieving its objective is irrelevant here. As long as Al Qaeda is capable of conducting attacks against the United States and its allies Al Qaeda’s existence will be unacceptable. In the execution of its LOO’s Al Qaeda has taken full advantage of the information age to redefine the concept of insurgency safe havens. It has used a two-pronged cause of pro-Islam and anti-West sentiment to rally supporters - both individuals and pre-existing organizations. It has resisted the urge to create a rigid hierarchical structure in favor of a flexible and more responsive network. This network takes advantage of and manipulates local issues for Al Qaeda’s global objectives. And most significantly, Al Qaeda has used its Arabic-Islamic culture as a nebulous yet resilient network to provide its sustenance. This structure includes financing as well as personnel and information resources to increase support and threaten global stability. A graphical depiction of Al Qaeda LOO’s appears in Figure 2:

Figure 2. Al Qaeda Lines of Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Operations (deed &amp; word)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy (members identity &amp; communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Safe Base of Operations (consolidated &amp; dispersed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Support (generating &amp; moving)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining New Members (individuals &amp; groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating and Maintaining Internal Structure (headquarters &amp; global)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With Al Qaeda’s LOO’s presented, the suitability of using a defector operation to attack these LOO’s will be determined. This determination will be made by contrasting capabilities with structure.

**Defector Operations vs. Al Qaeda**

Figure 3. Defector Operations LOCs vs Al Qaeda’s LOOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>(deed &amp; word)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>(consolidated &amp; dispersed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing</td>
<td>of Operations</td>
<td>(production &amp; distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>New Members</td>
<td>(individuals &amp; groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating and</td>
<td>Maintaining</td>
<td>Internal Structure (headquarters &amp; global)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A graphical depiction of defector operation’s LOC’s applied against Al Qaeda’s LOO’s appears in Figure 3. Each point of impact between a line of capability and a line of operation, denoted by a star, will be analyzed for the potential effects of a defector program. The analysis of contrasting defector operation’s LOC’s against Al Qaeda’s LOO’s cannot be done without incorporating the 2nd and 3rd steps of analysis mentioned in the introduction: feasibility and acceptability. There is an obvious correlation between how a defector program would affect Al Qaeda and how many members of Al Qaeda defect. Speculation on how successful the elicitation program would be against Al Qaeda is a product of the 2nd step of analysis. For determining the potential impact of defector operations on Al Qaeda the assumption is made that the elicitation of
Al Qaeda members is possible. The term ‘government’ as used in this chapter denotes an organization of nations, to include the United States, working together on a defector program. The proposed construct of this organization to include membership and operating procedures would be a product of the 3rd step of analysis. The assumption made here is that the organization consists of the United States, European nations either attacked by Al Qaeda or who have citizens in Al Qaeda, and Middle Eastern countries that are the target of Al Qaeda’s insurgency.

**Intelligence**

Defector-generated intelligence was deemed the greatest derivative advantage of defector programs in the last century and it would be the same with Al Qaeda. Secrecy is Al Qaeda’s most critical LOO. Al Qaeda must be free to operate in the countries upon which it has declared war. Al Qaeda is not capable, without long-range weapons, to project its power from its isolated safe haven in Pakistan. In order to conduct propaganda of the deed and generate the needed publicity and support Al Qaeda’s operatives have to physically penetrate these nations. Al Qaeda also relies on the vast financial wealth from charities that operate within these nations. Its front companies also rely on the stability of governed nations to generate funds. Any intelligence a defector provided whether regarding an operations cell, network, or financial system would be subject to immediate action by local and international law enforcement entities. Al Qaeda’s ability to generate new members in these target countries would also be jeopardized. Defectors would know the identity of the link that enabled their joining the organization. The critical link between Al Qaeda and other insurgent organization would also be compromised for if it became unsafe to associate with Al Qaeda then it would become unpopular as well.

There are elements of Al Qaeda that would appear less susceptible or negligibly affected by defector-generated intelligence. Al Qaeda’s propaganda of the word would continue to operate. Modern technology, specifically the Internet, allows for significant protection as well as adaptability in communicating to the masses. This holds true for communication between
individuals. Therefore the communication component of the secrecy LOO would experience negligible impact from a defector program. There are few insights a defector could provide into the propaganda component of Al Qaeda that the organization could not circumvent or create alternate procedures to negate. Al Qaeda’s safe bases in failed states and ungoverned areas are not necessarily threatened by intelligence along with its contained headquarters structure. The failure to date in capturing Bin Laden in Pakistan is not the result of inadequate intelligence, but rather the political and situational reality in that area. Even if a close confidant of Bin Laden’s were to defect, the intelligence that individual could provide would most likely not be adequate or substantial enough to allow for the time sensitive targeting of Bin Laden. The hawala network, Al Qaeda’s means of transferring funds, does not rely upon the veil of secrecy to operate. Rather the network’s simplicity, system of personal relationships, and vastness would make it resilient to defector intelligence.

**PSYOPS**

The National Security Strategy describes the War on Terror as a battle of ideas and the FM 3-24 states that one of the five overarching requirements for a successful COIN operation is to discredit the insurgent’s propaganda. PSYOPS plays a significant role in both of these endeavors, and defector supported PSYOPS would only increase PSYOPS effectiveness. Kilcullen writes that multiple aspects of Al Qaeda’s propaganda of the word are subject to debate. A defector, specifically one that spoke with some religious authority, could do considerable damage to Al Qaeda by denouncing their claimed religious authority and exposing their manipulation of Islamic text. Al Qaeda’s propaganda of the deed attacks would lose validity.

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109 Kilcullen, 7.
as legitimate jihad actions, becoming instead the murderous and violent machinations of a political insurgency. Supporters who currently finance the group out of religious principles would instead funnel their money to legitimate Islamic benefiting agencies, threatening the critical link between the Al Qaeda network and regional groups. Without religious authority a key link connecting Al Qaeda with regional jihad organizations would be severed. The effect of severing the link between Al Qaeda and a regional affiliate is demonstrated by the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. The question would become: how strong would Al Qaeda be with only an anti-Western cause? In Iraq Al Qaeda is being hunted by its former allies. Besides the assault on Al Qaeda’s religious cause, defector generated PSYOPS would also hamstring Al Qaeda’s ability to attract new members. This effort would not require a defector with religious authority, rather any mid or low-level defector who could dissuade the droves of potential recruits surfing the Internet from seeking membership in Al Qaeda would impinge Al Qaeda’s membership. The specific targets would be those young males currently residing in western nations whose local knowledge, cultural awareness, and passports Al Qaeda needs in order to operate in that region. A former disgruntled Muslim youth like themselves who could provide a first hand alternative opinion about life as a jihadist or the true sincerity of Al Qaeda’s objectives is most likely the best tool for preventing these youths from joining the cause.

PSYOPS, regardless of its quality, would have minimal to no impact on preventing Al Qaeda’s propaganda of the deed attacks, nor would it affect the hawala money transfer networks. There are certain individuals in Al Qaeda who will never be dissuaded from the validity of their cause; these people will continue to fight until they are captured or killed. This committed population includes the majority of the headquarters element. There are also those people who support or facilitate the organization for other-than-religiously reasons, such as financial gains. The act of invalidating Al Qaeda’s religious credibility is a significantly daunting one, but a
mandatory process in defeating Al Qaeda and the similar organizations that will follow behind it. Defector assisted PSYOPS can play a major role in the effort.

**Government Legitimacy**

By offering a reasonable, compassionate, and well-executed means for Al Qaeda members to quit the fight and reenter society, the United States along with the nations partnered in the program can degrade Al Qaeda’s information operations. Al Qaeda’s propaganda of the word would be affected by challenging the Al Qaeda theme that the established governments want to destroy either all Muslims or those Muslims who challenge the Middle Eastern authorities. Though a defector program would not completely eliminate the claims of persecution and unlawful assumption of power espoused by Al Qaeda it would be progress in the right direction. Government legitimacy would significantly undermine Al Qaeda’s espoused rationality for terrorist attacks and target a critical component of Al Qaeda’s tactics; significant portions of Al Qaeda’s victims are fellow Muslims. If the governments allied against Al Qaeda are popularly perceived to be reaching out to all Muslims while Al Qaeda is simultaneously attacking them the contrast between the two sides in the struggle would only be made clearer. Al Qaeda also portrays their violent actions as the only recourse available to their struggle. A well-publicized government program of defector support would serve to negate Al Qaeda’s justifications for terrorist attacks. Secondary effects of an increase in perceived government legitimacy and the corollary decrease in Al Qaeda’s legitimacy would be a reduction in publicly generated funding as well as membership.

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110 Ibid., 13.
COIN Force Enhancement

The LOC of COIN Force Enhancement through defector operations is potentially as valuable if not more so than defector generated intelligence. Not only does the LOC of force enhancement impact all of Al Qaeda’s LOO’s it does so in a fashion that allows COIN to be proactive. Where as intelligence, either from a defector or not, requires an action from the enemy to create that intelligence, Force Enhancement can create opportunities in spite of limited defectors or limited mistakes in Al Qaeda’s security measures. Defectors provide the COIN force with insight into the insurgent’s tactics, training, and procedures. If the COIN force is experiencing a dearth of quality intelligence, common in COIN efforts, they can more accurately and effectively direct their efforts proactively by knowing how the enemy operates. This is analogous to looking for a needle in a haystack with the foreknowledge of what the needle looks like, where it is most likely hidden, and why it was hidden that way. A law enforcement agency or military force that understands how the enemy operates is a much more formidable weapon than one blindly looking for clues. Insight gained from defectors does not just effect the kinetic actions against Al Qaeda’s LOO’s, but the full spectrum of the COIN effort. Kilcullen writes at length as to the criticality of cultural awareness in a COIN fight. He espouses that every individual, irrelevant of position, must possess a significant level of cultural awareness. The challenge of providing this culturally aware force, which Kilcullen states a professional army will never be able to do in significant numbers, is compounded by Al Qaeda’s global nature. Because Al Qaeda is engaged in an overlapping manner upon other regional issues, some dating back centuries, there will be multiple levels of culture effecting the environment wherever Al Qaeda operates.\footnote{111} The task of preparing a force capable of operating at these multiple levels simultaneously is daunting, but can be made significantly less so with the aid of individuals who have already operated or even grown up at those levels: defectors.
Insurgent Instability

In an insurgency, the struggle is for the popular support. As the government’s efforts in PSYOPS and government legitimacy are increased through the use of a defector program, the insurgent’s success at gaining popular support will naturally decrease. With a decrease in popular support, Al Qaeda will lose valuable support in financing, facilitating expansion through new members, and mission support. In attempting to limit the damage from defectors and to prevent further defections Al Qaeda would have to take countermeasures. The most obvious of countermeasures would be a clamp down on security. With each attempt to tighten security, however, Al Qaeda’s ability to conduct operations and maintain its disbursed network would be made more difficult. Sageman credits the failure of eight Al Qaeda plots to poor communication within the organization.\textsuperscript{112} As security is tightened, the ability of members to react to unanticipated complications during the planning and execution of attacks would only decrease. The tighter its security, the less agile a network becomes. Al Qaeda would also have to become more cautious with new members in order to prevent further compromise through more defections. The pool of potential new members would summarily decrease.

Conclusion

By understanding defector operation’s capabilities as well as Al Qaeda’s LOO’s it is clear that defector operations would be a suitable weapon against Al Qaeda. Defector operation’s capabilities provide impact across the spectrum of Al Qaeda operations without negative repercussions to the government. Although Al Qaeda is a powerful and intelligent adversary it must expose its weaknesses in order to achieve its objectives. Defector operations target those exposed weaknesses with efficient lethality. Countermeasures taken to prevent attack only serve

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 22 and 31.

\textsuperscript{112} Sageman, 167.
to degrade the organization more. Defector operations also serve to tighten alliances, bringing together partner nations in a positive endeavor that kinetic operations do not offer.

The true defeat of Al Qaeda will only occur when the Muslim populace denounces the idea of a radical, violent Islam. Even if every member of Al Qaeda were captured or killed today another group of individuals would unite to continue the cause as long as it is perceived as valid by enough supporters. Defector operations can target that cause with the most capable of weapons: the voices of former cause supporters. Therefore defector operations can transcend the existence of Al Qaeda and salt the fields that nourish the cause of radical Islam for generations to come.

As previously mentioned this paper alone does not provide the required research for the United States to establish an effective defector program against Al Qaeda. This paper, however, does successfully complete the first step: establishing that a defector operation is a suitable weapon against Al Qaeda. With the first step complete justification for follow on research to complete steps two and three is validated. It is recommended that in validating step two, establishing the feasibility of defector operations as a resource against Al Qaeda, an individual with a psychology education be used. In establishing feasibility it must be determined how a member of Al Qaeda would be elicited to defect. Historical case studies would be useful in determining key aspects of previous successful elicitations, but, even more productive would be interviews with members of Al Qaeda. Members of Al Qaeda detained in Guantanamo or repatriated to Saudi Arabia would be an invaluable source for determining what could be done or said to get their former compatriots to defect. Here a researcher with psychological training as well as knowledge of Arab culture and Islamic doctrine would be critical. To understand how someone evaluates choices and to be able to influence and manipulate those choices requires understanding of the mind as well as the target’s culture and beliefs. In validating step three, determining the acceptability of the required organization and operating structure to conduct a global defector program, a member with diplomatic experience should be used, such as a U.S.
State department official. In order to establish an effective defector operation against Al Qaeda several nations will have to agree on the process and components of the program. Multiple nations are required because Al Qaeda defectors could come from various countries. Therefore a potential defector would have citizenship and legal rights tied to their country of origin as well as, most likely, family members the defectors would like to return to. Nations that were victims of Al Qaeda attacks or that might have other justifications for seeking legal action against former members of Al Qaeda, would have to agree to a common treatment procedure for the defectors. If a member of Al Qaeda defects under the promise of good treatment, but is instead incarcerated upon his return home or is seized enroot by a third party nation, then the chance of eliciting further defections would be negligible. Creating a viable international agreement for the process of handling the defectors, both legally and physically, requires someone with experience in diplomatic protocol, procedure, and practice. When steps two and three are completed, then the United States can proceed with creating a defector program with an expectation of effectiveness that can expedite the demise of Al Qaeda.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


